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Everything posted by Nytro
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Cracking the WPA Security Standard By Andrew Garcia | Posted 2008-11-09 Analysis: As security researchers prepare to discuss how they were able to subvert the WPA wireless security standard, eWEEK Labs outlines what this means to wireless administrators. At the PacSec conference in Tokyo the week of Nov. 10, researchers Erik Tews and Martin Beck will outline the attack they created to subvert WPA wireless security protections. Although the attack is limited in scope at this time-as it only affects TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol)-protected networks and can only be used to inject traffic but not to steal data-there is sure to be significant confusion about the effects of the attack. In this article, I have outlined five points about the attack and its consequences that are crucial for wireless administrators to understand-about how it works, what its limits are, and what can be done to protect wireless networks and the data they carry from attackers. First of all, the attack by Tews and Beck only works against networks protected with TKIP. TKIP, originally called WEP2, was an interim standard adopted to allow wireless users to have an upgrade from the broken WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol that lets them protect their wireless data without requiring an investment in new hardware. TKIP took the basics of WEP (and therefore uses the same RC4 stream cipher), enforced a longer encryption key, added per-packet keys, boosted the Initialization Vector used to generate keys from 24-bit to 48-bit in length, and added a new Integrity Check checksum (called Michael). It is Michael that is at the root of the new attack. The attack, which leverages a modified chop-chop attack that allows the decryption of individual packets without cracking the Pairwise Master key (the shared secret between clients and the network used for encryption), goes after the Pairwise Transient Key protecting the session in order to interpret very small packets (like an ARP) of just a few bytes of unknown data. The attacker must probe cautiously because Michael will shut down a device for 60 seconds and rekey if it sees two Michael errors within a minute. However, because there is little to guess in these small packets, the attacker only needs to spend a few minutes (12 to 15 minutes, from what I understand) probing Michael until it stops returning errors. At that point, the attacker can then go to work with the chop-chop attack to get past the integrity check built into the original WEP (that TKIP still uses). AES-protected networks, on the other hand, are immune to this attack, as AES uses an entirely different keying method called CCMP (Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol). Second, because the encryption key is not broken as part of this attack, and the subversion of the Michael Integrity Check the attack uses is really only practical when interpreting small packets (too much to guess and not enough time before a regularly scheduled rekeying event happens), an attacker cannot decrypt and steal data from over the air. However, the attack (along with some MAC spoofing) allows the attacker to pose as an access point in order to inject a small amount of traffic into the stream. This traffic injection could be used to poison the client's ARP or DNS caches, redirecting the machine to an unintended (and possibly nefarious) destination. "In the worst possible case scenario, the attacker can inject-pretending to be the access point-up to seven packets to the client," said Rick Farina, senior wireless security researcher at AirTight Networks. "The client will accept these as validly encrypted. You could cause all kinds of denial-of-service conditions by ARP spoofing, or you could probably convince the client to talk to a server on the Internet." However, wireless users and administrators should not be fooled into thinking WPA2 equals safety from this attack. The WPA2 Wi-Fi certification standard includes both AES- and TKIP-based security as options, so wireless administrators must make sure that a WPA2-protected network only supports AES encryption in order to be safe from this attack. Third, from what I gather, the mode of authentication used for a WPA with a TKIP network does not make a difference. This attack should work against TKIP-protected networks running either preshared key or 802.1x/EAP authentication, since the attack is going after the Pairwise Transient Key, which is used in both cases. However, enterprise wireless administrators may be able to tune their networks to rekey at a faster rate than normal to thwart the attack (I've heard the attack authors recommend rekeying every 2 minutes). But wireless administrators should evaluate carefully whether the performance impact from this change is significantly greater than the impact derived from moving to AES encryption instead. Also, since this is not a brute force attack, wireless administrators should be aware that the length of a preshared key does not make a difference with this attack. Fourth, you may already have defenses in place to protect you from this attack. Companies using Wireless Intrusion Detection and Prevention technology, like that provided by AirTight Networks or Motorola's AirDefense unit, should have some protection from this attack right away. These systems can definitely identify MAC spoofing that would be used as part of an attempt to inject traffic. Location detection tools could also be useful: Since the attacker has to pose as an access point, the system should throw up immediate warnings if it looks like an access point suddenly moved. Presumably, WIPS vendors are right now cooking up new detections as well to help find and correlate any Michael errors that must occur as part of the attack. Since Michael errors are rare (it's pretty hard to accidentally change data payload without changing the checksum hash), a regular stream of Michael errors happening every 61 seconds or so should be easy to detect and send out an alert. As a temporary workaround solution, TKIP enjoyed a remarkably good run without coming under serious threat. However, with this first attack now published (and early-generation tools using the attack, like aircrack-ng, available in the wild), undoubtedly TKIP will come under significantly more scrutiny in the months to come. Consequently (fifth), even though the encryption is not yet broken, wireless administrators should start re-evaluating the use of WPA and TKIP. Many companies are already faced with some wireless upgrades to come into compliance with PCI 1.2, which last month finally put a timeline in place for retiring WEP as a security measure on wireless networks carrying sensitive data. For those companies needing to finally retire old scanners, bar code readers or other wireless mobile devices used for transactions, make sure to look for AES support on your next equipment investments. Fortunately, most enterprise-grade equipment bought in the last four years will have support for AES. However, some patches may be necessary to get common client devices up to speed. Windows Mobile devices running versions prior to WM 6.1 may not offer AES support, so mobile administrators should investigate whether an upgrade is available. Also, those who use the Windows XP and the Zero-Config wireless tool (but have not yet installed Windows XP SP3) will also need to install a patch to add AES support. eWEEK Labs Senior Technical Analyst Andrew Garcia can be reached at agarcia@eweek.com. Sursa: Cracking the WPA Security Standard
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256-bit AES Encryption for SSL and TLS: Maximal Security Updated 12/7/2011 with AES security data for the newest browsers and mobile devices. SSL and TLS are the workhorses that provide the majority of security in the transmission of data over the Internet today. However, most people do not know that the degree of security and privacy inherent in a “secure” connection of this sort can vary from “almost none” to “really really good … good enough for US government TOP SECRET data”. The piece which varies and thus provides the variable level of security is the “cipher” or “encryption technique”. There are a large number of different ciphers — some are very fast and very insecure. Some are slower and very secure. Some weak ones (export-grade ciphers) are around from the days when the USA did not permit the export of decent security to other countries. AES, the Advanced Encryption Standard, is a relatively new encryption technique/cipher that is the successor of DES. AES was standardized in 2001 after a 5 year review, and is currently one of the most popular algorithms used in symmetric key cryptography (which, for example, is used for the actual data transmission in SSL and TLS). It is also the “gold standard” encryption technique; many security-conscious organizations actually require that their employees use AES-256 (256-bit AES) for all communications. This article discusses AES, its role in SSL, which web browsers and email programs support it, how you can make sure that you only use 256-bit AES encryption of all secure communications, and more. More about AES AES has been available in most cryptographic libraries for a long time. It was available in “OpenSSL” starting in 2002 with v0.9.7. OpenSSL is the foundation of most SSL services in UNIX and Linux environments, such as that used by LuxSci. GPG, the open source implementation of PGP, also include an AES 256 option. So, while AES is the new kid on the block, it has been around long enough to permeate most software. However, as we shall see, this does not mean that is its actually being used on your computer! How Secure is 256-bit AES? AES is FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) certified and there are currently no known non-brute-force direct attacks against AES (except some side channel timing attacks on the processing of AES that are not feasible over a network environment and this not applicable to SSL in general). In fact, AES security is strong enough to be certified for use by the US government for top secret information. The design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 192 and 256) are sufficient to protect classified information up to the SECRET level. TOP SECRET information will require use of either the 192 or 256 key lengths. The implementation of AES in products intended to protect national security systems and/or information must be reviewed and certified by NSA prior to their acquisition and use.” (Lynn Hathaway, June 2003 – reference.) If you have the choice of encryption methods, 256-bit AES is the method to choose. Also good are 128-bit and 192-bit versions of AES. Tutorial complet: http://luxsci.com/blog/256-bit-aes-encryption-for-ssl-and-tls-maximal-security.html
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Cine mai e de acord ca trebuie dat test la inregistrare?
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1. De acord daca te ocupi tu si mai gasesti pe cineva care sa te ajute 2. Unele sunt ok pentru cateva zile, sa nu ii "descurajam" pe doritorii nostri de parole de Firefox 3. De ce nu? Cam toata lumea trece la Windows 7, procentul de compatibilitate e foarte mare
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Computer Science from the Bottom Up Ian Wienand <ian@wienand.org> Copyright © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Ian Wienand Computer Science from the Bottom Up — A free, online book designed to teach computer science from the bottom end up. Topics covered include binary and binary logic, operating systems internals, toolchain fundamentals and system library fundamentals. Table of Contents Introduction Welcome Philosophy Why from the bottom up? Enabling technologies 1. General Unix and Advanced C Everything is a file! Abstraction and function pointers Application Programming Interfaces Libraries Summary Exercises Standard File Descriptors The Shell Redirection 2. Binary and Number Representation Binary -- the basis of computing Binary Theory Hexadecimal Practical Implications Types and Number Representation C Standards Types Number Representation 3. Computer Architecture The CPU Branching Cycles Fetch, Decode, Execute, Store CISC v RISC Memory Memory Hierarchy Cache in depth Peripherals and busses Peripheral Bus concepts DMA Other Busses Small to big systems Symmetric Multi-Processing Clusters Non-Uniform Memory Access Memory ordering, locking and atomic operations 4. The Operating System The role of the operating system Abstraction of hardware Multitasking Standardised Interfaces Security Performance Operating System Organisation The Kernel Userspace System Calls Overview Analysing a system call Privileges Hardware Other ways of communicating with the kernel File Systems 5. The Process What is a process? Elements of a process Process ID Memory File Descriptors Registers Kernel State Process Hierarchy Fork and Exec Fork Exec How Linux actually handles fork and exec The init process Context Switching Scheduling Preemptive v co-operative scheduling Realtime Nice value A brief look at the Linux Scheduler The Shell Signals Example 6. Virtual Memory What Virtual Memory isn't What virtual memory is 64 bit computing Using the address space Pages Physical Memory Pages + Frames = Page Tables Virtual Addresses Page Offset Virtual Address Translation Consequences of virtual addresses, pages and page tables Individual address spaces Protection Swap Sharing memory Disk Cache Hardware Support Physical v Virtual Mode The TLB TLB Management Linux Specifics Address Space Layout Three Level Page Table 7. The Toolchain Compiled v Interpreted Programs Compiled Programs Interpreted programs Building an executable Compiling The process of compiling Syntax Assembly Generation Optimisation Assembler Linker Symbols The linking process A practical example Compiling Assembly Linking The Executable 8. Behind the process Review of executable files Representing executable files Three Standard Sections Binary Format Binary Format History ELF ELF in depth Debugging ELF Executables Libraries Static Libraries Shared Libraries ABI's Byte Order Calling Conventions Starting a process Kernel communication to programs Starting the program 9. Dynamic Linking Code Sharing Dynamic Library Details Including libraries in an executable The Dynamic Linker Relocations Position Independence Global Offset Tables The Global Offset Table Libraries The Procedure Lookup Table Working with libraries and the linker Library versions Finding symbols 10. I/O Fundamentals File System Fundamentals Networking Fundamentals Computer Science from the Bottom Up Glossary Link: http://www.bottomupcs.com/index.html Puneti mana si mai si cititi cate ceva
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Nu stiu exact cum vor arata tricourile sau cat vor costa, deja trebuie sa fac mai mult de 15. Trimiteti-mi PM cu marimea tricoului, le am notate si fac cate pot, nu bag 10 milioane sa va fac tricouri, dar cateva tot fac. Voi veniti la eveniment si mai discutam acolo.
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Tricourile cu RST le fac eu si sunt independente de eveniment. Problema e ca s-au cerut in jur de 12 pana acum si ma va costa ceva sa le fac. Nu cheltuiesc eu 4-5 milioane pe voi degeaba Pretul va fi exact cat am cheltuit sa fac tricoul. Discutam cand ne intalnim. Daca vreti, dati-mi PM cu marimea tricoului.
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Eu vin. Vin mai multi de pe RST, ne regasim acolo. Cei care vor cazare sa trimita mail la cazare@defcamp.ro Cei care vor tricou cu RST sa imi dea PM. Daca aveti intrebari postati aici.
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Asta nu e problema, e feature. Dupa ce postezi ceva sau vizitezi un topic e imediat marcat ca fiind citit, de aceea nu apare. PS: Par sa fie ceva posturi si thread-uri "orphaned", o sa incerc sa le recuperez, dar nu stiu daca am prea multe sanse.
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Reparat, cel putin partial: Threads 57,032 Posts 374,630 Members 88,488
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O sa rezolve tex diseara.
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Salut, Dupa cum ati aflat, anul acesta, intre 30 noiembrie - 2 decembrie la Bucuresti va avea loc conferinta nationala de hacking si securitate IT Defcamp 2012. Timp de 3 zile vor fi sustinute peste 20 de prezentari TEHNICE ale speakerilor din 5 tari, oameni de la OWASP, WhiteHat Security si chiar Nytro de pe RST :->. Titlurile prezentarilor le puteti vedea aici: agenda | DefCamp iar lista de speakeri aici: Speakeri | DefCamp . Dar asta nu inseamna ca evenimentul se va rezuma doar la aceste prezentari: va fi un Wall of Sheep (vedeti voi ce inseamna daca nu stiti deja), veti putea participa la concursul DCTF (Defcamp Capture The Flag) si daca aveti un site mai multi baieti se vor ocupa de un scurt audit de securitate pentru el. Va puteti inregistra aici: DefCamp 2012 @Bucharest - Eventbrite . Da, este o taxa de 50 RON (15 dolari) pentru studenti si 100 RON (30$) care sa ii ajute pe organizatori sa isi acopere o parte din cheltuieli. Daca aceasta taxa este o problema pentru voi putem discuta si daca exista persoane foarte interesate si pasionate va platesc eu taxa (2-3 persoane). Ca sa fie clar ce aveti, cu 50 RON (studenti) / 100 RON taxa de participare: - acces la eveniment si sa vad ca are curajul careva sa spuna ca nu ai ce vedea - acces la materialele promotionale ale evenimentului (mapa, pixuri si alte prostii din astea + ceva foarte misto) - cunosti oameni smecheri si daca esti cuminte poate te si distrezi cu ei (aka faci schimb de experienta) - masa de pranz inclusa (bufet suedez) pentru 3 zile Evenimentul va avea loc la Hotelul Yesterday, langa metroul Grozavesti, iar pentru cei care vin din alte orase, oferta arata asa: - 100 RON/noapte/persoana (pret preferential oferit de sponsor care include si mic dejun) ceea ce e foarte ieftin pentru un hotel de 3 stele. - daca doresti cazare trimite un mail la cazare@defcamp.ro si iti oferim detaliile necesare Asadar, cu 250 RON (daca esti din afara orasului) ai: 2 nopti de cazare cu mic dejun inclus, masa de pranz si participi la cea mai importanta conferinta tehnica de securitate IT din Romania (+ cateva surprize). Oricum, banii astia ii cheltuiti aiurea la cateva iesiri in oras + mancare + tigari... Astfel ne vom putea cunoaste personal si pe viitor putem colabora si putem dezvolta ramura securitatii IT in Romania, care este la pamant, dar care poate evolua rapid si bine, iar dupa eveniment pe RST vor fi mai multe schimbari, veti vedea. Daca sunteti si mai buni, puteti obtine un cupon gratuit de participare : Studiu de caz pe o comunitate de securitate din România, RSTCenter + cupoane de participare gratuit? la DefCamp | DefCamp Mai multe informatii pe: DefCamp | Where hacking & security collide. PS: Cine vrea tricouri cu RST? Vreau sa fac cateva, sa stiu daca sunt doritori.
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Salut Exista persoane carora le-a disparut contul, nu se mai pot loga? Exista thread-uri care lipsesc? Numarul de posturi este acelasi ca inainte pentru voi? E probabil sa fi existat niste probleme cu baza de date, voi incerca sa vad despre ce e vorba cand ajung acasa. Astept de la voi raspunsuri la intrebarile de mai sus si alte eventuale probleme pe care sa le pot repara. Thanks
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Nu e foarte complicat sa "executi" un shellcode: ((void ())shellcode)(); Transformarea in exe se poate realiza prin-un exe "gol", doar cu headere, iar in sectiunea de cod - Entrypoint, se copiaza shellcode-ul. Nu gasesc momentan o utilitate magnifica pentru asa ceva dar na, probabil uneori poate fi util.
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Pe blogul Romanian Security Team, al comunit??ii hackerilor din România, informa?ia a fost comentat? ca un fapt aproape banal, utilizatorul adonisslanic comentând, acid: „Tinkode era prea slab pentru închisoare cu executare”. Iar wildchild anun?? c? TinKode s-a relansat în „afacere” ?i îl avertizeaz?: „Tinkode la butoane, cont proaspat f?cut azi. Coae, ai grij? ?i nu te juca cu internetul, e?ti sub observa?ie”.
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Eu zic sa incercam sa ridicam nivelul forumului si sa nu mai postam cacaturi pentru copii de 12 ani. Se muta la gunoi.
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Bravo. Poate adaugi si suport pentru conversie video.
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ps-axl are acum acces. Cine mai vrea, sa imi spuna.
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Iei un osciloscop si verifici (Rx/Tx). Sau bagi un USB stick si vezi daca merge.
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E clar. Mutam la cos. Asta nu e ShowOff.
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[h=1]Government hackers develop Windows 8 exploit – already[/h] 31 October 2012 [h=2]Less than a week after Microsoft took the wraps off of its shiny new operating system for revolutionizing the PC world, Windows 8, hackers have developed an exploit.[/h] French firm Vupen, which works with government agencies to develop and thwart hacking techniques, has already developed a Windows 8 exploit for taking over machines running Internet Explorer 10. “We welcome #Windows 8 with various 0Ds combined to pwn all new Win8/IE10 exploit mitigations,” Vupen’s chief executive Chaouki Bekrar wrote on Twitter on Tuesday, employing hacker slang to squeeze it into 140 characters. Bekrar has been boasting for weeks that his firm would compromise the new OS: “Windows 8 will be officially released by MS on Oct 26th, we’ll release to customers the 1st exploit for Win8 the same day #CoordinatedPwnage,” he tweeted earlier in the month. Microsoft’s Windows 8 contains a slew of new security features, including a default anti-malware application called Windows Defender and a security measure known as Address Space Layout Randomization, which randomizes the location of programs’ executable commands within the memory in order to better evade exploits. Also, the latest version of Internet Explorer uses a “sandbox” mode to bog down hackers trying to attack a system through the browser. However, clearly the OS is not impervious. And, in fact, at the Black Hat security conference this summer, white hat hackers ran through several theoretical exploits for Windows 8, taking into account the new security measures. "The Windows 8 kernel is not fundamentally changing any of the algorithms" used in Windows 7, he said. "It's more of a hardened version of Windows 7 … [in that] you don't have any significant structur[al] changes, but you have a lot more checks," said Tarjei Mandt, a senior vulnerability researcher with information security consultancy Azimuth Security. As for Microsoft, the software giant was not alerted to the vulnerabilities by Vupen, which sells its hacks and information to government agencies for a profit. “We saw [Vupen's] tweet, but further details have not been shared with us,” Microsoft’s director of Trustworthy Computing Dave Forstrom told Forbes. “We continue to encourage researchers to participate in Microsoft’s Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure program to help ensure our customers’ protection.” Sursa: Infosecurity - Government hackers develop Windows 8 exploit – already
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Hmm, daca nu am gresit la calcule, o parola md5 de 8 caractere a-zA-Z0-9 si cam toate caracterele speciale ASCII (total 94 de caractere) poate fi sparta dupa aproximativ o saptamana (sub 2 saptamani), iar o parola [a-z]{11} tot intr-o saptamana (maxim). Nu e rau
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Facebook, Messenger (Pidgin), Porn? E un sistem de operare, il poti folosi la orice. Sigur, Linux nu e Windows dar cam ce poti face pe unul poti face si pe celalalt, doar ca la un alt nivel.