Jump to content
Usr6

Photonic Side Channel Attacks Against RSA

Recommended Posts

Posted

Photonic Side Channel Attacks Against RSA

Elad Carmon, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Avishai Wool
Abstract
This paper describes the first attack utilizing the photonic side channel against a public-key crypto-system.

We evaluated three common implementations of RSA modular exponentiation, all using the Karatsuba multiplication method.

We discovered that the key length had marginal impact onresilience to the attack: attacking a 2048-bit key required only 9% more decryption attempts than a 1024-bit key.
We found that the most dominant parameter impacting the attacker’s effort is the minimal block size at which the Karatsuba method reverts to naive multiplication: even for parameter values as low as 32 or 64 bits our attacks achieve 100% success rate with under 10,000 decryption operations. Somewhat surprisingly, we discovered that Montgomery’s Ladder—commonly perceived as the most resilient of the three implementations to side-channel attacks—was actually the most susceptible: for 2048-bit keys, our attack reveals 100% of the secret key bits with as few as 4000 decryptions.

 

Link: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/108.pdf

  • Upvote 3

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.



×
×
  • Create New...