Nytro

Metasploit Low Level View Saad Talaat (saadtalaat@gmail.com) @Sa3dtalaat Abstract: for the past decade (almost) Metasploit have been number one pentesting tool. A lot of plug-ins have been developed specially for it. However, the key-point of this paper is to discuss metasploit framework as a code injector and payload encoder. Another key-point of this paper is malware different forms and how to avoid anti-viruses which have been a pain for pentesters lately. And how exactly anti-malware software work. Download: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/18532.pdf

Why Keccak is not ARX If SHA-2 is not broken, why would one switch to SHA-3 and not just stay with SHA-2? There are several arguments why Keccak/SHA-3 is a better choice than SHA-2. In this post, we come back on a particular design choice of Keccak and explain why Keccak is not ARX, unlike SHA-2. We specified Keccak at the bit-level using only transpositions, bit-level additions and multiplications (in GF(2)). We arranged these operations to allow efficient software implementations using fixed sequences of bitwise Boolean instructions and (cyclic) shifts. In contrast, many designers specify their primitives directly in pseudocode similarly including bitwise Boolean instructions and (cyclic) shifts, but on top of that also additions. These additions are modulo 2n with n a popular CPU word length such as 8, 32 or 64. Such primitives are dubbed ARX that stands for “addition, rotation and exclusive-or (XOR)”. The ARX approach is widespread and adopted by popular designs MD4, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, Salsa, ChaCha, Blake(2) and Skein. So why isn't Keccak following the ARX road? We give some arguments in the following paragraphs. ARX is fast! It is! Is it? One of the main selling points of ARX is its efficiency in software: Addition, rotation and XOR usually only take a single CPU cycle. For addition, this is not trivial because the carry bits may need to propagate from the least to the most significant bit of a word. Processor vendors have gone through huge efforts to make additions fast, and ARX primitives take advantage of this in a smart way. When trying to speed up ARX primitives by using dedicated hardware, not so much can be gained, unlike in bit-oriented primitives as Keccak. Furthermore, the designer of an adder must choose between complexity (area, consumption) or gate delay (latency): It is either compact or fast, but not at the same time. A bitwise Boolean XOR (or AND, OR, NOT) does not have this trade-off: It simply take a single XOR per bit and has a gate delay of a single binary XOR (or AND, OR, NOT) circuit. So the inherent computational cost of additions is a factor 3 to 5 higher than that of bitwise Boolean operations. But even software ARX gets into trouble when protection against power or electromagnetic analysis is a threat. Effective protection at primitive level requires masking, namely, where each sensitive variable is represented as the sum of two (or more) shares and where the operations are performed on the shares separately. For bitwise Boolean operations and (cyclic) shifts, this sum must be understood bitwise (XOR), and for addition the sum must be modulo 2n. The trouble is that ARX primitives require many computationally intensive conversions between the two types of masking. ARX is secure! It is! Is it? The cryptographic strength of ARX comes from the fact that addition is not associative with rotation or XOR. However, it is very hard to estimate the security of such primitives. We give some examples to illustrate this. For MD5, it took almost 15 years to be broken while the collision attacks that have finally been found can be mounted almost by hand. For SHA-1, it took 10 years to convert the theoretical attacks of around 2006 into a real collision. More recently, at the FSE 2017 conference in Tokyo, some attacks on Salsa and ChaCha were presented, which in retrospect look trivial but that remained undiscovered for many years. Nowadays, when a new cryptographic primitive is published, one expects arguments on why it would provide resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Evaluating this resistance implies investigating propagation of difference patterns and linear masks through the round function. In ARX designs, the mere description of such difference propagation is complicated, and the study of linear mask propagation has only barely started, more than 25 years after the publication of MD5. A probable reason for this is that (crypt)analyzing ARX, despite its merits, is relatively unrewarding in terms of scientific publications: It does not lend itself to a clean mathematical description and usually amounts to hard and ad-hoc programming work. A substantial part of the cryptographic community is therefore reluctant to spend their time trying to cryptanalyze ARX designs. We feel that the cryptanalysis of more structured designs such as Rijndael/AES or Keccak/SHA-3 leads to publications that provide more insight. ARX is serious! It is! Is it? But if ARX is really so bad, why are there so many primitives from prominent cryptographers using it? Actually, the most recent hash function in Ronald L. Rivest's MD series, the SHA-3 candidate MD6, made use of only bitwise Boolean instructions and shifts. More recently, a large team including Salsa and ChaCha designer Daniel J. Bernstein published the non-ARX permutation Gimli. Gimli in turn refers to NORX for its design approach, a CAESAR candidate proposed by a team including Jean-Philippe Aumasson and whose name stems from a rather explicit “NO(T A)RX”. Actually, they are moving in the direction where Keccak and its predecessors (e.g., RadioGatún, Noekeon, BaseKing) always were. So, maybe better skip ARX? Sursa: https://keccak.team/2017/not_arx.html

Breaking out of Restricted Windows Environment ON JUNE 14, 2017 BY WEIRDGIRL Many organizations these days use restricted windows environment to reduce the surface of vulnerability. The more the system is hardened the less the functionalities are exposed. I recently ran across such a scenario, where an already hardened system was protected by McAfee Solidcore. Solidcore was preventing users from making any changes to the system like installing/un-installing softwares, running executables, launching applications etc. The system (Windows 7) which I was testing, boots right on to the application login screen while restricting access to other OS functionalities. I could not do anything with that system except for restarting it. I spent a whole week in gathering information about the application and the system, which includes social engineering as well And then I got an entry point to start with. The credentials to login to the application(that gave me headache for one week) was available on Internet (thanks to Google dork). The credential I got was admin credential. After logging in to the application there was no way to get out of the application and get in to the base system. The application was so well designed that there was not a single way to get out of it. Then I found an option in the application to print some document. Then clicked on print-->printer settings-->add a printer-->location-->browse location and I got access to file browser of host machine. Every windows file explorer has a windows help option which provides free help about windows features. It was possible to open command prompt from the help option. I was only able to open command prompt but not any other windows application. Even after getting access to command prompt I was unable to do any changes in the system(not even opening a notepad). Every windows application that I tried to open, ended up with the following error message: The error was very clear that the application is blocked and it can either be enabled from registry editor or group policy editor. However I did not have access to both of them. Solidcore was blocking access to any of those. So I used the following batch script to enable task manager. The script was used to modify the registry key(though I didn’t have any idea if it was actually blocked from registry editor or group policy editor): And to my surprise I was able to unlock task manager. Similarly I was able to unlock and open control panel. My main objective was to disable or uninstall Solidcore as it was restricting the desktop environment. But then the system kept on giving me challenges. I was able to uninstall any software except for Solidcore. Then there was only one way left to disable Solidcore / enable installation of other software and that was “Group Policy Editor“. However I didn’t have direct access to gpedit. I used the following way to get access to gpedit: Open Task manager-->File -->New task-->Type MMC and enter This opened Microsoft Management Policy In mmc File-->Add/Remove snap-in--> Select Group Policy Objects and click on add After this I was able to perform numerous actions like enabling blocked system applications, allowing access to Desktop, disabling windows restrictions etc. However my main objective was to disable Solidcore and find out a way to run any windows executable. Group Policy editor provides an option to run/block only allowed windows software. And this policy can be set in the following way: Group Policy editor-->User Configuration > Administrative Templates > System On the right side there's option "Do not run specified windows applications". Click on that: Edit-->Select Enabled-->Click on show list of disallowed applications--> then add the application name that you want to block(in my case it was solidcore). Then click "Ok" . To apply changes I restarted my system. In the same way it was possible to enable list of allowed applications that can run in windows(a malicious software as well). And that’s how I was able to break out of a completely restricted desktop environment Sursa: https://weirdgirlweb.wordpress.com/2017/06/14/first-blog-post/

[RHSA-2017:2787-01] Important: rh-mysql56-mysql security and bug fix update From: "Security announcements for all Red Hat products and services." <rhsa-announce@xxxxxxxxxx> To: rhsa-announce@xxxxxxxxxx Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2017 03:43:23 -0400 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ===================================================================== Red Hat Security Advisory Synopsis: Important: rh-mysql56-mysql security and bug fix update Advisory ID: RHSA-2017:2787-01 Product: Red Hat Software Collections Advisory URL: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2787 Issue date: 2017-09-21 CVE Names: CVE-2016-5483 CVE-2016-8327 CVE-2017-3238 CVE-2017-3244 CVE-2017-3257 CVE-2017-3258 CVE-2017-3265 CVE-2017-3273 CVE-2017-3291 CVE-2017-3302 CVE-2017-3305 CVE-2017-3308 CVE-2017-3309 CVE-2017-3312 CVE-2017-3313 CVE-2017-3317 CVE-2017-3318 CVE-2017-3450 CVE-2017-3452 CVE-2017-3453 CVE-2017-3456 CVE-2017-3461 CVE-2017-3462 CVE-2017-3463 CVE-2017-3464 CVE-2017-3599 CVE-2017-3600 CVE-2017-3633 CVE-2017-3634 CVE-2017-3636 CVE-2017-3641 CVE-2017-3647 CVE-2017-3648 CVE-2017-3649 CVE-2017-3651 CVE-2017-3652 CVE-2017-3653 ===================================================================== 1. Summary: An update for rh-mysql56-mysql is now available for Red Hat Software Collections. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section. 2. Relevant releases/architectures: Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (v. 6) - x86_64 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (v. 7) - x86_64 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server EUS (v. 6.7) - x86_64 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server EUS (v. 7.3) - x86_64 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation (v. 6) - x86_64 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation (v. 7) - x86_64 3. Description: MySQL is a multi-user, multi-threaded SQL database server. It consists of the MySQL server daemon, mysqld, and many client programs. The following packages have been upgraded to a later upstream version: rh-mysql56-mysql (5.6.37). Security Fix(es): * An integer overflow flaw leading to a buffer overflow was found in the way MySQL parsed connection handshake packets. An unauthenticated remote attacker with access to the MySQL port could use this flaw to crash the mysqld daemon. (CVE-2017-3599) * It was discovered that the mysql and mysqldump tools did not correctly handle database and table names containing newline characters. A database user with privileges to create databases or tables could cause the mysql command to execute arbitrary shell or SQL commands while restoring database backup created using the mysqldump tool. (CVE-2016-5483, CVE-2017-3600) * Multiple flaws were found in the way the MySQL init script handled initialization of the database data directory and permission setting on the error log file. The mysql operating system user could use these flaws to escalate their privileges to root. (CVE-2017-3265) * It was discovered that the mysqld_safe script honored the ledir option value set in a MySQL configuration file. A user able to modify one of the MySQL configuration files could use this flaw to escalate their privileges to root. (CVE-2017-3291) * It was discovered that the MySQL client command line tools only checked after authentication whether server supported SSL. A man-in-the-middle attacker could use this flaw to hijack client's authentication to the server even if the client was configured to require SSL connection. (CVE-2017-3305) * Multiple flaws were found in the way the mysqld_safe script handled creation of error log file. The mysql operating system user could use these flaws to escalate their privileges to root. (CVE-2017-3312) * A flaw was found in the way MySQL client library (libmysqlclient) handled prepared statements when server connection was lost. A malicious server or a man-in-the-middle attacker could possibly use this flaw to crash an application using libmysqlclient. (CVE-2017-3302) * This update fixes several vulnerabilities in the MySQL database server. Information about these flaws can be found on the Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory pages listed in the References section. (CVE-2016-8327, CVE-2017-3238, CVE-2017-3244, CVE-2017-3257, CVE-2017-3258, CVE-2017-3273, CVE-2017-3308, CVE-2017-3309, CVE-2017-3313, CVE-2017-3317, CVE-2017-3318, CVE-2017-3450, CVE-2017-3452, CVE-2017-3453, CVE-2017-3456, CVE-2017-3461, CVE-2017-3462, CVE-2017-3463, CVE-2017-3464, CVE-2017-3633, CVE-2017-3634, CVE-2017-3636, CVE-2017-3641, CVE-2017-3647, CVE-2017-3648, CVE-2017-3649, CVE-2017-3651, CVE-2017-3652, CVE-2017-3653) Red Hat would like to thank Pali Rohár for reporting CVE-2017-3305. Bug Fix(es): * Previously, the md5() function was blocked by MySQL in FIPS mode because the MD5 hash algorithm is considered insecure. Consequently, the mysqld daemon failed with error messages when FIPS mode was enabled. With this update, md5() is allowed in FIPS mode for non-security operations. Note that users are able to use md5() for security purposes but such usage is not supported by Red Hat. (BZ#1452469) 4. Solution: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing this update, the MySQL server daemon (mysqld) will be restarted automatically. 5. Bugs fixed (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/): 1414133 - CVE-2017-3312 mysql: insecure error log file handling in mysqld_safe, incomplete CVE-2016-6664 fix (CPU Jan 2017) 1414337 - CVE-2016-8327 mysql: Server: Replication unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414338 - CVE-2017-3238 mysql: Server: Optimizer unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414342 - CVE-2017-3244 mysql: Server: DML unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414350 - CVE-2017-3257 mysql: Server: InnoDB unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414351 - CVE-2017-3258 mysql: Server: DDL unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414352 - CVE-2017-3273 mysql: Server: DDL unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414353 - CVE-2017-3313 mysql: Server: MyISAM unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414355 - CVE-2017-3317 mysql: Logging unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414357 - CVE-2017-3318 mysql: Server: Error Handling unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jan 2017) 1414423 - CVE-2017-3265 mysql: unsafe chmod/chown use in init script (CPU Jan 2017) 1414429 - CVE-2017-3291 mysql: unrestricted mysqld_safe's ledir (CPU Jan 2017) 1422119 - CVE-2017-3302 mysql: prepared statement handle use-after-free after disconnect 1431690 - CVE-2017-3305 mysql: incorrect enforcement of ssl-mode=REQUIRED in MySQL 5.5 and 5.6 1433010 - CVE-2016-5483 CVE-2017-3600 mariadb, mysql: Incorrect input validation allowing code execution via mysqldump 1443358 - CVE-2017-3308 mysql: Server: DML unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443359 - CVE-2017-3309 mysql: Server: Optimizer unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443363 - CVE-2017-3450 mysql: Server: Memcached unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443364 - CVE-2017-3452 mysql: Server: Optimizer unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443365 - CVE-2017-3453 mysql: Server: Optimizer unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443369 - CVE-2017-3456 mysql: Server: DML unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443376 - CVE-2017-3461 mysql: Server: Security: Privileges unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443377 - CVE-2017-3462 mysql: Server: Security: Privileges unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443378 - CVE-2017-3463 mysql: Server: Security: Privileges unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443379 - CVE-2017-3464 mysql: Server: DDL unspecified vulnerability (CPU Apr 2017) 1443386 - CVE-2017-3599 mysql: integer underflow in get_56_lenc_string() leading to DoS (CPU Apr 2017) 1472683 - CVE-2017-3633 mysql: Server: Memcached unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472684 - CVE-2017-3634 mysql: Server: DML unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472686 - CVE-2017-3636 mysql: Client programs unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472693 - CVE-2017-3641 mysql: Server: DML unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472703 - CVE-2017-3647 mysql: Server: Replication unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472704 - CVE-2017-3648 mysql: Server: Charsets unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472705 - CVE-2017-3649 mysql: Server: Replication unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472708 - CVE-2017-3651 mysql: Client mysqldump unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472710 - CVE-2017-3652 mysql: Server: DDL unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1472711 - CVE-2017-3653 mysql: Server: DDL unspecified vulnerability (CPU Jul 2017) 1477575 - service start fails due to wrong selinux type of logfile 1482122 - Test case failure: /CoreOS/mysql/Regression/bz1149143-mysql-general-log-doesn-t-work-with-FIFO-file Sursa: https://mailinglist-archive.mojah.be/redhat-announce/2017-09/msg00048.php

How Booking.com manipulates you Published on September 17, 2017; tags: Misc Many websites and applications these days are designed to trick you into doing things that their creators want. Here are some examples from timewellspent.io: YouTube autoplays more videos to keep us from leaving. Instagram shows new likes one at a time, to keep us checking for more. Facebook wants to show whatever keeps us scrolling. Snapchat turns conversations into streaks we don’t want to lose. Our media turns events into breaking news to keep us watching. But one of the most manipulative websites I’ve ever come across is Booking.com, the large hotel search & booking service. If you ever used Booking.com, you probably noticed (and hopefully resisted!) some ways it nudges you to book whatever property you are looking at: Let’s see what’s going on here. Prices First, it tries to persuade you that the price is low. “Jackpot! This is the cheapest price you’ve seen in London for your dates!” Of course it is — this is literally the first price I am seeing for these days — so that statement is tautological. The first price I see will automatically be the lowest I will have seen, no matter how ridiculously high it’s going to be. The statement “This is the highest price you’ve seen in London for your dates!” would be just as valid. Likewise, the struck-through prices are there to anchor you and make the actual price seem like a great deal. The struck-through US$175 is before applying my 10% “genius” discount — ok, that’s fair. But where does the US$189 come from? Let’s hover over the price to get an explanation: I imagine most people will feel intimidated by the complex description, skip to the last sentence, and get the impression that “you get the same room for a lower price compared to other check-in dates”. (If this wasn’t the case, Booking.com’s marketing department would change the wording to make it so.) But what is it actually saying? If there is only one room of this type, then 90% of time there will be an appearance of a lucky deal. What you should be reading is “If I choose this, I am not a total loser”. And if there are 3 comparable room types with differential pricing, there is even less of a reason to feel good about this — you’ve successfully avoided the worst 3% of the offerings. Urgency Another way Booking.com manipulates you is by conveying the sense of urgency. “In high demand - only 3 rooms left on our site!” “33 other people looking now, according to our Booking.com travel scientists” (what?) “Last chance! Only 1 room left on our site!” And just to prove they are not kidding, they will show you something that you’ve missed already: But my favorite one is this red badge: Although it cannot be seen on the screenshot, the badge doesn’t appear right away when you open the page. Instead, it pops up one or two seconds later, making it seem like a realtime notification — an impression reinforced by the alarm clock icon. To be clear, it is not realtime, and there is no reason to delay its display other than to trick you: How much time has elapsed since the last booking doesn’t simply play on our irrational emotions. This is a valuable piece of information that can be used to estimate at what rate these rooms are being booked. By a Gott-like argument (see Algorithms to Live By for an excellent explanation), if the last booking was made 4 hours ago, you can estimate that a room is booked about every 8 hours. Plenty of time to relax and compare your options. If, on the other hand, the last booking happened just two seconds ago, you’d better not waste another second before entering your credit card number. Kudos to Booking for at least providing the actual information in a tooltip window (I wonder what regulations make them do that), but not all users will hover to read it, and even then, something that you experience (a badge popping up) will probably take precedence over what you later read. The “Someone just booked this” badge does not just make you worry that the room you are considering will soon be snatched; it also reassures you. If other people are actively booking this property, it must be good. Of course, the person who made a reservation 4 hours ago has not yet visited the hotel and so probably has little more knowledge than you. Their decision to book is probably to some extent influenced by the same red badge. This situation, where everyone relies on everyone else to have accurate information, is also well described in Algorithms to Live By. Reviews Instead of listening to people who have just booked the property but have not yet visited it, we should turn to those who have been there, right? That’s what reviews are for! But Booking.com managed to game the reviews, too. There are quite a few crappy hotels out there, especially on the cheaper end of the spectrum. These are the hotels you and I would want to avoid, but if we did, Booking would not make money on them. An extreme example is the hotel I’m currently staying at, New Union. From its Booking.com page you wouldn’t think there’s anything wrong with it, would you? If you spend enough time perusing that page, you’ll eventually stumble upon the “fine print”: “noise may be heard whilst the bar is open” is an understatement; the music is so loud that the floor in my room shakes very perceptibly, and the bar is open until late at night/early in the morning. And why is this warning hidden in the fine print instead of being a big red fucking badge? To be fair, this is more of the hotel’s fault than Booking’s. Also, I should have read the fine print. Or the reviews. But wait, I’ve read the reviews: What I didn’t realize skimming an overloaded webpage was that the reviews displayed on the main page had been cherry-picked. The full list of reviews is available from a separate page, e.g. Ratings Notice something interesting here: the first, moderately negative review, gives the place a rating of 7 out of 10, and the second review, probably as negative as it gets, gives it almost a 6. As a result, the overall rating of the property is high (7.6), and even the distribution of ratings does not look alarming: Unlike IMDB or Amazon, where you simply give a movie or product a number of stars, when you rate your stay on Booking.com, you evaluate it on several factors: location, cleanliness, facilities etc. But Booking.com doesn’t present individual ratings; it presents the average (like 7.1 or 5.8), and the average of averages (the overall rating of a property). It is unlikely that all factors will be bad simultaneously, but a problem in one of them may easily ruin your trip. A great location will not compensate for dirty sheets, but Booking.com thinks otherwise. What to do with all of this Frankly, I don’t think I am going to stop using Booking.com. I am not aware of any other service with a comparable number of properties and reviews. Instead, we need to be aware of all the ways Booking is trying to screw us over and try to counter them: Ignore urgency-provoking red text and anchoring struck-through prices. Do not rely on the magnitude of the ratings. I think it is still fine to use them as a sorting criterion. Do not read the cherry-picked reviews on the main page. Go to the review page (“Our guests’ experiences”) and sort the reviews from newest to oldest, to get an up-to-date and hopefully unbiased selection. Sursa: https://ro-che.info/articles/2017-09-17-booking-com-manipulation

Kali Linux 2017.2 Release September 20, 2017 dookie We are happy to announce the release of Kali Linux 2017.2, available now for your downloading pleasure. This release is a roll-up of all updates and fixes since our 2017.1 release in April. In tangible terms, if you were to install Kali from your 2017.1 ISO, after logging in to the desktop and running ‘apt update && apt full-upgrade’, you would be faced with something similiar to this daunting message: 1399 upgraded, 171 newly installed, 16 to remove and 0 not upgraded. Need to get 1,477 MB of archives. After this operation, 1,231 MB of additional disk space will be used. Do you want to continue? [Y/n] That would make for a whole lot of downloading, unpacking, and configuring of packages. Naturally, these numbers don’t tell the entire tale so read on to see what’s new in this release. New and Updated Packages in Kali 2017.2 In addition to all of the standard security and package updates that come to us via Debian Testing, we have also added more than a dozen new tools to the repositories, a few of which are listed below. There are some really nice additions so we encourage you to ‘apt install’ the ones that pique your interest and check them out. hurl – a useful little hexadecimal and URL encoder/decoder phishery – phishery lets you inject SSL-enabled basic auth phishing URLs into a .docx Word document ssh-audit – an SSH server auditor that checks for encryption types, banners, compression, and more apt2 – an Automated Penetration Testing Toolkit that runs its own scans or imports results from various scanners, and takes action on them bloodhound – uses graph theory to reveal the hidden or unintended relationships within Active Directory crackmapexec – a post-exploitation tool to help automate the assessment of large Active Directory networks dbeaver – powerful GUI database manager that supports the most popular databases, including MySQL, PostgreSQL, Oracle, SQLite, and many more brutespray – automatically attempts default credentials on discovered services On top of all the new packages, this release also includes numerous package updates, including jd-gui, dnsenum, edb-debugger, wpscan, watobo, burpsuite, and many others. To check out the full list of updates and additions, refer to the Kali changelog on our bug tracker. Ongoing Integration Improvements Beyond the new and updated packages in this release, we have also been working towards improving the overall integration of packages in Kali Linux. One area in particular is in program usage examples. Many program authors assume that their application will only be run in a certain manner or from a certain location. For example, the SMBmap application has a binary name of ‘smbmap’ but if you were to look at the usage example, you would see this: Examples: $ python smbmap.py -u jsmith -p password1 -d workgroup -H 192.168.0.1 $ python smbmap.py -u jsmith -p 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:da76f2c4c96028b7a6111aef4a50a94d' -H 172.16.0.20 $ python smbmap.py -u 'apadmin' -p 'asdf1234!' -d ACME -h 10.1.3.30 -x 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' If you were a novice user, you might see these examples, try to run them verbatim, find that they don’t work, assume the tool doesn’t work, and move on. That would be a shame because smbmap is an excellent program so we have been working on fixing these usage discrepancies to help improve the overall fit and finish of the distribution. If you run ‘smbmap’ in Kali 2017.2, you will now see this output instead: Examples: $ smbmap -u jsmith -p password1 -d workgroup -H 192.168.0.1 $ smbmap -u jsmith -p 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:da76f2c4c96028b7a6111aef4a50a94d' -H 172.16.0.20 $ smbmap -u 'apadmin' -p 'asdf1234!' -d ACME -h 10.1.3.30 -x 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' We hope that small tweaks like these will help reduce confusion to both veterans and newcomers and it’s something we will continue working towards as time goes on. Learn More About Kali Linux In the time since the release of 2017.1, we also released our first book, Kali Linux Revealed, in both physical and onlineformats. If you are interested in going far beyond the basics, really want to learn how Kali Linux works, and how you can leverage its many advanced features, we encourage you to check it out. Once you have mastered the material, you will have the foundation required to pursue the Kali Linux Certified Professional certification. Kali ISO Downloads, Virtual Machines and ARM Images The Kali Rolling 2017.2 release can be downloaded via our official Kali Download page. This release, we have also updated our Kali Virtual Images and Kali ARM Images downloads. As always, if you already have Kali installed and running to your liking, all you need to do in order to get up-to-date is run the following: apt update apt dist-upgrade reboot We hope you enjoy this fine release as much as we enjoyed making it! Sursa: https://www.kali.org/news/kali-linux-2017-2-release/

Managed object internals, Part 1. The layout Sergey TeplyakovMay 26, 2017 The layout of a managed object is pretty simple: a managed object contains instance data, a pointer to a meta-data (a.k.a. method table pointer) and a bag of internal information also known as an object header. The first time I’ve read about it, I’ve got a question: why the layout of an object is so weird? Why a managed reference points into the middle of an object and an object header is at a negative offset? What information is stored in the object header? When I started thinking about the layout and did a quick research, I’ve got few options: 1. JVM used a similar layout for their managed objects from the inception. It could sound a bit crazy today but remember that C# has one of the worst features of all times (a.k.a. array covariance) just because Java had it back in the day. And compared to that decision, reusing some ideas about the structure of an object doesn’t sound that unreasonable. 2. Object header can grow in size with no cross-cutting changes in the CLR. Object header holds some auxiliary information used by CLR and it is possible that CLR will require more information than a pointer size field. And indeed, .Net Compact Framework used in mobile phones has different headers for small and large objects (see WP7: CLR Managed Object overhead for more details). Desktop CLR never used this ability but it doesn’t mean that it is impossible in the future. 3. Cache line and other performance related characteristics. Chris Brumme -- one of the CLR architects, mentioned in the comment on his post “Value Types“ that cache friendliness is the very reason for the managed object layout. It is theoretically possible that due to cache line size (64 bytes) it will be more efficient to access fields that are closer to each other. This means that dereferencing method table pointer with the following access to some field should have some performance difference depending on the location of the field inside the object. I’ve spent some time trying to proof that this is still true for modern processors but was unable to get any benchmarks that showed the difference. After spending some time trying to validate my theories, I’ve contacted Vance Morrison asking this very question and got the following answer: current design was made with no particular perf considerations. So, the answer to the question – “Why the managed object’s layout is so weird?”, is simple: “historical reasons”. And, to be honest, I can see a logic for moving object header at a negative index to emphasize that this piece of data is an implementation detail of the CLR, the size of it can change in time, and it should not be inspected by a user. Now, it’s time to inspect the layout in more details. But before that, let’s think about, what extra information CLR can be associated with a managed object instance? Here are some ideas: · Special flags that GC can use to mark that an object is reachable from application roots. · Special flag that notifies GC that an object is pinned and should not be moved during garbage collection. · Hash code of a managed object (when a GetHashCode method is not overridden). · Critical section and other information used by a lock statement: thread that acquired the lock etc. Apart from instance state, CLR stores a lot of information associated with a type, like method table, interface maps, instance size and so on, but this is not relevant for our current discussion. IsMarked flag Managed object header is a multi-purpose chameleon that can be used for many different purposes. And you may think that the garbage collector (GC) uses a bit from the object header to mark that the object is references by a root and should be kept alive. This is a common misconception, and few very famous books are to blame (*). Namely “CLR via C#” by Jeffrey Richter, “Pro .NET Performance” by Sasha Goldstein at al and, definitely, some others. Instead of using the object header, the CLR authors decided to use one clever trick: the lowest bit of a method table pointer is used to store a flag during garbage collection that the object is reachable and should not be collected. Here is an actual implementation of ‘mark’ flag from the coreclr repo, file gc.cpp, lines 8974 (**): (**) Unfortunately, the gc.cpp file is so big that github refuses to analyze it. This means that I can’t add a hyperlink to a specific line of code. Managed pointers in a CLR heap are aligned on 4-byte or 8-byte address boundaries depending on a platform. This means that 2 or 3 bits of every pointer are always 0 and can be used for other purposes. The same trick is used by JVM and called ‘Compressed Oops’ – the feature that allows JVM to have 32 gigs heap size and still use 4 bytes for managed pointer. Technically speaking, even on a 32-bit platform there is 2 bits that can be used for flags. Based on a comment from the object.h file we can think that this is indeed the case and the second lowest bit of the method table pointer is used for pinning (to mark that the object should not be moved during compaction phase of garbage collection). Unfortunately, it is not clear, is true or not, because SetPinned/IsPinned methods from the gc.cpp (lines 3850-3859) are implemented based on a reserved bit from the object header and I was unable to find any code in the coreclr repo that actually sets the bit of the method table pointer. Next time we’ll discuss how locks are implemented and will check how expensive they are. Part 1: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/seteplia/2017/05/26/managed-object-internals-part-1-layout/ Part 2: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/seteplia/2017/09/06/managed-object-internals-part-2-object-header-layout-and-the-cost-of-locking/ Part 3: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/seteplia/2017/09/12/managed-object-internals-part-3-the-layout-of-a-managed-array-3/ Part 4: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/seteplia/2017/09/21/managed-object-internals-part-4-fields-layout/

CVE-2017-0785 PoC This is just a personal study based on the Android information leak vulnerability released by Armis. Further reading: https://www.armis.com/blueborne/ To run, be sure to have pybluez and pwntools installed. sudo apt-get install bluetooth libbluetooth-dev sudo pip install pybluez sudo pip install pwntools Sursa: https://github.com/ojasookert/CVE-2017-0785

Abstract— The continuous discovery of exploitable vulnerabilities in popular applications (e.g., document viewers), along with their heightening protections against control flow hijacking, has opened the door to an often neglected attack strategy— namely, data-only attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate the practicality of the threat posed by data-only attacks that harness the power of memory disclosure vulnerabilities. To do so, we introduce memory cartography, a technique that simplifies the construction of data-only attacks in a reliable manner. Specifically, we show how an adversary can use a provided memory mapping primitive to navigate through process memory at runtime, and safely reach security-critical data that can then be modified at will. We demonstrate this capability by using our cross-platform memory cartography framework implementation to construct data-only exploits against Internet Explorer and Chrome. The outcome of these exploits ranges from simple HTTP cookie leakage, to the alteration of the same origin policy for targeted domains, which enables the cross-origin execution of arbitrary script code. The ease with which we can undermine the security of modern browsers stems from the fact that although isolation policies (such as the same origin policy) are enforced at the script level, these policies are not well reflected in the underlying sandbox process models used for compartmentalization. This gap exists because the complex demands of today’s web functionality make the goal of enforcing the same origin policy through process isolation a difficult one to realize in practice, especially when backward compatibility is a priority (e.g., for support of cross-origin IFRAMEs). While fixing the underlying problems likely requires a major refactoring of the security architecture of modern browsers (in the long term), we explore several defenses, including global variable randomization, that can limit the power of the attacks presented herein. Download: https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~mikepo/papers/xfu.eurosp17.pdf

osx-config-check Checks your OSX machine against various hardened configuration settings. You can specify your own preferred configuration baseline by supplying your own Hjson file instead of the provided one. Disclaimer The authors of this tool are not responsible if running it breaks stuff; disabling features of your operating system and applications may disrupt normal functionality. Once applied, the security configurations do not not guarantee security. You will still need to make good decisions in order to stay secure. The configurations will generally not help you if your computer has been previously compromised. Configurations come from sites like: drduh's OS X Security and Privacy Guide Usage You should download and run this application once for each OS X user account you have on your machine. Each user may be configured differently, and so each should be audited. Download this app using Git, GitHub Desktop, or the "download as zip" option offered by GitHub. If you choose the zip option, unarchive the zip file after. In the Terminal application, navigate to the directory that contains this app. You can use the cd command (see example below) to change directories. If you've downloaded the file to your "Downloads" directory, you might find the app here: cd ~/Downloads/osx-config-check If that directory doesn't exist because the folder you retrieved is named slightly different (such as 'osx-config-check-master' or 'osx-config-check-1.0.0'), you can always type in a portion of the directory name and hit the [TAB] key in Terminal to auto-complete the rest. Next run the app as follows: python app.py This will take you through a series of interactive steps that checks your machine's configuration, and offers to fix misconfigurations for you. Intermediate users and advanced users can also invoke various command-line arguments: Usage: python app.py [OPTIONS] OPTIONS: --debug-print Enables verbose output for debugging the tool. --report-only Only reports on compliance and does not offer to fix broken configurations. --disable-logs Refrain from creating a log file with the results. --disable-prompt Refrain from prompting user before applying fixes. --skip-sudo-checks Do not perform checks that require sudo privileges. --help -h Print this usage information. Sursa: https://github.com/kristovatlas/osx-config-check

Air-Gap Research Page By Dr. Mordechai Guri Cyber-Security Research Center Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel email: gurim@post.bgu.ac.il (linkedin) aIR-Jumper (Optical) "aIR-Jumper: Covert Air-Gap Exfiltration/Infiltration via Security Cameras & Infrared (IR)" Mordechai Guri, Dima Bykhovsky‏, Yuval Elovici Paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1709.05742 Video (infiltration): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=auoYKSzdOj4 Video (exfiltration): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=om5fNqKjj2M xLED (Optical) Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici. "xLED: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Networks via Router LEDs" Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.01140 Or: http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/system/files/xLED-Router-Guri_0.pdf Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSNt4h7EDKo AirHopper (Electromagnetic) Mordechai Guri, Gabi Kedma, Assaf Kachlon, and Yuval Elovici. "AirHopper: Bridging the air-gap between isolated networks and mobile phones using radio frequencies." In Malicious and Unwanted Software: The Americas (MALWARE), 2014 9th International Conference on, pp. 58-67. IEEE, 2014. Guri, Mordechai, Matan Monitz, and Yuval Elovici. "Bridging the Air Gap between Isolated Networks and Mobile Phones in a Practical Cyber-Attack." ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST) 8, no. 4 (2017): 50. Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OzTWiGl1rM&t=20s BitWhisper (Thermal) Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, Yisroel Mirski, and Yuval Elovici. "Bitwhisper: Covert signaling channel between air-gapped computers using thermal manipulations." In Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2015 IEEE 28th, pp. 276-289. IEEE, 2015. Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EWRk51oB-1Y&t=15s GSMem (Electromagnetic) Mordechai Guri, Assaf Kachlon, Ofer Hasson, Gabi Kedma, Yisroel Mirsky, and Yuval Elovici. "GSMem: Data exfiltration from air-gapped computers over gsm frequencies." In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15), pp. 849-864. 2015. Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RChj7Mg3rC4 Fansmitter (Acoustic) Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov, and Yuval Elovici. "Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers." arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.05915 (2016). Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2_sZIfZkDQ DiskFiltration (Acoustic) Mordechai Guri,Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici. "Acoustic Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Hard-Drive Noise (‘DiskFiltration’)". European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2017) pp 98-115 Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov, and Yuval Elovici. "DiskFiltration: Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Hard Drive Noise." arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.03431 (2016). Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7lQXmSLiP8 USBee (Electromagnetic) Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, and Yuval Elovici. "USBee: Air-Gap Covert-Channel via Electromagnetic Emission from USB." arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.08397 (2016). Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E28V1t-k8Hk LED-it-GO (Optical) Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Yuval Elovici. "LED-it-GO: Leaking (A Lot of) Data from Air-Gapped Computers via the (Small) Hard Drive LED". Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 14th International Conference, DIMVA 2017: 161-184 Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Eran Atias, and Yuval Elovici. "LED-it-GO: Leaking (a lot of) Data from Air-Gapped Computers via the (small) Hard Drive LED." arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06715 (2017). Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vIu8ld68fc VisiSploit (Optical) Mordechai Guri, Ofer Hasson, Gabi Kedma, and Yuval Elovici. "An optical covert-channel to leak data through an air-gap." In Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 2016 14th Annual Conference on, pp. 642-649. IEEE, 2016. Mordechai Guri, Ofer Hasson, Gabi Kedma, and Yuval Elovici. "VisiSploit: An Optical Covert-Channel to Leak Data through an Air-Gap." arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.03946 (2016). Attachment: PDF icon xLED-Router-Guri.pdf Link: http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap

The information security world is rich with information. From reviewing logs to analyzing malware, information is everywhere and in vast quantities, more than the workforce can cover. Artificial intelligence is a field of study that is adept at applying intelligence to vast amounts of data and deriving meaningful results. In this book, we will cover machine learning techniques in practical situations to improve your ability to thrive in a data driven world. With clustering, we will explore grouping items and identifying anomalies. With classification, we’ll cover how to train a model to distinguish between classes of inputs. In probability, we’ll answer the question “What are the odds?” and make use of the results. With deep learning, we’ll dive into the powerful biology inspired realms of AI that power some of the most effective methods in machine learning today. The Cylance Data Science team consists of experts in a variety of fields. Contributing members from this team for this book include Brian Wallace, a security researcher turned data scientist with a propensity for building tools that merge the worlds of information security and data science. Sepehr Akhavan-Masouleh is a data scientist who works on the application of statistical and machine learning models in cyber-security with a Ph.D from University of California, Irvine. Andrew Davis is a neural network wizard wielding a Ph.D in computer engineering from University of Tennessee. Mike Wojnowicz is a data scientist with a Ph.D. from Cornell University who enjoys developing and deploying large-scale probabilistic models due to their interpretability. Data scientist John H. Brock researches applications of machine learning to static malware detection and analysis, holds an M.S. in computer science from University of California, Irvine, and can usually be found debugging Lovecraftian open source code while mumbling to himself about the virtues of unit testing. Download: http://defense.ballastsecurity.net/static/IntroductionToArtificialIntelligenceForSecurityProfessionals_Cylance.pdf

No Coin No coin is a tiny browser extension aiming to block coin miners such as Coinhive. You can grab the extension from: Chrome Web Store FireFox Add-on (coming soon) Why? Even though I think using coin mining in browser to monetize content is a great idea, abusing it is not. Some websites are running it during the entire browsing session which results in high consumption of your computers resources. I do believe that using it occasionally such as for the proof of work of a captcha is OK. But for an entire browsing session, the user should have the choice to opt-in which is the aim of this extension. Why not just block the URLs in an adblocker? The idea was to keep it separate from adblocking. Coin mining in the browser is a different issue. Where ads are tracking you and visually interfering with your browsing experience, coin mining, if abused, is eating your computer resources resulting in slow downs (from high CPU usage) and excessive power consumption. You might be OK with that and not with ads, or vice versa. Or you might just want to keep ads blocked entirely and just enable the coin mining script for a minute to pass a Captcha. That's why I believe having a separate extension is useful. How does it work? The extension is simply blocking a list of blacklisted domains in blacklist.txt. Clicking on the icon will display you a button to pause/unpause No Coin. If you are aware of any scripts or services that provide coin mining the browser, please submit a PR. Contribute Contributions are welcome! Don't hesitate to submit bug fixes, improvements and new features. Regarding new features, please have a look at the issues first. If a feature you whish to work on is not listed in here, you might want to add an issue first before starting to work on a PR. Made by Rafael Keramidas (keraf [at] protonmail [dot] com - @iamkeraf - ker.af). Image used for logo by Sandro Pereira. Sursa: https://github.com/keraf/NoCoin

Chiar exista oameni care citesc "Terms and conditions"? Sau "Privacy policy".

Abusing Delay Load DLLs for Remote Code Injection Sep 19th, 2017 I always tell myself that I’ll try posting more frequently on my blog, and yet here I am, two years later. Perhaps this post will provide the necessary motiviation to conduct more public research. I do love it. This post details a novel remote code injection technique I discovered while playing around with delay loading DLLs. It allows for the injection of arbitrary code into arbitrary remote, running processes, provided that they implement the abused functionality. To make it abundantly clear, this is not an exploit, it’s simply another strategy for migrating into other processes. Modern code injection techniques typically rely on a variation of two different win32 API calls: CreateRemoteThread and NtQueueApc. Endgame recently put out a great article[0] detailing ten various methods of process injection. While not all of them allow for injection into remote processes, particularly those already running, it does detail the most common, public variations. This strategy is more akin to inline hooking, though we’re not touching the IAT and we don’t require our code to already be in the process. There are no calls to NtQueueApc or CreateRemoteThread, and no need for thread or process suspension. There are some limitations, as with anything, which I’ll detail below. Delay Load DLL Delay loading is a linker strategy that allows for the lazy loading of DLLs. Executables commonly load all necessary dynamically linked libraries at runtime and perform the IAT fix-ups then. Delay loading, however, allows for these libraries to be lazy loaded at call time, supported by a pseudo IAT that’s fixed-up on first call. This process can be better illuminated by the following, decades old figure below: This image comes from a great Microsoft article released in 1998 [1] that describes the strategy quite well, but I’ll attempt to distill it here. Portable executables contain a data directory named IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT, which you can see using dumpbin /imports or using windbg. The structure of this entry is described in delayhlp.cpp, included with the WinSDK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 struct InternalImgDelayDescr { DWORD grAttrs; // attributes LPCSTR szName; // pointer to dll name HMODULE * phmod; // address of module handle PImgThunkData pIAT; // address of the IAT PCImgThunkData pINT; // address of the INT PCImgThunkData pBoundIAT; // address of the optional bound IAT PCImgThunkData pUnloadIAT; // address of optional copy of original IAT DWORD dwTimeStamp; // 0 if not bound, // O.W. date/time stamp of DLL bound to (Old BIND) }; The table itself contains RVAs, not pointers. We can find the delay directory offset by parsing the file header: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 0:022> lm m explorer start end module name 00690000 00969000 explorer (pdb symbols) 0:022> !dh 00690000 -f File Type: EXECUTABLE IMAGE FILE HEADER VALUES [...] 68A80 [ 40] address [size] of Load Configuration Directory 0 [ 0] address [size] of Bound Import Directory 1000 [ D98] address [size] of Import Address Table Directory AC670 [ 140] address [size] of Delay Import Directory 0 [ 0] address [size] of COR20 Header Directory 0 [ 0] address [size] of Reserved Directory The first entry and it’s delay linked DLL can be seen in the following: 1 2 3 4 5 0:022> dd 00690000+ac670 l8 0073c670 00000001 000ac7b0 000b24d8 000b1000 0073c680 000ac8cc 00000000 00000000 00000000 0:022> da 00690000+000ac7b0 0073c7b0 "WINMM.dll" This means that WINMM is dynamically linked to explorer.exe, but delay loaded, and will not be loaded into the process until the imported function is invoked. Once loaded, a helper function fixes up the psuedo IAT by using GetProcAddress to locate the desired function and patching the table at runtime. The pseudo IAT referenced is separate from the standard PE IAT; this IAT is specifically for the delay load functions, and is referenced from the delay descriptor. So for example, in WINMM.dll’s case, the pseudo IAT for WINMM is at RVA 000b1000. The second delay descriptor entry would have a separate RVA for its pseudo IAT, and so on and so forth. Using WINMM as our delay example, explorer imports one function from it, PlaySoundW. In my particular running instance, it has not been invoked, so the pseudo IAT has not been fixed up yet. We can see this by dumping it’s pseudo IAT entry: 1 2 3 0:022> dps 00690000+000b1000 l2 00741000 006dd0ac explorer!_imp_load__PlaySoundW 00741004 00000000 Each DLL entry is null terminated. The above pointer shows us that the existing entry is merely a springboard thunk within the Explorer process. This takes us here: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0:022> u explorer!_imp_load__PlaySoundW explorer!_imp_load__PlaySoundW: 006dd0ac b800107400 mov eax,offset explorer!_imp__PlaySoundW (00741000) 006dd0b1 eb00 jmp explorer!_tailMerge_WINMM_dll (006dd0b3) explorer!_tailMerge_WINMM_dll: 006dd0b3 51 push ecx 006dd0b4 52 push edx 006dd0b5 50 push eax 006dd0b6 6870c67300 push offset explorer!_DELAY_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR_WINMM_dll (0073c670) 006dd0bb e8296cfdff call explorer!__delayLoadHelper2 (006b3ce9) The tailMerge function is a linker-generated stub that’s compiled in per-DLL, not per function. The __delayLoadHelper2 function is the magic that handles the loading and patching of the pseudo IAT. Documented in delayhlp.cpp, this function handles calling LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress and patching the pseudo IAT. As a demonstration of how this looks, I compiled a binary that delay links dnslib. Here’s the process of resolution of DnsAcquireContextHandle: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 0:000> dps 00060000+0001839c l2 0007839c 000618bd DelayTest!_imp_load_DnsAcquireContextHandle_W 000783a0 00000000 0:000> bp DelayTest!__delayLoadHelper2 0:000> g ModLoad: 753e0000 7542c000 C:\Windows\system32\apphelp.dll Breakpoint 0 hit [...] 0:000> dd esp+4 l1 0024f9f4 00075ffc 0:000> dd 00075ffc l4 00075ffc 00000001 00010fb0 000183c8 0001839c 0:000> da 00060000+00010fb0 00070fb0 "DNSAPI.dll" 0:000> pt 0:000> dps 00060000+0001839c l2 0007839c 74dfd0fc DNSAPI!DnsAcquireContextHandle_W 000783a0 00000000 Now the pseudo IAT entry has been patched up and the correct function is invoked on subsequent calls. This has the additional side effect of leaving the pseudo IAT as both executable and writable: 1 2 3 4 0:011> !vprot 00060000+0001839c BaseAddress: 00371000 AllocationBase: 00060000 AllocationProtect: 00000080 PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY At this point, the DLL has been loaded into the process and the pseudo IAT patched up. In another additional twist, not all functions are resolved on load, only the one that is invoked. This leaves certain entries in the pseudo IAT in a mixed state: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 00741044 00726afa explorer!_imp_load__UnInitProcessPriv 00741048 7467f845 DUI70!InitThread 0074104c 00726b0f explorer!_imp_load__UnInitThread 00741050 74670728 DUI70!InitProcessPriv 0:022> lm m DUI70 start end module name 74630000 746e2000 DUI70 (pdb symbols) In the above, two of the four functions are resolved and the DUI70.dll library is loaded into the process. In each entry of the delay load descriptor, the structure referenced above maintains an RVA to the HMODULE. If the module isn’t loaded, it will be null. So when a delayed function is invoked that’s already loaded, the delay helper function will check it’s entry to determine if a handle to it can be used: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 HMODULE hmod = *idd.phmod; if (hmod == 0) { if (__pfnDliNotifyHook2) { hmod = HMODULE(((*__pfnDliNotifyHook2)(dliNotePreLoadLibrary, &dli))); } if (hmod == 0) { hmod = ::LoadLibraryEx(dli.szDll, NULL, 0); } The idd structure is just an instance of the InternalImgDelayDescr described above and passed into the __delayLoadHelper2 function from the linker tailMerge stub. So if the module is already loaded, as referenced from delay entry, then it uses that handle instead. It does NOT attempt to LoadLibrary irregardless of this value; this can be used to our advantage. Another note here is that the delay loader supports notification hooks. There are six states we can hook into: processing start, pre load library, fail load library, pre GetProcAddress, fail GetProcAddress, and end processing. You can see how the hooks are used in the above code sample. Finally, in addition to delay loading, the portable executable also supports delay library unloading. It works pretty much how you’d expect it, so we won’t be touching on it here. Limitations Before detailing how we might abuse this (though it should be fairly obvious), it’s important to note the limitations of this technique. It is not completely portable, and using pure delay load functionality it cannot be made to be so. The glaring limitation is that the technique requires the remote process to be delay linked. A brief crawl of some local processes on my host shows many Microsoft applications are: dwm, explorer, cmd. Many non-Microsoft applications are as well, including Chrome. It is additionally a well supported function of the portable executable, and exists today on modern systems. Another limitation is that, because at it’s core it relies on LoadLibrary, there must exist a DLL on disk. There is no way to LoadLibrary from memory (unless you use one of the countless techniques to do that, but none of which use LoadLibrary…). In addition to implementing the delay load, the remote process must implement functionality that can be triggered. Instead of doing a CreateRemoteThread, SendNotifyMessage, or ResumeThread, we rely on the fetch to the pseudo IAT, and thus we must be able to trigger the remote process into performing this action/executing this function. This is generally pretty easy if you’re using the suspended process/new process strategy, but may not be trivial on running applications. Finally, any process that does not allow unsigned libraries to be loaded will block this technique. This is controlled by ProcessSignaturePolicy and can be set with SetProcessMitigationPolicy[2]; it is unclear how many apps are using this at the moment, but Microsoft Edge was one of the first big products to be employing this policy. This technique is also impacted by the ProcessImageLoadPolicy policy, which can be set to restrict loading of images from a UNC share. Abuse When discussing an ability to inject code into a process, there are three separate cases an attacker may consider, and some additional edge situations within remote processes. Local process injection is simply the execution of shellcode/arbitrary code within the current process. Suspended process is the act of spawning a new, suspended process from an existing, controlled one and injecting code into it. This is a fairly common strategy to employ for migrating code, setting up backup connections, or establishing a known process state prior to injection. The final case is the running remote process. The running remote process is an interesting case with several caveats that we’ll explore below. I won’t detail suspended processes, as it’s essentially the same as a running process, but easier. It’s easier because many applications actually just load the delay library at runtime, either because the functionality is environmentally keyed and required then, or because another loaded DLL is linked against it and requires it. Refer to the source code for the project for an implementation of suspended process injection [3]. Local Process The local process is the most simple and arguably the most useless for this strategy. If we can inject and execute code in this manner, we might as well link against the library we want to use. It serves as a fine introduction to the topic, though. The first thing we need to do is delay link the executable against something. For various reasons I originally chose dnsapi.dll. You can specify delay load DLLs via the linker options for Visual Studio. With that, we need to obtain the RVA for the delay directory. This can be accomplished with the following function: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 IMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR* findDelayEntry(char *cDllName) { PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER pImgDos = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)GetModuleHandle(NULL); PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS pImgNt = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((LPBYTE)pImgDos + pImgDos->e_lfanew); PIMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR pImgDelay = (PIMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR)((LPBYTE)pImgDos + pImgNt->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT].VirtualAddress); DWORD dwBaseAddr = (DWORD)GetModuleHandle(NULL); IMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR *pImgResult = NULL; // iterate over entries for (IMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR* entry = pImgDelay; entry->ImportAddressTableRVA != NULL; entry++){ char *_cDllName = (char*)(dwBaseAddr + entry->DllNameRVA); if (strcmp(_cDllName, cDllName) == 0){ pImgResult = entry; break; } } return pImgResult; } Should be pretty clear what we’re doing here. Once we’ve got the correct table entry, we need to mark the entry’s DllName as writable, overwrite it with our custom DLL name, and restore the protection mask: 1 2 3 4 5 IMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR *pImgDelayEntry = findDelayEntry("DNSAPI.dll"); DWORD dwEntryAddr = (DWORD)((DWORD)GetModuleHandle(NULL) + pImgDelayEntry->DllNameRVA); VirtualProtect((LPVOID)dwEntryAddr, sizeof(DWORD), PAGE_READWRITE, &dwOldProtect); WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), (LPVOID)dwEntryAddr, (LPVOID)ndll, strlen(ndll), &wroteBytes); VirtualProtect((LPVOID)dwEntryAddr, sizeof(DWORD), dwOldProtect, &dwOldProtect); Now all that’s left to do is trigger the targeted function. Once triggered, the delay helper function will snag the DllName from the table entry and load the DLL via LoadLibrary. Remote Process The most interesting of cases is the running remote process. For demonstration here, we’ll be targeting explorer.exe, as we can almost always rely on it to be running on a workstation under the current user. With an open handle to the explorer process, we must perform the same searching tasks as we did for the local process, but this time in a remote process. This is a little more cumbersome, but the code can be found in the project repository for reference[3]. We simply grab the remote PEB, parse the image and it’s directories, and locate the appropriate delay entry we’re targeting. This part is likely to prove the most unfriendly when attempting to port this to another process; what functionality are we targeting? What function or delay load entry is generally unused, but triggerable from the current session? With explorer there are several options; it’s delay linked against 9 different DLLs, each averaging 2-3 imported functions. Thankfully one of the first functions I looked at was pretty straightforward: CM_Request_Eject_PC. This function, exported by CFGMGR32.dll, requests that the system be ejected from the local docking station[4]. We can therefore assume that it’s likely to be available and not fixed on workstations, and potentially unfixed on laptops, should the user never explicitly request the system to be ejected. When we request for the workstation to be ejected from the docking station, the function sends a PNP request. We use the IShellDispatch object to execute this, which is accessed via Shell, handled by, you guessed it, explorer. The code for this is pretty simple: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 HRESULT hResult = S_FALSE; IShellDispatch *pIShellDispatch = NULL; CoInitialize(NULL); hResult = CoCreateInstance(CLSID_Shell, NULL, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IShellDispatch, (void**)&pIShellDispatch); if (SUCCEEDED(hResult)) { pIShellDispatch->EjectPC(); pIShellDispatch->Release(); } CoUninitialize(); Our DLL only needs to export CM_Request_Eject_PC for us to not crash the process; we can either pass on the request to the real DLL, or simply ignore it. This leads us to stable and reliable remote code injection. Remote Process – All Fixed One interesting edge case is a remote process that you want to inject into via delay loading, but all imported functions have been resolved in the pseudo IAT. This is a little more complicated, but all hope is not lost. Remember when I mentioned earlier that a handle to the delay load library is maintained in its descriptor? This is the value that the helper function checks for to determine if it should reload the module or not; if it’s null, it attempts to load it, if it’s not, it uses that handle. We can abuse this check by nulling out the module handle, thereby “tricking” the helper function into once again loading that descriptor’s DLL. In the discussed case, however, the pseudo IAT is all patched up; no more trampolines into the delay load helper function. Helpfully the pseudo IAT is writable by default, so we can simply patch in the trampoline function ourselves and have it instantiate the descriptor all over again. In short, this worst-case strategy requires three separate WriteProcessMemory calls: one to null out the module handle, one to overwrite the pseudo IAT entry, and one to overwrite the loaded DLL name. Conclusions I should make mention that I tested this strategy across several next gen AV/HIPS appliances, which will go unnamed here, and none where able to detect the cross process injection strategy. It would seem overall to be an interesting challenge at detection; in remote processes, the strategy uses the following chain of calls: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 OpenProcess(..); ReadRemoteProcess(..); // read image ReadRemoteProcess(..); // read delay table ReadRemoteProcess(..); // read delay entry 1...n VirtualProtectEx(..); WriteRemoteProcess(..); That’s it. The trigger functionality would be dynamic among each process, and the loaded library would be loaded via supported and well-known Windows facilities. I checked out a few other core Windows applications, and they all have pretty straightforward trigger strategies. The referenced project[3] includes both x86 and x64 support, and has been tested across Windows 7, 8.1, and 10. It includes three functions of interest: inject_local, inject_suspended, and inject_explorer. It expects to find the DLL at C:\Windows\Temp\TestDLL.dll, but this can obviously be changed. Note that it isn’t production quality; beware, here be dragons. Special thanks to Stephen Breen for reviewing this post References [0] https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process [1] https://www.microsoft.com/msj/1298/hood/hood1298.aspx [2] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh769088(v=vs.85).aspx [3] https://github.com/hatRiot/DelayLoadInject [4] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff539811(v=vs.85).aspx Posted by Bryan Alexander Sep 19th, 2017 Sursa: http://hatriot.github.io/blog/2017/09/19/abusing-delay-load-dll/

Sakurity Racer This 128 LOC extension works pretty much as a "Make Money" button if used properly. LEGAL: Use at your own risk and only with your own projects. Do not use it against anyone else. Load this unpacked extension into your Chrome. We didn't upload it to the Chrome Store because for best results you need to run your own racer.js server anyway. See the circle on the right? It's the sniffer button. Once you click it, for next 3 seconds all requests (except ignored ones like OPTIONS) will be blocked and sent to specified default_server location where racer.js is running. Racer.js will get exact same request you were about to make along with all credentials and cookies and will repeat it to the victim in parallel (5 by default). That can trigger a race condition. No luck? Do it a few times because most race conditions are hard to reproduce. For basic tests you can run racer.js on your localhost and that will be used by default. For real pentest run it on a server as close to the victim as possible and change default_server inside sniffer.js. Best functionality to pentest: financial transfers, vouchers, discount codes, trade/withdraw functions and other actions that you're supposed to do limited amount of times. It doesn't cover all scenarios such as timed race conditions or when you need to run few different requests to achieve the result. Sursa: https://github.com/sakurity/racer

Kubebot: A Kubernetes Based Security Testing Slackbot Posted: 13 hours ago by @pentestit Leave a Comment 384 views About a week ago, I blogged about List of Portable Hardware Devices for Penetration Testing. The tool that I am blogging about today – Kubebot – can be an awesome example and be installed very easily on a Raspberry Pi that you have lying around. Best part is that this is open source and can be customized to do anything you want. What is Kubebot? Kubebot is an open source security testing Slackbot in the Go programming language, with a Kubernetes backend on the Google Cloud Platform. All of us know that Kubernetes is an open-source system for automating deployment, scaling, and management of dockerized applications. We also know that running tasks such as reconnaissance on a target network is almost always time-consuming and cumbersome. If you have a tool like Kubebot to help, you can use the time it does it’s stuff to concentrate on other important stuff. It dockerizes a lot of useful tools that help you perform reconnaissance on a target. List of tools included with Kubebot: Enumall: This is a custom implementation of the Enumall script by the author. It helps you identify subdomains using several techniques that relies on services such as threatcrowd, Bing, Shodan, HackerTraget and the famous Recon-NG. git-all-secrets: git-all-secrets is an open source tool by the author @anshuman_bh to capture all the GIT secrets by leveraging multiple open source GIT searching tools. Gitrob: Gitrob is an open source, command line tool which can help organizations and security professionals find sensitive information lingering in publicly available files on GitHub. git-secrets: The git-secrets open source tool scans commits, commit messages and alerts you of sensitive data that has been found. Gobuster: Gobuster is a tool used to brute-force URIs (directories and files) in web sites and DNS subdomains (with wildcard support). Nmap: All of us already know that Nmap aka Network Mapper is a free and open source utility for network discovery and security auditing. SubBrute: SubBrute is a DNS meta-query spider that enumerates DNS records, and subdomains. Sublist3r: Sublist3r is an open source python tool designed to enumerate subdomains of websites using OSINT. It helps penetration testers and bug hunters collect and gather subdomains for the domain they are targeting by enumerateing subdomains using many search engines such as Google, Yahoo, Bing, Baidu, and Ask. Sublist3r also enumerates subdomains using Netcraft, Virustotal, ThreatCrowd, DNSdumpster, and ReverseDNS. SubBrute was integrated with Sublist3r to increase the possibility of finding more subdomains using bruteforce with an improved wordlist. truffleHog: truffleHog is an open source tool that searches through GIT repositories for high entropy strings, digging deep into commit history and branches. This is effective at finding secrets accidentally committed that contain high entropy. Wfuzz: Wfuzz is a tool designed to brute force web applications. As of now, only basic authentication brute forcing has been implemented in Kubebot. Support for tools such as Metasploit is being worked upon. Installing the tool though lengthy, is a lot easy. Download Kubebot: Installation instruction along with it’s pre-requisites can be found here. You can check out the Kubebot GIT repository from here. Sursa: http://pentestit.com/kubebot-kubernetes-based-security-testing-slackbot/

Cure53 Browser Security White Paper Welcome to the code repository for the Cure53 Browser Security White Paper! This is the right place to leave comments and file bugs in case we got something wrong. The latest version of the PDF will be available here as well. Expect frequent updates for smaller fixes and adjustments. Sursa: https://github.com/cure53/browser-sec-whitepaper

WordPress 4.8.2 Security and Maintenance Release Posted September 19, 2017 by Aaron D. Campbell. Filed under Releases, Security. WordPress 4.8.2 is now available. This is a security release for all previous versions and we strongly encourage you to update your sites immediately. WordPress versions 4.8.1 and earlier are affected by these security issues: $wpdb->prepare() can create unexpected and unsafe queries leading to potential SQL injection (SQLi). WordPress core is not directly vulnerable to this issue, but we’ve added hardening to prevent plugins and themes from accidentally causing a vulnerability. Reported by Slavco A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in the oEmbed discovery. Reported by xknown of the WordPress Security Team. A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in the visual editor. Reported by Rodolfo Assis (@brutelogic) of Sucuri Security. A path traversal vulnerability was discovered in the file unzipping code. Reported by Alex Chapman (noxrnet). A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in the plugin editor. Reported by 陈瑞琦 (Chen Ruiqi). An open redirect was discovered on the user and term edit screens. Reported by Yasin Soliman (ysx). A path traversal vulnerability was discovered in the customizer. Reported by Weston Ruter of the WordPress Security Team. A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in template names. Reported by Luka (sikic). A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in the link modal. Reported by Anas Roubi (qasuar). Thank you to the reporters of these issues for practicing responsible disclosure. In addition to the security issues above, WordPress 4.8.2 contains 6 maintenance fixes to the 4.8 release series. For more information, see the release notes or consult the list of changes. Download WordPress 4.8.2 or venture over to Dashboard → Updates and simply click “Update Now.” Sites that support automatic background updates are already beginning to update to WordPress 4.8.2. Thanks to everyone who contributed to 4.8.2. Sursa: https://wordpress.org/news/2017/09/wordpress-4-8-2-security-and-maintenance-release/

JKS private key cracker - Nail in the JKS coffin The Java Key Store (JKS) is the Java way of storing one or several cryptographic private and public keys for asymmetric cryptography in a file. While there are various key store formats, Java and Android still default to the JKS file format. JKS is one of the file formats for Java key stores, but JKS is confusingly used as the acronym for the general Java key store API as well. This project includes information regarding the security mechanisms of the JKS file format and how the password protection of the private key can be cracked. Due the unusual design of JKS the developed implementation can ignore the key store password and crack the private key password directly. Because it ignores the key store password, this implementation can attack every JKS configuration, which is not the case with most other tools. By exploiting a weakness of the Password Based Encryption scheme for the private key in JKS, passwords can be cracked very efficiently. Until now, no public tool was available exploiting this weakness. This technique was implemented in hashcat to amplify the efficiency of the algorithm with higher cracking speeds on GPUs. To get the theory part, please refer to the POC||GTFO article "15:12 Nail in the Java Key Store Coffin" in issue 0x15 included in this repository (pocorgtfo15.pdf) or available on various mirros like this beautiful one: https://unpack.debug.su/pocorgtfo/ Before you ask: JCEKS or BKS or any other Key Store format is not supported (yet). How you should crack JKS files The answer is build your own cracking hardware for it . But let's be a little more practical, so the answer is using your GPU: _____: _____________ _____: v3.6.0 ____________ _\ |__\______ _/_______ _\ |_____ _______\______ /__ ______ | _ | __ \ ____/____ _ | ___/____ __ |_______/ | | | \ _\____ / | | \ / \ | | |_____| |______/ / /____| |_________/_________: | |_____:-aTZ!/___________/ |_____: /_______: * BLAKE2 * BLOCKCHAIN2 * DPAPI * CHACHA20 * JAVA KEYSTORE * ETHEREUM WALLET * All you need to do is run the following command: java -jar JksPrivkPrepare.jar your_JKS_file.jks > hash.txt If your hash.txt ends up being empty, there is either no private key in the JKS file or you specified a non-JKS file. Then feed the hash.txt file to hashcat (version 3.6.0 and above), for example like this: $ ./hashcat -m 15500 -a 3 -1 '?u|' -w 3 hash.txt ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 hashcat (v3.6.0) starting... OpenCL Platform #1: NVIDIA Corporation ====================================== * Device #1: GeForce GTX 1080, 2026/8107 MB allocatable, 20MCU Hashes: 1 digests; 1 unique digests, 1 unique salts Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates Applicable optimizers: * Zero-Byte * Precompute-Init * Not-Iterated * Appended-Salt * Single-Hash * Single-Salt * Brute-Force Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90c Watchdog: Temperature retain trigger set to 75c $jksprivk$*D1BC102EF5FE5F1A7ED6A63431767DD4E1569670...8*test:POC||GTFO Session..........: hashcat Status...........: Cracked Hash.Type........: JKS Java Key Store Private Keys (SHA1) Hash.Target......: $jksprivk$*D1BC102EF5FE5F1A7ED6A63431767DD4E1569670...8*test Time.Started.....: Tue May 30 17:41:58 2017 (8 mins, 25 secs) Time.Estimated...: Tue May 30 17:50:23 2017 (0 secs) Guess.Mask.......: ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 [9] Guess.Charset....: -1 ?u|, -2 Undefined, -3 Undefined, -4 Undefined Guess.Queue......: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.Dev.#1.....: 7946.6 MH/s (39.48ms) Recovered........: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts Progress.........: 4014116700160/7625597484987 (52.64%) Rejected.........: 0/4014116700160 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 5505024000/10460353203 (52.63%) Candidates.#1....: NNVGFSRFO -> Z|ZFVDUFO HWMon.Dev.#1.....: Temp: 75c Fan: 89% Util:100% Core:1936MHz Mem:4513MHz Bus:1 Started: Tue May 30 17:41:56 2017 Stopped: Tue May 30 17:50:24 2017 So from this repository you basically only need the JksPrivkPrepare.jar to run a cracking session. Other things in this repository test_run.sh: A little test script that you should be able to run after a couple of minutes to see this project in action. It includes comments on how to setup the dependencies for this project. benchmarking: tests that show why you should use this technique and not others. Please read the "Nail in the JKS coffin" article. example_jks: generate example JKS files fingerprint_creation: Every plaintext private key in PKCS#8 has it's own "fingerprint" that we expect when we guess the correct password. These fingerprints are necessary to make sure we are able to detect when we guessed the correct password. Please read the "Nail in the JKS coffin" article. This folder has the code to generate these fingerprints, it's a little bit hacky but I don't expect that it will be necessary to add any other fingerprints ever. JksPrivkPrepare: The source code of how the JKS files are read and the hash calculated we need to give to hashcat. jksprivk_crack.py: A proof of concept implementation that can be used instead of hashcat. Obviously this is much slower than hashcat, but it can outperform John the Ripper (JtR) in certain cases. Please read the "Nail in the JKS coffin" article. jksprivk_decrypt.py: A little helper script that can be used to extract a private key once the password was correctly guessed. run_example_jks.sh: A script that runs JksPrivkPrepare.jar and jksprivk_crack.py on all example JKS files in the example_jks folder. Make sure you run the generate_examples.py in example_jks script before. Related work and further links A big shout to Casey Marshall who wrote the JKS.java class, which is used in a modified version in this project: /* JKS.java -- implementation of the "JKS" key store. Copyright (C) 2003 Casey Marshall <rsdio@metastatic.org> Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting documentation. No representations are made about the suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty. This program was derived by reverse-engineering Sun's own implementation, using only the public API that is available in the 1.4.1 JDK. Hence nothing in this program is, or is derived from, anything copyrighted by Sun Microsystems. While the "Binary Evaluation License Agreement" that the JDK is licensed under contains blanket statements that forbid reverse-engineering (among other things), it is my position that US copyright law does not and cannot forbid reverse-engineering of software to produce a compatible implementation. There are, in fact, numerous clauses in copyright law that specifically allow reverse-engineering, and therefore I believe it is outside of Sun's power to enforce restrictions on reverse-engineering of their software, and it is irresponsible for them to claim they can. */ Various more information which are mentioned in the article as well: JKS is going to be replace as the default type in Java 9 http://openjdk.java.net/jeps/229 https://gist.github.com/zach-klippenstein/4631307 http://www.openwall.com/lists/john-users/2015/06/07/3 https://github.com/bes/KeystoreBrute https://github.com/jeffers102/KeystoreCracker https://github.com/volure/keystoreBrute https://gist.github.com/robinp/2143870 https://www.darknet.org.uk/2015/06/patator-multi-threaded-service-url-brute-forcing-tool/ https://github.com/rsertelon/android-keystore-recovery https://github.com/MaxCamillo/android-keystore-password-recover https://cryptosense.com/mighty-aphrodite-dark-secrets-of-the-java-keystore/ https://hashcat.net/events/p12/js-sha1exp_169.pdf https://github.com/hashcat/hashcat Neighborly greetings go out to atom, vollkorn, cem, doegox, corkami, xonox and rexploit for supporting this research in one form or another! Sursa: https://github.com/floyd-fuh/JKS-private-key-cracker-hashcat

Cred ca da.

Dar cele uploadate nu sunt si ele verificate de catre cineva?

Physical Penetration Testing Walter Belgers Your pentesting goal: getting the data. You decide to do it physically. How to go about? #PhysicalSecurity Link: https://media.ccc.de/v/SHA2017-24-physical_penetration_testing

Wireless LAN auditing procedure for industrial environments Magnus Andreas Ohm Abstract Today’s industry is dependent on computer networks. These computer networks are a vital part of how industrial environments operate. They are used for a variety of different tasks. Networks are needed to do everything from operating possibly dangerous equipment, to support employees in their every day activities. Having to support such a variety of tasks means that these networks will need to fulfill a lot of different requirements to function in a proper and safe way. DNV-GL has seen that these requirements are often not upheld in industrial environments. They have therefore seen a business opportunity when it comes to testing networks that operates in these types of environments. Download: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2441138/16203_FULLTEXT.pdf