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Fi8sVrs

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Posts posted by Fi8sVrs

  1. 16 minutes ago, BiosHell said:

    #malone

    Nu era pt tine man, am pus ^ 

    In fine, merge mutat la bashed, 8+1, mai sunt cazuri 

    / specii ce comunica cu iIsus, fecioara Maria etc..

    // daca continui prezic Apocalipsa

  2.  

    23 minutes ago, BiosHell said:

    sunteți direct responsabili pentru ce operează el, și nu atât în fața copiilor voștri, cât în fața umanității.

    Copiii când citesc acest post, oare ce zic? Să-mi dai doo beri ca mi-am pierdut secunde sa citim aberatii de etnobotanic

  3. Vulnerability-200x200.jpg

     

    Vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are not uncommon. There are roughly 26 million lines of code, with 3,385,121 lines added and 2,512,040 lines removed in 2018 alone. The sheer complexity of that much code means that vulnerabilities are bound to exist. However, what is not at all common is the existence of unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities — a critical issue that every system administrator hopes to avoid.

     

    On May 8, 2019, the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) published details for a Linux kernel vulnerability, CVE-2019-11815, with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 3.0 base score of 8.1. The details of the vulnerability include: having an attack vector of “network,” no privileges required, and administrative level code execution — i.e., the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) impact are all “high.” At first glance, this seems like a worst-case scenario. But assessing a vulnerability’s potential impact goes beyond the attack vector, privileges, and CIA impact of the CVSS base score.

     

    One component of the CVSS 3 base score is attack complexity, for which this vulnerability has a rating of “high” as well. This means that a successful attack is dependent on a very specific set of circumstances that is hard to achieve. According to the CVSS 3.0 standard, this rating means that “a successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker’s control” and “a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected.”

    Looking at the vulnerability itself in some detail will reveal why the scoring is technically correct, especially when taking the attack complexity rating into account, but is not completely representative of the actual risk to enterprises and users.

    Breaking down the vulnerability

     

    The description of the vulnerability from the NVD states that the issue was “discovered in rds_tcp_kill_sock in net/rds/tcp.c in the Linux kernel before 5.0.8,” and that there is “a race condition leading to a use-after-free, related to net namespace cleanup.” This is an accurate and concise description of the vulnerability from a code perspective, but the lack of some critical information may lead to alarm given the mention of TCP, or Transmission Control Protocol.

     

    The first major component of this vulnerability is Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS), a socket interface and protocol developed by Oracle, which was created to allow a single transport socket to facilitate sending and receiving to a very large number of different endpoints. This vulnerability involves RDS when TCP is used as the underlying transport protocol: The application data in an RDS header is encapsulated and sent via TCP, typically to port 16385, where it is then unencapsulated and passed to the RDS socket.

     

    Beyond Oracle’s documentation and a very short Wikipedia page, there is not much information about RDS or where it’s typically used. The obscurity of this protocol, combined with the existence of previous local privilege escalation vulnerabilities, has led most popular Linux distributions such as Ubuntu to blacklist kernel modules relating to RDS for many years. This immediately reduces the potential harm of such a vulnerability by a large margin.

     

    What if the rds and rds_tcp kernel modules are enabled?

     

    When using RDS over TCP, the underlying TCP transport is completely managed by the kernel. This means that when a client establishes a new RDS socket, the TCP socket is opened by the kernel in rds_tcp_conn_path_connect() in tcp_connect.c, which is called by the worker thread function rds_connect_worker() in threads.c.

     

    cvss1.png

    Figure 1. rds_connect_worker() in threads.c calling rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()

     

     

    The RDS-specific portion of the vulnerability arises when the underlying TCP client-side socket continually fails to connect. When TCP connect()fails, the rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() function is called, and sets the t_sock pointer in the rds_tcp_connection structure to NULL, which is completely reasonable behavior.

     

     

     

    cvss2.png

     

    Figure 2. rds_tcp_conn_path_connect() calling rds_tcp_restore_callbacks()

     

     

    cvss3.png

    Figure 3. t_sock set to NULL in rds_tcp_restore_callbacks()

     

    The problem arises when we introduce the second major component of the vulnerability: network namespaces. Network namespaces allow for the use of a separate set of interfaces and routing tables for a given namespace, where traditionally the entire operating system shares the same interfaces and routing tables as every other process. This namespace functionality is used by platforms such as Docker to provide network isolation for containers.

     

    When an RDS-TCP socket is initialized in rds_tcp_init(), the network namespaces function register_pernet_device() is called, passing in a pointer to a pernet_operations structure, rds_tcp_net_ops, which contains initialization and exit functions to perform when a network namespace is initialized or removed and the socket is active.

     

    cvss4.png

     

    Figure 4. register_pernet_device() called to register network namespace device

     

    cvss5.png

     

    Figure 5. rds_tcp_exit_net() as the exit function for the network namespace device

     

     

    The exit function rds_tcp_exit_net() will call rds_tcp_kill_sock(), which is used to perform cleanup of various parts of the RDS-TCP socket. Part of the process is the creation of a list of connections to be cleaned up, called the tmp_list.

     

    One of the checks performed on each connection is to see if the t_sock pointer is NULL for the underlying TCP socket in use and if so, the t_tcp_node is not added to the “cleanup list.” As a result, rds_conn_destroy() is not called for those nodes and much of the “cleanup” is not performed.

     

    cvss6.png

    Figure 6. rds_tcp_kill_sock() skipping cleanup if t_sock is NULL

     

    Most importantly, the rds_connect_worker() thread is not stopped and will continue to try reconnecting. Eventually, the underlying net structure is freed as part of the namespace cleanup, and may be used by a still running rds_connect_worker(), triggering a use-after-free issue. Technically, this flaw is as described: no privileges required, and administrative level code execution possible if exploited.

     

    The fix for the issue is simple: System administrators simply need to ensure the vulnerable modules are disabled or an updated kernel is installed.

     

    The real risks posed by CVE-2019-11815

     

    Given the characteristics of CVE-2019-11815, what does this mean for users? A potential victim would first have to have the commonly blacklisted rds and rds_tcp modules loaded — if these are not loaded, no further movement is possible. If an attacker happens to find such a rare target — because the TCP connect() is performed only by RDS-TCP clients, not servers — an attacker would then have to entice their target into connecting to an attacker-controlled RDS-TCP socket from within a network namespace.

     

    The attacker’s next job would be to cause a failure on the underlying TCP connection and at the same time to cause the target user’s network namespace to be cleaned up — a task that a remote attacker has practically no chance of performing. To make things even more impossible, race conditions — flaws caused by unexpected timing of events that affect other actions — are notoriously difficult to exploit and would likely require a large number of attempts.

     

    With all these conditions taken into consideration, the chances of this vulnerability being “remotely exploitable without authentication” are essentially zero. There is a very small chance that this could be used as a local privilege escalation, but that would require that the commonly blacklisted rds andrds_tcp modules are loaded.

     

    Although the CVSS score of this vulnerability is technically correct in its assessment, users should be aware that risk is also dependent on the probability of the attack due to its complexity and the conditions required for an attacker to be successful. The circumstances in which this attack would be feasible are unlikely to ever be seen in a real production environment. The vast majority of Linux servers are simply not vulnerable in a remote context.

     

    Source

    • Upvote 1
  4. Slack.png

     

    An attacker can supply a malicious hyperlink in order to secretly alter the download path for files shared in a Slack channel.

    A remotely exploitable vulnerability in the Windows desktop app version of the Slack collaboration platform has been uncovered, which allows attackers to alter where files from Slack are downloaded. Nefarious types could redirect the files to their own SMB server; and, they could manipulate the contents of those documents, altering information or injecting malware.

     

    According to Tenable Research’s David Wells, who discovered the bug and reported it via the HackerOne bug-bounty platform, a download hijack vulnerability in Slack Desktop version 3.3.7 for Windows would allow an attacker to post a specially crafted hyperlink into a Slack channel that changes the document download location path when clicked. Victims can still open the downloaded document through the application, however, that will be done from the attacker’s Server Message Block (SMB) share.

    Quote

    “[The issue exists in] the ‘slack://’ protocol handler, which has the capability to change sensitive settings in the Slack Desktop Application,”

     

     

    Wells said in a posting on Friday.

    Quote

    “This download path can be an attacker-owned SMB share, which would cause all future documents downloaded in Slack to be instantly uploaded to the attacker’s server.”

     

    The reason it has to be an SMB share is because of a security check built into the platform. The Slack application filters certain characters out – including colons – so an attacker can’t supply a path with a drive root.

    Quote

    “An SMB share, however, completely bypassed this sanitation as there is no root drive needed,”

     

    Wells explained.

    Quote

    “After setting up a remote SMB share, we could send users or channels a link that would redirect all downloads to it after they click the link.”

     

    Remote Exploitation

    An attack can be carried out by both authenticated and unauthenticated users, Wells said. In the first scenario, an insider could exploit the vulnerability for corporate espionage, manipulation or to gain access to documents outside of their role or privilege level.

    In the second scenario, an outsider could place crafted hyperlinks into pieces of content that could be pulled into a Slack channel via external RSS feeds.

     

    Quote

    “Let’s consider an example with reddit.com. Here I could make a post to a very popular Reddit community that Slack users around the world are subscribed to (in this test case however, I chose a private one I owned),”

     

    Wells said.

    Quote

    “I will drop an http link (because slack:// links are not allowed to be hyperlinked on Reddit) that will redirect to our malicious slack:// link and change settings when clicked. Once posted to this subreddit, our test Slack channel (that is subscribed to this subreddit feed), is now populated with the new article entry and previews the text which includes the link.”

     

    Success here would require knowing which RSS feeds the target Slack user subscribes to, of course.

     

    Malware and More

    In addition to being an information-disclosure concern (attackers could access sensitive company documents, financial data, patient records and anything else someone shares via the platform), the vulnerability could be used as a jumping-off point for broader attacks.

    Quote

    “If an Office Document (Word, Excel, etc.) is downloaded, the attacker’s server could inject malware into it, so that when opened, the victim machine is compromised,”

     

    Wells explained. He added,

    Quote

    “the Slack user that opens/executes the downloaded file will actually instead be interacting with our modified document/script/etc off the remote SMB share, the options from there on are endless.”

     

    Because it does require user interaction to exploit, the vulnerability carries a medium-level CVSSv2 rating of 5.5. However, the researcher said that attackers can use a spoofing technique to mask the malicious URL behind a fake address, say “http://google.com,” to give it more legitimacy and convince a Slack user to click on the link.

    More specifically, it’s possible to link to words within Slack by adding an “attachment” field to a Slack POST request with appropriate fields, Wells said.

    Quote

    “The hyperlink text can be masqueraded by using the ‘attachment’ feature in Slack, which allows an attacker to replace the hyperlink’s actual uniform resource identifier with any custom text, possibly fooling users into clicking,” Wells noted.

     

    The attack surface is potentially large. Slack said in January that it has 10 million active daily users, and 85,000 organizations use the paid version (it’s unclear how many are Windows users). Fortunately, Slack patched the bug as part of its latest update for Slack Desktop Application for Windows, v3.4.0, so users should upgrade their apps and clients.

     

    Via threatpost.com

    • Upvote 1
  5. Windows Terminal

     

    Windows Terminal is a new, modern, feature-rich, productive terminal application for command-line users. It includes many of the features most frequently requested by the Windows command-line community including support for tabs, rich text, globalization, configurability, theming & styling, and more.

    The Terminal will also need to meet our goals and measures to ensure it remains fast, and efficient, and doesn't consume vast amounts of memory or power.

     

    This repository contains the source code for:

    • Windows Terminal
    • The Windows console host (conhost.exe)
    • Components shared between the two projects
    • ColorTool
    • Sample projects that show how to consume the Windows Console APIs

     

    Other related repositories include:

     

    Download

     

    Source

     

    • Upvote 2
  6. book_cover_with_title.png

     

    By Brennon

    The definitive guide to Secure Shell (SSH) tunneling, port redirection, and bending traffic like a boss.

    Want to up your penetration testing skills and reach the dark corners of networks? Wish you knew how attackers pivot and move within networks? Are you maximizing the capabilities within SSH?

    This book is packed with practical and real world examples of SSH tunneling and port redirection in multiple realistic scenarios. It walks you through the basics of SSH tunneling (both local and remote port forwards), SOCKS proxies, port redirection, and how to utilize them with other tools like proxychains, nmap, Metasploit, and web browsers.

    Advanced topics included SSHing through 4 jump boxes, throwing exploits through SSH tunnels, scanning assets using proxychains and Metasploit's Meterpreter, browsing the Internet through a SOCKS proxy, utilizing proxychains and nmap to scan targets, and leveraging Metasploit's Meterpreter portfwd command. For the complete list of topics covered, check out the table of contents.

    The book is a PDF packed with 80 pages of examples, code snippets, and figures to transform you into a Cyber Plumber! The book is available to download immediately after purchasing. Lastly, as part of giving back to the information technology community, this book is free for students with a .edu email!

     

    Download: https://gumroad.com/l/the_cyber_plumbers_handbook/hackernews20190518

    Source

  7. 36 minutes ago, andoni said:

     

    Ma ce glumet esti tu ma sa ma pis in poarta ta ;)

    Sunt o multime, esti dispus sa platesti? Posteaza in categoria potrivită, in primul rand e piraterie, next... mai ai ceva de zis? il am eu, dar pariu ca nu ai habar cum sa il folosesti

    • Like 1
  8. Machine Learning for .NET

     

    ML.NET is a cross-platform open-source machine learning framework which makes machine learning accessible to .NET developers.

     

    ML.NET allows .NET developers to develop their own models and infuse custom machine learning into their applications, using .NET, even without prior expertise in developing or tuning machine learning models.

     

    ML.NET was originally developed in Microsoft Research, and evolved into a significant framework over the last decade and is used across many product groups in Microsoft like Windows, Bing, PowerPoint, Excel and more.

     

    ML.NET enables machine learning tasks like classification (for example: support text classification, sentiment analysis) and regression (for example, price-prediction).

     

    Download: https://github.com/dotnet/machinelearning.git

     

    Sources: 

    • Upvote 1
  9. Google Analytics is a good tool: it’s free, easy to implement, and has served me well over the years. However, partly because I’m not in love with Big Brother Google looking over the shoulder of all my website visitors, and partly because I like experiments in minimalism, I decided to replace Google Analytics on benhoyt.com with a simple analytics setup based on log file parsing.

     

    Log file parsing is an old-skool but effective way of measuring the traffic to your site. It works with or without JavaScript (my version uses a hybrid approach), and doesn’t send any data to Google or other tracking companies.

    To do this, I used three main tools:

    • Amazon Cloudfront serving a transparent 1x1 pixel image (with logs going to S3)
    • A Python script to convert the pixel logs to Apache/nginx “combined log format”
    • GoAccess to actually parse the logs and show an analytics report

     

    This article describes why I used this approach and how I implemented it using GoAccess and a tiny bit of custom code.

     

    Cloudfront pixel

     

    My website is a simple and fast static site hosted via GitHub Pages (it’s probably handling a Hacker News traffic spike as you read this ;-). To use GoAccess, I needed a simple way to write to a log file whenever someone requests a page. I decided to use a ping to a pixel.png file hosted on S3 and served via Cloudfront.

     

    So I created a new S3 bucket and uploaded a single transparent 1x1 pixel.png file. Then I created a Cloudfront distribution with logging enabled and pointed it at the S3 bucket (logs go to another S3 bucket).

     

    Finally I added a small code snippet at the bottom of my page template (Cloudfront domain replaced to avoid bots hitting it from here):

    <script>
      if (window.location.hostname == 'benhoyt.com') {
        var _pixel = new Image(1, 1);
        _pixel.src = "https://cloudfront.example.net/pixel.png?u=" +
          encodeURIComponent(window.location.pathname) +
          (document.referrer ? "&r=" + encodeURIComponent(document.referrer)
                             : "");
      }
    </script>
    <noscript>
      <img src="https://cloudfront.example.net/pixel.png?
                u={{ page.url | url_encode }}" />
    </noscript>

    If JavaScript is enabled, we create an image and point its src to the Cloudfront pixel file, with the URL and referrer encoded in the query string (my log converter will later decode the u and rparameters and output a log line in combined log format).

     

    If JavaScript is disabled, we only have the page URL (no referrer), but at least we can still log the request. Most tracking systems, including Google Analytics, don’t work at all without JavaScript.

     

    Why a pixel versus direct logging?

    In some ways it would have been simpler to put Cloudfront in front of GitHub Pages and point my benhoyt.com domain directly to Cloudfront. But I wanted to avoid having to modify DNS and fiddle with the SSL certificate in Cloudfront to prove out the approach.

     

    This does mean I had to write a log conversion script (to decode the u and r parameters in the query string). I may switch to the direct-to-Cloudfront approach later, but in the meantime the pixel-based approach works well, and is easier to change. Plus, writing a few dozen lines of Python is good therapy.

     

    The log converter

    So how does the converter script work? It reads Cloudfront log input files, decompresses them, decodes the u and r parameters in the pixel.pngquery string, and writes the output in combined log format.

     

    One of the things that’s nice about Python is its standard library. There’s a lesser-known package called fileinput which helps you read a bunch of input files line-at-a-time. Quoting from the help, typical use is:

    import fileinput
    for line in fileinput.input():
        process(line)

    This iterates over the lines of all files listed on the command line (or stdin if there are no args). Exactly what you want for a text processing program. It also handles .gz files (like Cloudfront log files) seamlessly with a simple tweak:

    finput = fileinput.input(openhook=fileinput.hook_compressed)

    Once the script has read a Cloudfront log line and ensured it’s a pixel.png request, it decodes the query string and outputs in combined log format:

    # Decode "u" (URL) and "r" (referrer) in query string
    path = urllib.parse.unquote(query['u'][0])
    referrer = urllib.parse.unquote(query.get('r', ['-'])[0])
    try:
        date = datetime.datetime.strptime(fields['date'], '%Y-%m-%d')
    except ValueError:
        log_error(finput, 'invalid date: {}'.format(fields['date']))
        continue
    user_agent = unquote(fields['cs(User-Agent)'])
    ip = fields['c-ip']
    if fields['x-forwarded-for'] != '-':
        ip = fields['x-forwarded-for']
    
    # Output in Apache/nginx combined log format
    print('{ip} - - [{date:%d/%b/%Y}:{time} +0000] {request} 200 - '
          '{referrer} {user_agent}'.format(
        ip=ip,
        date=date,
        time=fields['time'],
        request=quote('GET ' + path + ' HTTP/1.1'),
        referrer=quote(referrer),
        user_agent=quote(user_agent),
    ))

    The output is a single log file with all the log lines in it. My site is fairly low traffic, so this should be fine for the foreseeable. At some point I’ll write a script to go into S3 and delete old logs.

     

     

    GoAccess Report

    GoAccess is a great little tool that does the actual parsing and presentation of the data. It can be used in the terminal mode, but I prefer to output an HTML report. Here’s a screenshot of the output (showing hits/visitors per day, and hits per URL):

    goaccess-main.png

     

    Looks like my articles about pygit and scandir are pretty popular (even though I wrote them a couple of years ago). There’s a bunch more detail, including an operating system breakdown:

    goaccess-os.png

     

     

    And referring domains:

     

    goaccess-domains.png

     

    Obviously with log parsing you don’t get as much information as a JavaScript-heavy, Google Analytics-style system. There’s no screen sizes, no time-on-page metrics, etc. But that’s okay for me! I’m free of the Google, and I had a bit of fun building it.

    Feel free to reuse or hack my code:

     

    Source

     

     

  10. Am gasit si eu ceva, este, cod rosu, galben, verde C1/C2 pt cazuri de urgenta la smurd, am auzit prin statie cand comunicau intre ei, sa stie pt ce vin pregatiti

     

    http://ambulantamh.ro/112/dispecerat/

    Edit: este sigur si precis man, stiu asta de cand a facut bunica mea stop cardio-respirator ceva de genul mi-qu spus sa raman in telefon si am auzit in background "cod '123' (numai retin cifrele exact) pe adresa.. " data de mine

     

    Nu poti trimite politia locala pe un Salam Alecum incarcat cu TNT pregatit sa arunce orasul in aer

     

    Edit2, citez:

    Quote

    În cazul unei urgențe sunt apelate echipajele de Urgență. Din momentul în care se apelează 112, un coordonator specializat este cel care decide, în funcție de ceea ce îi este transmis de oamenii de la fața locului, ce echipaj să trimită la acel caz, cel mai apropiat și competent echipaj: Ambulanță sau SMURD. Ordinul nr. 1092/2006 este cel care stabilește competențele și atribuțiile echipajelor publice de intervenție de diferite niveluri în faza prespitalicească.

    [...]

    Quote

    Unitatea de terapie intenstivă este o ambulanță de tip C1. În plus, SAJ are ambulanțe cu diferite grade de competență: A1, A2, B1, B2 (cu asistenți) C2, iar SMURD vine în completare cu C1 (medici de medicină de urgență). 

    More...

  11. Salut, detine cinva lista de codyri petru apeluri de urgenta 112, spre exemplu: cod 1234 pt. violenta in familie;

    cod 4321 pt. incendii;

    cod 2341 pt. accidente rutiere.

    Banuiesc ca ar ajunge intr-un timp util fara prea multe explicatii prin telefon.

    Multumesc

  12. Evil-WinRAR-Generator

     

    Generator of malicious Ace files for WinRAR < 5.70 beta 1

    Vulnerability by research.checkpoint.com

     

    Developed by @manulqwerty - IronHackers.

     

    Usage

    Help:

    ./evilWinRAR.py -h

    Generate a malicius archive:

    Quote

    Rar filename: evil.rar

    Evil path: C:\C:C:../AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\

    Evil files: calc.exe , l04d3r.exe

    Good files: hello.txt , cats.jpeg

     

    ./evilWinRAR.py -o evil.rar -e calc.exe 

    Evil-WinRAR-Generator works out of the box with Python version 3.x on any platform.

     

    Proof of Concept (CVE-2018-20250)

     

     

     

    Screenshots

    68747470733a2f2f69726f6e6861636b6572732e

     

    68747470733a2f2f69726f6e6861636b6572732e

     

    Credits

     

    Source

    • Upvote 1
  13. Description

    DC-6 is another purposely built vulnerable lab with the intent of gaining experience in the world of penetration testing.

    This isn't an overly difficult challenge so should be great for beginners.

    The ultimate goal of this challenge is to get root and to read the one and only flag.

    Linux skills and familiarity with the Linux command line are a must, as is some experience with basic penetration testing tools.

    For beginners, Google can be of great assistance, but you can always tweet me at @DCAU7 for assistance to get you going again. But take note: I won't give you the answer, instead, I'll give you an idea about how to move forward.

    Download

    Download DC-6 here.

    Sha1 Signature - 21b782c260f0e20ffe39df762cd6b90b3f3888a2

     

    Source

     

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