Jump to content

All Activity

This stream auto-updates

  1. Today
  2. Last week
  3. Lista de RPC-uri pentru ping: http://rpc.pingomatic.com/ http://rpc.icerocket.com:10080/ http://blogsearch.google.com/ping/RPC2 http://1470.net/api/ping http://api.feedster.com/ping http://api.moreover.com/RPC2 http://api.moreover.com/ping http://api.my.yahoo.com/RPC2 http://api.my.yahoo.com/rss/ping http://bblog.com/ping.php http://bitacoras.net/ping http://blog.goo.ne.jp/XMLRPC http://blogdb.jp/xmlrpc http://blogmatcher.com/u.php http://bulkfeeds.net/rpc http://coreblog.org/ping/ http://mod-pubsub.org/kn_apps/blogchatt http://www.lasermemory.com/lsrpc/ http://ping.amagle.com/ http://ping.bitacoras.com http://ping.blo.gs/ http://ping.bloggers.jp/rpc/ http://ping.cocolog-nifty.com/xmlrpc http://ping.blogmura.jp/rpc/ http://ping.exblog.jp/xmlrpc http://ping.feedburner.com http://ping.myblog.jp http://ping.rootblog.com/rpc.php http://ping.syndic8.com/xmlrpc.php http://ping.weblogalot.com/rpc.php http://ping.weblogs.se/ http://pingoat.com/goat/RPC2 http://rcs.datashed.net/RPC2/ http://rpc.blogbuzzmachine.com/RPC2 http://rpc.blogrolling.com/pinger/ http://rpc.icerocket.com:10080/ http://rpc.newsgator.com/ http://rpc.pingomatic.com http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping http://rpc.weblogs.com/RPC2 http://topicexchange.com/RPC2 http://trackback.bakeinu.jp/bakeping.php http://www.a2b.cc/setloc/bp.a2b http://www.bitacoles.net/ping.php http://www.blogdigger.com/RPC2 http://www.blogoole.com/ping/ http://www.blogoon.net/ping/ http://www.blogpeople.net/servlet/weblogUpdates http://www.blogroots.com/tb_populi.blog?id=1 http://www.blogshares.com/rpc.php http://www.blogsnow.com/ping http://www.blogstreet.com/xrbin/xmlrpc.cgi http://www.mod-pubsub.org/kn_apps/blogchatter/ping.php http://www.newsisfree.com/RPCCloud http://www.newsisfree.com/xmlrpctest.php http://www.popdex.com/addsite.php http://www.snipsnap.org/RPC2 http://www.weblogues.com/RPC/ http://xmlrpc.blogg.de http://xping.pubsub.com/ping/ http://rpc.copygator.com/ping/
  4. Kev

    Caut Administrator/i

    IT , sa nu faca prostii utilizatorii Sper sa pot pleca pe la sfarsitul lunii urmatoare (iulie - august) Edit:/ gen spam, scam, s.a.m.d.
  5. Pe ce nisa sunt blog-urile? Ce ai nevoie mai exact pentru administrare? Cat timp ai nevoie sa fie administrate?
  6. Salut, detin 5 blog-uri, urmeaza sa ma internez intr-un spital din Europa, unde am acces la TV doar pe YouTube, dureaza sa iau acces la tot (Google, Yandex, RST, etc..) Este cineva de incredere? imi poate lãsa mesaj privat. Multumesc anticipat.
  7. Cred ca se refera la faptul ca e o nevoie acuta de video-uri in limba romana care sa demonstreze proiectele astea. Nu prea sunt pe youtube in lb romana.
  8. Eu nu folosesc neaparat RPC de la google, Am o lista de server, Interesanta ideea de a folosi api-ul direct de la google. din ce citesc The Indexing API allows any site owner to directly notify Google when pages are added or removed. This allows Google to schedule pages for a fresh crawl, which can lead to higher quality user traffic. <b> Currently, the Indexing API can only be used to crawl pages with either JobPosting or BroadcastEvent embedded in a VideoObject</b>. For websites with many short-lived pages like job postings or livestream videos, the Indexing API keeps content fresh in search results because it allows updates to be pushed individually. Ei recomanda sa faci ping la sitemap mai degraba . Observ ca acea limita de 200 se poate creste prin submit de request. Oricum interesant topicul
  9. Ping-ul pe rpc nu functioneaza pentru mine pentru site-uri noi, mai rapid am indexat in google cu metoda din topic.
  10. Faceti liber codul ? Mi se pare interesant proiectul plus ca am si eu un ESP32 si un arduino prin casa
  11. De ce nu sa folosesti RPC servers cred ca e mai usor Eu folosesc chestia asta intr-un cms facut cu laravel si de fiecare data cand creez un post nou am un job care ping-uieste o lista de 2000 de website-uri ce folosesc RPC. Deobicei imi apare in google in media intr-o ora sau 2
  12. MEGA is a leading cloud storage platform with more than 250 million users and 1000 Petabytes of stored data, which aims to achieve user-controlled end-to-end encryption. We show that MEGA's system does not protect its users against a malicious server and present five distinct attacks, which together allow for a full compromise of the confidentiality of user files. Additionally, the integrity of user data is damaged to the extent that an attacker can insert malicious files of their choice which pass all authenticity checks of the client. We built proof-of-concept versions of all the attacks, showcasing their practicality and exploitability. Background MEGA is a cloud storage and collaboration platform founded in 2013 offering secure storage and communication services. With over 250 million registered users, 10 million daily active users and 1000 PB of stored data, MEGA is a significant player in the consumer domain. What sets them apart from their competitors such as DropBox, Google Drive, iCloud and Microsoft OneDrive is the claimed security guarantees: MEGA advertise themselves as the privacy company and promise User-Controlled end-to-end Encryption (UCE). We challenge these security claims and show that an adversarial service provider, or anyone controlling MEGA’s core infrastructure, can break the confidentiality and integrity of user data. Key Hierarchy At the root of a MEGA client’s key hierarchy, illustrated in the figure below, is the password chosen by the user. From this password, the MEGA client derives an authentication key and an encryption key. The authentication key is used to identify users to MEGA. The encryption key encrypts a randomly generated master key, which in turn encrypts other key material of the user. For every account, this key material includes a set of asymmetric keys consisting of an RSA key pair (for sharing data with other users), a Curve25519 key pair (for exchanging chat keys for MEGA’s chat functionality), and a Ed25519 key pair (for signing the other keys). Furthermore, for every file or folder uploaded by the user, a new symmetric encryption key called a node key is generated. The private asymmetric keys and the node keys are encrypted by the client with the master key using AES-ECB and stored on MEGA’s servers to support access from multiple devices. A user on a new device can enter their password, authenticate to MEGA, fetch the encrypted key material, and decrypt it with the encryption key derived from the password. Attacks RSA Key Recovery Attack MEGA can recover a user's RSA private key by maliciously tampering with 512 login attempts. Plaintext Recovery MEGA can decrypt other key material, such as node keys, and use them to decrypt all user communication and files. Framing Attack MEGA can insert arbitrary files into the user's file storage which are indistinguishable from genuinely uploaded ones. Integrity Attack The impact of this attack is the same as that of the framing attack, trading off less stealthiness for easier pre-requisites. GaP-Bleichenbacher Attack MEGA can decrypt RSA ciphertexts using an expensive padding oracle attack. RSA Key Recovery Attack MEGA uses RSA encryption for sharing node keys between users, to exchange a session ID with the user at login and in a legacy key transfer for the MEGA chat. Each user has a public RSA key pksharepkshare used by other users or MEGA to encrypt data for the owner, and a private key skshareskshare used by the user themselves to decrypt data shared with them. The private RSA key is stored for the user in encrypted form on MEGA’s servers. Key recovery means that an attacker successfully gets possession of the private key of a user, allowing them to decrypt ciphertexts intended for the user. We discovered a practical attack to recover a user’s RSA private key by exploiting the lack of integrity protection of the encrypted keys stored for users on MEGA’s servers. An entity controlling MEGA’s core infrastructure can tamper with the encrypted RSA private key and deceive the client into leaking information about one of the prime factors of the RSA modulus during the session ID exchange. More specifically, the session ID that the client decrypts with the mauled private key and sends to the server will reveal whether the prime is smaller or greater than an adversarially chosen value. This information enables a binary search for the prime factor, with one comparison per client login attempt, allowing the adversary to recover the private RSA key after 1023 client logins. Using lattice cryptanalysis, the number of login attempts required for the attack can be reduced to 512. Proof of Concept Attack Since the server code is not published, we cannot implement a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) in which the adversary actually controls MEGA. Instead, we implemented a MitM attack by installing a bogus TLS root certificate on the victim. This setup allows the attacker to impersonate MEGA towards the user while using the real servers to execute the server code (which is unknown to us). Server responses can be patched on the fly since they do not rely on secrets stored by the server, allowing the attack to be performed in real time as the victim interacts with MEGA. The following video shows how our attack recovers the first byte of the RSA private key. Afterward, we abort the attack to avoid any adverse impact on MEGA’s production servers. For each recovered bit, the attack consists of the following steps: The victim logs in. The adversary hijacks the login and replaces the correct session ID with their probe for the next secret bit. Based on the client’s response, the adversary updates its interval for the binary search of the RSA prime factor. The login fails for the victim. This is only a limitation of the MitM setup, since the correct SID is lost. An adversarial cloud storage provider can simply accept the returned SID. Note that after aborting the attack, the search interval is [0xe03ff...f, 0xe07ff...f]. The secret prime factor qq of the RSA modulus starts with 0xe06.... This value is within the search interval and the adversary already recovered the first byte 0xe0. Using all of qq, the adversary can recover the RSA private key (d,N)(d,N) using the public key (e,N)(e,N) as p=N/qp=N/q and d=e−1mod(p−1)(q−1)d=e−1mod(p−1)(q−1). Video: https://mega-awry.io/videos/rsa_key_recovery_poc.mp4 Plaintext Recovery As shown in the key hierarchy MEGA clients encrypt the private keys for sharing, chat key transfer, and signing with the master key using AES-ECB. Furthermore, file and folder keys also use the same encryption. A plaintext recovery attack lets the adversary compute the plaintext from a given ciphertext. In this specific attack, MEGA can decrypt AES-ECB ciphertexts created with a user’s master key. This gives the attacker access to the aforementioned and highly sensitive key material encrypted in this way. With the sharing, chat, signing, and node keys of a user, the adversary can decrypt the victim’s data or impersonate them. This attack exploits the lack of key separation for the master key and knowledge of the recovered RSA private key (e.g., from the RSA key recovery attack). The decryption oracle again arises during authentication, when the encrypted RSA private key and the session ID (SID), encrypted with the RSA public key, is sent from MEGA’s servers to the user. MEGA can overwrite part of the RSA private key ciphertext in the SID exchange with two target ciphertext blocks. It then uses the SID returned by the client to recover the plaintext for the two target blocks. Since all key material is protected with AES-ECB under the master key, an attacker exploiting this vulnerability can decrypt node keys, the victim’s Ed25519 signature key, its Curve25519 chat key, and, thus, also all exchanged chat keys. Given that the private RSA key has been recovered, one client login suffices to recover 32 bytes of encrypted key material, corresponding, for instance, to one full node key. Framing Attack This attack allows MEGA to forge data in the name of the victim and place it in the target’s cloud storage. While the previous attacks already allow an adversary to modify existing files using the compromised keys, this attack allows the adversary to preserve existing files or add more documents than the user currently stores. For instance, a conceivable attack might frame someone as a whistle-blower and place an extensive collection of internal documents in the victim’s cloud storage. Such an attack might gain credibility when it preserves the user’s original cloud content. To create a new file key, the attacker makes use of the particular format that MEGA uses for node keys. Before they are encrypted, node keys are encoded into a so called obfuscated key object, which consists of a reversible combination of the node key and information used for decryption of the file or folder. (Specifically, a nonce and a truncated MAC tag.) Since none of our attacks allow an attacker to encrypt values of their choosing with AES-ECB under the master key, the attacker works in the reverse direction to create a new valid obfuscated key object. That is, it first obtains an obfuscated key by decrypting a randomly sampled key ciphertext using the plaintext recovery attack. Note that this ciphertext can really be randomly sampled from the set of all bit strings of the length of one encrypted obfuscated key object. Decryption will always succeed, since the AES-ECB encryption mode used to encrypt key material does not provide any means of checking the integrity of a ciphertext. The resulting string is not under the control of the adversary and will be random-looking, but can regardless be used as a valid obfuscated key object since both file keys and the integrity information (nonces and MAC tags) can be arbitrary strings. Hence, the adversary parses the decrypted string into a file key, a nonce and MAC tag. It then modifies the target file which is to be inserted into the victim’s cloud such that it passes the integrity check when the file key and integrity information from the obfuscated key is used. The attacker achieves this by inserting a single AES block in the file at a chosen location. Finally, the adversary uses the known file key to encrypt the file and uploads the result to the victim’s cloud. Many standard file formats such as PNG and PDF tolerate 128 injected bits (for instance, in the file’s metadata, as trailing data, or in unused structural components) without affecting the displayed content. The image above shows the file our proof of concept inserts in the victim account. Our attack added the highlighted bytes to satisfy the integrity check. Due to the structure of PNG files, these bytes do not change the displayed pixels, i.e., it is visually identical to the unmodified image. Proof-of-Concept Attack The PoC shows our framing attack in the MitM setting described in the RSA private key recovery attack. The video shows the following steps: The victim logs into their account without any attack running. There are only three files in the cloud storage and none of them is called hacker-cat.png. The victim logs out and the adversary runs the plaintext recovery attack once. This involves the following steps: The adversary hijacks the victim’s login attempt and replaces the encrypted SID with the encrypted key that it picked for the file forgery. The victim’s client responds with the decrypted SID, from which the adversary can recover the plaintext for the injected ciphertext blocks. The log in attempt fails, which is only a limitation of the MitM setting. A malicious cloud provider can perform this attack without the user noticing. The adversary uses the key recovered in the previous step to forge an encrypted file. The victim logs in again. The adversary injects the forged file into the loaded file tree. The victim’s cloud now displays four files, including a new file called hacker-cat.png. When the user views this file in the browser, it correctly decrypts and shows the image. Video: https://mega-awry.io/videos/framing_attack_poc.mp4 Integrity Attack This attack exploits the peculiar structure of MEGA’s obfuscated key objects to manipulate an encrypted node key such that the decrypted key consists of all zero bytes. Since the attacker now knows the key, this key manipulation can be used to forge a file in a manner similar to the framing attack. Unlike for the framing attack (which requires the ability to decrypt arbitrary AES-ECB ciphertexts), for this attack the adversary only needs access to a single plaintext block and the corresponding ciphertext encrypted with AES-ECB under the master key. For instance, the attacker can use MEGA’s protocol for public file sharing to obtain the pair: when a user shares a file or folder publicly, they create a link containing the obfuscated key in plaintext. Hence, a malicious cloud provider who obtains such a link knows both the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext for the node key, since the latter is uploaded to MEGA when the file was created (before being shared). This can then be used as the starting point for the key manipulation and allows a forged file ciphertext to be uploaded into the victim’s cloud, just as for the framing attack. However, this attack is less surreptitious than the framing attack because of the low probability of the all-zero key appearing in an honest execution, meaning that an observant user who inspects the file keys stored in their account could notice that the attack has been performed. GaP-Bleichenbacher Attack This attack is a novel variant of Bleichenbacher’s attack on PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. We call it a Guess-and-Purge (GaP) Bleichenbacher attack. MEGA can use this attack to decrypt RSA ciphertexts by exploiting a padding oracle in the fallback chat key exchange of MEGA’s chat functionality. The vulnerable RSA encryption is used for sharing node keys between users, to exchange a session ID with the user at login and in a legacy key transfer for the MEGA chat. As shown in the key hierarchy, each user has a public RSA key used by other users or MEGA to encrypt data for the owner, and a private key used by the user themselves to decrypt data shared with them. With this attack, MEGA can decrypt these RSA ciphertexts, albeit requiring an impractical number of login attempts. Attack idea: The original Bleichenbacher attack maintains an interval for the possible plaintext value of a target ciphertext. It exploits the malleability of RSA to test the decryption of multiples of the unknown target message. Successful unpadding leaks the prefix of the decrypted message due to the structure of the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. This prefix allows an adversary to reduce intervals efficiently and recover the plaintext. MEGA uses a custom padding scheme which is less rigid than PKCS#1 v1.5. This makes it challenging to apply Bleichenbacher’s attack, because a successful unpadding no longer corresponds to a single solution interval. Instead many disjoint intervals are possible, depending on the value of an unknown prefix in MEGA’s padding scheme. Our attack devices a new Guess-and-Purge strategy that guesses the unknown prefix and quickly purges wrong guesses. This enables us to perform a search for the decryption of a ciphertext in 216.9216.9 client login attempts on average. Although this attack is weaker than the RSA key recovery attack (in the sense that a key recovery implies plaintext recovery), it is complementary in the vulnerabilities that it exploits and requires different attacker capabilities. It attacks the legacy chat key decryption of RSA encryption instead of the session ID exchange and can be performed by a slightly weaker adversary since no key-overwriting is necessary. The details of the GaP-Bleichenbacher attack are intricate. For a full description, see Appendix B of the paper. Sources: https://mega-awry.io/ https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/researchers-uncover-ways-to-break.html https://blog.mega.io/mega-security-update/
  13. In 2022 va avea loc a treia ediție a Romanian Cyber Security Challenge - RoCSC, un eveniment anual de tip CTF ce urmărește să descopere tinere talente în domeniul securității cibernetice. La competiție pot participa tineri dornici să își demonstreze abilitățile, ce se pot înscrie online până în ziua concursului. Participanții se vor întrece pe 3 categorii de concurs: Juniori (16-20 de ani), Seniori (21-25 de ani) și Open (disponibil indiferent de vârstă). Participarea este gratuită. Tinerii vor trebui să-și demonstreze abilitățile în domenii precum mobile & web security, crypto, reverse engineering și forensics. Primii clasați la RoCSC22 vor avea oportunitatea de a reprezenta România la Campionatul European de Securitate Cibernetică - ECSC22. Calendarul ROCSC22: Etapa de calificare: 22.07 ora 16:00 - 23.07 ora 22:00 Finala ROCSC22: 06.08 Bootcamp pentru selectia echipei pentru competitia ECSC22: 17.08 - 21.08 Premii: Categoria Juniori: Locul I: 2000 euro Locul II: 1000 euro Locul III: 500 euro Locurile 4-10: premii speciale Categoria Seniori: Locul I: 2000 euro Locul II: 1000 euro Locul III: 500 euro Locurile 4-10: premii speciale Pentru a fi eligibili pentru premii, jucătorii trebuie să trimită prezentarea soluțiilor la contact@cyberedu.ro. Jucătorii care participă la categoria Open vor primi doar puncte pe platforma CyberEDU și nu sunt eligibili pentru premii. Competiția este organizată de Centrul Național Cyberint din cadrul Serviciului Român de Informații, Directoratul National de Securitate Cibernetica și Asociația Națională pentru Securitatea Sistemelor Informatice - ANSSI, alături de partenerii Orange România, Bit Sentinel, CertSIGN, Cisco, UIPath, KPMG, Clico, PaloAlto Networks. Programul ROCSC 2022 Inscrierile se fac pana la data de 22 Iulie 2022: Etapa de calificare: 22.07 ora 16:00 - 23.07 ora 22:00 Finala ROCSC22: 06.08 Bootcamp pentru selectia echipei pentru competitia ECSC22: 17.08 - 21.08 Pentru înscriere, apăsați aici. https://www.rocsc.ro/
  14. Am testat eu, functioneaza Tethering Bluetooth sony + alt device (nu-mi permite Android-ul Cablu nu gasesc in sat Thanks man, insa nu gasesc, am gasit doar RCA, online ma abtin
  15. Earlier
  16. Cred ca tu ai nevoie de boxa care suporta TWS. Eu am o boxa de genu asteia si stiu ca suporta inca una (n-am testat)
  17. Aduni asta https://www.emag.ro/receiver-audio-ugreen-aux-3-5-mm-micro-usb-bluetooth-5-0-aptx-alb-6957303848546/pd/DS5383MBM/?cmpid=86939&gclid=Cj0KCQjw2MWVBhCQARIsAIjbwoNI9USUvE3CzMRerfAA-rSuY91SgygRRbtQqC4MdVvav-V6W9DfRoUaAmNvEALw_wcB cu asta https://www.dhgate.com/product/dual-3-5mm-earbud-earphone-splitter-aux-cable/394070510.html Calitate proasta, dar macar ai audio pe ambele boxe Sau iti iei niste boxe care au fost facute din fabrica sa poata fi folosite si in stereo (Gen Sony SRS-XB13/12)
  18. cablu aux boxe - conectezi la o sursa cablu aux boxe bluetooth - conectezi la o sursa Tu vrei sa conectezi sursa la sursa, nu se poate. Cred ca ar merge ce vrei tu sa faci cu un splitter de aux cu 2xmother -> sursa
  19. Bun, deci am doua boxe portabile cu auxiliar (in-put) si bluetooth am cautat si am gasit cablu jack <||------||> pot conecta ambele boxe intre ele, iar ulterior sa ma conectez la ele prin bluetooth? Nu gasesc cablu jack Y Nu-mi permite adroid-ul, stiu ca se poate, testat prin bluetooth
  20. Kev

    DALL-E 2.0

    DALL·E 2 can create original, realistic images and art from a text description. It can combine concepts, attributes, and styles. Register: https://openai.com/dall-e-2/ Source: Primit de la un amic. Enjoy
  21. One by one. Use youtube-dl or other similar tools.
  22. Hello, How do you download the videos?
  23. Do not rely on what I'm saying but it might be related to how Garbage Collector works, it is asynchronous and does not perform the cleanup action exactly when called. Although gc() is explicitely called it seems to act as a "suggestion" not an enforcement for cleanup.
  1. Load more activity
  • Create New...