martin08215

Eu n-am avut experiente prea bune cu D-Link, un DIR300 care mergea foarte prost, se bloca destul de des, si am scapat de el si un DIR615 pe care am pus DDWRT a mers ok vreo 8 luni pana a crapat de tot, mi-am luat banii inapoi pe el ca inca era in garantie, nu mai putea fi reparat si nici nu aveau sa imi dea altul in loc. Dintre cele doua si eu as merge pe Asus desi nu am avut dar stiu ca in general au un raport bun performanta/pret, si daca mai merge si openWRT/DDWRT/etc. pe el, e chiar super ok.

Da, de fapt e doctor-laptop.ro si sunt ok. Au si baterii originale, ceea ce pe mine ma interesat ca vroiam una mai mare, cu noua celule, si doar la ei am gasit, ca nici importatorii oficiali nu avea/aduceau.

La suma pe care esti disponibil sa o investesti mai bine iti iei un sistem audio HIFI direct sau pe componente si iti renovezi si camera in care il pui sa iti ingropi firele in perete. Oricum boxele au nevoie de curent separat daca semnalul audio se transmite fara fir, sunt cateva sisteme home theater, fara fir cu boxele alimentate separat, deci de fire nu scapi, poate cu acumulatori ca am vazur destule boxe fara fir, pe Bluetooth. Dar nici asa nu e comod, sa stai sa incarci acumulatori sau sa schimbi bateri, ca oricum un sitem puternic consuma. Uitate pe forumurile de specialitate, am vazut o discutie pe tema asta mai demult chiar pe un forum romanesc.

Transformatorul boxelor suporta 110-220 V sau 110-120 V? Daca suporta 110-220 V poti inlocui doar cablul cu stecher ptr RO, dar sa fii sigur ca suporta, eventual sa te uiti daca are vreun switch de la 110 la 220V ca la unele surse de PC.

Android security mystery – ‘fake’ cellphone towers found in U.S. [There have been many comments to this story from people who are assuming that these 'towers' are physical installations. There's no reason to assume this is the case: it's far likelier that they are mobile installations of the kind used not only by law enforcement and government agencies, but also by scammers and other criminals. (David Harley)] Seventeen mysterious cellphone towers have been found in America which look like ordinary towers, and can only be identified by a heavily customized handset built for Android security – but have a much more malicious purpose, according to Popular Science. The fake ‘towers’ – computers which wirelessly attack cellphones via the “baseband” chips built to allow them to communicate with their networks, can eavesdrop and even install spyware, ESD claims. They are a known technology - but the surprise is that they are in active use. The towers were found by users of the CryptoPhone 500, one of several ultra-secure handsets that have come to market in the last couple of years, after an executive noticed his handset was “leaking” data regularly. Its American manufacturer boasts that the handset has a “hardened” version of Android which removes 468 vulnerabilities from the OS. Android Security: Towers throughout the US Despite its secure OS, Les Goldsmith of the handset’s US manufacturer ESD found that his personal Android security handset’s firewall showed signs of attack “80 to 90” times per hour. The leaks were traced to the mysterious towers. Despite having some of the functions of normal cellphone towers, Goldsmith says their function is rather different. He describes them as “interceptors” and says that various models can eavesdrop and even push spyware to devices. Normal cellphones cannot detect them – only specialized hardware such as ESD’s Android security handsets. Who created the towers and maintains them is unknown, Goldsmith says. Origin of towers ‘unknown’ “Interceptor use in the U.S. is much higher than people had anticipated,” Goldsmith says. “One of our customers took a road trip from Florida to North Carolina and he found eight different interceptors on that trip. We even found one at South Point Casino in Las Vegas.” [Editor's note: Goldsmith has asked us to stress that the tower was actually in the vicinity of the casino, not within the casino itself.] Their existence can only be seen on specialized devices, such as the custom Android security OS used by Cryptophone, which includes various security features – including “baseband attack detection.” The handset, based on a Samsung Galaxy SIII, is described as offering, a “Hardened Android operating system” offering extra security. “Baseband firewall protects against over-the-air attacks with constant monitoring of baseband processor activity, baseband attack detection, and automated initiation of countermeasures”, claims the site. “What we find suspicious is that a lot of these interceptors are right on top of U.S. military bases.” says Goldsmith. “Whose interceptor is it? Who are they, that’s listening to calls around military bases? The point is: we don’t really know whose they are.” Baseband attacks are considered extremely difficult – the details of the chips are closely guarded. “Interceptors” are costly devices – and hacking baseband chips is thought to be technically advanced beyond the reach of “ordinary” hackers, ESD says. The devices vary in form, and are sold to government agencies and others, but are computers with specialized software designed to defeat the encryption of cellphone networks. The towers target the “Baseband” operating system of cellphones – a secondary OS which sits “between” iOS or Android, for instance, and the cellular network. Goldsmith says that the devices cost “less than $100,000” and does not mention what level or type of device his team has detected. Most are still out of reach of average hackers, although freely advertised. One model is the VME Dominator, which is described as, “a real time GSM A5.1 cell phone interceptor. It cannot be detected. It allows interception of voice and text. It also allows voice manipulation, up or down channel blocking, text intercept and modification, calling & sending text on behalf of the user, and directional finding of a user during random monitoring of calls.” What has come as a surprise is how many “interceptors” are in active use in the U.S., and that their purpose remains mysterious. Author Rob Waugh, We Live Security Sursa Android security mystery - 'fake’ cellphone towers found in U.S.

Din cate stiu media box-ul/decodorul e in pereche cu smart cardul (paired) adica nu functioneaza unul fara altul chiar si in reteaua aceluiasi furnizor de servicii, probabil poate fi ocolita intr-un fel protectia dar nu m-a interesat, si daca smart cardul nu e autentificat in retea sau media box-ul nu e paired, nu pot functiona.Aceeasi chestie e si incazul modulelor CAM CI

O alta chestie poate chiar mai dubioasa, proiectul ptr Legea securitatii cibernetice a Romaniei

Am folosit in trecut GetDataBack for NTFS/FAT etc.ca sa recuperez datele cu tot cu structura de directoare. Ai putea sa il incerci. Sa inteleg ca cu TestDisk PhotoRec nu merge, FAT sau MFT fix ai incercat ?

Incerci cumva din Torbrowser ? Am mai vazut asa ceva la el, solutia a fost schimbarea exit-nod-ului cu unul cara sa convina la yahoo, nu mi s-a parut o explicatie prea logica dar a mers.

Daca tot nu merge bine, macar se pot lua banii inapoi ?

Vodafone la calitate in general, la internet Orange pentru mine e dezamagitor. Am testat si Digi pe internet si chiar mi s-a parut peste Vodafone si Orange, dar probabil erau mai putini utilizatori pe celulele respective, oricum au o cota mica de piata si probabil reteaua mai putin incarcata.

pyOBD ca si soft pare o optiune de luat in seama, chiar nu auzisem si cred ca o sa o incerc si eu. Ma axasem pe variante profesionale, bine nu originale, dar sa suporte softul respectiv, pentru o diagnoza auto de amator, care sa stie ce e cu masina lui cat de cat inainte sa ajunga in service sau preventiv e ok un soft si o interfata low cost.

Eu am folosit VCDS de la Ross-Tech, nu originala, chinezarie dar isi facea treaba, ptr ce vrei tu si chiar mai mult, e ptr masinile din grupul VAG (Volskwagen, Audi, Seat, Skoda) si legate de el, gen Maybach, Porsche. Cel mai ok cred ca e sa cauti ceva dedicat ptr masina ta (iti recunoaste mai bine codurile) si poti folosi o masina virtuala, e chiar mai ok asa, clonele se mai ard cand isi fac update de pe site-ul oficial. Am folosit si Torque pt Android ca si scorpio2k2, dar nu am fost prea incantat, mergea, dar nu vedeam prea multe, probabil depinde si de masina.

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Sa ne faci si noua un review pe forum poate ma convingi. Ai comandat cumva si cu rucsac/baterie ?

Cred ca merita mai mult decat cealalta optiune comparabila, Reaver Pro, care are pret dublu. Dar trebuie sa fii convins ca il folosesti. Ma tentau si pe mine dar pot fi comandata doar din SUA, cel putin eu n-am gasit nimic in Europa, si ma gandeam ca se mai adaugau si taxe/accize, desi sub 150 USD/Euro, nu mai tin minte exact, nu se plateste si TVA, probabil doar acize. As fi curios de o parere, detaliata daca se poate, a cuiva care chiar a folosit unul din deviceurile astea sau ceva asemanator.

Nu sunt familiarizat cu internele Androidului, dar nu e nici o solutie de modificare a listei default de cryptare ? Am folosit Test your browser si clar, preferintele din browserul Androidului sunt inferioare celor din Opera Mini instalat de utilizator, probabil si din alte browsere.

Cooler Thermaltake Contac 21 Coolere Procesor Tip socket AM3 - eMAG.ro

Users of Mobile Portals Exposed to HTTP Header Pollution Attacks, Expert Finds Present at the EUSecWest security conference in Amsterdam, independent security researcher Bogdan Alecu has unveiled his findings on GSM vulnerabilities in a paper entitled “Using HTTP headers pollution for mobile networks attacks.” The attacks he has demonstrated target the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) and Web portals on which the customers of mobile operators can perform specific tasks such as money transfers, download content and subscribe to certain services. “I have found a way to browse the dedicated page of mobile operators for their customers, while pretending to be any customer. This page is usually automatically set to open when you get your Internet settings on your phone,” Alecu told Softpedia just before the conference. “For this exploit all I need to know is the target phone number. This number gets injected into the traffic by adding or modifying specific HTTP headers that are used by the operators for billing the right customer.” Depending on the services offered by the carrier on these websites, cybercriminals can abuse the security holes for their own gain. “Some allow you to buy ringtones, games, themes, subscribe to daily quotes or online streaming, others let you even change specific options for your number like setting a ring-back tone, recharge a prepay account, change Roaming status. “And there are other operators that have exposed even online mobile banking services, which in general are tied to the customer's number. So, it really depends on what the operators chose to put on this dedicated page,” he noted. “It's not much a criminal can do rather than making someone else to pay for his shopping. A criminal might also gain access to your private details (address, online subscriptions, email, etc). Of course, if we think about social engineering, then the danger is even higher.” Apparently, there’s also a way for shady companies to take advantage of these flaws. Third-party mobile content providers can enter agreements with the carrier and secretly subscribe customers to their paid services. However, this attack is risky because, as the expert highlights, victims will notice the fraudulent payments and report them. A majority of the sites tested by the researcher – belonging to operators from all over the world – have been found to be vulnerable to the attack method he identified. But, before making his findings public, the researcher contacted all the affected companies and warned them of the risks. “I have contacted all the operators that I've found to be vulnerable to such attack. Also thanks to one of them, I have reported the issue to GSM Association (GSMA) who has sent a warning to all of the mobile operators in the world,” he explained. “What I really appreciated was that most of the operators have addressed these issues fast enough and generally I had a good communication with them.” On the other hand, he reveals that not all of the affected companies have addressed these issues. “Most of the problems seem to be with the 3rd party content providers as the operators need somehow to send to the 3rd party the number of their subscriber, when the user is redirected to their site - and usually this is done by HTTP headers,” Alecu noted. As always, we’ve asked the expert to provide some pieces of advice for regular users on how they can protect themselves against such attacks. Unfortunately, similar to other research made by him – such as the SIM Toolkit attack – there’s not much that users can do. Only the operator can fix the vulnerabilities and some of them have already started implementing additional security measures. According to the researcher, in certain countries companies allow their customers to unsubscribe from any form of premium rate billing, but that’s not enough to prevent these attacks. Other carriers have implemented a system that warns users via SMS in case the mobile portal is accessed or content is downloaded. However, additional solutions are needed to ensure that customers are completely protected. “If you ask me, a first step would be to make the first line customer service report anything unusual to the 2nd or 3rd line when the customer complaints about a strange or wrong billing on his number, because generally I noticed a tendency to make the problem go away by accusing the customer of wrong usage of the phone,” he concluded. Sursa: Users of Mobile Portals Exposed to HTTP Header Pollution Attacks, Expert Finds - Softpedia

Da, merita, desi e intro pentru networking, te ia de la 0 si 1 pana la protocoale de routare. Iar certificarea de CCNA e valabila 3 ani din cate stiu.

Care credeti ca ar fi cele mai interesante si axate pe 0day vulnerabilitati si exploituri ? Scuze daca s-a mai discutat.