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Nu se mai pot sparge coonturi, ca toate ciocanele-s la popa pornohaci. Ia legatura cu el..... lovite-ar Cristos cu ciocanu-n cap, sa-ti pice tărîța din creer.

Daca nu esti in Babuinland vezi de gdax de la coinbase. Poloniex pentru margin trading.

Multumesc @adicode Am facut cu el cateva proiecte , lucreaza repede si foarte bine. Preturile sunt rezonabile . Baiat de nota 10 .

chaiOS bug: Text the link below, it will freeze the recipient's device, and possibly restart it. http://iabem97.github.io/chaiOS Do not use it for bad stuff. Presupun ca e de la treaba cu preview + faptul ca sunt o tona de caractere ciudate, posibil sa le contina pe toate posibile, n-am verificat. L-am testat de curiozitate si pe chatul de la facebook, nu-l trimite dupa ce "incarca" preview-ul. Am deschis pagina si pe un firefox pe Windows 7, l-a omorat mai mult sau mai putin atat in modul normal cat si in view source.

his site is dedicated to helping you start your own Internet Service Provider. Specifically, this guide is about building a Wireless ISP (WISP). This guide is focused on the very earliest stages of starting a WISP - determining feasibility up through connecting the first few customers. There are many challenges that will come up at 100, 1,000 or 10,000 customers that are not (yet) covered in this guide. For context, this site is the result of this discussion on Hacker News. Join the discussion! Chat with me (the author) and others interested in this kind of thing here: #startyourownisp:matrix.org. This site is a work in progress! Only some of the content is up so far and there’s still some bugs in the interface. Use the form on the bottom left to be notified of new updates. Getting Started# What is a WISP? And why might you want to build one? Also defines some terminology. Costs What does it cost to build a wireless Internet Service Provider? (Link to a Google Sheet that you can copy and customize.) About Me Who am I? Why am I doing this? Step by Step Guide# Step 1: Evaluate an Area: Make sure your area is a good candidate for a Wireless Internet network. Step 2: Find a Fiber Provider: Find a building where you can purchase a fiber connection and use the rooftop to start your wireless network. Step 3: Find Relay Sites: Extend your network wirelessly toward your customers. Step 4: Pick a Hardware Platform: Evaluate available options for wireless hardware. Step 5: Billing and Customer Management: Make sure you’re able to get paid and support your customers. Step 6: Network Topology: Design your network topology to make your network reliable and scalable. Routers, switches, IP addresses, VLANs, etc. Step 7: Build your Infrastructure: Install hardware for your fiber connection and your relay sites. Step 8: Install a Customer: Get your first customer online! Step 9: Marketing: Let people know about your service so they can experience a better Internet connection! Step 10: Maintenance: Keep your network running smoothly. Miscellaneous# Tools you’ll want to have A list of the tools you’ll need to install relays sites and customers. Aim a Backhaul A guide describing the proper techniques for aiming backhauls. Designed to be printed out and taken to the site for reference. Backhaul Picker If you just need to get a solid wireless connection from Point A to Point B then use this interactive guide to pick the right equipment and get it set up. Channel Planning Avoid self interference by carefully choosing channels for your access points and backhauls. MDUs (Multiple Dwelling Units) Best practices for providing service to apartment buildings, condos, attached townhomes, etc. Guide to Google Earth Some tips and tricks for using Google Earth to plan and build your network. Weather Proof your Network Rain, snow, ice and wind can all cause problems for a wireless network. Channel Planning Roof and Ladder Safety Stay safe out there! Sursa: https://startyourownisp.com/

Sa se cheme dupa cel mai tare hacker roman: Tinkoin

Web Development Limbaje WEB: PHP, Javascript Design: Bootstrap Template engine: Smarty Editare/Fixare/Optimizare: Wordpress Framework pentru scrapere: Simple HTML Dom Informatii -Accept proiecte de lunga durata cat si cele de scurta durata. -La orice proiect or sa se stabileasca toate detaliile la inceput cu clientul, nu se pot aduce new features pe durata proiectului.(Decat mici modificari) -Support-ul este FREE in totalitate. Prin support ma refer: instalare, fixare buguri, fixare MySQL, etc. -Preturile or sa fie stabilite in functie de timpul necesar proiectului si complexitatea sa. -Accept si job-uri unde primesc salariu lunar. -Accept si job-uri in care sunt platit pe ora. Portofoliu: -Ofer live preview la proiecte in privat sau prin TeamViewer(Nu am voie sa las link-ul companiilor dar pot arata poze.) Plata -BitCoin/Etherum -PayPal -Transfer Bancar -Paysafe Contact -ICQ: MOMENTANT NEDISPONIBIL -Telegram: @adicode -Skype: adicode32@outlook.com -Jabber: adicode@404.city **Nu lasa-ti mesaje gen "ti-am dat add", "cat m-ar costa?", "poti face asta?" in topic, va rog frumos. Astept orice intrebare in PM sau pe una din retelele de mai sus. Multumesc.

Name: TheBodyguard.jpg MD5: 1593E87EA6754E3960A43F6592CC2509 import string alfabet = string.ascii_lowercase alfabet2 = string.ascii_uppercase parola = "?" plain_text = "" for i in parola: if i in alfabet: plain_text += i def enc1(text): ret = "" for i in text: tmp = alfabet.find(i) if tmp != -1: ret += alfabet2[(tmp + 3) % 26] return ret def enc2(t1, t2): ret = "" for i in range(len(t1)): ret += str(ord(t1[i]) + ord(t2[i])) + "," return ret print "You need this:", enc2(parola, enc1(parola)) Output: You need this:201,203,165,195,165,191,205,187,181,191,173,187,173,187,193,199,

De obicei nu. Daca dai mai multe detalii iti pot spune mai multe. Btw, merge dat short la bitcoi pana ii se opreste caderea pe la $5-6k

Le folosesti tu si-ti merge bine? Din experienta personala nu i le recomand. Daca eu mi-am luat-o sus sa nu si-o ia si el.

De ce sa evite site-urile enumerate de tine?

Coinflux, Binance, Poloniex, Bittrex, Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Kraken, cex evita btcxchange, gatehub si changelly.

Salut, am venit pe acest site strict sa contactez un hecker, se poate?

https://github.com/ICSrepo/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN This repository contains original samples and decompiled sources of malware attacking commonly used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.

ia legatura cu Gucifer, te rezolva el

plm uite de ce a ajuns ăsta aici...

active workers reprezinta numarul de pc-uri de pe care minezi in cazul tau vezi ca daca iti arata ca minezi XMR (monero) tu defapt minezi 2 coinuri nu doar XMR; al doilea este fantomcoin. nu recomand oricum minergate. succes

il strici

BitConnect said it’s closing the company’s cryptocurrency exchange and lending operation after receiving two cease-and-desist letters from state authorities for the unauthorized sale of securities and suffering from denial-of-service attacks. The Texas State Securities Board and North Carolina Secretary of State Securities Division warned that the firm isn’t registered to sell securities in those states, the company said on its website Tuesday. BitConnect offered to let people receive interest on their digital coin balance by lending or investing their capital. BitConnect’s token, BCC, was among the world’s top-20 most successful tokens until its price plunged 65 percent since Jan. 3, as the states announced the actions. Launched a year ago, the coin still has a market cap of almost $1 billion. States are becoming more active, and joining federal authorities in going after businesses related to bitcoin and other digital currencies that they allege try to avoid proper registrations. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently halted an initial coin offering -- in which a startup issues shares to raise funds -- of Munchee Inc., after it was found to have offered unregistered securities. BitConnect.com will continue to operate a wallet and a news site, it said. Sursa: https://www.bloomberg.com/technology

I’ve been reviewing the source code of a number of blockchain thingies, both for paid audits and for fun on my spare time, and I routinely find real security issues. In this post I’ll describe a vulnerability noticed a while ago, and now that Lisk finally describes it and warns its users, I can comment on its impact and exploitability. TL;DR: you can hijack certain Lisk accounts and steal all their balance after only 264 evaluations of the address generation function (a combination of SHA-256, SHA-512, and a scalar multiplication over Ed25519’s curve). What is Lisk? In blockchain-speak, Lisk is yet another platform for building decentralized applications. To simplify, Lisk is a kind of Ethereum where contracts are written in JavaScript—instead of Solidity or Viper—and where the consensus protocol relies on proof-of-stake instead of proof-of-work. More precisely, Lisk uses a delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) protocol, wherein a limited number of nodes, chosen by user through a voting mechanism, will actually validate transactions. Having only a limited number (101) of validators speeds up transactions validation while keeping Lisk kinda decentralized. As I’m writing this, Lisk is ranked 19th on coinmarketcap, with a market cap of approximately 3.4 billions of dollars. First problem: short addresses Like in any cryptocoin platform, coin owners are identified by an address. In Lisk, addresses are 64-bit numbers, such as 3040783849904107057L. Whereas in Bitcoin, for example, an address is simply a hash of one’s public key, a Lisk address is derived deterministically from a passphrase, while generating the users’s keypair along the way. In more details, it works like this: Given a passphrase, compute a 256-bit seed as seed = SHA-256(passphrase). Derive an Ed25519 keypair from this seed, which involves computing SHA-512(seed) and a scalar multiplication. Compute the SHA-256 hash of the public key, and define the address as the last 8 bytes of the 32-byte hash. Now you guess part of the problem: you can find a preimage of any address in approximately 264 evaluations of the above series of operations. Second problem: no address–key binding Ideally, short addresses shouldn’t be a huge problem: if an address already exists and is bound to a key pair, you shouldn’t be able to hijack the account by finding another passphrase/keypair mapping to this address. And that’s the second problem: an address isn’t bound to a keypair until it has sent money to another address (or voted for a delegate). What this means is that if an account only receives money but never sends any, then it can be hijacked by finding a preimage—and once the attacker has found a preimage, they can lock the original user out of their account by issuing a transaction and binding the address to their new passphrase/keypair. I don’t know how many accounts are vulnerable, but it’s easy to find ones: just by browsing through the top accounts list, you can for example find a vulnerable that holds more than 1.6 million of Lisk units (or $48M)—look for an account with no associated public key. Exploitation and mitigation Running the 264 address computations isn’t instantaneous though; because it involves a key generation operation, these 264 operations are considerably slower than (say) 264 evaluations of a hash function like SHA-256. But completing the attack within a month will clearly cost you less than $48M. And of course in practice you’ll parallelize the attacks on N cores, and you’ll target one-of-M addresses, so the expected running time will only be around 263/NM operations. With only 64 targets and 256 cores, we’re talking of 249 iterations. As Lisk now recommends, “it’s important to broadcast the correct public key to the network for any given Lisk address. This can be done by simply sending at least one transaction from a Lisk account.” I don’t know whether this vulnerability has been exploited, but yet again this shows that blockchain systems security is a vastly unexplored area, with lot of unaudited architectures and source code, and new bug classes to be found and exploited. PoC||GTFO I’ve tested that the attack works, by first finding a collision (two passphrases/keypairs mapping to the same address), creating an account using the first passphrase, receiving money to this address, and then hijacking the account using the second passphrase. I also simulated a real preimage attack to estimate the cost of the attack on my machine (can’t find the numbers though, it was a while ago). If you’re interested in benchmarking this, the following code can be useful (combined with an optimized implementation of Ed25519’s arithmetic). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 #define N 16 // generates a pub key from a 32-byte seed int pubkeyFromSeed(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *seed) { unsigned char az[64]; sc25519 scsk; ge25519 gepk; sha512(az,seed,32); az[0] &= 248; az[31] &= 127; az[31] |= 64; sc25519_from32bytes(&scsk,az); ge25519_scalarmult_base(&gepk, &scsk); ge25519_pack(pk, &gepk); return 0; } // computes raw pub key from utf-8 secret static inline void pubkeyFromSecret(const char *secret, size_t secretlen, uint8_t *pk) { // first hash secret uint8_t seed[32]; SHA256((const unsigned char*)secret, secretlen, seed); pubkeyFromSeed(pk, seed); } // computes raw address from raw pubkey static inline void addressFromPubkey(const uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *address) { uint8_t hash[32]; SHA256(pk, 32, hash); for(int i=0; i<N/2; ++i) address = hash[7-i]; } string addrToStr(unsigned long long a) { stringstream ss; ss << hex << setw(16) << setfill('0') << a; return ss.str(); } // address is N/2-byte long unsigned long long addressToInt(uint8_t * address) { unsigned long long addressint = 0; for(int i=0; i<N/2; ++i) { addressint |= (uint64_t)address << (56 - (i*8)); } return addressint; } // tested to match /api/accounts/open unsigned long long addressFromSecret(unsigned long long in) { uint8_t pk[32]; uint8_t address[N/2]; string s = addrToStr(in); pubkeyFromSecret(&s[0u], N, pk); addressFromPubkey(pk, address); return addressToInt(address); } And there’s more: secret keys aren’t secret Ah, and there’s another security issue in Lisk: looking at the client API documentation, you’ll notice that clients need to send their passphrase (the secret value) to open an account or to send a transaction. In other word, Lisk is missing the whole point of public-key cryptography, which is to keep secret keys secret. Oh, and there’s even an endpoint (/api/accounts/open) that allows you to request your public key given your secret key. So much for trustlessness and decentralization. Sursa: https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2018/01/16/blockchains-how-to-steal-millions-in-264-operations/

@Silviu, ca tot esti implicat, cateva observatii rapide: - ganditi-va rapid la alt nume, acum cat e mai usor de schimbat, inainte sa va treziti cu un proces in brate de la webdollar.com - activi din 1997, mai ales pentru ca se ocupa cu tranzactii financiare (domeniu activitate similar). Chiar daca par dormanti /inactivi, nu sunt. (in plus, wbd/wdb [usor de confundat] in engleza sunt acronime pentru "water-bottle dick" / "well-deserved boner" ) - opriti treaba cu "mining-ul" automat, altfel riscati un puhoi de procese de la folosirea neautorizata (vezi cum este "consent" definit in GDPR din Mai 2018) a unui pc, pana la furt de curent, uzura/arsura procesor, brower crash = loss of data, s.a.m.d. Rezultatul lor poate varia de la ineficienta si timp pierdut pana la sume destul de costisitoare, mai ales daca se formeaza un class action rapid. - daca tot mergeti la media cu treaba asta macar asigurati-va de o anumita calitate a ceea ce expuneti, eventual platiti pentru expunere de calitate. Dupa cum vezi mai sus, articole de rahat scrise de tot felul de aiuriti nu aduc prea multa imagine pozitiva. Iar avand treburi gen "libertatea" si "evz" in subsol iarasi nu ajuta imaginii. Te asociezi cu ratati.. vrei-nu vrei, arati ca si ei. Revin cu edit dupa ce citesc whitepaper-ul.

Salutare, Aici avem singurul PoC real de meltdown, care functioneaza fara probleme (probat de mine). https://github.com/IAIK/meltdown This repository contains several videos demonstrating Meltdown Video #1 shows how Meltdown can be used to spy in realtime on a password input. Video #2 shows how Meltdown leaks physical memory content. Video #3 shows how Meltdown reconstructs a photo from memory. Video #4 shows how Meltdown reconstructs a photo from memory which is encoded with the FLIF file format. Video #5 shows how Meltdown leaks uncached memory. Am incercat sa scot parola de la un login de chrome (parola nefiind salvada, decat introdusa pentru login) merge ca si uns. Hai, la joaca!

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Cumpar BTC !!! update// a incercat cineva bancomatul bitcoinromania de la piata unirii ? aveti idee daca se poate cumpara de acolo si sume mai mari gen 5k euro ?