Nytro

Copii fara viitor, au invatat sa foloseasca Google si au devenit hackeri, patetici.

Eu ii dadeam ban lui Tinkode aici, Tinkode imi dadea ban pe ISR. Ce vremuri

De la ieu pt baety: Florin Salam - Cap si pajura 2011 (Live Club One Million Timisoara) - YouTube

dsfMrdfUfxIcvE AdfNsdOdsfNtyYfgMzOxcUasSdf.

Sa nu va plangeti la mine ca a venit valu' de copii copaci peste voi...

L-am oprit pe Salam ca sa ascult porcaria aia? Muie!

In C un vector e un pointer, adresa de memorie contigua unde e memorat acel vector. Ex. char plm[13] = "Ana are mere"; plm == 0x12345678, adresa de unde incepe acel sir, adica la adresa 0x12345678 e caracterul "A", adica 65, adresa 0x12345679 corespunde lui "n" si tot asa. Tipul de date al vectorului, char, indica faptul ca fiecare element ocupa un octet pentru ca sizeof(char) este 1.

Integer overflow - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Fals. Nu se aloca nimic pentru acel s[256], e un pointer si se vor pune pe stiva 4 octeti (respectiv 8 pentru sisteme pe 64 de biti) indiferent daca e s[1] sau s[1337]. Ii este trimis un pointer la un sir de caractere deja alocat. Practic va copia sirul "dupa" sirul existent (in memorie). Revin cu detalii mai tarziu.

Ce hackeri avem noi? Acestia sunt hackeri? Persoane care ghicesc parole? Persoane care ruleaza o comanda "./scan cacat" si nu stiu ce e ala kernel? Acestia? Apoi, SUA poate "cumpara" persoane capabile, daca are nevoie.

char sir[17] = "SimpleCChallange"; - Asta e const char * void fct(char s[256], int i) { - Aici e char * Nu se poate apela functia, nu se face conversia implicit.

sizeof(char *) si sizeof(void *) depind de arhitectura procesorului, 32 de biti sau 64 de biti. sizeof(int) este cel mai des 4, dar standardul C specifica doar dimensiunea pentru char/signed char/unsigned char ca fiind 1, deci depinde de compilator.

Ar trebui sa mearga pana la (aproximativ) 2 miliarde, apoi devine negativ. Am vazut ca e ";" dupa for, deci se va afisa (aproximativ) -2 miliarde.

Ai noroc ca imi e lene sa ma loghez sa iti dau ban...

Bun, am scapat de unul, maturizati-va hackeri de carton ce sunteti. Si se muta la gunoi, asta e un gunoi, nu un "show off".

1) Site de 2 lei 2) Nu cred ca ai avut niciun motiv, probabil e gasit cu dork 3) Nu stii SQL Injection, ai luat un link si l-ai pus in program De ce vii cu pretentia sa vezi numai comentarii ca "Esti cel mai tare, sunt fanul tau"? E normal sa comentam astfel, cu asa ceva te poti lauda prietenilor care nu stiu sa instaleze un Windows, dar noi am trecut de aceasta etapa.

Da, il mai vazusem pe forumuri, nu e tocmai un "zmeu".

Te astepti sa te laude toti pentru ca ai dat un click in Havij?

Nu stiu daca ai observat, dar acolo se genereaza un request HTTP, care se presupune a fi trimis catre un server. Ok, Denial Of Service, adica sa primesti cateva mii de request-uri nu e nimic, tu avand 3 trilioane de procesoare, da, nu este problema, dar este ce mai mult de atat. "try to execute code at 0x1111111111111111" for ($i=1; $i<8; $i++) { $payload .= "\x11"; } Asta nu spune nimic?

Se stie din noiembrie 2011, s-a votat pe 26 ianuarie 2012, de unde stiai tu acum 7 ani de ACTA?

In Bucuresti pula, pe Facebook ziceau ca vin 40.000, sa imi suga pula cei care ziceau ca vin si si-au facut laba pe Facebook. "Pentru cei care protesteaza de pe Facebook: MUIE specatorilor!"

Deci care veniti? La 4:30 la Universitate, dati mesaj privat daca vreti sa ne strangem.

Cred ca o sa ne strangem cativa, ne intalnim la Universitate, pe la 16;00-17:00. Cine vine sigur, sa imi dea un mesaj privat. Oricum, e posibil ca eu sa fiu unul cu un steag mare cu Romania pe spate. Daca aveti materiale sau puteti face rost, orice, aduceti cu voi.

Cea mai smechera

[h=1]As Iran Cracks Down Online, Tor Tests Undetectable Encrypted Connections[/h] Andy Greenberg, Forbes Staff [h=6]2/10/2012 @ 11:48AM[/h]Keeping secrets on the web in a country as digitally repressive as Iran isn’t easy. But as Iran tightens the screws on its Web censorship, the hackers at the anti-censorship Tor project are working on something harder: Keeping secret the act of keeping secrets. Ahead of the anniversary of Iran’s revolution Saturday, the country’s government has locked down its already-censored Internet, blocking access to many services and in some cases cutting off all encrypted traffic on the Web of the kind used by secure email, social networking and banking sites. In response, the information-freedom-focused Tor Project is testing a new idea: Encrypted connections that don’t look encrypted. To skirt the so called “deep packet inspection” filters Iran’s government has deployed to block all Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL and TLS) encryption that protesters might use to communicate privately, Tor is trying a new kind of bridge to the Web, one the group is calling “obfsproxy,” or obfuscated proxy. Tor executive director Andrew Lewman says the idea is to “make your Ferrari look like a Toyota by putting an actual Toyota shell over the Ferrari,” where the Toyota is normal communications and the Ferrari underneath is the encrypted communications. “Basically, say you want to look like an XMPP chat instead of SSL,” he writes to me, referring to a protocol for instant messaging as the decoy for the encrypted SSL communications. “Obfsproxy should start up, you choose XMPP, and obfsproxy should emulate XMPP to the point where even a sophisticated [deep packet inspection] device cannot find anything suspicious.” Lewman warns that obfsproxy is in a “super alpha” stage of development, and in its current form might only last a short time before Iran finds a way to detect the obscured encrypted communications. The tool currently only obscures SSL and TLS as the SOCKS protocol used by proxy servers, but in the future, he hopes it will be able to impersonate any sort of traffic, including HTTP or instant messages. In addition to its crackdown on encryption, sources inside Iran are reporting that the country is blocking access to sites including Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo! using its traditional IP blocking technology. Tor typically circumvents that censorship technique by routing Internet traffic through a series of volunteers’ computers around the world, and in recent years using a collection of more secret encrypted “bridge” connections that relay users’ traffic to that network. Between 50,000 and 60,000 users in the country use Tor daily. But the country’s efforts to block all SSL and TLS traffic put that strategy at risk. Hence the group’s efforts to prevent the government’s censors from distinguishing its encrypted traffic from normal traffic with the new obfsproxy tool. Lewman says that despite a few bugs, the early users of obfsproxy report that it’s “working well in-country.” In the mean time, Tor is looking for technically-skilled users to run obfsproxy bridges to give Iranians a path to the uncensored web. “This kind of help is not for the technically faint of heart but it’s absolutely needed for people in Iran, right now,” wrote Tor developer Jacob Appelbaum in an email to the Tor Talk mail list. Read Appelbaum’s full message asking for obfsproxy volunteers here, and read a full technical desription of how obfsproxy works here. Sursa: As Iran Cracks Down Online, Tor Tests Undetectable Encrypted Connections - Forbes