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u0m3

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u0m3 last won the day on October 13

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About u0m3

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  • Birthday 12/14/87

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  1. Promotii online de black Friday / Thanksgiving Day: https://pastebin.com/EvJJqBJD (via: https://twitter.com/bbaskin/status/934074433664442369) Daca va uitat prin thread-ul de pe twiiter mai sunt cateva...
  2. [Easy] The big fat panda

    @FoxBlood: Uita-te la cum a fost rezolvat ultimul Sau asteapta writeup-ul de la acesta.
  3. MINIX - most popular OS in the world

    L.E.: oarecum tangential...
  4. Oona Räisänen never disappoints...
  5. Abstract: Today’s standard embedded device technology is not robust against Fault Injection (FI) attacks such as Voltage Fault Injection (V-FI). FI attacks can be used to alter the intended behavior of software and hardware of embedded devices. Most FI research focuses on breaking the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. However, this paper’s contribution is in showing that FI attacks are effective at altering the intended behavior of large and complex code bases like the Linux Operating System (OS) when executed by a fast and feature rich System-on-Chip (SoC). More specifically, we show three attacks where full control of the Linux OS is achieved from an unprivileged context using V-FI. These attacks target standard Linux OS functionality and operate in absence of any logical vulnerability.We assume an attacker that already achieved unprivileged code execution. The practicality of the attacks is demonstrated using a commercially available V-FI test bench and a commercially available ARM Cortex-A9 SoC development board. Finally, we discuss mitigations to lower probability and minimize impact of a successful FI attack on complex systems like the Linux OS. Link: https://www.riscure.com/publication/escalating-privileges-linux-using-fault-injection/
  6. Si nu numai Word... Iar pentru cine e interesat de aceasta "functionalitate", aici este un articol care discuta DDEAUTO: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/bug-feature-debate-back-yet-again-ddeauto-root-cause-analysis Update Metode de mitigare https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/no-macros-no-problem-how-microsoft-office-dde-attacks-work-and-how-to-block-them-barkly https://gist.github.com/wdormann/732bb88d9b5dd5a66c9f1e1498f31a1b Si inca un vector:
  7. Synopsis: Cameradar hacks its way into RTSP CCTV cameras. An RTSP stream access tool that comes with its library. Link: https://github.com/EtixLabs/cameradar
  8. Synopsis: Noriben is a Python-based script that works in conjunction with SysInternals Procmon to automatically collect, analyze, and report on run-time indicators of malware. In a nutshell, it allows you to run your malware, hit a keypress, and get a simple text report of the sample's activities. Link: https://github.com/Rurik/noriben
  9. Synopsis: In past blog posts, we shared our approach to hunting for traditional in-memory attacks along with in-depth analysis of many injection techniques. As a follow up to my DerbyCon presentation, this post will investigate an emerging trend of adversaries using .NET-based in-memory techniques to evade detection. I’ll discuss both eventing (real-time) and on-demand based detection strategies of these .NET techniques. At Endgame, we understand that these differing approaches to detection and prevention are complimentary, and together result in the most robust defense against in-memory attacks. Link: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory-net-attacks
  10. Synopsis: Small and highly portable detection tests mapped to the Mitre ATT&CK Framework. Link: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team (via https://twitter.com/redcanaryco/status/918236402814394368)
  11. Synopsis: UEFITool is a cross-platform C++/Qt program for parsing, extracting and modifying UEFI firmware images. It supports parsing of full BIOS images starting with the flash descriptor or any binary files containing UEFI volumes. Original development was started here at MDL forums as a cross-platform analog to PhoenixTool's structure mode with some additional features, but the program's engine was proven to be usefull for another projects like UEFIPatch, UBU and OZMTool. Link: https://github.com/LongSoft/UEFITool
  12. Synopsis: PCILeech uses PCIe hardware devices to read and write from the target system memory. This is achieved by using DMA over PCIe. No drivers are needed on the target system. Link: https://github.com/ufrisk/pcileech/
  13. Synopsis: A Threat hunter's playbook to aid the development of techniques and hypothesis for hunting campaigns by leveraging Sysmon and Windows Events logs. This project will provide specific chains of events exclusively at the host level so that you can take them and develop logic to deploy queries or alerts in your preferred tool or format such as Splunk, ELK, Sigma, GrayLog etc. This repo will follow the structure of the MITRE ATT&CK framework which categorizes post-compromise adversary behavior in tactical groups. In addition, it will provide information about hunting tools/platforms developed by the infosec community for testing and enterprise-wide hunting. Link: https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/ThreatHunter-Playbook
  14. Synopsis: From the attacker’s perspective, the more logical way to do things nowadays is to simply move to the next level down into the software stack — after boot code, that is the way to the BIOS. Intel Boot Guard is an excellent example of a complex technology where exist a lot of places where making a small mistake allows an attacker to bypass full technology. Link: https://medium.com/@matrosov/bypass-intel-boot-guard-cc05edfca3a9
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