Nytro

DOM Clobbering Thursday, 16 May 2013 The DOM is a mess. In an effort to support legacy quick short cuts such as “form.name” etc the browsers have created a Frankenstein monster. This is well known of course but I just wonder how far the rabbit hole goes. I’m gonna share what I discovered over the years. HTML Collections First up is my favourite “HTML Collections”, when html elements are combined into groups they become a collection. You can actually force a collection by giving an element the same name. Such as: <input id=x><input id=x><script>alert(x)</script> On IE “x” alerts “Object HTML Collection”. What’s interesting is there are two ways of doing this, via name and via id, because it’s an array like structure you can reference each element by the order they appear in the collection e.g. collection[0] is the first element. We can use this functionality to “clobber” variables into window to create some interesting stuff. An example of this: <a href="invalid:1" id=x name=y>test</a> <a href="invalid:2" id=x name=y>test</a> <script>alert(x.y[0])</script> What is especially odd is that a collection constructed like this can refer to itself forever, for example: <script> alert(x.y.x.y.x.y[0]); alert(x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.y.x.y.x.y[0]); </script> When the elements become a collection this of course removes the normal properties/methods on the HTML element if it was being referenced by name. <a href=1 name=x>test</a> <a href=1 name=x>test</a> <script> alert(x.removeChild)//undefined alert(x.parentNode)//undefined </script> You can see how that could cause problems Variable assignments cause anchor href modifications This is a very old bug probably a few years old now, it was rediscovered by @gsnedders. On IE a global variable with the same name as an anchor element caused modification of that anchors href. For example <a href="123" id=x>test</a> <script> x='javascript:alert(1)'//only in compat! ;</script> If you have an anchor named “x” and an assignment with the same name then even if it is fully encoded you can still inject XSS by modifying the anchor directly. Framebusters busted Lastly on my trip down memory lane I have another interesting bug that was again found many moons ago. You might be familiar with code similar to this: <script> if(top!=self){ top.location=self.location } </script> It’s checking if the top most window is the same as the current window (usually to prevent a page being framed). If we can clobber a form before the check then we can fool the logic into thinking that self is a form and “self.location” is an attribute on that form like this: <form name=self location="javascript:alert(1)"></form> <script> if(top!=self){ top.location=self.location } </script> Which fires the alert! But there’s more, since an attribute is decoded when it’s accessed we can encode the colon of course but because on IE when the assignment occurs it’s also decoded we can now double encode! Which means this is perfectly valid too: <form name=self location="javascript:alert(1)"></form> <script> if(top!=self){ top.location=self.location } </script> In conclusion the DOM is a mess. Sursa: DOM Clobbering

Advanced XSS Nicolas Golubovic Today's menu Starter: reboiled XSS Course: spicy blacklists & filters Course: sweet content sniffing Course: salty defenses a. httpOnly cookies b. Content Security Policy (CSP) c. XSS Auditor Dessert: tips and tricks a. DOM clobbering Cookies? Download: https://www.owasp.org/images/a/ae/Advanced_XSS.pdf

Softpedia: vBulletin Exploitable Through SQL Injection

Nu e blind, dar l-am facut dimineata la 7 inainte sa plec la munca si nu am avut timp sa il fac altfel. Fac un request pentru un caracter (SUBSTR). Se putea si altfel, dar era un query urat si nu am avut timp sa ma complic.

GCHQ leak lists UK cyber-spies' hacking tools By Leo Kelion Technology desk editor More than 100 codenamed projects are defined in the leaked GCHQ document A document that appears to list a wide variety of GCHQ's cyber-spy tools and techniques has been leaked online. It indicates the agency worked on ways to alter the outcome of online polls, find private Facebook photos, and send spoof emails that appeared to be from Blackberry users, among other things. The document is alleged to have been among those leaked by former US intelligence analyst Edward Snowden. One expert said the release, published on the site Intercept, was "damaging". Alan Woodward, a security consultant who has done work for GCHQ, the UK's intelligence agency, said: "If you read the mission statement of any signals intelligence organisation, all the listed techniques are what you'd expect them to be doing. "But it's very unhelpful for the details to leak out because as soon as you reveal to people how something is being done they can potentially take steps to avoid their information being collected. The leaked document lists the techniques in the style of the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia "We've already seen it happen when various forms of interception were revealed previously with the Snowden leaks." Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who published the latest document, noted in his article that an earlier inquiry by the European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee had called into question the "legality, necessity and proportionality" of the data-collection activities of GCHQ and the US National Security Agency (NSA), for which Mr Snowden worked. He also highlighted that the article's publication coincided with the start of a legal challenge brought by Privacy International, Liberty and other civil rights groups that claimed the UK's security agencies had acted unlawfully. However, GCHQ denies it is at fault. "It is a longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters," it said in a statement. "Furthermore, all of GCHQ's work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from the secretary of state, the interception and intelligence services commissioners and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee." Swamp donkey More than 100 projects are included in the document, which appears to be from a Wikipedia-style listing for GCHQ's Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group. The leak indicates that GCHQ created a tool to help agents make use of Second Life Many involve eccentric codenames. For example, the ability to send an audio message to a large number of telephones and/or "repeatedly bomb" a target number with the same message is called Concrete Donkey - the name of a weapon in the video game Worms. Other examples include: Angry Pirate - a tool to permanently disable a target's account on their computer Bomb Bay - the capacity to increase website hits/rankings Cannonball - the ability to send repeated text messages to a single target Gestator - a tool to make a message, normally a video, more visible on websites including YouTube Glitterball - software to help agents carry out operations in Second Life and other online games Birdstrike - Twitter monitoring and profile collection Fatyak - public data collection from the business-focused social network LinkedIn Spring Bishop - a tool to find private pictures of targets on Facebook Changeling - the ability to spoof any email address and send messages under that identity Bearscrape - a tool to extract a computer's wi-fi connection history Miniature Hero - the ability to source real-time call records, instant messages and contact lists from Skype Swamp donkey - a way to send a modified Excel spreadsheet document that silently extracts and runs malware on the target's computer Underpass - a tool to change the result of online polls Some of the schemes are listed as being operational while others are said to be still at the design, development or pilot stages. Analysis: Gordon Corera, security correspondent The latest revelations suggest that GCHQ is developing a wide range of capabilities which go beyond the simple gathering of information and into the realms of covert action. This is another traditional part of the work of spy agencies but one they prefer to keep clandestine and therefore "deniable". According to the documents, this appears to range from disrupting an individual's online activity to broader "information operations" to influence opinion in other countries. What is not clear from the document is how far these capabilities have actually been deployed and put into action and against whom. Almost every state is secretly developing capabilities to disrupt their opponents in cyberspace but they do not like talking about them or having them revealed in public. 'Chinese menu' It is not clear exactly how out-of-date the list is. The document states it was last modified in July 2012, but includes a note saying: "We don't update this page anymore, it became somewhat of a Chinese menu for effects operations." Staff are instead directed to an alternative page, which has not been leaked. "The accusation that GCHQ has been manipulating polls and influencing and distorting political discourse is incredibly serious," said Emma Carr, acting director of the Big Brother Watch campaign group. "The UK is always the first to point the finger at countries if there is a whiff of corruption or interference within a democratic process, so if senior ministers are aware that this is taking place then this absolutely stinks of hypocrisy. "It is essential that the government directly addresses these accusations, otherwise they are at risk of losing the international moral high ground." Sursa: BBC News - GCHQ leak lists UK cyber-spies' hacking tools

Thanks! Backup: https://rstforums.com/fisiere/Algorithm.mp4 Click dreapta, Save Link As.

"In the late 1950's MIT hackers belived as I do: that information should be free. We call that terrorism nowadays..." http://vimeo.com/98771421

A Closer Look at Pass the Hash, Part I Posted by: Andy Green We’ve done a lot of blogging at the Metadata Era warning you about basic attacks against passwords. These can be mitigated by enforcing strong passwords, eliminating vendor defaults, and enabling reasonable lockout settings in Active Directory. But don’t rest yet! Hackers have another password trick that’s much more difficult to defend against. Advanced password, or more precisely, credential attacks are still very popular and, unfortunately, quite effective. Known generically as pass-the-hash or PtH, these attacks are seen by some as more of an issue with older Windows systems. Somewhat true, but they’re still very much a menace: PtH is the subject of presentations at recent Black Hat conferences, several white papers from Microsoft’s own Trustworthy Computing division, and a security bulletin from the NSA (for what it’s worth!). What’s a Hash? Security researchers have known almost since the beginning of modern computing that storing plain-text passwords is a poor security practice. Instead, they came up with the idea of passing the plaintext string through a special 1-way encryption function to produce a hash. You can read more about hashes in Rob’s excellent posts on the subject. The key point is that in both Windows (and Linux systems too) the hashed password is stored instead of the readable password. If you think about this a little, the hash acts as a proxy for identity—if you can prove you have it, it’s your ticket in. In Windows, the NTLM authentication protocol involves exchanging messages to validate that users have the hash without actually sending the hash over the wire. This authentication technique is at the center of how Active Directory supports remote logins within a domain and is also used for other Windows services, most significantly remote file access By the way, vulnerabilities in earlier implementations of NTLM—since corrected—have led some to believe that PtH attacks are a thing of the past. Not only is PtH still viable but the same idea—grabbing hashes from disk or memory—can also be used against more sophisticated Kerboros authentication. Don’t Crack the Hash, Pass it Windows caches the hashed passwords in memory to implement Single Sign On or SSO, which is an essential feature of Windows enterprise environments. So far, so good. For example, on my Varonis laptop, I logon once with my password, Windows hashes it and stores the code—currently 128-bits in NTLMv2— in memory so that when, say, I mount a remote directory or use other services where I need to prove my identity, I don’t have to re-enter my password— Windows instead uses the cached hash. And that is enough of an opening for hackers to exploit. We’ve seen other attacks, most significantly with RAM scrapers used on Point-of-Sale devices, where hackers use easily available software to peek into this memory. Not surprisingly there are toolkits out there that will let hackers grab the credentials from memory, and log them in as that user—see SANS’ Why Crack When You Can Pass the Hash. And that’s one of the major benefits of SSO, so to speak, for hackers: they don’t have to crack the hashes, they just re-use or pass them to an authenticating server! PtH: It’s a Feature, Not a Bug The assumption that this attack makes is that the cyber thief gains administrator-level permissions for a user’s machine. Any expert will tell you, that’s not necessarily difficult to pull off, as we’ve seen in the Target hack. In a typical exploit, the hacker will grab some hashes, log onto other servers, and continue the process of stockpiling credentials. If they hit the jackpot—a domain controller or SQL server—they may able to get the hashes of just about everyone. As an aside, we don’t know exactly how Snowden obtained employee logon credentials—social engineering likely played a part. But his admin-level access would have made PtH a very good choice to extract the credentials of those with a higher security clearance than him. Unfortunately, pass-the-hash is a feature of Windows! After all, the underlying NTLM authentication is effectively passing the hash to implement SSO, saving you from password entry fatigue. Hackers are just exploiting this feature for their own purposes. Not to be too hard on Windows, PtH is also an issue in Linux systems that implement Kerboros , where you have an equivalent pass-the-ticket or PtT attack. Here’s the most important takeaway: you can’t prevent PtH, you can only mitigate or greatly reduce the possibility of this attack occurring. Hold that thought and we’ll take up PtH mitigation through smart configurations of Active Directory and other services in the next post. Image Credit: Mattia Luigi Nappi A Closer Look at Pass the Hash, Part II: Prevention Last week, I attended a webinar that was intended to give IT attendees a snapshot of recent threats—a kind of hacker heads-up. For their representative case, the two sec gurus described a clever and very targeted phishing attack. It led to an APT being secretly deposited in a DLL. Once the hackers were in, I was a little surprised to see they were probing memory for password hashes. Pass the Hash, or PtH, I learned, was a standard hacker trick for gaining new identities. It makes sense. Hackers prefer to use credentials taken this way and logon directly as a user, rather than using more roundabout C2-style backdoors. Without sophisticated monitoring in place, they’re less likely to be spotted in real-time or even forensically afterwards when appearing as an ordinary insider. Beware of Local Admin As I mentioned last time, PtH assumes that an attacker has admin-level privileges on the machine they’ve first entered. The hash, which is kept in the memory space of a process with local admin permissions, is by itself not used to establish identity. Instead, it becomes part of a secret key for encrypting and decrypting messages in a challenge-response protocol. In effect, you need just the hash code to take over the identity of another user. The hard part is getting local admin access. Unfortunately, this is not a major hurdle. On older Windows systems (pre-Vista), the local admin account is automatically created and even worse, IT may have given each user machine the same admin password. Suppose a laptop is compromised through a phish-mail that deposits malware. The malware succeeds in a brute force assault on the local admin passwords. From this machine, the hackers can leapfrog to other devices and servers, either through new credentials that’ve been scooped from memory by PtH toolkits or by simply reusing the admin password. It may be an annoyance for admins, but UAC is a good defense against PtH. Thankfully, newer Windows OSes—Windows 7 and 8—by default don’t create a local admin account. Even better, Microsoft added a new malware defense known as User Account Controls or UAC, which requires explicit authorization for a user (or software) to gain elevated privileges. Admins know UAC through the Consent or Credential prompts (see pic) that pop up when they do legitimate work. While they may find this somewhat inconvenient, it does go a long way towards preventing malware and APTs from getting a critical foot hold. For organizations with older OSes, IT can enforce a policy of creating unique and robust admin passwords for each user machine. It’s a low-effort remedy for preventing the hackers from easily guessing admin credentials and then reusing hashes on other machines. One simple trick is to append the machine name (or variation of it) to the password. Stomp Out Local Network Logon Access Another powerful mitigation that works on both old and new Windows OSes is to prevent ordinary and local admin users from directly networking into other users’ machines. In an Active Directory environment, you’d do that by using the Group Policy Object (GPO) Editor to configure a User Rights Assignment networking policy. You can read more about how to do this here. Quick summary: disable network and remote interactive logon privileges and then link users and groups to these specific User Rights policies. And Just Limit Hashes The above measures take care of a large part but not all the entry points for PtH attacks. In the exploit that I opened this post up with the hackers used SQL injection techniques to hijack a database server that was already running with elevated privileges. Result: they were able to scoop up high-level hashes. The least privilege security principle now comes to the fore: don’t run services—SQL servers, and other IT infrastructure—with domain or enterprise level access rights. These permissions are far broader than what system tools and services generally need to do the job, and if the software is ever compromised, the shells or commands that are spawned automatically run at elevated access. However, sometimes this may not be feasible, and of course, there are always zero-day exploits waiting to happen. So the key idea now is to limit the “bad” hashes—typically domain administrators—from spreading throughout the network. Recall that with Single Sign On, the hash, even for DAs, is always deposited in memory when logging onto a machine. The rule is simple: only give domain administrators the right to access machines with high-privilege levels—i.e., domain controllers—and never allow the same accounts access to plain-old employee laptops and desktops. You can always create a separate account for system admins for servicing user devices but with non-domain admin privileges. That way, if a hacker (or internal user) should ever get control of a machine, they’ll never get the “keys to the kingdom”—a domain administrator’s hash that just happens to be in memory at the time. A Closer Look at Pass the Hash, Part III: How NTLM will get you hacked (and what you should do about it) I was about ready to wrap up this series of posts (part 1, part 2 ) on PtH and make my larger point, which is that you should assume hackers will break into your system. And then I learned new information about credential stealing that amplifies this warning by a factor of 10. The most important takeaway about PtH is that the password hashes that are stored in memory (and grabbed by hackers) are a feature of Single Sign On. Most organizations can’t live without SSO, so they’re stuck with PtH risks. I already blogged about ways to reduce these risks, but they can’t altogether be eliminated. More Features to Worry About There’s another underlying feature that also has to be taken into account. Existing Windows authentication protocols, which directly use the password hash, have had a long history of problems. As of January 2013, Microsoft’s official line on NTLM, their workhorse logon authentication software, is that you should not be using version 1—the newer v2 is better (but still has some vulnerabilities). By all means, if feasible, jump from NTLM to Kerboros, which will greatly reduce your security exposure. But many IT groups can’t completely cut their ties to NTLM—mostly because lots of client apps (email, browsers, VPN, file sharing) still depend on it. And then there’s SAMBA, a suite that provides windows file and print services for UNIX/Linux, which also uses NTLM. Bottom line: NTLM has deep hooks into Windows. But even more troubling—and here’s one piece of new information I learned from security blogger Mark Gamache—is that there’s an enormous security exposure because of all the XP out there—at least 20% of all computer based on W3 data. And these legacy clients can only authenticate with—you guessed it—NTLM version 1. A Little NTLM To understand what’s wrong with NTLM, we need to know a little more about how its challenge-response works. Rather than write out a geeky protocol syntax, the interaction (for version 1) can be roughly summarized by the following dialogue: Server: Hi. I know you’re claiming to be user XYZ, but you’ll need to prove it. But don’t tell me the password out loud—someone will overhear! Instead, I want you to take this challenge: encrypt “swordfish”, and then tell me the results. You can use DES. User: And what key should I use for DES? Server: The MD4 hash of your password—use that. Client: Ok, I’ve encrypted “swordfish” with the password hash and I have weird 24-byte string. Is that what you want? Server: Yes Client tells server the encrypted string. And server compares with its encryption of swordfish, which matches. Server: You are worthy, please enter! The most important improvement in NTLMv1 over an even earlier Windows authentication method, known as LM, was not directly sending the password over the wire. Instead, encrypting the challenge with the hash of the password is proof that the user is who he/she claims to be. The initial version of NTLM dates back to pre-internet NT systems—it stands for NT LAN Manager. Certainly, a more innocent time—circa 1990s—where the assumption that no one could get into an office LAN and launch crafty relay or man-in-the-middle exploits was a good one. That was then. NTLMv1 eventually became susceptible to a style of attack wherein users were redirected to connect to a rogue server—you can read more about that here. The server would send a challenge for which it had already pre-computed the hashes for zillions of passwords and stored the encrypted challenges in a giant dictionary. If the fake server finds a match, it then automatically has the password hash for that user. NTLM Is Really Broken In response, Microsoft improved the challenge-response protocol in NTLMv2 to prevent these server-based dictionary attacks. However, it still left open the possibility of man-in-the-middle exploits, as well as PtH. But up until recently, you could make a case for staying with v1. In 2012 some astonishing news came out of a Defcon conference. Using special purpose-built hardware, security researchers had succeeded in cracking the DES encryption used in the NLTMv1 challenge-response exchange. In other words, by watching the wire and grabbing the packets containing the challenge text from the server and the encrypted DES response, hackers could, through a brute force approach, work out the key— i.e., the underlying password hash. Yikes! And then the researchers made this DES cracking capability available as a service, known as CloudCracker, for penetration testers! I don’t want to get too much into the weeds about the fatal flaw in NTLMv1. In short: NTLMv1 doesn’t use the full 128-bit output of the MD4 hash as a DES key, but smaller 56-bit groupings, thereby making the client response amenable to being cracked by a powerful computing device. By the way, NTLMv2 use a full 128-bit key. And Going Forward This crypto-news eventually made its way to Microsoft, which then issued the NTLMv1 warning I mentioned earlier. So what’s a reasonable next step considering all this? The first action for IT is to review current LAN authentication levels (in GPO or within Local Security Policy). It’s not unusual to have set NTLMv2 as default, but still allow clients to negotiate NTLMv1 or the still older LM. If it’s feasible, they should set the “refuse LM and NTLM” option. NTLMv2 is—as far as we know and assuming you’re not dealing with the NSA—immune to DES cracking. The caveat here is that user passwords are long enough—at least 8 characters—otherwise even this new version is also vulnerable to DES brute force approaches. So another ‘to do’ on your list is to really enforce a strong password policy across the organization. The v2 challenge-response protocol can still, though, be tricked by sneaky servers getting in the middle and relaying credentials from a client to an authenticating app. And v2 doesn’t do anything to prevent PtH attacker from grabbing credentials. Here’s a simple rule of thumb based on all this: assume the hacker will get in. You therefore need a solid ‘Plan B’ defense strategy. In my previous PtH post, I recommended disabling remote access rights for ordinary users to prevent hackers from harvesting credentials by hopping on to other machines. It’s a good idea, and even more so considering all this new information. Your final defensive wall should, of course, be business-as-usual data governance practices—monitoring, alerting, etc. And you do that, as the Metadata Era has pointed out on many occasions, by finding where PII and other sensitive data is located, determining the true data owners, making sure the owners limit access to those who truly need it as part of their job or role, monitoring use and using automation to detect possible abuse. So when the hackers enter the site, they’re not coming in as if they “own the place” since they no longer have easy access to troves of sensitive data. Surse: 1. A Closer Look at Pass the Hash, Part I 2. A Closer Look at Pass the Hash, Part II: Prevention 3. A Closer Look at Pass the Hash, Part III: How NTLM will get you hacked (and what you should do about it)

[h=1]Google Races NSA to Discover Zero-Day Vulnerabilities[/h] July 15th, 2014, 15:24 GMT · By Gabriela Vatu Google has had enough of people exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, be them hackers or government entities. After numerous efforts to make sure the system is secure following the NSA revelations, Google has now announced the so-called “Project Zero,” which makes use of hackers’ talents to discover and fix zero-day bugs. The company has already invested a lot in securing its products, including SSL encryption by default for Search, Gmail and Drive. When it discovered from the media that the NSA had also infiltrated the connection between its servers to get access to the unencrypted data traveling there, Google moved to also encrypt that data. “You should be able to use the web without fear that a criminal or state-sponsored actor is exploiting software bugs to infect your computer, steal secrets or monitor your communications,” Google writes in the announcement, taking a jibe at the NSA and its mass surveillance efforts, which often targeted the world’s largest Internet company. Google’s objective is to significantly reduce the number of people harmed by targeted attacks, which is why it’s been hiring security researchers who dedicate their time to improving security across the Internet, not just at Google. So, what will Google’s new team do? It will look for vulnerabilities, as well as conduct new research into mitigations, exploitations, program analysis and everything else. Not only will the company look for these vulnerabilities, but it will also file them in an external database, while reporting them to the software vendor, but no third parties. Once a patch is available, the bug report will likely become public and everyone will have access to it. This is also another jibe to the NSA, which admitted to looking for and discovering various zero-day vulnerabilities. The US government, however, said that these weren’t always reported immediately. Instead, some are kept and exploited by the NSA for a while before the risk of discovery from third parties is too big to continue and only then they are shared with the world. All this information came forth after the Heartbleed bug was exposed several months ago thanks to Neel Mehta of Google’s security team that discovered it. The NSA was then accused of knowing about the OpenSSL vulnerability and exploiting it for years, something that the intelligence agency actually denied. However, it is rather hard to believe that the spy agency, which commonly seeks such coding issues, didn’t know about Heartbleed in advance. As a reminder, the vulnerability left no traces on the affected servers and provided the attackers with unencrypted access to whatever content passed through the targeted server at the time of the attack. Google, Facebook, Yahoo and many other companies and products were affected by it since it slipped through the cracks of an OpenSSL update dating two years back. Sursa: Google Races NSA to Discover Zero-Day Vulnerabilities

Hacker Dream Team, by Google July 15th, 2014, 14:36 GMT · By Ionut Ilascu Google has announced today Project Zero, a group of elite hackers formed to hunt down zero-day security risks in various pieces of software, not just in Google products. The members of the group are led by security engineer Chris Evans and all of them have proved their skills on numerous occasions, being credited for finding numerous security bugs in products developed by heavy-weight companies such as Google, Adobe, Microsoft, Apple or Sony. At the moment, the dream team is composed of Ben Hawkes, Tavis Ormandy, Ian Beer, and the latest addition, George Hotz, who has been given the status of “intern,” according to Wired. “You should be able to use the web without fear that a criminal or state-sponsored actor is exploiting software bugs to infect your computer, steal secrets or monitor your communications. Yet in sophisticated attacks, we see the use of ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities to target, for example, human rights activists or to conduct industrial espionage. This needs to stop,” said Chris Evans in the first blog post for the project. Project Zero is not limited to just these five super-hackers and is open for new talent. The team is expected to exceed ten full-time researchers working in an office equipped with all the necessary tools for finding software security glitches. The purpose of the project is touted as being primarily altruistic, but there is more to the idea behind it. Evans told Wired that increased user confidence in the security of the web also benefits Google “in a hard-to-measure and indirect way.” Security vulnerabilities are not leveraged by cybercriminals alone, as Snowden’s revelations showed that government organizations also used them for spying purposes. As such, Project Zero also increases the general confidence in Google’s posture for improving the privacy protection of customer information. Moreover, since a chain is as strong as its weakest link, Google products are also vulnerable if third-party content included in them presents a security risk. The security researcher told the online publication that “it’s a major source of frustration for people writing a secure product to depend on third party code,” and that a serious and skilled attacker would always go for the weakest spot. Project Zero offers companies whose product has been found vulnerable a tolerance of 60 to 90 days to issue a patch. After this period, the flaw will be disclosed publicly. If the flaw is already exploited in the wild, the tolerance limit drops to a week, since a larger period of time could mean more victims. The hacker dream team concentrates on bugs in specific areas to make sure that an exploit is rendered unsuccessful. Most of the time, defeating the protection measures implies leveraging a sequence of flaws, and if one of them is patched, exploitation is no longer possible. The team is confident that they’ll be able to successfully hunt down zero-day bugs and “step on some toes,” as Ben Hawkes puts it. Sursa: Hacker Dream Team, by Google

Thanks. Astept un fix de la vBulletin, un realease care sa repare problema, mai astept putin sa isi mai faca lumea update apoi public exploit-ul.

Stiu ca e probabil doar o obsesie a mea, dar daca nu puteti scrie un post incepand propozitia cu majuscula, macar cacatul de titlul sa il incepeti cu majuscula. Tutorial: Tinand apasata tasta Shift, apasati prima litera din titlu. Eliberati tasta Shift. Pentru avansati: Aveti grija sa nu aveti Caps Lock apasat. Multumesc.

Thanks. Postasem si pe forumul lor, dar au sters postul.

Author: Nytro @ Romanian Security Team All details will be available after a fix from vBulletin.

Faceti publice toate informatiile despre el. Jeg de om.

Mergi la Iasi.

Mergi la Iasi.

Si ati luat muie.

Nu am idee. Am primit un card (gift card) cu acel cod. Nu l-am incercat, dar banuiesc ca e bun.

Securitate complet? Aceast? solu?ie de protec?ie complet? permite utilizatorilor individuali ce folosesc orice combina?ie de PC-uri, Mac-uri?i Smartphone-uri sau Tablete cu sistem de operare Android s? î?i protejeze toate dispozitivele de amenin??rile informatice. Acest produs poate acoperi pân? la 3 utilizatori ?i este dedicat exclusiv folosirii la domiciliu! Fiecare utilizator poate proteja un num?r nelimitat de dispozitive. Am primit-o la Defcamp Sparks si nu o folosesc. Primii norocosi... Serial No: http://X44PC5M (Doar pentru userii inregistrati) Have fun.

Ai putea pune si tu un titlu normal.

Da, cred ca s-au terminat, ziceau cei de la suport ca au fost activate toate 5. Am sters din primul post licenta.

[TABLE=width: 626] [TR] [TD=width: 365, align: left]Renewal Kaspersky PURE 3.0 - 5 licenses (1 year)[/TD] [TD=width: 111, align: center]1[/TD] [TD=width: 75, align: right]$109.00[/TD] [TD=width: 75, align: center][/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD=colspan: 2, align: center][TABLE=width: 476] [TR] [TD=bgcolor: #e5e5e5, align: center]Activation code: M19SY-VZ6BW-15VZF-REMOVED [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Am activat pe 3-4 calculatoare, deci ar trebui sa mai fie posibila activarea pe 1-2. Am rugamintea sa postati daca a mers sau nu. Nota: Kaspersky este dupa parerea mea cel mai bun antivirus, dar daca nu aveti un PC bun nu va obositi sa il instalati. Consuma extrem de multe resurse. Merge greu si un i5, cel putin cu setarile "paranoia" facute de mine.

Stiu ca e o porcarie, dar na, poate ii e util cuiva. Discount 10 euro pentru Agentie de turism – Oferte turism | Veltravel . Cod: VEL6MYLFGWR Valabilitate: 30 de zile calendaristice.

La mine, CodeBlocks + MinGW, la 1: 16777217.0 16777218.0 Am gresit pe 2. In C afiseaza "1". In C++ cu "-fpermissive" afiseaza tot "1". Nu am nici cea mai mica idee de ce. Restul le-am stiut.