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Fi8sVrs

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Everything posted by Fi8sVrs

  1. revenind la subiect: poti investi in orice, in bursa am cunostinte care fac schimburi cu 50k-100k profit 100 euro, asta in cateva secunde revenind iar la subiect un domeniu virusz.ro cu plata in btc, paypal, moneygram si ce mai vrei, alta cunostinta are in fine... off: referitor la numele ceasului de șpe mii de euro, pariu ca ai 'parola123' lowercase
  2. mai du-te in vest cu ceasul tau tag heuer monaco sixty nine cauta consultant de afaceri
  3. https://worldoftanks.ru/ Cu un pic de imaginatie pui plata btc, si corona ca tot e in trend cap sec
  4. Ceasule omul a intrebat de investitii... Poate contacta un consultant de afaceri nu e obligatoriu btc
  5. joc de strategie cmF6Ym9pdWwscm8= e liber Succes
  6. //grep.app searches code from over a half million public repositories on GitHub. We’re hoping to add more soon… It searches for the exact string you enter, including any punctuation or other characters. You can also search by regular expression, using the RE2 syntax https://grep.app Source.
  7. Searches For Threat Hunting and Security Analytics A collection of known log and / or event data searches for threat hunting and detection. They enumerate sets of searches used across many different data pipelines. Implementation details are for ELK. Adama is part of the SpaceCake project which is a set of hunts, searches, alerts, visualizations and data pipelines for for intrusion detection, security analytics and threat hunting using F/OSS (free and open source) tools Download git clone https://github.com/randomuserid/Adama.git Source
  8. ma baieti, am intrat cu vpn de China, Japonia, am buchisit pe acolo stirile, Stirea e pentru prosti, si e veche de prin 2017 mureau toti din emisiunea Asia Express, Pepe, Capatos, Maruta.. cameramani producatori pana acum, ah.. si toti care va imbracati din Dragonul Rosu (Bucuresti) Cius, avezi grije
  9. The US Navy has deployed ‘Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy,’ a new weapon better referred to as ODIN. This device is defensive in nature — it is designed to take down unwanted and potentially dangerous Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), more commonly called drones. The laser was installed on the USS Dewey, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer. Naval officials announced the deployment on February 20, explaining that this defensive laser system went from being a concept to a fully installed system in around 2.5 years. This is the first time a standalone system capable of functioning as a ‘dazzler’ has been operationally employed on a destroyer. ODIN was developed because UAS threats have ‘increased significantly,’ the Navy explains. The laser dazzler was installed on the destroyer back in November, but the US Navy has only revealed its deployment as of February. The technical details related to ODIN haven’t been revealed publicly for the obvious reason of needing to keep them a secret — if the way the system works are revealed, it could enable the development of new drone technologies that can beat the system. The USS Dewey will be used to conduct operations and experiments that will help shape the future deployment of this laser dazzler on other ships. This isn’t the first time the US Navy has detailed high-powered laser systems — in early May, for example, officials revealed that the Navy will install the HELIOS laser system from Lockheed Martin on the USS Preble in 2021. Via slashgear.com
  10. https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/startup_options/mac_spoofing/index.en.html#disable
  11. NEW BATTERY HACKS WILL ‘SPARK’ YOUR IMAGINATION 🔋💥 (2020 Magic Hacks by Rick Lax) https://www.facebook.com/realRickLax/videos/2365827827060663/
  12. apropo, de tot ai inviat mortii, cacatul acesta de copil e in blacklist http://panka.ru/9/454050.htm
  13. CNP,, parinti, vecini (de incredere)
  14. Fi8sVrs

    Fun stuff

    Ah si sa iti reamintesc ca am 50cm in bicepsi, 120 kg si daca ne intalnim din fata tasturii s-ar putea sa numai haha si hihihi cu toti dintii m-ai jignit de 3x pana acum
  15. Fi8sVrs

    Fun stuff

    nici pe mine nu ma amuza, in primul rand trebuia sa posteze in categoria potrivită (RST Bashed)
  16. Fi8sVrs

    Fun stuff

    tu ai inceput, si presupun ca nu ai mai mult de 14 ani, nici nu ti s-a uscat cerneala pe buletin /ti-a bubuit adrenalina in tine cand ai vazut atatea notificari (hahaha) credeai ca te cauta Alba ca Zapada si cei VII pitici, ti le scot ursule //ai dat aiurea dislike, ma referam la ANALOG nu DIGITAL,
  17. Bine ai revenit, ce user aveai?
  18. cat oferi sa iti facem un header asemănator cu https://bacaul.ro ?
  19. https://youtu.be/MgN4r1YufcI Tutorial: https://rstforums.com/forum/topic/69481-privacy-monitor-hacked-from-an-old-lcd-monitor/?tab=comments#comment-446411
  20. Researcher published details about a backdoor mechanism he found in HiSilicon chips, but he did not report it to the vendor due to the lack of trust in it. The Russian security expert Vladislav Yarmak has published technical details about a backdoor mechanism he discovered in HiSilicon chips. The backdoor mechanism could allow attackers to gain root shell access and full control of device. The expert also published a Proof of concept code for the vulnerability. The expert did not disclose the flaw to HiSilicon due to the lack of trust in the vendor to address the issue. HiSilicon is a Chinese fabless semiconductor company based in Shenzhen and owned by Huawei, it is the largest domestic designer of integrated circuits in China. HiSilicon is the largest domestic designer of integrated circuits in China, its chips are used by millions of IoT devices worldwide, including security cameras, DVRs, and NVRs. The presence of backdoor mechanisms in the HiSilicon chips was already documented by other experts in the past. More recent versions of the devices had access enabled with a static root can be recovered from with (relatively) little computation effort. More recent firmware versions had Telnet access and debug port (9527/tcp) disabled by default, but they had open port 9530/tcp that could be exploited by attackers to send a special command to start telnet daemon and enable shell access with a static password ([1], [2], [3]). Yarmak explained that it is possible to exploit the backdoor by sending a series of commands over TCP port 9530 to devices based on HiSilicon chips. The commands allow the attacker to enable the Telnet service on a flawed device, then the attacker could log in using one of the following six Telnet credentials, and gain access to a root account. Login Password root xmhdipc root klv123 root xc3511 root 123456 root jvbzd root hi3518 Below the backdoor activation process described by the expert: Client opens connection to port TCP port 9530 of device and sends string OpenTelnet:OpenOnce prepended with byte indicating total message length. This step is last for previous versions of backdoor. Probably telnetd was already started if there no response after this step. Server (device) anwers with string randNum:XXXXXXXX where XXXXXXXX is 8-digit random decimal number. Client uses it’s pre-shared key and constructs encryption key as concatenation of received random number and PSK. Client encrypts random number with encryption key and sends it after string randNum:. Entire message is prepended with byte indicating total length of message. Server loads same pre-shared key from file /mnt/custom/TelnetOEMPasswd or uses default key 2wj9fsa2 if file is missing. Server performs encryption of random number and verifies result is identical with string from client. On success server sends string verify:OK or verify:ERROR otherwise. Client encrypts string Telnet:OpenOnce, prepends it with total length byte, CMD: string and sends to server. Server extracts and decryptes received command. If decryption result is equal to string Telnet:OpenOnce it responds with Open:OK, enables debug port 9527 and starts telnet daemon. Yarmak pointed out that despite the presence of backdoor mechanism was reported by experts in the past, the vendor was not able to address them and only opted to disable the Telnet service. The bad news for the users is that currently even if no patch is available for the backdoor, the expert decided to publish a proof-of-concept (PoC) code. As mitigation, users are recommended to “completely restrict network access to these devices to trusted users.” According to the expert, there are dozens of brands and hundreds of model vulnerable to hack, he referred to previous research conducted by another researcher that listed some of the vulnerable brands. window._mNHandle = window._mNHandle || {}; window._mNHandle.queue = window._mNHandle.queue || []; medianet_versionId = “3121199”; try { window._mNHandle.queue.push(function () { window._mNDetails.loadTag(“762221962”, “300×250”, “762221962”); }); } catch (error) {} Via
  21. Overview This is a function that calculates the Gini coefficient of a numpy array. Gini coefficients are often used to quantify income inequality, read more here . The function in gini.py is based on the third equation from here, which defines the Gini coefficient as: Examples For a very unequal sample, 999 zeros and a single one, >>> from gini import * >>> a = np.zeros((1000)) >>> a[0] = 1.0 the Gini coefficient is very close to 1.0: >>> gini(a) 0.99890010998900103 For uniformly distributed random numbers, it will be low, around 0.33: >>> s = np.random.uniform(-1,0,1000) >>> gini(s) 0.3295183767105907 For a homogeneous sample, the Gini coefficient is 0.0: >>> b = np.ones((1000)) >>> gini(b) 0.0 Input Assumptions The Gini calculation by definition requires non-zero positive (ascending-order) sorted values within a 1d vector. This is dealt with within gini(). So these four assumptions can be violated, as they are controlled for: def gini(array): """Calculate the Gini coefficient of a numpy array.""" # based on bottom eq: http://www.statsdirect.com/help/content/image/stat0206_wmf.gif # from: http://www.statsdirect.com/help/default.htm#nonparametric_methods/gini.htm array = array.flatten() #all values are treated equally, arrays must be 1d if np.amin(array) < 0: array -= np.amin(array) #values cannot be negative array += 0.0000001 #values cannot be 0 array = np.sort(array) #values must be sorted index = np.arange(1,array.shape[0]+1) #index per array element n = array.shape[0]#number of array elements return ((np.sum((2 * index - n - 1) * array)) / (n * np.sum(array))) #Gini coefficient Notes It is significantly faster than (the current implementation of) PySAL's Gini coefficient function (see pysal.inequality.gini) and outputs are indistinguishable before approximately 6 decimal places. In other words, the two functions are arithmetically identical. It is slightly faster than the Gini coefficient function by David on Ellipsix. Many other Gini coefficient functions found online do not produce equivalent results, hence why I wrote this. Download Source
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