prodil89

Of all the mods/hacks I’ve seen, this is both the most ingenious and somewhat scary. A pair of bored yet crafty American (not Dutch!) fellows took a retired Army Drone and re-deployed it with a new, lesser violent mission — to sniff for WiFi networks. Controlling the drone only needs human intervention for takeoff and landing. Once up in the air, pre-plotted routes using Google Earth keep the plane on it’s dedicated route. Inside the drone, the downward facing WiFi antenna located in the nose is good for ~1,000sq. ft. of coverage at 400 feet up. After said wireless signals are sniffed and an appropriate network found, the drone will then automatically circle the area and continue feeding network packets back to hacker HQ, from which the hacking pair can eventually break into the network. And to think, they could be on the other side of the world as the drone. Again, awesome in implementation, scary in regards to potential scenarios. Source... [url=http://www.hackinthebox.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=37503&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0]Hackers turn old Army drone into aerial WiFi sniffer :: Hack In The Box :: Keeping Knowledge Free[/url] Daca niste militari au putut sa faca asta.....va dati seama ce face guvernul???

Hello digital-cowboys, Today i'm releasing ~1year old (almost) remote exploit for the MS09-050 SMB2 negotiation vulnerability. Since users had almost a year to patch up their machines and some other remote exploits for this vulnerability are flying over the internet for a long time already i have decided to release my own. This exploit uses the trampoline technique that I described in my previous blog post [1] and it is also a fantastic example of how not^H^H^H to write exploits. Additionally, to make this one more miserable and yet still funky, I have attached a brand new 3D HACKTRO (yay!). As always, greetings for all of the hidden demosceners spending more time bouncing to cracktros than original games. Here comes the video capture of the pure-awesome hacktro (low-quality): [url=http://vimeo.com/14138182]SMB2 HACKTRO - LOW QUALITY on Vimeo[/url] And here is the list of mirrors where you can find exploit src + hacktro bin: [url]http://www.piotrbania.com/all/smb2_exploit_mirrors.txt[/url] Please note that some of the mirrors listed there may be dead soon because we are expecting big liquor* shipment straight from Russia (*beep*). So be sure you will get your copy before this transport arrives! Also make sure you click on the ascii g00gle ads to support our cause. ODZYSKAMY POLMOS! thank you and have a nice winter! _o/ Source.... [url=http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Aug/200]Full Disclosure: RELEASE: SMB2 REMOTE EXPLOIT (VISTA SP1/SP2) + HACKTRO[/url]

Mda eu cred ca trebuie sa imi parchez contul pentru ca nu am avut timp sa descarc. Plus ca am probleme cu upload

Ahahah mijto that should keep him busy. Dar putea sa o faca mult mai repede acum cateva zile... [url=http://www.blogherald.com/2010/08/15/twitter-broken-allows-longer-tweets/]Twitter Broken, Allows Posts Larger Than 140 Characters | The Blog Herald[/url]

@robertos ce e folositor mah pentru tn. tu faci posturi SPAM in prostie cu ms si multumesc fara sa ai habar despre ce se vb in thread...

Contents I Design and Organization 1 Introduction 1.1 Goals and Scope 1.2 Road Map 1.3 Overall Design Principles 1.4 Configuring the OSKit 1.5 Building the OSKit 1.6 Using the OSKit 2 Execution Environments 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Pure Model 2.3 Impure Model 2.4 Blocking Model 2.5 Interruptible Blocking Model II Interfaces 3 Introduction to OSKit Interfaces 3.1 Header File Conventions 3.2 Common Header Files 4 The Component Object Model 4.1 Objects and Interfaces 4.2 Reference and Memory Management Conventions 4.3 Error Handling 4.4 Binary Issues 4.5 Source Issues 4.6 COM Header Files 4.7 oskit_iunknown: base interface for all COM objects 4.8 oskit_stream: standard interface for byte stream objects 4.9 oskit_listener: callback interface for event notification 4.10 oskit_listener_mgr: Interface for managing multiple listeners 5 Interface Registration 5.1 oskit_services: registration database 5.2 Global Registry 6 Synchronization Interfaces 6.1 oskit_lock: Thread-safe lock interface 6.2 oskit_condvar: Condition variable interface 6.3 oskit_lock_mgr: Lock manager: Interface for creating locks and condition variables 7 Input/Output Interfaces 7.1 oskit_absio: Absolute I/O Interface 7.2 oskit_asyncio: Asynchronous I/O Interface 7.3 oskit_blkio: Block I/O Interface 7.4 oskit_bufio: Buffer-based I/O interface 7.5 oskit_netio: Network packet I/O interface 7.6 oskit_posixio: POSIX I/O interface 7.7 oskit_ttystream: Interface to Unix TTY-like streams 8 OSKit Device Driver (OS Environment) Framework 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Organization 8.3 Driver Sets 8.4 Execution Model 8.5 Performance 8.6 Device Driver Initialization 8.7 Device Classification 8.8 Buffer Management 8.9 Asynchronous I/O 8.10 Other Considerations 8.11 Common Device Driver Interface 8.12 Driver Memory Allocation 8.13 DMA 8.14 I/O Ports 8.15 Hardware Interrupts 8.16 Sleep/Wakeup 8.17 Driver-Kernel Interface: Timing 8.18 Misc 8.19 Device Registration 8.20 Block Storage Device Interfaces 8.21 Serial Device Interfaces 8.22 Driver-Kernel Interface: (X86 PC) ISA device registration 9 OSKit File System Framework 9.1 Introduction 9.2 oskit_principal: Principal Interface 9.3 oskit_filesystem: File System Interface 9.4 oskit_file: File Interface 9.5 oskit_dir: Directory Interface 9.6 oskit_openfile: Open File Interface 9.7 Dependencies on the Client Operating System 10 OSKit Networking Framework 10.1 Introduction 10.2 oskit_socket: Socket Interface 11 Flask Security Framework 11.1 flask_types.h: basic Flask types and constants 11.2 oskit_security: Security Server Interface 11.3 oskit_avc: AVC Interface 11.4 oskit_avc_ss: AVC Interface for the Security Server 12 Miscellaneous OSKit Interfaces 12.1 oskit_random: Interface for random number generators III Function Libraries 13 “Client OS” Library: liboskit_clientos.a 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Initialization 13.3 C Library Environment 13.4 Memory Interface 14 Minimal C Library: liboskit_c.a 14.1 Introduction 14.2 POSIX Interface 14.3 Unsupported Features 14.4 Header Files 14.5 Memory Allocation 14.6 Standard I/O Functions 14.7 Initialization 14.8 Termination Functions 14.9 Miscellaneous Functions 15 Kernel Support Library: liboskit_kern.a 15.1 Introduction 15.2 Machine-independent Facilities 15.3 (X86) Generic Low-level Definitions 15.4 (X86 PC) Generic Low-level Definitions 15.5 (X86) Processor Identification and Management 15.6 (X86) Base Environment 15.7 (X86) Base Environment: Segmentation Support 15.8 (X86) Base Environment: Trap Handling 15.9 (X86) Base Environment: Page Translation 15.10 (X86) Base Environment: Protected-mode entry and exit 15.11 (X86 PC) Base Environment: Physical Memory Management 15.12 (X86 PC) Base Environment: Interrupt Support 15.13 (X86 PC) Base Environment: Console Support 15.14 (X86 PC) MultiBoot Startup 15.15 (X86 PC) Raw BIOS Startup 15.16 (X86 PC) DOS Startup 15.17 Remote Kernel Debugging with GDB 15.18 Serial-line Remote Debugging with GDB 15.19 Annotations 15.20 Boot Module Filesystem 15.21 Signals 16 Symmetric Multiprocessing: liboskit_smp.a 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Supported Systems 16.3 API reference 17 Kernel Device Driver Support: liboskit_dev.a 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Device Registration 17.3 Naming 17.4 Memory Allocation 17.5 Buffer Management 17.6 Processor Bus Resource Management 18 Unix User-Mode Environment: liboskit_unix.a 18.1 Introduction 18.2 Converting your OSKit kernel to run on Unix 18.3 Building for Unix user-mode 18.4 Running OSKit kernels with Unix support 19 OSKit “Quick Start” Library: liboskit_startup.a 19.1 Introduction 19.2 General 19.3 Disk and Filesystem 19.4 Network 19.5 Misc IV Component Libraries 20 POSIX Interface Library: liboskit_posix.a 20.1 Introduction 20.2 Modified Functions 20.3 POSIX Message Queue and Semaphore 20.4 POSIX Signals 20.5 Client Operating System Dependencies 20.6 Extended API functions 21 FreeBSD C Library: liboskit_freebsd_c.a 21.1 Introduction 21.2 POSIX Interface 21.3 Malloc Support 21.4 Signal Support 21.5 Missing Functionality 21.6 errno.h 21.7 Client Operating System Dependencies 21.8 Library Initialization 22 FreeBSD Math Library: liboskit_freebsd_m.a 22.1 Introduction 22.2 Functions 23 Filesystem Namespace: liboskit_fsnamespace.a 23.1 Introduction 24 Runtime Linker/Loader: liboskit_rtld.a 24.1 Introduction 25 List-based Memory Manager: liboskit_lmm.a 25.1 Introduction 25.2 Memory regions 25.3 Example use 25.4 Restrictions and guarantees 25.5 Sanity checking 25.6 API reference 26 Address Map Manager: liboskit_amm.a 26.1 Introduction 26.2 Addresses and attributes 26.3 Address maps and entries 26.4 Simple interface 26.5 Generic interface 26.6 Generic interface example 26.7 External dependencies 26.8 API reference 27 Simple Virtual Memory: liboskit_svm.a 27.1 Introduction 27.2 API reference 28 (X86)NetBSD UVM: liboskit_netbsd_uvm.a 28.1 Introduction 28.2 Restrictions 28.3 Virtual Address Space Layout 28.4 Memory Interface 28.5 Threads 28.6 Page Faults 28.7 Virtual memory system calls 28.8 API reference 29 POSIX Threads: liboskit_threads.a 29.1 Introduction 29.2 Examples and Caveats 29.3 POSIX Threads Reference 29.4 Oskit API Extensions 29.5 Thread-safe Adaptors 29.6 InterThread Communication 29.7 CPU Inheritance Framework 30 (X86)Simple Process: liboskit_sproc.a 30.1 Introduction 30.2 Example 30.3 Requirements 30.4 System Calls 30.5 API reference 31 Memory Debugging Utilities: liboskit_memdebug.a 31.1 Introduction 31.2 Debugging versions of standard routines 31.3 Additional Debugging Utilities 32 Profiling Support: liboskit_gprof.a 32.1 Introduction 32.2 Caveats 32.3 API reference 32.4 Using gprof 32.5 Files 32.6 Changing parameters and other FAQs 33 Disk Partition Interpreter: liboskit_diskpart.a 33.1 Introduction 33.2 Supported Partitioning Schemes 33.3 Example Use 33.4 Restrictions 33.5 API reference 34 File System Reader: liboskit_fsread.a 34.1 Introduction 34.2 External dependencies 34.3 Limitations 34.4 API reference 35 Executable Program Interpreter: liboskit_exec.a 35.1 Header Files 35.2 Types 35.3 Function Reference 36 Linux File Systems: liboskit_linux_fs.a 37 NetBSD File Systems: liboskit_netbsd_fs.a 38 Memory File System: liboskit_memfs.a 39 FreeBSD Networking: liboskit_freebsd_net.a 39.1 Introduction 39.2 Header Files 39.3 Interfaces 40 BOOTP Support: liboskit_bootp.a 40.1 Introduction 40.2 External Dependencies 40.3 API reference 41 HPFQ: Hierarchical Network Link Sharing: liboskit_hpfq.a 41.1 Introduction 41.2 Configuration 41.3 Usage 41.4 API reference 41.5 External Requirements and Constructors 41.6 pfq_sched: Interface to PFQ Schedulers 41.7 pfq_leaf: Interface to PFQ Leaf Nodes 42 Packet Dispatcher: liboskit_pd.a 42.1 Introduction 42.2 Example Use 42.3 Restrictions 42.4 Sanity checking 42.5 API reference 43 Linux Driver Set: liboskit_linux_dev.a 43.1 Initialization and Registration 43.2 Obtaining object references 43.3 Introduction 43.4 Partially-compliant Drivers 43.5 Internals 43.6 Block device drivers 43.7 Network drivers 43.8 SCSI drivers 44 FreeBSD Driver Set: liboskit_freebsd_dev.a 44.1 Introduction 44.2 Supported Devices 44.3 Header Files 44.4 Interfaces 44.5 “Back door” Interfaces 45 Video Support: liboskit_video.a 45.1 Introduction 45.2 X11 S3 Video Library 45.3 Svgalib Video Library V Utilities 46 Network Booting 46.1 Introduction 46.2 Implementation Issues and Requirements 46.3 Using NetBoot VI The Legal Stuff 47 Copyrights and Licenses 47.1 Copyrights & Licenses 47.2 Contributors 47.3 Acknowledgements [url=http://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/oskit/html/oskit-www.html]D R A F T The OSKit: The Flux Operating System Toolkit Version 0.97 (SnapShot 20020317)[/url]

@Cipry...Ahahaha Da totul e posibil....dar o sa fie mult mai greu daca o sa te duci la un liceu care nu are nici o legatura cu....calculatoare(xD) E destul de greu sa inveti singur programare...

[url]http://files.cloudprivacy.net/ssl-mitm.pdf[/url]

Nu am citit tot dar...e doar vizual nu?? No TERMINAL=No FUN!!

Little, fluffy and talkative? Clouds can communicate, a new paper suggests but what are they talking about? A new study has found that clouds "communicate" with each other, much like chirping crickets or flashing fireflies on a summer night. The surprising findings, published online in the journal Nature, may have significant implications for our understanding of the Earth's climate. So the next time you find yourself laying on your back picking out shapes among the clouds, mull on this one: Are they talking among themselves about you? "Cloud fields organize in such a way that their components 'communicate' with one another and produce regular, periodic rainfall events," explained Graham Feingold, a research scientist with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) and the paper's lead author. In other words, Feingold found clear evidence of self-organization in the regular patterns of rainfall and repeating growth of those floating puffs of cotton. How does such synchronization come about? Falling rain cools the air as it descends. This creates downward air currents. These downdrafts hit the surface of the planet, flow outward, and collide with each other, forming updrafts. The air flowing up creates new clouds in previously open sky as older clouds dissipate. Then the new clouds rain, and the oscillating pattern repeats itself. "In a sense what's going on is that the clouds are communicating with each other by driving down to the ground. If you have a number of clouds doing exactly that, air is forced to go sideways from one cloud and meets the air from another," Feingold told FoxNews.com. Voila! cloud speech! Earlier theories about cloud structure explained that temperature change was at the heart of cloud generation, that warming and cooling shifts were the key forces. Precipitation as a driving factor is something of a radical shift. But talking clouds? That's even more radical. Feingold is nevertheless quite serious, citing a lengthy history of research into cloud communication. "If you go back far enough, the basic physics behind this phenomenon was recorded in the early 1900s by a French scientist," he explained. He was looking at the sun though a telescope and noticed convection patterns. Lord Rayleigh later put it into a theoretical framework, explaining the hexagonal patterns observed in the lab, Feingold told FoxNews.com. "1933 is the earliest report of patterns in the clouds," by a scientist known as Graham, he said. But Feingold thinks the idea of cloud communication might date back far further. Source.... [url]http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/08/13/clouds-communicate-scientists-say/[/url] Deci va jur de aici incolo o sa vedem stiri tot mai socante pe zi ce trece :0 LE:WoW sa reparat forumul???? Nu mai tre sa dau edit??Cool @Birkoff naaah sorry da am vrut sa postez pentru ca mi se pare socant cum dreq sa comunice norii ?

Am asa o vaga presimtire ca esti un TROLL.Sau incerci sa faci pe trollu LE: CLAR ce posturi face... Nu ai ce face nu ai o viata iesi dreq din casa nu ai alteceva e facut decat sa faci pe prostu pe forumuri. TU ESTE PROST

Ba conteaza foarte mult "interigenta" si mintea

Cat de retardat poti sa fii????

It seems plenty of people around the UK are still just finding out about Google Street View and the wonderful or ghastly things you can find if you look hard enough. The latest find, isn't a flying pair of pliers, but what appears to be a dead girl. Eek. Don't panic, or call the police however, as it has been since found out that it was, in fact, just a girl playing dead, rather than actually being dead. Turns out, 9-year-old Azura, who is now 10 and no doubt enjoying her new found fame, was messing around with a friend in Middle Road, St John’s, Worcester, when the Google Street View car was driving past. Months later when the pictures started appearing online, concerned families started phoning the police to alert them to the supposed crime. Luckily all that had really happened was that Azura had fallen over and was "playing dead" as a prank on her friend … and now it appears the Internet. Source.... [url=http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/34916/google-street-view-dead-girl]Google Street View finds "Dead girl", but is she? - Pocket-lint[/url]

Lol )) poate candva prin anul 2050. dar eu nu vad cum dreq ar folosi cineva IE in loc ed crhome sau ff

Computer gamers crack protein-folding puzzle WHO says computer games are a waste of time? Players of the online game Foldit have managed to devise ways of folding proteins that had eluded both experts and protein analysis software. Foldit presents players with proteins whose amino acids they can manipulate to alter the protein's shape. The goal is to find the lowest-energy configuration, which is the shape that the protein would naturally adopt (Nature, DOI: 10.1038/nature09304). The game, developed by Seth Cooper and colleagues at the University of Washington in Seattle, isn't just an intellectual challenge. It could also help in the design of proteins that have a therapeutic role. In April, the team reported that a player had found a way to fold a protein that could potentially help in neutralising an influenza virus. Source.... [url=http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20727725.100-computer-gamers-crack-proteinfolding-puzzle.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=online-news]Computer gamers crack protein-folding puzzle - tech - 10 August 2010 - New Scientist[/url]

Adobe ColdFusion's Directory Traversal Disaster The ColdFusion enterprise development platform has had security vulnerabilities before. This is not really surprising that a platform that caters to "super-simple development" ends up with security issues since you can rarely get easy and secure in the same product. In fact, I don't think I've ever seen an enterprise development suite that has figured out how to make software development simple while maintaining some level of security - I'm convinced it's simply not possible. The ColdFusion directory traversal vulnerability has been classified by Adobe as important rather than critical, and I agree with A.P. (Adrian P. of GnuCitizen) that this is a mistake. Here's why I think this is a big mistake ... on top of the excellent analysis Adrian has already done (check his excellent post here) I think it's relevent to do a little digging yourself to understand the full scope of the potential problem. First, let's do a little Google-fu to determine whether there are really ColdFusion administrators who would put their CFAdmin pages (the administrative page for a ColdFusion server) on the Internet. There is really [no legitimate reason to have a ColdFusion Admin interface on the public internet ... really, I can't think of one... yet there are many results! Check out the results for the various admin components: * CFIDE "adminapi" * CFIDE "Administrator" * CFIDE "ComponentUtils" * CFIDE "Wizards" Now, that's a lot of results (at least at the time of this blog post) of mostly wide-open ColdFusion administrative interfaces ...many of them have directory listing turned on - why I can't even begin to explain. What makes this worse is there is a rumor that this attack is actually also executable against other directories - I'm trying to substantiate that... This attack can lead to a full system compromise, so let's make sure we're clear. It's not just that you can poke around the system files of the machine you've attacked (which is highly likely a MS Windows server); it's also the ability to upload scripts that can compromise the system or even poke around the database natively if the security is really that bad. So ... should this vulnerability be rated important? My assessment is absolutely not. Look, any system that is built to be "easy to use" (remember Windows?) is one where the user typically expects the vendor (Adobe) to "do the hard stuff for me" right? This thinking most definitely extends into security, and while Adobe has done a good job encrypting database passwords by default, and other little security nuances like not providing a default administrator password ... it's not enough. If you have a ColdFusion server, patch it ...NOW. Otherwise the ColdFusion system you administer is likely to be not your own - and that's not just FUD talking. Good luck out there! Source...... [url=http://h30507.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-White-Rabbit-A/Adobe-ColdFusion-s-Directory-Traversal-Disaster/ba-p/81964]HP Blogs - Adobe ColdFusion's Directory Traversal Disaster - The HP Blog Hub[/url]

1337 vorbesti de insula serpiilor sa ce plm?

Hmm nu mai stiu parca sa mai discutat nu?? Eu sun de acord este o idee geniala...ar fii o idee geniala

VIPER VAST Live Distro beta 2.77 VAST is a VIPER Lab live distribution that contains VIPER developed tools such as UCsniff, videojak, videosnarf and more. Along with VIPER tools and other essential VoIP security tools, it also contains tools penetration testers utilize such as Metasploit, Nmap, and Hydra.This distribution is a work in progress. If you would like to see a tool or package included please feel free to suggest them and I will do what I can to make it happen. VAST also has built into synaptic package manager a third party repository link for the VIPER tools, so when we update a tool it's as easy as "apt-get".VAST beta 2.74 has been released with UCSniff 3.0 which includes GUI interface, VoIP video realtime monitoring, TFTP MitM modification of IP phone features, Gratuitous ARP disablement bypass support, and support for several compression codecs. The new VAST also has a new look as well. Videos...... [url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNhvbQrP72M]YouTube - VIPER VAST Live DVD http://vipervast.sourceforge.net[/url] [url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAPBSvZ6TmQ]YouTube - VIPER VAST 2[/url] Download...... [url=http://sourceforge.net/projects/vipervast/files/VIPER_VASTbetav2.77.iso/download]Download VIPER VAST from SourceForge.net[/url] More.... [url=http://vipervast.sourceforge.net/]VIPER VAST Live Distro[/url]

OPEME – ROP Exploit Made Easy – is a PoC tool for ROP exploit automation on Linux x86. It contains a set of simple Python scripts to generate and search for ROP gadgets from binaries and libraries (e.g libc). A sample payload class is also included to help generate multistage ROP payload with the technique described in the Black Hat USA 2010 talk: “Payload already inside: data re-use for ROP exploits“. Check the latest paper and slides and PoC code. More... [url=http://www.vnsecurity.net/2010/08/ropeme-rop-exploit-made-easy/]ROPEME – ROP Exploit Made Easy : VNSECURITY TEAM (Vietnam Internet Security Research Team)[/url]

Jurnalistul sportiv francez Nelson Monfort a facut o gluma proasta la adresa romanilor, pe postul de televiziune France 2, in cadrul Campionatelor Europene de Natatie din Budapesta, relateaza site-ul de stiri Le Post Referindu-se la faptul ca inotatoarea franceza de origine romana Roxana Maracineanu, care se afla in studio, este trezorierul fan clubului unei alte sportive din Franta, Monfort a comentat: "Trebuie sa fim atenti cu romanii pe acest plan". Nelson Monfort se pregatea sa o intervieveze, la Budapesta, in timpul Campionatelor Europene, pe inotatoarea franceza Aurore Mongel. Acesta i-a mentionat sportivei ca este foarte apreciata, iar Roxana Maracineanu, inotatoare franceza nascuta in Romania si consultant al televiziunii franceze, este principalul ei suporter. "Si este trezorierul fan club-ului tau, asa ca atentie, deoarce cu romanii trebuie sa fim atenti pe acest plan", a comentat Monfort. Ulterior, sesizand protestele colegilor sai, jurnalistul a adaugat: "Dar tu stii cat te iubesc, Roxana, spun asta in gluma". More... [url=http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-7688857-video-gluma-proasta-unui-jurnalist-sportiv-din-franta-romanii-trebuie-fii-atent-cand-vorba-administrarea-banilor.htm]VIDEO Gluma proasta a unui jurnalist sportiv din Franta: Cu romanii "trebuie sa fii atent" cand e vorba de administrarea banilor - International - HotNews.ro[/url]

[url]http://mariano-graziano.llab.it/docs/report.pdf[/url]

Google's Gmail service in China has been hijacked by hackers, who are redirecting users to a fake log-in page to steal e-mail credentials. According to a report by Fast CompanyGmail users in China have been complaining that when they access the website, they are automatically redirected to a fake Gmail page. This happens when they attempt to access their accounts from the Google Toolbar or visit 'www.gmail.com' directly. In a statement to Fast Company, a Google spokesperson said: “As always, users should be careful about where they share their personal information, and should avoid clicking through warnings about suspicious sites. We encourage Gmail users to visit https://mail.google.com directly.” Fast Company suggests there might be a more sinister purpose behind the Gmail phishing attack, indicating that it might be an attempt to create mistrust around Google services, so that Chinese Internet users abandon it. More.... [url=http://www.itproportal.com/portal/news/article/2010/8/13/gmail-hijacked-hackers-china/]Gmail Hijacked By Hackers In China - ITProPortal.com[/url]

What Happend to Yahoo August 2010 When I went to work for Yahoo after they bought our startup in 1998, it felt like the center of the world. It was supposed to be the next big thing. It was supposed to be what Google turned out to be. What went wrong? The problems that hosed Yahoo go back a long time, practically to the beginning of the company. They were already very visible when I got there in 1998. Yahoo had two problems Google didn't: easy money, and ambivalence about being a technology company. Money The first time I met Jerry Yang, we thought we were meeting for different reasons. He thought we were meeting so he could check us out in person before buying us. I thought we were meeting so we could show him our new technology, Revenue Loop. It was a way of sorting shopping search results. Merchants bid a percentage of sales for traffic, but the results were sorted not by the bid but by the bid times the average amount a user would buy. It was like the algorithm Google uses now to sort ads, but this was in the spring of 1998, before Google was founded. Revenue Loop was the optimal sort for shopping search, in the sense that it sorted in order of how much money Yahoo would make from each link. But it wasn't just optimal in that sense. Ranking search results by user behavior also makes search better. Users train the search: you can start out finding matches based on mere textual similarity, and as users buy more stuff the search results get better and better. Jerry didn't seem to care. I was confused. I was showing him technology that extracted the maximum value from search traffic, and he didn't care? I couldn't tell whether I was explaining it badly, or he was just very poker faced. I didn't realize the answer till later, after I went to work at Yahoo. It was neither of my guesses. The reason Yahoo didn't care about a technique that extracted the full value of traffic was that advertisers were already overpaying for it. If they merely extracted the actual value, they'd have made less. More..... [url=http://www.paulgraham.com/yahoo.html]What Happened to Yahoo[/url]