Nytro Posted February 19, 2015 Report Posted February 19, 2015 When Cryptographic API Design Goes WrongFebruary 18, 2015Ionu? AmbrosieWhether we like to admit it or not, failing to account for human factors and usability issues when designing secure systems can have unwanted consequences. And while Security Usability is a broad field, today I’d like to focus on what I like to call the [lack of] usability of [some] cryptographic APIs.A paper on SSL Certificate ValidationTo get my point across, I’d like to bring forth a paper written in 2012 by Martin Georgiev, Subodh Iyengar, Suman Jana, Rishita Anubhai, Dan Boneh, and Vitaly Shmatikov, called The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software.In this paper, the authors claim and empirically confirm that SSL certificate validation is completely broken in many security-critical applications and libraries, meaning that any SSL connection initiated from any of these applications and libraries is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack.They credit these vulnerabilities to badly designed APIs of SSL implementations and data-transport libraries, which present developers with a confusing array of settings and options.Articol complet: http://securitycafe.ro/2015/02/18/when-cryptographic-api-design-goes-wrong/ Quote