Nytro

Android 4.3 and Updated Developer Tools Posted by Dave Burke, Engineering Director, Android Platform Today in San Francisco we announced Android 4.3, a sweeter version of Jelly Bean that includes great new features for users and developers. Android 4.3 powers the new Nexus 7 tablet that's coming soon to Google Play and retail outlets, and it’s rolling out now as an update to Nexus 4, Nexus 7, Nexus 10, and Galaxy Nexus HSPA+ devices across the world. For developers, Android 4.3 includes the latest performance enhancements to keep your apps fast, smooth, and efficient, together with new APIs and capabilities to use in your apps. Here's a taste of what's new: OpenGL ES 3.0 — Game developers can now take advantage of OpenGL ES 3.0 and EGL extensions as standard features of Android, with access from either framework or native APIs. Bluetooth Smart — Now your apps can communicate with the many types of low-power Bluetooth Smart devices and sensors available today, to provide new features for fitness, medical, location, proximity, and more. Restricted profiles — Tablet owners can create restricted profiles to limit access to apps, for family, friends, kiosks, and more. Your app can offer various types of restrictions to let tablet owners control its capabilities in each profile. New media capabilities — A modular DRM framework enables media application developers to more easily integrate DRM into their own streaming protocols such as MPEG DASH. Apps can also access a built-in VP8 encoder from framework or native APIs for high-quality video capture. Notification access — Your apps can now access and interact with the stream of status bar notifications as they are posted. You can display them in any way you want, including routing them to nearby Bluetooth devices, and you can update and dismiss notifications as needed. Improved profiling tools — New tags in the Systrace tool and on-screen GPU profiling give you new ways to build great performance into your app. Check out the Android 4.3 platform highlights for a complete overview of what’s new for developers. To read more about the new APIs and how to use them, take a look at the API Overview or watch the new . Along with the new Android 4.3 platform we’re releasing an update to the Android NDK (r9). The new NDK gives you native access to the OpenGL ES 3.0 APIs and other stable APIs in Android 4.3, so if you use high-performance graphics in your games or apps, make sure to check it out. Last, we’ve updated the Android Support Library (r18) with several key APIs to help you build great apps with broad compatibility. Most important, we've added an Action Bar API to let you build this essential Android design pattern into your app with compatibility back to Android 2.1. For apps targeting RTL languages, there's a new BidiFormatter utility you can use to manage RTL strings with compatibility back to Android 2.1. Also, watch for a new RenderScript feature coming soon that will let you take advantage of hardware-accelerated computation with compatibility back to Android 2.2. You can get started developing and testing on Android 4.3 right away, in Android Studio or in ADT/Ant. You can download the Android 4.3 Platform (API level 18), as well as the SDK Tools, Platform Tools, and Support Library from the Android SDK Manager. Sursa: Android 4.3 and Updated Developer Tools | Android Developers Blog

ARP-Scan ARP Generation Tool 1.9 Authored by Roy Hills | Site nta-monitor.com arp-scan sends ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) queries to the specified targets, and displays any responses that are received. It allows any part of the outgoing ARP packets to be changed, allowing the behavior of targets to non-standard ARP packets to be examined. The IP address and hardware address of received packets are displayed, together with the vendor details. These details are obtained from the IEEE OUI and IAB listings, plus a few manual entries. It includes arp-fingerprint, which allows a system to be fingerprinted based on how it responds to non-standard ARP packets. Changes: This release adds support for ARM 64-bit CPUs and Dragonfly BSD, adds a --rtt (-D) option to display the packet round-trip time, uses libpcap functions to obtain the interface IP address and send the packet (to increase portability), requires libpcap 0.9.3 or later, raises the default timeout from 100ms to 500ms to avoid missed responses from slow-responding hosts, modifies the get-iab and get-oui scripts to the support new IEEE website URL and new file format (also fixes the -u option in these scripts), updates MAC/Vendor mapping files from the IEEE website, and adds additional arp-fingerprint patterns. Download: http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/122538/arp-scan-1.9.tar.gz Sursa: ARP-Scan ARP Generation Tool 1.9 ? Packet Storm

JDWP Exploitation Authored by prdelka This is a whitepaper discussing arbitrary java code execution leveraging the Java Debugging Wire Protocol (JDWP). JDWP Arbitrary Java Code Execution Exploitation =============================================== Java Debugging Wire Protocol (JDWP) is the lowlevel protocol used for communication between a debugger and a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) as outlined in the Java Platform Debugger Architecture. It is often used to facilitate remote debugging of a JVM over TCP/IP and can be identified by the initial protocol handshake ascii string "JDWP-Handshake", sent first by the client and responded to by the server. "jdb" is a proof-of-concept JDWP capable debugger included in Oracle JDK and OpenJDK which can be used to interact with remote JDWP capable services. Typically this service runs on TCP port 8000 however it can be found to run on arbitrary TCP ports and is sometimes found enabled inadvertantly on servers running Java services. It is possible to use this utility to exploit remote JVM's and execute arbitrary Java code. An example shown here outlines how to leverage this weakness to execute arbitrary host OS commands in the context of the JVM. $ jdb -attach x.x.x.x:8000 Set uncaught java.lang.Throwable Set deferred uncaught java.lang.Throwable Initializing jdb ... > Information leaks can be leveraged to determine details about the remote OS platform and Java installation configuration through the "classpath" command. > classpath base directory: C:\Windows\system32 classpath: [ ** MASKED ** list of jar's loaded in remote JVM ] bootclasspath: [ ** MASKED ** list of JRE paths ] > jdb is capable of performing remote object creation and method invokation from within the CLI using the "print" "dump" and "eval" commands with the "new" keyword. To determine the classes and methods available use the "classes" and then "methods" on the corrosponding class. > classes ... java.lang.Runtime ... > methods java.lang.Runtime ... java.lang.Runtime exec(java.lang.String[]) ... It is often necessary to set the JDB context to be within a suspended thread or breakpoint before attempting to create a new remote object class. Using the "trace go methods" function can be used to identify a candidate for a breakpoint and then "stop in your.random.class.method()" to halt the execution of a running thread. When the execution is halted you can use "print new" to create your class and invoke methods such as in the following example. Breakpoint hit: "thread=threadname",your.random.class.method(), line=745 bci=0 threadname[1] print new java.lang.Runtime().exec("cmd.exe /c dir") new java.lang.Runtime().exec("cmd.exe /c dir") = "java.lang.ProcessImpl@918502" threadname[1] cont > Exploitation success will be determined from the output of the JDB process as functions returning "null" or errors about "unsuspended thread state" would indicate that exploitation was unsuccessful, however in the example above we can see that the java created a new object "java.lang.ProcessImpl@918502" indicating the "cmd.exe /c dir" was executed with success. On Linux this may need adjusting to "java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec()" however see the method / class enumeration when attempting to exploit this flaw. Your java will be executed in the context of the running JVM application, this has been identified on services running as both "root" (*nix) and "SYSTEM" (win32) in the wild. -- prdelka Sursa: JDWP Exploitation ? Packet Storm

[Tutorial] Dns Spoofing With S.E.T. And Ettercap [Kali Linux] Description: DNS Spoofing with S.E.T. (Social Engineering Toolkit) & Ettercap This tutorial work in LAN. Follow DarkSoloNetwork on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Darkso... and Twitter: https://twitter.com/DarkSoloNetwork IMPORTANT : DarkSoloNetwork assumes no responsibility for misuse of the information contained in the video. Sursa: [Tutorial] Dns Spoofing With S.E.T. And Ettercap [Kali Linux]

Am colorat.

Da, asta alesesem si eu initial, dar e o varianta mult mai ok

Normal, nu e EXPLOIT, e SHELLCODE. Vedeti tutorialele facute de neox. Pe scurt: 1. Ai un program/server (Apache HTTPD de exemplu) pe Linux 2. Acel program are un buffer static: char buffer[100] 3. Cand intri pe o pagina web: GET /pagina.php HTTP/1.1, acest rand e pus in acel buffer 4. Daca pui peste 100 de caractere: GET /paginaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.php se depaseste dimensiuea acelui buffer 5. Ceea ce depaseste acest buffer, in conditii optime, poate suprascrie EIP-ul (codul in executie) 6. Prin exploatarea acestei probleme tu ajungi la posibilitatea de a rula cod, ca cel de mai sus, shellcode, in locul codului programului respectiv 7. Codul (de mai sus), se executa, si iti ofera un shell, ca tu, om rau, sa executi comenzi rele E doar ideea, foarte pe scurt. NU iti exploateaza o problema din kernel ca sa "fii root". Doar deschide un shell. Vedeti asta: setuid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Vorbeam cu niste colegi, cateva lucruri interesante de programarea in C/C++. 1. Ai o structura, nu stii exact ce campuri are (ce tipuri). Cum afli dimensiunea unei astfel de structuri fara a folosi operatorul sizeof? 2. Ai un sir de n numere. Cum gasesti si minimul, si maximul, efectuand maxim 3n / 2 comparatii? 3. Ai n siruri de numere (vectori), fiecare avand m numere, ordonate crescator. Cum creezi un singur sir, ordonat, cu toate acele numere, in mod optim. Complexitatea: O(n * m * log n) 4. Cum fortezi ca o clasa sa nu poata fi mostenita (acel "final" din Java)? Fara C++0x sau extensii Microsoft. Intrebarea e dificila, va dau un indiciu: friend. 5. Ai: int x = 3; *(char *)&x = 5; Cat va fi x? 6. Cum ati implementa o clasa care sa faca acelasi lucru ca shared_ptr? Luati in considerare operatii ca Clasa x; Clasa y = x; z = x; Daca imi mai aduc aminte, revin cu mai multe. Puteti raspunde aici, sa discutam parerile, sau daca va e lene, e ok si doar sa va ganditi la ele.

[root@rstforums ~]# as test.asm -o object.o [root@rstforums ~]# ld object.o -o shell [root@rstforums ~]# ./shell sh-3.2# Nu e un privilege escalation exploit, e doar un shellcode care deschide un shell. 1. setuid: http://linux.die.net/man/2/setuid 2. execve: /bin/sh

Nu conteaza. Oricum, nu 10 RON pe care i-ati da voi.

Suntem 14 persoane in staff, majoritatea suntem salariati, ne descurcam noi.

Sponsorizati niste concursuri cu banii pe care vreti sa ii donati.

Exploit (& Fix) Android "Master Key" Earlier this year, Bluebox Security announced that they had found a bug in Android that could be used to modify the contents of any application package (including ones distributed as part of the system software) without affecting the attached cryptographic signatures; details to be disclosed at Black Hat USA 2013. However, enough detail was disclosed in the abstract of the talk that others were able to find this bug. Later, a patch was applied to the popular open-source Android ROM CyanogenMod, making the issue both public and obvious: there are now proof-of-concepts for how this bug might be used in concrete form. In this article, I describe a different approach to the exploitation of bug #8219321 that does not fall prey to the limitations of previous descriptions (specifically, the packages being attacked do not need to have an existing "classes.dex" file inside, which is not actually common on production devices). This technique is simple enough that it can be performed by hand; this article walks the user through the process, allowing a full understanding of how the exploit is performed. However, an automated tool called Impactor is also introduced that is capable of performing this process on virtually any Android device. Finally, details of how the underlying bug behind this exploit can be patched using the Cydia Substrate code modification framework are provided, along with a concrete implementation that can be installed on any device supported by Substrate. In the process, an overview of existing work in this area is provided. Many people reading this article will be doing so only to learn about how to use Cydia Impactor to exploit their device. The download links are: Mac OS X and Windows. This article includes instructions (using local.prop) under "Obtaining Root" that work up through approximately Android 4.1, including Glass and Google TV. Background Information A few months ago, the schedule for the yearly Black Hat USA conference was posted. With a catchy title and a powerful abstract, one talk in particular caught the eye of many people browsing the conference: Android: One Root to Own Them All. The abstract is as follows, discussing an undisclosed vulnerability. This presentation is a case study showcasing the technical details of Android security bug 8219321, disclosed to Google in February 2013. The vulnerability involves discrepancies in how Android applications are cryptographically verified & installed, allowing for APK code modification without breaking the cryptographic signature; that in turn is a simple step away from system access & control. A lot of discussion occurred regarding this bug, but few details were available past that abstract and a couple cryptic posts to Twitter by Bluebox Security, the company whose founders were giving the talk. It was over a month later that further information was published by Jeff Forristal, the discoverer of the bug. In their blog post, Uncovering Android Master Key that Makes 99% of Devices Vulnerable, a rather bleak picture was painted of the threat posed by this discovery, and in the weeks that followed, the story generated a lot of press, being covered by everything from TechCrunch to the LA Times. Play Store Safety On Android, all applications are signed by their developers using private cryptographic keys; it is by comparing the certificates used to verify these signatures that Android's package manager determines whether applications are allowed to share information, or what permissions they are able to obtain. Even the system software itself is signed by the manufacturer of the device; applications signed by that same key are thereby able to do anything that the system software can. Normally, this is only possible if you are the manufacturer; however, using bug #8219321, anyone could steal those signatures for their own. A key concern this raises is that applications in the wild might be signed with the system keys of your device; while you think you are just installing a harmless game, that application would look to the package manager as if it came from the manufacturer, giving it elevated and dangerous system permissions. Thankfully, in the CIO article Vulnerability allows attackers to modify Android apps without breaking their signatures, we learn from Forristal that when Google was made aware of this bug by Bluebox Security, they did not find packages exploiting this bug in their Android application market, the Play Store. Using Google Play to distribute apps that have been modified to exploit this flaw is not possible because Google updated the app store's application entry process in order to block apps that contain this problem, Forristal said. The information received by Bluebox from Google also suggests that no existing apps from the app store have this problem, he said. Another potential exploit vector are packages that have the permission to install other packages. Interestingly, and as noted in H-Online's article Android's code signing can be bypassed, "Google blocked non-Play-Store updating in April this year". That policy being a workaround for this security issue is a compelling thought. Responsible Disclosure Of course, as many of my readers are keenly aware, there are non-malicious reasons to be interested in such vulnerabilities. Many users have devices that are locked down by manufacturers or carriers for any number of dubious reasons. To free these devices, exploits are often used to empower the user. The result is that many times, bugs like this are hoarded and used by groups such as evad3rs without any warning or notice to those who might be affected, for the purpose of accessing locked up devices. This is, of course, a dangerous game to play; but, it is one that some of us feel we must attempt. With bug #8219321, Bluebox Security made a point that they felt "responsible disclosure" was important, notifying Google about the bug well before Black Hat, when the bug was to be disclosed to the public. (Jeff Forristal is reportedly even "responsible for the first publicized responsible security disclosure policy".) However, there was an abstract posted that explained that there was a signature vulnerability; a few of us in the security community were able to find this bug based on this information alone: knowing where to look and knowing there's something there to find makes the process of discovery much much easier. Finding the Bug In my case, I had previously looked at the handling of zip files while commenting on a bug someone had found in 2012, Ice Cream Sandwich: why native code support sucks. In my comment, I described the hashtable used to read an archive; so, when I looked at the code used to verify the archive, the bug was quite clear. Once I had found the bug, I was posed with a moral quandary: do I release a tool that helps people use and patch this vulnerability, or do I wait until it is disclosed to the public at Black Hat? After some consultation with other security researchers on IRC, I purchased a ticket to Black Hat, tentatively deciding to wait. In the end, however, Bluebox Security made a point about drumming up more press about the issue, which led to more speculation and more eyeballs. While frankly, we should assume that the truly scary adversaries had the bug within hours of the Black Hat schedule being posted, now it was nigh-unto public knowledge. To demonstrate just how easily this could be found, someone commenting on Hacker News managed to figure it out using only idle speculation based on reading a description of the jar signing algorithm; in ctz's comment, he describes two possibilities, the first one being the same bug found by Bluebox Security. The zip format doesn't structurally guarantee uniqueness of names in file entries. If the APK signature verification chooses the first matching file entry for a given name, and unpacking chooses the last then you're screwed in the way described. Soon thereafter, an issue was filed against CyanogenMod (an open-source alternative distribution of Android), Patch for Android bug security bug 8219321?; and coming right on its heels was a patch for the bug posted to their revision control system, Remove support for duplicate file entries. The bug is now public. APK Verification To some extent, I don't really need to describe the bug anymore, as this has been done by others; one highly-detailed blog even posted an entire series of articles (seven so far) documenting the bug called The Great Android Security Hole Of ’08 ?. However, as the way I exploit the issue is different, I will need to re-document the bug. The core issue is that Android package (APK) files are parsed and verified by a different implementation of "unzip a file" than the code that eventually loads content from the package: the files are verified in Java, using Harmony's ZipFile implementation from libcore, while the data is loaded from a C re-implementation. The way that these two implementations handle multiple files with the same name occurring in the zip file differs. The way the Java implementation reads the file is that it goes through the "central directory" and adds each entry to a LinkedHashMap. The key the entry is stored using is the name of the file. .... Articol complet: http://www.saurik.com/id/17

E in regula, l-am citit inainte de a posta, de aceea l-am postat. Sunt 2 syscall-uri: - setuid - execve Corespund cu cele de aici: >Ryan A. Chapman | Linux System Call Table for x86_64 Iar acea "linie" este "hs//nib/" => /bin/sh

Nu stiu daca vom mai deschide donatiile.

coolbyte : Asteapta cateva zile. Nu platesc doar eu, cei din staff platim, dar costa ceva. Revenim cu mai multe informatii zilele urmatoare.

https://rstforums.com/proiecte/DK_v3.3.zip E sursa, se poate compila. Cand ajung acasa.

Pare sa fie o aceeasi problema ca si CRLF-urile de la formularele de email (SMTP si HTTP folosesc acelasi delimitator de headere, \r\n): CRLF Injection (CRLF Injection attacks and HTTP Response Splitting - Acunetix) doar cu un nume mai trendy. Sau ii putem zice HTTP Response Splitting, mai generic (HTTP response splitting - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). In orice caz, este XSS (daca nu sunt filtrate datele). In loc sa generezi ca raspuns un alt set de headere HTTP, mai bine generezi tu un cod HTML/JS care face cine stie ce prostii. Din acest motiv, sigur, e vulnerabilitate. Dar uite niste idei: - poti pune header de descarcare de fisier: "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=MyFileName.ext" si poti forta descarcarea unui fisier, care provine dintr-o sursa "sigura" - poti pune Location catre ce vrei tu, deci ai URL redirection sau cum va place sa ii ziceti, cu "Location" - poti seta diverse cookie-uri cu "Set-Cookie" Legat strict de ce zici tu, de acel "Cross User Defacement" adica de posibilitatea de a raspunde cu 2 (sau mai multe) raspunsuril HTTP, nu e o problema de web security: 1. Ai nevoie de acea "shared connection" care in practica nu cred ca e foarte comun 2. Este o problema, DAR este o problema in porcaria de server de proxy cache, NU in aplicatia web Cross-user defacement si web cache poisoning sunt probleme in servere de proxy cache. Da, atat la nivel teoretic cat si la nivel practic, nu este in regula sa existe posibilitatea de a modifica headerele de raspuns. E cam urat de exploatat dar tot o problema ramane, insa nu una foarte periculoasa. Voi vota ca "da", ca e o problema de securitate, dar una "Low", nu foarte periculoasa. Cum altfel ai putea exploata asa ceva? Legat de raspunsul lor, cred ca nu au inteles exact despre ce e vorba. Mie numele (Cross User Defacement) mi se pare o porcarie gay.

3 warn-uri care au rezultat in 3 ban-uri. Vorbiti mult si prost.

[h=2]Linux Mint 15 “Olivia” KDE released![/h]Written by Clem on Sunday, July 21st, 2013 The team is proud to announce the release of Linux Mint 15 “Olivia” KDE. Linux Mint 15 Olivia KDE is a vibrant, innovative, advanced, modern looking and full-featured desktop environment. This edition features all the improvements from the latest Linux Mint release on top of KDE 4.10. New features at a glance: KDE 4.10 MDM Software Sources Driver Manager Software Manager System Improvements Artwork Improvements Upstream Components For a complete overview and to see screenshots of the new features, visit: “What’s new in Linux Mint 15 KDE“. Important info: PAE required for 32-bit ISOs EFI support Make sure to read the “Release Notes” to be aware of important info or known issues related to this release. System requirements: x86 processor (Linux Mint 64-bit requires a 64-bit processor. Linux Mint 32-bit works on both 32-bit and 64-bit processors). 1GB RAM 8 GB of disk space Graphics card capable of 1024×768 resolution DVD drive or USB port Upgrade instructions: To upgrade from a previous version of Linux Mint follow these instructions. To upgrade from the RC release, simply apply any level 1 and 2 updates (if any) available in the Update Manager. Download: Md5 sum: 32-bit: 72fe1cfd477b074a1849dda34430b4b7 64-bit: 38dd24371ceafe34915eb5cb350217c7 Torrents: 32-bit 64-bit HTTP Mirrors for the 32-bit DVD ISO: Argentina Cooperativa Telefonica de Villa Gobernador Galvez Ltda. Argentina Xfree Australia AARNet Australia Internode Australia uberglobal Australia Western Australian Internet Association Australia Yes Optus Mirror Austria Goodie Domain Service Bangladesh dhakaCom Limited Bangladesh IS Pros Limited Belarus ByFly Belgium Cu.be Solutions Brazil Universidade Federal do Parana Bulgaria Telepoint Canada University of Waterloo Computer Science Club Czech Republic Ignum, s.r.o. Denmark Development Group Denmark Denmark klid.dk France GoPotato France Gwendal Le Bihan France IRCAM France Nouknouk France Ordimatic France RTS Informatique Germany Artfiles Germany Copahost Germany FH Aachen Germany GWDG Germany killerhorse.eu Germany NetCologne GmbH Greece Hellenic Telecommunications Organization Greece National Technical University of Athens Greece University of Crete Greenland Tele Greenland Iceland Siminn hf India Honesty Net Solutions Ireland HEAnet Israel Israel Internet Association Italy GARR Lithuania Atviras kodas Lietuvai Luxembourg root S.A. Malaysia Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Open Source Mirror Netherlands NLUUG Netherlands Triple IT New Zealand University of Canterbury New Zealand Xnet Norway Communica Poland ICM – University of Warsaw Portugal CeSIUM – Universidade do Minho Portugal Universidade do Porto Romania ServerHost Russia Yandex Team Serbia University of Kragujevac Singapore 0x.sg Singapore NUS – School of Computing – SigLabs Slovakia Rainside South Africa University of Free State South Korea KAIST South Korea NeowizGames corp Sri Lanka Lanka Education and Research Network Sweden DF – Computer Society at Lund University Sweden Portlane Switzerland SWITCH Taiwan NCHC Taiwan Southern Taiwan University of Science and Technology Taiwan TamKang University Thailand adminbannok.com Turkey Linux Kullanicilari Dernegi Ukraine OSDN.Org.UA United Kingdom Bytemark Hosting United Kingdom University of Kent UK Mirror Service USA James Madison University USA Linux Freedom USA MetroCast Cablevision USA mirrorcatalogs.com USA Nexcess USA PSGNet USA Secution, LLC. USA University of Maryland, College Park Vietnam FPT Telecom HTTP Mirrors for the 64-bit DVD ISO: Argentina Cooperativa Telefonica de Villa Gobernador Galvez Ltda. Argentina Xfree Australia AARNet Australia Internode Australia uberglobal Australia Western Australian Internet Association Australia Yes Optus Mirror Austria Goodie Domain Service Bangladesh dhakaCom Limited Bangladesh IS Pros Limited Belarus ByFly Belgium Cu.be Solutions Brazil Universidade Federal do Parana Bulgaria Telepoint Canada University of Waterloo Computer Science Club Czech Republic Ignum, s.r.o. Denmark Development Group Denmark Denmark klid.dk France GoPotato France Gwendal Le Bihan France IRCAM France Nouknouk France Ordimatic France RTS Informatique Germany Artfiles Germany Copahost Germany FH Aachen Germany GWDG Germany killerhorse.eu Germany NetCologne GmbH Greece Hellenic Telecommunications Organization Greece National Technical University of Athens Greece University of Crete Greenland Tele Greenland Iceland Siminn hf India Honesty Net Solutions Ireland HEAnet Israel Israel Internet Association Italy GARR Lithuania Atviras kodas Lietuvai Luxembourg root S.A. Malaysia Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Open Source Mirror Netherlands NLUUG Netherlands Triple IT New Zealand University of Canterbury New Zealand Xnet Norway Communica Poland ICM – University of Warsaw Portugal CeSIUM – Universidade do Minho Portugal Universidade do Porto Romania ServerHost Russia Yandex Team Serbia University of Kragujevac Singapore 0x.sg Singapore NUS – School of Computing – SigLabs Slovakia Rainside South Africa University of Free State South Korea KAIST South Korea NeowizGames corp Sri Lanka Lanka Education and Research Network Sweden DF – Computer Society at Lund University Sweden Portlane Switzerland SWITCH Taiwan NCHC Taiwan Southern Taiwan University of Science and Technology Taiwan TamKang University Thailand adminbannok.com Turkey Linux Kullanicilari Dernegi Ukraine OSDN.Org.UA United Kingdom Bytemark Hosting United Kingdom University of Kent UK Mirror Service USA James Madison University USA Linux Freedom USA MetroCast Cablevision USA mirrorcatalogs.com USA Nexcess USA PSGNet USA Secution, LLC. USA University of Maryland, College Park Vietnam FPT Telecom Enjoy! We look forward to receiving your feedback. Thank you for using Linux Mint and have a lot of fun with this new release! Sursa: The Linux Mint Blog

Relax! Java is OK – and Easy to Secure July 17, 2013 / Simon Crosby It’s become cool, particularly among those that sport Macs, to scoff at Java and pretend that it’s an anachronism that the world doesn’t need. Perhaps it’s a re-enactment by the Apple faithful of Steve Jobs’s disdain for Flash, spurred by Apple’s removal of Java as a default plugin for Safari after Apple itself was compromised by a Java-based attack. After all, who can resist getting in a dig at Larry Ellison’s expense? But the fever pitch around Java is bigger than that. It has grown to the point that the US DHS warned users to disable client-side Java. Talk about shouting into the wind: Java is here to stay – approximately forever. And it can easily be made completely secure. If you need to ask why Java is needed, then you do not work in a real enterprise setting. Last week I visited a leading manufacturer of heavy machinery, whose innovative designs are crucial to its success. It is being heavily targeted as a result. Like many organizations for which IT is not the focus of the business, the IT operations team is stretched thin. They do their best to keep up. The company is being actively attacked using Java as a vector because they are stuck with an old version: They use Oracle R11 as their ERP system, which apparently (I haven’t been able to verify this) requires the client to use Java 1.5.0_17. Upgrading the ERP system would be disruptive, expensive and complex, and banning client side Java is not an option – everyone, from Finance to Engineering, has to use the system. No matter how you look at it, the problem isn’t Java. Nor is it the “You” in “User”. Unlike the countless failed attempts to train users not to click on “seemingly unsafe” links or files, I’m going to assert that user training will never succeed since the attacker is always a step ahead of the trainer. (Unpatched) Java, and un-trainable users are with us to stay. What is the problem? Complex application and OS software environments are vulnerable because they offer a huge attack surface. Java has been successfully targeted of late because it is a classic example of a complex software environment, and because of its ubiquity and platform independence. Java meets the economic needs of malware writers: One can target a massive number of deployed systems with one piece of malware. The response of the security and OS vendors is at best, sad. The security industry has nothing more useful to offer than advice on how to un-install, or update the Java plugin. Apple removed Java from Safari last October, and Microsoft FixIt now blocks Java from IE. For its part, Oracle has repeatedly promised to fix Java once and for all, and a recent blog is telling (the highlights are mine): In JDK 7.2, Oracle added enhanced security warnings before executing applets with an old Java runtime… In JDK 7.10, Oracle introduced a security slider configuration option, …. Further, with the release of JDK 7.21, Oracle introduced the following: … With this update … users can prevent the execution of any applets if they are not signed. The default plug-in security settings were changed to further discourage the execution of unsigned or self-signed applets. This change is likely to impact most Java users, and Oracle urges organizations …to sign [their] Applets While Java provides the ability to check the validity of signed certificates … the feature is not enabled by default because of a potential negative performance impact. …In the interim, we have improved our static blacklisting to a dynamic blacklisting mechanism … The Oracle “solution” appears to be “hope the user does the right thing”, “make Java unusable”, and “when all else fails, try blacklisting”. Depending on the user is a bad idea. Making Java unusable is a terrible response, both for Oracle and for its customers. Moreover banning or disabling Java doesn’t address the root of the problem. Blacklisting is an article of faith for the AV vendors, but I think we all recognize that its time has come and gone. A Future Proof Architecture There is a way out of this mess that enables Today’s vulnerable applications & plugins (Flash, Java, Silverlight, Chrome, Firefox, IE, Word, Powerpoint, Excel, PDF, media etc) to run as intended by the vendor New mobile-centric, cloud based applications for consumers or enterprises, to deliver a user experience that fully empowers the user, and With absolute security. The way out is Bromium vSentry. We use use hardware isolation on a per-task basis - to protect the system from every attack. When the next zero day comes along, the attacker will be unable to steal any information or gain access to the corporate network. Moreover, the attacker and all persisted state will be simply discarded as soon as the user closes the task window. No remediation. No change to the applications or to the end user experience. And if the endpoint is attacked, Bromium LAVA will provide live attack visualization, with complete forensic analysis – delivered instantly to the SOC. Check out our new Safely Use Java Apps page to learn more. Sursa: Relax! Java is OK – and Easy to Secure | A Collection of Bromides on Infrastructure

Uitati-va la voi inainte de a-i critica pe ceilalti, ca nu fac nimic. Ganditi-va asa: "Eu ce cacat am facut in ultimii 2-3 ani de cand sunt pe acest forum?" Daca raspunsul e: "Uite, am facut 2 proiecte, am scris cateva sute de linii de cod, am citit 3 tutoriale, am ajutat cativa oameni sa isi rezolve problemele", sunteti pe drumul cel bun. Daca raspunsul e: "Pai am dat la laba pana mi-am bagat mana in ghips, am injurat 200 de oameni ca nu sunt de acord cu mine si consider ca sunt al dracu de destept, am invatat multe de la Nora pentru mama", ar trebui sa va puneti cateva intrebari.

Frumos

C++ SAU Java? Alege. Pentru C++, carti "fizice", dar pe care le gasesti si online: - C++ manual complet, Herbert Schildt - C++ pentru incepatori, vol. I si II, Liviu Negrescu - Totul despre C si C++, Kris Jamsa Pentru Java: - Java de la 0 la expert Vezi la biblioteci.

Edward Snowden Is No Traitor Posted By Philip Giraldi On July 16, 2013 @ 1:18 am There are a number of narratives being floated by the usual suspects to attempt to demonstrate that Edward Snowden is a traitor who has betrayed secrets vital to the security of the United States. All the arguments being made are essentially without merit. Snowden has undeniably violated his agreement to protect classified information, which is a crime. But in reality, he has revealed only one actual secret that matters, which is the United States government’s serial violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution through its collection of personal information on millions of innocent American citizens without any probable cause or search warrant. That makes Snowden a whistleblower, as he is exposing illegal activity on the part of the federal government. The damage he has inflicted is not against U.S. national security but rather on the politicians and senior bureaucrats who ordered, managed, condoned, and concealed the illegal activity. First and foremost among the accusations is the treason claim being advanced [1] by such legal experts as former Vice President Dick Cheney, Speaker of the House John Boehner, and [2] Senator Dianne Feinstein. The critics are saying that Snowden has committed treason because he has revealed U.S. intelligence capabilities to groups like al-Qaeda, with which the United States is at war. Treason is, in fact, the only crime that is specifically named and described in the Constitution, in Article III: “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” Whether Washington is actually at war with al-Qaeda is, of course, debatable since there has been no declaration of war by Congress as required by Article I of the Constitution. Congress has, however, passed legislation, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force, empowering the President to employ all necessary force against al-Qaeda and “associated” groups; this is what Cheney and the others are relying on to establish a state of war. But even accepting the somewhat fast and loose standard for being at war, it is difficult to discern where Snowden has been supporting the al-Qaeda and “associated groups” enemy. Snowden has had no contact with al-Qaeda and he has not provided them with any classified information. Nor has he ever spoken up on their behalf, given them advice, or supported in any way their activities directed against the United States. The fallback argument that Snowden has alerted terrorists to the fact that Washington is able to read their emails and listen in on their phone conversations—enabling them to change their methods [3] of communication—is hardly worth considering, as groups like al-Qaeda have long since figured that out. Osama bin Laden, a graduate in engineering, repeatedly warned his followers not to use phones or the Internet, and he himself communicated only using live couriers. His awareness of U.S. technical capabilities was such that he would wear a cowboy hat [4] when out in the courtyard of his villa to make it impossible for him to be identified by hovering drones and surveillance satellites. Attempts to stretch the treason argument still further by claiming that Snowden has provided classified information to Russia and China are equally wrong-headed, as the U.S. has full and normally friendly diplomatic relations with both Moscow and Beijing. Both are major trading partners. Washington is not at war with either nation and never has been apart from a brief and limited intervention in the Russian Civil War in 1918. Nor is there any evidence that Snowden passed any material directly to either country’s government or that he has any connection to their intelligence services. Then there is the broader “national security” argument. It goes something like this: Washington will no longer be able to spy on enemies and competitors in the world because Snowden has revealed [5] the sources and methods used by the NSA to do so. Everyone will change their methods of communication, and the United States will be both blind and clueless. Well, one might argue that the White House has been clueless for at least 12 years, but the fact is that the technology and techniques employed by NSA are not exactly secret. Any reasonably well educated telecommunications engineer can tell you exactly what is being done, which means the Russians, Chinese, British, Germans, Israelis, and just about everyone else who has an interest is fully aware of what the capabilities of the United States are in a technical sense. This is why they change their diplomatic and military communications codes on a regular basis and why their civilian telecommunications systems have software that detects hacking by organizations like NSA. Foreign nations also know that what distinguishes the NSA telecommunications interception program is the enormous scale of the dedicated resources in terms of computers and personnel, which permit real time accessing of billions of pieces of information. NSA also benefits from the ability to tie into communications hubs located in the continental United States or that are indirectly accessible, permitting the U.S. government to acquire streams of data directly. The intelligence community is also able to obtain both private data and backdoor access to information through internet, social networking, and computer software companies, the largest of which are American. Anyone interested in more detail on how the NSA operates and what it is capable of should read Jim Bamford’s excellent books [6] on the subject. The NSA’s capabilities, though highly classified, have long been known to many in the intelligence community. In 2007, I described [7] the Bush administration’s drive to broaden the NSA’s activities, noting that The president is clearly seeking open-ended authority to intercept communications without any due process, and he apparently intends to do so in the United States… House Republican leader John Boehner (OH), citing 9/11, has described the White House proposal as a necessary step to ‘break down bureaucratic impediments to intelligence collection and analysis.’ It is not at all clear how unlimited access to currently protected personal information that is already accessible through an oversight procedure would do that. ‘Modernizing’ FISA would enable the government to operate without any restraint. Is that what Boehner actually means? It was clear to me that in 2007 Washington already possessed the technical capability to greatly increase its interception of communications networks, but I was wrong in my belief that the government had actually been somewhat restrained by legal and privacy concerns. Operating widely in a permissive extralegal environment had already started [8] six years before, shortly after 9/11, under the auspices of the Patriot Act and the Authorization for Use of Military Force. The White House’s colossal data mining operation has now been exposed by Edward Snowden, and the American people have discovered that they have been scrutinized by Washington far beyond any level that they would have imagined possible. Many foreign nations have also now realized that the scope of U.S. spying exceeds any reasonable standard of behavior, so much so that if there are any bombshells [9] remaining in the documents taken by Snowden they would most likely relate to the specific targets of overseas espionage. Here in the United States, it remains to be seen whether anyone actually cares enough to do something about the illegal activity while being bombarded with the false claims [10] that the out of control surveillance program “has kept us safe.” It is interesting to observe in passing that the revelations derived from Snowden’s whistleblowing strongly suggest that the hippies and other counter-culture types who, back in the 1960s, protested that the government could not be trusted actually had it right all along. Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest. Sursa: The American Conservative