Nytro

Translated from: El blog de Nutrix | RSAhack RSAhack Posted by Cristian on 05/09/201411/09/2014 Amicelli As we all know, is one of the RSA asymmetric algorithms (Public and Private Key) used and best known in recent decades. It was created by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977, The safety of this algorithm lies in the problem of factoring integers. RSA algorithm The algorithm consists basically of three steps: Key Generation Based on two distinct prime numbers, to which they are known as "p and q", which are chosen randomly. Taking primes n is calculated, which is basically the product of "pq" which makes "n" (semiprime) in the module. Now once the module having the Euler function ? (n) = (p-1) (q-1) is used, and having this calculation proceeds to choose a public exponent which is known as "e" this has two particular be less than ? (n) and is also coprime of this, usually 65 537 is used. A number that is called "d" using modular arithmetic, where "d" must be the inverse modular multiplier "e" is then determined. Then we have that: The public key is made up of "n" and "e" and the private key is composed of "n", "d", "p", "q" and these modules. encryption Using the public key (nye) A message "c" is created (Encryption) c ? m (clear message) ^ e (mod n) decryption Using the private key (n, d, p, q) is obtained from c m m ? c (encrypted message) ^ d (mod n) attacks As we saw above seems complicated operation, although there are many complicated known attacks that can be performed partially. Cyclic Encryption: Be decrypted using the same key figure is the public key, by an attack that uses only data from the victim that are public. The problem is that we present ourselves then anyone who knows the keys used in the process of figure or key exchange, could theoretically recover the secret. Dual EC DRBG: It is a generator cryptographically secure pseudo-random numbers, which was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and later adopted by RSA Security in your kit Bsafe which adopted double elliptic curve. However, this Backdoor was discovered in 2007, and was detailed by security expert Bruce Schneier. Birthday Paradox Most interesting of all is that for the attack only need to have the public key values ??of the victim factoring: In number theory, integer factorization or prime factorization is to decompose a composite number (not prime) in non-trivial divisors, which when multiplied give the original number. In this type of attack is try to factor n into p and q, and (p-1) (q-1) calculated by allowing you to determine d and e. Where are RSA As previously mentioned this algorithm is well known and is not implemented in a number of places. OpenSSL GnuPG PGP OpenVPN ETC RSAhack In what is developing this tool basically abusing a flaw in the implementation of RSA in OpenSSL found in all versions, the attack is done by Brute Force is made. When OpenSSL generates an RSA key uses rsa_builtin_keygen function located within /crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c static int rsa_builtin_keygen (RSA * rsa, int bits, bignum * E_value, BN_GENCB * cb) { Bignum * r0 = NULL, * r1 = NULL, * r2 = NULL, * r3 = NULL, * tmp; Bignum local_r0, local_d, local_p; Pr0 bignum *, * d, * p; int bitsp, bitsq, k = 1, n = 0; BN_CTX * ctx = NULL; BN_CTX_new ctx = (); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start (ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); r3 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); if (r3 == NULL) goto err; bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2; bitsq = bits-bitsp; / * We need the RSA components non-NULL * / if (! RSA-> n && ((RSA-> n = BN_new ()) == NULL)) goto err; if (! RSA-> d && ((RSA-> d = BN_new ()) == NULL)) goto err; if (! RSA-> e && ((RSA-> e = BN_new ()) == NULL)) goto err; if (! RSA-> p && ((RSA-> p = BN_new ()) == NULL)) goto err; if (RSA-> q && ((RSA-> q = BN_new ()) == NULL)!) goto err; if (RSA-> DMP1 && ((RSA-> BN_new DMP1 = ()) == NULL)!) goto err; if (RSA-> dmq1 && ((RSA-> BN_new dmq1 = ()) == NULL)!) goto err; if (RSA-> iqmp && ((RSA-> BN_new iqmp = ()) == NULL)!) goto err; BN_copy (RSA-> e, E_value); *********** In the portion of the code, we see that it has a bit and then divides by 2 the length of the key, this is done to determine the length of p and q, that is, for a 1024-bit key p and q will be prime numbers 512, 5 bits and 511.5 bits. What this means it helps ?, partly because the attack is that for a 1024-bit key numbers are 512 bits. Looking at other implementations in applications such as GnuPG have realized this and corrected the lines, so that the prime numbers are not the same length, which adds another layer of complexity. But however it is not all primes to perform Superpower we lack, if this becomes quite complicated but we have several options depending on the hardware you have, the better the quality of the task simpler calculation. But to start, we can use it and extract OpenSSL primes. I pass an example: genrsa -out key 1024 openssl This command generates an RSA key with OpenSSL 1024. openssl rsa key -in -text -out key2 This further allows us to pass the RSA key text which we get the following. Private-Key: (1024 bit) modulus: 00: c7: 76: 50: d1: 5f: d3: e1: fc: 31: 3f: 7d: e6: e0: 49: 28: 75: b6: 7e: 29: c3: 3a: 1d: ce: 46: 27: 1f: e5: 60: 9b: 2d: 26: 37: 75: 80: 94: 07: 7a: 05: 87: 45: 5d: d4: ad: 6f: ce: df: 26: 23: a1: 3d: 0f: 26: 92: 0a: from: 9b: 95: 07: 55: e8: 36: 4c: 92: bf: 99: 59: 22: 7a: a2: 22: 21: 82: 4b: 90: 06: 72: 4b: 46: c3: 3f: 32: b6: c8: 3a: b6: 3c: 2f: 7e: 3f: a2: 98: fc: 60: d7: 3b: aa: 35: 14: 13: 50: 68: 0a: 4c: 84: 71: 39: e4: 47: dd: dd: 7b: 86: 85: d3: f5: 0a: 86: 34: db: 47: b1: 00: 9d: 28: from: e2: 4d: ad publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001) privateExponent: 53: 69: 08: d6: e5: a9: e7: 60: dc: ff: 5e: 19: 04: 45: d3: a3: 96: 13: 20: 47: c1: af: e1: 28: b9: 07: bf: 96: 2c: 8e: 2e: e3: 16: 42: 14: a5: 23: c3: d8: 13: 8b: ef: 7a: 2f: bd: 64: d7: c0: 22: 97: 34: 14: bf: 11: c8: 91: 6b: 3a: cc: 13: f5: 51: 04: 34: 5a: 19: 8d: 3c: 3f: bd: a9: 5c: 98: 0d: bc: 56: f8: ea: 68: da: 1c: a9: a1: d0: 05: 83: 97: e9: 29: 41: 09: 5a: 8a: 9d: 03: be: 39: 5c: 11: 44: 9e: 7f: ac: 48: d3: a1: 64: 40: b1: 5d: 8a: f9: c3: 7e: c5: e6: the 9th: 80: 8a: 00: 86: 52: 0d: 27: 73: 98: 51: 01 prime1: 00: ee: 80: 9d: af: ee: 43: e1: 41: f9: 23: 53: 39: 54: 89: 13: 43: 3d: ef: c2: db: d2: 87: the 9th: 3c: 2c: a1: d9: d4: 88: 12: 03: c6: 96: db: 2e: 3b: 52: b0: a7: 9e: 44: 0a: dc: 9c: 06: 57: e1: 50: 7b: 1d: 1d: b7: d1: 68: 00: 36: 09: 51: 7c: a3: 53: 3c: fd: a1 Prime2: 00: d6: 18: 79: 3a: bf: 95: 28: 13: 06: 03: 11: 72: b7: 8b: 9f: 2a: 5d: ec: 1e: 7b: 89: 0b: 88: dd: 67: 8e: 55: 0b: ac: af: 56: 9c: 09: 6f: 8d: 79: d1: b3: 24: 79: 5f: 82: d6: b4: 70: 6e: a3: 93: c8: af: d7: 4a: a1: c0: a6: d2: f4: 7f: cf: 72: 3d: 6d 1c: 8d exponent1: 4b: 99: cd: 62: 45: 1e: 93: 3a: bc: 64: 6c: 2f: 12: 12: d9: 5e: 49: 35: c5: 08: b5: 35: 72: b8: 7c: 55: 59: 9d: 3a: fc: aa: e1: ba: 54: 03: d5: 9e: 22: 8d: 1f: 67: e6: 21: 83: fb: a6: c3: af: 25: 37: 57: 82: 3b: 08: c2: 78: 5e: 7f: cc: 08: 61: 8c: 45: c1 exponent2: 7e: ad: 22: 65: d1: 5f: b6: c3: 72: c6: 33: f7: b5: 84: 66: 5b: d2: 10: d8: 84: 6d: b5: 26: 79: 22: 41: c4: 2e: 51: 31: b9: c4: 3f: 8d: 02: 9f: b6: a5: 11: 8a: c3: 29: 8e: 52: 5b: 48: 0b: 7f: 70: ba: 22: 5f: a5: 4f: 71: 25: d6: c7: 1c: fe: 52: 3c: 12: 2d coefficient: 00: d6: fa: 86: 0c: ff: 5f: 8c: 3d: db: 74: b2: bd: ac: 84: 1b: 86: 16: b6: 24: 98: 0b: 5b: e8: 89: 90: 38: e2: 7c: 96: ee: 3b: c1: 0e: bc: eb: 66: 64: 16: ca: e7: 6c: 85: 0a: 7b: f2: ee: e7: 4a: 39: 9c: 66: 77: fd: 34: 77: 66: b7: d1: 51: a8: 55: ca: 5f: f3 ----- BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY ----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQDHdlDRX9Ph / DE / febgSSh1tn4pwzodzkYnH + Vgmy0mN3WAlAd6 BYdFXdStb87fJiOhPQ8mkgrem5UHVeg2TJK / mVkieqIiIYJLkAZyS0bDPzK2yDq2 PC9 P6KY + / GDXO6o1FBNQaApMhHE55Efd3XuGhdP1CoY020exAJ0o3uJNrQIDAQAB AoGAU2kI1uWp52Dc / 14ZBEXTo5YTIEfBr + EouQe / liyOLuMWQhSlI8PYE4vvei + 9 ZNfAIpc0FL8RyJFrOswT9VEENFoZjTw / valcmA28VvjqaNocqaHQBYOX6SlBCVqK OVwRRJ5 NQO + / + cN + rEjToWRAsV2K xeaagIoAhlINJ3OYUQECQQDugJ2v7kPhQfkj UzlUiRNDPe / C29KHmjwsodnUiBIDxpbbLjtSsKeeRArcnAZX4VB7HR230WgANglR fKNTPP2hAkEA1hh5Or + VKBMGAxFyt4ufKl3sHnuJC4jdZ45VC6yvVpwJb4150bMk C1rRwbqOTyK eV + / XSqHAptL0f89yPW0cjQJAS5nNYkUekzq8ZGwvEhLZXkk1xQi1 NXK4fFVZnTr8quG6VAPVniKNH2fmIYP7psOvJTdXgjsIwnhef8wIYYxFwQJAfq0i ZdFftsNyxjP3tYRmW9IQ2IRttSZ5IkHELlExucQ / jQKftqURisMpjlJbSAt / cloi UjwSLQJBANb6hgz X6VPcSXWxxz + / X4w923SyvayEG4YWtiSYC1voiZA44nyW7jvB DrzrZmQWyudshQp78u7nSjmcZnf9NHdmt9FRqFXKX / M = ----- END RSA PRIVATE KEY ----- All we need is to extract the prime numbers that look and keep them in the same format as we see what is hexadecimal, this task can be automated so you can start playing with numbers Cousins ??Big Eye is not the only way, but if used for testing. After getting a good deal (many) primes we can start making Fuerza Bruta on a public key, and then to generate the private key. advice for driving large primes recommend using GMP Here's a video where you can see running RSAhak, in an attack on a public key of 1024 bits. video Demonstration I leave a simple module written in Python so that after the primes to generate RSA private key. You can download it from github. Later I'll post the full project RSAhack Cristian Amicelli Tagged as: Cryptography, Superpower, Python, RSA Categorized as: Cryptography 4 thoughts on "RSAhack" jorge kamlofsky says: 09/08/2014 at 13:29 Hello, Cristian. I am a mathematician: Discrete Mathematics teacher IAU. Hence I know Juan Manuel, who passed me your presentations. Excellent job! Congratulations! I will try to reproduce the attack in order to understand it better. Thanks and regards. JK Reply Cristian Amicelli says: 09/08/2014 at 17:45 Thank you Jorge, you have any questions, ideas or advice do not hesitate to perform them Reply NU11 says: 09/09/2014 at 18:24 SEAS primes not the same length == primes SEAN not the same length? Reply Cristian Amicelli says: 09/14/2014 at 19:21 Post navigation Pharming ? PHP and cURL View: Mobile | Classic Google Translate for Business:Translator ToolkitWebsite TranslatorGlobal Market Finder Sursa: OpenSSL RSA Hack: www.cristianamicelli.com.ar/blog/rsahack - Pastebin.com

Follow @DanDragomir 6 octombrie 2014 @ 11:33 Facebook Messenger va oferi posibilitatea de a transfera bani între prieteni, fiind de fapt un plan al Facebook de a deveni o afacere cu adev?rat profitabil?. De aceea a fost impus tuturor. Apropo, am descoperit c? dac? dezistalez aplica?ia de Facebook ?i o reinstalez iar, merge mesageria cum era înainte. S? vedem pentru cât timp. Codul legat de transfer de bani a fost descoperit de un student ?i publicat prima oar? de TechCrunch. Industria întreag? este tot mai interesat? s? aduc? pl??ile mobile pe telefonul mobil. Atât b?ncile ?i institu?iile financiare, cât ?i utilizatorii sunt interesa?i de asta, iar evident marile platforme care pot deveni intermediari vor avea de câ?tigat. A?a c? Facebook bate Google la interven?ii for?ate. Întâi au f?cut un studiu dubios pe spatele utilizatorilor, apoi au impus for?at Messenger cu un singur scop: s? câ?tige cât mai mul?i bani. Pentru a putea transmite ?i primi bani va trebui s? introduce?i în Facebook Messenger datele de card bancar. S? vede?i distrac?ie Sursa: https://www.computerblog.ro/business/adevarul-despre-facebook-messenger.html

C?t?lin Ni?u - 30 sep 2014 Întrucât reclamele de pe mobile nu aduc la fel de mul?i bani precum cele de pe desktop, Google pl?nuie?te s? î?i m?reasc? profiturile schimbând modul de afi?are al acestora. Asemeni ini?iativei iAds lansat? de Apple în urm? cu patru ani, noile reclame de pe Android vor beneficia de elemente multimedia care ocup? întregul ecran pentru a m?ri ?ansa de de interac?iune din partea utilizatorilor. Aparent planul este s? foloseasc? atât clipuri video de diverse dimensiuni, cât ?i mini-aplica?ii interactive. Acest gen de reclame nu este deloc nou, alte companii oferind astfel de solu?ii de mai mult? vreme în spa?iul mobil. Cum ini?iativa Apple a e?uat în mare parte, iar juc?torii de pe aceast? pia?? sunt prea mici pentru a putea acapara un procent prea mare din pia?a de publicitate online pe mobile, Google este singura companie care ar putea avea succes acum în acest spa?iu. Implementarea noilor reclame trebuie f?cut îns? într-un mod care s? nu deranjeze utilizatorii. Google pare s? condi?ioneze utilizarea lor doar în momente obi?nuite de „pauz?”. Un exemplu interesant ar putea fi integrarea unui clip video de 15-20 secunde între dou? niveluri dintr-un joc de genul Angry Birds. Interesant este faptul c? Google a decis s? foloseasc? astfel de reclame chiar dup? ce Apple a decis s? mai încerce odat? cu reclamele pe mobil, ini?iativ? confirmat? în urm? cu câteva luni. Sper?m doar ca aceste practici s? nu distrug? de tot ecosistemul de aplica?ii mobile, care este chiar ?i acum plin de reclame de tip banner ?i de micro-tranzac?ii mai mult sau mai pu?in justificate. Sursa: Reclame fullscreen în aplica?ii pentru Android de la Google ADSdroid.

Super, asta inteleg eu prin "hacking". E inutil, dar e for fun.

Nu acceptam "market" de la persoane care nu au 50 de posturi. Ban.

Ok, nu vine nimeni cu o captura de Wireshark? Cu un screenshot in care sa se vada un apel SetWindowHookEx sau GetAsyncKeyState? Adica o demonstratie. Dar ce zice acolo e mult mai mult decat un keylogger. Nu folositi asa ceva, dupa cum spun si ei, folositi doar pentru teste.

Poate cineva sa descarce si sa uploadeze in alta parte? E un jeg site-ul ala.

BadUSB the unpatchable malware code published on Github 0 By Vijay on October 3, 2014 · BadUSB : The unpatchable and unfixable USB malware Exactly two months after researcher Karsten Nohl demonstrated an attack he called BadUSB to a standing-room-only crowd at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas. The BadUSB was later demonstrated again by two researchers, Adam Caudill and Brandon Wilson. Caudill and Wilson presented the vulnerability at Derbycon 4.0 conference last week in Louisville. What is BadUSB? The malware which is dubbed BadUSB, reprograms embedded firmware to give USB devices new, covert and most powerful capabilities. In a demo at Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas, a USB drive was infected and showed its ability to act as a keyboard that surreptitiously types malicious commands into attached computers. Another USB was similarly be reprogrammed to act as a network card that causes connected computers to connect to malicious sites impersonating Google, Facebook or other trusted destinations. The demo showed that similar hacks could work against Android phones when attached to targeted computers. The malware is so huge that it can work on almost any USB linked devices like Web cams, keyboards, smart phones etc. BadUSB on Github Researchers Wilson and Caudill reversed-engineered USB firmware and reprogrammed it to launch various attacks. They then put the code for BadUSB on Github with a intent of letting all the users know abouts its effects. “The belief we have is that all of this should be public. It shouldn’t be held back. So we’re releasing everything we’ve got,” Caudill told the Derbycon audience on Friday. “This was largely inspired by the fact that [sR Labs] didn’t release their material. If you’re going to prove that there’s a flaw, you need to release the material so people can defend against it.” Caudill and Wilson discussed various scenarios where BadUSB can be used. Prominent among them and most deadliest is the USB device to emulate a keyboard and issue commands on behalf of a logged-in user to exfiltrate data or install malware. Unpatchable!!! BadUSB remains unpatchable at the moment. The reason according to the both the researchers, is that the USB controller chips in peripherals can be reprogrammed to spoof other devices and there’s little or no protection to prevent anyone from doing so. They also feel that since USBs are mass manufactured these days and it proves that anyone can input the code to insert the malware and take command of any system, perhaps the USB manufacturers will be under pressure to fix it soon. “If the only people who can do this are those with significant budgets, the manufacturers will never do anything about it,” Caudill told Wired. “You have to prove to the world that it’s practical, that anyone can do it…That puts pressure on the manufactures to fix the real issue.” The researchers also hope that putting teh code on Github would encourage companies and white hat researchers to find a fix for the malware. Sursa: BadUSB the unpatchable malware code published on Github

Poate tu muncesti pe 10 milioane. Lasa matura/lopata si pune mana si invata.

Nu mai are meniul ala de cacat "Metro", are butonu de start ca in imagine dar in rest nu am vazut diferente...

S-a facut. S-au gasit persoane care sa predea si s-au oferit o gramada ca participa, dar cand se preda, pula "studenti", intrau doar cativa plus alti cativa care erau "Idle". Nu meritati.

Da, de-asta am incercat si eu sa vad daca extrag toate tabelele, daca e limitat.

Ha? Si pe aia cu FinFisher de ce nu ii aresteaza? Sa le dau la muie.

user() == sqli2@localhost ? Nota: Iti pot extrage tabelele.

More Mac OS X and iPhone sandbox escapes and kernel bugs Posted by Ian Beer A couple of weeks ago Apple released OS X 10.9.5 and iOS 8 which fixed a number of sandbox escapes and privilege escalation bugs found by Project Zero. All-bar-one of these bugs were found via manual source code auditing where there was source and binary analysis where there wasn’t. As always, click through the bugs for proof-of-concept code and further details: CVE-2014-4403* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=23 ] was as issue allowing a kernel ASLR bypass on OS X due to insufficient randomization of very early kernel heap allocations, the addresses of which could be leaked using the unprivileged SGDT instruction. This bug could be exploited from within any sandbox on OS X and allowed an attacker to determine the load address of the kernel. CVE-2014-4394* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=28 ] CVE-2014-4395* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=29 ] CVE-2014-4401* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=30 ] CVE-2014-4396* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=30 ] CVE-2014-4397* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=30 ] CVE-2014-4400* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=30 ] CVE-2014-4399* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=30 ] CVE-2014-4398* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=32 ] CVE-2014-4416* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=34 ] were all bounds-checking bugs in the driver for the Intel integrated HD GPU present on all current-generation Macs. Eight of these bugs allowed controlled kernel memory corruption from with most sandboxes on OS X (those with access to the GPU such as the Safari renderer process or the Chrome GPU process.) CVE-2014-4402* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=33 ] was another case of missing bounds checks, this time in another part of the graphics acceleration pipeline. CVE-2014-4376* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=31 ] was a kernel NULL-pointer dereference when setting up IOKit shared memory. This was exploitable from within some sandboxed 32-bit processes on OS X (for example the Chrome GPU process.) As is true with all these bugs this bug also allows any unsandboxed processes to execute code in the kernel. CVE-2014-4418 [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=36 ] No CVE* [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=35 ] were bugs affecting OS X and iOS in the implementation of the IOKit IODataQueue class where the kernel trusted index and size fields in shared memory which was mapped into userspace and writable. Looking at the release notes for iOS 8 these bugs seem to be very similar to one used in the recent Pangu Team jailbreak which was released a few days after these bugs were reported to Apple. CVE-2014-4389 [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=39 ] were integer overflows in the bounds checking code of IODataQueue allowing kernel memory corruption on iOS and OS X. CVE-2014-4390 [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=37 ] was another shared memory queuing bug, this time in the bluetooth stack. CVE-2014-4404+ [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=40 ] was an interesting kernel heap overflow when parsing a binary keyboard map which affected iOS and OS X and was reachable by setting an IOKit registry value. See the linked bug for more details along with a PoC demonstrating kernel instruction pointer control. CVE-2014-4379 [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=42 ] was another bug in the keyboard mapping code affecting iOS and OS X allowing userspace to read arbitrary kernel memory. CVE-2014-4405+ [ https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=41 ] was a kernel NULL pointer dereference due to incorrect error handling in the key map parsing code, again see the linked bug for a PoC demonstrating kernel instruction pointer control on OS X. Finding and eliminating sandbox escapes is an important focus for Project Zero. The attack surface to break out of a sandbox is often smaller than the attack surface available to remote attackers to gain an initial foothold inside a sandbox. Therefore, strengthening sandboxes represents a solid return on investment of time. Our research seems to indicate that sandbox break-outs on OS X and iOS are an under-researched topic. We’d encourage others to join us in bringing these sandboxes up to strength. You can keep up-to-date with the latest Project Zero research by subscribing to labels in our bug tracker: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/subscriptions These bugs exceeded Project Zero’s standard 90-day disclosure deadline. (+) These bugs were only fixed on iOS and remain unpatched on OS X. Sursa: Project Zero: More Mac OS X and iPhone sandbox escapes and kernel bugs

October 01, 2014 Bash bug: the other two RCEs, or how we chipped away at the original fix (CVE-2014-6277 and '78) The patch that implements a prefix-based way to mitigate vulnerabilities in bash function exports has been out since last week and has been already picked up by most Linux vendors (plus by Apple). So, here's a quick overview of the key developments along the way, including two really interesting things: proof-of-concept test cases for two serious, previously non-public RCE bugs tracked as CVE-2014-6277 and CVE-2014-6278. NOTE: If you or your distro maintainers have already deployed Florian's patch, there is no reason for alarm - you are almost certainly not vulnerable to attacks. If you do not have this patch, and instead relied only on the original CVE-2014-6271 fix, you probably need to act now. See this entry for a convenient test case and other tips. Still here? Good. If you need a refresher, the basic principles of the underlying function export functionality, and the impact of the original bash bug (CVE-2014-6271), are discussed in this blog post. If you have read the earlier post, the original attack disclosed by Stephane Chazelas should be very easy to understand: HTTP_COOKIE='() { 0; }; echo hi mom;' bash -c : In essence, the internal parser invoked by bash to process the specially encoded function definitions passed around in environmental variables had a small problem: it continued parsing the code past the end of the function definition itself - and at that point, flat out executing whatever instructions it came across, just as it would do in a normal bash script. Given that the value of certain environmental variables can be controlled by remote attackers in quite a few common settings, this opened up a good chunk of the Internet to attacks. The original vulnerability was reported privately and kept under embargo for roughly two weeks to develop a fairly conservative fix that modified the parser to bail out in a timely manner and do not parse any trailing commands. As soon as the embargo was lifted, we all found out about the bug and scrambled to deploy fixes. At the same time, a good chunk of the security community reacted with surprise and disbelief that bash is keen to dispatch the contents of environmental variables to a fairly complex syntax parser - so we started poking around. Tavis was the quickest: he found that you can convince the parser to keep looking for a file name for output redirection past the boundary between the untrusted string accepted from the environment and the actual body of the program that bash is being asked to execute (CVE-2014-7169). His original test case can be simplified at: HTTP_COOKIE='() { function a a>\' bash -c echo This example would create an empty file named "echo", instead of executing the requested command. Tavis' finding meant that you would be at risk of remote code execution in situations where attacker-controlled environmental variables are mixed with sanitized, attacker-controlled command-line parameters passed to calls such as system() or popen(). For example, you'd be in trouble if you were doing this in a web app: system("echo '"+ sanitized_string_without_quotes + "' | /some/trusted/program"); ...because the attacker could convince bash to skip over the "echo" command and execute the command given in the second parameter, which happens to be a sanitized string (albeit probably with no ability to specify parameters). On the flip side, this is a fairly specific if not entirely exotic coding pattern - and contrary to some of the initial reports, the bug probably wasn't exploitable in a much more general way. Chet, the maintainer of bash, started working on a fix to close this specific parsing issue, and released it soon thereafter. On the same day, Todd Sabin and Florian Weimer have independently bumped into an off-by-one issue in the parser (CVE-2014-7186). The bug manifested in what seemed to be a non-exploitable crash, but was enough to cast even more doubt on the robustness of the underlying code. The test for this problem was pretty simple - you just needed a sequence of here-documents that overflowed a static array, say: HTTP_COOKIE='() { 0 <<a <<b <<c <<d <<e <<f <<g <<h <<i <<j <<k <<l <<m; }' bash -c : Florian also bumped into a similar issue with loop parsing (CVE-2014-7187); the proof-of-concept function definition for this is a trivial for loop nested 129 levels deep, but the effect can be only observed under memory access diagnostics tools. In any case, the practical impact of this finding wasn't particularly clear. Nevertheless, all these revelations prompted him to start working on an unofficial but far more comprehensive patch that would largely shield the parser from untrusted strings in normally encountered variables present in the environment. In parallel to Tavis' and Florian's work, I set up a very straightforward fuzzing job with american fuzzy lop. I seeded it with a rudimentary function definition: () { foo() { foo; }; >bar; } ...and simply let it run with a minimalistic wrapper that took the test case generated by the fuzzer, put it in a variable, and then called execve() to invoke bash. Although the fuzzer had no clue about the syntax of shell programs, it had the benefit of being able to identify and isolate interesting syntax based on coverage signals, deriving around 1,000 other distinctive test cases from the starting one while "instinctively" knowing not to mess with the essential "() {" prefix. For the first few hours, it kept hitting only the redirect issue originally reported by Todd and the file-creation issue discovered by Tavis - but soon thereafter, it spewed out a new crash illustrated by this snippet of code (CVE-2014-6277): HTTP_COOKIE='() { ) { _; }; ) { _; } <<a; }' bash -c : This proved to be a very straightforward use of uninitialized memory: it hit a code path in make_redirect() where one field in a newly-allocated REDIR struct - here_doc_eof - would not be set to any specific value, yet would be treated as a valid pointer later on (somewhere in copy_redirect()). Now, if bash is compiled with both --enable-bash-malloc and --enable-mem-scramble, the memory returned to make_redirect() by xmalloc() will be set to 0xdf, making the pointer always resolve to 0xdfdfdfdf, and thus rendering the bug harder to exploit (essentially depending on whether the stack or any other memory region can be grown by the attacker to overlap with this address). That said, on a good majority of Linux distros, these flags are disabled, and you can trivially get bash to dereference a pointer that is entirely within attacker's control: HTTP_COOKIE="() { ) { _; }; ) { _; } <<`perl -e '{print "A"x1000}'`; }" bash -c : bash[25662]: segfault at 41414141 ip 00190d96 sp bfbe6354 error 4 in libc-2.12.so[110000+191000] The actual fault happens because of an attempt to copy here_doc_eof to a newly-allocated buffer using a C macro that expands to the following code: strcpy(xmalloc(1 + strlen(redirect->here_doc_eof)), (redirect->here_doc_eof)) This appears to be exploitable in at least one way: if here_doc_eof is chosen by the attacker to point in the vicinity of the current stack pointer, the apparent contents of the string - and therefore its length - may change between stack-based calls to xmalloc() and strcpy() as a natural consequence of an attempt to pass parameters and create local variables. Such a mid-macro switch will result in an out-of-bounds write to the newly-allocated memory. A simple conceptual illustration of this attack vector would be: char* result; int len_alloced; main(int argc, char** argv) { /* The offset will be system- and compiler-specific */; char* ptr = &ptr - 9; result = strcpy (malloc(100 + (len_alloced = strlen(ptr))), ptr); printf("requested memory = %d\n" "copied text = %d\n", len_alloced + 1, strlen(result) + 1); } When compiled with the -O2 flag used for bash, on one test system, this produces: requested memory = 2 copied text = 28 Of course, the result will vary from system to system, but the general consequences of this should be fairly evident. The issue is also made worse by the fact that only relatively few distributions were building bash as a position-independent executable that could be fully protected by ASLR. (In addition to this vector, there is also a location in dispose_cmd.c that calls free() on the pointer under some circumstances, but I haven't really really spent a lot of time trying to develop a functioning exploit for the '77 bug for reasons that should be evident in the text that follows... well, just about now.) It has to be said that there is a bit less glamour to such a low-level issue that still requires you to go through some mental gymnastics to be exploited in a portable way. Luckily, the fuzzer kept going, and few hours later, isolated a test case that, after minimization, yielded this gem (CVE-2014-6278): HTTP_COOKIE='() { _; } >_[$($())] { echo hi mom; id; }' bash -c : I am... actually not entirely sure what happens here. A sequence of nested $... statements within a redirect appears to cause the parser to bail out without properly resetting its state, and puts it in the mood for executing whatever comes next. The test case works as-is with bash 4.2 and 4.3, but not with more ancient releases; this is probably related to changes introduced few years ago in bash 4.2 patch level 12 (xparse_dolparen()), but I have not investigated if earlier versions are patently not vulnerable or simply require different syntax. The CVE-2014-6278 payload allows straightforward "put-your-commands-here" remote code execution on systems that are protected only with the original patch - something that we were worried about for a while, and what prompted us to ask people to update again over the past few days. Well, that's it. I kept the technical details of the last two findings embargoed for a while to give people some time to incorporate Florian's patch and avoid the panic associated with the original bug - but at this point, given the scrutiny that the code is under, the ease of discovering the problems with off-the-shelf open-source tools, and the availability of adequate mitigations, the secrecy seems to have outlived its purpose. Any closing thoughts? Well, I'm not sure there's a particular lesson to be learnt from the entire story. There's perhaps one thing - it would probably have been helpful if the questionable nature of the original patch was spotted by any of the notified vendors during the two-week embargo period. That said, I wasn't privy to these conversations - and hindsight is always 20/20. Sursa: lcamtuf's blog: Bash bug: the other two RCEs, or how we chipped away at the original fix (CVE-2014-6277 and '78)

Inside The Atheros WiFi Chipset - Adrian Chadd The Qualcomm Atheros wireless chips have a variety of open source drivers available. Adrian will walk through the open Atheros HALs and ath9k-htc firmware, describing how things hold together and how to use them. Note - everything discussed will be based on what is the open source software and publicly available information. Bio: Adrian is the FreeBSD wireless maintainer and worked at Atheros for 18 months on chip bring-up and open source work. He worked with other Atheros developers to open source the USB firmware for the AR5513 and ath9k-htc hardware, as well as the AR9300 HAL. He also works on network parallelism and scaling in FreeBSD. His day job isn't anything to do with wifi. Via: Inside The Atheros WiFi Chipset - Adrian Chadd (Defcon Wireless Village 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

SDR Tricks with HackRF - Michael Ossmann HackRF and some other Software Defined Radio platforms can be used in creative ways. I'll show methods, including a dirty trick or two, for using HackRF outside the advertised frequency range. I'll also show how the HackRF design lends itself to use as an oscilloscope or function generator suitable for many hardware hacking tasks. Bio: Michael Ossmann is a wireless security researcher who makes hardware for hackers. He founded Great Scott Gadgets in an effort to put exciting, new tools into the hands of innovative people. Via: SDR Tricks with HackRF - Michael Ossmann (Defcon Wireless Village 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

Hacking 802.11 Basics - textile Hacking 802.11 Basics - textile Bio: Some dude. Via: Hacking 802.11 Basics - textile (Defcon Wireless Village 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

802.11ac Evolution: Data rates and Beamforming - Eric Johnson This session will discuss what is new in 11ac Discuss how the new data rates are derived. Where does 1.3 Gbps come from? The latest 11ac standard introduced 11ac beamforming. What is beamforming at a basic level? The practicalities of how 11ac beamforming works. Why it is not about making pretty antenna patterns? How it is different than proprietary analog solutions that proceeded the standards solution? Bio: Eric Johnson is one of Aruba's radio subject matter experts. He holds a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Electrical Engineering (Electromagnetics) from Carleton University. He has contributed solely and with teams on a total of 7 patents. His career now spans 26 years of defining, designing, building, and selling high performance radio and antenna solutions. He has contributed to and driven solutions for; space and terrestrial based remote sensing solutions; antenna designs from 30 MHz to 60 GHz; and at Nortel as architect on cellular radios, basestations, and antennas. Eric joined the Aruba Networks team in 2011 as the Product Manager for outdoor radio solutions and most recently delivered the AP-270 outdoor 11ac Access Point solutions. Via: 802.11ac Evolution: Data rates and Beamforming - Eric Johnson (Defcon Wireless Village 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

Mobile Forensics and Its App Analysis - Dr. Charline Nixon This presentation will talk about different mobile forensic tools, its uses, pros and cons. I will also use attack tree and its forensic tools comparison. The discussion also include app analysis, vulnerabilities, and breaches of mobile phone analysis. Bio: Charline F. Nixon is currently an IT Faculty at Calhoun Community College where she is responsible for teaching computer forensics, cyber terrorism and ethical hacking courses. She is currently developing a new course focused on mobile device hacking and forensics. Her previous positions include, IT School Chair and IT Faculty Lead Instructor. She holds 2 PhD’s in Education and Management and 2 Masters in Business and Cyber Security and a Black Belt Six Sigma. Charline has previously spoken at BSides Memphis and is one of the co-organizers of BSides Huntsville. In addition she holds several IT certifications, including GCIA, CEH, CHFI, ECSA, MFE,MCT, MCP,CASP (+10 others). Via: Mobile Forensics and Its App Analysis - Dr. Charline Nixon (TakeDownCon Rocket City 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

IPv6 Attack tools - Scott Hogg Many international organizations already have IPv6 networks, some organizations are working on their transitions to IPv6 and others are contemplating what IPv6 means to them. However, many organizations already have IPv6 running on their networks and they don’t even realize it. Many computer OSs now default to running both IPv4 and IPv6 which could lead to security vulnerabilities if one is not prepared. IPv6 security vulnerabilities currently exist “in the wild” and as the popularity of the IPv6 protocol increases so will the number of threats. This session will cover the overview of IPv6 security threats and protection measures. This session will cover recently released IPv6 attack tools that target the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and how Ethernet switch manufacturers have created protection measures. Bio: Scott Hogg is the CTO for Global Technology Resources, Inc. (GTRI), a founding member of the Rocky Mountain IPv6 Task Force, and a member of the Infoblox IPv6 Center of Excellence. Scott has a B.S. in Computer Science, a M.S. in Telecommunications, along with his CCIE (#5133), CISSP (#4610), among many other vendor and industry certifications. Scott has authored the Cisco Press book on IPv6 Security and writes a popular blog for NetworkWorld.com. Scott helps enterprises and service providers with their IPv6 planning, training and deployment activities. Via: IPv6 Attack tools - Scott Hogg (TakeDownCon Rocket City 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught Most of you have probably used Tor before, but I2P may be unfamiliar. Both are anonymization networks that allow people to obfuscate where their traffic is coming from, and also host services (web sites for example) without it being tied back to them. This talk will give an overview of both, but will focus on real world stories of how people were deanonymized. Example cases like Eldo Kim & the Harvard Bomb Threat, Hector Xavier Monsegur (Sabu)/Jeremy Hammond (sup_g) & LulzSec, Freedom Hosting & Eric Eoin Marques and finally Ross William Ulbricht/“Dread Pirate Roberts” of the SilkRoad, will be used to explain how people have been caught and how it could have been avoided Bio: Adrian Crenshaw has worked in the IT industry for the last fifteen years. He runs the information security website Irongeek.com, which specializes in videos and articles that illustrate how to use various pen-testing and security tools. He did the cert chase for awhile (MCSE NT 4, CNE, A+, Network+. i-Net+) but stopped once he had to start paying for the tests himself. He holds a Master of Science in Security Informatics and is also one of the co-founders of Derbycon. Via: Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught (TakeDownCon Rocket City 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

Energy-efficient bcrypt cracking - Katja Malvoni Abstract:Bcrypt is not completely hardware resistant: certain low-power parallel platforms improve bcrypt cracking energy-efficiency by a factor of 20+ when compared to traditional CPU implementations. https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLdIqs92nsIzRFk0OCN_uQiOkgtPiNk2mv&feat ure=player_embedded&v=maq2IY1F3x8 Via: Energy-efficient bcrypt cracking - Katja Malvoni (Passwords Con 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

Net hashes: a review of many network protocols - Robert Graham https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLdIqs92nsIzRFk0OCN_uQiOkgtPiNk2mv&feat ure=player_embedded&v=dM3n1Vff2xs Via: Net hashes: a review of many network protocols - Robert Graham (Passwords Con 2014) (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)