Aerosol Posted January 5, 2015 Report Posted January 5, 2015 1. Executive summary 32. Introduction 43. Infection vector 53.1 Download page 63.2 CAPTCHA 73.3 Word document with VBA macros 84. Overall scheme 95. Malware analysis 115.1 Obfuscation 115.1.1 Dropper 115.1.2 Launcher 125.2 Local store 125.3 SMTP credentials and address book stealing 135.4 Network protocol 13 5.4.1 Choosing a C&C server 13 5.4.2 Communication protocol 14 5.4.3 Victim identification code generation 155.5 Cryptography 166. Decryption software analysis 187. Similarity with Hesperbot banking trojan 197.1 Malware distribution page similarity 197.2 C&C server reuse 197.3 PDB path 198. Statistics 218.1 Methodology 218.2 Results 219. Conclusion 2410. Acknowledgement 2511. References 2512. Appendixes 27Appendix A: Screenshots of CAPTCHA-enabled download pages 27Appendix B: List of known domains hosting download page 31Appendix C: List of known Onion URLs delivering payment information 35Appendix D: Domains in TorrentLocker DGA 36Appendix E: List of file types encrypted by TorrentLocker 37Appendix F: List of hardcoded keys 38Appendix G: List of samples 39Read more here: http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/torrent_locker.pdf Quote