Jump to content
Sign in to follow this  
Usr6

Photonic Side Channel Attacks Against RSA

Recommended Posts

Photonic Side Channel Attacks Against RSA

Elad Carmon, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Avishai Wool
Abstract
This paper describes the first attack utilizing the photonic side channel against a public-key crypto-system.

We evaluated three common implementations of RSA modular exponentiation, all using the Karatsuba multiplication method.

We discovered that the key length had marginal impact onresilience to the attack: attacking a 2048-bit key required only 9% more decryption attempts than a 1024-bit key.
We found that the most dominant parameter impacting the attacker’s effort is the minimal block size at which the Karatsuba method reverts to naive multiplication: even for parameter values as low as 32 or 64 bits our attacks achieve 100% success rate with under 10,000 decryption operations. Somewhat surprisingly, we discovered that Montgomery’s Ladder—commonly perceived as the most resilient of the three implementations to side-channel attacks—was actually the most susceptible: for 2048-bit keys, our attack reveals 100% of the secret key bits with as few as 4000 decryptions.

 

Link: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/108.pdf

  • Upvote 3

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Sign in to follow this  

×
×
  • Create New...